CAMBODIAN DECISION; WHY PRESIDENT ACTED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000200240010-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 30, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

.NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 206-010 :k?RDP72.-00337R000200240010-0
WASHINGTON, June 29- Or third, to let American
Cam ho liar ecisl on ? , forces join the South Vietna-
President Nixon's venture in= ? mere in a swift full-scale as-
to Cambodia is ending with
Y 4 Ii j President A. c to d1 sault on the bases.
0 proclamations of unprece- Using the American forces
Wdented military gain, but it General Abrams did not far-
was launched for the broader, molly recommend any course.
purpose of rescuing Cam- Washington was still looking
By HEDRICK SMITH for diplomatic ways to contain
bodia from sudden Com- Special to The New YoTt Times the Cambodian situation. Per-
'munist domination and that cessation of United States raids calls, an out-of-channel' mes- haps Hanoi, with its forces
purpose is still unrealized. on the North-with the pur- sage to the field and other now less secure in Cambodla
A reconstruction shows' pose, officials now acknowl- activities that bypassed plan-
that the survival of an anti- edge, of warning Hanoi against ners at the State and Defense ]would show Interest in negotia-I
i tioa - if not on Vietnam alone
Comifiunist Government' in: counterattackinacross the de- Departments.
militarized zone into South The White House became so then in the context of an inter.
Vietnam. came to be seen Vietnam. The four attacks al?- worried about security leaks national conference on all In-
by Mr. Nixon as essential for; p'eared to be a violation of the that even members of the Joint dochina, which France pro-
11 the defense of Vietnam and private understandings with Chiefs of Staff were late to posed on A
the American stake in Indo- Hanoi prohibiting bombing of learn of some critical discus- poss April ril 1.
Nol tried to
china: As pieced together by the North. signs. State Department law- eno ,work oat Lon and-lettri e a to
correspondents of The New Like Predecessors, Uneasy yers were not told to prepare the legal case for invasion until rangements with the North
York Times in Washington, Formally, the Cambodian four days after it began. Vietnamese, first in direct talks
'Saigon and Pnompenh, Mr. 'operations began with a Pres- The gestation process , for and then through Chinese. and
' Nixon's handling of his most 'identlal announcement on April Mr. Nixon's decision was. other Communist Intermediar-
serious crisis also involved 30. But for Mr. Nixon, the be- much longer than Administra ies. He asked North Vietnam to reduce its military presence
the following main factors: ginning was well before that. tionaccounts suggested. It be- l
Like President Kennedy in gan almost immediately after; in Cambodia and its reliance'
(]The President, believing the Cuban crisis and President General Lon. Nol and others ,on shipments through Siha-j
that Communist nations had Johnson in Vietnam, he, felt deposed Prince Norodom Siha-, ' 'noukville. Hanoi refused.
long been trifling with him Communist forces crowding and nouk on March 18. Washington made no direct
in Indochina, Korea and the testing him. He had contained Twilight Zone of War approach to Hanoi, but passed
the frustration of not retaliating word to Asian intermediaries
Middle East, saw Cambodia when the North Vietnamese For years, Cambodia was 'a that it would respect any deal
as the first feasible oppor- shelled Saigon early in his term, twilight zone of the Vietnam' General Lon Nol made, It got
tunity to demonstrate that he' when North Korea shot down war. Prince Sihanouk, bno diplomatic reply.
could meet force with force. an American intelligence plane, ing between the belligerents,One Diplomat Unsure
(]Mr. Nixon was haunted; when the Paris peace talks had let the North Vietnamese
by intelligence reports that, bogged down. Now the Soviet'create a dozen base areas to One diplomat said the Amer-
enemy commanders were~ Union was moving combat pi- shelter 40,000 to 60,000 troops !can approach was so feeble
pirem lots into the United Arab Re- for use against South Vietnam. and casual that he was not
0 moving against Cambodia, public and Communist forces American generals had sure the intermediaries under-
confident that American. -were threatening another na-.periodically pressed the John- stood that the messages were
hands were tied by war- Lion in Indochina. son Administration for permis- meant for Hanoi. American of-
Of all these situations, Mr. sion to attack these sanctuaries, ficials, moreover, were sure
-weariness at home. I
(]Before attacking, , the Nixon felt, Cambodia offered but President Johnson had re- that Hanoi suspected the Unit-
military first , opening reaction for that effective fused. The Nixon Administra- ed States of having ousted
would tion grudgingly tolerated the Prince Sihanouk and could not,
Nixon Administration tried
Hanoi d to the
signal circuitously to carry his darer olitical mes- situation. Its plans for a gradual therefore, credit Washington
that it would accept an ac- sage. As the President con- troop withdrawal from Vietnam with good faith.
commodation -- -which the ' Tided to a senior adviser: This assumed that the enemy bases South Vietnamese forces,
Cambodian Government was is a risk, but this is the kind of In Cambodia would remain in- meanwhile, were staging spo-
thing I have been waiting for. tact. radic raids across the Cambo-
Mr. seeking provided that Cam- Within the last year, how- dian border, against the ad-
.bodla's principal port re- b Nixont objontista in
Cambodia centered on staving ever, even Prince Sihanouk be- vice of American officials in
,mained closed to Communist off Communist domination. Sur- an to worry about the ex- Saigon. The United States in-
.supply shipments. The over- vival of Premier Lon Nol's panding enemy activity on his creased bombing raids against
`tures collapsed over the port Government, for a time, at toil. He allowed Ameri- enemy concentrations in Cam-
least, appeared essential. It's son B 52's to bomb the base bodia, but General Abrams's
issue. survival was needed to assure areas. For a time, he curtailed contingency plans, now sent by
(]Once he felt himself mill- the defense of South Vietnam f'he enemy supply shipments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
.tarily challenged by the and the process of American dlhe bases through the port, White House, were in limbo.
enemy in Cambodia, Mr. . withdrawal, to spare Saigon then Sihanoukvdlie, now Kom- Secretary Laird, talking with
`Nixon pushed the pace of de-. the blow of seeing a neighbor p'ong Som. President Nixon in the second
cision-making here-so much collapse while the United States Prince Sihanouk's ouster, de- week of April, opposed an Am-,
that one senior adviser cau- did nothing and to deny Hanoi scribed as a surprise in Wash- erican assault because he?
a gain that would tempt -it, in ington, posed an opportunity, feared heavy casualties -- as
tinned him that the generals the words of one senior ad- All foreign-policy agencies high as 400 to 800 dead in th%
in Saigon might be giving viser, to "go for all the quickly drafted proposals for first week alone - and a pub-
'the President, only the ad- marbles" in Indgch'ina and for- dealing with the new situation. lie outcry.
vice they thought he wanted ever spurn negotiation. In this process, Secretary of In mid-April the combat sit-
Defense Melvin R. Laird dn- uation changed. Starting April
to hear. Lift for the Premier vited the generals in Saigon to 13, enemy forces were detect-
49Repeated and forceful op- An American attack from the submit contingency plans. ed moving westward into Cam-
:position to the use of Ameri- rear, Mr. Nixon thought, would Abrams's Options bodia from the border areas,
can troops in Cambodia fromidivert and disrupt the enemy 1, Gen. Creighton W. cutting roads, blowing up
Secretary of State William P.I,forces threatening General Lon By April bridges,, harassing military
Rogers, stressing the risks of Nol and also give the Cam- Abrams, the United States com- posts and towns. The White
bodian Premier ,a badly needed minder in Vietnam had offered House interpreted the reports
reliable on
domestic discontent, caused political lift. But it required no the Pentagon several options: "leniently" - interpreted
Mr. Nixon to delay the opeta- open commitment. First, to let South Vietnamese the location of enemy actions,
tion 24 hours. Despite his preference for troops harrass the enemy across but not on their size, serious-
Once decided, Mr. Nixon also orderly procedure, border.
o.xon like his rp President Second, to help the south Hess or intent.
ordered four. heavvy~ bombin on like his predecessors, In Saigon, however, General'
raids against Nort?PP &4i~f , r re)R@ea$eis20O2104 F- 624% particularly struck
respite? the. year-and-a-half-old grOu meetings, -late phone. bases,. by the ; nnmg out of enemy
inrePC in the Fishhook, a Cam-
 bodian salient that juts into
South Vietnam 75 miapG
,west of Saigon, which ' was con-i
'sidered the most important en-
emy refuge area.
General Abrams and Ells-
worth Bunker, the American
Ambassador, met privately for
several nights and about April
15, sent parallel recommenda-
tions to the Departments of
State and Defense. They urged
an American attack into the
Fishhook and joint attacks
with the South Vietnamese
against other bases.
Arguments Summarized
High military sources
summed up General Abrams's
arguments as follows:
One of the two American
divisions standing guard
against attacks from the en-
He let Saigon's forces increase On that day, too--although
!"P.N.M M~Iqq "- ~
IThe purpose, one high official spokesman in Peking indicated
said later, was "to put pressure that Prince Sihanouk was join-
on the enemy forces so they ino a new united military front
wouldn't turn toward Pnom- for the "liberation" of all Indo-
penh." china; the Russians backed off
American advisers were told their interest in a Geneva con-
to help plan the enlarged raids, ference, and the Lon Nol re-'
but not get, into combat inside gime submitted a request for
Cambodia. more than $500-million In mili-
By April 17, the President to aid. -
had slso & approved a secret Mr. Nixon was restless that
shipment of 6,000 captured AK- night-"wound up," his wife
47 rifles of Soviet design to said-and after his speech,
the Cambodian Army. The Un- abruptly flew back to Washing-
ited States first tried to use ton. One aide said afterward
Indonesia as a, cover for " this that the President might have
aid, but for reasons of diplo- sensed "something was up."
macy, shifted to South Vietnam. Confirmed b Intelli once
Plans were also made to as. Y g
semble a force of 2,000 Khmer By morning, intelligence rea
Krom troops to stiffen the ports had built up a picture of
Cambodian 'army. These mer- steady deterioration in Cam
cenaries fighting in South Viet- bodia, but the problem hit Mr.
nam for the American Special Nixon with sudden force. '
Forces were later flown secret- From that day on, Mr. Nix-
ly to Pnompenh. on got daily briefings from
Richard Helms, Director of
President Distracted Central intelligence. Details
president Nixon evidently were sketchy,
but the Commu-
hoped that these measures would win time. He was, in any nists were attacking Saang, Ta-
case, distracted by the battle keo and Angtassom, south 0*1
emy' bases in Cambodia was' going home soon under Presi- dent Nixon's withdrawal pro- gram, shifting a major burdento Saigon's forces. With the rainy season approaching and the Lon Nol Government un- likely to survive until fall, thetime was right. An attack would help the South Vietnam-ese and assure further Amer- ican withdrawals. With- a third
of the enemy forces moved
I west, the risks of American'
casualties were reduced. -
The general's argument en-
visioning benefits for the Viet-
namization program, impressed
Secretary Laird.; The promise
of lower casualties convinced
him, and he endorsed the pro-
posal.
But at the White House, the
military possibilities were still
offset by the fear of pushing
the war deeper into Cambodia
and the fear of' spoiling the
chances for negotiation.
The prospects for diplomacy
had unexpectedly improved
when the Soviet Union said that
it, too, was interested in an In-
dochina conference. "Only a
new Geneva conference could
'bring a new solution. and re-
,lax tension," Yakov A. Malik,
the Soviet representative at
the United Nations, said on
April 16. The Americans got
private indications that this as
a deliberate Initiative and as-
sumed that the Russians had
cleared it with Hanoi.
Pressures Still Rise
over his Supreme Court nomi- Pnompenh and Snoul and ivle-
nees, the Apollo 13 astronauts mot, to the north.
and the need to announce an. The State Department sur-
other troop withdrawal, mised that the enemy was us-
General Abrams was pleading ing -hit-and-run maneuvers to
for a 60-day delay in with- create an impression of. civil
.drawals. Secretary Laird want- Iwar. The Pentagon view, more
ed a cutback of 50,000 by Aug. (persuasive to the Wbite House,
15. With the issue unresolved, (was that the North Vietnamese
Mr. Nixon went to greet the had decided to overthrow Lon
returning astronauts in - Hono-
Julu.
' He finally hit . on a com-
promise, surprising even some
senior advisers: to delay with-
drawals for 60 days but to hide
that fact in an announcement
Helms; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler,
er, his successor, and Marshall!
Greene, Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian Affairs.
The group met twice on April
23, again on April 24. In Sai-
gon, the South Vietnamese gen-
erals were hesitant about a
major strike without the Amer-
icans. General Abrams and Am-
bassador Bunker met with Pres-
ident Nguyen Van Thieu, after
which Saigon finally "geared for
action while General Abrams
pressed Washington to use Am-
erican advisers in the Parrot's
Beak operation.
Nixon Is Iitate
M. Nixon was now pushing,
the process of making deci-
sions, irritated that the enemy
appeared complacent. Ameri-
can intelligence confirmed;
anew that the enemy command
was telling its troops to push
west without fear of an Ameri-
can attack from the rear. The
White House denounced" the
the enemy moves as a "for-
eign "invasion. "
On Friday morning, April 24,
the President called for opera-
tional plans for the Fishhok
operation to be delivered from
Saigon within 24 hours. He
.-'ailed a secret meeting of the
ational Security Council for
Sunday," pointing toward a final
decision Sunday night. This
would give the generals the 72
hours they said they needed to
attack on April 29, which'
Nol by isolating his capital, or; 'would be dawn, April 30, Sai-I
taking it. ? gon time.
Mr. Nixon summoned thej l The President flew to Camp
National Security Council to> 'David, Md., Friday afternoon.
meet on April 22, the group's' Kissinger brought ht the first consideration of the con-; mr. g plans
tingency plans. The talk cen-, on Saturday and the two men
tered largely on a proposed studied them. In Wasington
000 men by May, 1971, nor.!, South Vietnamese offensive;;; that evening, they conferred
'
Nixon flew back to San Cle-
mente, Calif., to make the an-
nouncement April 20-a long
and, as it turned out, fateful
day in his perception of the
situation in Indochina.
The speech emphasized his
terms for a political settlement
in, more flexible terms than
into the Parrot
s Beak,. an en-"-with Secretary Laird and At
emy position jutting into Viet- General John N.
nam 35 miles from Saigon. torney
There was some discussion of Mitchell aboard the Govern-
an American attack into the 1 ment yacht Sequoia on the
Fishhook. Potomac. They then attended a
Crisis Schedule Enforced 'private sowing of "Patton,"
the film biography of the de-
The next morning the Presi- fiant general, which Mr. Nixon
dent seemed "bent on some.kind was eager to see for a second
tune. .
Two Members Absent
He Reiterates Warnings tional plans for the Parrot's)
He did point with concern 'Beak, forcing a crisis schedule
to "the enemy's escalation in upon the Washington Special,
Laos and Cambodia" and re- Action Group - a body head,
peated warnings that if "in- ed by Henry A. Kissinger, his
creased enemy action jeopar- special assistants for isecurity
dizes our remaining forces in. affairs.
Vietnam, I-shall not hesitate to Thn group, which is called
take strong and effective mea- WASAG, was created in April,
sures to deal with that situ- 1969, when North Korea shot
ation." down an American intelligence
There was no real hint of the plane. it played a central role
internal discussions about Cam- in the Cambodian venture from
late March onward by assenil-,
boofficials insist that Mr. tiling and` refining all contin-
Nixon's optimism did not dis- gency,;plans, assessing their
guise any secret calculations.' consequence, and managing the
Press dispatches had already execution of Presidential orders
At the, peak of crisis, the
district reported the fall of Siang, a group's members were Mr. Kis-
Pnon hcapital
u omiles fro confi m; singer; David Packard, Deputy
nompe did but official fr Secretary of Defense; U. Alex-
mation did not reach the travel . Johnson Under Secretary of
Aaa'~~1b~1' t~~2e1i~~Df1GU
Still, the pressures in Cam-
bodia were building up. Pre-
mier Lon Nol pleaded with
greater urgency each day. Mr.
Nixon did not want another
state In Southeast Asia, de-
pendent on the United States,
but neither did he want to
stand idly by. High officials
felt the whole rationale for de-
fending South Vietnam would
collapse if they acquiesced in
a Communist take-over of Laos
and Cambodia. Also, the Presi-
dent feared Prince Sihanouk,
with Hanoi's aid, might be re-
turned to power.
So Mr. Nixon set out to help
Premier Lon Nol cIeAM d
Secretary of State Rogers re-
turned from New York on Sun-
day morning and, with Secre-
tary Laird, heard a Pentagon
briefing on the Fishhok plans.
Thus all participants in the
afternoon meeting of the Sec-,
Iurity Council were prepared for,
the main topic of debate.
The two Secretaries joined
,the President, the Attorney
General, General Wheeler, Mr.
Helms and Mr. Kissinger at
,the Executive Office Building
'next to the White House. Two
statutory members of the Coun-
cil, Vice President. Agnew and
George A. Lincoln, director of
the Office of Emergency Pre-
paredness, were not present.
Mr. Nixon said that he had
49ti -bto do something." The
 Parrot's Beak o tAi6rl :roved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200240010-0
Pera nal entry saying that inaction through eight lop hand drafts hind after June 30 and fried to'
tentative approval, with Amer- by both sides would leave an g
ican air support but not Amer- "ambiguous situation" with on Tuesday and :Wednesday arrange Thal support as well,
ican ground advisers. The Fish- time favoring the Communists, night, staying up toll 5 A.M. American planes now fly taa-
hook was the problem at hand. I Unlike, President Kennedy and tical air support for the Cam-
The Pentagon represent- Liabilities Listed Johnson, he never submitted it bodians under the guise of raids
atives argued that a full as- The President then listed the for editing by his main cabinet against enemy supply lines:
sault, with American troops; pros and cons for American advisers. All of Mr. Nixon's'Ai.icrican. ships blockade Cam-
'
was essential. Military analysis action in the Fishhook and for senior aides still wince at some
ther to topple the Lon Nol re- alone in the Parrot's Beak. He Some of Mr. Nixon's senior,
gime or to clear a supply cor- recognized that the Fishhook aides, were troubled by the
ridor to the sea in eastern Cam- move would bring a "deep di- President's apocalyptic vision
bodia. Either prospect jeopar- `,vision" of the American people. of the stakes. Others found
dized the defense of South .'He feared that it might pro- 'some military points over-
Vietnam and American with- voke a collapse of the Paris 'dramatized.
drawal. The Parrot's Beak I talks, an attack on Pnompenh I . The President's assertion that
alone would serve only as a or a major North Vietnamese
the enemy was massing in the
warning. Using the South Viet- attack across the DMZ.
sanctuaries to attack South
namese in the Fishhook would Mr. Nixon seemed deter- Vietnam contradicted Secretary
require a major reshuffle of. mined to attack, but the oppos- t of the American
armies, and might prove too ing arguments of Secretary Laird 's s support the enemy's
difficult for them. With the Rogers evidently led him to assault
ment..;ththe other way. It
heavy rains due in a month, break his own deadline. He mov .'
in'
and Lon Nol unlikely to sur called another meeting for also. contnet forces
vive until fail, it was now or, Monday morning, April 27, with telligsensed ence that d the the
what elatest was never. Mr. Rogers, Mr. Laird, Mr. Kis- coming
Secretary Rogers carried the singer and H. R. Haldeman, his and were dispersing faster than
principal burden of opposition.; chief of staff, but without the before with some of their arms
The use of American troops in' military or intelligence chiefs. caches.
Cambodia meant widening the Someone-apparently still The generals ,felt uneasy that,
war. The risk was grave of Mr. Rogers-suggested that the Mr. Nixon, to give importance
becoming entrapped, as the military might be telling the to his move, led the American
Johnson Administration had President only what it thought public to expect the capture of
been. The President won wide he wanted to hear. The sugges- top enemy commanders by an-
Popular haunted Mr. Nixon. Out of pouncing an attack on "the.
support for gradual that meeting came his personal, headquarters for the entire
withdrawal and should not risk out-of-channels message to Communist military operation
losing it. The allies' military General Abrams demanding in South Vietnam." They knew
objectives could be achieved "the unvarnished truth," man- ithe enemy command unit-the
by South Vietnamese forces to-man. (Central Office for South. Viet-
alone. . That afternoon, Mr. Rogers nom, called COSVN-was al-
They Meet for 3 Hours
The debate lasted three
hours, ranging over other en-
emy base areas. Mr. Nixon
came away thinking he had a
choice of doing nothing or-in-
volving American troops. An
attack In the Parrot's Beak
alone seemed unlikely to bring
much military advantage. To
use only South Vietnamese
ground forces would be a pre-
tense, for American air and lo-
gistical support was deemed es-
sential. It was a line of think-
ing Mr. Kissinger appears to
have shared. Besides, the Pres-
ident was determined to prove
that he could meet force with
force.
Mr. Nixon withdrew to his
hideaway office and ordered a
tray of dinner. On a pad of
yellow legal paper he summar-
ized the pros and cons. As dis-
closed by Stewart Alsop in
Newsweek and later confirmed
officially, the President's dood-
ling showed how intimately the
survival of the Lon Nol regime
had become linked in his mind
with American success in Viet-
nam.
In reviewing whether there
should be some action in Cam-
bodia, Mr. Nixon listed only
arguments In favor: "Time run-
ning out" was followed by "mil-
itary aid" to Lon Nol could be
"only symbolic." Then came a
scribble saying inaction might
testified at a closed session of ways on the move and doubted
the Senate Foreign Relationq they would catch its 200 men
Committee and ran into a storm in Fishhook. Their troops were
of opposition to possible Amer- ordered to "neutralize -the
ican involvement in Cambodia. COSVN base area"-'mearjing
Without directly disclosing the arms caches, supply dumps and
contemplated use . of United other facilities. .
States troops, he tried to hint Cable Office Closed
decision. Mr. Rogers recounted
the Senators' objections in a
long telephone report to the
President: that evening.
Wrote His TV Speech.
From Saigon, General Abrams
replied that an American as-
sault was necessary. With that
message and new memos from
other advisers; and after one
more call to Mr. Laird, Mr.
Nixon withdrew to make his
decision. The .next morning he
conveyed it, first to Mr. Kis-
singer and then to Mr. Rogers;
whose, advice, always impor-
known In this case.
Having decided to attack in
the Fishhook, the President said
that he was also sending Amer-
ican ground advisers Into the
of enemy base areas. As the
operation unfolded, he also ap-
proved the. four raids on North
Vietnam.
Ignoring some advice that he
treat the event in a low key
Notice of the President's
speech reached Premier Lon
.Nol only after _it was over,: be-
cause the Pnompenh cable of-
fice was closed. Although he.
had agreed in mid-April to
deeper raids by the South Viet-
namese and more recently to
the Parrot's Beak operation, his
consent was not sought for the.
Fishhook. The White House be
lieved.if he said "no," it was'
in trouble; if he said "yes," he-
might be.
In the days following Mr.
Nixon's speech, what the Con-
gress and the public took to
took
limitations of time'. and
scope on the invasion were only
firm definitions of the AClmin-
istration's private intentions:
six to eight weeks and a.limit
to penetrations of about - 20
miles. Some field commanders
even found the time lie it a
welcome surprise; they had ex-
pected two to four weeks.
But other rules of engage-
ment had to be adjusted to
the enemy's spreading attacks
throughout Cambodia. To help
bodia
s coastline. And new mili-
tary and economic aid J., being,
prepared. Thus, the opf~c~-ation,
now formally ended is, in fact,
far from over.
This article was written In col-
laboration with Max Frankel
and incorporates reports by
William Beecher, Henry Giniger,
Henry Kamm, Sydney H. Shan.
berg, Robert B. Semple Jr,,
Neil Sheehan, Terence Smith,
James P. Sterba and Tad Szulc,
tempt Hanoi to install a puppet the President prepared his owri' Administration agreed to leave.
regime In Pnompenh cue iP 1 4405200=4g ? @FI bRMPt7'2 MIV0Dd!00240010-0
 NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 28020211`x-RDP72-00337R000200240010-0
Ouster of Sihanouk Depicted as Almost an Accident
By NEIL SHEEHAN
Apecial W The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 29 -
The overthrow o Prince oro-
dom Sihanouk of Gambodia,\the
event that thrust ano per an
country into the Indochina war,
appears to have been almost
an accident for everyone con-
cerned.
The full account of how and
why Prince Sihanouk fell as
Chief of State is still unknown.
However, the United States
Government and diplomatic
sources here have pieced the
fragments together. and have
produced an account of a Carn-
bodian elite that wandered into
a coup d'etat and of competing
outside powers maneuvering
toward a climax that none ex-
pected.
Apparently Premier Lon Nol
and his colleagues did not de-
cide to oust the Prince until
one or two days before they
,,formally announced his over-
throw on March 18.
While there is a suspicion
that some South Vietnamese
leaders encouraged the coup,
;there is no evidence that they
'knew it was coming. Both the
United States and North Viet-
nam, the two other foreign
countries most vitally affected,
were apparently surprised and
unprepared.
The Soviet Uriion Is said to
have offered to fly the Prince
back to Pnompenh on the day
of the coup in the hope that
his presence would reverse
events. When he declined, Mos-
cow set about quietly to try to
do business with his anti-Com-
munist successors.
Peking Backs Sihanouk
Communist China is thought
t' have tried to persuade
Camera Press-Pix
Prince Norodom Sihanouk
permitted the Vietnamese Com-
munists to construct a complex
of bases along the Cambodian
border with South Vietnam and
to open a sea supply route
through the port of Sihanouk-
ville, now Kompong Som.
By 1968, these, Vietnamese
guests were behaving in a fash-
ion the Cambodians had- not
bargained for. They reorganized
and armed the dissident Cam-
bodian Communist movement,
the Khmer Rouge, and began
using the bases as staging
points for' assaults on Ameri-
can and South Vietnamese out-
posts just across the border.
The Cambodian casualties
caused by retaliatory allied
bombing and shelling and the
incitement,of the Khmer Rouge
so disturbed the Prince and his
army that he shut off the Siha-
noukville supply route in the
spring of 1969.
Last August, economic trou-
In September, Prince Siha-
nouk went to Hanoi for the
funeral of President Ho Chi
Minh and extracted a promise
of better behavior from the
North Vietnamese.
But the North Vietnamese did
not change their ways. The
Cambodian Army engaged them
as well as Khmer Rouge bands
in scattered clashes. Shortly
before he arrived in France in
January for a lengthy visit, the
Prince warned that he might
have to break off relations with
Hanoi and with the provisional
revoultionary government . of
the Vietcong guerrillas.
Sihanoukvllle Cut Off
Premier Lon Nol once more
cut off Sihanoukville to the
Vietnamese at the beginning of
this year, apparently with the
Prince's acquiescence. In Febru-
ary, the provincial governors
met with the central Govern-
ment in Pnompenh and deliv-
ered a detailed and alarming
account of the extent of Viet-
namese penetration throughout
the country.
Trying to.compel Hanoi to re-
strict its activities, the Lon Nol
Cabinet arranged anti-Viet-
namese demonstrations early-in
March. The Cambodian authori-
ties appear to have lost control
over the demonstration in
Pnompenh on March 11 and a
mob sacked the North Viet-
namese and Vietcong Embas-
sies.
Premier Lon Nol and his col-
leagues are said to have expect-
ed the Prince to criticize this
violence but to back their
underlying aims. Instead, in
statements from Paris, he
shocked them by denouncing
General Lon Nol for alleged pro-
American sympathies.
The Prince did not appear to
associates to be really expecting
a coup. He did, however, make
clear that he would dismiss;
Premier Lon Nol on his return.
Premier Lon Nol began nego-
tiations with the North Viet-
namese on March 13, two days
after the sacikng of the embas-
sies. He opened with a public
demand that he apparently re-1
garded as little more than a
high bid to start the bargaining
-the withdrawal of all of the
estimated 60,000 Vietnamese
troops from Cambodia within
72 hours. Privately, he indicated.
a readiness to settle for much,
less.
The Vietnamese refused to
have their activities thus cur-,
tailed. They appeared to be
stalling on the assumption that!
Prince Sihanouk's return wouldl
restore the old arrangements.
The North Vietnamese repre-
sentatives reiterated a hard line
in a three-hour confrontation
with the Cambodians on March
16,. demanding reparations and
an apology.
It was after this meeting, or
the next day, that Premier Lon
Nol and his colleagues are said
to have decided to depose
Prince Sihanouk.
Although there has been
speculation that individual
United States intelligence agents
in Pnompenh may have encour-
aged the coup, there is no
evidence here of a United States
Government involvement.
Several days after the March
18 announcement of the Prince's
ouster, high officials in Wash-
ington were still conjecturing
that he had arranged the whole
thing as an elaborate sham, an-
other of the maneuvers that the
Prince had pursued through 15
years of rule to preserve a
precarious neutrality for his
country. When they finally
recognized his fall, they saw
too that thq United States as
well as Cambodia faced an
entirely new situatlQn.
e!ortb Vietnam to come to
terms with the new Cambodian
regime. When it failed, it
wound up supporting Prince
Sihanouk's government in exile.
Here is the account as it
Is being recounted by informed
sources here:
The Vietnamese are the Cam-
bodians' traditional enemies.
Prince Sihanouk decided late
In 1963, however, that it would
be useful to gain some credit
with Hanoi, whose side he be-
aeved would win the Vietnam
rear. Over several years he
bles resulting from the Prince's
nationalization policies and un-
rest over North Vietnamese en-
croachment forced him to form
another government. He named
a Cabinet led by an old asso-
ciate, Lieut. Gen. Lon Nol. It
had a basically rightist com-
plexion and was designed to
liberalize and stimulate the
economy.
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200240010-0