Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 8, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 6, 1970
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8.pdf1.94 MB
:J 25X1A `~`T PARTNtEf~T OfST 'f `TEtEGRA1Vr"""`" INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 EA- 10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 10-13 UPW-01 RSR-01 /126 W ACTION NEA-15 R 0607352 JUN 70 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1200 INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK AMCONSUL BOMBAY AMCONSUL CALCUTTA AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR AMEMBASSY LONDON AMCONSUL MADRAS AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH AMEMBASSY SAIGON AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE RUESRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 124 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NEW DELHI 6614 SUBJECT: ICC LAOS 1. TIME OF INDIA JUNE 6 FEATURED REPORT ON "INDIAN BID REVIVE ICC VIENTIANE TO SAVE LAOS." IN ESSENCE, INDIA SAID MAKING UNSPECIFIED FRESH EFFORTS ACTIVATE ICC TO INHIBIT CAMBODIAN COMBAT SPILLOVER IN LAOS. 2. "WHETHER EFFORTS WILL YIELD RESULTS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL SINCE COMMISSION CANNOT INTERVENE EFFECTIVELY UNLESS MEMBERS CANADA AND POLAND PERSUADED AGREE UPON COMMON APPROACH. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 Approved For Reler~01~/R: q~4-~?Hf~-03~3~W&0020015-8 MFG. 9/69 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PAGE 02 NEW D E 06614 061007Z EM ZMAJORITY DECISION OBVIOUSLY HAS NOT MORAL IMPACT UNANIMOUS VERD ICTS. 4. "IF COMMISSION DEADLOCK CANNOT BE BROKEN, INDIA WILLING TAKE UP WITH BRITAIN AND USSR, IN HOPE THEY CAN BE PERSUADED USE IN- FLUENCE TO RESTORE ICC ROLE UNDER GENEVA AGREEMENTS, 5. "BEST WOULD BE IF COMMISSION AGREED TAKE COGNIZANCE OF TROOP MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LAOS IN CONTEXT CAMBODIAN FIGHTING. PRESENCE OF U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE GROUND FORCES IS ADMITTED BY THE TWO COUNTRIES, BUT THOSE OF OTHERS IS NOT. 6. "NORTH VIETNAMESE ACCORDING RLG ARE INVESTING STRATEGIC SARAVANE. THERE ALSO REPORTS OF ENCROACHMENTS INTO LAOS BY THAI TROOPS, WHILE FORCES OF PATHET LAO AND RLG HAVE BEEN DISREGARDING CEASE-FIRE LINES JOCKEYING FOR POSITIONS. 7. "THIS BUILDING INTO EXPLOSIVE SITUATION WHILE ICC IMMOBILIZED BY DIFFERENCES, STANDS BY IDLY. S. "INDIAN ICC CHAIRMAN RECEIVED REQUEST FROM LAOTIAN GOVERN- MENT MAY 9 TO NOTE THREAT TO SARAVANE WHICH LAOTIAN ARMY DID NOT HAVE MEANS TO REPULSE. ICC ACKNOWLEDGED REQUEST MAY 26?WITHOUT INDICATING ACTION. 9.. SUCH INACTION DESTROYING LITTLE CREDIBILITY ICC STILL HAS. IMMOBILITY ALSO DAMAGING TO INDIA'S POSITION AS NEUTRAL AND IMPARTIAL OBSERVER. HENCE NEW DELHI ANXIETY THAT COMMISSION RESUME FUNCTIONS IT REQUIRED PERFORM UNDER GENEVA CHARTERS, 10. "RLG SAYS HANOI TRYING TURN AREA AROUND SARAVANE INTO SANCTUARY TO REPLACE LOSS OF CAMBODIAN. IT IS ALSO ALLEGED HANOI TROOP MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LAOS MEANT CREATE NEW HO CHI MINH TRAIL- It. "THESE CHARGES HAVE PLAUSIBLE RING BECAUSE COMPULSIONS OF GEOGRAPHY IN INDO-CHINA STATES CANNOT ALLOW LAOS REMAIN UNAFFECTED BY BITTER FIGHTING VIET-NAM AND NEW CONFLICT CAMBODIA. 12, "BUT IDLE FOR RLG PROTEST ITS NEUTRALITY; TESTIMONY RECORDED BY U. S. SENATE'S FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES Approved For Release Miii OQ U1A- 72L S37R000300020015-8 n .Approved For Releas 2;Qp / 300020015-8 MFG. 9/69 - .. Ut~HK Ill tIV 151 K 1 tla"n7nvi V CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY PER # TOTAL COPIES: REPRO BY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PAGE 03 NEW DE 06614 061007Z RLG?S CONCURRENCE IN U. S. STRIKES AGAINST PATHET LAO-HELD AREAS AS WELL AS INTO NORTH VIET-NAM. 13. "IN TANGLED SITUATION ICC9 CREATED SUPERVISE CEASE-FIRE WHICH NO LONGER EXISTS, FINDS ITSELF COMPLETELY BYPASSED BY EVENTS. AS NEW DELHI SEES IT t INDIA CANNOT DISOWN RESPONSIBILITIES AS LONG AS COMMISSION CONTINUES TO EXIST." COMMENT: MINISTRY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS JOINT SECRETARY GONSALVES TOLD POLITICAL COUNSELOR JUNE 6 TIMES REPORT USUAL PRESS SPECULA- TION. SAID GOI IS EXPLORING VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES BUT THERE NO REPEAT NO FRESH BID AND SITUATION REMAINS ESSENTIALLY THAT REPORTED PARA ELEVEN NEW DELHI 6426. ADDED THERE NO QUESTION OF REVIVAL ICC LAOS, IT EXISTS, BUT HIGHLY ACADEMIS TO EXPECT ICC TO SAVE LAOS. STONE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 CPyaRrroved For Release 2001/08/30: CIA-RI f I7R000300020015-8 view of international rela- needs an answer badly, the I) F'I'R o I'1' , MT C l i . tions being suitable and "re- CIA may not be able to pro- NEWS Others in the.dark duce. N~'Vf'' de the disin enuous amoral S i, situation would be - situation would be h~ - ?~):', (,1 6 S - 'l,U~3b .1 'r~'?a ' 1970_._ E LY A le of St as 'and its work, Hannan might Ctol. S Donovan's Office d look back to an earlier Amer- j e ( the hem of his garment. should know better. Before he disdains the CIA IN ITC AR inside our government - and has served as an assistant I that is why Hannah withdraws secretary of d e f e n s e and p g , - if not immoral, covert, and pleasing in Moscow, Pelting, selfishly' pro-American, being Cairo, Damascus, and very. "disrespectable." lihzly in Berkeley or Cam- Obviously, AID would not' bridge, but perhaps not so want its acronym tarnished much. so to high-minded, de- by? disrespectable associationsi cent men like Hannah, who ), urmg scan, Nathan Hale, who, when gic heves World War II, our pre-CIA reproached in 1775 by a friend e-d.b i n t e l l i g e n c e organiza for "dirtying himself" by spy Lion planted representatives I ing within the British lines, r at any point in the govern,' lied' "Every kind of ser- i structure where re- vice, necessary to, the public ? suits could best be attained. a by good,. ., becomes hotiorab Since World - War II was a being necessary." e patriotic, "moral" war, no ob- e ram, `J jections were raised. Nor, for the same reason, during the If Hannah succeeds in di- which they will sit out. vorcing AID and CIA, his Blatchfot~i's Peace Corps, iRichard Helm's IA is a As a practical matter, it agency will then make com- statt a e n c of the hardly requires a manpower Mon rps,cwhich haith the s always held United States provided for by "right" to ofre selective th service' Co I off-limits to the murky Congress and pai dfor from (in which the individual se -but?vitallynecessary-game; the public treasury. Whether lects his own wars), means' of Intohigence. or ^ not given individuals.. or that the day the bugle blows ..a1,.,.. nm,nrnment AM-11. - kind of operation," he said. literally depen s. ! Like Hannah's AID and which wars they will fight and varlvu5 ageuc+eb m miskills. litary 6 - ment agencies paid for by t Expressing the hope that ernment to turn their back on taxpayer can pick and chose; the CIA (AID and the Peace the relationship between AID the kind of work they take in: -is a and CIA could be severed by and obstructs ttheeCIA hinders per- the doct ph r i to soh cal siblingt popular n i legislation now pending, Han- forming crucially important nah expressed distaste for tellectual and even some ju- functions on which the sur- working with the CIA. "Our dicial circles: that people vival of the United States preference is to get out of this d . enjoy the "right" to choose By COL. R. D. HEINL JR. THE ATTITUDE taken by Korean war, was there any News Miiitars AeabRl annah, as well as by two tendency on the part of U.S. WASHINGTON - e; hrivar and .k Agency for International De- 'HoodVaughan, and the pres- It is only because of the velopment (AID) is a cover, ent director, Joseph H. domestic unpopularity of Viet- for the' CIA in os and Blatchford, is that their agen- nam and a simplistic view of wishes it weren't. . cies are or ought to be too government and its interests Since 1962, according to its pure to dirty their hands with and their defense, that organi administrator, John A. Han intelligence matters. It infers I; zations like AID and the nah, the mission in Vientiane' that such work should be left P a a c e. Corps conclude that to the CIA which, in the in- .they' should be allowed to re, has maintained a "rural de- velopment" division which is ference;. comes through as a f u s e government business crew of amoral tricksters and " that some internal opinion in fact a CIA front for train- disapproves. in individuals and units in warmongers. pp_ _ Thn ,nrrawcine desire f -ties, appioua the xma vL WULl1 lot of high-minded young men. .CIA sometimes does, the fact ` to go to that particular war. remains that CIA business is Strictly on principle, you un- government business-no less derstand. than AID business - and usu- a good bit more import- IN THE SAME WAY, if. ally ant. various government agencies Yet the stance of AID and acquire the discretion to cold-; the Peace Corps suggests that ? shoulder the CIA for the sake .there is a kind of pousse-cafe venience, or because agency i stratification of government of image, administrative con- ,functions: some at the top officials are lukewarm on, a above - board, pure, disinter- particular tenet of defense or psted, rt}oral in the- Wilsonian it foreign policy,.; then some fine morning__when. the President, Approved For Release 2 C W 0 000015-8 E 5351 June 8, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL REGOI~D x ens1JA 9 ,VM9 early days of Vietnam. money" is a subjective interpretation has become the only viable indigenous . He was killed in the of some old, over-generalized figures that the political force capable of providing government's late-summer offensive. "These guys are tigers," says an American Post Office Department has publicly declared leadership for thousands of dislocated personally acquainted with many CIA to be obsolete and invalid. Postmaster Gen- and poverty stricken peasants. agents in Laos. "They're tough, intelligent eral Blount has stated on numerous occasions I ask, Mr. Speaker, is this the course guys who know how to 'handle themselves. positive Third con Bulk mail is a desirable, the President Will now take in Cambodia They're not afraid to mix it up out in the tributor pe postal to Operation. the economic ciency of the T state- after the,withdrawal of U.S. troops on jungle." The American is a civilian engineer . This s effi - theirhelping oto ment is supported by the Department's Reve- June 30? If so, he must be warned that whoa befriended ded onyagents ofwhile came er Laos their because remote nue and Cost Analysis report issued on indiscriminate bombing, use of chemi- outposts. airstrips April 6 of this year. The report shows that cals, and other forms of massive civilian ili were fed," he says. "Here they're ands things m its handling cost by 98% whereas the revenue which invite resistance and the growth the way they want to, and getting better pay from First Class mail exceeds its respective of Communism. for it as well." handling sthohat t Third hard Class Bul k is same most The excerpts from the four articles An Important CIA adjunct in Laos has the by only %. also table of ms l handled the the innocuous title of "Requirements Office". It is Post major class of mail by the follow: St Office. WASHINGTON'S DILEMMA staffed by about 90 men, most of whom also are ex- military types. Their function may be a step further, Assistant Postmaster (By Arnold Abrams) inconspicuous, but it is not innocuous. Sta- I TO go Gen General al James W. Hargrove stated on April 13 Ironically, those most in the dark about tioned at field level, requirements officers- of this year that, if Third Class Bulk mail did Laos are the American people. More than called ROs-handle the distribution of arms not exist, then the 296 million dollars in gross simply being unaware of the scope of U.S. and ammunition, as well as general logistics. profit which it produced in. fiscal 1969 would operations here, th ^ have yet to be told by They are vital to any military operation have had to come from some other source. their government that their nation is mili- mounted by the government. He added that there are only two alterna- tarily involved in Laos. American officials activities prompted tives for 'that other source'-either a con- still seek to officially conceal U.S. violations Learning about Fulbright these raise aca key rompted gressional subsidy or an increase in First of the 1962 Geneva Accord, which bars all about the CIA's role her since its function Class postage rates. forms of 'foreign military intervention in ostensibly is to gather information, why is With these thoughts in mind, I certainly Laos. They contend that Hanoi's refusal to st running a war in Laos? "I don't hope that you will reconsider your present concede the presence of North Vietnamese this sibly s agency kind of activity at all," n't position on this subject. When I served as troops here makes it diplomatically unfeasi- appro e said. " this But if it is activity the national c- one of your county chairman in the in se 1968 ble for Washington to at otherwise. Senatorial Campaign, I had complete con- Consequently, everyone in Vientiane, from curity ought intererest st t too d do this, regular it seems aems s to to me me it forces to be by US jectivi of your unquestioned integrity, ob- the Russian ambassador to the mamasan of and not by an intelligence=gathering agency." weigh all nd the facts to acting seek ut and the legendary White Rose, knows what the He added that the National Security Act. weigh alsure facts before actinon any Americans are doing here. But the American which created the CIA, "`never contemplated issue. I with ure that this personal involve- public remains ignorant of the fact that this function" for the agency. s and past efforts tends regard eighten their government is arming, training, sup- The CIA mission chief in Laos is Lawrence myat wtyour my awareness and concern rarsome plying, transporting and directing approxi- Devlin, listed as a "political officer" in the of your' more recent activities. However, I mately 70,000 Laotian troops in a war which US Embassy. Unlike most political officers, cero ist ainly hope (and must assume) tout these threatens to get out of hand. however, Devlin flatly refuses to see reporters. sidered personal not represent your con- Instead of setting the record at least par- For all anybody ver- d ou sec al campaign but are simply tially straight, U.S. officials here do things knows:. he might agree on o over-zealous campaign efforts which were like allowing yang Pao to declare recently, that last point with Senator Fulbright, who produced well intentioned supporters. before a sizable contingent of visiting journ- stressed that he was not criticising the the The voters of Iowa's First District right- alists, that his Meo forces fight with an- CIA. "The agency is just following orders," fully look to both you and your opponents Fulbright said. for information and interpretation on vital tiquated weapons, inadequate communica- Cargo and military supplies-as well as tions and inconsequential American sup- eCargo rsonnel ndry ilitard supplies-as Laos by issuest I am sure that you constantly strive port. As he was speaking, American F-4 per America and Continental Air Services, fo fulfill td unbiased in the most straight Phantom jets roared overhead, several Amer- o Amer- hope rivate charter firms under contract to the hope td that and the- unbased information manner which I have of- and ican observation planes were parked nearby Up S govern e charter rmsy are bconr known as tw of assistato you nce this three cargo-laden American transport ment. effordt. Enclosed youswill find some further de- planes landed in quick succession at his of- the "CIA Airlines", and most of their pilots flcial Sam Thong base. After denying he are ex-air force officers. Reporters are allowed the which maybe of its postal expling even received indirect U.S. military sup- to accompany flights involving rice drops to the subect of Third Class postal economics. port, Vang Pao calmly climbed into an un- refugee camps, but are banned when military Sincerely, marked American helicopter, guarded by cargoes are carried. MIKE MCSWEENEY. Laotians carrying American-made M-16 au- "Why do you guys always ask about weap- tomatic rifles, and was flown back to his se- ons and ammo shipments?" pilot Jim Walsh cret Long Cheng headquarters by a three- asked me. Walsh, 38, is an ex-air force officer 'man American crew. who has worked in Laos for Air America since U.S. POLICY IN LA TRENC*THENS Vang Pao and official verbiage notwith- 1962. "You know we're not allowed to talk THE ~CNISTS standing, American involvement in the La- about such things," he said. otian conflict takes the following principal Another form of American air service in- HON. DONALD M. FRASER forms: In addition to 75 military advisers Laos constitutes the most direct US involve- listed as embassy "attaches," about 300 men ment in the fighting. Under the euphemism OF MINNESOTA are employed in a variety of clandestine mill- of "armed reconnaissance flights", Thailand- IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES tary activities supervised by the- CIA. Al- based American jets and bombers have though technically civilians, many CIA mounted aerial bombardments equal to the Monday, June 8, 1970 agents In Laos are former Special Forces pounding taken by North Vietnam prior to Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, in the soldiers recruited because of military ex- the bombing halt in 1968. The He Chi Minh pertise and Vietnam experience. trail in southeast Laos has been the prime di Presdust pThese ex-Green Berets train government target of American air attacks, but enemy Nidot of public concern over not forget invasion of Camboda, we must troops, assist wide-ranging reconnaissance encampments and troops on the Plain of not forget the quiet war of escalation the teams and plan guerrilla and psychological Jars came under heavy fire during the recent administration has been conducting in warfare operations. They wear combat fa- government offensive. Laos throughout 1969 and 1970. tigues and work out of three main camps, Money for many US operations in Laos is I wish to bring to the attention of the where they administer rigorous training in. cloaked in the budget of the mammoth Congress excerpts from four articles from jungle warfare, guerrilla tactics, communica- Agency for International Development, or the Far Eastern Economic Review which tions handling and weaponry. channelled through other unobtrusive con- describe how Vietnamization, a reduc- The CIA also maintains and largely con- duits. The scope of American financial sup- trols yang Pao's army of approximately 15,- port of the neutralist Royal Lao government has resulted ginu a tes al io Vietnam, 000 fulltime troops. Officials instructions to testifies to the effectiveness of such cover. has all escalatory 'Vu se the contrary, CIA personnel occasionally Sc- Total American assistance here is reliably Weapons of mass deStructiOn in Laos. S. company these forces no combat forays. More estimated at between US $250 million and As these articles point out, massive. than 20 agents have been killed in Laos. $300 million per year. Of that, only the tech- devastation of civilian life and property Among. the most recent CIA casualties was nical budgetst-about t $60 illioo ea is m made undisclosed, has drastically altered the fragile politics Phil Werbisky, a former Special Forces cap- P of neutrality in Laos. The Pathet Lao tain widely known for his exploits during the entirely for military purposes. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 ME 52 Ai.J r.J1.Vv 1 VI 1\G IGcs LVV I/VV/JV . VIA-1\Vr I L-VVJJI 1\VVVJVVVLVV 1,J-V tf~l CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -Extensions of Remarks June 8, 1970 P111- 'calls woo support the mammoth US bomb. {Sy T. D, Allniati) suit Of an illusory military victory, attd his ing operation in Laos irorn bases in Thailand, The situation In Laos is .;:1ct particularly earnpulsive lack of candour on the effects and Vietnam and Guam. eneos*aging for either side fo3 the 1 yyeri_ motives Of t lat policy carried him from the Nixon said: "No American stationed in calls h to have dropped hundreds of thou- greatest plurality in the history of presiden+ Laos has ever been killed in ground combat sands of tons of bombs to prop Up the tial elections to political oblivion four years operations." Although the phrasing is highly t$Lx a gov 'lsr'nattt#` or for the North Viet- later. restrictive=most of the Laos war is fought XlWtie4e, Who have Invested tens of thousands This time the president appears less ego- from outside Laos by i`;3 personnel not sta- af, trdops in a aso-lay futile effort to .once involved; the country is Laos, not Vietnam; tioned there-It is well known in Vientiane Prince Souvanna Piouma's government to and llchard Nixon still has many, many that many Americans have been killed in foUowmore aequie5centpolicles, mistakes to make before he turns into the combat situations in Los, and that their Almost paradoxically, both sides have be- Lear-like figure that Johnson has become. deaths, in South Vietnam, would be counted gun the present dry season, which marts the But mistakes are being made in Laos, and as combat casualties. Ini'ormed sources here- annual upswing in fighting, in weaker ,posi- they became more obvious after Nixon's re- recalling that Americans killed in Laos are tiaras than they held six months or ea year cent nationwide address on Laos. It was sup- often shipped out on special planes without ago. Both sides seem as far away as ever posed to tell all, but it wound up being un- legal formalities in order to avoid publicity- from achieving their goals in Laos. And the deniably-and probably. deliberately- estimate that about 150 Americans are killed country Is victim of an escalating level of cavalier with the facts about the disguised each year in the Laos war, the vast majority violence that so far has maintained the.rough war the US is fighting in Laos. balance of territorial power only at era ever The major fact Nixon apparently wished al lone. them The pilots shot down on bombing mn- president's contention that no higher cost in Laotian lives, property and to conceal was that the US war effort in Laos American lives are being spent in Laos, of hope of finding some way out of the Vietnam had Increased greatly since November 1968 all his experiments with the truth, may be war. when the bombing halt in North Vietnam the one that comes ba.rk to haunt him the Indeed, as Laos enters its sixth full year resulted In an almost automatic escalation of most as more and more Americans-mostly of war since the break-up of the coalition bombing In Laos. life said reports that the the families of civilian Air America pilots government and escalation of the war in increase in "our air activity has had the effect and US Air Force officers -rece,ve death tele- South Vietnam, nothing seems to have of escalating the conflict" were "grossly in- grams from Washington. turned out the way anyone wanted it. accurate," Perhaps most importantly, the president The North Vietnamese hoped to use Laos The fact remains that US bombing sorties sought to camouflage the major changes that as an unimpeded funnel to victory in South over Laos have risen from an average 4-5,000 have occurred in the US policy in Laos over Vietnam. When the Vientiane government a month to 15--18,00D today. The fact remains the last year by averring that American ex- permitted the Americans to start the bomb- that the US now is bombing whole areas of pansion of its war role in Laos has occurred ing, the North Vietnamese committed in- Laos it did not touch before, including the "only when requested by the Laotian govern- creasing amounts of troops. in an effort to Plain of Jars. The iact remains that Vie US ment". He also said: "The level of our air discredit that 'government. This they have has expanded Its policy of systematically operations has been increased only as the succeeded in doing, at least militarily, time denuding the Communist-held areas of Laos number of North Vie' neiraese in Laos and the after time, but the U.S. bombing has only by moving in, taking out the civilian popu- level of their aggression has increased." Increased. lation, destroying all stocks of food and de- In fact, observers here point out, the ini- The Americans began the bombing with foliating productive land. It is also a fact tial US air escalation in Laos, which occurred some hope of keeping the war from spread- that US personnel-including advisers, plan- during late 1968 and early 1969, happened lag deep Into the territory of an increasingly ners, transport pilots and American. gunship when there was no communist threat of dependent Vietiane government. But jet crews-are more deeply Involved in fighting noticeably increased proportions. Indeed, the bombers cannot stop ambushes; they are of the Laotians' war for them than ever before. aerial escalation did not occur because of relatively little use even in medium-;sized Nixon, of course, went on television to de- special events in Laos, but because the US engagements. As a result. American bombs fend his policy, not to pick it apart. The bombing halt in North Vietnam for the first have been able to drive the communists off speech, obviously aimed squarely at Middle time permitted the focus of the US air ar- the Plain. of Jars and have constantly har- America, was an attempt to win political ap- senal to shift to Laos. And perhaps, the cru- aissed traffic along the Ho Chi Minh ',rail. proval for what is going on in Laos. With in- cial point, long-time observers here say, is But nothing the Americans can do, short of creasing disquiet expressed in the US Con- that until a year ago Laotian requests for an moving their own ground troops into Laos, gress and the press about the US war effort escalation of the US bombing and logistics can prevent the communists from disrupt- in Laos, the President could be excused for effort were rejected as a matter of a long- ing normal commerce and government in emphasizing the logic behind his own Laos established policy of keeping the US Involve- the -Mekong valley. Similarly, commt.nist policy-even if it meant trying to lay all the ment in Laos as low profile as possible. raids and larger attacks can discredit the blame for the unhappy state of affairs in That policy has changed, and the Nixon Vietiane government's pretensions to effec- Laos on Hanoi's doorstep. But the President administration clearly is no longer interested tive authority but they cannot stop the Amer- can hardly be excused for saying things that in keeping a particularly low profile in Laos, lean bombing. even US officials here have had to concede, despite the overall thrust of the Nixon Doc- Thus neither North Vietnam nor the just aren't right. Among the Nixonlan dcpar- trine. The underlying rea ons for the change United States have found the short-cut to tures from reality: is Laos policy are not hard to discern: "The victory In South Vietnam that they sought The President said there were 67,000 North US is deescalating downstream in South in violations of Laotian neutrality. The Lao- Vietnamese troops in Laos, up from 55,000 in Vietnam," a Vientiane diplomat recently ob- tians, on both sides, have suffered heavily. mid-1969. The US embassy here, despite its served. "It is only naturae that it should es- Probably neither the Americans nor the enthusiasm for the task, can find only 50,000 calate upstream In Laos, especially on the North Vietnamese originally anticipated North Vietnamese troops, an increase from Ho Chi Minh Trail." that the Laotian war would involve theist so the 47,000 figure estimated in the middle of The American bombin" of communist In- deeply, and turn out to be so inconclusive. last year. filtration routes in Laos,,a fact, will be one There now is some debate in Vietiane on He said a total of 1,040 Americans work for of the few controls the US will retain over when the communists will finally be able to the US government in Laos, directly or in- events In South Vietnam as Vietnamisation get their Plain of Jars counter-offensive directly, of which 643 are involved in some proceeds. The effectiveness of the bombing going, and when they do, whether it will military or logistics capacity. A paragraph is debatable. But the President clearly does force the United States Into another escala- later, lie said: "US personnel in Laos during not wish to relinquish 1 while he is sur- tien, such as the use of B-52 bombers for the past year has not increased ." But only rendering so many other options in South the first time in large numbers outside the last September, in another administration Vietnam. He Chi Minh trail. statement supposed to tell all about Laos, Indeed, from all appearances, U.S. policy- But in contrast to a year ago, there is now the US State Department said that only makers sec the U.S. bombing in Laos as one absolute unanimity among all observers, of 8:33 Americans were working in Laos. Had the of the keys to escape frost, the whole Indo- all persuasions, that an end to the Laos total number of Americans In Laos actually china labyrinth. If the bombing can control war is impossible until after the end of the increased from ,333 to 1,040--a rise of almost the flow of North Vietnamese soldiers and Vietnam war, whenever that may come, and 25%? Or was the State Department wrong? supplies into South Vietn,tn, Vietnamisation that the prognoisis for Laos in 1970, and in- Or the presiden.? will have a better chance of success, and the deed for a long time after that, is for more-- Most disturbing, reliable sources here say U.S. Will be well on its way out of the war. ,perhaps much more-of the same. the total of US personnel dire tl c LAOS SHADES OF LBJ (By T. D. Allman) VIENTIANE.--Two expressions-"escala- tion" and "credibility gap"-may well be on the way to having the same dark significance for President Nixon that they had for his predecessor. Lyndon Johnson's fruitless up- y supporting , course, the train of cause and effect in the Vietnamese government's war effort is international affairs is seldom so simple, and really much higher than 643, more like 1,000, the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao have if one includes "temporary duty personnel", expressed their displeasure at the increase and military and logistics personnel who of bombing by continuing their attacks spend the day to Laos but sleep at night at against government positions in Laos. They US bases in Thailand and Vietnam. None of are using more men than ever before in the the figures-the.State_ Department's, the pres- current dry season offensive-though the rise ident's or those knowledgeable sources in in number of North Vietnamese troops in Laos-include the tens of thousands of Amer- Laos does not constitute the escalation Presi- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 June 8, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks dent Nixon charged so much as a need to protect the Plain of Jars flank which the U.S. and Laotians for the first time attacked last year. If the communists continue, as they have in the past, to win more and more ground in Laos, the government of Prince Souvanna Phouma could fall, or be forced to make con- cession to the communists, such as calling for a U.S. bombing halt. This, of course, would undermine the whole American effort to get out of South Vietnam gracefully, and so the Nixon administration has gone to escalated lengths to preserve the Vientiane government from a string of communist defeats. Vang Vleng they would be recapturing terri- tory belonging to the Kong Le neutralists in 1962 and could then claim it In the name of their own "patriotic neutralist" forces. They might move southwest in an attempt to take Long Cheng and Sam Thong. Long Cheng Is the major US military base in northeast Laos. Recently visited by jour- nalists for the first time, they reported seeing the longest runway in northern Laos, big helicopters used for rescuing downed Ameri- can pilots in northern Laos, and American planes landing and taking off every minute. Sam Thong, seven miles away by air, is a centre for airlifting arms, food and medical THE LABYRINTHINE WAR In 1953 the Vietminh launched an offensive into Laos. This forced the French to make an unpalatable choice; either attempt to hold on to Laos or, as military sense dictated, withdraw and concentrate forces on the Viet- namese coastal plans. The French chose the former-and Dienbienphu and disaster soon followed. Now, in 1970, a white foreign power fight- ing to maintain its position in Laos and Vietnam may soon be faced with a similar decision. If current communist military ac- tivities continued, the U.S. will have to de- cide whether to become more Involved in Laos or make political and military concessions it has not yet been willing to consider. It is still too early to say where the pendu- lum will swing. But one thing Is clear: the U.S. and the Royal Lao Government are on the defensive. If the communists decide to continue their offensive-however large and whoever is leading-it is not likely to be con- tained without substantial military escala- tion or significant concessions on the part of the Americans. For the past two years the U.S. has carried out one of the most sustained bombing cam- paigns in history against essentially civilian targets in northeastern Laos. The area is a carpet of forest dotted by villages, and a few towns. Refugees report that the bombing was primarily directed against their villages. Operating from Thai bases and from aircraft carriers, American jets have destroyed the great majority of villages and towns in the northeast. Severe casualties have been in- flicted upon the inhabitants of the region, rice fields have been burned, and roads torn up. Refugees from the Plain of Jars report they were bombed almost daily by American jets last year. They say they spent most of the past two years living in caves or holes. The basic aim of this bombing has been to hurt communist forces in every possible way: to deprive them of villages which could provide them with shelter, of manpower which could be used as porters or rice growers, to limit food supplies and road travel and to demoralise. It seems probable, however, that this at- tempt to "raise the ante" has worked only too well. Militarily the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese seem to be as strong as ever. The Ineffectiveness of American airpower is highlighted in a comparison of the com- munist offensives against the Plain of Jars in 1964 and 1970. It took them three days to take it six years ago. This year, despite the massive American air 'support for gov- ernment forces, it took five days. Perched on the plain, communist forces could move in any or all of three directions. They could push west to Route 13, then move south toward Vang Vieng. Pathet Lao forces include a number of former neutralist bat- talions, currently commanded by General Deuane. The Pathet Lao claim that these represent the real neutralists. By taking egnitary outposts. These are locates on moun- taintops and can be supplied only from the air. Long Cheng and Sam Thong constitute the logistics and air support centre for mili- tary activities throughout the northeast. Both are relatively easy to defend, being sur- rounded by hills on all sides. If the com- munists are willing to pay the price, however, there seems little doubt that they could cap- ture both; this would mean a major military defeat for government forces. A third though less likely possibility is that the communists may move southeast and attempt to take Paksane, a Mekong river town. -Militarily this would be relatively easy but it might risk Thai involvement and con- ceivably, American ground Intervention. It also seems unlikely that communist forces could hold Paksane for very long. Whatever direction they choose to move, a communist offensive from the plain could place the US in a most difficult position. Air- power would be unlikely to halt their ad- vance. Neither would the Royal Lao Army or the CIA-directed Clandestine Army. The 60,000-man Royal I,ao Army is made up primarily of village youths conscripted to fight in a war they neither understand nor desire. A private's salary is about US$5 a month. Government soldiers have shown a marked-and one suspects rather astute- disposition for retreat during major battles. Corruption and indifference is rife in the officers corps. American military attaches complain constantly that the only advice Lao army officers seek from them is in preparing escape plans. During the last battle for the plain government soldiers complained that they had been fenced in by barbed wire to Drevent their retreat, The Meo soldiers-and Thai, Burmese and Cambodian mercenaries of the Clandestine Army-tend to be more aggressive than reg- ular troops. A private is paid more than US$30 a month and is better equipped and trained. Their strength is about 6,000 in northeastern Laos and 6,000 in the rest of the country. However, as an American official delicately put it, the Meos are "better at at- tacking than defending". The fact is that they are basically a group of guerillas, effec- tive at harassing and small actions but simply not designed to function as a regular army. The most serious problem with Vang Pao's Men soldiers is their lack of discipline. Laotian refugees complain bitterly of mis- treatment by Meo soldiers during their cap- ture of the plain last September. Refugees say the Meos slaughtered hundreds of cows and buffaloes, destroyed many of their shelters and looted their belongings. The only real military options left-to the US should a major communist thrust develop are the introduction of American ground troops or support of a Thai invasion into Laos. At present, neither seems very likely. Laos is simply not a vital enough interest for the US to introduce ground troops, particularly after nine years of Vietnam. And support of E5353 Thai troops in Laos might In the end prove more complicated and costly than sending in American troops. Despite periodic breast- beatings at SEATO conferences and other occasions, the Thais are not-very anxious to confront the North Vietnamese army face to face. And few Americans here believe that if they did they would make a particularly good showing. A successful communist push in Laos would probably result in major political and military concessions on the part of the US. This would seem to be the communist goal. Few informed observers here believe that the communists plan to take over Laos in the near future. American military at- taches, the first to ascribe aggressive motives to the North Vietnamese, have stated pub- licly that they do not believe that the North Vietnamese are intent on "colonising" Laos. The first priority for the communists would probably be to force the US to stop its bombing of both the Ho Chi Minh trail and northern Laos. A second would be to give greatly increased strength to the Pathet Lao within the framework of a coalition govern- ment. A third, and intriguing, possibility is that a communist offensive in Laos may be de- signed to force a faster rate of American troop withdrawal from South Vietnam. A major thrust which seemed on the point of taking over all of Laos would place the US In an untenable position. It might well be that in such a case the Americans would be prepared to swap a faster withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam in re- turn for some firm communist guarantees of neutral status for Laos. Such speculations point up the basic weak- ness of the American position In Laos. Over the past five years Royal Lao Government control has gradually been eroded. Most of Laos is either a no-man's land or is con- trolled by the Pathet Lao. A successful com- munist offensive would shrink government control even further. This weakness was im- plicit in President Richard Nixon's March 8 statement on Laos. By appealing to the Rus- sians-who are unlikely to have either the inclination or capability to slow a Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese advance into Laos-the president seemed to imply that American ability to contain communist forces in Laos is limited. Perhaps most significantly, American mili- tary priorities have prevented any' strength- ening of the Royal Laos Government. Its corruption, lethargy and indifference is as great if not greater than it ever was. Few peo- ple living under its rule actively support it. American officials have been unable to push for basic reforms due to the political necessity of getting on with the Lao civilian and military elite so that continued American bombing will be permitted. Laos is not Vietnam: U.S. deaths here are counted in the hundreds-mostly downed pilots and crew-not tens of thousands. And expenses are measured in hundreds of mil- lions of dollars, not billions. But if Vietnam is America's quagmire, Laos is its labyrinth. It seems clear at this point that the only path out leads through agreement on some sort of political settlement. The Americans simply do not have enough usable military power to force a favourable military situa- tion. The U.S. will not find the concessions necessary to bring peace to Laos very pleas- ant. At the least, it will involve a suspension of all bombing in Laos and acceptance of a truly non-aligned Vientiane government. And it may involve trading complete and rela- tively rapid withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam for a guarantee of Laotian neutrality. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 , 7 ST}4TUS RE RT ON THE BRITISH- Satisfaction with Concorde, which has made effects of French de\aluation-this would bl R CONCORDE Americans less afraid of the possibilit th t y a and make huge? inroads into the balance unwilling to agree to go back to Whe draw N. HENRY S. REUSS of payments, although the 'reps.,,., t t IN THE ITSE OF REPRESENTATIVES he -'^~ osedron. dolt engineers believe that The result is that the American SST's the proposed modi cation of the fuselage > a -- budget has been. scraping throu h n g triere are two catc] uncomfortably narrow votes. V+On ednes- is that only the naive~.a~#e . ll p Spared toobvio 11Ir. REU , Mr. Speaker, the .LondOri day, the house of Representatives finally ept ac- estimates b fie aircraft industry, here T~conomist f May 30, 1970, contained passed it without cuts but might have been c or in the Uni St ari Inter estin article on the ]3riti h s- t a es But the m i rougher hd th .orempor- ae Russian not helpfully tans: one that Concorde has not, unlike FreliCh Concor e supersonic transport. flown their supersonic transport at its de- the So .t SST, yet flown at twice the speed is ~`in easing airline dissatis- signed speed of twice the speed of sound for of nd. It There should have been doing so any faction" with Concorde. the a.rtiele, the first time on ate . e~, i,e aenave, avariety of reasons; most obviously strike-; small, the article es on, and 'they eX- where the opposition is tougher and bet at Bristol (see page H1 ). These trials at cruis- pect to make a1 on Concorde, y cx- organised, and where some pessimists he ing speed are crucial No amount of work I. ever, they fly it. aviation press are even beginning aspect wind tunnels and on computers can substi- t it tha could be voted down al ether. tuts for them. They will test the two points Furthermore, the rueial trials of the If the American programm s visibly in where Concorde is most vulnerable: the fuel Concorde at cruiSiug eed have been de- trouble, is this the time for e next British consumption of its engines at normal cruis- layed. These trials W 1 test. two points government to get toget with the French ing, and the aerodynamics of its wing. If Where the Concorde iS oat vulnerable- and talk seriously abo hether they should either behaves fractionally less well than ii fuel consumption and e aerodynamics concede some airli ' request to redesign should, so that it takes more power to push of its wing. Accordulg t the Economist: Concorde-since t re could now be less ur- the aircraft or more fuel to k , eep the engines If either behaves fraction ly less well than gency aboul, p rig it into the market be- up to the mark, then crossing the North It If either > so that is takes one ewer e fore an Ame an competitor and more to Atlantic could be impossible for the Con- :'to Should, be gained m offering an aircraft with im- corde. That is, unles, the airlines and the the aircraft, or more fuel to k ep the engines proved ormance? The present complaint government regulatory bodies behind them up to the mark, then crossing e North At- I. that oncorde is too small. The two manu- are prepared to compromise on the size of lantic could be impossible for e Concorde. fact ers are cur:;ently proposing that air- the fuel reserve that any aircraft is required I include the Economist art le in the 11 s should reduce the seats in it to 110; to carry for possible diversion to another this REcnc at this point; d fly it as an a:1-first class service, charg- airport. In lay languaPa~ this w ld o b e trans - Wtrnx To CONCORDE: SHO to r Ing first class or marginally less than first lated as cutting safety , margins, and many NA Do Wi ii drN C0 R a class fares (which on the North Atlantic are therefore be politically unacceptable. NE GOVERNMENT REDESIGN OF IN CORD BR CONCOR Ara- high: #213 return). On the manufacturers' The two governments need the result of LINER? THE figures, this would. show a profit; on the air- these trials before the'~t can know what sort lines' calculations, it would not. They ex- of Concorde they have on their hands, or The formal announcement a wh pect to make a loss on Concorde however paper* on Wednesday that supersom they fly it. whether it is even airlines w,l discussing a rapport flying will be banned eve ritain is im- cation.- The ad d think 01 cordially t would portaut because it put o the record what \ ,airlines proposal that has been put by some them if they did think of changes. It would hairlines is that a en pp now uenea so tht-ti .a an extra row of seats can to pay for so expensiveanaircraft during ail easonably developedbrun down its It is a decision length. This would increase that period of the mid??1970s when most of countries are -ex ed sooner or later to the eating from four to five abreast and get them will be staggering from the losses they take. In the Uni States, already acutely num ers up closer to 200. Technically, this are going to make on jumbos until the traf- poiluton-coils ci the British lead will woul a easy to do, and it also looks as if Sc catches up with the new capacity. Some stiffen the polKlea opposition to the Amer- it mig even improve flying performance airlines will simply not be able to, a fact that lean supers is programme. That opposi- by has g ned momentum this ear, Su Y givin the aircraft a bigger surface area, must cut sales of Concorde. What airlines 's y p- it is not oPort for erica light, at this preliminary stage, would most like is that the present Concorde prier S proposed supersonic air- that it wo d involve any of those costly des as ( ) had never been cordial. But this changes to a wing that lengthening the 200ign-se be treated t a prototype for a not bigger ater; year t amount of money required has fuselage wog Lengthening Concorde's ready until, the latter would then not be jumped sharply, to $290 million. This has fuselage, witho t also changing the wings, ready until, at a guess, 1976, as against a coincided with growing reports that the would make the uselage stick out at the probable 1974 for the aircraft in its present Boeing design is altering for the worse--with back and wail dan rously. It is a ploy to be form. To make the decision easy for the two its weight going up and and its performance avoided in a norm , delta-shaped aircraft, governments, the airlines might, with arm- going down, just as on the first prototype The Government a eared to set its face twisting, take perhaps 40 of the present Con- abandoned early last year. It has also coin- against late major ch ges 12 months ago. cordes: just as they took a small version of cided with reports of increasing airline dis- It said that 'if Concor costs were to rise the original 707 from Boeing 1:3 years ago, in more than 15 per 'lent Bove the estimated order to ease the introduction, to jets. This ? The Protection of the Environment. #730 million it was then taking to develop- is a let-out that should be seriously con- Cmd 4378. a figure which still holds, thanks to the sidered after June 18th. vva~vi~a.;JJiVly ray icuL,u.Kl)-Extensions of Remarks June 8 1 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 " WASHINGTON POST DATE 11) RJ!0 PAGE Approved For Release 2001/08/30 . CIA-Mir 2-033 7 015-8 CPYRGHT AID Confirms Its Use As CIA Cover in-Laoe CPYRGHT By William N. Curry The head of the U.S. foreign aid program confirmed yester- day that CIA agents use the civilian aid mission in Laos as a cover for anti-Communist operations, much to his dis- pleasure. Bait he asserted that Laos 'U-Abe. only place iii e in Laos that were be in the national i hot routine AID ope "Our preference i g believed to nterest but rations. s to get rid world" where CIA operatives of this kind of opera tion." Mgscjuerade as_ f eid ,workers Previously, the a id agency of ,, the Agency for Interna- ti l D has declined to co mment on ona evelopment (AIn). ATD Administrator John A. published reports that CIA !.Hannah, asked if the CIA uses agents pose as AID rural de- the mission in Laos as a cover velopment workers but ac- , said: "Well I just have t tually recruit and train anti- , o admit that this is true. This Communist guerrillas,. detect was a decision that was made enemy movements and act as back in 1962 and by adminis- ground controllers strik for air 1 trations from now until then es. , The 1962 Geneva Conven-" tion declared Laos a neutral country . Hannah's remarks were made on the Metromedia radio news program "Profile." See HANNAH, A6, Col. 5, and it is the only place in the world that we are." He said, "We have had peo- ple that have been associated with the CIA and doing thin s Hannah said he hopes the connection, between the two agencies could be eliminated in a proposed revamping of AID. The separation was one recommendation of a recent task force that studied AID. "I am sure that it is going to be in the rQ1260- I mAndatinng for discussion," he said. "I hope it is going to be in the legislation once that is submitted." _ Hannah conceded that the Vietnamese. police officers for AID role in Laos, plus its war? the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. related activities in Vietnai'h, "might" have an adverse af- The program turned out to be feet on the AID programs to run by the CIA. other nations. "It certainly has Hannah, who joined AID in not helped . . . It distorts the 1969, said President Nixon role of AID," he said. But he defended the original deci- "places a high priority" on the sions to involve AID as being foreign aid program and ex- correct when they were made pressed hope that the Senate in 1962. will restore recent House- annah was president of made cuts in AID's budget re- Michigan State University quest for the coming fiscal when it agreed, to train South year. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 NEW YORK TIMES DATE 9 10 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 C.I.A. Role iri Laos r Official Confirms Aid Unit Conceals WASHINGTON, June 7 (AP) -Dr. John A. Hannah, director of the Agency for International Development, acknowledged to- day that the United States aid program was being used as a cover for operations of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency in Laos. He said President. Nixon might propose divorcing such intelligence work from over- seas economic assistance in the future in proposals on foreign- aid reform to be sent to Con- gress. "Well, I just have to admit that that is true," Mr. Hannah said when asked if his agency's economic aid "is being used as a cover for C.I.A. operations in Laos" He was questioned on the Metromedia radio news pra- gram "Profile." Mr. Hanah made it clear that he disapproved of the C.I.A.'~s use of his agency. He said Laos was the only country in which this was being done and that it stemmed from a 1962 decision that such activity was in the national interest. Central Intelligence Agency nrovislon of logistical support for the neutralist Government in Vientiane was reported in the east, and Senator J. W. Ful- bright, the Arkansas Democrat who is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has ac- cused the C.I.A. of exceeding its authority in supporting United States military activi- ties in Laos. Mr. Nixon described United States aid to Laos in a state- ment March 6 but did not men tion any Central Intelligence Agency role. It ,is unusual for an execu- tive-branch official to acknowl- edee publicly that 'M or ani- zatltJ N-heink used for under- cover work abroad. PAGE S. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 SUNDAY STAR DATE 1Rh10 PAGE_ Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337ROO0300020015-8 CIA Reportedly Maims Its Dead on(LuQPatrols merican Central Intelligence gency operatives killed in round combat operations in ortlleast Laos are maimed as uch as possible to prevent he North Vietnamese from us- g them as tangible proof of 1.S. ground presence in the rea, well informed Lao ources say. "The Americans have or- ers they must not be cap- ured. If they are killed, other embers of their patrol put a renade on their face or shoot hem up with their machine uns till they can't be recog- ized," the sources said. There are 10 American com- ando teams of 8 to 10 men ach operating in northeast aos, the sources said. The earns operate behind North ietnamese lines. By TAMMY ARBUCKLE hien, 75 miles northeast of special to The Star VIENTIANE - Bodies of t,808 Thais, Encounter Laotians First "When the North Vietnamese unch a big attack, they come gainst the Laotians first. The ao escape around the flanks the rear leaving the North ietnamese facing Thais or eo tribesmen," the sources aid. "American and Thai earns infiltrate the rear, bit- ing enemy headquarters and ommunications." The Americans and Thais Aerate from a small, secret nd tightly guarded airfield ear the U.S.-supported guer- illa headquarters at Long including artillery and infan- trymen, in northeast Laos op- erations, according to the sources. U.S. sources refuse to say how many Americans are in- volved in the military opera- tions. Sources Become Edgy They b e c o in e extremely edgy when asked if the num- ber of American military per- sonnel in Laos has increased since the U.S. Senate subcom- mittee hearings on Laos last October. Lao military sources say a further increase in U.S. mili- tary aid is coming. The United States is being asked to supply helicopters and U.S. crews for a new "elite" airmobile unit to be formed from Lao paratroops and other units. The Lao request follows a worsening in the over-all mili- tary situation here. "Militarily, the Lao are in the worst position they have ever been since 1964," reliable sources say. In northern Laos, the Plain of Jars is ringed by North Vi- etnamese units offering a tight defense against the guerrillas. The North Vietnamese still are pressuring the guerrilla bases at Long Chien and Sam Thong and are to launch new attacks when the monsoon rains begin, probably this month. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337ROO0300020015-8 WASHII~GT ON POST DATE PAGE Approved For Release 2001/08/30 . - - 015-8 The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, June 4,1970 F7 JAtc CoujcW;ecome Second Cambodia PPJTk Anderson increasingly to the U.S. to and AID contracts, haul food,, The ouster of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk has stirred up plots in Laos to dump Prince Souvanna Phouma and set up a Cambodian-style mili- tary government. This could repeat the Cambodian crisis all over again in Laos, with dangerous consequences for the U.S. Intelligence reports warn that rightist Laotian leaders have been encouraged by the Cambodian experience to at- tempt a similar takeover in their country. They are weary of the aging Souyanna Phouma who, like Sihanouk, has put on a show of out- ward neutrality. But just as Sihanouk permitted secret in- cursions by the North Viet- namese, Souvanna Phouma al- lowed the Americans to oper? ate in Laos. The Kremlin had promised both leaders that the North Vietnamese would leave their countries after the Vietnam War was settled. But as the encroachments increased, the two princes lost faith In the Soviet promise and concluded that the North Vietnamese would never clear out volun- tarily. Souvanna Phouma. turned ist crunch. But Sihanouk lew to Moscow and Peking to en ist support in getting the North Vietnamese out of Cam- bodia. While he was on this mission, he was deposed by the generals he left behind. Now he has joined the same forces, ironically, that he had tried to remove. Secret Understanding Washington and Moscow reached a secret under- standing, meanwhile, to keep still about the U.S. interven- tion in Laos. As long as the U.S. didn't officially acknowl- edge its clandestine opera- tions, the Kremlin agreed to ignore them. The Russians, as they had promised Sihanouk and Sou- vanna Phouma, also guaran- teed there would be no North Vietnamese takeover of Laos and Cambodia. Both the So- viet and Americans agreed to endeavor, at least, to confine the war to South Vietnam. At no time did the U.S. wish to expand the Vietnam con- f l i c t into a full-scale Indo- china war. Restricting the bat- tlefield to South Vietnam, ,however, also had advantages that the U.S. could never really win the war. For it is im neeihin 4n ' "Foat .. who can escape across the bor- der into sanctuaries. In 1964, the North Vietnam- ese began enlarging their sanc- tuary privileges in Laos by at- tacking the Plain of Jars and increasing the Infiltration down the Ho Chi Minh spider- web of trails. The U.S. countered by step- ping up its clandestine activi. ties and bombing the infiltra- tion routes. After the bombing of North Vietnam was halted in 1968, the U.S, simply moved the sorties across the border and concentrated the full fury upon Red targets in Laos. CIA Secret Army The Central Intelligence Agency, meanwhile, has subsi- dized a secret, army in Laos under Gen Vang Pao; a vulgar ex-French Army sergeant, whose 14,000 fighting men have been recruited largely from the minority Meo tribes. The secret army is head- quartered at the multi-mil- lion-dollar CIA base of Long Cheng. A steady stream of Air America and Continental Air Services planes, under CIA munitions and the monthly payroll for Vang Pao's troops OLUFIeS nave now leaked out about his clandestine army, describing it accurately as the only effective fighting force in Laos on the American side. Yet my reporler in Indochina, Les Whitten, reports from Vientiane: "The sad fact is that all the millions expended upon Vang Pao's mercenaries have not convinced one responsible U.S. official in Saigon or Ven- tiane that this land of 2.8 mil- lion people can be defended for more than. a few weeks by the secret army against a de- termined- Communist attack. "The Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese control half of Laos and clearly could take over the other half 'al- most at will." Whitten adds that "the fa- bled CIA forces, which liberal senators regard as some kind of powerful presence in Laos, are made up, in fact, of time servers, a few brilliant intelli- gence men and a larger num- ber of ex-servicemen who are as harassed as any Washing- ton bureaucrats simply trying to carry out routine duties. ? 1970. Bell-McClure Syndicate. Inc. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 /~NNIVVC r 1 RCIC J L V/ V -R1/r/L-VV RVVV VVVLVV IJ-V June 1, 1970 CO GR S5I0 L - xtensaons o emar s E 5015 The Telephone: Sharp blows with the flat hand are delivered simultaneously to both ears. This causes a loss of balance, impair- ment of hearing, as well as severe pain. Sexual abuse: In most cases the docu- ments declare that the prisoners are stripped of their clothes at the initiation of the in- terrogation. Humiliation is an obvious ele- ment in the psychological aspect of the tor- ture. The genitals of both men and women receive considerable attention in beatings and the administration of electric shocks. Women prisoners are often violated by tor- turers or are turned over to police or soldiers of lower rank for their amusement. Male prisoners are sometimes forced to witness the sexual abuse of their wives, children or fiancees. ' Simulated execution: prisoners nave been taken from sessions of torture or awakened during a brief respite and brought before a firing squad armed with blanks or empty rifles. Others have been drowned in buckets of water and then revived. And still others have been hung and then cut down after losing consciousness. This list is not a complete catalog of all of the tortures described in the available docu- mentation. It is, however, a compilation of those mentioned most frequently by the victims. As might be expected under such circum- stances, increasing numbers of Brazilians are leaving their homeland to seek refuge in other countries. Many of them are faced with almost insurmountable difficulties: improper or incomplete travel documents, insufficient financial resources, hostile military regimes in several of the nearest countries. (The best estimates available at this time are about 500 in Chile, 1300-1500 In Uruguay and ap- proximately 2,000 in Paris, many of whom are students uncertain that they can safely return to Brazil. Large numbers are in other countries, including the U.S., but the figures are unavailable since many of them fear to declare themselves refugees.) Although the exodus grows each day and the potential for future refugees is tremendous, international refuge organizations have done little to re- spond to the needs of the victims of this new situation. Massive efforts, not unlike those made on behalf of the Jews and others from Europe and Cubans in the early 1960's may now have to be made on behalf of Brazilians. The first step of such a response is now being organized by a group of individuals from the religious, academic, professional and artistic fields in New York City. (For infor- mation, write: The Editor, Christianity and Crisis.) HOW THE UNITED STATES FITS IN All of this information and documentation of torture and repression becomes even more disturbing when the extent of continuing U.S. Government and business involvement in Brazil is recognized. Very little open criti- cism has been forthcoming from these two institutions regarding the course of events of the past six years and particularly of recent months. When the coup occurred in 1964 Ambassa- dor Lincoln Gordon received it with open sat- isfaction. He said it was "perhaps as signif- icant to the defense of the Free World as the Sino-Soviet split and the success of the Marshall Plan," Through his influence Wash- ington recognized' the military regime within 24 hours. Significantly, the Agency for International Development increased its expenditures in Brazil from $15.1 million in 1964 to $122.1 million in 1965. It has proposed a $187 mil- lion program for 1970. In addition, the US military has maintained the largest of its Latin American missions in Brazil, with over 100 advisers on the staff. The Military As- sistance Program provided $24.9 million in 1967 and $19.4 million in 1968. Between 1964 and 1968 2,255 military men passed through its training program. The one brief (four-month) interruption in US support occurred after the closing of Congress in 1968. Some observers believe that aid and assistance were restored quickly be- cause of the inconvenience caused to US busi- ness and banks by the suspension, US invest- ment there accounts for $1,326 million of the $7,314 million invested in all of South America. This article is not intended to be sensa- tional. Its purpose is, rather, to awaken American Christians and public opinion to this horrendous terror and inhumanity. The authorities of Brazil are concerned about their image abroad, and especially in the United States, from which they receive mas- sive foreign aid and investment capital. In- ternational outcries may not bring democracy back to Brazil, but it may force the Govern- ment to restrict its present policies in the treatment of political prisoners. Regardless of what its impact in Brazil may be, we must not-cannot-any longer allow our Government and business to quietly support a type of government that we-and prior to certain recent erosions of our own civilization in the past at least-have re- garded as contrary to our way of life. What Brazil does is ultimately her own problem: what we do to support, and thereby encour- age, her dehumanizing policy of repression is our problem. Brazil-a nation that has made significant contributions to interna- tional culture-may be losing the respect of the nations of the world, but we can only wonder how much greater is her loss than ours, [From the Washington Post, May 4, 1970] THE BRAZILIAN CHURCH MAY BE CHRISTIAN AFTER ALL (By Colman McCarthy) No doubt exists any longer that the mil- itary men running Brazil are stylists in tor- ture, violence and hounding. Too many re- ports from reliable witnesses have appeared in the North American and European press for anyone to think that the current oppres- sion is merely a lapse in taste by Gen. Emi- lio Medici and his six-year-old government. The aim of the torture, backed by the same kind of secret police tactics used in Ger- many, Spain, Portugal and Italy in an ear- lier era and in Greece, Haiti, South Africa and Rhodesia today, is to keep the opposition silent, afraid and in view. The students, journalists, professors, labor organizers, social workers, priests and others who are among the potential targets of tor- ture in Brazil have been put in a strained stance. Do they resist by fighting violence with counter-violence? Or do they hold out and work for the peaceful revolution that their country, crushed by poverty, disease and illiteracy, desperately needs? Large numbers are now joining both groups. But many who go for the second do so because much of the leadership in the Catholic Church is both vocal and risk-tak- ing in opposing the military dictators. "Sur- prisingly," writes Prof. Ralph Della Cava of Queen's College, N.Y., in last week's Com- monweal, "the Brazilian Catholic Church, once a mainstay of the status quo, has emerged for a variety of reasons as the only national institution that remains capable of defending the principles of freedom, justice and social change in the face of government repression." The church in Brazil, as elsewhere in Latin America, has long been a sleeping part- ner of the rich and the military. Officially, it passed out the sacraments and rites, a coin-machine operation from which bless- ings dropped like candies on which the poor were meant to suck for comfort, not thirst for change. Unofficially, it was the chaplain church, blessing the landowners who vir- tually enslaved the poor by forcing many of them to live on less than $350 a year. The self-cowed clergy dared not defy the army or the rich, fearing economic pressures on re- ligious hospitals, schools and parishes. A few years ago, from northeast Brazil, a small, slim man with a strong clear mind spoke out, quickly to become a Martin Lu- ther King figure to the Brazilian social move- ment. Since then, Archbishop Helder Camara has been rattling the generals, exposing the rich, but perhaps most important, making it clear to the poor that they have a right to something better and there is a way to get it. Last October 2, the centennial of Gandhi, Camara outlined the theme of his move- ment called Action, Justice and Peace. "Many Latin American governments, per- haps without realizing and without caring, are preparing an explosion worse than the nuclear bombs, worse than the H-bomb: it is the M-bomb, the bomb of misery. (This explosion) is prepared by those who cower before the powerful and the privileged and make a show of elaborate reforms and ways to execute them, but who afterwarn leave the situation as it is to see if it won't take care of itself." In calling for. non-violent, structural re- forms in Brazil, Camara is labeled a Com- munist,by the right, a standard dismissal of anyone who fights a little too hard for the poor. From the far left, Camara gets it also, because he insists on non-violence. He is firm about the latter, not just frolin his pacifism, but also practicality. "If there was a move- ment of violence here, Brazil would be crushed immediately, either by the United States . . . or by the USSR. To change one for the other of those two powers would all be the same, as neither of the two serve for Brazil- ians." Lumping together America and Russia is not Camara's exclusive idea. In October 1968, the moderate newspaper, Jornal do Brazil, expressed what observers say is a widespread sentiment: "Russians and North Americans proceed as if they were invaders from Mars. They are of anot:_er race, an- other civilization. This planet is a colony which they exploit shamelessly and whose inhabitants-us-as the inferior beings that we are, can continue dying of hunger in our sun-baked and noisy craters." Gen. Medici and his terrorists know better than to jail, torture or otherwise silence Camara. He is too well known internation- ally and too revered locally. But the gov- ernment moves in on less prominent clergy. Last December, a military court indicated the bishop of Volta Redonda on charges of "subversion." Fifteen of his priests were also brought up on charges. Their trial, like the bishop's is pending, with no date set. Other priests have been imprisoned and tor- tured, as well as many nuns and laymen. Forcefully, one bishop, Joao Costa, recently denounced the government's treatment of political prisoners: The latter "have been violently beaten and tortured. I am making this denunciation so that there shall be elim- inated once and for all from all investiga- tions, those procedures which dishonor all those who practice them and render the process of justice suspect." All of this puts the Vatican on the spot. It has 245 bishops in what is the world's most Catholic country-at least nominally Catho- lic, which means making Mass perhaps twice a year. The Pope, who has received a report called "Terror and Torture in Brazil," knows he cannot play it safe much longer-or as Pius XII did during Hitler's Germany, play it silent. The Vatican naturally supports non- violent reform. But preached from across an ocean, this stance risks becoming an accom- plice to the current economic and political structures that also do violence-not by bul- lets or thumbscrews, perhaps, but by keeping the poor in their poverty through unjust Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 501 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extensions of Remarks ,Tune .1, x laws or by letting greedy land-owners con- tinue to hoard the land, Many in the Third World are beginning to believe that this kind of violence is infinitely more criminal than the war games played by Che-style guerrillas. The Brazilian generals, like the Greek colonels-are touchy about their image in the United States and work hard to keep it pol- ished; this is where the massive foreign aid and private investment capital comes from, with bad days to come were the well to run drv. But the U.S. should be less of a worry to the Brazilian government than the Church. American businessmen will not likely pull back their money and investments so long as the generals say they are devoted to "strop- ping communism." The Church--or at least that part of it exemplified by Helder Ca- mara and a growing number of bishops and thousands of clergy and laymen-sees through the big talk about anti-communism. That is not the real battle. "When will we be able to show everybody," said Camara last fall, "that the number one problem is not the clash between East and West, but be- tween North and South-that is, between the'developed world and the underdeveloped world? When will we be able to help every- body understand that misery is the enslaver, the assassin par excellence and that It is the war against misery which should be the number one and only war upon which we must focus our energy and resources?" Camara doesn't know the answer to his questions. But he does know his country seethes with the poor and the hungry who demand answers soon. Christianity, which has solved the problems of the next world seems ready, at least In Brazil, to begin solv- ing some of the problems of this world. [From the Washington Post, May 13, 1970] NEw BRAZIL PURGE Errs 10 SCIENTISTS (By Leonard Greenwood) Rio DE JAxkiRO.-Brazil's small scientific community is reeling from its second politi- cal purge in a year. Ten scientists, including several known internationally,- have been fired from the Oswaldo Cruz institute here and stripped of their political rights. A government spokesman said the decision had been made by President Emilio Car- rastazu Medici after "careful investigation" had shown the scientists to be "agents of subversion and enemies of the regime." The withdrawal of their political rights makes it virtually impossible for them to continue scientific work in Brazil. Anyone who loses his rights is forbidden to work for any government-supported organization and there are almost no private laboratories. Less than a year ago, between 60 and 70 scientists were fired from research, techni- cal and teaching posts and some also lost their political rights. In Brain, which has a scientific commu- nity of only about 5,000 in a population of 94 million, the effects of last year's purge was psychologically staggering. "People were lust beginning to settle down again after that when this latest blow fell," one Brazilian scientist said. "All the old fears have been awakened again. People are saying there are more lists. God knows who'll be next." The director of the Cruz Institute, Guil- herme Lacorte, is reluctant to discuss the case, which he describes as "one of those things that happens." He says only that the departure of the 10 men need not affect the working of the institute. The victims, who are in an extremely vul- nerable situation with accusations of sub- version hanging over them, refuse to meet reporters. The men were reported to be carrying out work on many diseases. The institute, founded at the beginning of the century, has made important contributions to world medicine, especially in the field of yellow fever. Brazilian scientists say it is difficult to see how any of them could be accused of sub- version. None was working on a job even remotely connected with national security. As is the case with most of Brazil's scien- tific community, all 10 are known to have liberal ideas about society. "You'd have to stretch imagination along way to seem them as Communists," one eminent Brazilian sci- entist said. Other scientsts ridicule Lacorte's state- ment, They say the lA men were key figures in a small team of high-level researchers at Cruz. Without them, they add, some depart- ments, including physiology and entomology, may have to close, the scientific standing of the institute will be damaged and Brazilian research in certain fields will be retarded. TRIBUTE TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. McCORMACK SPEECH OF HON. JOHN C. KLUCZYNSKI OF ILLINOIS IN -THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, May 26, 1970 Mr. KLUCZYNSI.{I. Mr. Speaker, it is indeed a real pleasure for me to join in this warm and glowing tribute to our be- loved Speaker, JOHN W. MCCORMACK, who will retire from public life at the end of this Congress. His departure from this House will sadden us, his colleagues, his constituents, and his legion of friends throughout the country and the world. He has been a Speaker who helped sustain the Republic during its recent, trying years. The cries for and against seniority, the cries for and against a more partisan form of government, the cries for and against a more "liberal" or a more "conservative" path of policy---all of these cries and counter-cries could only have been met and subsumed under the sort of moderate and enlightened leadership which JOHN MCCORMACK brought to the House of Representatives during his tenure as Speaker. He has acted as this country's physician-in- residence to bind up political wounds. He has been the kind of man mentioned in the beatitudes : Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall see God. JOHN MCCORMACKC was a poor, Irish boy who helped support his widowed mother by selling newspapers on the streets of South Boston. He grew up in a hard school to become a member of his State's house of representatives and its senate, and a Member of the U.S. House of Representatives during the 70th to 91st Congresses. He became Democraite majority leader under his great mentor and friend, the late Sam Rayburn, during the 79th. Congress, and Speaker of the House upon the death of Mr. Rayburn in 1961. His honorary degrees, awarded by such institutions as Tufts College and George- town University, are numerous. His hon- ors include the Order of Malta First Class and the Order of Saint Gregory. JOHN MCCORMACK, as a nian and as a legisla- tor, has, during a long and productive lifetime, well served his country and hs faith. We salute him, in a troubled and changing period, as a an who held back waves of irresponsibitity so that we could achieve needed changes behind the dike of constitutional order. He takes with him into retirement the gratitude of his brothers in this House and the people of the United States. Speaker MCCORMACK, I wish you and Mrs. McCormack the greatest possible happiness and good health in the years ahead after your your retirement. dor\i PRIEST TELLS OF COMMUNIST BRUTALITY )N LAOS HON. RICHARD H. ICHORD OF MISSOURI IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, June 1, 1970 Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, we have heard a great deal of sound and fury from the Senate about the presence of 300 or so American mi'i;itary attaches in the little landlocked nation of Laos. We heard a great deal less about the presence there of more than &:,000 North Viet- namese. We heard a great deal about alleged American casualties inadvertently caused when American planes flew in support of Laotian forces trying to keep their coun- try from being overwhelmed by the North Vietnamese Communists. But we heard very little of coldalooded, purpose- ful, indiscriminate murder of civilians by North Vietnamese and Laotian Com- munists. Therefore, I would liken to bring to your attention this recent account; in the St. Louis Globe Democrat c,i' the experiences of a Catholic priest who has spent 14 years in Laos and tried recently to de- scribe Communist terrorism and murder to a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees. Father Matt Menger says he expects to die in Laos. He says 1.5 of his fellow priests have been murdered by the Com- munists. But he says that of 11 wit- nesses, only the testimony of one was published in a Washington, D.C., news- paper-one concerning indiscriminate American bombing. The other 10, Father Menger says, stressed that U.S. bombing was not indiscriminate. He states that Communist-inflicted casualties were far more numerous than any caused by U.S. intervention. The account in full fellows: SAYS REDS KILLED 15 COLLEAGUES-PRIEST TELLS OF MURDERS IN LAOS (By Allan Hale) Father Matt Menger expects to die in Laos. Since 1960, he says, 15 of his colleagues have been murdered by the Communists. He stood unnoticed and silent Friday at the rear of a crowded halt at St. Louis Uni- versity while students talked of the future of ROTC and black students wok over the meet- ing to present a list of demands. A missionary priest who has been in Laos 14 years, he had never seen it militant student gathering before. He was in St. Louis on a visit after testifying at a Senate hearing in Washington Thursday. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 Approved For Releas 20 CI -RDP.72-00 3 00 0020015-8 5017 June 1, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-Ixtensions 0~kR Leaving the student meeting at Busch Memorial Center he walked away across the campus, a tall, lean man indistinguishable from other priests crossing the walks. He was silent for a long time. Once he burst out: "We don't have a university in Laos. Not one. If only we had a university. We wouldn't burn it down." He fell silent again for several minutes, then "I wouldn't have believed it. I'm glad I saw it. Otherwise, I wouldn't have believed it.,, He had heard of the St. Louis University meeting by chance and had gone to listen, not to participate. "It is not my university,". he said carefully . "and I know more about the problems of Laos than I do those of America." He had been summoned to a hearing Thursday conducted by Sen. Edward M. Ken- nedy, chairman of the Judiciary Subcom- mittee on Refugees, on civilian war casualty problems in Indochina. He did not think, he said Friday, that the committee had liked his answers to questions. "I stated, when Sen. Kennedy was pressing me about the casualties, I stated just one little example of 15 civilians I knew very well. I've lived with these men for some years, who were actually murdered by the Communists-15 Catholic priests. We are only 100 in the whole country, but they have killed 15, not in any bombing or village-shelling but in cold blood." Still talking of the Senate committee hear- ing, Father Menger went on: "Of the 11 witnesses who testified, the testimony of only one was published, at least in the Washington Post, entitled 'Indiscrim- inate Bombing of Civilians in Laos Alleged'. The other witnesses, all of them, including myself, testified that the U.S. bombing in Laos was not indiscriminate. On the contrary. "In my testimony I brought out the large number of civilians wounded and killed by the North Vietnamese in our country. The Communist-inflicted casualities were far, far more numerous than any inflicted by the American Intervention." There are believed to be 67,000 North Viet- namese troopO in Laos, he said. "In addition, it is very rarely printed that there are 12,000 to 14,000 Chinese Communist troops who are building a road in Laos. The news media today stress the presence of 300 American military advisers." President Nixon's move into Cambodia has not extended the war, he said. It had already been extended throughout the entire region by the North Vietnamese. For years Father Menger has given Laotian villagers medical treatment for anything from malaria to wild animal bites. He has helped rebuild churches and schools and homes after the tide of war has rolled over them and organized distribution of emergency food. They call him "The Tall Priest" in Laos, and with his fluent Lao he has interpreted at high-level conferences between American and Laotian officials. Therefore he is a marked man. He intends to return to Laos as soon as possible. "I don't expect to live," he says calmly. "But it does not matter if I die next month, at the age of 40, with a bullet in the back of the head, or at 95 on an inner-spring mat- tress. I am doing something." HON. JOHN 0. MARSH, JR. OF VIRGINIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, May 27, 1970 Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I should like to conclude at this time my presenta- tion of portions of a report of a pilot study of possible applications of the sys- tems approach to the appropriations process of the Congress. It may be recalled that this study- entirely unofficial-was undertaken by a seminar group at American University under the direction of Dr. George K. Chacko, professorial lecturer and sys- tems scientist. I believe this interesting voluntary ef- fort represents a useful contribution to our current active consideration of ways in which modem informational analysis techniques might be used to improve the efficiency of the legislative branch. The final portion of the paper pro- duced by Dr. Chacko and his associates THE SYSTEMS APPROACH ASSUME EACH ELEMENT HIERARCHY TO BE EQUALLY CONSISTENT As was mentioned earlier, no attempts were made to straight-jacket illustrative scores at the horizontal or vertical levels. The members of the Seminar had very little knowledge of the preferences that the admin- istrative personnel of the Department of the Interior would have employed in either achieving the goals that have been set or in weighing them. Nevertheless, each Study Team Group that pursued the different hierarchial choices corresponding to the ele- ments tried conscientiously to relate it in a responsible manner to the overall objective of averting national ecological disaster. Owing to the differences in professional and personal background, the nonfulfillment of the organismic objectives of averting eco- logical disaster was given the penalty ranging from one billion to 50 billion. Assuming that the protagonist of each element was equally consistent, how would the Congressional decision-maker decide among the competing claims for the same limited resources? SET ORGANISMIC OBJECTIVE NONFULFILLMENT PENALTY AT 50 X 10? The preferred tactical choice in Element 1 was: Improve fire prevention /fighting tech- niques with a weighted penalty of 150, com- pared with the weighted penalty for non- fulfillment of the organismic objective of one billion. To make a valid comparison between the claims of this particular tactical choice and, say, the tactical choice of improving routes to more distant areas in the national forests, its weighted penalty score of 300 must be related to the corresponding penalty for non- fulfillment of not one billion but 50 billions. Although the weighted penalty score itself is twice that of the first tactical choice, the much larger base against which it has to be compared in fact reduced the resource alloca- tion for the same. In Table 10 the organismic objective nonfulfillment penalty is set at the highest level of 50 billion. Accordingly, the tactical choice of fire prevention/fighting techniques gets a score of 7,500 compared with only 300 for improving the roads to more distant areas. TABLE 10.-EQUALIZING THE 5-BUDGET ELEMENT PENALTIES FOR NONFULFILLMENT: SET ORGANISMIC OBJECTIVE NONFULFILLMENT PENALTY AT 50X109 1. Tactical choice: Improve fire prevention/fighting techniques: 50X100 1X100 X 150 = 2. Tactical choice: Create new cities in semiwild forests: 50X109 8X100 X 50 3. Tactical choice: Improve routes to9 more distant areas: X 300 = 50X109 Once the tactical choices are each related to the organismic objective of averting na- tional ecological disaster, the relative allo- cation of resources to each can be determined on the basis of: 1. Penalty score. 2. Weighted penalty. 3. Organismic level penalty. The change by the Congressional decision- maker of the organismic objectives would change the organismic level penalties and corresponding tactical level penalty scores. Should the agencies of the Government change the number and/or importance 'of alternative strategic and tactical choices to accomplish the organismic objective, that would be reflected in the penalty scores and/ or penalty levels by hierarchy. It bears repetition that: 4. Tactical choice: Preserve trees by better farming: 50X109 - X 90 10X100 5. Tactical choice: State assistance for land acquisition: 50X100 - X 20 = 12X100 Total for 5 tactical choices. ---_---_--_--_._----__-__------------------- 8, 644 1. The Congressional decision-maker de- cides what the organismic objectives should be, and can change them; 2. The agencies of the Government decide upon the best means of accomplishing the organismic objectives and can change them. In this study, there are 14 tactical choices identified as competing for the achievement of the overall objective. They are listed in Table 11: The weighted penalty scores for the 14 tactical choices together came to 30,712. TABLE 11 I. Avert ecological disaster ------------ 100 U. Improve the environment---------- 80 ELEMENT 1. FOREST PROTECTION UTILIZATION Improve fire prevention/fighting tech- niques. Prevent strip mining. Prevent strip logging. ELEMENT 2. ACQUISITION OF LAND Create new cities in semiwild forests. Move to suburban areas with civil systems electronic products. ELEMENT 3. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE Improve routes to more distant areas. Education of the public on fire protection. Demonstration of effects of violating en- vironmental ethic. ELEMENT 4. BUREAU OF LANDMANAGEMENT Preserve trees by better farming. Establish criteria on fossil fuels (e.g. oil) mining. Improve seed inventory replenishment to restore land. ELEMENT 5. BUREAU OF OUTDOOR RECREATION State assistance for land acquisition. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8 E 5018 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- Extensions of Remarks June 1. 1970 State assistance to acquisition of ur:yan land for recreation. State assistance to acquisition of indus- trial land for recreation. As a first approzimation, consider that the 14 tactical choices are the only measures open to the Department of the Interior to ac- complish the organismic objective. In that case, Improved fire prevention/fighting tech- niques with its score of 7,500 claims 24.2% of the total budget. Similarly, prevent strip mining with its score of 9,500 claims 30.c% of the total budg- et allocation, and so on. For illustrative purposes, a simplified corn- puter program was written, and the budge- tary allocation based on these hypothetical hierarchic objectives was made for both FY 1970 and FY 1971. CREED Turning now from the tactical choices open to the pursuit of the organic objective to their logical groupings, what- can be said about the 14 tactical choices employed In this study? Improving fire prevention/fighting tech- niques; preserving trees by better farming; and Improving seed inventory replenishment clearly conserve natural resources. Simi- larly, prevention of strip logging, strip m.n- lag and the establishment of criteria on fos- sil fuel mining was designed to regulate The education of the public on fire preven- tion and the demonstration of the effects of violating environmental ethics are designed to educate. The tactical choices to im- prove roads to more distant areas, state as- sistance for land acquisition in general and urban and industrial land in particular, ac- cent the facility to enjoy. Finally the cr'e?. anon, of cities In semi-wild forests and the move to suburban areas of electronic product industries are designed to develop the en- vironment. Combining the first letter of these five a.a- tivities, the acronym CREED is evolved. The Congressional decision-maker can look at the allocation of resources under each of these categories as shown in Table 12 and decide, for instance, that the allocation of 65 %, of resources to regulate the use of the environment may be too much and the al- location of 1.5% to facilitate the enjoyment of the environment too little. He could in- street that certain other percentages, say 37% and 25' may be more appropriate. He can ask for the decreasing of the allocation to regulatory activities from 65% to 37 0, and the Increase of the allocation of the facilita- tion of the enjoyment, of the environment from 1.5% to 25%. The methodology of the present study requires the Indication from the decision-maker as to where he would want to make the change, so that the total of resources to all of CREED is 100%, TABLE 12. CREED CONSERVE, 27.19% Percent Improve fire prevention/lighting tech- niques ---------------------------- 24.42 :Preserve trees by better farming ------ 1. 47 :iniprove seed inventory replenishment to restore land ..-------.-____----. REGULATE, 65.43%, Prevent strip logging ----------------- Prevent strip mining --------------- .__ kistablish criteria on fossil fuel (e.g. oil) mining-__----_ -------- EDUCATE, 4.88 % --- - -:EL ucation of the public on fire pre- vention 3;14 laemonstratidn of effects of violating environmental ethic_ _ .---------- - -- 1.14 ENJOY, 1.:10% 7[mprove routes to more distant areas- 0. is btate assistance for land acquisition-- 0.26 State assistance to acquisition of urban 'and ----------------------------- 0.13 State assistance to acquisition of in- dustrial land---------------------- 0.13 DRVELO)?, 1.00% best move of anyone so i z. He is going to Create new cities In s?amiwild forests-.- 0 98 finish it. Over where you are, you. don't know Move to suburban areas with civil sys- all that is happening, but from here, I can tems eleotroni:c products ----------- 0.02 hear the 52's bombing in Cambodia.. It CONCLUSIONS The purpose of this introductory study has been to explore the use of the systems approach to help the systematic evaluation of the budget request by the Congressional decision-makers on the Appropriations Com- mittee, The Department of the Interior Budget figures for FY 1970 and FY 1971 were selected, and some 55% of the total budget (NOA) represented in five elements was identified for analysis. Using the organismic, strategic and tacti- cal hierarchy of objecDaves, the five elements were associated with a single, overall ob- jective: Averting national ecological dis- aster. Alternative measures of .meeting this overall objective were systematically de- veloped for each of the five elements. A systematic comparison was made of dif- ferent tactical level choices, horizontally; and also of each tactical choice with its higher level of objectives at the strategic and organismic level, vertically. The consequence of nonfulfillment of each of the tactical level choices upon the or- ganismic objective were illustratively put into numerical terms. Based upon the rela- tionship of each tactical objective to each other and each tactical objective to the cor- reEponding strategic and organismic objec- tives, the allocations of the Interior Budget were demonstrated. The strength of the systems approach ex- plored with respect to the appropriate evalu- ation lies in the consistency of Its method- olcgy which forces the user to make explicit his hidden assumptions and values, so that alternative means of accomplishing the same objective can be Identified and evaluated; and also courses and consequences corre- sponding to altogether different sets of over- all objective themes. A YOUNG MAN IN VIETNAM WRITES .HIS PARENTS HON. MARK. ANDREWS OF NORTH DAKOTA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, Jane-1, 1970 Mr. ANDREWS of North Dakota. Mr. Speaker, the war in. Vietnam and the President's recent decision to send troops into Cambodia to destroy enemy con- centrations have been the subjects of major controversy over the past several weeks. Everyone is hearing what the students on our campuses are saying, but too few have heard what our young men who are serving in Vietnam have to say. I was pleased to receive a copy of a letter from Philip Foss to his mother and father, Mr, and Mrs. William Foss of Michigan N :Dak Phili i i hi , . p s serv ng s .: 32.55 30.93 country in Vietnam and his letter speaks for itself. I include the letter at this point in the RECORD: DEAR MOM AND DAD: l know you've waited a long time for this letter, and that I should have written sooner but I'll get this one in the mail. I got both of your packages. The bread was in fine shape as was the sausage and cheese. It didn't last 20 minutes once it got hero. I ate about 8 or 10 sandwiches myself and let the other fellows have the rest. It was the beat sandwich. I've had in nearly a year. I suppose you're wondering what is going on over here. Well, Nixon made the sounds like drufns rolling- The only way to end this is to go after them. But the main thing is that the people at hoarse stand to- gether whether Nixon is right or wrong. We are in Cambodia now and it's too late to back out. So we must go ahead. and finish the mission and hope we have done right. In my own mind, this will be the turning point. I would have made the same decision if it were for we to decide. My time is nearly over. Its been ten months now and they've gene fairly fast. One day I'll be walking in the door. :1 can't wait to eat some food again. I never gave it much thought until I didn't have ill anymore. I miss all that food, vegetable soup with dumplings, chile. I could go on forever. This is the busy time at home, I suppose, The farmers with their crops and you with insurance. When the grain is ripe, I'll see it this year. Hope you're both in the best of health. Tell the people you finally got a letter from me. Take good care of yourselves. Love, your son THE HARD HATS-FOR GOD AND COUN'l.'R,'Y" HON. JOHN R. RAR ECK OF LOVISIA74A IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, June 1, 1970 Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, for years I have been saying that when the Ameri- can workingman becomes fed up with what is going on in our country, we can expect a change for the better. In New York City, upward of 150,000 hard hats-workingmen--recently pa- raded in a show of American flags to pledge unity for our country and sup- port for its leaders. Their shouts "All the Way U.S.A." have echoed around the world. Now we in Washington understand that the hard hats are to come to our Na- tion's Capital-not to protest against but to demonstrate for the United States, for our fighting men, for our flag, and even for police officers. I predict that when the builders-the workers of our country start being heard we can anticipate a stiffening in the attitudes of many of the liberal-left politicians. And, when our patriotic labor Americans join forces with the farmers and the other concerned loyal Americans, along with patriotic youth, there will arise a ground swell of Americanism from the once silent majority which may yet save our country. Mr. Speaker, I have my hard :hat in my office-I, too, have heard the cry "U.S.A., All the Way." I include several news clippings,' as follow: [From the Washington (D.C') Post, May 31, 19701 FLAG'S DEsSNDEa3: HARD HATS MA-SCBI FOR A WAY or Lips: (By Richard Harwood) NEw YORK.-In lower Manhattan, the flags are everywhere, Little flags, taped to car an- tennas, overhead cranes and Ice-cream carts. Big flags, whipping in the winds that blow through Wall Street. Metal flags stuck in Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8