STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE RE: ICC LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: June 6, 1970
• Content Type: TELEGRAM

:J 25X1A `~`T PARTNtEf~T OfST 'f `TEtEGRA1Vr"""`"
INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 EA- 10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07
L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12
10-13 UPW-01 RSR-01 /126 W
ACTION NEA-15
R 0607352 JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1200
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMCONSUL BOMBAY
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MADRAS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUESRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 124
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NEW DELHI 6614
SUBJECT: ICC LAOS
1. TIME OF INDIA JUNE 6 FEATURED REPORT ON "INDIAN BID REVIVE
ICC VIENTIANE TO SAVE LAOS." IN ESSENCE, INDIA SAID MAKING
UNSPECIFIED FRESH EFFORTS ACTIVATE ICC TO INHIBIT CAMBODIAN
COMBAT SPILLOVER IN LAOS.
2. "WHETHER EFFORTS WILL YIELD RESULTS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL SINCE
COMMISSION CANNOT INTERVENE EFFECTIVELY UNLESS MEMBERS CANADA
AND POLAND PERSUADED AGREE UPON COMMON APPROACH.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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EM ZMAJORITY DECISION OBVIOUSLY HAS NOT MORAL IMPACT UNANIMOUS
VERD ICTS.
4. "IF COMMISSION DEADLOCK CANNOT BE BROKEN, INDIA WILLING TAKE
UP WITH BRITAIN AND USSR, IN HOPE THEY CAN BE PERSUADED USE IN-
FLUENCE TO RESTORE ICC ROLE UNDER GENEVA AGREEMENTS,
5. "BEST WOULD BE IF COMMISSION AGREED TAKE COGNIZANCE OF TROOP
MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LAOS IN CONTEXT CAMBODIAN FIGHTING.
PRESENCE OF U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE GROUND FORCES IS ADMITTED BY
THE TWO COUNTRIES, BUT THOSE OF OTHERS IS NOT.
6. "NORTH VIETNAMESE ACCORDING RLG ARE INVESTING STRATEGIC
SARAVANE. THERE ALSO REPORTS OF ENCROACHMENTS INTO LAOS BY
THAI TROOPS, WHILE FORCES OF PATHET LAO AND RLG HAVE BEEN
DISREGARDING CEASE-FIRE LINES JOCKEYING FOR POSITIONS.
7. "THIS BUILDING INTO EXPLOSIVE SITUATION WHILE ICC IMMOBILIZED
BY DIFFERENCES, STANDS BY IDLY.
S. "INDIAN ICC CHAIRMAN RECEIVED REQUEST FROM LAOTIAN GOVERN-
MENT MAY 9 TO NOTE THREAT TO SARAVANE WHICH LAOTIAN ARMY DID NOT
HAVE MEANS TO REPULSE. ICC ACKNOWLEDGED REQUEST MAY 26?WITHOUT
INDICATING ACTION.
9.. SUCH INACTION DESTROYING LITTLE CREDIBILITY ICC STILL HAS.
IMMOBILITY ALSO DAMAGING TO INDIA'S POSITION AS NEUTRAL AND
IMPARTIAL OBSERVER. HENCE NEW DELHI ANXIETY THAT COMMISSION
RESUME FUNCTIONS IT REQUIRED PERFORM UNDER GENEVA CHARTERS,
10. "RLG SAYS HANOI TRYING TURN AREA AROUND SARAVANE INTO
SANCTUARY TO REPLACE LOSS OF CAMBODIAN. IT IS ALSO ALLEGED HANOI
TROOP MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LAOS MEANT CREATE NEW HO CHI MINH
TRAIL-
It. "THESE CHARGES HAVE PLAUSIBLE RING BECAUSE COMPULSIONS
OF GEOGRAPHY IN INDO-CHINA STATES CANNOT ALLOW LAOS REMAIN
UNAFFECTED BY BITTER FIGHTING VIET-NAM AND NEW CONFLICT
CAMBODIA.
12, "BUT IDLE FOR RLG PROTEST ITS NEUTRALITY; TESTIMONY RECORDED
BY U. S. SENATE'S FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES
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RLG?S CONCURRENCE IN U. S. STRIKES AGAINST PATHET LAO-HELD AREAS
AS WELL AS INTO NORTH VIET-NAM.
13. "IN TANGLED SITUATION ICC9 CREATED SUPERVISE CEASE-FIRE WHICH
NO LONGER EXISTS, FINDS ITSELF COMPLETELY BYPASSED BY EVENTS. AS
NEW DELHI SEES IT t INDIA CANNOT DISOWN RESPONSIBILITIES AS LONG AS
COMMISSION CONTINUES TO EXIST."
COMMENT: MINISTRY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS JOINT SECRETARY GONSALVES
TOLD POLITICAL COUNSELOR JUNE 6 TIMES REPORT USUAL PRESS SPECULA-
TION. SAID GOI IS EXPLORING VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES BUT THERE NO
REPEAT NO FRESH BID AND SITUATION REMAINS ESSENTIALLY THAT REPORTED
PARA ELEVEN NEW DELHI 6426. ADDED THERE NO QUESTION OF REVIVAL
ICC LAOS, IT EXISTS, BUT HIGHLY ACADEMIS TO EXPECT ICC TO SAVE
LAOS.
STONE
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view of international rela- needs an answer badly, the
I) F'I'R o I'1' , MT C l i . tions being suitable and "re- CIA may not be able to pro-
NEWS Others in the.dark duce.
N~'Vf'' de the disin enuous amoral S i, situation would be
- situation would be
h~ - ?~):', (,1 6
S - 'l,U~3b
.1 'r~'?a ' 1970_._
E
LY A
le of St as 'and its work, Hannan might
Ctol. S Donovan's Office d look back to an earlier Amer- j
e
(
the hem of his garment. should know better.
Before he disdains the CIA
IN ITC
AR
inside our government - and has served as an assistant
I that is why Hannah withdraws secretary of d e f e n s e and
p g , -
if not immoral, covert, and pleasing in Moscow, Pelting,
selfishly' pro-American, being Cairo, Damascus, and very.
"disrespectable." lihzly in Berkeley or Cam-
Obviously, AID would not' bridge, but perhaps not so
want its acronym tarnished much. so to high-minded, de-
by? disrespectable associationsi cent men like Hannah, who
), urmg scan, Nathan Hale, who, when
gic heves
World War II, our pre-CIA reproached in 1775 by a friend
e-d.b i n t e l l i g e n c e organiza for "dirtying himself" by spy
Lion planted representatives I ing within the British lines,
r
at any point in the govern,' lied' "Every kind of ser-
i structure where re- vice, necessary to, the public
? suits could best be attained. a by
good,. ., becomes hotiorab
Since World - War II was a being necessary."
e patriotic, "moral" war, no ob- e ram, `J jections were raised. Nor, for
the same reason, during the
If Hannah succeeds in di- which they will sit out.
vorcing AID and CIA, his Blatchfot~i's Peace Corps, iRichard Helm's IA is a As a practical matter, it
agency will then make com- statt a e n c of the hardly requires a manpower
Mon rps,cwhich haith the s always held United States provided for by "right" to ofre selective th
service'
Co
I off-limits to the murky Congress and pai dfor from (in which the individual se
-but?vitallynecessary-game; the public treasury. Whether lects his own wars), means'
of Intohigence. or ^ not given individuals.. or that the day the bugle blows
..a1,.,.. nm,nrnment AM-11. -
kind of operation," he said. literally depen s.
! Like Hannah's AID and which wars they will fight and
varlvu5 ageuc+eb m
miskills. litary 6 - ment agencies paid for by t
Expressing the hope that ernment to turn their back on taxpayer can pick and chose;
the CIA (AID and the Peace
the relationship between AID the kind of work they take in: -is a and CIA could be severed by and obstructs ttheeCIA hinders
per- the doct ph
r i to soh cal siblingt popular n i
legislation now pending, Han- forming crucially important
nah expressed distaste for tellectual and even some ju-
functions on which the sur-
working with the CIA. "Our dicial circles: that people
vival of the United States
preference is to get out of this d . enjoy the "right" to choose
By COL. R. D. HEINL JR. THE ATTITUDE taken by Korean war, was there any
News Miiitars AeabRl annah, as well as by two tendency on the part of U.S.
WASHINGTON - e;
hrivar and .k
Agency for International De- 'HoodVaughan, and the pres- It is only because of the
velopment (AID) is a cover, ent director, Joseph H. domestic unpopularity of Viet-
for the' CIA in os and Blatchford, is that their agen- nam and a simplistic view of
wishes it weren't. . cies are or ought to be too government and its interests
Since 1962, according to its pure to dirty their hands with and their defense, that organi
administrator, John A. Han intelligence matters. It infers I; zations like AID and the
nah, the mission in Vientiane' that such work should be left P a a c e. Corps conclude that
to the CIA which, in the in- .they' should be allowed to re,
has maintained a "rural de-
velopment" division which is ference;. comes through as a f u s e government business
crew of amoral tricksters and " that some internal opinion
in fact a CIA front for train- disapproves.
in individuals and units in warmongers. pp_
_ Thn ,nrrawcine desire f
-ties, appioua the xma vL WULl1 lot of high-minded young men.
.CIA sometimes does, the fact `
to go to that particular war.
remains that CIA business is Strictly on principle, you un-
government business-no less derstand.
than AID business - and usu-
a good bit more import- IN THE SAME WAY, if.
ally
ant. various government agencies
Yet the stance of AID and acquire the discretion to cold-;
the Peace Corps suggests that ? shoulder the CIA for the sake
.there is a kind of pousse-cafe venience, or because agency i
stratification of government of image, administrative con-
,functions: some at the top officials are lukewarm on, a
above - board, pure, disinter- particular tenet of defense or
psted, rt}oral in the- Wilsonian it foreign policy,.; then some fine
morning__when. the President,
 Approved For Release 2 C W 0 000015-8 E 5351
June 8, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL REGOI~D x ens1JA 9 ,VM9
early days of Vietnam.
money" is a subjective interpretation has become the only viable indigenous . He was killed in the
of some old, over-generalized figures that the political force capable of providing government's late-summer offensive.
"These guys are tigers," says an American
Post Office Department has publicly declared leadership for thousands of dislocated personally acquainted with many CIA
to be obsolete and invalid. Postmaster Gen- and poverty stricken peasants. agents in Laos. "They're tough, intelligent
eral Blount has stated on numerous occasions I ask, Mr. Speaker, is this the course guys who know how to 'handle themselves.
positive Third con Bulk mail is a desirable, the President Will now take in Cambodia They're not afraid to mix it up out in the tributor pe postal to Operation. the economic
ciency of the T state- after the,withdrawal of U.S. troops on jungle." The American is a civilian engineer
. This s effi -
theirhelping oto
ment is supported by the Department's Reve- June 30? If so, he must be warned that whoa befriended ded onyagents ofwhile
came er Laos their because remote
nue and Cost Analysis report issued on indiscriminate bombing, use of chemi- outposts. airstrips
April 6 of this year. The report shows that cals, and other forms of massive civilian ili were fed," he says. "Here they're ands things m its handling cost by 98% whereas the revenue which invite resistance and the growth the way they want to, and getting better pay
from First Class mail exceeds its respective of Communism. for it as well."
handling sthohat t Third hard Class Bul
k is same most The excerpts from the four articles An Important CIA adjunct in Laos has the by only %. also table of ms l handled the the innocuous title of "Requirements Office". It is
Post major class of mail by the follow:
St Office. WASHINGTON'S DILEMMA staffed by about 90 men, most of whom also
are ex- military types. Their function may be
a step further, Assistant Postmaster (By Arnold Abrams) inconspicuous, but it is not innocuous. Sta-
I TO go
Gen General al James W. Hargrove stated on April 13 Ironically, those most in the dark about tioned at field level, requirements officers-
of this year that, if Third Class Bulk mail did Laos are the American people. More than called ROs-handle the distribution of arms
not exist, then the 296 million dollars in gross simply being unaware of the scope of U.S. and ammunition, as well as general logistics.
profit which it produced in. fiscal 1969 would operations here, th ^ have yet to be told by They are vital to any military operation
have had to come from some other source. their government that their nation is mili- mounted by the government.
He added that there are only two alterna- tarily involved in Laos. American officials activities prompted
tives for 'that other source'-either a con- still seek to officially conceal U.S. violations Learning about Fulbright these
raise aca key rompted
gressional subsidy or an increase in First of the 1962 Geneva Accord, which bars all about the CIA's role her since its function
Class postage rates. forms of 'foreign military intervention in ostensibly is to gather information, why is
With these thoughts in mind, I certainly Laos. They contend that Hanoi's refusal to st running a war in Laos? "I don't
hope that you will reconsider your present concede the presence of North Vietnamese this sibly s agency kind of activity at all," n't
position on this subject. When I served as troops here makes it diplomatically unfeasi- appro e said. " this But if it is activity the national c-
one of your county chairman in the in se
1968 ble for Washington to at otherwise.
Senatorial Campaign, I had complete con- Consequently, everyone in Vientiane, from curity ought intererest st t too d do this, regular it seems aems s to to me me it
forces to be by US jectivi of your unquestioned integrity, ob- the Russian ambassador to the mamasan of and not by an intelligence=gathering agency."
weigh all nd the facts to acting seek ut and the legendary White Rose, knows what the He added that the National Security Act.
weigh alsure facts before actinon any Americans are doing here. But the American which created the CIA, "`never contemplated
issue. I with ure that this personal involve- public remains ignorant of the fact that this function" for the agency.
s and past efforts tends regard eighten their government is arming, training, sup- The CIA mission chief in Laos is Lawrence
myat wtyour
my awareness and concern rarsome plying, transporting and directing approxi- Devlin, listed as a "political officer" in the
of your' more recent activities. However, I mately 70,000 Laotian troops in a war which US Embassy. Unlike most political officers,
cero ist ainly hope (and must assume) tout these threatens to get out of hand. however, Devlin flatly refuses to see reporters.
sidered personal not represent your con- Instead of setting the record at least par- For all anybody
ver- d ou sec al campaign but are simply tially straight, U.S. officials here do things knows:. he might agree on
o
over-zealous campaign efforts which were like allowing yang Pao to declare recently, that last point with Senator Fulbright, who
produced well intentioned supporters. before a sizable contingent of visiting journ- stressed that he was not criticising the the
The voters of Iowa's First District right- alists, that his Meo forces fight with an- CIA. "The agency is just following orders,"
fully look to both you and your opponents Fulbright said.
for information and interpretation on vital tiquated weapons, inadequate communica- Cargo and military supplies-as well as
tions and inconsequential American sup- eCargo rsonnel ndry ilitard supplies-as Laos by
issuest I am sure that you constantly strive port. As he was speaking, American F-4 per America and Continental Air Services,
fo fulfill td unbiased in the most straight Phantom jets roared overhead, several Amer-
o Amer-
hope rivate charter firms under contract to the
hope td that and the- unbased information manner which I have of- and ican observation planes were parked nearby Up S govern e charter rmsy are bconr known as
tw of assistato you nce this three cargo-laden American transport ment.
effordt. Enclosed youswill find some further de- planes landed in quick succession at his of- the "CIA Airlines", and most of their pilots
flcial Sam Thong base. After denying he are ex-air force officers. Reporters are allowed
the which maybe of its postal expling even received indirect U.S. military sup- to accompany flights involving rice drops to
the subect of Third Class postal economics. port, Vang Pao calmly climbed into an un- refugee camps, but are banned when military
Sincerely, marked American helicopter, guarded by cargoes are carried.
MIKE MCSWEENEY. Laotians carrying American-made M-16 au- "Why do you guys always ask about weap-
tomatic rifles, and was flown back to his se- ons and ammo shipments?" pilot Jim Walsh
cret Long Cheng headquarters by a three- asked me. Walsh, 38, is an ex-air force officer
'man American crew. who has worked in Laos for Air America since
U.S. POLICY IN LA TRENC*THENS Vang Pao and official verbiage notwith- 1962. "You know we're not allowed to talk
THE ~CNISTS standing, American involvement in the La- about such things," he said.
otian conflict takes the following principal Another form of American air service in-
HON. DONALD M. FRASER forms: In addition to 75 military advisers Laos constitutes the most direct US involve-
listed as embassy "attaches," about 300 men ment in the fighting. Under the euphemism
OF MINNESOTA are employed in a variety of clandestine mill- of "armed reconnaissance flights", Thailand-
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES tary activities supervised by the- CIA. Al- based American jets and bombers have
though technically civilians, many CIA mounted aerial bombardments equal to the
Monday, June 8, 1970 agents In Laos are former Special Forces pounding taken by North Vietnam prior to
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, in the soldiers recruited because of military ex- the bombing halt in 1968. The He Chi Minh
pertise and Vietnam experience. trail in southeast Laos has been the prime
di Presdust pThese ex-Green Berets train government target of American air attacks, but enemy
Nidot of public concern over
not forget invasion of Camboda, we must troops, assist wide-ranging reconnaissance encampments and troops on the Plain of
not forget the quiet war of escalation the teams and plan guerrilla and psychological Jars came under heavy fire during the recent
administration has been conducting in warfare operations. They wear combat fa- government offensive.
Laos throughout 1969 and 1970. tigues and work out of three main camps, Money for many US operations in Laos is
I wish to bring to the attention of the where they administer rigorous training in. cloaked in the budget of the mammoth
Congress excerpts from four articles from jungle warfare, guerrilla tactics, communica- Agency for International Development, or
the Far Eastern Economic Review which tions handling and weaponry. channelled through other unobtrusive con-
describe how Vietnamization, a reduc- The CIA also maintains and largely con- duits. The scope of American financial sup-
trols yang Pao's army of approximately 15,- port of the neutralist Royal Lao government
has resulted ginu a tes al io Vietnam, 000 fulltime troops. Officials instructions to testifies to the effectiveness of such cover.
has all escalatory 'Vu se the contrary, CIA personnel occasionally Sc- Total American assistance here is reliably
Weapons of mass deStructiOn in Laos. S. company these forces no combat forays. More estimated at between US $250 million and
As these articles point out, massive. than 20 agents have been killed in Laos. $300 million per year. Of that, only the tech-
devastation of civilian life and property Among. the most recent CIA casualties was nical budgetst-about t $60 illioo ea is m made undisclosed, has drastically altered the fragile politics Phil Werbisky, a former Special Forces cap- P
of neutrality in Laos. The Pathet Lao tain widely known for his exploits during the entirely for military purposes.
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 ME 52 Ai.J r.J1.Vv 1 VI 1\G IGcs LVV I/VV/JV . VIA-1\Vr I L-VVJJI 1\VVVJVVVLVV 1,J-V
tf~l CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -Extensions of Remarks June 8, 1970
P111- 'calls woo support the mammoth US bomb.
{Sy T. D, Allniati) suit Of an illusory military victory, attd his ing operation in Laos irorn bases in Thailand,
The situation In Laos is .;:1ct particularly earnpulsive lack of candour on the effects and Vietnam and Guam.
eneos*aging for either side fo3 the 1 yyeri_ motives Of t lat policy carried him from the Nixon said: "No American stationed in
calls h to have dropped hundreds of thou- greatest plurality in the history of presiden+ Laos has ever been killed in ground combat
sands of tons of bombs to prop Up the tial elections to political oblivion four years operations." Although the phrasing is highly
t$Lx a gov 'lsr'nattt#` or for the North Viet- later. restrictive=most of the Laos war is fought
XlWtie4e, Who have Invested tens of thousands This time the president appears less ego- from outside Laos by i`;3 personnel not sta-
af, trdops in a aso-lay futile effort to .once involved; the country is Laos, not Vietnam; tioned there-It is well known in Vientiane
Prince Souvanna Piouma's government to and llchard Nixon still has many, many that many Americans have been killed in
foUowmore aequie5centpolicles, mistakes to make before he turns into the combat situations in Los, and that their
Almost paradoxically, both sides have be- Lear-like figure that Johnson has become. deaths, in South Vietnam, would be counted
gun the present dry season, which marts the But mistakes are being made in Laos, and as combat casualties. Ini'ormed sources here-
annual upswing in fighting, in weaker ,posi- they became more obvious after Nixon's re- recalling that Americans killed in Laos are
tiaras than they held six months or ea year cent nationwide address on Laos. It was sup- often shipped out on special planes without
ago. Both sides seem as far away as ever posed to tell all, but it wound up being un- legal formalities in order to avoid publicity-
from achieving their goals in Laos. And the deniably-and probably. deliberately- estimate that about 150 Americans are killed
country Is victim of an escalating level of cavalier with the facts about the disguised each year in the Laos war, the vast majority
violence that so far has maintained the.rough war the US is fighting in Laos.
balance of territorial power only at era ever The major fact Nixon apparently wished al lone. them The pilots shot down on bombing mn-
president's contention that no
higher cost in Laotian lives, property and to conceal was that the US war effort in Laos American lives are being spent in Laos, of
hope of finding some way out of the Vietnam had Increased greatly since November 1968 all his experiments with the truth, may be
war. when the bombing halt in North Vietnam the one that comes ba.rk to haunt him the
Indeed, as Laos enters its sixth full year resulted In an almost automatic escalation of most as more and more Americans-mostly
of war since the break-up of the coalition bombing In Laos. life said reports that the the families of civilian Air America pilots
government and escalation of the war in increase in "our air activity has had the effect and US Air Force officers -rece,ve death tele-
South Vietnam, nothing seems to have of escalating the conflict" were "grossly in- grams from Washington.
turned out the way anyone wanted it. accurate," Perhaps most importantly, the president
The North Vietnamese hoped to use Laos The fact remains that US bombing sorties sought to camouflage the major changes that
as an unimpeded funnel to victory in South over Laos have risen from an average 4-5,000 have occurred in the US policy in Laos over
Vietnam. When the Vientiane government a month to 15--18,00D today. The fact remains the last year by averring that American ex-
permitted the Americans to start the bomb- that the US now is bombing whole areas of pansion of its war role in Laos has occurred
ing, the North Vietnamese committed in- Laos it did not touch before, including the "only when requested by the Laotian govern-
creasing amounts of troops. in an effort to Plain of Jars. The iact remains that Vie US ment". He also said: "The level of our air
discredit that 'government. This they have has expanded Its policy of systematically operations has been increased only as the
succeeded in doing, at least militarily, time denuding the Communist-held areas of Laos number of North Vie' neiraese in Laos and the
after time, but the U.S. bombing has only by moving in, taking out the civilian popu- level of their aggression has increased."
Increased. lation, destroying all stocks of food and de- In fact, observers here point out, the ini-
The Americans began the bombing with foliating productive land. It is also a fact tial US air escalation in Laos, which occurred
some hope of keeping the war from spread- that US personnel-including advisers, plan- during late 1968 and early 1969, happened
lag deep Into the territory of an increasingly ners, transport pilots and American. gunship when there was no communist threat of
dependent Vietiane government. But jet crews-are more deeply Involved in fighting noticeably increased proportions. Indeed, the
bombers cannot stop ambushes; they are of the Laotians' war for them than ever before. aerial escalation did not occur because of
relatively little use even in medium-;sized Nixon, of course, went on television to de- special events in Laos, but because the US
engagements. As a result. American bombs fend his policy, not to pick it apart. The bombing halt in North Vietnam for the first
have been able to drive the communists off speech, obviously aimed squarely at Middle time permitted the focus of the US air ar-
the Plain. of Jars and have constantly har- America, was an attempt to win political ap- senal to shift to Laos. And perhaps, the cru-
aissed traffic along the Ho Chi Minh ',rail. proval for what is going on in Laos. With in- cial point, long-time observers here say, is
But nothing the Americans can do, short of creasing disquiet expressed in the US Con- that until a year ago Laotian requests for an
moving their own ground troops into Laos, gress and the press about the US war effort escalation of the US bombing and logistics
can prevent the communists from disrupt- in Laos, the President could be excused for effort were rejected as a matter of a long-
ing normal commerce and government in emphasizing the logic behind his own Laos established policy of keeping the US Involve-
the -Mekong valley. Similarly, commt.nist policy-even if it meant trying to lay all the ment in Laos as low profile as possible.
raids and larger attacks can discredit the blame for the unhappy state of affairs in That policy has changed, and the Nixon
Vietiane government's pretensions to effec- Laos on Hanoi's doorstep. But the President administration clearly is no longer interested
tive authority but they cannot stop the Amer- can hardly be excused for saying things that in keeping a particularly low profile in Laos,
lean bombing. even US officials here have had to concede, despite the overall thrust of the Nixon Doc-
Thus neither North Vietnam nor the just aren't right. Among the Nixonlan dcpar- trine. The underlying rea ons for the change
United States have found the short-cut to tures from reality: is Laos policy are not hard to discern: "The
victory In South Vietnam that they sought The President said there were 67,000 North US is deescalating downstream in South
in violations of Laotian neutrality. The Lao- Vietnamese troops in Laos, up from 55,000 in Vietnam," a Vientiane diplomat recently ob-
tians, on both sides, have suffered heavily. mid-1969. The US embassy here, despite its served. "It is only naturae that it should es-
Probably neither the Americans nor the enthusiasm for the task, can find only 50,000 calate upstream In Laos, especially on the
North Vietnamese originally anticipated North Vietnamese troops, an increase from Ho Chi Minh Trail."
that the Laotian war would involve theist so the 47,000 figure estimated in the middle of The American bombin" of communist In-
deeply, and turn out to be so inconclusive. last year. filtration routes in Laos,,a fact, will be one
There now is some debate in Vietiane on He said a total of 1,040 Americans work for of the few controls the US will retain over
when the communists will finally be able to the US government in Laos, directly or in- events In South Vietnam as Vietnamisation
get their Plain of Jars counter-offensive directly, of which 643 are involved in some proceeds. The effectiveness of the bombing
going, and when they do, whether it will military or logistics capacity. A paragraph is debatable. But the President clearly does
force the United States Into another escala- later, lie said: "US personnel in Laos during not wish to relinquish 1 while he is sur-
tien, such as the use of B-52 bombers for the past year has not increased ." But only rendering so many other options in South
the first time in large numbers outside the last September, in another administration Vietnam.
He Chi Minh trail. statement supposed to tell all about Laos, Indeed, from all appearances, U.S. policy-
But in contrast to a year ago, there is now the US State Department said that only makers sec the U.S. bombing in Laos as one
absolute unanimity among all observers, of 8:33 Americans were working in Laos. Had the of the keys to escape frost, the whole Indo-
all persuasions, that an end to the Laos total number of Americans In Laos actually china labyrinth. If the bombing can control
war is impossible until after the end of the increased from ,333 to 1,040--a rise of almost the flow of North Vietnamese soldiers and
Vietnam war, whenever that may come, and 25%? Or was the State Department wrong? supplies into South Vietn,tn, Vietnamisation
that the prognoisis for Laos in 1970, and in- Or the presiden.? will have a better chance of success, and the
deed for a long time after that, is for more-- Most disturbing, reliable sources here say U.S. Will be well on its way out of the war.
,perhaps much more-of the same. the total of US personnel dire tl
c
LAOS SHADES OF LBJ
(By T. D. Allman)
VIENTIANE.--Two expressions-"escala-
tion" and "credibility gap"-may well be on
the way to having the same dark significance
for President Nixon that they had for his
predecessor. Lyndon Johnson's fruitless up-
y supporting , course, the train of cause and effect in
the Vietnamese government's war effort is international affairs is seldom so simple, and
really much higher than 643, more like 1,000, the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao have
if one includes "temporary duty personnel", expressed their displeasure at the increase
and military and logistics personnel who of bombing by continuing their attacks
spend the day to Laos but sleep at night at against government positions in Laos. They
US bases in Thailand and Vietnam. None of are using more men than ever before in the
the figures-the.State_ Department's, the pres- current dry season offensive-though the rise
ident's or those knowledgeable sources in in number of North Vietnamese troops in
Laos-include the tens of thousands of Amer- Laos does not constitute the escalation Presi-
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020015-8
June 8, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks
dent Nixon charged so much as a need to
protect the Plain of Jars flank which the U.S.
and Laotians for the first time attacked last
year.
If the communists continue, as they have
in the past, to win more and more ground in
Laos, the government of Prince Souvanna
Phouma could fall, or be forced to make con-
cession to the communists, such as calling
for a U.S. bombing halt. This, of course, would
undermine the whole American effort to get
out of South Vietnam gracefully, and so the
Nixon administration has gone to escalated
lengths to preserve the Vientiane government
from a string of communist defeats.
Vang Vleng they would be recapturing terri-
tory belonging to the Kong Le neutralists in
1962 and could then claim it In the name of
their own "patriotic neutralist" forces.
They might move southwest in an attempt
to take Long Cheng and Sam Thong. Long
Cheng Is the major US military base in
northeast Laos. Recently visited by jour-
nalists for the first time, they reported seeing
the longest runway in northern Laos, big
helicopters used for rescuing downed Ameri-
can pilots in northern Laos, and American
planes landing and taking off every minute.
Sam Thong, seven miles away by air, is a
centre for airlifting arms, food and medical
THE LABYRINTHINE WAR
In 1953 the Vietminh launched an offensive
into Laos. This forced the French to make
an unpalatable choice; either attempt to
hold on to Laos or, as military sense dictated,
withdraw and concentrate forces on the Viet-
namese coastal plans. The French chose the
former-and Dienbienphu and disaster soon
followed.
Now, in 1970, a white foreign power fight-
ing to maintain its position in Laos and
Vietnam may soon be faced with a similar
decision. If current communist military ac-
tivities continued, the U.S. will have to de-
cide whether to become more Involved in Laos
or make political and military concessions
it has not yet been willing to consider.
It is still too early to say where the pendu-
lum will swing. But one thing Is clear: the
U.S. and the Royal Lao Government are on
the defensive. If the communists decide to
continue their offensive-however large and
whoever is leading-it is not likely to be con-
tained without substantial military escala-
tion or significant concessions on the part
of the Americans.
For the past two years the U.S. has carried
out one of the most sustained bombing cam-
paigns in history against essentially civilian
targets in northeastern Laos. The area is a
carpet of forest dotted by villages, and a few
towns. Refugees report that the bombing
was primarily directed against their villages.
Operating from Thai bases and from aircraft
carriers, American jets have destroyed the
great majority of villages and towns in the
northeast. Severe casualties have been in-
flicted upon the inhabitants of the region,
rice fields have been burned, and roads torn
up. Refugees from the Plain of Jars report
they were bombed almost daily by American
jets last year. They say they spent most of
the past two years living in caves or holes.
The basic aim of this bombing has been
to hurt communist forces in every possible
way: to deprive them of villages which could
provide them with shelter, of manpower
which could be used as porters or rice
growers, to limit food supplies and road travel
and to demoralise.
It seems probable, however, that this at-
tempt to "raise the ante" has worked only
too well. Militarily the Pathet Lao and North
Vietnamese seem to be as strong as ever.
The Ineffectiveness of American airpower is
highlighted in a comparison of the com-
munist offensives against the Plain of Jars
in 1964 and 1970. It took them three days to
take it six years ago. This year, despite
the massive American air 'support for gov-
ernment forces, it took five days.
Perched on the plain, communist forces
could move in any or all of three directions.
They could push west to Route 13, then move
south toward Vang Vieng. Pathet Lao forces
include a number of former neutralist bat-
talions, currently commanded by General
Deuane. The Pathet Lao claim that these
represent the real neutralists. By taking
egnitary outposts. These are locates on moun-
taintops and can be supplied only from the
air. Long Cheng and Sam Thong constitute
the logistics and air support centre for mili-
tary activities throughout the northeast.
Both are relatively easy to defend, being sur-
rounded by hills on all sides. If the com-
munists are willing to pay the price, however,
there seems little doubt that they could cap-
ture both; this would mean a major military
defeat for government forces.
A third though less likely possibility is that
the communists may move southeast and
attempt to take Paksane, a Mekong river
town. -Militarily this would be relatively easy
but it might risk Thai involvement and con-
ceivably, American ground Intervention. It
also seems unlikely that communist forces
could hold Paksane for very long.
Whatever direction they choose to move, a
communist offensive from the plain could
place the US in a most difficult position. Air-
power would be unlikely to halt their ad-
vance. Neither would the Royal Lao Army or
the CIA-directed Clandestine Army.
The 60,000-man Royal I,ao Army is made
up primarily of village youths conscripted to
fight in a war they neither understand nor
desire. A private's salary is about US$5 a
month. Government soldiers have shown a
marked-and one suspects rather astute-
disposition for retreat during major battles.
Corruption and indifference is rife in the
officers corps. American military attaches
complain constantly that the only advice Lao
army officers seek from them is in preparing
escape plans. During the last battle for the
plain government soldiers complained that
they had been fenced in by barbed wire to
Drevent their retreat,
The Meo soldiers-and Thai, Burmese and
Cambodian mercenaries of the Clandestine
Army-tend to be more aggressive than reg-
ular troops. A private is paid more than
US$30 a month and is better equipped and
trained. Their strength is about 6,000 in
northeastern Laos and 6,000 in the rest of
the country. However, as an American official
delicately put it, the Meos are "better at at-
tacking than defending". The fact is that
they are basically a group of guerillas, effec-
tive at harassing and small actions but
simply not designed to function as a regular
army. The most serious problem with Vang
Pao's Men soldiers is their lack of discipline.
Laotian refugees complain bitterly of mis-
treatment by Meo soldiers during their cap-
ture of the plain last September. Refugees say
the Meos slaughtered hundreds of cows and
buffaloes, destroyed many of their shelters
and looted their belongings.
The only real military options left-to the
US should a major communist thrust develop
are the introduction of American ground
troops or support of a Thai invasion into
Laos.
At present, neither seems very likely. Laos
is simply not a vital enough interest for the
US to introduce ground troops, particularly
after nine years of Vietnam. And support of
E5353
Thai troops in Laos might In the end prove
more complicated and costly than sending in
American troops. Despite periodic breast-
beatings at SEATO conferences and other
occasions, the Thais are not-very anxious to
confront the North Vietnamese army face
to face. And few Americans here believe that
if they did they would make a particularly
good showing.
A successful communist push in Laos
would probably result in major political and
military concessions on the part of the US.
This would seem to be the communist
goal. Few informed observers here believe
that the communists plan to take over Laos
in the near future. American military at-
taches, the first to ascribe aggressive motives
to the North Vietnamese, have stated pub-
licly that they do not believe that the North
Vietnamese are intent on "colonising" Laos.
The first priority for the communists
would probably be to force the US to stop
its bombing of both the Ho Chi Minh trail
and northern Laos. A second would be to give
greatly increased strength to the Pathet Lao
within the framework of a coalition govern-
ment.
A third, and intriguing, possibility is that
a communist offensive in Laos may be de-
signed to force a faster rate of American
troop withdrawal from South Vietnam. A
major thrust which seemed on the point
of taking over all of Laos would place the US
In an untenable position. It might well be
that in such a case the Americans would be
prepared to swap a faster withdrawal of
American forces from South Vietnam in re-
turn for some firm communist guarantees of
neutral status for Laos.
Such speculations point up the basic weak-
ness of the American position In Laos. Over
the past five years Royal Lao Government
control has gradually been eroded. Most of
Laos is either a no-man's land or is con-
trolled by the Pathet Lao. A successful com-
munist offensive would shrink government
control even further. This weakness was im-
plicit in President Richard Nixon's March 8
statement on Laos. By appealing to the Rus-
sians-who are unlikely to have either the
inclination or capability to slow a Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese advance into
Laos-the president seemed to imply that
American ability to contain communist
forces in Laos is limited.
Perhaps most significantly, American mili-
tary priorities have prevented any' strength-
ening of the Royal Laos Government. Its
corruption, lethargy and indifference is as
great if not greater than it ever was. Few peo-
ple living under its rule actively support
it. American officials have been unable to
push for basic reforms due to the political
necessity of getting on with the Lao civilian
and military elite so that continued American
bombing will be permitted.
Laos is not Vietnam: U.S. deaths here are
counted in the hundreds-mostly downed
pilots and crew-not tens of thousands. And
expenses are measured in hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars, not billions. But if Vietnam
is America's quagmire, Laos is its labyrinth.
It seems clear at this point that the only
path out leads through agreement on some
sort of political settlement. The Americans
simply do not have enough usable military
power to force a favourable military situa-
tion. The U.S. will not find the concessions
necessary to bring peace to Laos very pleas-
ant. At the least, it will involve a suspension
of all bombing in Laos and acceptance of a
truly non-aligned Vientiane government. And
it may involve trading complete and rela-
tively rapid withdrawal of American troops
from Vietnam for a guarantee of Laotian
neutrality.
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 ,
7
ST}4TUS RE RT ON THE BRITISH- Satisfaction with Concorde, which has made effects of French de\aluation-this would bl
R CONCORDE Americans less afraid of the possibilit
th
t
y
a
and make huge? inroads into the balance unwilling to agree to go back to Whe draw
N. HENRY S. REUSS of payments, although the 'reps.,,., t
t
IN THE ITSE OF REPRESENTATIVES he -'^~ osedron. dolt engineers believe that
The result is that the American SST's the proposed modi
cation of the fuselage
> a -- budget has been. scraping throu
h
n
g
triere are two catc]
uncomfortably narrow votes. V+On ednes- is that only the naive~.a~#e . ll p Spared toobvio
11Ir. REU , Mr. Speaker, the .LondOri day, the house of Representatives finally ept
ac-
estimates b fie aircraft industry, here
T~conomist f May 30, 1970, contained passed it without cuts but might have been c or in the Uni St
ari Inter estin article on the ]3riti h
s-
t
a
es But the m i
rougher hd th
.orempor-
ae Russian not helpfully tans: one that Concorde has not, unlike
FreliCh Concor e supersonic transport. flown their supersonic transport at its de- the So .t SST, yet flown at twice the speed
is ~`in easing airline dissatis- signed speed of twice the speed of sound for of nd. It
There should have been doing so any
faction" with Concorde. the a.rtiele, the first time on
ate . e~, i,e aenave, avariety of reasons; most obviously strike-;
small, the article es on, and 'they eX- where the opposition is tougher and bet at Bristol (see page H1 ). These trials at cruis-
pect to make a1 on Concorde, y cx- organised, and where some pessimists he ing speed are crucial No amount of work I.
ever, they fly it. aviation press are even beginning aspect wind tunnels
and
on computers can substi-
t it
tha could be voted down al ether. tuts for them. They will test the two points
Furthermore, the rueial trials of the If the American programm s visibly in where Concorde is most vulnerable: the fuel
Concorde at cruiSiug eed have been de- trouble, is this the time for e next British consumption of its engines at normal cruis-
layed. These trials W 1 test. two points government to get toget with the French ing, and the aerodynamics of its wing. If
Where the Concorde iS oat vulnerable- and talk seriously abo hether they should either behaves fractionally less well than ii
fuel consumption and e aerodynamics concede some airli ' request to redesign should, so that it takes more power to push
of its wing. Accordulg t the Economist: Concorde-since t re could now be less ur- the aircraft
or more fuel to k
,
eep the engines
If either behaves fraction ly less well than gency aboul, p rig it into the market be- up to the mark, then crossing the North
It If either
> so that is takes one ewer e fore an Ame an competitor and more to Atlantic could be impossible for the Con-
:'to Should, be gained m offering an aircraft with im- corde. That is, unles, the airlines and the
the aircraft, or more fuel to k ep the engines proved ormance? The present complaint government regulatory bodies behind them
up to the mark, then crossing e North At- I. that oncorde is too small. The two manu- are prepared to compromise on the size of
lantic could be impossible for e Concorde. fact ers are cur:;ently proposing that air- the fuel reserve that any aircraft is required
I include the Economist art le in the 11 s should reduce the seats in it to 110; to carry for possible diversion to another
this
REcnc at this point; d fly it as an a:1-first class service, charg- airport. In lay languaPa~ this w ld
o b
e trans
-
Wtrnx To CONCORDE: SHO to r Ing first class or marginally less than first lated as cutting safety , margins, and many
NA Do Wi ii drN C0 R a class fares (which on the North Atlantic are therefore be politically unacceptable.
NE GOVERNMENT
REDESIGN OF IN CORD BR CONCOR Ara- high: #213 return). On the manufacturers' The two governments need the result of
LINER? THE figures, this would. show a profit; on the air- these trials before the'~t can know what sort
lines' calculations, it would not. They ex- of Concorde they have on their hands, or
The formal announcement a wh pect to make a loss on Concorde however
paper* on Wednesday that supersom they fly it. whether it is even airlines w,l discussing a rapport
flying will be banned eve ritain is im- cation.- The ad d think 01 cordially t would
portaut because it put o the record what \ ,airlines proposal that has been put by some them if they did think of changes. It would
hairlines is that
a
en
pp
now
uenea so tht-ti
.a an extra row of seats can to pay for so expensiveanaircraft during
ail easonably developedbrun down its It is a decision length. This would increase that period of the mid??1970s when most of
countries are -ex ed sooner or later to the eating from four to five abreast and get them will be staggering from the losses they
take. In the Uni States, already acutely num ers up closer to 200. Technically, this are going to make on jumbos until the traf-
poiluton-coils
ci the British lead will woul a easy to do, and it also looks as if Sc catches up with the new capacity. Some
stiffen the polKlea opposition to the Amer- it mig even improve flying performance airlines will simply not be able to, a fact that
lean supers is programme. That opposi- by has g ned momentum this ear, Su Y givin the aircraft a bigger surface area, must cut sales of Concorde. What airlines
's y p- it is not oPort for erica light, at this preliminary stage, would most like is that the present Concorde
prier S proposed supersonic air- that it wo d involve any of those costly des as ( ) had never been cordial. But this changes to a wing that lengthening the 200ign-se be treated t a prototype for a not bigger ater; year t amount of money required has fuselage wog Lengthening Concorde's ready until, the latter would then not be
jumped sharply, to $290 million. This has fuselage, witho t also changing the wings, ready until, at a guess, 1976, as against a
coincided with growing reports that the would make the uselage stick out at the probable 1974 for the aircraft in its present
Boeing design is altering for the worse--with back and wail dan rously. It is a ploy to be form. To make the decision easy for the two
its weight going up and and its performance avoided in a norm , delta-shaped aircraft, governments, the airlines might, with arm-
going down, just as on the first prototype The Government a eared to set its face twisting, take perhaps 40 of the present Con-
abandoned early last year. It has also coin- against late major ch ges 12 months ago. cordes: just as they took a small version of
cided with reports of increasing airline dis- It said that 'if Concor costs were to rise the original 707 from Boeing 1:3 years ago, in
more than 15 per 'lent Bove the estimated order to ease the introduction, to jets. This
? The Protection of the Environment. #730 million it was then taking to develop- is a let-out that should be seriously con-
Cmd 4378. a figure which still holds, thanks to the sidered after June 18th.
vva~vi~a.;JJiVly ray icuL,u.Kl)-Extensions of Remarks June 8
1
1
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 "
WASHINGTON POST DATE 11) RJ!0 PAGE
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 . CIA-Mir 2-033 7 015-8
CPYRGHT
AID Confirms Its Use
As CIA Cover in-Laoe
CPYRGHT By William N. Curry
The head of the U.S. foreign
aid program confirmed yester-
day that CIA agents use the
civilian aid mission in Laos as
a cover for anti-Communist
operations, much to his dis-
pleasure.
Bait he asserted that Laos
'U-Abe. only place iii e
in Laos that were
be in the national i
hot routine AID ope
"Our preference i
g
believed to
nterest but
rations.
s to get rid
world" where CIA operatives
of this kind of opera
tion."
Mgscjuerade as_ f eid ,workers
Previously, the a
id agency
of ,, the Agency for Interna-
ti
l D
has declined to co
mment on
ona
evelopment (AIn).
ATD Administrator John A.
published reports
that CIA
!.Hannah, asked if the CIA uses
agents pose as AID
rural de-
the mission in Laos as a cover
velopment workers
but ac-
,
said: "Well
I just have t
tually recruit and
train anti-
,
o
admit that this is true. This
Communist guerrillas,. detect
was a decision that was made
enemy movements and act as
back in 1962 and by adminis-
ground controllers
strik
for air
1
trations from now until then
es.
,
The 1962 Geneva Conven-"
tion declared Laos
a neutral
country
.
Hannah's remarks were
made on the Metromedia
radio news program "Profile."
See HANNAH, A6, Col. 5,
and it is the only place in the
world that we are."
He said, "We have had peo-
ple that have been associated
with the CIA and doing thin
s
Hannah said he hopes the
connection, between the two
agencies could be eliminated
in a proposed revamping of
AID. The separation was one
recommendation of a recent
task force that studied AID.
"I am sure that it is going to
be in the rQ1260- I
mAndatinng for discussion," he
said. "I hope it is going to be
in the legislation once that is
submitted." _
Hannah conceded that the Vietnamese. police officers for
AID role in Laos, plus its war? the Ngo Dinh Diem regime.
related activities in Vietnai'h,
"might" have an adverse af- The program turned out to be
feet on the AID programs to run by the CIA.
other nations. "It certainly has Hannah, who joined AID in
not helped . . . It distorts the 1969, said President Nixon
role of AID," he said. But he
defended the original deci- "places a high priority" on the
sions to involve AID as being foreign aid program and ex-
correct when they were made pressed hope that the Senate
in 1962. will restore recent House-
annah was president of made cuts in AID's budget re-
Michigan State University quest for the coming fiscal
when it agreed, to train South year.
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 NEW YORK TIMES DATE 9 10
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C.I.A. Role iri Laos r
Official Confirms
Aid Unit Conceals
WASHINGTON, June 7 (AP)
-Dr. John A. Hannah, director
of the Agency for International
Development, acknowledged to-
day that the United States aid
program was being used as a
cover for operations of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency in
Laos.
He said President. Nixon
might propose divorcing such
intelligence work from over-
seas economic assistance in the
future in proposals on foreign-
aid reform to be sent to Con-
gress.
"Well, I just have to admit
that that is true," Mr. Hannah
said when asked if his agency's
economic aid "is being used as
a cover for C.I.A. operations in
Laos" He was questioned on
the Metromedia radio news pra-
gram "Profile."
Mr. Hanah made it clear that
he disapproved of the C.I.A.'~s use
of his agency. He said Laos was
the only country in which this
was being done and that it
stemmed from a 1962 decision
that such activity was in the
national interest.
Central Intelligence Agency
nrovislon of logistical support
for the neutralist Government
in Vientiane was reported in
the east, and Senator J. W. Ful-
bright, the Arkansas Democrat
who is chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, has ac-
cused the C.I.A. of exceeding
its authority in supporting
United States military activi-
ties in Laos.
Mr. Nixon described United
States aid to Laos in a state-
ment March 6 but did not men
tion any Central Intelligence
Agency role.
It ,is unusual for an execu-
tive-branch official to acknowl-
edee publicly that 'M or ani-
zatltJ N-heink used for under-
cover work abroad.
PAGE S.
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 SUNDAY STAR DATE 1Rh10 PAGE_
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CIA Reportedly Maims
Its Dead on(LuQPatrols
merican Central Intelligence
gency operatives killed in
round combat operations in
ortlleast Laos are maimed as
uch as possible to prevent
he North Vietnamese from us-
g them as tangible proof of
1.S. ground presence in the
rea, well informed Lao
ources say.
"The Americans have or-
ers they must not be cap-
ured. If they are killed, other
embers of their patrol put a
renade on their face or shoot
hem up with their machine
uns till they can't be recog-
ized," the sources said.
There are 10 American com-
ando teams of 8 to 10 men
ach operating in northeast
aos, the sources said. The
earns operate behind North
ietnamese lines.
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE hien, 75 miles northeast of
special to The Star
VIENTIANE - Bodies of t,808 Thais,
Encounter Laotians First
"When the North Vietnamese
unch a big attack, they come
gainst the Laotians first. The
ao escape around the flanks
the rear leaving the North
ietnamese facing Thais or
eo tribesmen," the sources
aid. "American and Thai
earns infiltrate the rear, bit-
ing enemy headquarters and
ommunications."
The Americans and Thais
Aerate from a small, secret
nd tightly guarded airfield
ear the U.S.-supported guer-
illa headquarters at Long
including artillery and infan-
trymen, in northeast Laos op-
erations, according to the
sources.
U.S. sources refuse to say
how many Americans are in-
volved in the military opera-
tions.
Sources Become Edgy
They b e c o in e extremely
edgy when asked if the num-
ber of American military per-
sonnel in Laos has increased
since the U.S. Senate subcom-
mittee hearings on Laos last
October.
Lao military sources say a
further increase in U.S. mili-
tary aid is coming.
The United States is being
asked to supply helicopters
and U.S. crews for a new
"elite" airmobile unit to be
formed from Lao paratroops
and other units.
The Lao request follows a
worsening in the over-all mili-
tary situation here.
"Militarily, the Lao are in
the worst position they have
ever been since 1964," reliable
sources say.
In northern Laos, the Plain
of Jars is ringed by North Vi-
etnamese units offering a tight
defense against the guerrillas.
The North Vietnamese still
are pressuring the guerrilla
bases at Long Chien and Sam
Thong and are to launch new
attacks when the monsoon
rains begin, probably this
month.
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 WASHII~GT ON POST DATE PAGE
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The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, June 4,1970 F7
JAtc CoujcW;ecome Second Cambodia
PPJTk Anderson
increasingly to the U.S. to
and AID contracts, haul food,,
The ouster of Cambodia's
Prince Sihanouk has stirred
up plots in Laos to dump
Prince Souvanna Phouma and
set up a Cambodian-style mili-
tary government. This could
repeat the Cambodian crisis
all over again in Laos, with
dangerous consequences for
the U.S.
Intelligence reports warn
that rightist Laotian leaders
have been encouraged by the
Cambodian experience to at-
tempt a similar takeover in
their country. They are weary
of the aging Souyanna
Phouma who, like Sihanouk,
has put on a show of out-
ward neutrality. But just as
Sihanouk permitted secret in-
cursions by the North Viet-
namese, Souvanna Phouma al-
lowed the Americans to oper?
ate in Laos.
The Kremlin had promised
both leaders that the North
Vietnamese would leave their
countries after the Vietnam
War was settled. But as the
encroachments increased, the
two princes lost faith In the
Soviet promise and concluded
that the North Vietnamese
would never clear out volun-
tarily.
Souvanna Phouma. turned
ist crunch. But Sihanouk
lew to Moscow and Peking to
en ist support in getting the
North Vietnamese out of Cam-
bodia. While he was on this
mission, he was deposed by
the generals he left behind.
Now he has joined the same
forces, ironically, that he had
tried to remove.
Secret Understanding
Washington and Moscow
reached a secret under-
standing, meanwhile, to keep
still about the U.S. interven-
tion in Laos. As long as the
U.S. didn't officially acknowl-
edge its clandestine opera-
tions, the Kremlin agreed to
ignore them.
The Russians, as they had
promised Sihanouk and Sou-
vanna Phouma, also guaran-
teed there would be no North
Vietnamese takeover of Laos
and Cambodia. Both the So-
viet and Americans agreed to
endeavor, at least, to confine
the war to South Vietnam.
At no time did the U.S. wish
to expand the Vietnam con-
f l i c t into a full-scale Indo-
china war. Restricting the bat-
tlefield to South Vietnam,
,however, also had advantages
that the U.S. could never
really win the war. For it is
im neeihin 4n ' "Foat ..
who can escape across the bor-
der into sanctuaries.
In 1964, the North Vietnam-
ese began enlarging their sanc-
tuary privileges in Laos by at-
tacking the Plain of Jars and
increasing the Infiltration
down the Ho Chi Minh spider-
web of trails.
The U.S. countered by step-
ping up its clandestine activi.
ties and bombing the infiltra-
tion routes. After the bombing
of North Vietnam was halted
in 1968, the U.S, simply moved
the sorties across the border
and concentrated the full fury
upon Red targets in Laos.
CIA Secret Army
The Central Intelligence
Agency, meanwhile, has subsi-
dized a secret, army in Laos
under Gen Vang Pao; a vulgar
ex-French Army sergeant,
whose 14,000 fighting men
have been recruited largely
from the minority Meo tribes.
The secret army is head-
quartered at the multi-mil-
lion-dollar CIA base of Long
Cheng. A steady stream of Air
America and Continental Air
Services planes, under CIA
munitions and the monthly
payroll for Vang Pao's troops
OLUFIeS nave now leaked out
about his clandestine army,
describing it accurately as the
only effective fighting force in
Laos on the American side.
Yet my reporler in Indochina,
Les Whitten, reports from
Vientiane:
"The sad fact is that all the
millions expended upon Vang
Pao's mercenaries have not
convinced one responsible
U.S. official in Saigon or Ven-
tiane that this land of 2.8 mil-
lion people can be defended
for more than. a few weeks by
the secret army against a de-
termined- Communist attack.
"The Communist Pathet Lao
and North Vietnamese control
half of Laos and clearly could
take over the other half 'al-
most at will."
Whitten adds that "the fa-
bled CIA forces, which liberal
senators regard as some kind
of powerful presence in Laos,
are made up, in fact, of time
servers, a few brilliant intelli-
gence men and a larger num-
ber of ex-servicemen who are
as harassed as any Washing-
ton bureaucrats simply trying
to carry out routine duties.
? 1970. Bell-McClure Syndicate. Inc.
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June 1, 1970 CO GR S5I0 L - xtensaons o emar s E 5015
The Telephone: Sharp blows with the flat
hand are delivered simultaneously to both
ears. This causes a loss of balance, impair-
ment of hearing, as well as severe pain.
Sexual abuse: In most cases the docu-
ments declare that the prisoners are stripped
of their clothes at the initiation of the in-
terrogation. Humiliation is an obvious ele-
ment in the psychological aspect of the tor-
ture. The genitals of both men and women
receive considerable attention in beatings
and the administration of electric shocks.
Women prisoners are often violated by tor-
turers or are turned over to police or soldiers
of lower rank for their amusement. Male
prisoners are sometimes forced to witness the
sexual abuse of their wives, children or
fiancees. '
Simulated execution: prisoners nave been
taken from sessions of torture or awakened
during a brief respite and brought before a
firing squad armed with blanks or empty
rifles. Others have been drowned in buckets
of water and then revived. And still others
have been hung and then cut down after
losing consciousness.
This list is not a complete catalog of all of
the tortures described in the available docu-
mentation. It is, however, a compilation of
those mentioned most frequently by the
victims.
As might be expected under such circum-
stances, increasing numbers of Brazilians are
leaving their homeland to seek refuge in
other countries. Many of them are faced with
almost insurmountable difficulties: improper
or incomplete travel documents, insufficient
financial resources, hostile military regimes
in several of the nearest countries. (The best
estimates available at this time are about
500 in Chile, 1300-1500 In Uruguay and ap-
proximately 2,000 in Paris, many of whom
are students uncertain that they can safely
return to Brazil. Large numbers are in other
countries, including the U.S., but the figures
are unavailable since many of them fear to
declare themselves refugees.) Although the
exodus grows each day and the potential for
future refugees is tremendous, international
refuge organizations have done little to re-
spond to the needs of the victims of this new
situation.
Massive efforts, not unlike those made on
behalf of the Jews and others from Europe
and Cubans in the early 1960's may now
have to be made on behalf of Brazilians. The
first step of such a response is now being
organized by a group of individuals from
the religious, academic, professional and
artistic fields in New York City. (For infor-
mation, write: The Editor, Christianity and
Crisis.)
HOW THE UNITED STATES FITS IN
All of this information and documentation
of torture and repression becomes even more
disturbing when the extent of continuing
U.S. Government and business involvement
in Brazil is recognized. Very little open criti-
cism has been forthcoming from these two
institutions regarding the course of events
of the past six years and particularly of
recent months.
When the coup occurred in 1964 Ambassa-
dor Lincoln Gordon received it with open sat-
isfaction. He said it was "perhaps as signif-
icant to the defense of the Free World as
the Sino-Soviet split and the success of the
Marshall Plan," Through his influence Wash-
ington recognized' the military regime within
24 hours.
Significantly, the Agency for International
Development increased its expenditures in
Brazil from $15.1 million in 1964 to $122.1
million in 1965. It has proposed a $187 mil-
lion program for 1970. In addition, the US
military has maintained the largest of its
Latin American missions in Brazil, with over
100 advisers on the staff. The Military As-
sistance Program provided $24.9 million in
1967 and $19.4 million in 1968. Between 1964
and 1968 2,255 military men passed through
its training program.
The one brief (four-month) interruption
in US support occurred after the closing of
Congress in 1968. Some observers believe that
aid and assistance were restored quickly be-
cause of the inconvenience caused to US busi-
ness and banks by the suspension, US invest-
ment there accounts for $1,326 million of the
$7,314 million invested in all of South
America.
This article is not intended to be sensa-
tional. Its purpose is, rather, to awaken
American Christians and public opinion to
this horrendous terror and inhumanity. The
authorities of Brazil are concerned about
their image abroad, and especially in the
United States, from which they receive mas-
sive foreign aid and investment capital. In-
ternational outcries may not bring democracy
back to Brazil, but it may force the Govern-
ment to restrict its present policies in the
treatment of political prisoners.
Regardless of what its impact in Brazil
may be, we must not-cannot-any longer
allow our Government and business to quietly
support a type of government that we-and
prior to certain recent erosions of our own
civilization in the past at least-have re-
garded as contrary to our way of life. What
Brazil does is ultimately her own problem:
what we do to support, and thereby encour-
age, her dehumanizing policy of repression
is our problem. Brazil-a nation that has
made significant contributions to interna-
tional culture-may be losing the respect of
the nations of the world, but we can only
wonder how much greater is her loss than
ours,
[From the Washington Post, May 4, 1970]
THE BRAZILIAN CHURCH MAY BE CHRISTIAN
AFTER ALL
(By Colman McCarthy)
No doubt exists any longer that the mil-
itary men running Brazil are stylists in tor-
ture, violence and hounding. Too many re-
ports from reliable witnesses have appeared
in the North American and European press
for anyone to think that the current oppres-
sion is merely a lapse in taste by Gen. Emi-
lio Medici and his six-year-old government.
The aim of the torture, backed by the same
kind of secret police tactics used in Ger-
many, Spain, Portugal and Italy in an ear-
lier era and in Greece, Haiti, South Africa
and Rhodesia today, is to keep the opposition
silent, afraid and in view.
The students, journalists, professors, labor
organizers, social workers, priests and others
who are among the potential targets of tor-
ture in Brazil have been put in a strained
stance. Do they resist by fighting violence
with counter-violence? Or do they hold out
and work for the peaceful revolution that
their country, crushed by poverty, disease
and illiteracy, desperately needs?
Large numbers are now joining both
groups. But many who go for the second do
so because much of the leadership in the
Catholic Church is both vocal and risk-tak-
ing in opposing the military dictators. "Sur-
prisingly," writes Prof. Ralph Della Cava of
Queen's College, N.Y., in last week's Com-
monweal, "the Brazilian Catholic Church,
once a mainstay of the status quo, has
emerged for a variety of reasons as the only
national institution that remains capable of
defending the principles of freedom, justice
and social change in the face of government
repression."
The church in Brazil, as elsewhere in
Latin America, has long been a sleeping part-
ner of the rich and the military. Officially,
it passed out the sacraments and rites, a
coin-machine operation from which bless-
ings dropped like candies on which the poor
were meant to suck for comfort, not thirst
for change. Unofficially, it was the chaplain
church, blessing the landowners who vir-
tually enslaved the poor by forcing many of
them to live on less than $350 a year. The
self-cowed clergy dared not defy the army
or the rich, fearing economic pressures on re-
ligious hospitals, schools and parishes.
A few years ago, from northeast Brazil,
a small, slim man with a strong clear mind
spoke out, quickly to become a Martin Lu-
ther King figure to the Brazilian social move-
ment. Since then, Archbishop Helder Camara
has been rattling the generals, exposing the
rich, but perhaps most important, making it
clear to the poor that they have a right to
something better and there is a way to get
it. Last October 2, the centennial of Gandhi,
Camara outlined the theme of his move-
ment called Action, Justice and Peace.
"Many Latin American governments, per-
haps without realizing and without caring,
are preparing an explosion worse than the
nuclear bombs, worse than the H-bomb: it is
the M-bomb, the bomb of misery. (This
explosion) is prepared by those who cower
before the powerful and the privileged and
make a show of elaborate reforms and ways
to execute them, but who afterwarn leave
the situation as it is to see if it won't take
care of itself."
In calling for. non-violent, structural re-
forms in Brazil, Camara is labeled a Com-
munist,by the right, a standard dismissal of
anyone who fights a little too hard for the
poor. From the far left, Camara gets it also,
because he insists on non-violence. He is firm
about the latter, not just frolin his pacifism,
but also practicality. "If there was a move-
ment of violence here, Brazil would be
crushed immediately, either by the United
States . . . or by the USSR. To change one for
the other of those two powers would all be the
same, as neither of the two serve for Brazil-
ians."
Lumping together America and Russia is
not Camara's exclusive idea. In October
1968, the moderate newspaper, Jornal do
Brazil, expressed what observers say is a
widespread sentiment: "Russians and North
Americans proceed as if they were invaders
from Mars. They are of anot:_er race, an-
other civilization. This planet is a colony
which they exploit shamelessly and whose
inhabitants-us-as the inferior beings that
we are, can continue dying of hunger in our
sun-baked and noisy craters."
Gen. Medici and his terrorists know better
than to jail, torture or otherwise silence
Camara. He is too well known internation-
ally and too revered locally. But the gov-
ernment moves in on less prominent clergy.
Last December, a military court indicated
the bishop of Volta Redonda on charges of
"subversion." Fifteen of his priests were
also brought up on charges. Their trial, like
the bishop's is pending, with no date set.
Other priests have been imprisoned and tor-
tured, as well as many nuns and laymen.
Forcefully, one bishop, Joao Costa, recently
denounced the government's treatment of
political prisoners: The latter "have been
violently beaten and tortured. I am making
this denunciation so that there shall be elim-
inated once and for all from all investiga-
tions, those procedures which dishonor all
those who practice them and render the
process of justice suspect."
All of this puts the Vatican on the spot. It
has 245 bishops in what is the world's most
Catholic country-at least nominally Catho-
lic, which means making Mass perhaps twice
a year. The Pope, who has received a report
called "Terror and Torture in Brazil," knows
he cannot play it safe much longer-or as
Pius XII did during Hitler's Germany, play
it silent. The Vatican naturally supports non-
violent reform. But preached from across an
ocean, this stance risks becoming an accom-
plice to the current economic and political
structures that also do violence-not by bul-
lets or thumbscrews, perhaps, but by keeping
the poor in their poverty through unjust
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501 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extensions of Remarks ,Tune .1, x
laws or by letting greedy land-owners con-
tinue to hoard the land, Many in the Third
World are beginning to believe that this
kind of violence is infinitely more criminal
than the war games played by Che-style
guerrillas.
The Brazilian generals, like the Greek
colonels-are touchy about their image in the
United States and work hard to keep it pol-
ished; this is where the massive foreign aid
and private investment capital comes from,
with bad days to come were the well to run
drv.
But the U.S. should be less of a worry to
the Brazilian government than the Church.
American businessmen will not likely pull
back their money and investments so long
as the generals say they are devoted to "strop-
ping communism." The Church--or at least
that part of it exemplified by Helder Ca-
mara and a growing number of bishops
and thousands of clergy and laymen-sees
through the big talk about anti-communism.
That is not the real battle. "When will we
be able to show everybody," said Camara last
fall, "that the number one problem is not
the clash between East and West, but be-
tween North and South-that is, between
the'developed world and the underdeveloped
world? When will we be able to help every-
body understand that misery is the enslaver,
the assassin par excellence and that It is
the war against misery which should be the
number one and only war upon which we
must focus our energy and resources?"
Camara doesn't know the answer to his
questions. But he does know his country
seethes with the poor and the hungry who
demand answers soon. Christianity, which
has solved the problems of the next world
seems ready, at least In Brazil, to begin solv-
ing some of the problems of this world.
[From the Washington Post, May 13, 1970]
NEw BRAZIL PURGE Errs 10 SCIENTISTS
(By Leonard Greenwood)
Rio DE JAxkiRO.-Brazil's small scientific
community is reeling from its second politi-
cal purge in a year.
Ten scientists, including several known
internationally,- have been fired from the
Oswaldo Cruz institute here and stripped of
their political rights.
A government spokesman said the decision
had been made by President Emilio Car-
rastazu Medici after "careful investigation"
had shown the scientists to be "agents of
subversion and enemies of the regime."
The withdrawal of their political rights
makes it virtually impossible for them to
continue scientific work in Brazil. Anyone
who loses his rights is forbidden to work for
any government-supported organization and
there are almost no private laboratories.
Less than a year ago, between 60 and 70
scientists were fired from research, techni-
cal and teaching posts and some also lost
their political rights.
In Brain, which has a scientific commu-
nity of only about 5,000 in a population of 94
million, the effects of last year's purge was
psychologically staggering.
"People were lust beginning to settle down
again after that when this latest blow fell,"
one Brazilian scientist said. "All the old fears
have been awakened again. People are saying
there are more lists. God knows who'll be
next."
The director of the Cruz Institute, Guil-
herme Lacorte, is reluctant to discuss the
case, which he describes as "one of those
things that happens." He says only that the
departure of the 10 men need not affect the
working of the institute.
The victims, who are in an extremely vul-
nerable situation with accusations of sub-
version hanging over them, refuse to meet
reporters.
The men were reported to be carrying out
work on many diseases. The institute,
founded at the beginning of the century, has
made important contributions to world
medicine, especially in the field of yellow
fever.
Brazilian scientists say it is difficult to see
how any of them could be accused of sub-
version. None was working on a job even
remotely connected with national security.
As is the case with most of Brazil's scien-
tific community, all 10 are known to have
liberal ideas about society. "You'd have to
stretch imagination along way to seem them
as Communists," one eminent Brazilian sci-
entist said.
Other scientsts ridicule Lacorte's state-
ment, They say the lA men were key figures
in a small team of high-level researchers at
Cruz. Without them, they add, some depart-
ments, including physiology and entomology,
may have to close, the scientific standing of
the institute will be damaged and Brazilian
research in certain fields will be retarded.
TRIBUTE TO THE HONORABLE
JOHN W. McCORMACK
SPEECH OF
HON. JOHN C. KLUCZYNSKI
OF ILLINOIS
IN -THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, May 26, 1970
Mr. KLUCZYNSI.{I. Mr. Speaker, it is
indeed a real pleasure for me to join in
this warm and glowing tribute to our be-
loved Speaker, JOHN W. MCCORMACK,
who will retire from public life at the
end of this Congress. His departure from
this House will sadden us, his colleagues,
his constituents, and his legion of friends
throughout the country and the world.
He has been a Speaker who helped
sustain the Republic during its recent,
trying years. The cries for and against
seniority, the cries for and against a
more partisan form of government, the
cries for and against a more "liberal" or
a more "conservative" path of policy---all
of these cries and counter-cries could
only have been met and subsumed under
the sort of moderate and enlightened
leadership which JOHN MCCORMACK
brought to the House of Representatives
during his tenure as Speaker. He has
acted as this country's physician-in-
residence to bind up political wounds. He
has been the kind of man mentioned in
the beatitudes :
Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall
see God.
JOHN MCCORMACKC was a poor, Irish
boy who helped support his widowed
mother by selling newspapers on the
streets of South Boston. He grew up in a
hard school to become a member of his
State's house of representatives and its
senate, and a Member of the U.S. House
of Representatives during the 70th to
91st Congresses. He became Democraite
majority leader under his great mentor
and friend, the late Sam Rayburn, during
the 79th. Congress, and Speaker of the
House upon the death of Mr. Rayburn in
1961.
His honorary degrees, awarded by such
institutions as Tufts College and George-
town University, are numerous. His hon-
ors include the Order of Malta First Class
and the Order of Saint Gregory. JOHN
MCCORMACK, as a nian and as a legisla-
tor, has, during a long and productive
lifetime, well served his country and hs
faith.
We salute him, in a troubled and
changing period, as a an who held back
waves of irresponsibitity so that we
could achieve needed changes behind the
dike of constitutional order. He takes
with him into retirement the gratitude
of his brothers in this House and the
people of the United States.
Speaker MCCORMACK, I wish you and
Mrs. McCormack the greatest possible
happiness and good health in the years
ahead after your your retirement.
dor\i
PRIEST TELLS OF COMMUNIST
BRUTALITY )N LAOS
HON. RICHARD H. ICHORD
OF MISSOURI
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 1, 1970
Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, we have
heard a great deal of sound and fury
from the Senate about the presence of
300 or so American mi'i;itary attaches in
the little landlocked nation of Laos. We
heard a great deal less about the presence
there of more than &:,000 North Viet-
namese.
We heard a great deal about alleged
American casualties inadvertently caused
when American planes flew in support of
Laotian forces trying to keep their coun-
try from being overwhelmed by the
North Vietnamese Communists. But we
heard very little of coldalooded, purpose-
ful, indiscriminate murder of civilians
by North Vietnamese and Laotian Com-
munists.
Therefore, I would liken to bring to your
attention this recent account; in the St.
Louis Globe Democrat c,i' the experiences
of a Catholic priest who has spent 14
years in Laos and tried recently to de-
scribe Communist terrorism and murder
to a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Refugees.
Father Matt Menger says he expects to
die in Laos. He says 1.5 of his fellow
priests have been murdered by the Com-
munists. But he says that of 11 wit-
nesses, only the testimony of one was
published in a Washington, D.C., news-
paper-one concerning indiscriminate
American bombing. The other 10, Father
Menger says, stressed that U.S. bombing
was not indiscriminate. He states that
Communist-inflicted casualties were far
more numerous than any caused by U.S.
intervention.
The account in full fellows:
SAYS REDS KILLED 15 COLLEAGUES-PRIEST
TELLS OF MURDERS IN LAOS
(By Allan Hale)
Father Matt Menger expects to die in Laos.
Since 1960, he says, 15 of his colleagues have
been murdered by the Communists.
He stood unnoticed and silent Friday at
the rear of a crowded halt at St. Louis Uni-
versity while students talked of the future of
ROTC and black students wok over the meet-
ing to present a list of demands.
A missionary priest who has been in Laos
14 years, he had never seen it militant student
gathering before. He was in St. Louis on a
visit after testifying at a Senate hearing in
Washington Thursday.
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5017
June 1, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-Ixtensions 0~kR
Leaving the student meeting at Busch
Memorial Center he walked away across the
campus, a tall, lean man indistinguishable
from other priests crossing the walks.
He was silent for a long time. Once he burst
out: "We don't have a university in Laos. Not
one. If only we had a university. We wouldn't
burn it down."
He fell silent again for several minutes,
then "I wouldn't have believed it. I'm glad
I saw it. Otherwise, I wouldn't have believed
it.,,
He had heard of the St. Louis University
meeting by chance and had gone to listen, not
to participate. "It is not my university,". he
said carefully . "and I know more about
the problems of Laos than I do those of
America."
He had been summoned to a hearing
Thursday conducted by Sen. Edward M. Ken-
nedy, chairman of the Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Refugees, on civilian war casualty
problems in Indochina.
He did not think, he said Friday, that the
committee had liked his answers to questions.
"I stated, when Sen. Kennedy was pressing
me about the casualties, I stated just one
little example of 15 civilians I knew very
well. I've lived with these men for some
years, who were actually murdered by the
Communists-15 Catholic priests. We are only
100 in the whole country, but they have killed
15, not in any bombing or village-shelling
but in cold blood."
Still talking of the Senate committee hear-
ing, Father Menger went on:
"Of the 11 witnesses who testified, the
testimony of only one was published, at least
in the Washington Post, entitled 'Indiscrim-
inate Bombing of Civilians in Laos Alleged'.
The other witnesses, all of them, including
myself, testified that the U.S. bombing in
Laos was not indiscriminate. On the contrary.
"In my testimony I brought out the large
number of civilians wounded and killed by
the North Vietnamese in our country. The
Communist-inflicted casualities were far, far
more numerous than any inflicted by the
American Intervention."
There are believed to be 67,000 North Viet-
namese troopO in Laos, he said. "In addition,
it is very rarely printed that there are 12,000
to 14,000 Chinese Communist troops who are
building a road in Laos. The news media
today stress the presence of 300 American
military advisers."
President Nixon's move into Cambodia has
not extended the war, he said. It had already
been extended throughout the entire region
by the North Vietnamese.
For years Father Menger has given Laotian
villagers medical treatment for anything
from malaria to wild animal bites. He has
helped rebuild churches and schools and
homes after the tide of war has rolled over
them and organized distribution of
emergency food.
They call him "The Tall Priest" in Laos,
and with his fluent Lao he has interpreted at
high-level conferences between American and
Laotian officials. Therefore he is a marked
man. He intends to return to Laos as soon
as possible.
"I don't expect to live," he says calmly.
"But it does not matter if I die next month,
at the age of 40, with a bullet in the back of
the head, or at 95 on an inner-spring mat-
tress. I am doing something."
HON. JOHN 0. MARSH, JR.
OF VIRGINIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 27, 1970
Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I should
like to conclude at this time my presenta-
tion of portions of a report of a pilot
study of possible applications of the sys-
tems approach to the appropriations
process of the Congress.
It may be recalled that this study-
entirely unofficial-was undertaken by a
seminar group at American University
under the direction of Dr. George K.
Chacko, professorial lecturer and sys-
tems scientist.
I believe this interesting voluntary ef-
fort represents a useful contribution to
our current active consideration of ways
in which modem informational analysis
techniques might be used to improve the
efficiency of the legislative branch.
The final portion of the paper pro-
duced by Dr. Chacko and his associates
THE SYSTEMS APPROACH
ASSUME EACH ELEMENT HIERARCHY TO BE
EQUALLY CONSISTENT
As was mentioned earlier, no attempts
were made to straight-jacket illustrative
scores at the horizontal or vertical levels. The
members of the Seminar had very little
knowledge of the preferences that the admin-
istrative personnel of the Department of the
Interior would have employed in either
achieving the goals that have been set or in
weighing them. Nevertheless, each Study
Team Group that pursued the different
hierarchial choices corresponding to the ele-
ments tried conscientiously to relate it in
a responsible manner to the overall objective
of averting national ecological disaster.
Owing to the differences in professional and
personal background, the nonfulfillment of
the organismic objectives of averting eco-
logical disaster was given the penalty ranging
from one billion to 50 billion. Assuming that
the protagonist of each element was equally
consistent, how would the Congressional
decision-maker decide among the competing
claims for the same limited resources?
SET ORGANISMIC OBJECTIVE NONFULFILLMENT
PENALTY AT 50 X 10?
The preferred tactical choice in Element 1
was: Improve fire prevention /fighting tech-
niques with a weighted penalty of 150, com-
pared with the weighted penalty for non-
fulfillment of the organismic objective of
one billion.
To make a valid comparison between the
claims of this particular tactical choice and,
say, the tactical choice of improving routes
to more distant areas in the national forests,
its weighted penalty score of 300 must be
related to the corresponding penalty for non-
fulfillment of not one billion but 50 billions.
Although the weighted penalty score itself
is twice that of the first tactical choice, the
much larger base against which it has to be
compared in fact reduced the resource alloca-
tion for the same. In Table 10 the organismic
objective nonfulfillment penalty is set at the
highest level of 50 billion. Accordingly, the
tactical choice of fire prevention/fighting
techniques gets a score of 7,500 compared
with only 300 for improving the roads to
more distant areas.
TABLE 10.-EQUALIZING THE 5-BUDGET ELEMENT PENALTIES FOR NONFULFILLMENT:
SET ORGANISMIC OBJECTIVE NONFULFILLMENT PENALTY AT 50X109
1. Tactical choice: Improve fire prevention/fighting techniques:
50X100
1X100 X 150 =
2. Tactical choice: Create new cities in semiwild forests:
50X109
8X100 X 50
3. Tactical choice: Improve routes to9 more distant areas:
X 300 =
50X109
Once the tactical choices are each related
to the organismic objective of averting na-
tional ecological disaster, the relative allo-
cation of resources to each can be determined
on the basis of:
1. Penalty score.
2. Weighted penalty.
3. Organismic level penalty.
The change by the Congressional decision-
maker of the organismic objectives would
change the organismic level penalties and
corresponding tactical level penalty scores.
Should the agencies of the Government
change the number and/or importance 'of
alternative strategic and tactical choices
to accomplish the organismic objective, that
would be reflected in the penalty scores and/
or penalty levels by hierarchy.
It bears repetition that:
4. Tactical choice: Preserve trees by better farming:
50X109
- X 90
10X100
5. Tactical choice: State assistance for land acquisition:
50X100
- X 20 =
12X100
Total for 5 tactical choices. ---_---_--_--_._----__-__------------------- 8, 644
1. The Congressional decision-maker de-
cides what the organismic objectives should
be, and can change them;
2. The agencies of the Government decide
upon the best means of accomplishing the
organismic objectives and can change them.
In this study, there are 14 tactical choices
identified as competing for the achievement
of the overall objective. They are listed in
Table 11: The weighted penalty scores for
the 14 tactical choices together came to
30,712.
TABLE 11
I. Avert ecological disaster ------------ 100
U. Improve the environment---------- 80
ELEMENT 1. FOREST PROTECTION UTILIZATION
Improve fire prevention/fighting tech-
niques.
Prevent strip mining.
Prevent strip logging.
ELEMENT 2. ACQUISITION OF LAND
Create new cities in semiwild forests.
Move to suburban areas with civil systems
electronic products.
ELEMENT 3. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
Improve routes to more distant areas.
Education of the public on fire protection.
Demonstration of effects of violating en-
vironmental ethic.
ELEMENT 4. BUREAU OF LANDMANAGEMENT
Preserve trees by better farming.
Establish criteria on fossil fuels (e.g. oil)
mining.
Improve seed inventory replenishment to
restore land.
ELEMENT 5. BUREAU OF OUTDOOR RECREATION
State assistance for land acquisition.
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E 5018 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- Extensions of Remarks June 1. 1970
State assistance to acquisition of ur:yan
land for recreation.
State assistance to acquisition of indus-
trial land for recreation.
As a first approzimation, consider that the
14 tactical choices are the only measures
open to the Department of the Interior to ac-
complish the organismic objective. In that
case, Improved fire prevention/fighting tech-
niques with its score of 7,500 claims 24.2% of
the total budget.
Similarly, prevent strip mining with its
score of 9,500 claims 30.c% of the total budg-
et allocation, and so on.
For illustrative purposes, a simplified corn-
puter program was written, and the budge-
tary allocation based on these hypothetical
hierarchic objectives was made for both FY
1970 and FY 1971.
CREED
Turning now from the tactical choices
open to the pursuit of the organic objective
to their logical groupings, what- can be said
about the 14 tactical choices employed In
this study?
Improving fire prevention/fighting tech-
niques; preserving trees by better farming;
and Improving seed inventory replenishment
clearly conserve natural resources. Simi-
larly, prevention of strip logging, strip m.n-
lag and the establishment of criteria on fos-
sil fuel mining was designed to regulate
The education of the public on fire preven-
tion and the demonstration of the effects of
violating environmental ethics are designed
to educate. The tactical choices to im-
prove roads to more distant areas, state as-
sistance for land acquisition in general and
urban and industrial land in particular, ac-
cent the facility to enjoy. Finally the cr'e?.
anon, of cities In semi-wild forests and the
move to suburban areas of electronic product
industries are designed to develop the en-
vironment.
Combining the first letter of these five a.a-
tivities, the acronym CREED is evolved.
The Congressional decision-maker can look
at the allocation of resources under each of
these categories as shown in Table 12 and
decide, for instance, that the allocation of
65 %, of resources to regulate the use of the
environment may be too much and the al-
location of 1.5% to facilitate the enjoyment
of the environment too little. He could in-
street that certain other percentages, say
37% and 25' may be more appropriate. He
can ask for the decreasing of the allocation
to regulatory activities from 65% to 37 0, and
the Increase of the allocation of the facilita-
tion of the enjoyment, of the environment
from 1.5% to 25%. The methodology of the
present study requires the Indication from
the decision-maker as to where he would
want to make the change, so that the total
of resources to all of CREED is 100%,
TABLE 12. CREED
CONSERVE, 27.19%
Percent
Improve fire prevention/lighting tech-
niques ---------------------------- 24.42
:Preserve trees by better farming ------ 1. 47
:iniprove seed inventory replenishment
to restore land ..-------.-____----.
REGULATE, 65.43%,
Prevent strip logging -----------------
Prevent strip mining --------------- .__
kistablish criteria on fossil fuel (e.g.
oil) mining-__----_
--------
EDUCATE, 4.88 % --- -
-:EL ucation of the public on fire pre-
vention 3;14
laemonstratidn of effects of violating
environmental ethic_ _ .---------- - -- 1.14
ENJOY, 1.:10%
7[mprove routes to more distant areas- 0. is
btate assistance for land acquisition-- 0.26
State assistance to acquisition of urban
'and ----------------------------- 0.13
State assistance to acquisition of in-
dustrial land---------------------- 0.13
DRVELO)?, 1.00%
best move of anyone so i z. He is going to
Create new cities In s?amiwild forests-.-
0 98
finish it. Over where you are, you. don't know
Move to suburban areas with civil sys-
all that is happening, but from here, I can
tems eleotroni:c products -----------
0.02
hear the 52's bombing in Cambodia.. It
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this introductory study
has been to explore the use of the systems
approach to help the systematic evaluation
of the budget request by the Congressional
decision-makers on the Appropriations Com-
mittee, The Department of the Interior
Budget figures for FY 1970 and FY 1971
were selected, and some 55% of the total
budget (NOA) represented in five elements
was identified for analysis.
Using the organismic, strategic and tacti-
cal hierarchy of objecDaves, the five elements
were associated with a single, overall ob-
jective: Averting national ecological dis-
aster. Alternative measures of .meeting this
overall objective were systematically de-
veloped for each of the five elements.
A systematic comparison was made of dif-
ferent tactical level choices, horizontally;
and also of each tactical choice with its
higher level of objectives at the strategic
and organismic level, vertically.
The consequence of nonfulfillment of each
of the tactical level choices upon the or-
ganismic objective were illustratively put
into numerical terms. Based upon the rela-
tionship of each tactical objective to each
other and each tactical objective to the cor-
reEponding strategic and organismic objec-
tives, the allocations of the Interior Budget
were demonstrated.
The strength of the systems approach ex-
plored with respect to the appropriate evalu-
ation lies in the consistency of Its method-
olcgy which forces the user to make explicit
his hidden assumptions and values, so that
alternative means of accomplishing the same
objective can be Identified and evaluated;
and also courses and consequences corre-
sponding to altogether different sets of over-
all objective themes.
A YOUNG MAN IN VIETNAM WRITES
.HIS PARENTS
HON. MARK. ANDREWS
OF NORTH DAKOTA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, Jane-1, 1970
Mr. ANDREWS of North Dakota. Mr.
Speaker, the war in. Vietnam and the
President's recent decision to send troops
into Cambodia to destroy enemy con-
centrations have been the subjects of
major controversy over the past several
weeks. Everyone is hearing what the
students on our campuses are saying, but
too few have heard what our young men
who are serving in Vietnam have to say.
I was pleased to receive a copy of a
letter from Philip Foss to his mother
and father, Mr, and Mrs. William Foss
of Michigan
N
:Dak
Phili
i
i
hi
,
.
p
s serv
ng
s
.:
32.55
30.93 country in Vietnam and his letter speaks
for itself.
I include the letter at this point in
the RECORD:
DEAR MOM AND DAD: l know you've waited
a long time for this letter, and that I should
have written sooner but I'll get this one in
the mail.
I got both of your packages. The bread
was in fine shape as was the sausage and
cheese. It didn't last 20 minutes once it got
hero. I ate about 8 or 10 sandwiches myself
and let the other fellows have the rest. It
was the beat sandwich. I've had in nearly
a year. I suppose you're wondering what is
going on over here. Well, Nixon made the
sounds like drufns rolling- The only way to
end this is to go after them. But the main
thing is that the people at hoarse stand to-
gether whether Nixon is right or wrong. We
are in Cambodia now and it's too late to
back out. So we must go ahead. and finish
the mission and hope we have done right.
In my own mind, this will be the turning
point. I would have made the same decision
if it were for we to decide.
My time is nearly over. Its been ten
months now and they've gene fairly fast. One
day I'll be walking in the door. :1 can't wait
to eat some food again. I never gave it much
thought until I didn't have ill anymore. I miss
all that food, vegetable soup with dumplings,
chile. I could go on forever.
This is the busy time at home, I suppose,
The farmers with their crops and you with
insurance. When the grain is ripe, I'll see it
this year.
Hope you're both in the best of health.
Tell the people you finally got a letter from
me. Take good care of yourselves.
Love, your son
THE HARD HATS-FOR GOD AND
COUN'l.'R,'Y"
HON. JOHN R. RAR ECK
OF LOVISIA74A
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 1, 1970
Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, for years
I have been saying that when the Ameri-
can workingman becomes fed up with
what is going on in our country, we can
expect a change for the better.
In New York City, upward of 150,000
hard hats-workingmen--recently pa-
raded in a show of American flags to
pledge unity for our country and sup-
port for its leaders. Their shouts "All the
Way U.S.A." have echoed around the
world.
Now we in Washington understand
that the hard hats are to come to our Na-
tion's Capital-not to protest against but
to demonstrate for the United States, for
our fighting men, for our flag, and even
for police officers.
I predict that when the builders-the
workers of our country start being
heard we can anticipate a stiffening in
the attitudes of many of the liberal-left
politicians. And, when our patriotic labor
Americans join forces with the farmers
and the other concerned loyal Americans,
along with patriotic youth, there will
arise a ground swell of Americanism
from the once silent majority which may
yet save our country.
Mr. Speaker, I have my hard :hat in my
office-I, too, have heard the cry "U.S.A.,
All the Way."
I include several news clippings,' as
follow:
[From the Washington (D.C') Post, May 31,
19701
FLAG'S DEsSNDEa3: HARD HATS MA-SCBI FOR A
WAY or Lips:
(By Richard Harwood)
NEw YORK.-In lower Manhattan, the flags
are everywhere, Little flags, taped to car an-
tennas, overhead cranes and Ice-cream carts.
Big flags, whipping in the winds that blow
through Wall Street. Metal flags stuck in
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