CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE, 9 APRIL 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 9, 1970
• Content Type: OPEN

, Approved For Release 200-2/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
'April 9I 1970 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 5479
whether a continuing strategic standstill ment. These problems are not an excuse Mr. President (Mr. How.ralos) , it would
is both workable and verifiable. It is my for rejecting the interim arrangement I be a negotiator's pause.
understanding that this is consistent propose. Without this pause, all chances of ban-
With the intent of Senate Resolution 211 Fifth. As a measure of precaution, we ning MIRV's and ABM's are lost. Once
as amended. I shall vote for the resolu- should maintain a high state of rea,di- both sides go beyond present testing of
tion, ness to resume testing and deployment MIRV's and deployment of ABM's, ban-
The limited duration of the initial sus- the MIRV's, we would not be able to de-
Let me describe more precisely why I
its coverage. As I see it, this approach . are being deployed. The Soviet Union is
would work, what its advantages are, and
Why I believe it should begin as a tempo-
rary arrangement. I visualize five ele-
ments in the MISS:
First, The United States should take
the initiative in making the proposal. It
should be the first order of business at
Vienna. If the Soviet Union is not in-
terested, we can move on to other nego-
tiating possibilities. If the Soviets are in-
terested, the entire initial Vienna session
? can be well devoted to ironing out the
details.
etecond. The substantive effect of the
proposal would be a mutual halt to first,
MRV and ivnav flight testing, and, sec-
ond, further deployments of all other
strategic offensive and defensive systems.
Only by prohibiting Soviet missile test-
ing that could lead to the development
Independently targetable warheads could
we have the confidence that Soviet
MIRV's would not be deployed. Because
- of our open society, the Soviets need not
have a similar concern about U.S. cir-
cumvention. MRV and MIRV testing and
deployments would be halted, thus giv-
ing neither side an opportunity to gain
advantage. Research and development,
an area which is inherently unverifiable
and hence uncontrollable, would con-
tinue. The ban on further deployments
would encompass land and sea based
ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and
ABM radar construction and upgrading
along with associated missiles. The halt
would apply only to strategic offensive
and defensive nuclear systems It would
not in any way affect the current deploy-
ment of ground forces, air and sea units,
or of tactical nuclear weapons. We would
be as prepared to deal with any con-
tingency?strategic, tactical, nuclear,
and conventional?as we are today.
Third. The halt would be for a 6-month ' situation could only become worse. The agreements which do not ban t ese
period with an automatic lapse unless Soviets eventually could develop a five
renewed in the same or in modified form or a 10 headed MIRted missilewand with Finally, if the talks make unsatisfac-
systems.
by both sides. Initially, this would be a force of only 300 SS-9's do more dam- tory progress, or if we become dissatis-
-long enough to provide negotiating room age that at present. Can this kind of fled with the freeze, both sides can go
and short enough to forestall either sides, development be checked by anything forward on their own.
having the jitters. Of course, if we de- other than an arms control agreement? The point is that only a mutual tern-
tect Soviet cheating, we would have the Would a 6-months freeze, which I have porary freeze preserves all three of these
option to call off the whole arrangement. proposed, make the threat of the SS-9
If all works satisfactorily, both sides options.
SALT is a very complicated and sen-
greater?
could extend the temporary halt. Of course, U.S. ABM and MIRV pro- sitive matter. The technical aspects, the
Fourth. Both sides would agree to rely grams would be suspended as well. But intricacies of strategic thinking, the no-
on national means of vertification to de- this should be no cause for concern. tentialities of different weapon systems,
tect violations. For the United States Those who still take great comfort in are not easy to co.mprehend?especially
this means utilization of onr ample tech- U.S. "superiority" in numbers of nuclear when all the pieces must be fitted to-
nological capabilities. For the Soviet warheads and technology ought not to gether in an agreement. No one can be
Union, it means also the ample supple- be disturbed by the mutual freeze. To the confident today as to what a good agree-
ment obtainable IV reading_ American extent that this superiority is translat- ment should look like at this time, and
newspapers. Given the all-encompassing able into diplomatic and strategic cur- we should not commit ourselves to any
nature of the temporary agreement, both rency, the mutual freeze leaves the long-term arrangement without careful
sides would have high confidence of be- United States with those advantages as negotiations.
ing able to detect cheating. Any new de- well. At the same time, Mr. President, it
pIoyment would be a violation, and would Another benefit from a mutual interim would be an enormous tragedy to see
bring an end to reciprocal reStraint, strategic standstill is that it keeps the reasonable options destroyed because
Problems associated with detection and door open for permanent agreement es- those in positions of responsibility do not
verification need to be looked at closer there along the same over-all freeze lines have the will to preserve them. We do
when it comes to making a final agree- or along more limited lines. So in a sense, not need to know all the answers in order
I. A BOTTITAL INTERIM 'STRATEGIC STANDSTILL programs. ning becomes impractical. In the case of
pension makes possible the . breadth of tect with confidence whether or not they
support Senate Resolution 211, how it
has the advantages of more limited pro- not nearly far enough along? ey
posals to ban MIRV testing or ABM de- have started at all?on -a MIRV testing
ployment and the like, without involv- program. If an agreement is not made
ing their disadvantages. More limited which prevents their testing and they do
proposals which focus on banning one or develop MIRV's, they could deploy this
more weapon systems are open to the weapons system by the simple process of
charge that compensatory actions in putting new upper stages on their pres-
other weapon systems could upset the ent missiles and by changing internal
balance For example, simply prohibiting guidance systems. These operations pre-
sent some difficulty for detection. As is
now well known, our own country is well
down the road with MIRV testing. MIRV
deployments are readied for next Janu-
ary. Once these take place, the door is
completely shut on the possibility of
banning MIRV's. For once MIRV's are
placed on missiles, the only means of
verification is onsite inspection and a
canopener. Neither the Russians nor our-
selves are prepared for this degree of in-
trusive isnpection.
So far as ABM's are concerned, de-
ployment would create problems of polit-
ical inertia as well as problems of veri-
fication. Once present ABM deployment
schedules are met, political pressures
would make it difficult, if not impossible,
to tear it down. The technical verifica-
tion problem concerns the potential for
upgrading present radars which are as-
sociated with air defense. Some try to
argue that the radar support for an ABM
system cannot be banned effectively be-
cause of this. Given all the difficulties
with sophisticated radars in general, this
argument seems to me overdrawn. It is
no easy task to make existing radarg
much better, and my proposal would ban
the construction of new radars.
If, at the end of the freeze period, we
MIRV testing and deployment would do
nothing about ABM systems, and simply
banning ABMs would leave the MIRV
threat intact. Pressures to resume de-
ployments and make new deployments
are bound to arise in such situations.
A mutual interim strategic standstill
takes no chances with our security. No
one in the Nixon administration has
argued, and I believe no one can argue,
that no matter what happens, our se-
curity could be impaired over such a
short period of time. The President and
the Secretary of Defense have said that
we are in good shape now and in the
short term, and that our only cause for
concern might be the possible situation
in the mid-1970's. For example, even the
very first stage of the supposedly "vital"
Safeguard ABM system is not due to be-
come operational until 1973 at the
earliest.
The immediate benefit to the United
States of a MTSS is that it would halt
Soviet ABM and SS-9 buildups and mul-
tiple warhead tests. The Nixon adminis-
tration points to these ongoing Soviet
programs as the cardinal reasons for
U.S. ABM's and MIRV's. To be specific,
Secretary Laird has said that 420 SS-9's
with three warheads per missile could
destroy almost all of our Minuteman decide that MIRVS and ABM's serve
missile force. But if we do not act now some useful purpose vis-a-vis other nu-
to hold off this MIRVing potential, the clear powers, we can make other kinds of
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
. ,
S 5480 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE April 9, 1970
to institute a temporary freeze. All we ating and stabilizing the balance. I stress about "the variety of threats we may
need to know is that our national safety the guesswork becanse the President said face* does he mean the Chinese? Both
will not be impaired by the freeze, and in his recent state of the world message. the President and the Secretary
Dc-
this we do know. We reached general agreement within fense talk about the Chinese threat as if
The hest way to decide about the com- the government on four specific criteria it were something our present and fu-
plexities of an agreement and what is for sufficiency." His statement, however, ture capabilities cannot fully manage.
necessary to maintain confident mutual did not explicitly identify those criteria. Again, Secretaries McNamara and Clif-
deterrence is to talk to the Soviets as we Withholding of this information, 1 ford Made abundantly clear that our
are doing, but also to give the negotiators might add, is a serious departure from forces are designed to maintain assured
the chance to talk meaningfully by frees- the view of the Kennedy and Johnson destruction against both the Soviet
ing the strategic situation. administrations that the objective of de- Union and China at the same time. This
The only risk in this proposal, as I see terrence and the U.S. interest are best judgment still seems eminently sensible
it, is the possibility that the Soviets served if the Soviets know where we in view of Secretary Laird's Posture
might reject the Proposal. Such rejection stand arid why. Statement prediction that "If flight test-
could lead to a chores of "I fold you so's." Until the President tells us what he ing began in the near future, the Chi-
But those making up this Chorus would has in mind, however, we can piece parts nese might have as many as 10 to 25
be the same people who oppose a freeze. of the picture .together from his own ICBM's in 1975." How does this stack up
I believe the proposal is worth this risk. words. He says: against our present capability of about
II, THE PRESIDENT% poLxey: THE= RoADDLOCKS The strategic doctrine that had gained the 3,000 deliverable nuclear warheads? In
TO SVCCESSFOZ SALT , greatest acceptance by the time my Adminis- calling his area ABM "essential", the
President Nixon has repeatedly said tration took office was this: According to the President seems to be saying that we need
that we are leaving the era of confronta-
th re than theory of 'assured destruction,' deterrence more 100 to one superiority to deter
was guaranteed if we were sure we could de-
tion and entering "an era of negotla- stroy a significant percentage of Soviet popu- and cope with the Chine,e. If this is notenough, then nothing can suffice?since
tion." With respect to SALT, his mixture lation and industry after the worst con-
of negotiation and confrontation can ceivable Soviet attack on our strategic forces. only the sane can be deterred.
best be described az "massive ambiguity." While we can assume that assured de-
Then President Nixon went on to say struction is one of the President's four
This "massive ambiguity" appears on
three fronts: his linking SALT with other that? criteria, we must also assume that his
political issues, his strategic criteria, and The growing strategic forces on both sides other three criteria go well beyond this.
pose new and disturbing problems. Should a Presumably they deal with issues of de-
his negotiating tactics.
President; in the event of a nuclear attack, fense and the fighting and winning of
Let me deal with each of these three be left with the single option of ordering the nuclear wars. What else could they be,
points briefly, mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the
First, shortly after President Nixon face of the certainty that it would be fol-
until he tells us differently?
assumed office, we began to learn that he lowed by the mass slaughter of Americans? To the extent that the President would
thought of strategic arms talks with the
Should the concept of assured destruction be go beyond deterrence and assured de-
Soviets as a part of our over-ail relation-
narrowly defined and should it be the only struction, we are brought, again into pur-
measure of our ability to deter the variety suit of the Will-of-the-wisp of superi-
ship with the Soviet Union. This was a of threats we may face?
sensible and admirable thought?except ority?w:hether it is called "relative ad-
that it was carried to an extreme. Well, I submit that this statement abounds vantage" or the new phrase "sufficiency."
before Helsinki, he stressed that 'SALT with errors of fact and logic. As a matter These latter goals arc illusions. They
depended on progress toward settlements of fact, both Secretary McNamara and are based on the twin pillars of nuclear
in Vietnam, the Middle East, and Europe. Secretary Clifford defined assured de-
absurdity: that a nuclear war can some-
In other words, unless the Soviet Union struction "as the ability to inflict at all how be fought in a controlled way, and
made concessions in those other areas, no that one side can emerge the victor.
times and under all. foreseeable condi-
real movement could be expected on teens an unacceptable degree of damage Think about it, Mr. President. The one
SALT. . upon any single aggressor, or a combin-
reality in the nightmare world of nuclear
While the President was deciding ation of aggressors--even after absorb-
arms is mutual deterrence. To the ex-
whether such talks could even begin ing a surprise attack." This was con-
tent either side tries to turn this situa-
without progress on these other fronts, sidered the basis of deterrence. As such, tion to its advantage, it can lead only to
precious time was lost. Now that the talks it seemed and still seems a valid and sen-
the continuation of an arms race that
are underway, it is not clear whether the sible criterion--especially since the basis neither side can win.
President is prepared to reach any kind for calculating assured destruction was a Third, the President's actions and his
of agreement with the Soviets in the very conservative one. Without even negotiating tactics do not seem consist-
absence of these side concessions. To the counting the lives lost due to radioactive ent with his rhetoric about SALT. He
extent that this approach remains an fallout and the catastrophic disruptions calls MIRV and ABM deployments "es-
implicit or explicit part of the President's on society and services, it was estimated sential." Even as the negotiators will
attitude, it can forestall substantive prog- that after absorbing a full blow on our-
meet in Vienna, deployment activities
s
ress for Vienna and beyond, selves we .still could kill at least 25 per-
will be going forward. MIJELV' will be in
By lumping negotiations on the stria. cent of the Soviet population and destroy some missiles by June and ABM site
tegic nuclear balance with tenuously re- upwards of 50 percent of its industrial construction is taking form.
lated issues, the President makes SALT capacity. These estimates were made in I find it difficult to accept the admin-
agreement much less likely. There are terms of the highest expected Soviet istration's description of these actions as
real differences of interests and different threat and a greater than expected So-
"restraint."
issues involved in these separate' areas. viet threat?that is, under the worst To justify "negotiating from strength"
Should we deny or reject the common possible circumstances to us. as a good negotiating tactic shows a lack
interest we have with the Soviets in cur- If we already have this kind of caPa-
of understanding of the negotiating
tailing the costs and risks of the stra- bility, surely we have the capability both process.
tegic arms race because our interests con- to respond to lesser attacks and to give In the first place, it misjudges the
filet in Vietnam or elsewhere? Does the the President more than "the single one Soviets. For years they have resisted
President's phrase an "era of negotia- tion" of holocaust. Former Defense Sec- negotiations from a position of inferior-
tion" mean a complete across-the-board rotary Clifford stated that U.S. policy for itY. Would they negotiate from such a
agreement with the Soviets or no agree- years has been to "try" to provide "our position now or would they attempt to
.ment at all? forces with characterisics that will per- get parity? In the second place, it over-
If the "era of negotiations" is ever to mit them to be used effectively in a lint- looks the 'obvious fact that agreements
arrive in fact, we must try to negotiate ited and controlled retaliation as well es are based on mutuality of interests, not
what is negotiable, for assured destruction, thereby being advantage. Both the Soviet Union and
Second, the President seems to be bas- prepared for any type of Soviet attack, the United States are strong enough not
ing his SALT policies on strategic cri- What kinds of capabilities and what to have to make agreements that are not
tens which, if I guess at them rightly, kinds of options is the President really in their interests.
are incompatible with the goal of negotie talking about? When the President talks Another point of concern is the Presi-
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Aivrii 9, 1970 Approved FoMitstesn821Q3/20.;-,CIA,IRDP7A402aaR
NAL icr.u,uttio----- oraTrvim -000300040009-3 S 5481
dent's leisurely pace, despite his stated
interest in SALT. The Soviets cannot be
execused on this point either. Time is
running out for agreements on MIRV
and ABM. From what we here in the
Senate hear about the President's "build-
ing block" approach, he intends to take
matters slowly and one at a time. With
such a view and at such a pace, what will
be left to negotiate if deployments and
testing continue?
Again, I want to underline my main
point about negotiations. Mutually per-
ceived parity is the best and perhaps the
only basis for agreement. Agreement at
this time may be our last hope against
increased dangers of nuclear holocaust
and a terrible drain on our resciurces and
our people. Unless we act now to preserve
parity and the possibilities it offers, it
will vanish through Soviet and U.S. ac-
tions and responses.
CONCLUSION: ACTING NOW AND ACTING
FOR THE FUTURE
President Nixon called this resolution
"irrelevant." This choice of word invites
two questions. Is it "irrelevant" because
it is not feasible and desirable? If so, he
should explain. Is it "irrelevant" because
it is what he himself really wants? If so,
why does he not propose it?
With only slight differences, a mutual
interim strategic standstill has been pro-
posed by a group of experts in the Ameri-
can Assembly and by the President's own
Arms Control General Advisory Commit-
tee. Many men in both of these groups
have had and still have access to all the
relevant classified information on strate-
gic nuclear forces. They know what they
are talking about and they have the
facts. Now, I hope that 'U.S. Senate will
add its voice and act favorably on Senate
Resolution 211, the resolution before us.
Acting now means making the tem-
porary freeze relevant.
Acting for the future requires that the
freeze be temporary. We need the time
to negotiate and the time to decide. Five
Issues need to be thoroughly discussed
with the Soviet Union and within our
own Nation:
First. What to do about land-based
ICBM's which are becoming vulnerable
as missile accuracy on both sides im-
proves and which invite attack on our
own territory.
Second. Whether MIRV's are neces-
sary to maintain mutual deterrence, giv-
ing us enough deliverable nuclear war-
heads to hedge against unexpected
threats or whether a ban is feasible.
Third. Whether ABM's work, and even
if they do work, do we want them, given
the costs and the strategic dangers. leapfrogging weapons system, carrying
Fourth, What over-all political and us ever closer to the point of no return.
strategic directions should we set in We now have an opportunity, its prom-
order to guide 17.S. choices, on these ise still untested, to begin to bring a halt
weapon options and on. our foreign policy. to this melancholy pattern. Next week
. . .
Thoughtful Americans will recognize be much more difficult, and will require
that this approach, if accepted by both on-site inspection. As long as the MIRV's
sides, would greatly increase our na- are not deployed, so-called national
tional security. In no respect would it verification procedures such as satellite
diminish our ability to protect American photography can provide an accurate
interests. The interim standstill would assessment of weapons levels. Given the
involve no element of unilateral disarm- climate of mutual fear, it will be difficult
ament. Instead, it wopld involve recipro- if not impossible to gain agreement for
cal restraint. Although the suspension on-site inspection. Without verification,
would apply to all types of strategic agreement on arms limitations will be
weapons systems, it would not affect con- correspondingly more difficult.
ventional forces and related capabilities. Time is very short. Air Farce Secretary
The breadth of the ban, and the con- Seamans announced last month that the
sequent questions about compliance and United States first multiple warheads
verification, would be fully offset by the would be operative on Minuteman mis-
relatively short duration of its initial sties in June. While the administration
period. later said that the announcement should
In making his decision on these mat- not have been made, they did not deny its
ters, the President would do well to re- truth. The U.S.S.R. apparently will not
member the war in Heaven which Milton be ready to deploy MIRV's until some-
imagined in his Paradise Lost. After the time after that date, but as things now
first day of fighting in which the rebel stand the time is not far away when
angels suffered the worse, Satan sought both great powers will have reached a
to redress the balance of forces. He said: new and more dangerous plateau.
Weapons more violent, perhaps more valid One way to avoid losing this opportu-
Armes, when next we meet, May serve to nity would be to adopt the policy urged
better us, and worse our foes, Or equal what by the distinguished junior Senator from
between us made the odds, in Nature none: Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) as modi-
To the amazement of his followers, fled by the suggestion of the distin-
Satan then produced a field gun. And guished senior Senator from Kentucky
in the next day's fighting, these guns (Mr. COOPER). This proposal, now be-
wreaked havoc among the loyal angels. fore the Senate in Senate Resolution 211
Losing and in their fury, the good angels of which I am one of 51 cosponsors, calls
grasped the absolute weapon. They tore upon the President to propose immedi-
up the hills of heaven and hurled them ate suspension of strategic offensive and
at the rebels. Not to be outdone, the defensive weapons to the Soviet Union.
rebels did the same. Heaven threatened This would apply, if accepted by the So-
with imminent ruin, God intervened and viets, to ABM systems, and to land and
cast the rebels into darkness. sea based offensive weapons, including
MRV and MIRV warheads. Its intent is
Angels, unlike men, cannot die. Men, to provide time for permanent agree-
unlike angels, cannot chance and should agree-
ments to be worked out at the SALT
not want absolute weapons. Without di- talks, and to give impetus to the Vienna
rect divine intervention, men have to meeting.
fall back on their own good sense.
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, the Dutch The large number of Senate cospon-
humanist Erasmus once asked: sors for Senate Resolution 211 is only
one indication of the wide support such
What is more foolish than to enter upon
a co-nilict . . . wherein each side reaps more an initiative would have in this country.
Of 10SS than of gain? Recently, a similar suggestion for an
"interim halt" in strategic weapons de-
Today, we live in an era in which a ployment was made by a panel of arms-
nuclear war would incontestably bring control specialists called together by the
more of loss than of gain to each corn- American Assembly of Columbia Uni-
batant, Even preparations designed to versity. Perhaps even more important,
protect ourselves and to deter the con- the prestigiousGeneral AdvisoryCorn-
flagration we devoutly hope never comes mittee of the Arms Control and Dis-
are made at great cost. We are becoming armament Agency chaired by the Hon-
acutely aware that there is no absolute orable John J. McCloy recently argued
security as long as we remain the hos- that such an immediate mutual halt of
tages of the escalating technology of the deployment of strategic weapons should
arms race, be proposed to the Russians, and that
If vie are to fulfill Faulkner's opti- such a halt should also apply to the test-
mistic belief that "man will not merely ing of multiple warheads for offensive
endure: he will prevail," then we must missiles. This committee, composed of,
break the cycle of weapons system after in addition to Mr. McCloy, Dean Rusk,
William Scranton, Cyrus Vance, William
C. Foster, and James R. Killian, repre-
sents much of our accumulated experi-
ence in arms control, gained in the serv-
ice of several administrations.
Fifth. What are our overall national in Vienna, the strategic arms limitation Support is clearly bipartisan for this
priorities? talks with the Soviet Union will begin. proposal. Its prime movers in the Senate
It is only by answering these and other It would be tragic if, at the moment have been two distinguished Republicans,
questions that we can be ready for a when constructive talks seem possible at while the Senate Democratic Policy Corn-
final agreement. But we must act now last, we allow the chance to slip away. mittee on Tuesday announced its agree-
with a teinporary freeze to insure that There is real danger that this will ment and informed the President that
these questions are not answered by de- happen. Scientific experts have made it strong Democratic support would be
fault. This is why T propose my 6 month quite clear that once MIRV's are de- forthcoming if he chose to make such an
interim freeze. played, verification of weapons levels will initiative to the Soviet Union.
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RD072-00337R000300040009-3
S 5482 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE April. 91 19170
Unfortunately, the administration has be easier to achieve now than it might timely, and thoughtful statements they
chosen to label Senate Resolution 211 as be at some time in the future when one have made this morning on the subject
"irrelevant," and has given indications side might have made technological ad- DO which I shall addrees myself briefly
that it intends to, pursue a flexible, non- vances to which the other would feel at this time.
committal approach in the forthcoming compelled to reply As Washington said: No NEVV MIRY OR ME'srt,TEMAN MONEY
SALT talks. I agree that flexibility is a There can be no greater error than to ex-
necessity in such complicated and tedh- Mr. President, the measure presentl3r
pect or calculate upon real favors from n
Meal discussions but cannot agree that non to nation. a- before the Senate, Senate Resolution 211,
the initiative suggested by Senate Fteso- sponsored chiefly by the Senator from
lution 211 Is irrelevant. Such an interim Only when there is a mutual advan- Massachusetts (Mr. BP,00xE), deserves
halt accepted by both sides would pro- tage in a proposal can we expect agree- the speedy approval of the Senate in the
vide thne for the Vienna talks to bear /tient. Such mutual advantages exist at same overwhelming fashion that it was
fruit by removing the threat that de- the present, and we should not be timid aproved by the Committee on Foreign
in our efforts to convert the situation Relations.
ployment of MIRV's would make a per-
ma,nent amement difficult if not im- into a completed agreement. The original version of this proposal,
possible to achieve. n would be an A second point can be considered more along with the more far reaching reso-
indication of our sincere intent, thus briefly. Contrary to the fears of some, lution offered by Senator CASE, Senate
providing a favorable atmosphere for she there is no way in which the policy sug- Ite,solution 210, have been before the
talks themselves. Finally, it would delay gested in this resolution could be con- President since last June as they con-
the need to deploy expensive ABM sys- vested to one of unilateral disarmament. sidered aidvice of more than 40 Sen-
terns until we know whether they will be The halt in deployment of both offensive tetotcys_onidgeetalin
blge re-len;ityltiple independ-
needed, at no cost to our security. and defensive strategic weapons would vehicles, or
In spite of these advantages to our- take place only if both skies agreed. If so-called MIRV s, in the context of
selves, the administration seems to per- such agreement could not be obtained, the strategic arms limitation talks. The
Foreign Relations Com
AA in a more timid exploratory approach then each would be free to do what it Committee report on
to the SALT talks. Yesterday's National thought necessary for its own protection,
this version reaffirms f1 11 that
Security Council meeting to consider the further development of MIRV's "could
Finally, there has been considerable
most effectively be suspended by st
U.S. position in the talks apparently opping
discussion of how such a halt in deploy-
reached no final decision, ignoring the further flight tests which are subject to
ment, whether the interim one proposed
opportunity to make this important hd- national verification or other measures of
in Senate Reso:Ution 211 or a permanent observation and inspection."
tiative. The New York Times this morn- one which might result from the Vienna
ing cites "informed officials" for the re- The President for some reason has not
talks, would be verified to insure that accepted the advice of the 40 Senators
port that the administration is not neither party was violating it. This is
prepared to make a proposal for a freeze speaking out on the issue. MIRV testMg
a complex technical problem, but our has continued, and we offered no mutual
on strategic weapons deployment, and, scientists are confident that at the pres-
apparently, is unwilling to consider the moratorium during last year's first round
ent level of weapons sophistication, 114- of SALT discussions Instead the "scope"
thoughtful and useful recommendation tional vertification techniques can insure of the talks was outlined.
of McGeorge Bundy for an American ini- that each side will know what the other The approach was described as a "corn-
tiative for deferring its planned deploy- is doing. As I have said earlier, the verti-
ment. promise" between military and disarma-
fication problem once MIRV's or MRV's ment factions. I think that term is in-
In the course of Senate debate on thisaccurate. The practical effect of con-
are deployed would be much more dif-
resolution several points have been madeficult, since not only ssiles would have tinuing the tests may well be to force
mi
which I believe should receive additional to be counted, but the number of war- acceptance of the proposition that any
emphasis,
agreement must assume some MIRV's on
heads on each missile would have to be
t
verified; that could at present only be
First, it Is generally agreed that we both sides. Especially Jn the case of this
? done by on-site inspection. Since both
are now in a situation of "rough parity new technology, it is clear that we can-
es still need tests to make their multi-
with the Russians with respect to deliv- sid not pursue serious efforts to limit arms
d h weapons operational, na-
le warhead erable nuclear capability. Sentiment has p while we are simultaneously feeding mil-
been expressed In some quarters that tonal verification could keep each itary ambitions to build them.
informed if additional tests in violation
we should only negotiate from a position In any case, the pending resolution
of streng of any agreement were being conducted.
strength. If this means that we ought is another plea that the President corn-
to fact that verification is possible with
to be strong enough to avoid any possi- t prehend the gravity of his course,
bility of nuclear blackmailpresent working arrangements, but
, I am in At the same time, we should recognize
would not possible after multiple war-
agreement. Some have argued that we t b that this is a cautious and limited step.
d
hea weapons are deployed is to me the
should only negotiate when we are con- It has, of course, no binding effect upon
most compelling reason for both an In- stronger than the other side the President. It is advice and no more.
:
and, ternn halt in deployment now along the
therefore, that agreement should In light of our technological lead the
es suggested in Senate Resolution 211
not be actively pursued until we re- lin Soviet Union might well reject the over-
establish a superiority by deploying and for a permanent and comprehen- tures it asks.
MIRV's on Minuteman and Poseidon. sive agreement for suspension of testing There is another route which I believe,
l
and deployment to be sought at Vienna.
But, Mr. President, if we would not be a we should examine, primarily because it
w-illing to negotiate from a position of The folly of the nuclear arms race is consistent with prudent, management
nuclear inferiority, why should the So- has continued long enough. We must now of our strategic forces regardless of
viet Union be willing to do so? We must truly implement the ''era of negotiation" SALT, but also because it can help to re-
realize that the nuclear arms race is the President has promised both in this tam MIRV among the weapons which
both a cause and a -result of cold war field and in others, such as Indochina as can be avoided through the negotiations
tensions and fears, that misunderstand- I suggested last week. In each instance that will soon begin in Vienna. It seems
ing exists on both sides, and that our we should read the phrase to mean an appropriate to discuss it briefly today in
good intentions are not always as clear "era of significant negotiations," in connection with the pending resolution
to others as they seem to ourselves. For which we do all we can to insure that because of its direct relationship to sev-
these reasons, the present time is par- negotiation leads to agreement. The dip- eral of the most important issues facing
tieularly auspicious for reaching agree- lomatic initiative proposed in Senate our negotiators.
ment on arms limitations, since currently Resolution 211 in my opinion would be Particularly in light of the aelminis-
each side is clearly able to deter the an important way to begin to convert tration's refusal thus far to propose a
o teen Further, each side has a clear in- the President's February statement from mutual moratorium on PLIFSV tests--
terest in diverting the vast funds pros-- hope to reality, which, if accepted, would have halted the
ently earmarked for strategic weapons Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, first Soviet program as well as our own and
to other purposes. Because of the ex- of all, I commend the Senator from Okla-- would have thus avoided the threat to
isting weapons parity, I submit that a hams (Mr. Hams) and the Senator from Minuteman?I think we are forced to
meaningful and effective agreement will Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) for the excellent, consider this year whether it would not
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
4wit 9, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
be wise to allow the phasing out of the
entire concept of fixed-site ICBM's.
At the very least we should forego ex-
penditures on futile improvements in the
Minuteman force pending an investiga-
tion of whether land-based missiles can
be a viable component of our retaliatory
forces in the future. The $686 million
which has been requested in the budget
for the Minuteman procurement program
in fiscal 1971 should, in my judgment, be
deleted from the military procurement
authorization bill, and we should also
prohibit expenditure of any funds pre-
viously appropriated for that purpose.
At an appropriate time, Mr. President,
I intend to move to delete these funds for
expansion of the Minuteman system.
The first and most compelling reason
for taking this step is the growing vulner-
ability of fixed-site missiles. There is cer-
tainly no need for me to make this case,
which has already been made so force-
fully by Secretary Laird and his col-
leagues throughout the past year. It is
their assessment that the Soviet SS-9
missile will be able to destroy most or all
of our Minuteman force in the mid-
1970's.
For a time that vulnerability was her-
alded as evidence of the need for the
"hard-point" defense to be provided by
phase I of the Safeguard antiballistic
missile system. But the situation has now
changed. In his defense program and
budget report of February 20, Secretary
Laird made the startling admission that
If the Russians deploy MIRV warheads
on the 85-9, improve its accuracy, and
continue deploying at the present rate?
precisely the steps he said last year
showed the need for Safeguard?then
the threat in the mid-1970s, in the Sec-
retary's words, "will be much too large to
be handled by the level of defense en-
visioned in the Safeguard system."
Most of us would certainly agree that
its degree of security against enemy at-
tack must be a primary measurement of
the worth of a strategic weapons system.
There is very little point in deploying a
strategic system if, in the words of the
Secretary of Defense, we have no reliable
fay to defend that system. It is also clear
that we cannot significantly increase the
reliability of a questionable Minuteman
force by protecting it with an even more
questionable ABM. We should instead
concentrate our resources upon those
which can perform the mission more
effectively.
A second strong reason for phasing out
Minuteman is the fact that the Safe-
guard ABM is among the direct con-
sequences of keeping it. In other words,
under the new rationalization for build-
ing the ABM, it is designed to protect the
land-based Minuteman system. Any
honest evaluation of the costs of Minute-
man must now include not only its own
costs of acquisition, operation and main-
tenance, but also the enormous expense
of trying to protect it with the ABM.
Retention of the fixed-site concept will
involve a continuing drain of resources,
fkurther increasing the disparity which
I believe already exists between the prices
of land-based missiles and those sta-
tioned aboard submarines.
Third, the mrRAT test program is rap-
idly approaching the point where Min-
uteman III with multiple warheads will
be ready for deployment, probably within
the next several months. If we do not
prevent deployment we will have a weap-
ons system with the worst immaginable
characteristics.
Minuteman III's stationed in fixed sites
will be no less vulnerable to attack on
the ground than Minuteman I's and II's.
So, to whatever extent Secretary Laird's
fears about the capacity of Safeguard to
defend our existing Minuteman system
is true, the same doubts and fears would
extend to the Minuteman III after it has
been armed with the MIRV system.
There has been an attempt to make the
case that adding multiple warheads will
improve the deterrence potential of Min-
uteman by increasing the amount of
damage that can be done by those sur-
viving a Soviet first strike. This is not a
valid argument, however, since there is a
loss in megantonnage per missile involved
In 1V1IRV'ing. Against cities, and within
the assured destruction levels we have
considered necessary for deterrence, a
single 1-megaton Minuteman warhead is
probably just as potent as three 150 to
200 kiloton independently targetable
warheads. This rationale for MIRV is
reminiscent of the curious search for
missions we have seen in the case of the
Safeguard ABM system?its advocates
have been forced to find a new reason for
MIRV because they can hardly argue, as
they did last year, that it is needed to
penetrate a virtually nonexistent Russian
ABM.
So we can conclude that MIRV'ing will
not make Minuteman more valuable as a
deterrent force. It is axiomatic that a
Soviet weapon that can destroy a single-
warhead missile in silo can as easily de-
stroy one with several warheads.
If this is our realistic understanding
of MIRV, however, it may very well con-
flict with the view taken by the Soviet
Union. They must assume the maximum
accuracy for our MIRV's, and there is
little reason for them not to conclude
that we are adding this system in the
hopes of achieving a first strike potential
against them. The multiplication of 500
warheads to 1,500 will very likely un-
settle the current relative balance of
forces, and it will severely complicate
the problems of inspection and verifica-
tion upon which previous arms control
efforts have floundered.
The pending resolution?unless its ad-
vice is accepted by the administration
and unless the Soviets then agree to an
immediate freeze notwithstanding our
lead in both MIRV and ABM technol-
ogy?will not avoid these damaging con-
sequences. We can at least put them off,
however, by freezing our land-based
missiles in their current status, and by
prohibiting any deployment of Minute-
man III.
A fourth and final reason for refusing
to spend more money on Minuteman
relates to future force planning In the
event that the SALT talks do not pro-
duce early agreement. In addition to the
fact that Minuteman will then probably
become vulnerable regardless of what
S 5483
we do, it seems to me that there is a
positive benefit to be gained from pur-
suing nuclear weapons systems which do
not require basing on U.S. territory.
The Nixon administration's fears
about Soviet intentions to achieve a first
strike capability still seem incredible to
me. No one is even willing to assert that
they are likely to degrade our Polaris
force, and no one can argue that they
can perform the physically impossible
task of attacking bombers and missiles at
the same time.
If such a Soviet strike is part of the
administration's vision of the future,
however, we should recognize that we
can no longer take any comfort from
the fact that our land-based missiles are
located away from population centers.
An SS-9 attack from the Soviet Union
large enough to eliminate our Minute-
man force, which Secretary Laird says is
a possibility, would involve a minimum
of 5,000 megatons detonating over the
Continental United States. That is the
equivalent of 5,000 million, or 5 trillion,
tons of TNT. The total energy released
would be 250,000 times as great as the
blasts which leveled Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki. The cumulative effects of blast,
shock wave, radiation, and fallout would
bring death and destruction throughout
the country, no matter where those
enormous explosions took place.
We cannot even imagine the full con-
sequences of this enormous series of ex-
plosions. But does anyone believe that
it would make any significant differ-
ence that the detonations were scattered
across the continent instead of concen-
trated in major cities?
The concept that we gain some safety
for our population by basing our nuclear
forces in rural areas is, in truth, becom-
ing obsolete at the same rate as is the
fixed-site missile. Both are losing their
vitality through the steady growth in the
size of warheads which can be delivered
against them. The safety of our popula-
tion can be best served by diverting
whatever threat exists away from U.S.
soil.
In sum, the deployment of Minuteman
III can serve only those who see more
virtue in arms competition than in arms
limitation.
If the aims of the pending resolution
are realized or if the SALT sessions suc-
ceed by another route in the near term,
then there will be no compulsion to make
any improvements at all in Minuteman.
If the talks fail, then in the long term
there is probably little we can do, re-
gardless of how much we spend, to re-
tain the fixed-site missile as a viable
force. The Safeguard ABM will accom-
plish no more than a chastity belt for a
fallen woman, in those situations.
It has been asserted, Mr. President,
that actions we might take to freeze our
forces while the talks are underway
might give the Soviet Union the impres-
sion that we are somehow too anxious
for an agreement.
Let us reject this preposterous notion.
We are anxious for an agreement. Can
we not realize that all people represented
at SALT, all Americans and all Russians,
will be best served by an end to the
. Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
S 5484 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 9, 19'0
dangerous and futile arms competition
which has devoured our resources and
imperiled our survival for the past 25
years.
The pending resolution should be ap-
proved. Going beyond it. I hope Congress
will assert its aspirations for arms con-
trol :through actions as well as advice, by
refusing authority for weapons which can
undermine the talks as effectively as if
our negotiators turned their backs on the
table.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio Mr. President,
the adoption of this resolution today will
be an important step in the long journey
toward peace. I asp very proud to be a
cosponsor of this resolution. This places
the U.S. Senate squarely on record
for the suspension of the testing of
MIRV warheads and for reversing the
mad momentum of the arms race. Both
the United States and the Soviet Union
now have more than enough nuclear fire-
power, enough overkill, to utterly de-
stroy each other?all the people of the
Soviet Union and all the people of the
United States?many times over.
The continuing stockpiling of super
weapons by both nations must be
stopped. If it is not, all mankind could be
on the brink of a nuclear doomsday.
More important, Mr. President (Mr.
Burtercx), the continued testing of nu-
clear weapons by the United States has
imperiled the hope for success of the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks?the
SALT talks. We cannot tolerate even the
thought on the part of anyone that we
would be doing that. This insane nuclear
arms and missile race between the
United States and the Soviet Union has
brought all mankind nearer to the possi-
bility of total destruction. Our hope lies
in the SALT talks now proceeding. Oar
hope is based on the fact that we in the
Senate today will do our part, by passing
this resolution.
Many armament systems are obsolete
before they even reach completion. The
emphasis may change from bombs to
missiles, or from missiles to antimissile
missiles, but the armament race con-
tinues. Hundreds of billions of dollars
and hundreds of billions of rubles are
being wasted on the seemingly insatiable
demands of the militarists of both na-
tions for more and more weapons.
After years of this dangerous rivalry,
neither our Nation nor the Soviet union
is any more secure than it was at the be-
ginning of this decade.
Every effort to develop a stockpile of
new super weapons only results in sim-
ilar action by the other side, After each
nation has developed new weapons, the
race begins all over again to produce
new, and more expensive, and more so-
phisticated weapons.
Continuing development by the Soviet;
Union and by the United States, of
course, in testing the deployment of
MIRV systems, and further deployment
of ABM systems, must be halted.
The way to halt it is by mutual
agreement.
We must proceed with the SALT talks.
We must give impetus, to this develop-
ment, to this movement toward perma-
nent peace, by Passing this resolution
today.
It is just ft sm.s411 step, but here is an
oportunity to show the will arid the mood
of the Senate.
MIRV is the major factor that could
cause a tragic spiraling of the arms race
and preclude for many years the op-
portunity for meaningful arms limita-
tion negotiations.
In our MIRV fight testing, we may
reach the point of no return toward being
able to halt this mad momentum of the
arms race between this country and the
Soviet Union.
The negotiations now proceeding first
began in Helsinki on November 17, 1969,
which was the day set for the prelimi-
nary discussions. The SALT talks have
been proceeding since that time and are
now proceeding in Vienna.
These negotiations are man's best hope
for future permanent peace; indeed, for
his survival.
Mr. President, President Nixon has
rendered a great service to humanity in
promoting and encouraging the SALT
talks, to limit altogether this horrible
race between our two countries.
Our Navy at the present time has
nearly 700 missiles with nuclear war-
heads on Polaris submarines, and with
our Poseidon submarines and MIRV
warheads, that is more than 4,000. The
more mobile of the bases between our two
countries are beneath the seas, close to
lied China, or close to various areas of
the Soviet Union. At the present time,
these missiles with new warheads and
Polaris submarines can hit on targets at
a distance of 2,875 miles. In fact, they
can hit with such accuracy that one of
our most distinguished and knowledge-
able Senators, the Senator from Arizona
(Mr. GOLDWATER), said that if the men's
room in the Kremlin were the target--
whoosh?and there would be no more
men's room.
Perhaps that is somewhat of an exag-
geration but it manifests recognition by
the Senator from Arizona of the tre-
mendous accuracy of these missiles.
Now, with the Poseidon submarines
and the MIRV warheads, the mileage ca-
pability has far extended the offensive
power of the United States, which is our
best defense. It is so tremendous and so
accurate that we can, at this time, and
certainly within the very near future,
eliminate or annihilate the Armed Forces
of the Soviet Union and millions of Rus-
sian citizens.
How much overkill do we need? Do we
want to kill every Russian 10 times over?
President Nixon did a great service for
the American people in promoting the
SALT talks. It is one of the notable
achievements of his administration that
he has encouraged the SALT talks, which
we all hope will proceed to a successful
conclusion.
In supporting the SALT talks, and in
supporting this motion in the Senate, we
are evidencing the fact that we are mark-
ing a turning point in history. Since the
first atomic bomb was exploded in Au-
gust of 1945, mankind has lived precari-
ously under what the late great President
John F. Kennedy described as a "nuclear
sword of Damocles."
In urging Senate ratification of the
Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Pres-
ident Kennedy quoted an ancient Chi-
hese proverb, "A journey of a thousand
miles must begin with a single step."
Mr. President, we are taking a very
short step today in showing the sense and
the views and the deep feelings of the
Senate, that we must strive with all our
might to have the SALT talks in Vienna
succeed, in order to bring an end to the
strategic arms race between this country
and the Soviet Union.
In that connection, following the fail-
ure of three Presidents to achieve it,
President Kennedy, nr trough the great
work of that master diplomat and states-
man and truly great American, Ambas-
sador Averell Harriman, achieved a Lim-
ited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that was a
great step toward permanent peace.
Neither the Soviet Union nor the
United States has in any way, at any
time, violated any part of that treaty.
Mr. President, I am hopeful that the
Senate this afternoon will unanimously
agree to Senate Resolution 211 which is
now pending before the Senate. This
would be a vital contribution to our
children and to our grandchildren and
to all generations that we hope will in-
habit this planet in peace. We must
succeed in ending the menace of MIRV.
Let us all do everything within our
power to bring about a firm agreement
at Vienna. Let us hope that by the action
of our delegates there, as well as those
of the Soviet Union, we will take this tre-
mendous step to avoid mutual annihila-
tion.
If we are faced with either mutual an-
nihilation or with permanent peace, let
us be recorded today as being in favor
of permanent peace.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I thank
the very able and very distinguished
senior Senator from Ohio for his sup-
port, of Senate Resolution 211.
The distinguished Senator from Ohio
(Mr. Theme has always been in the
forefront of the struggle for peace. I
think that his statement is certainly a
most worthy contribution in support of
this resolution which is, as he has pointed
out, a very simple resolution. It merely
calls upon the President. of the United
States to propose to the Soviet Union
a joint freeze on offensive and defensive
nuclear weapons.
The Senator very well knows that we
are engaged in a very costly and devas-
tating nuclear arms race with the So-
viets.
The Senator also well knows that we
are probably as close to parity as we have
have ever been or may ever be and that if
either the Soviet Union or the United
States of America were to continue its
operational flight testing of these de-
vastating technologies known to them at
the present time or, even worse, go for-
ward to the deployment of this tech-
nology, it would only mean that the
other side would follow up with further
testing and feather deployment and that
each of our nations would spend perhaps
additional billions of dollars which could
be better used for other purposes not
only by the United States or America but
also by the Soviet Union.
I have never believed that the Soviet
Union has inexhaustive funds. I have
never been in the Soviet Union. I be-
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
April 9,.1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 5485
lieve that my distinguished colleague,
the senior Senatorirom Ohio, has. But
I believe that the Soviet people certainly
cannot want to continue the spending of
billions of dollars on nuclear wealions
when they could best put that money to
better use, as we in the United States
also could.
We have come to a point in history
when it is no longer true that superior
strength means superior security. It
used to be true that the stronger one was,
the more secure he was. But that is not
true any longer.
If we had more nuclear weapons, it
would, in fact, mean that we would be
less secure because the Soviet Union
might be tempted either to catch up or
to fire some of their nuclear missiles in
a preempted first strike pattern.
What we have always wanted was mu-
tual deterrents which would bring about
mutual security in the world.
, I think that by this resolution we are
by no means taking away any of the pre-
rogatives of the President, but that we
are sharing with the President this po-
litical burden and are simply saying to
the President, "It is the sense of the sen-
ate that you make this proposal to the
Soviet Union."
. Some have asked the question, "Sup-
pose the Soviet Union does not accept."
If they do not accept, what will we have
lost?
No one is suggesting that we unilat-
erally call a freeze on our flight teSting
or deployment. We are saying that if the
Soviet Union were to accept such an
agreement and if they were to stop their
flight testing and stop their deployment,
the United States would do the same.
I think it is most significant that such
a proposal be made by the President of
the United States of America. I think it
would certainly be reassuring to the
world that our Nation wants peace and
that we have made this proposal in an
effort to obtain that peace.
I want to again say to the very dis-
tinguished Senator from Ohio that he
has talked eloquently for so many years
on the subject of peace on the floor of
the U.S. Senate. Unfortunately, at least
for this Senator and I think for all of his
colleagues, he has announced that he will
not be a candidate for reelection.
I am pleased that in the last years
of his very able and distinguished service
to his Nation and to the Senate, he still
raises his voice in behalf of peace. I
hope that his voice will be heard by the
President and by both the U.S. delegates
and the Soviet delegates to the SALT
talks and that this agreement might be
entered into and that hopefully the SALT
talks will be successful in reaching an
agreement on nuclear arms control.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I
express my gratitude to the distinguished
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
BROOKE) for the very flattering state-
ment he has made about me today.
I feel very unworthy and very unde-
serving of the magnificent statements
made by my fine friend, the Senator
from Massachusetts. I hope that just a
small fraction of the fine things that the
Senator from Massachusetts has said
about me is true.
I am very grateful and touched, indeed.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, in the
Senator's customary modesty he has
made that statement, but I want to as-
sure him that I believe 98 other Senators
would have made the same statement
I made and I again say how proud I am
to have him support Senate Resolution
211. I thank the Senator.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I, too,
should like to add my comments to those
of the distinguished junior Senator from
Massachusetts and pay tribute to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Ohio for his
contribution in this field.
I would be very remiss, indeed, if I did
not express on behalf of many of us our
indebtedness to the distinguished Senator
from Massachusetts for his initiative and
leadership in seeking a mutual suspen-
sion of testing of MIRV's by both the
Soviet Union and the United States. By
the introduction of Senate Resolution 211
he gave focus to the concern of many
of us in both parties who hope to reduce
the arms race.
Just 1 year ago this week, on April
17, 1969, I gave a speech at Shippensburg
State College in Shippensburg, Pa., in
which I said that the future peace of
the world requires a mutual freeze on
the further development of strategic mis-
siles both offensive and defensive. I called
for a moratorium on the arms race
to be the first topic for discussion at the
forthcoming talks with the Soviet Union
on nuclear weapons.
That was a year ago, before the nar-
rowly won congressional decision to de-
ploy antiballistic missiles?the ABM--
and before the recent announcement that
deployment of multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles?MIRV?
would begin in June.
The U.S. readiness to deploy MIRV and
ABM, and the administration estimates
of accelerated Soviet ICBM construction,
make it even more imperative now that
the arms race be stopped and be stopped
immediately.
The modification of Senate Resolution
211 by the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions has strengthened and broadened
the resolution. The measure now calls on
the President to propose to the Soviet
Union an immediate and mutual sus-
pension of the further deployment of all
offensive and defensive nuclear strategic
weapons systems, subject to appropriate
verification.
I believe deeply that this is the right
course, and I hope that the Senate will
adopt the resolution.
I have just returned from the spring
session of the Interparliamentary Union
held in Monaco. During the course of
that conference I had occasion to speak
to the chairman of the Soviet delegation
and other members of the Soviet delega-
tion. We discussed the SALT talks. I told
them I felt confident we were going to
be exceedingly realistic and also reason-
able in trying to find a basis whereby
we could come to an agreement that
would be verifiable and an agreement,
the integrity of which would be main-
tained, but to try to find a way to halt
the nuclear arms race.
I asked them whether with all the
armaments they have built, all at the
expense of mankind, they feel any safer
for having all those weapons stored and
for all the weapons they still have in pro-
duction. The chairman of the Soviet
delegation and other members of that
delegation made perfectly clear that so
long as one country continued to arm,
the other would be required to do so.
He said the hawks in the Kremlin can
point to the defense we are building. He
pointed to the number of weapons we
possess, the number of missiles we pos-
sess, and the number of submarines We
have, and how the pressure is on the
Kremlin to take money and funds from
the consumer goods area and to press
forward in the area of armament pro-
duction.
Mr. President, in effect we have an es-
calation. We build because they build,
and they build because we build. Do any
of us feel any safer than we did 10 years
ago or 15 years ago? The level of terror
has simply increased.
We have developed the capacity of
some 20,000 tons of TNT for practically
every human being on earth, the capacity
to exterminate ourselves, not one or two
times, but three or four times. What do
we have to do? Will we feel safer when
we have the capacity to exterminate
each other six, seven, eight, or ten times?
It is admitted we cannot unilaterally
disarm. No one proposes that. What is
proposed here is that we mutually move
ahead; that it is sensible that we have
to reach agreements in the deployment
of new systems, both offensive and de-
fensive, the existence of which can be
verified by technology and reconnais-
sance. They cannot build defensive or
offensive systems without our detection,
nor can we build defensive or offensive
missile systems without their detection.
Therefore, if we can agree at a leveling
off point, that would seem to be the
sensible thing to do. Our defense is ade-
quate.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, would
the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. PERCY. I yield.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator has raised a very important point,
and I just want to point out that if we
do not stop now and if we go forward
with the deployment of MIRV, the multi-
ple independently targetable reentry ve-
hicles, then, of course, the Senator's
point, although accurate at the present
time, that we have adequate verification
means and they have adequate verifica-
tion means, may not be valid then pri-
marily because once MIRV is out of the
bottle, or when the genie is out of the
bottle, it may require and, in fact, would
require, in my opinion, and I think in
the 'opinion of most of the respected
weight of 'authority in the scientific
community, that we have on-site inspec-
tion and actually dismantle the missile
and look into it to make a determination
if there are actual MIRV's in that
missile.
The Senator's point is so important
because if we do not stop now even the
verification means may be lost to us,
which is so essential in any arms limita-
tion agreement.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator is absolutely right. We will be over
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
S 5486 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 9, 190
the point of no return very soon. Al-
ready we have had an announcement
that we will be deploying MIRV very
soon. The Senator is absolutely right
that we can verify the number of missile
sites we have, but there could be no veri-
fication except ori-site inspection, which
has not been acceptable to the Soviet
Union, if we reach that point. There is
no way to verify how many heads are on
each missile. If we reach that point, we
will have crossed the point at which we
could come to a satisfactory agreement,
because we should not Accept an agree-
ment, that cannot be verified.
We must be tough, hardheaded, ar.d
realistic?but a part of realism is the
recognition that many of the national
goals we established for ourselves, such
as cleaning up our environment and
cleaning up our cities, and other neces-
sary areas of defense, will be impossible
to achieve if we continue the arms race
and deploy new nuclear weapons sys-
tems.
We are at a crucial point. This is why
the resolution of the Senator is so urgent
and important, and It is why an over-
whelmingly favorable reaction from the
Senate now is important.
I am very pleased, indeed, with the
progress I have learned of in the Helsinki
phase of the SALT talks. From every-
thing I have learned the administration
went into these talks with a brilliant
team, and they went into the talks ade-
quately and fully prepared and realistic
about finding a basis for negotiation,
compromise, and understanding. We can-
not have it all our way if we expect those
talks to be successful; but also there
seems to be a basis for realism on the
other side. It is a crucial time for us to
move forward and the progress we make
will be important to the future of man-
kind if we can find a rational and sensible
basis to limit the arms race. Hopefully
both sides want to find that basis.
I am quite realistic--we must all be--
about the fact that if we do not have
a common objective, it will be difficult
to find a basis for understanding and
agreement.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PERCY. I am happy to yield. In
fact, I am glad to yield the floor.
Mr. BROOKE. Before the Senator
yields the floor, I just want to say, first,
that I am most pleased and proud that
the distinguished senior Senator from
Illinois has supported this resolution. He
is one of the early cosponsors of the
resolution. He has certainly been in the
forefront in this whole area. He is very
knowledgeable in the area. He is very
knowledgeable about the arms limitation
talks, the SALT talks. But I think what
he has said this afternoon in support
of the resolution has been most worthy
and most helpful.
The Senator has made another very
valid point, and that is the chances that
we have that the Soviet Union might ac-
cept such a proposal. Many persons have
asked the question, What evidence do we
have that the Soviet Union will accept
such a proposal? Of course, we do not
know whether the Soviet Union will ac-
cept this proposal. I do not think anyone
really knows. I am not sure the Soviet
Union knows at tills time whether it
would accept the proposal. But we do
know, as the Senator has very ably
pointed out, that there perhaps is no
better time than now, when the Soviet
Union recognizes the problems, as does
the United States, of the tremendous
cost of the arms race in which we are
presently engaged; recognizes, as do we,
that this arms race is really availing us
little or nothing at all.
I want to point out to the Senator that
there have been very encouraging state-
ments, though, of course, we will not de-
pend upon those statements solely, to
come out of the Soviet Union by rather
high-ranking Soviet officials that they
very well might be receptive to such a
proposal at this time.,
During this debate one of the very able
Senators raised the question as to
whether we can trust the Soviet Union;
that they have not always lived up to
their agreements. Of course, we entered
into an agreement on a partial nuclear
test-ban treaty, as the Senator from Illi-
nois well, knows. Most recently we en-
tered into a treaty with the Soviet Union
and other nations on the nonprolifera-
tion treaty, which, so far as we know to
date, has been honored by all sides.
The point is, if we do not try, how will
we ever know? And what are the options?
The only option would be to say, "Well,
we distrust the Soviets." The Soviets will
say, "We distrust the United States, so
we are going to build more nuclear weap-
ons." Then we will say, "Well, the So-
viets have constructed more nuclear
weapons, so we had better construct new
nuclear weapons for our defense."
It will spiral ever upward, and who
knows what will come out of the great
minds of our .scientists and the great
minds of the Soviet scientists as well.
Then when we add to that the fact that
the Chinese Communist nation is a nu-
clear nation and that there are nations,
it is rumored, who are very much con-
cerned with developing a nuclear ca-
pability, who knows that we will not get
into a situation where there will be mul-
tiple nuclear nations in the world with
devastating capabilities, and who knows
whether, not only through design but
through inadvertency, somebody might
push the button and send some nuclear
weapons over some country? Then we
will have such devastation that I, for one,
would not want to be living in such a
world. I know the Senator from Illinois
would not want to be living in such a
world.
So we have a very great responsi-
bility to those who are living today and
to those who are unborn to do all that
we can to prevent a nuclear holocaust.
I do not know how many of the Ameri-
can people or how many people of the
world are really aware of the nuclear
capability of the United States or of
the Soviet Union, but we are not talk-
ing here of the capability of killing thou-
sands of people. We are talking about
the capability of an immediate kill of
millions of people, to say nothing about
contamination and the fallout and the
disease and all of the problems that could
result from a nuclear explosion.
We know something about what hap-
pened in World War IL when literally
thousands of people were killed from a
bomb which has nowhere near the Ca-
tiple-nuclear nations in the world with
So it would seem to me that this is a
resolution which could be very helpful
to our President and to our delegation as
it goes to Vienna. I agree with the able
Senator from Illinois that there was
some reason for optimism out of the
Helsinki talks. There is some reason for
optimism as we enter the Vienna talks.
Those talks are to begin on April 16,
next week, and certainly time is of the
essence. We want our President and our
delegation to go to that conference know-
ing where the Senate of the United
States stands, how it feels, how it thinks.
We have a responsibility to, and we
have respect for, the President of the
tinted States, but as well as respect him,
we have the responsibility to give him
our counsel, and our best counsel.
So I hope that by pas,sage of this very
simple resolution we will indicate both
our respect and our advice, consent, and
counsel to the President and to the dele-
gation that goes to Vienna. Not per-
haps, but without question, the fate of
the world rests on their decisions and on
their important deliberations.
So once again I thank the distin-
guished Senator from Illinois.
Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Massa-
chusetts has raised some very important
points. One of the important points is
that of timing. It is crucial to any bilater-
al negotiations. You must have the
proper climate. The tinu is right some-
times, and it is not right some other
times. Sometimes a period of years goes
by before it returns again.
The distinguished Senator has pointed
out the importance of timing now be-
cause we are on the threshold of a vast
movement, the development of MIRV's
and the deployment of a whole new series
of weapons which cannot be certified or
inspected or assured.
There is another question involved
here. We have at this stage a balance, a
sufficiency on both sides No one in the
military in this country would presume to
say that the Soviet Union does not have
a sufficiency of powers of destruction to
rain devastation upon this country. No
one in the Soviet Union or in Red China
itself would presume that we do not have
a sufficiency of power to strike them if
we should ever be struck, In fact, I would
want to reiterate again what I have said
on the floor several times: Our defense
depends upon an adequacy of retalia-
tory weapons if ever struck, and the will
to use them if we are ever struck, or if
any of our vital allies are ever struck.
I for one have seen Ho sense of in-
adequacy of capability, and never for a
moment a lack of will to use those
weapons if we are ever struck by an op-
posing force.
But now the question is, When we both
have an adequacy in.bala rice, is not that,
then, a good time? Because when one gets
too far ahead, is not the other less likely
to .negotiate?
I say there is a real self-interest, also,
both for our side and for their side, at
this particular stage. We are both on the
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
April 9,- 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 5487
threshold of major deployments of ABM
systems. I wonder whether they have
learned, in the deployment of their sys-
tem around Moscow, that their costs have
escalated considerably. And as they build
that system, are they not worried that
they are constructing a system that is
already obsolete? I have Seen no hesita-
tion on the part of our attack forces to
say, "We can penetrate it, simply by ex-
hausting it, and it presents no real prob-
lem to us."
We see our costs escalating for these
systems, estimated to be about $5 or $6
billion originally, to a figure now esti-
mated to be at least $12 billion, and
many of us think it could be $50 or $75
billion, since the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the distinguished David Pack-
ard?with his candor and knowledge of
costs on these two systems?has now im-
plied that the $12 billion figure may not
be a figure we can really hold to.
So we have more than doubled our
' cost estimates in just a year. And we see
what has happened to costs on the C-5A,
we see what has happened to costs on
the F-111, and we see what has hap-
pened to costs on so many other sophis-
ticated weapons systems. In undertaking
these whole new systems, research on
which has not even been finished, the
software for which has not been made,
and the system never tested or evalu-
ated, I do not know whether the end of
cost escalation would ever be in sight.
There are other needs in this coun-
try. We have to look realistically at the
health of our people, for example. If we
had $12 billion, we could build 100 medi-
cal schools. We could run them and op-
erate them, at $25 million apiece, with a
$20 million initial investment, for 20
years with that $12 billion. A real human
need exists here. The Soviet Union has
the same need.
And what will we have when we fin-
ish the ABM system? We are protecting
other missiles, maybe; but they can pen-
etrate our system just as we can pene-
trate theirs. Neither of us is any bet-
ter off.
This is the crucial time. This is the
time when we must move ahead. If we
could take this next step, to at least
freeze the present systems, we might
find we had other areas of mutual in-
terests as well.
I do not imagine they like to see 310,-
000 American soldiers stationed in Eu-
rope today, 25 years after the end of the
war. And we do not like to see it cost
$15 billion a year to American taxpayers
each and every year to maintain those
forces, the NATO forces and our contri-
bution to them.
The Chancellor of the Federal Re-
public of Germany has recently made a
proposal that possibly there ought to
be a mutual deescalation of forces in.
both Western and Eastern Eurerie. We
should seize that opportunity as a possi-
bility for reducing the mutual level of
terror and the mutual level of costs.
There are possibilities of space ex-
ploration together, if we can take these
other steps.. It is senseless for one coun-
try, in behalf of mankind, to spend bil-
lions of dollars to send a rocket to Venus
and billions of dollars to send a rocket to
Mars, and have another country send
one to Venus and one to Mars. I do not
see any particular military advantage,
and I really doubt that competition now
between the two countries for the con-
quest of space, is going to be advan-
tageous in any way for either country. We
are at the point of diminishing returns
now in the race for space. Would it not
be much better for us now to work out a
practical means, as we did in the Inter-
national Geophysical Year, to have each
country take a separate part in some
of these programs, and share the knowl-
edge gained with the rest of mankind?
These are the kinds of sensible pro-
grams that will give us the kind of coun-
try we need and want for future genera-
tions. We must be strong, and we must
be secure, but we should be realistic about
the way we look ahead. We can go the
route of hope and promise, or we can
go the other route that we have been
going?a route of terror, mutual distress,
and certainly anguish on both sides, and
without a sufficient degree of security on
either side to give us any comfort or pro-
tection.
I thank the Senator for the opportu-
nity he has provided for all of us in the
Senate to deal specifically with one more
step we can take as a step of progress
for our Nation and for all mankind.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, every-
thing that the distinguished Senator
from Illinois has said makes much sense.
I think that he has spoken with his
customary 'eloquence, but, even more
than eloquence, he has spoken with pro-
found and deep feeling, and with sure
knowledge of the facts. He has pointed
out the urgency of such a move on the
part of the United States and the Soviet
Union.
Our Nation has just recently an-
nounced through the Defense Depart-
ment, as the Senator very well knows,
that we will be ready to deploy MIRV in
June of 1970. That is just 2 months
away. If we deploy MIRV, we will then
be deploying a technology which will
enable us to field a missile with multiple
warheads that will not fall in one cluster
around a target, but that will go toward
many targets at different ranges.
It would be very difficult, if not im-
possible, for the Soviet Union, with its
present defenses, to intercept such war-
heads by using its existing arsenal.
What does that mean? It means that
the Soviet Union, in order to be secure,
will have to improve its technology, and
probably move toward MIRV'ing its
SS-9's, which have superior megaton-
nage to our Minuteman III and our
land-based missiles, our ICBM's.
We would then be called upon, in turn,
to improve our MIRV system, probably
putting more warheads in the missile,
and probably increasing our payload
and our megatonnage. As the Senator
has so well pointed out, the cost of any
of these moves is in the billions of dol-
lars?money, as he has so well pointed
out, that is so desperately needed for
the hospitals of our cities and urban
centers, for education, and as the
Senator stated in his very simple but
most illustrative example, for building
and supporting medical schools around
the country, to say nothing of the hos-
pitals, which are crying out for salva-
tion?and literally for salvation?today;
for rapid transit systems that will free
us from these clogged cities in which we
live; for clean air and clean water; and
for attacks upon cancer and other dis-
eases.
Just think of what we could do, both
in the United States and? in the Soviet
Union, if we could use just a fraction
of the money that would be spent for the
deployment of these sophisticated weap-
ons systems for such purposes.
Time is of the essence. I fear that, once
we deploy MIRV, the Soviets probably
will have no recourse other than to move
ahead as rapidly as possible in order to
MIRV their SS-9's. ?
As the Senator has pointed out, we are
as near parity, perhaps, as we can be. It
is no secret that we have more ICBM's
in our arsenal than does the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union is building more
ICBM's. They are building more SS-9's,
and more SS-11's. We know that. And
it does not come as any shock or surprise
to me. They know how many ICBM's we
have. They are trying to catch up. Per-
haps they are trying to pass us. If I
knew and if the Senator knew that the
Soviet Union had more ICBM's than we,
we would perhaps be arguing on this floor
right now that we should catch up to
them so that we could have parity.
It is no secret that we have a superior
submarine force, our-Polaris force, which
we are in the process of converting into
a Poseidon force. We also know that the
Soviets are beginning to move in this di-
rection, and they are trying to catch up
with us and, again, perhaps pass us. It
comes as no shock to me that they are
doing this. If the situation were reversed,
I am sure we would. do at.
We also know that the United States
is ahead in the B-52 bomber force and
the Soviets are doing something in this
direction. Perhaps they are trying to
catch up with us again, and perhaps try-
ing to pass us. We also know that we have
nuclear weapons in Europe at the present
time. They do not have long ranges, to
be sure, but they certainly can be used
if there should be an exchange between
the Soviet Union and the United States--
and God forbid that there is ever any
nuclear exchange.
So we cannot continue this insanity.
That is all it is--it is insanity.
Before the very able Senator from Illi-
nois entered the Chamber, I said that
we have been criticized for perhaps giv-
ing too much credence to the Soviet
Union; that the Soviet Union is just try-
ing to buy time. The Senator has heard
that argument, I am sure?that the
Soviet Union is trying to buy time; that
if we did bring about a freeze on our
offensive and defensive weapons, that
would give the Soviet Union time, and
they would use that time to step up their
efforts in this general direction.
Let us examine that in the light of this
resolution. We are not suggesting that
we give them any more time than we
have. We are suggesting, as the Senator
has very well pointed out, that this is a
mutual freeze; that nothing will happen
unless the Soviets join with us in this
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 ? CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
S 5488 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE April 9 ,11970
freeze; that we do not want in any way
to diminish our national security. We
want always to have national security.
But all we are saying is that if the So-
viets can in very sane moments and we
can in very sane Moments realize that
nothing, really Is being gained by the
nuclear arms race in which we find oura
selves, we just stop, that is all, and do
no more?just stela
Let me just point out to the Senator
that he knows as well as / that these
agreements generally take time. Men
cannot sit dawn and come to an agree-
ment on an important issue overnight,
and certainly nations cannot be expected
to do so. They have their delegations. I
think the Senator pointed out that they
have their hawks, so to speak, and they
have their doves; and we have our
hawks, and we have our doves. They have
their interests at heart, and we have our
interests at heart, which is acceptable
and understandable.
So it is conceivable that these talks
could go on for months and years. There
is nothing unusual about it. I do not
know how long the partial test ban
treaty took, but it took a long time to
come to an agreement. The same is true
with respect to the nonproliferation
treaty and other treaties.
If this negotiation between the Soviet
Union and the United States should go
on for, say, a year or 2 years, or per-
haps even more what we are really
talking about now as being the most
devastating technology known to man
conceivably could be obsolete, conceiv-
ably could be of very little importance,
compared to what the technology may be
in 1971 or 1972. If this is true, then we
are in a worse position, far worse Posi-
tion, to try to negotiate than we are now,
In June of 1970.
So if We could have this freeze during
the time that the negotiations are going
on, if both parties just stop and stand
still and there is no further testing and
no further deployment during this time,
both will have performed a great serv-
ice; and they will be more apt, in that
climate, to be able to enter into a mu-
tual arms limitation agreement than if
they sat down in June and began to
talk?but at the same time both parties
were increasing their arsenal, both par-
ties were continuing to test, and both
parties were moving ahead with far more
devastating technology.
Mr. PERCY. The points raised by the
distinguished Senator are valid. He has
mentioned particularly the timing and
the length of these negotiations.
I think we should point out very realis-
tically that there is a great sense of 1ra-
patience in the country with negotiations
of the type that are being carried on in
Paris?literally no progress, no realism
on the part of the opposition. Talks must
be fruitful if they are to have any credi-
bility with the American public.
The encouraging thing about Helsinki
and the planning for Vienna is that
neither side is using it for propaganda
purposes. Neither side is trying to use
that forum as just a means to spew forth
venom and hatred and accusations and
charges. They are businesslike; they are
straightforward. In the sense of realism
in which we are dealing between the two
great powers, it is essential that we make
continued and steady progress as we go
along day by day in these negotiations.
I think we should take this further
point into account; If we continue to
move forward, making progress, then we
can realistically say that what produc-
tion of existing weapons is being carried
on now should take into account the suf-
ficiency on both sides. However, I, who
have never been called a hawk, would
look with deep suspicion if the talks were
prolonged and. if during the course of
those talks the level of production of
weapons continues to escalate on the So-
viet side, as is now the case. I, for one?
not known as a hawk?would favor keep-
ing the balance; and it might mean that
we would have to go back into production
of ICBM's and more Polaris submarines.
We might have to move forward.
So there is a sense of balance and a
sense of timing here which are exceed-
ingly important. They should never un-
derestimate ill; nor feel that they can
prolong the negotiotions and have us
stand still while they move ahead in
construction of their offensive and de-
fensive weapons systems.
It is for this reason that the proposi-
tion is important that we have a mutual
freeze at this stage, so that in good faith
we can realistically have balance, I can
well understand that anyone could feel,
In a situation of nuclear monopoly, that
It was in their self-interest to move
ahead and develop nuclear capability. As
a major power, they had to do that. We
did not look on that as warlike when they
were trying to match the technology and
capabilities we had achieved. It is a dif-
ferent picture than if they continue to
move massively ahead, giving evidence
and credence to the fact that they may
be building a first-strike capability.
Should that be the case, I, for one,
would be arming the first to say that
we must move ahead with our own
production of both offensive and de-
fensive weapons. I would say that if
they want an arms race, our Government
would receive the approval of the Senate
to move ahead with all the productive
power it required to keep a sufficiency of
defensive and offensive weapons.
Mr. President (Mr. Caaarsama), let no
one underestimate the productive capac-
ity and the economic ability of the Amer-
ican system to move ahead, if that is
what they want, to a level of sufficiency
on both sides. There must be assured
negotiation. Talks should not be pro-
longed past the point when we can
realistically negotiate the cessation of
the arms race.
Mr. BROOKE. I am sure that the Sen-
ator from Illinois knows that the original
purpose of 1V1111V was the penetration of
an expected and sophisticated Soviet
ABM system.
I am sure the Senator also knows that
a sophisticated ABM system has not yet
materialized.
Now the purpose of MIRV originally
has been thwarted, so to speak; we now
have a different purpose for MIRV.
My point is, simply, is it not likely to
be the seine case on our side, and the
Soviet side, in each instance, that, if we
wish to deploy a new technology, we can
find a justification for it?maybe some-
times based upon fact out also possibly
sometimes just based upon suspicion?
If that is true, then we are danger-
ously flirting with a nuclear holocaust on
earth and, therefore, it is most important
that we do everything we can to avoid
such an eventuality.
Again I want to thank the very able
Senator from Illinois. He has made a rich
contribution to this debate. I am very
much pleased that he has entered into a
colloquy which I think has highlighted
some of the most important elements of
Resolution 211.
He has pinpointed seine of the most
important issues concei ning the resolu-
tion. I am very much pleased and proud
that he saw fit in the eaely stages to lend
his valuable support as a cosponsor of
the measure which I hope the Senate, in
its wisdom, will adopt today and that
the President and the American delega-
tion and the Soviet Government and its
delegation will accede to, when they meet
in Vienna.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I thank
my distinguished colleague.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
DOLE). The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proce( ded to call the
roll.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I yield
the floor to the distinguished Senator
from California.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Alaska is recognized.
Mr. GRAVEL. I thank the Senator
from Massachusetts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
would inquire from the Senator from
Massachusetts, did he cot yield to the
Senator from Alaska, or the Senator from
California? I recognized the Senator
from Alaska.
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I am
happy to yield to the Senator from Cali-
fornia (Mr. CRANSTON)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from California is recognized.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I
want to pay tribute to the great leader-
ship that the Senator from Massachu-
setts (Mr. BROOKE) has provided for so
many months in pushing this vitally im-
portant resolution that can have such
tremendous impact on the cause of
peace.
Both in his leadership in the Senate
and in the country, he has been joined
by another great leader on that side of
the aisle, the distinguished Senator from
Kentucky (Mr. COOPER ' , in broadening
the impact of the resolution. I am de-
lighted that I have been able to work
with both Senators on this very impor-
tant issue over a period of many months.
Mr. President, I want to express my
total support for the resolution in its
new form. This is, indeed, a vital and
necessary measure which I was pleased
to cosponsor. Seven days before the
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 ? CIA-RDP7?tIKHER000300040009-3
April 9 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? S 5489
United States and the Soviet Union be- President Nixon made comments in a
gin their discussions in Vienna on stra- press conference recently to the effect
tegic arms limitations, it is vital for the that our Nation is already trying to do
Senate to speak clearly on this issue. what Senate Resolution 211 calls for,
I was pleased to learn on April 5 of and then he called the resolution "irrele-
a report issued by a distinguished panel vant."
of experts from the American Assembly Those of us sponsoring and support-
in connection with Columbia University. ing the resolution should be very pleased
After a series of meetings, these men that the President thus, in effect, sup-
urged that President Nixon propose to ports the policy objectives set forth in
the Soviet Union a 2-year interim halt the resolution.
In deployment of strategic weapons I do not quite see how the President
while an agreement is negotiated to stop can consider the resolution "irrelevant."
the nuclear arms race. The panel was Richard Nixon has often made evi-
composed of such men as Herbert Sco- dent his great admiration for one of his
ville, Jr., a former Assistant Director of predecessors in the White House?
the Arms Control Agency, John G. Pal- Woodrow Wilson.
frey, a former member of the AEC and It so happens that in 1945- I wrote a
many academic specialists who have book about the struggle between Wood-
been intimately involved with national row Wilson and the Senate over the
security matters.
Upon entering office, the Nixon ad-
ministration was pledged to the doc-
trine of "nuclear sufficiency" instead of
superiority.
The testing and deployment of MIRV
vitiates the sufficiency doctrine and only
prepares the ground for a response from
the Soviet Union and a spiraling arms
race.
Any MMV deployment on Minuteman
III missiles creates a situation which
needlessly complicates arms limitations
negotiations. A central issue in Vienna
Will be the verification and inspection
procedures to be utilized once some form
of agreement might be reached. Both
the United States and the Soviet Union
now possess sophisticated satellite sur-
veillance systems which can detect mis-
siles in underground sites. However, no
system can detect an ICBM that has been
MIRV ed in its underground silo. MIRV-
lug of American missiles and of Soviet
missiles creates an uncontrollable and
unverifiable escalation in the strategic
arms race once they are deployed.'
The only way to prevent this intolera-
ble situation is for both the Soviet Union
and the United States to agree not to de-
ploy these weapens in the first place,
League of Nations. We all know what
happened. The League -of Nations was
rejected. Woodrow Wilson was broken.
The League of Nation was broken. And
that led to the killing of the peace.
I am sure that Woodrow Wilson would
not have considered Senate support of
the League of Nations "irrelevant."
Had the Senate supported the Presi-
dent's efforts toward peace, I believe it is
quite possible that World War II would
have been avoided and that we would not
now find ourselves in the desperate arms
Face which this resolution seeks to end.
It seems to me that our hopes for an
end to the arms race now and our oppor-
tunities for peace would be greatly en-
hanced by Senate agreement to this res-
olution embodying a policy that our
President has said, in effect, is his policy.
Certainly it would strengthen., our
President in his negotiations with the
Soviet Union if the Soviet Union were
to know that our Senate, responsible for
ratifying treaties, had indicated in ad-
vance its support for these negotiations
and for the American position in those
negotiations along the lines of this res-
olution and the President's statement
that it embodies the policies we are pres-
ently pursuing.
and to 'lack up that agreement with re- Uncertainty exists concerning the Sen-
liable inspection and verification pro- ate's responsibility for treaties negoti-
cedures. ated by the President, by the State De-
This resolution does just that in its partment, and by our negotiators, and it
often leads to weakness and uncertainty
? language: in those negotiations?a weakness and
Resolved further, That the President of uncertainty that we do not face when
the United States of America should propose
to the Government of the Union of soviet dealing with the Soviet Union.
Socialist Republics an inimediate suspension We know that if the representatives of
by the United States and by the Union of the Soviet Union approve in these nego-
Soviet Socialist Republics of the further de- tiations a resolution, it will not be re-
ployment of all offensive and defensive nu- jected by any parliament within that
clear strategic weapons systems, subject to land.
national verification or such other measures
of observation and inspection as may be
appropriate.
On the eve of the Vienna talks, it is
incumbent upon the Senate to clarify
Its position on MIRV. We must do all we
can to insure the success of these nego-
tiations.Por suCceis Would Mean a sig-
nificant step has been taken away from
the abyss of mutual annihilation.
The passage of Senate Resolution 211
would go far toward preparing an effec-
tive climate for the arms limitations
talks. It is in our interest as well as the
Soviet Union's interek to suspend the
testing of this desti:uctive, costly, and un-
necessary Weapon.
It seems to me this is a compelling rea-
son for total support of the resolution
and that in pushing for the adoption of
this resolution we are supporting and
strengthening the hands of the Presi-
dent of the United States.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I espe-
cially thank the distinguished junior
Senator from California for all that he
has done?and it has been much. In the
very early stages of this resolution, the
distinguished and able Senator from
California discussed this resolution with
rriost of his colleagues on the Democratic
side of the aisle. And he was very help-
ful in getting a great number of his
Democratic colleagues to join as co-
sponsors of the resolution. Those efforts
have now culminated in the unanimous
endorsement by the Democratic policy
committee of this resolution.
I thank the Senator for making that
contribution and more especially for the
substantive contribution he has made
both in the drafting of the resolution and
also for what he has said on the floor this
afternoon.
The Senator raised a question about a
statement that was made by our Presi-
dent in respect of this resolution. As a
result of that statement, I wrote a letter
to the President. I think it is important
that I read that letter at this time so
that the Senator and all our colleagues
may know of the exchange.
The letter reads:
DEAR MR. PRESIDE/4X : 1 am prompted to
write by your press conference remarks
concerning the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee's report of S. Res. 211, an amended ver-
sion of the proposal I made last summer.
The Resolution expresses the sense of the
Senate that the President should propose
to the Soviet Union a mutual suspension
of further deployments of strategic weapons
both offensive and defensive.
Our purpose in urging adoption of this
Resolution is to facilitate progress in the
vital SALT negotiations which you are about
to undertake. The Resolution is in the tradi-
tion of past Senate actions, including most
notably the resoluticris which anticipated
the partial nuclear test ban treaty and the
non-proliferation treaty. It is a device for
sharing the political burdens between the
Executive and Legislat.ve branches by mak-
ing clear that the Senate, which will ulti-
mately, be called on to endorse any SALT
treaty, will support you in presenting a far-
reaching arms control proposal. I hope that,
on further reflection, you will agree that
the Resolution is quite relevant and that
affirmative action by the Senate would as-
sist your efforts to obtain mutual arms limit-
ations. Since you indicated last Saturday
that your goal in SALT is the same as that
endorsed by the Resolution, I presume that
the Resolution will have your support.
Of greater importance to those of us work-
ing for the Resolution is the apparent im-
plication of your remarks that the United
States is willing to consider either a com-
prehensive or a system-by-system limitation
when we and the Soviets meet in Vienna.
It would be immensely reassuring to the
Resolution's supporters to know that the
United States will actually propose "an im-
mediate suspension by the United States and
by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of
the further deployment of all offensive and
defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems,
subject to national verification or such other
measures of observation and inspection as
may be appropriate."
If the Soviets refused to accept such a
proposal, the opportunity for more limited
agreements would still remain. However, if
they accepted this more general freeze, the
problems of verification would be greatly
simplified, since there would be many dif-
ferent means by which to confirm Soviet
compliance.
A freeze on Soviet weapons would relieve
us from immediate pressure to expand our
own arsenals. Credible deterrence could be
maintained at the present force levels. Un-
der such a general freeze, a suspension of
MIRV tests would be a principal means of
verifying that such potentially destabilizing
technology was not entering the inventory
of either side. Since we do not now require
MIRV to guarantee effective retaliation, a
halt to the Soviet ABM Effort would permit
us to maintain a confident deterrent with
existing systems And surely,the best safe-
guard of our land-based missile force would
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
8 5490 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
be for the Soviets to stop additional SS-9
deploneente and tO cease work on multiple-
warhead technolory for that booster.
A freeze of this type might well be pro-
posed for an interim period, perhaps two
years, during which details of verification
arrangements could be negotiated. If ar-
rangements satisfactory to both parties could
not be devised, one of another element of
the freeze might be altered later. However,
if the freeze is not proposed quickly, it will
be exceedingly difficult to reverse certain
inuniment deployments, especially MIRV. An
I have said before, the prospect of MIRV de-
ployment may well encourage diplomacy.
The fact of MIRV deployment might well de-
feat it.
In conclusion, Mr. President, I trust that
you will welcome Senate approval of S. Res
211 as a cc:instructive affirmation of the goal
you have set forth for the SALT negotiations
Your explicit support will certainly speed
final action on this important attempt to
bolster your diplomatic initiatives by pro-
viding an advance indication of the Senate's
sympathies. Furthermore, as an assurance
to the Senate and as a clear signal to the
Soviet union, I hope that you will confirm
that the 'United States will propose a com-
prehensive, mutual freer.? On strategic weap-
ons. No initiative would be so promising in
your historic effort to assure the national se-
curity through strategic arms controls.
With warm personal regards, I am,
Sincerely yours,
EDWARD W BROOKE.
Mr. President, the letter is dated
March 23, 1970. I will say to the Senator
I have received an acknowledgment of
the receipt of this letter to the Presi-
dent. The Senator knows, as do our col-
leagues, that in the interim period the
President's Advisory Council made a rec-
ommendation which certainly is in keep-
ing with the intent of this resolution;
and I am very hopeful that the President
will accept the sense of the Senate and
that he will go with this successfully to
the SALT talks in Vienna on April 16.
I thank the distinguished Senator
from California.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator
very much for his generous comments
about my efforts on behalf of the resolu-
tion. I commend the Senator for his bril-
liance in preparing the letter which sum -
xnarizes so succinctly what we are seek-
ing to do through the resolution. I am
glad we concur across the aisle that we
are seeking to strengthen the hand of
the President in his pursuit of peace
through the resolution.
I thank the Senator for the oppor-
tunity he has given Inc to work in con-
nection with a cause that is so impor-
tant I believe there is nothing I have
been able to do in the time I have
been in the Senate which is more im-
portant than what I have attempted to
do on behalf of the resolution.
(At this point, Mr. CRANSTON assumed
the chair.)
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I want to
associate myself with the remarks of
Praise of the Senator from Massachu-
setts. They are entirely warranted. I also
express my strong personal support for
Senate Resolution 211 proposed by my
friend and respected colleague from my
native State of Massachusetts, in which
I have the honor to join as a co-
sponsor.
Scarcely more than a week from to-
day, our 11.8, negotiators will sit down
Approved
in Vienna with their Soviet counterparts
to open talks on the limitation of stra-
tegic weapons. We all hope and pray that
these negotiations will mark the end of
the senseless and dangerous arms race in
which we have been trapped for over two
decades.
I feel that now is the time for the
Senate to,speak. Now is the time for the
elected representatives of the people to
make crystal clear to the President and
his advisers what we want. Now is the
time to ten the world that we believe we
can?indeed, in the name of humanity,
we must?firmly say "Stop.'
Our debates on nuclear policy and
strategic weapons systems too often
founder on the rocks and shoals of tech-
nology. The problems are intensely com-
plex, and the jargon has been refined by
the strategic experts until the layman
can only shake his head in bewilderment.
But we cannot?we must not?aban-
don this field to the technocrats and the
military analysts.
You do not have to be a doctor of
physics, or an Air Force general, or a
Defense Department bureaucrat, to un-
derstand the essential political and hu-
man problems involved. You do not have
to be totally conversant with the flight
characteristics of the Poseidon missile,
or to be able to talk glibly of the foot-
print of the Soviet SS-9 rocket, or to
argue knowledgeably about throw-weight
or early acquisition radar, to know that
we are spending ourselves into an eco-
nomic crisis on stockpiles of ever more
sophisticated weapons that are ever less
subject to rational political control. And
the Soviets are doing the same.
Some may even find the language of
Senate Resolution 211 rather imposing,
although we all have been forced in re-
cent years to learn to roll out phrases like
multiple independently targeted re-entry
vehicle trippingly on the tongue.
I for one find it useful to put the
meaning of the resolution in the simplest
possible terms. As I mentioned in my
speech of January 20 on the Senate floor
regarding the forthcoming strategic
arms talks, what I feel the Senate should
tell the President is that we want our
men in Vienna to propose an as is, where
Is, in-place halt in the arms race.
What would an as is, where is, in-
plaee halt be like? As I put it in my
earlier speech, it would simply prevent
any change in the numbers and kinds,
and modes of deployment, of land-
launched missiles, sub-launched missiles,
intercontinental bombers, and anti-
missile missiles. In particular, steps would
be taken to ban further flight tests of
MIRV's and their deployment on exist-
ing missiles.
I personally regree very much that
President Nixon chose to characterize
the Brooke resolution at a recent press
conference as "irrelevant." At this time
and place, what in the name of human
sense could be more relevant than for
the elected representatives of the people
in this Chamber to stand up and tell the
-administration precisely what we want,
what we expect?indeed, what we de-
mand?of our negotiators in Vienna?
Surely, in any question that inevitably
involves the expenditure of billions upon
April .9, 1920
billions of our tax dollars, the sense of
the Senate is relevant. Surely, any pro-
posal that offers some hope?even a very
slim hope?of reducing the danger of a
nuclear holocaust with which we are
'condemned to live is deeply relevant. Has
not the Senate the right and the duty to
speak out on an issue that ultimately af-
fects the lives of every citizen of our
Nation?
By what curious sure, therefore,
can Senate Resolution 231 be "irrelevant"
in the President's eyes? I find that de-
scription not only somewhat frightening,
but unworthy of the relationship of mu-
tual respect that I have always presumed
to exist between our branches of Govern-
ment.
Besides, even by the President's own
definition, the resolution under consid-
eration is deeply germane. In the same
press conference, the President remarked
that there were only two basic possi-
bilities for agreement between the United
States and the Soviet Union in our talks
In Vienna. He explained these as, first. a
"comprehensive agreement," and, sec-
ond, a "system by system agreement,"
If the language of Senate Resolution
211 means anything at all, it means that
the Senate is saying, loud and clear:
Mr. President, what we want is a compre-
hensive agreement.
And we want it sooner rather than later,
because the hour is late anC this may be our
only chance.
And we want our H.S. negotiating team
to take the initiative in proposing this
course to the Russians, rather than merely
sitting back and waiting to hear what the
other side has to say.
The President went on to comment
that we will be prepared to discuss either
basic alternative in Vienna. But that
passive approach suggests to me a pos-
sible scene at the negotiating table in
Vienna that would be ludicrous if it were
not so tragic. After all the vast expendi-
ture of time and diplomatic skill re-
quired to bring the representatives of
the two greatest sovereign powers of the
nuclear era together?and all the efforts
to prepare positions for what promises
to be the most momentous negotiation
since the end of the Second World War--
is it possible that the American team
will merely sit down and say "if you've
got anything of interest to say, we're
prepared to consider it?"
According to the newspapers, the Na-
tional Security Council will establish the
U.S. negotiating position for SALT with
the President during this week. I might
add that these meetings coming none
too soon. I find it difficult 'to understand
how we can have meaningful consulta-
tions with our NATO allies prior to the
opening of SALT?as the President has
promised?if the administration has not
yet established our own position just 1
week before the April 16 opening in Vien-
na. Faulty commtinications with our
allies have gotten us into deep trouble
before, and could well do so again.
I sincerely hope that in its delibera-
tions the National Security Council will
not be overwhelmed by charts and
graphs and complex technical briefings
by the missile elcperts. These are all
vitally important, and of course they
should be heard to provide a foundation
For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
4
Approved kr Release 2002/03/20 ? CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
pril , 197u CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD ? SENATE S 5491
for informed discussion. But what I
pray the members of the National Se-
curity Council, and the President, will
keep in mind, is this.
We are now almost 25 years into a
galloping arms race with the ..Soviet
Union. Our resources are not unlimited,
and neither are those of the Soviets.
We have an abundance of problems with-
in our own society that might be solved
or at least alleviated by investment of
some of the money and expertise that
we new devote to weapons of war. I am
sure the leaders in the Kremlin. could
say the same thing. Both sides have
acknowledged that we have reached a
critical plateau in nuclear weapons and
missile developement at which there is
rough strategic parity between Us. After
25 years of pouring out our national
treasure on arms and more arms, the
question is now whether we have the guts
to say simply "We'll stop, if you'll stop."
Edo not expect miracles on the first
day in Vienna, and I do not anticipate
that the arms race will come to a screech-
ing halt at our first Proposal to the
Soviets. But the time is ripe for the
kind of "risk for peace" that President
Nixon has promised the Nation he is
ready to take,
We must make this effort. We owe
it not only to ourselves but to our chil-
dren to make this the time when the
United States clearly and unequivocally
called for an as is, where is, in-place
halt in the absurd mpltiplication of
weapons of mass destruction.
I am not proposing that we dismantle
our defenses or lay down our arms. Nor
do I expect that the Russians would
accept any agreement that would en-
danger their national security. But a
temporary freeze?an in-place halt?in
the arms race give both the American
and Soviet negotiators in Vienna the
breathing space they so vitally need to
work out a more durable agreement, that
hopefully would include permanent
measures to stabilize and reduce num-
bers of strategic weapons.
If the Soviets do not want an as is,
where is, in-place halt, or if they fail
to live up to its conditions, I 'would be
deeply discouraged. But there would be
no permanent harm done to our nation-
al security posture.
. It is no secret that we have tested
MIRV warheads extensively. Indeed, an
administration spokesman has informed
the world,in an announcement I con-
sider very damaging to prospects for
success in SALT?that we are prepared
to deploy MIRV warheads on operation-
al missiles by June 1. If we have reached
that stage of advanced readiness, there
would be no significant delay in pro-
ceeding with deployment, should an in-
terim in-place halt of 6 months or more
fail to improve the climate for agree-
ment with the Soviets, or be broken by
either side.
At times, I think the Pentagon is on
the wrong side of this issue. Secretary
Laird and his subordinates have waged
a persistent public campaign raising the
specter of possible Soviet aspirations for
a strategic first-strike capability. The
Pentagon has published reports indicat-
ing that the Russians have been proceed-
ing with accelerated testing of multiple
warheads even since the preliminary
SALT meeting in Helsinki, and are
rapidly deploying more and more of their
powerful SS-9 rockets. If someone can
devise a plan that would stop the Rus-
sians from deploying more SS-9's and
from further MIRV testing for 6 months
to a year, why should not the generals in
the Pentagon leap at the idea?
If we already have a sufficiency of
nuclear-armed ballistic missiles today to
insure our national security, why should
not the Defense Department support any
proposal that would maintain that un-
easy equilibrium even temporarily?
But I confess that I am not sanguine
about the prospects of Secretary Laird's
endorsement of Senate Resolution 211,
although I would welcome it.
I feel that each Senator, in reaching a
judgment on this resolution, also should
consider some recent direct signs that
the Soviets might be prepared to talk in
Vienna about something very like an as
is, where is, in-place halt. In this regard,
it is well worth a few moments to look
carefully at an article that appeared in
the March 7 edition of the authoritative
Communist party newspaper Pravda.
This was a long and detailed discus-
sion of prospects for SALT, signed "ob-
server," a nom de plume often attached
to the most significant of statements in
the opaque world of Soviet affairs. The
article deserves far more expert analy-
sis than I, as a non-Kremlinologist, can
give it. But several aspects clearly are of
great importance.
The "observer" statement made clear
that the Soviets, rather than insisting
on "general and complete disarmament,"
are prepared to accept more limited
agreements if they are in the mutual na-
tional interests of the contracting par-
ties. The article stated that the Soviet
Union is by no means?and I quote?
"guided by the principle of all or nothing"
in its approach to SALT. And the Pravda
piece is replete with evidence of Soviet
apprehension that this is a critical op-
portunity in the history of the arms
race that, if lost, may never be regained.
Pravda of March 7 also left no doubt
that Soviet military planners agree that
our two nations are locked in a position
of rough strategic parity at present. The
article acknowledged that the Soviet
Union now possesses the modern arma-
ments necessary to guarantee the secu-
rity of the U.S.S.R. and its allies "to the
necessary degree." Let me underline that
phrase: "To the necessary degree." If
that is not a capsule definition of what
we have termed "sufficiency," I do not
know what is.
In addition, the Pravda article em-
phasized the fact that the Soviets are
keenly aware that a new escalation of the
arms race would make difficult if not
impossible the attainment of the do-
mestic goals the Politburo has set for the
Soviet Union. The article stated: _
The solution of the disarmament problem
would help to release from the sphere of
military production colossal means which are
expended on armaments throughout the
world, and whose utilization on economic
development need; could assist the scientific,
technical, and economic progress of all
mankind . . .
a or will state it.
I want to underline that that quota-
tion is from Pravda, and not from the
New York Times.
Finally, the anonymous "observer" ex-
tended an unmistakable warning that
neither side can be permitted to use the
strategic arms talks as a cover or screen
behind which to seek military advantage.
I think that our military experts in the
Pentagon would be quick to endorse that
statement. What better way to insure
that there is no improper use of SALT
by either side than through an interim
agreement on an as is, where is, in-place
halt? At least this would give the nego-
tiators in SALT time to test each other's
sincerity and willingness to reach a
more permanent accord.
Mr. President, I am convinced that we
must seize the opportunity presented by
the opening of the strategic arms talks
in Vienna to take the arms control ini-
tiative in our own national interest. I
believe that there is at least a reasonable
expectation that the Soviet response will
be positive.
I feel that a U.S. proposal for a tem-
porary freeze on MIRV testing and the
further deployment of both offensive and
defensive nuclear strategic weapons
will not adversely affect our national
security. I submit that we already have
the technical capacity to monitor such a
temporary agreement or in-place halt?
a capacity that we will lose, probably
irrevocably, once each side begins large-
scale deployment of MIRV warheads.
I, therefore, intend to vote in favor of
Senate Resolution 211, and I urge each
of my colleagues to lend his support to
this deeply significant?and relevant?
propOsal.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I thank
the very able and distinguished Senator
from Alaska for his contribution, and
especially for his tone of optimism with
regard to the possibility that the Soviet
Union may accept this agreement.
I assure the distinguished Senator that
I have put into the RECORD the Pravda
statement?which, incidentally, is the
Central Committee statement of the So-
viet Union. I also wish to say to the Sen-
ator that when we had hearings before
the Committee on Foreign Relations, we
had before us Prof. Marshall Shulman
of Columbia University, who is an au-
thority on the Soviet Union and the
Soviet people, and he pointed out to the
committee that there were many state-
ments which could give us some cause
for hope and optimism, though, of
course, no one really knows whether the
Soviet Union will or will not accept the
proposal if made by our President and
by ciur delegation at Vienna.
But at any rate, I am very grateful
that the Senator has so directed his re-
marks as to give us all a hope and some
optimism as to the chances of the Soviet
Union accepting the proposal that the
Senator is suggesting to our President.
I thank the distinguished Senator.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
recognizes the Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
t
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 CIA_rRDP7270.03.37R000300040009-3
S 5492 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN ATE Apia 9, 1970
Mr. BAKER. Who has the floor at this
oment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Massachusetts has the floor.
Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator from
Massachusetts yield?
Mr. BROOKE. I yield.
Mr. BAKER. First, of all, I commend
the distinguished Senator from Massa-
chusetts for his contribution in this field
and in this respect. I have a longtime,
high admiration, not only for his parlia-
mentary skill and ability, but for the
astuteness of his judgment on matters of
peace and security for this Republic.
I think he has great potential for an
additional contribution in that respect
in the resolution before the Senate at
this time. But to make sure that there is
no misunderstanding?and we must face
the fact that this forum, more often than
not, records colloquy that is at least as
significant as the wording of a resolu-
tion itself--I think it is Important to
clarify one or two points before I make
up my mind on how to vote on the reso-
lution.
First, I agree that the resolution, if
adopted by a significant part of this
body, would in effect be a signal not only
to our own negotiators at SALT, but to
the Soviet Union as well, that we want
this particular item negotiated success-
fully.
But may I ask my colleague, is It a sig-
nal that we want it so badly that we
single it out, to suggest that we will re-
treat or give in on almost any other
item in order to accomplish it? Is that
a fair statement of the intent?
Mr. BROOKE. My answer to the very
able and distinguished Senator from
Tennessee is that it is not the intent of
the resolution.
This resolution carries with it no in-
structions to our delegation that will go
to Vienna. It obviously carries with it
no instructions to the President at all. IL
is only a sense-of-the-Senate resolution,
and what it purports to say to the Presi-
dent is that it is the sense of the Senate
that he make this proposal to the Soviet
Union, and nothing more. If the Presi-
dent sees fit not to make the proposal to
the Soviet Union, then we have, certain-
ly, no recourse in that regard at all, and
the same thing applies to the delegation,
which is not an arm of the 11S. Senate.
I assure the distinguished Senator
from Tennessee that we certainly are
not suggesting in any fashion that we
propose to give away anything at all. I
further assure him that all we are sug-
gesting in this very simple resolution is
that the proposal be made. If the Soviet
Union does not accept the proposal, or
if the Soviet Union does not stop opera-
tional testing and does not stop deploy-
ment, then, of course, the United States
would not stop operational testing and
would not stop deployment of its weap-
ons systems.
In that event, I think that nothing
would happen at all. They would prob-
ably go on with their -testing and their
deployment, and the United States would
continue with its testing and deployment.
I certainly want to. reassure the Sen-
ator that we are giving up nothing in the
resolution, and that it is not the intent
that the United States give up anything,
or that it weaken its position at the bar-
gaining table
Mr. BAKER. I am pleased to know
that, and I thank my colleague. I would
have aasumed as much.
I think It is important that we make
it abundantly clear that we are not say-
ing to the world and to the Soviet Union
that we want this single item so badly
that we will relinquish our claim to other
controls in other categories in order to
obtain it?
I cite this as a:n example: I hope that,
even without a resolution such as the
Brooke resolutio:n, the President would
instruct and our negotiators would at-
tempt to obtain an agreement with the
Soviet Union to attempt to prevent fur-
ther deployment of any antiballistic mis-
sile system anywhere, but I would hope
that the resolution does not diminish our
fervor for an effort to stabilize our ABM
deployment with that of Russia. By the
same token; I would hope there might
be some sort of mutuality of limitation
on naval vessels, especially deep-running
nuclear submarines. I would hope that
the adoption of the Brooke resolution,
without reference to that item, would not
seem to diminish the intensity of our de-
sire for that item as well.
Would the Senator from Massachu-
setts agree with me that it would be
appropriate, through our colloquy, to sig-
nal specifically that that is not our in-
tent?
Mr. BROOKE. I most certainly would,
and I give the Senator from Tennessee
every assurance that that is the fact, and
that what we are doing here is merely
sharing the political burden with the
President of the United States. This is
our responsibility. We did it in connec-
tion with the partial Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty by a Senate resolution; we also
did it in connection with the Nonpro-
liferation Treaty into which we entered
with the Soviet Union; and we are merely
giving this advice to the President in
similar fashion here.
As I said earlier in the debate, we re-
spect the President, but in addition to
our respect, we owe him our counsel, and
we are merely here giving him our coun-
sel. He may or may not take it, though
I am very pleased that his Advisory
Council has practically made the identi-
cal recommendations that this resolu-
tion makes, and that the Senate would
be making by its adoption, and I am very
hopeful that the President is going to
accept it.
I know that the distinguished Senator
from Tennessee was somewhat con-
cerned about a statement which was
made, I think, by the distinguished Sen-
ator from Alaska and the distinguished
Senator from California, when they re-
ferred to words that the President had
used as "superfluous" or "irrelevant." If I
may correct the Ramie, the President
did not use the word "superfluous" at
any time. The President did use the word
"irrelevant," but I think he meant that
only in the sense that, as the distin-
guished Senator from Tennessee - has
said, that he hoped to do this anyway
at Vienna.
Mr. BAKER. And may I say that I
cannot, for my part, even visualize a sit-
uation where the President of the United
States would not ask that our negotiators
attempt to accomplish the objectives of
this resolution.
So I think, if I may be facetious for a
moment, the irrelevancy is in the irrele-
vance, because it is clear that the posi-
tion of the United States is to try to
stabilize the arms situation between the
superpowers of the world.
Mr. BROOKE. And it is equally clear
that the Senate of the Meted States has
not only the authority but the responsi-
bility to give to the President of the
United States its counsel in matters
which would affect a treaty which we
ultimately would be called upon to ratify.
And I might also add, for the satisfac-
tion of the distinguished Senator from
Tennessee, that the President, at a press
conference when this resolution was
originally introduced, :said that he
thought this resolution was most con-
structive, and I think I quote him cor-
rectly at that time. That resolution has
been broadened. It was broadened by an
amendment offered by the distinguished
senior Senator from Kentucky (Mr.
COOPER), and the Committee on Foreign
Relations, under its distinguished chair-
man, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr.
FULBRIGHT) , held hearings on this mat-
ter. I think the resolution has been
strengthened as well as broadened, and
certainly it carries with it more than we
had asked in the first ins.tance, though
it was implicit in that resolution. Never-
theless, it is spelled out, and I think it
Is of more value to the President in its
form now than it was in its original form
at the time he referred to it and char-
acterized it as constructive.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Massachusetts for
yielding for this purpose, so that there
might be, in my view, a sgnificant clari-
fication of the intendmeot and the im-
port of this resolution.
I had not yet made up my mind as to
how I will vote on this resolution. With
this clarification, I intend to support it.
Mr. BROOKE. I thank the distin-
guished Senator from Tennessee and say
to him that I am very grateful for the
question, and even more grateful for his
support of this resolution.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield?
Mr. BROOKE. I yield.
Mr. DOLE. Let me commend the Sen-
ator from Massachusetts. As a cospon-
sor of the amended resolution, it is my
understanding that President Nixon has
indicated this would be a constructive
step.
I also understand that it is the inten-
tion and purpose of the Senator from
Massachusetts to strengthen the hand of
the President and strengthen the hand
of the negotiators. This is the primary
purpose, as I read the resolution and
the report and as I listen to the debate
on the resolution. I believe it will
strengthen their hand. There is no ef-
fort, as I read the resolution?and
I will ask the Senator from Massa-
chusetts to comment?to take away any
power or right the President has or might
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Anil 1970 Approved FT8filftstesn82140A3129tiEKRWL'7ArR317e000300040009-3
have or a negotiator might have. Do I
interpret that correctly?
Mr. BROOKE. The distinguished Sen-
ator from Kansas is absolutely correct.
He is a very able and skillful lawyer, as
I certainly well know, and I think he has
read the resolution correctly.
Mr. DOLE. With reference to the
amended version, which refers to an im-
mediate proposal by the President that
the Russians suspend deployment, does
that have any effect, or what effect does
It have, on testing now underway by Rus-
sia and by our country?if any?'
Mr. BROOKE. If the Russians do not
cease their testing and their deployment,
the United States does not cease its test-
ing and its deployment. Until such agree-
ment is entered into by the Soviet Un-
ion and the United States, I presume it
would be full steam ahead for both na-
tions.
Mr. DOLE. I share the view expressed
by the Senator from Tennessee that the
President and the negotiators are pur-
suing this effort now. But in the interim
Period, as I understand, there will be no
effort to reduce testing on our part. In
other words, we are not going to relax
and wait for Russia to respond, I un-
derstand we will continue to test, hopr
ing every day and every hour that there
will be some agreement. Is that cor-
rect?
Mr. BROOKE. That is correct. A reso-
lution was proposed to the Senate which
called for unilateral cessation, which
meant that we would cease our testing
and our deployment, and make the pro-
posal, and then wait for the Soviet Union
to accept or reject that proposal. But
this resolution is not a unilateral pro-
posal. It is a mutual proposal. It is a
bilateral proposal. By this resolution, we
are saying that nothing will be done in
the interim period, as the Senator has
pointed out, until such time as the So-
viets accept the proposal.
Mr. DOLE. Again let me commend the
Senator from Massachusetts. I certainly
share his aspirations and hopes, and the
hopes of the cosponsors, this will have
some impact. It will be a signal. It will
offer some hope not only for our country
and Russia but also for all people of the
world, and I support the resolution on
that basis.
Mr. BROOKE. I am pleased to have
the Senator ag a cosponsor, and I thank
him for his very important and pertinent
questions.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BROOKE. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
want to make a few observations about
the resolution.
With regard to the recent exchange, it
is my understanding that the proposal of
the Senator from Massachusetts is that
the President following the advice of the
Senate, should propose to the Govern-
ment of the Soviet Union an immediate
suspension of the further deployment of
strategic nuclear weapons. This is not
proposed as the necessary ultimate goal.
The point is to suspend all deployment
now in order to enhance the probability
of getting some agreement, some perma-
nent agreement, at the talks in Vienna.
This is not proposed as the ultimate goal
of the talks at Vienna, but as a first meas-
ure that would insure, insofar as we can,
the success of those talks. That is the
way I interpret the resolution, and I be-
lieve the Senator from Massachusetts in-
terprets it that way.
We have had great difficulty in making
progress in negotiations, whether in Paris
with regard to Southeast Asia, or with
regard to the Middle East, or with the
Russians. The preliminary talks at Hel-
sinki were reasonably satisfactory. Ev-
erybody seemed to be pleased with their
seriousness ,and with the way they were
conducted. Both sides seemed to be
pleased.
If I understand correctly, we are not
saying that the ultimate goal of the talks
at Vienna is necessarily to achieve a
freeze. We are saying that now, at the
beginning of the talks, the President
should take the initiative by proposing
that we freeze everything so that we will
not have a destabilized situation or a
shifting base on which to try to negotiate
a final agreement.
I believe this is the meaning the Sen-
ator from Kentucky intended when he
offered his amendment; and I thought
the Senator from Massachusetts, if I un-
derstood the situation correctly, agreed
with this interpretation of the objective
of the resolution.
In a sense, the purpose of the resolu-
tion is to try to break the stalemate. We
will not break it if we negotiate one little
point and then another. In the mean-
time some other circumstances will have
changed, and that would mean that you
would have to renegotiate everything.
I believe that is the purpose of the reso-
lution, and I think it would be a useful
purpose.
Action on the resolution was precipi-
tated by the announcement by the Sec-
retary of the Air Force?it was not the
only reason, but it was one development
that I think was important to the spon-
sors?that we are going to deploy MIRV
warheads in June. It was believed?and
I think correctly?that if IVIERN deploy-
ment takes place in the midst of talks,
everything else might be affected. At
least, MIRV deployment gives some rea-
son for doubt as to the sincerity of
the negotiators. There is plenty of that
already.
I quote from page 5 of the committee
report on the resolutions:
It would seem, therefore, 13Qth feasible and
desirable to provide the strategic arms limi-
tation talks with an opportunity to reach
agreements without the additional problem
of having to take into account a constantly
shifting and asymmetrical situation with
respect to strategic weapons. The committee
believes that an immediate mutual suspen-
sion of further deployment of all strategic
weapons systems would provide such an.
opportunity.
We stress that the suspension is "mu-
tual." We are not expected to do any-
thing they do not fp, other than to take
the initiative of making the proposal.
We believe that the justification for our
taking the initiative in making the pro-
posal is that we have more weapons. We
are the more powerful, in a general way,
although there is rough parity between
us in strategic nuclear weapons. We have
a greater diversity of weapons and a
S 5493
greater number of the such secure weap-
ons as the Polaris missiles which are
launched from submarines. We get
bogged down in all kinds of classifica-
tions in the numbers game. At any rate,
we certainly are not inferior. I would
say that we each have a sufficiency. The
weight of the testimony, I think, would
suggest that because of the larger
number of Polaris-type submarines we
have?and they are considered, gener-
ally speaking, to be the most secure of
all weapons, the least subject to being
destroyed-7---we have some responsibility,
perhaps 6, little greater than their re-
sponsibility, to take the initiative in
making the proposal. That is all that is
contemplated that is not completely
mutual.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, is this
a convenient place for the Senator to
yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am always de-
lighted to yield to the Senator from Mis-
sissippi, and honored that he would see
fit to ask me a question.
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator will yield
to me?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Certainly.
Mr. STENNIS. Here is the proposition.
Basically, I believe it is the prerogative
and the responsibility of the President
to conduct these talks as he sees fit and
and in the best way he can, without any
interference?I am sure that this resolu-
tion is not designed to interfere?without
any distracting entanglements that
might come from some other branch of
the Government.
I know the high purpose here and the
desire, as it has been said, to help the
President, even though, I say, I think
we could help him more by giving him
counsel.
But I want to know this: The Sen-
ator has already said, as I understand
it, that he proposes in the resolution only
a mutual undertaking--
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Correct.
Mr. STENNIS. And nothing uni-
lateral
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Correct.
Mr. STENNIS. Nothing unilateral that
we should do. We are not saying we will
do anything on a unilateral basis.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. An immediate sus-
pension by the United States and by the
Soviet Union. That is mutuality, it seems
to me.
Mr. STENNIS. It seems to me it is
clear there.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Very clear.
Mr. STENNIS. Here is my question
further: I personally think that the
negotiations will have to go on a long
time, that the basic, fundamental, major
point to be decided is the matter of in-
spections, or some kind of surveillance
satisfactory to both sides. In the mean-
time, we will have appropriation bills
coming up here on the military program.
Suppose the Senate passes this resolu-
tion as the sense of the Senate, which it
is, and they are not able to work out
any mutuality on the points Within the
next several months that we will be pass-
ing on these appropriation bills. I am
sure that the Senator does not mean for
the Senate to be precluded, by passage
of this resolution, from supporting?each
Senator being free to support?.
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
S 5494 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE April 9, 1970
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
quite right.
Mr. STENNIS. Appropriations for the
necessary carrying out of Military pro-
grams, does he?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is ab-
solutely correct. This resolution does not
have any direct relation to those appro-
priations. Each proposal must stand on
its own Merits?
Mr. STENNIS. Correct.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Regardless of this
resolution. If we bring forward a weap-
ons system that would do violence to a
mutual moratorium, but if the mom,-
tothun has not been approved, the
weapons system stands on its own. But
if a mutual moratorium is approved and
accepted by the Russian Government,
and our own, of course the appropria-
tions would not do violence to the ban
on deployment. We could still appropri-
ate the money.
Mr. STENNIS. I am sure the Senator
understands what I am getting at, that
is, if there is a lack of mutuality in the
SALT talks on deployment, a Senator or
the Senate would not be precluded from
passing on appropriation bills on the
merits. I think that would be a grave
situation we could get into.
Mr. PULBRIGHT. I think that it
would be, but I do not believe the Sena-
tor should be worried that anyone who
votes for this resolution would feel
morally or lgally bound not to support
an ABM, for example. The ABM will
have to stand on its own feet. We will
have to defend it on its own merits with-
out prejudice to the vote. I would not
feel bound at all.
Mr. STENNIS. I was thinking of
MIRV.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think this
resolution?unless the mutual suspen-
sion has been agreed to. If that happens,
then I would assume that deployment
would be suspended; but again, as far as
appropriations are concerned, if for any
reason we want to hold the money there
and consider changing the system. But
hard up as we are, I do not think we
would want to do that.
Mr. STENNIS. If there has been an
actual finality on a mutual agreement,
I think it would be held as a suspension
and we should not proceed in a positive
way.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from
Mississippi made one remark earlier in
his statement that, to me, was not clear.
There was a slight intimation that he
thought the resolution might be pre-
sumptuous on the part of the Senate,
that it was not called for, and we were
seeking to interfere with the President's
legitimate constitutional authority. I do
not accept that at all. I think the Senate
clearly has a constitutional responsibility,
whenever it sees fit to give its advice on
matters of this consequence, because we
are faced with a continuation of the arms
race which threatens to break the coun-
try. It is a very important matter. So, in
this resolution we are doink it, we are
giving our advice. The Constitution does
not say the President will be left alone
without any advice. It says the opposite.
I am a strict constructionist, if I may
use that word to the Senator from Missis-
sippi. I believe in following the Constitu-
tion. This resolution follows the Consti-
tution. It is in performance of the re-
sponsibility of the Senate to give advice
to the President on matters of the great-
est importance. I do not know of anything
much more important than the arms
race which is what is involved in this
resolution._ It is costtng the country enor-
mous sum's of money, and is diverting
money from the development of the
country and the solution of so many of
our domestic problems.
Thus, I do not th:ink anyone should be
deterred from voting for this resolution
on the ground that it is presumptuous
to offer advice to the President. The Pres-
ident is getting advice almost every day,
and he should get it.
I hope he has an open mind, not only
as to our resolution, but as to what other
people think.
Mr. STENNIS. I just have one sen-
tence on that subject I should like to
state, if the Senator will yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, I yield.
Mr. STENNIS. Then I will be through.
I was not meaning to be critical of the
committee for having the resolution, or
critical of anyone for introducing it. But
I do think that, right here, on the very
eve of the opening of these talks, when
it is an Executive responsibility to plan
and carry out the best he can the most
difficult task, perhaps, that a President
has, I think that, right on the eve of
those settings, we should defer to the
President. That is my idea of the consti-
tutional prerogatives and the responsi-
bility that he has. But, of course, that is
a -matter of interpretation and an idea
that I have.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Do I understand
the question clearly, then, that the Sen-
ator thinks we should refrain from giv-
ing advice such as this?
Mr. STENNIS. Well, not under all cir-
cumstances.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Under present cir-
cumstances?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Yes, I really do.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President (Mr.
SAXSE) , under present circumstances, we
should refrain? That is what I was not
clear about. I regret that. I very much
disagree with the Senator from Missis-
sippi.
As a matter of fact, on yesterday?and
I say this without respect to the merits
of the question?I thought in acting as
we did in rejecting the idea that this
body, the Senate, does not have a con-
stitutional responsibility to give advice,
whether it be regarding foreign relations
as in this matter, or on nominations to
the Supreme Court of the United States,
I think that what the Senate did yester-
day made the Senate a significant body
again.
I am bound to say that in the last ad-
ministration, because of very unusual
circumstances. I think the Senate was
largely subverted, that we became sub-
servient to the Executive to a degree far
beyond what I think the Constitution
contemplated. Yesterday was a very fine
demonstration, I think, of senatorial in-
dependence of mind, regardless of the
rightness of the decision. At least, the
Senate exercised the power given to it
by the Constitution, the power which had
almost been subverted: at least we had
not exercised it at all. I complained my-
self, in the previous administration, on
the way Members of this body and the
? other body were taken to the White
House, briefed on a subject of the high-.
est importance, and then polled as to
whether we agreed or did not agree, be-
fore we had any hearings. We were more
or less made to commit ourselves on the
spot. I call that a serious blow to the
senatorial process. I think it was a bad
thing for the country. I think that was
one of the reason, we fell on hard times.
The Senate, in passing the commitments
resolution, in attempting to reassert its
part in making commitments that in-
volved commitments al manpower and
great amounts of money, is now asserting
its right to pass upon the fitness of nom-
inees, and is again a respectable body.
Every Member of the Senate should be
proud to be a Senator. I was very proud
to be a Member of this body, much more
than before because I now think that the
Senate is in a position to assert its right-
ful constitutional position in our Gov-
ernment.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do
not accept the idea that we have no
business giving advice. If the President
comes back from Vienna with an agree-
ment, we will have to approve it. I think
we have a right to do this.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield at that point, the illus-
tration he stated, with all due deference,
is on such a different subject matter and
with such a different purpose in mind
that it does not seem to be analogous.
Mr. President, I think that if negotia-
tors go over there now, the President
would be bound by this resolution. They
would have in their minds the fact that
the Senate passed this resolution and it
is the only thing available or that we
have more interest in this than in any-
thing else.
I think we ought to stay out of it,
particularly at this time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. 1Vir. President, the
Senator thinks it is a wise thing to pro-
mote these talks, does he not?
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. Pr?,sident, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I may say
that the adminstraton has not asked us
to refrain from acting an this resolution
at this time. The administration con-
siders that this is a matter for the Sen-
ate itself to decide. It neither undertakes
to raise objections or to promote it.
There may be individuals who feel
that we should not act upon it at this
time. But it is simply an expression of
the sense of the Senate as I understand
it, and an offer to support the adminis-
tration on these proposals.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. AIKEN. And I am sure that the ad-
ministration does not object to our act-
ing upon it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
think the Snator is quite right. Of course,
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 ? CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
April 9, 1-970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 5495
the Senator told me that before, and
that is the reason I believe it.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FIILBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I cer-
tainly would have liked to see the dis-
tinguished chairman of the Armed Serv-
ices Committee support the resolution. I
think it is a resolution that he mght very
well be able to support.
I jotted down three points which I
think might be helpful to the distin-
guished chairman of the Armed Services
Committee in, addition to the point so
very clearly made by the very distin-
guished chairman of the Foreign Re-
lations Committee.
Point No. 1 is that MIRV is defined in
the legislative history as including any
system able to strike more than one tar-
get. The SS-9 technology is specifically
covered by the resolution.
Second, the President does have clear
authority to define the duration of any
such mutual suspension and to determine
verification requirements for maintain-
ing it.
Third, the resolution does not require
reliance only on national intelligence for
verification since it makes clear that the
President can specify "such other meas-
ures of observation and inspection as
may be appropriate."
I further point out that the President
has referred to the resolution in its orig-
inal form as a very constructive resolu-
tion.
I should hope that the distinguished
Senator from Mississippi might find it
possible to support the resolution.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
join in saying that I regret that the Sen-
ator from Mississippi does not support
the resolution.
The report of the committee states:
The committee recognizes that Senate
Resolution 211 is in the nature of apivice to
the President which he is free to accept or
reject. The committee believes, however, that
the resolution expresses a growing recogni-
tion by the American people that no effort
must pe spared to bring to an end the
escalating cycle of the deployment of nuclear
weapons systems.
That is all it is. I think that is a lot.
And I think that the President would be
very ill-advised, assuming the resolution
Is agreed to by the Senate, not to follow
It. Of course, he would be within his
rights if he were not to follow it. 15ut
it would be very unwise because, if passed,
the resolution would express the collec-
tive judgment of the Senate which is
entitled to respect when one views the
events of the last several years.
I would hope the Senator,' from
Mississippi would reconsider.
I realize that there are perfectly honest
and honorable men who do not believe
that any kind of agreement with the
Russians or with any Communist is
worthwhile. Such people make speeches.
And there are quite a number of them.
They have concluded , that as result
of disappointments in the past, the
Russians are unreliable and that we
should not make any agreement with
them.
There are people who express this view.
This resolution is a means for the
Senate, in which there are representa-
tives of all 50 States, to express its
views?and on this not unimportant
matter?in a way that reflects the views
of a great majority of the people of the
country who are paying the bill for the
arms race.
The cost is so enormous that it is l\ard
to calculate not only the immediate cost,
but also the costs resulting from escala-
tion of the arms race.
In connection with our considera-
tion of Senate Resolution 211, I would
like to call attention to a pamphlet pub-
lished earlier this year. The pamphlet
will not be mentoned in book reviews,
sold on newstands, handed out in super-
markets, or mailed to lists of subscribers.
In fact, it will probably not be read by
more than a few thousand people at
most. That is a pity, for it deals with a
subject of the utmost importance, and its
message is grave and alarming. The
pamphlet is entitled "World Military Ex-
penditures 1969." It is published by the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.
In his introduction to the pamphlet,
the Director of the Agency states that the
rise in military spending is continuing,
although it is less sharp. He then com-
ments: "The world remains the poorer
for it."
The world is indeed the poorer because
of the continued rise in military spend-
ing. The pamphlet tells us that in 1969
world military spending reached a record
$200 billion, an increase of 34 percent
since 1964, and that in the last 6 years
more than $1 trillion has been spent for
arms and armed forces. This sum exceeds
the value of all the goads and services
produced in the United States in the past
year. It represents more than 2 years'
income for the world's 03 developing
countries in which over 21/2 billion people
live. The world's military budget for the
past 6 years has taken as much public
money as was spent by all governments
on all forms of public education and
health care, And more of this money for
military purposes was spent by the
United States than by any other country.
Specifically, of the $200 billion estimated
to have been spent for arms and armed
forces in 1969, expenditures by the
United States were estimated at $82 bil-
lion, and expenditures by the Soviet
Union, with the second largest military
budget, at $56 billion.
These are the figures of our own Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
The enormous amounts of money
which the United States and the Soviet
Union have spent reflect the high cost
of defense in an age of nuclear weapons.
The Poseidon missile, for example, will
cost a total of $5.5 billion according to
the Department of Defense, but Senator
PROXMIRE believes that the eventual cost
may be double that estimate. Minuteman
II will cost about $4.25 billion and Min-
uteman III another $4.25 billion. The
Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft will
cost $8.8 billion according to the Defense
Department, but other estimates have
ranged from $11 to $23 billion. Estimates
of the cost of the Safeguard system go
as high as $50 billion.
While on the subject of costs, may I
point out that in fiscal year 1971, the
total Federal budget will be $154.9 bil-
lion. Of this amount, 47.5 percent, or an
estimated $73.6 go for na-
tional defense. And of that $73.6 billion,
an estimated $7.9 billion will go for stra-
tegic forces.
Mr. President, we are dealing here
with an area of the greatest importance.
Yesterday we heard an extremely impor-
tant statement by McGeorge Bundy, who
formerly was Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the prede-
cessor of Dr. Kissinger in the White
House. I ask unanimous consent to have
his statement printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF MCGEORGE EVONDY
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-
Committee, I am happy to accept your in-
vitation to testify on the arms race, and I
am particularly happy to appear in company
with Dr. York. I would like to associate my-
self strongly with his basic argument.
My broad view of the arms race was stated
last October in an article in Foreign Affairs,
and to save the time of the Committee I
would like, with your permission, to offer that
article for the record instead of repeating it.
Its principal conclusion was simply that the
strategic arms race between the United States
and the Soviet Union has gone too far, threat-
ens to go further, and should be stopped by
an early agreement between these two great
powers. Since then SALT has begun in a
businesslike way, and our Government is now
considering what its position will be as the
talks resume in Vienna next week.
My own strong belief is that the best next
step for the United States in this field is to
follow the course proposed in Senate Reso-
lution 211. That Resolution first states the
sense of the Senate that prompt negotiations
be urgently pursued between the two great
powers, and on this point I think there is
little or no disagreement among Americans.
The second part of the Resolution expresses
the sense of the Senate that we should now
propose an immediate suspension by both
sides "of further deployment of all offensive
and defensive nuclear strategic weapons sys-
tems." An excellent basic argument in favor
of this Resolution is developed in the report
submitted by Senator Fulbright, and I will
not waste your time by repeating it. Let me
rather offer ten brief comments on the sig-
nificance of your Committee's position.
1. I assume that in passing Senate Resolu-
tion 211, the Senate will be urging the Presi-
dent to propose to the Soviet Union the mu-
tual suspension of these deployments for
some reasonable term during which further
progress could be made toward a definite
agreement. There are some who suppose that
the word "moratorium" implies a form of
permanent self-entanglement, but as I un-
derstand it no such self-entanglement is
either necessary or intended.
2. I strongly support the statement in the
Committee Report that an agreed suspen-
sion of deployment of strategic systems will
necessarily imply a suspension also of tests?
as well as deployment--of such emerging
systems as MIRV. The Committee Report
makes the correct connection between the
Soviet SS-9 and the American MIRV. This
connection goes both ways. Just as the So-
viets must limit SS-9 if they wish to stop
MIRV, so I believe that if we are to get any
early limit on SS-9 deployment, we ourselves
must place MIRV on the bargaining table.
3. I believe that there will not be much
progress in SALT until the United States
Government is prepared to make a specific
proposal. I think the odds are heavy that it
will prove wice and right for us to move first.
The Committee has heard the sensitive and
Perceptive testimony of Professor Marshall
Shulman on Soviet attitudes towards arms
negotiation. I share his view that Soviet
wariness is at least equal to our own. Our ex-
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Regase 2002/03/20 ? CIA-RDP/2-001337,R1200300040009-3
S 5496 l CoNGRESsION Ai RECoRD ? sEN E April 9, 1970
perience, Understanding and present strength
make it right for 515- to take the initiative.
4. Specifically, I believe that as a pert of
any proposal for an agreed moratorium the
United States should take a first step by an-
nouncing a suspension of its own deployment
of ABM and MIRV for a limited time. Such
a time cOuld and should be relatively brief,
and its extension could and should depend
upon the promptness and seriousness of
Soviet response. There might be some mar-
ginal inconvenience for our defense organi-
zation in such a suspension, and our already
overwhelming strategic war plans might need
marginal revision if specific planned deploy-
ments are delayed?but there is no real or
present danger in such a limited suspension,
and if we -want results in SALT, we should
try it, How long such a trial should be, and
precisely what it should include, are matters
I do not attempt to cover, since it would be
unwise for a private citizen to try to define
the exact length and direction of any first
step. My point is simply that we should be-
gin by an action as well as a proposal.
5. This belief rests not on any sentimental
notion that we must be more virtuous than
the Russians, but rather upon the deep con-
viction that effective limitation and reduc-
tion of the strategic arms race is an objective
deeply in our own national interest as well
as the interest of all mankind. It is wholly
false to suppose that the national secusity
Is always served by adding strategic weapons
and- never by their limitation. In the world
of the 1970s the truth is more nearly the op-
posite. We have more than enough strategic
weapons today. The addition of new systems
which will inevitably produce further Soviet
systems is not the road to safety for anyone
in any country.
6. In particular we should be on guard
against the notion that it is useful to press
the development or deployment of any
given weapons system because of its value
as a bargaining-counter for SALT. It is quite
true that if we get nowhere in SALT and if
Soviet strategic expansion continues, we
shall have to take careful stock of our own
needs. But there is no evidence at all that
pressing the deployment of systems we do
not yet need is likely to have a constructive
effect on Soviet behavior in SALT. There are
times and topics for toughness With Moscow,
but SALT in April is not one of thein,
many of those who urge this tactic are men
who do not want SALT to succeed. It will be
very hazel to get a good agreement even if
we do only what we have to do. It will prob-
ably be impossible if we provide unnecessary
ammunition to Soviet weapon-lovers by pres-
sing our own deployments relentlessly
throughout the talks.
7. In moving toward effective limitation
of the arms race, we shall need to be alert
and skeptical against distractions and di-
versions from those whose special interests
may be threatened. The history of arms ne-
gotiation includes many examples of efforts
by the partisans of particular weapons sys-
tems to prevent any agreement at all. Dur-
ing the negotiations before the Limited 'rest
Ban Treaty, for example, it was suggested
that the Soviets might obtain some decisive
advantage by secret nuclear tests conducted
behind the sun or by the construction of
underground holes so big that the very
existence of a test could not be detected.
These arguments now rest properly in the
dustbin of dead fantasy. But now new dan-
gers are depicted in the effort to justify a
refusal to limit or delay our own new weap-
ons systems. Such arguments should be sub-
jected to most meticulous and skeptical anal-
ysis, and in such study the role of the Con-
gress is of high importance.
8, There is a particular danger in the un-
critical acoeptance of doctrines of strategic
superiority--or even sufficiency?which may
be 'used by zealous men in support of their
own preferred weapons. This is aS true of
the Eisenhower Administration's belief in
"prevailing" in a general war as it is of later
doctrines of "assured destruction" and "dam-
age limitation." All of these forms of words
can be used to justify excessive expenditure
OIL unnecessary strategic systems. At pres-
ent there are four now criteria of strategic
sufficiency, but the Administration has not
told us what they are 'According to press re-
ports, these criteria include "assured tie-
struetion," "hostage equality," "crisis sta-
bility" and "thitd country protection." If the
Administration and the Congress are not
alert and watchful, criteria like these can
be protective umbrellas for unchecked stra-
tegic expansionism. They can also be road-
blocks in the way of arms limitation. They
deserve public discussion. My own conviction
is that the' realities of strategic nuclear
weapons are no'; subject to control by such
verbal formulae. In the language of Jus-
tice Holmes, I believe that criteria like these
tend to be spiders' webs inadequate to con-
trol the dominant facts.
9. The main proposition which we need
to understand in order to limit the dangers
of the nuclear age is that enough is enough.
The Soviet Union and the United States have
long since reached and passed that point.
Each is now able to do totally unacceptable
damage to the other, no matter how a nu-
clear catastrophe begins. Sane political lead-
ers on both sides know this reality for what
it is-It is of course possible that some still
unknown technological development might
genuinely disrupt this fundamental parity,
but there is no evidence whatever that any
such development is likely in the present
decade. So we have enough, and more than
enough, and we are on the edge of a most
unstabilizing and dangerous escalation. Now
is the time to stop.
10. The Committee Report recognizes what
I would like to emphasize in closing: that
while citizens can comment and the Senate
can advise, only the President can decide.
It will take negotiation to reach agreement,
and the official position of the Government
of the United States can be stated to the
Soviet Union only by our President and his
authorized agents. The President must
choose the timing and the shape of any
initiative he takes; in the end his leadership
is what will decide. As he considers the pos-
sible choices and deliberates on decisions
which have not yet been made, the Presi-
dent is entitled to the thoughtful advice of
the Senate, and in this field, where the
weight of bueaucratic influence has histori-
cally been heavily on the side of arms as
against arms controt, such advice can be of
particular value to him. The easy course is
always to avoid decisions; politically the
argument of weapons is easy, and the argu-
ment for acts of restraint is hard. A Presi-
dent who wants to 'sake the lead needs all
the help he can get. The Senate can give such
help, and in this situation it is obviously the
duty of citizens to respond to the Senate's
request for their honest views. I have stated
mine, and I will be glad to try to answer your
questions.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
wish to read a sentence which appears
an the first page of the statement by Mr.
Bundy:
My strong belief is that the best next step
for the United States'in this field is to follow
the course proposed in Senate resolution 211.
On page 2 a the statement, he states:
There are some who suppose that the word
'moratorium" implies a form of permanent
self-entanglement, but as I understand it
no such self-entanglement is either neces-
sary or intended. . . .
Just as the Soviets must limit SS-9 if
they wish to stop MERV, so I believe that if
we are to get any early limit on SS-0 de-
ployment. we ourselves must place MIRV on
the bargaining table.
3. I believe that there will not be much
progress in SALT until the United States
Government is prepared to make a specific
proposal_ I think the odds are heavy that it
will prove wise and right for us to move first.
The Committee has heard the sensitive and
perceptive testimony of Professor Marshall
Shulman on Soviet attitudes towards arms
negotiation. I share his view that Soviet
wariness is at least equai to our own. Our
experience, understand' rig and present
strength make it right for us to take the
initiative.
I wish to stress that last sentence. I
think that is the heart of the justification
for this resolution. It is our responsibil-
ity to take this initiative. The statement
continues:
Effective limitation and reduction of the
strategic arms race is an objective deeply
in our own national interest as well as the
interest of all mankind, it is wholly false
to suppose that the national security is al-
ways served by adding strategic weapons
and never by their limitation. In the world
of the 1970s the truth is more nearly the op-
posite. We have more than enough strategic
weapons today. The addition of new systems
which will inevitably produce further So-
viet systems is not the road to safety for
anone in any country,
6. In particular we should be on guard
against the notion that is is useful to press
the development or deployment of any given
weapons system because of its value as a
bargaining-oounter for SALT. It is quite true
that if we wet nowhere in SALT and if So-
viet strategic expansion continues, we shall
have to take careful stock of our own needs.
But there is no evidence at all that press-
ing the deployment of systems we do not yet
need is likely to have a constructive effect on
Soviet behavior in SALT. There are times
and topics for toughness with Moscow, but
SALT in April is not one of them, and
many of those who urge this tactic are
men who do not want SALT to succeed. It
will be very hard to get a good agreement
even if we do only what we have to do. It
will probably be impossible if we provide un-
necessary ammunition to Soviet weapon-
lovers by pressing our own deployments re-
lentlessly throughout the talks.
7. In moving toward effective limitation
of the arms race, we shall need to be alert
and skeptical against dist ractions and diver-
MOMS from those whose special interests may
be threatened.
I submit that is a very perceptive
statement.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a statement by Marshall D.
Shulman, director, Russian Institute,
Columbia University, be printed in the
RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT BY MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
The Soviet Union and the United States
have a common enemy?the strategic arms
race. Can anyone doubt the proposition that
both countries would be better off, and more
secure, if the strategic balance could be
maintained at lower levels? And yet, the up-
ward spiral continues, independent of will
or reason. The problem is: where and how
to initiate the process of checking and then
reversing this upward spiral?
The answer is full of technical complexi-
ties, but it is fundamentally a political prob-
lem. If the will exists to reverse the present
senseless trend, ways can be found to solve
the technical Obstacles. If the will does not
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
1970 Approved Fo8NtitshesgROA3eltattlipP7AR7F000300040009-3
April 9,
?
exist, or is not strong enough, any technical
rationalization will suffice as an epitaph.
It is not a question of trust: the level of
mistrust is too high in both directions for
that. The real question is whether enough
reasonable men on each side can be brought
to recognize and act upon their own rational
self-interest.
The present moment offers a singular op-
portunity. Usually in the past, when one
country has been ready to be serious about
arms limitations, the other has been build-
ing up its arsenal; the moment passes, and
the roles are reversed. Now, however? there is
an unusual combination of circumstances:
previous disparities have been greatly re-
duced; each side has more than enough
weapons to deter the other; each side is
under pressure to use its resources in more
constructive ways; and we stand poised fleet-
ingly before the entraneeway to a new era
in military technology?an era whose costs,
tensions and instabilities would reduce the
security .of both sides, In the course of the
next thirty days, decisions will be made in
Washington and Moscow that will determine
whether the present opportunity will be ex-
plored to its utmost by men of common
sense.
It is necessary to bring as much insight as
we can into the circumstances in which these
issues are being decided in the Soviet Union.
Although there is much that we do not know
about the process of decision-making in the
Soviet system, we have been learning to ap-
preciate the complex interplay of interests
and pressures at work in the SoViet Union
today. Like many industrialized countries,
including our own, the Soviet Union is ex-
periencing an increase in social tension re-
sulting from the paradoxical rise in pressures
for change and, at the same time, in strong
conservative resistance to change.
As a result, there are contradictory tend-
encies to be observed in Soviet political life
today. There are those who are concerned
about the declining growth rate and the lag
in advanced industrial technology, who are
seeking to clear away archaic and cumber-
some impedances to progress and to adapt
the system to modern requirements. Among
these men are to be found those who most
keenly appreciate the incubus of the arms
race upon Soviet economic progress. But there
Is also to be observed a backlash tendency of
Ultraconservatism, from those who tear that
reform and adaptation will threaten the role
of the Communist Party bureaucracy. They
are responsible for an upsurge of dogmatic
ideology reminiscent of the past; they are
engaged in a ca.mpaign for orthodox conform-
ity, for an extirpation of alien influence.
Their answer to economic and social problems
is the old tried and true method of exhorta-
tion and coercion, and this leads them to
form political alliances with the military and
with the police.
The top political leadership seeks to pre-
serve its collegial unity at all costs, and to
conciliate the contradictory pressures that
bear upon it. The cost of this effort to main-
tain a consensus government has been an
Incapacity to act decisively to resolve major
problems. Decisions are waiting to be made
for the XXIV Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and the new five-
year plan for the economy, both involving
fundamental economic and political issues.
Serious concern about turbulence in Eastern
Europe ahd even more so about relations
with Communist China are major complica-
tions intertwined with the domestic prob-
lems facing Soviet leadership.
It would be vain to try to prophesy the
outcome of these decisions, or to guess
whether the system will find the vitality and
the flexibility necessary to cope with its com-
plex problems. But it is important to appre-
ciate how deeply this interplay of conflicting
forces and pressures affects Soviet-American
relations, and also how much it is affected by
What We do and say. Clearly the conflicting
pressures of modernization and regression
toward dogmatic orthodoxy create uncertain-
ties and set limits on what the leadership
can do. It is also evident that many of our
old stereotypes about "the Russians" have
little applicability, whether the wishful
stereotype of Western-style liberalization or
the simple stereotype of Stalinist total
control.
Obviously, the complex currents of Soviet
politics affect decisions about SALT above all,
since these concern vital questions of secu-
rity, relations with the Soviet Union's fore-
most adversary, and the allocation of re-
sources as between military and industrial
interests. The decision to enter.into SALT
was hard-fought over a long period of time,
and those who argue for entering into talks
with the United States have always at their
backs powerful ideologies who voice their
suspicious of American intentions, and who
fear the operational problems of preserving
the muscularity of the Communist move-
ment during periods of reduced tension with
the United States. With the Chinese charg-
ing "collusion with the imperialists," the
military reacting neuralgicly to every word
and act of our military, and the Party dog-
matists hammering away at the inequities of
"American imperialism," it would be sur-
prising if the Soviet leadership did not show
reserve and hesitation in their negotiations
with the United States.
There are in addition a number of other
circumstances which also peculiarly affect
Soviet decision-making in regard to SALT.
Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union
does not have people circulating in and out
of government who can serve, while they are
out of government, as an independent and
knowledgeable lobby on arms control ques-
tions, nor does it have scientists who cir-
culate in and out of defense responsibilities
who can contribute critical tcehnical ex-
perience to the public discussion of these
isues. Unlike the United States, the Soviet
Union has not had a great contribution to
strategic military theory in the nuclear age
from civilians; its discussions of these mat-
ters are conducted in professional military
journals, many of which have limited circu-
lation?
In the compartmentalization of Soviet
life, there is not much lateral transfer of
information about military technology, par-
ticularly becaues of the extreme secrecy in
which all military affairs are held. The con-
sequence is that there has not been in the
Soviet Union the kind of broad educational
experience, involving the interplay of scien-
tific, military and political factors involved
in arms control questions, which this coun-
try has had, for example as the result of the
AEM debates.
If we consider how long it takes for the
ramifications of new weapons systems to sink
into our consciousness, we must also allow
for the learning time required for these
ramifications to be absorbed by the Soviet
political leadership and its staff. This proc-
ess has something to do with the lags in re-
action time which have characterized action-
reaction cycle between the two govern-
ments.
It takes time for such concepts as the
stability and instability of various new
weapons systems to be diffused back and
forth across the ocean, and to enter into
personal and bureaucratic habits of think-
ing. We therefore have to allow for the incu-
bation period of new ideas, if the negotia-
tiOns are to have some chance of success.
One other factor affecting Soviet attitudes
toward SALT and which sometimes gives rise
to misinterpretation is the distinctive Soviet
approach to negotiations and bargaining. It
has often been the case that the Soviet
Union will take elaborate pains to conceal
its anxieties, for fear that it may confer a
bargaining advantage upon its adversary.
When, after a long delay, the Soviet Union
S 5497
reached -a decision to enter into the SALT
negotiations, its representatives pressed the
United States on ,every occasion for an im-
mediate response. This. led to an interpre-
tation abroad that the Soviet Union needed
an easement of the burden of armaments
more than the United States did) and that
the United States could exact a political
price for entering into the negotiations. The
Soviet representatives'thereupon received in-
structions to "play it cool," which they did
with such elaborate casualness that many
observers concluded the Soviet Union had
lost all interest in the negotiations.
It will be recalled that when Stalin was
first publicly informed by President Truman
of the successful atomic explosion at Ala-
mogordo, he reacted with such elaborate in-
difference as to lead many Western observers
to conclude that he failed to appreciate the
significance of the event.
In retrospect, it became clear that he
was anxious not to give an impression of
Soviet concern lest the United States be en-
couraged to take diplomatic advantage of
_its lead. Many years later, it appeared to
many observers that the Soviet Union had
become reconciled to its status of strategic
inferiority, because so little value was given
to it in public. But it is now clear that the
Soviet leaders felt a deep concern, and par-
ticularly after the rapid American build-up
of the 1961-65 period, did everything possible
to overcome the American lead, with conse-
quences that we are now witnessing. Be-
cause of the time lag, however, the Soviet
build-up was not seen as part of a process
of interaction.
These general principles can be illustrated
specifically in considering some prevailing
assumptions about Soviet attitudes toward
the MIRV issue. It has been widely argued
here that the Soviet Union is indifferent to
MIRV because its representatives did not
show concern when the matter was raised at
Helsinki. But there has been no indication
that the question was clearly put by the
United States, and it should not be surpris-
ing that the Soviet Union was not prepared
to raise the issue, perhaps out of fear that
its show of concern would confer a bargain-
ing advantage upon the United States.
In unofficial discussions in the Soviet
Union last October with Soviet defense sci-
entists and officials, it was clear to the Ameri-
can participants that the complex ramifica-
tions of MIRV were beginning to be studied
with lively interest in the Soviet Union, and
that a learning process was at work. It may
be that the incubation period has now passed,
for there have been many indications that
at least some in the Soviet Union fully ap-
preciate what the consequences of MIRV de-
ployments will be for both sides, and are as
concerned about MIRV as they are about the
deployment of anti-ballistic missiles. It
would be a mistake for us to conclude that
a proposal for a ban on the testing and de-
ploy of MIRV would be automatically re-
jected by the Soviet Union:It might be, if
those in the Soviet Union who want to push
ahead. until they have reached our level of
experience with MIRV testing prevail. But
if the learning process has reached the point
at which the Soviet leadership recognizes
how costly this delay would be for them as
well as for us, it is possible that the mutual
advantages of heading off MIRV deployments
will be seriously considered.
One conclusion affecting our own policy
which follows from these observations of the
Soviet , situation is that a clear signal of
United States' intentions regarding SALT is
needed. A question often asked of Americans
in Moscow is whether the U.S. Administra-
tion is serious about the negotiations. There
have been a number of articles in the Soviet
press in recent days?in Pravda on March
7th, lzvestiia on the 13th and Red Star on the
14th?which are at .least in part intended
to influence the American discussion oithese
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
S 5498 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 9, 1910
matters, but which.,also reflect the extent
to which the uncertainty regarding American
intentiona toward SALT are involved in the
intramural debates in Moscow. More spe-
cifically, the articles pose two questions:
Whether the U.S. is now prepared to accept as
a basis for negotiations a condition of ap-
proximate parity in strategic capabilities? Or
whether -those spokesmen who urge an in-
tensified effort to gain a relative strategie
advantage over the Soviet Union before and
(luring the talks represent the Administra-
tion position?
Meanwhile, of course, the Soviet Union has
continned to, enlarge its strategic arsenal at
an impressive pace. Perhaps It should not
be surprising that as the two nations ap-
proach negotiations, they should each try
to improve their bargaining position by im-
proving their strategic capabilities. But wise
men should recognize that unless this Is
stopped, there will be nothing significant left
to negotiate.
This brings us directly to Senate Rescau-
tion 211. The essential question we must Lusk
ourselves is this: Would our security be bet-
ter served if both countries had MIRV capa-
bilities, Or if neither country did? It is net
likely that we could preserve a unilateral act-
vantage with this weapon for very long. The
answer seems clear that if we both move into
the MIRV era, we shall both be obligedecer-
tainly by the time the second generation of
MIRVIL makes its appearance, to enter upon
a huge restructuring of our strategic forces
to protect ourselves from the vulnerabilities
to which MIRV will subject us. In time, sev-
eral years and many billions of dollars laeer,
we would doubtless reach a new equilibrium,
but neither country will be more secure than
It is now, and the costs, tensions and insta-
bility may be very great.
It would therefore seem Urgently desira-
ble, in our own security interests, to try as
strongly and as sincerely as we can to step
the present movement toward MIRV deploy-
ments. This points toward the wisdom Of a
proposal from the President of the United
States to the Soviet Union at the earliest Fea-
sible moment for a 24-month agreed Imre-
toriurn including the following elements:
1. a ban on flight testing and deployment
of NfIRV's;
2. a hold at presently projected levels of
ABM deployments., including and most im-
portantly supporting radar installations;
3. a hold at present levels of land-based
fixed-site ICBMs--which includes no new
digging of silo emplacements for SS 9s;
4. an agreed limitation on flight tests of all
delivery vehicles to some moderate number,
with the understanding that all tests would
be conducted only in preannounced areas
where they can be observed by national
means of monitoring.
If this proposal were to have any chance of
acceptance, It would be essential that the
United States exercise restrain in the
liii-
mediate future in regard to the early de-
ployment of Minuteman 3 or a MIR17
Poseidon. The recently, announced plan to
deploy the first Minuteman 3 by June, wish
a rather slow rate of deployment for the bal-
ance of the year, would not improve our
capabilities significantly, and would only
serve to forestall any possible negotiations
about MIRV. The plan also suffers from the
logical defect that if we fail to hold the line
on MIRV, Minuteman seems destined for ob-
solescence in the foreseeable future.
A number of objections have been raised to
a moratorium proposal along these lines: It
is too late to stop MIRV. It is too difficult to
agree what should be included in the prohi-
bition. We need MIRV capabilities for our
strategic arsenal. We would be losing a bar-
gaining advantage if we did not proceed with
MIRV and Safeguard Phase U. It would be
difficult to resume our programs at the end
of the moratorium period even if the condi-
tions were not fulfilled. These are serious
objections, and they deserve to be examined
carefully.
Perhaps the most difficult objection is the
feeling that it is too late. It is more difficult
to reverse our course of thinking than it is
to give in to the inertial force of ongoing
events. But unless it is more important to
fulfill our presently programmed weapons
plans than it is so get an agreement to fore-
stial MIRV depleyments, this fatalistic argu-
ment is no more persuasive now than it was
when it was firse advanced in Washington a
year and a half ago.
The difficulty of defining what is to be
included and excluded in the agreement is a
real one; should the prohibition include
MIRV components tested singly, and if so
would we he able to verify compliance with
the prohibition? Should the prohibition ex-
tend to MRVs as well as MIRVs? The best
judgments seem to be that these are real but
dieproportionment objections, Whichever way
these problems of definition are worked out
In the negotiations, it is not reasonable to
fear that our security would be seriously
compromised within the 24-month period of
the moratorium, even under the worst as-
sumptions that can be made.
The argument that we need MIRV has at
various times rested upon three rationales.
The first is that we need more warheads; to
cover our present target obligations. This
would be a persuasive argument only if we
decided to depart from a deterrent posture: it
is clear that retaliatory damage to the adver-
sary does not greatly increase if numbers of
delivered warheads are increased much be-
yond 1,000--or, indeed, above 500. There is no
limit to what we could include In target
requirements if this is allowed to run free. A
second rationale is that we need MIRV as a
penetration aid, particularly if Soviet ABMs
should be increased, said if the Soviet Union
should upgrade its present surface-to-air
missile air defense to ABM-level capabilities.
This argument neglects the disparity in time
required between ABMs and MIRVs. We know
from our own Safeguard plans that at least
seven to eight years are required to install an
ABM system, Whereas a MIRV capability, can
be created in three or four years. The critical
point about the upgrading of SAMs would be
the supporting radars rather than the inter-
ceptors, Which might indeed be done under
concealment. But if phased-array radars
made their appearance, these could not be as
easily concealed, and the disparity in lead
times would still leave us a reasonable mar-
gin of safety. The third rationale has been
the need for /VITRVs as hard target killers,
and here it is most evident that the develop-
ment of MIRITs capable of destroying adver-
sary missiles would be destabilizing and
therefore undesirable, since It would create
understandable apprehensions on the Soviet
side about our intentions, particularly if it
were accompanied be an expansion of our
ABM capabilities.
The argument that we should proceed with
MIRV, and also with Safeguard Phase II, in
ruder to have a bargaining counter in our
hand is short-sighted. To enter upon these
programs in order to have something to bar-
gain with, or in order to apply pressure upon
the Russians, is likely to have an effect op-
posite to what is intended. The logical Soelet
remotion to such actions would be to question
our real intentions, and to redouble their own
militazy efforts. If SALT proceeds over a long
period, as it may do, and if both sides argue
the need for continuing their build-up to im-
prove their bargaining advantage, the effect
of the SALT negotiations will be to leave us
both worse off than if they had never been
begun. Negotiating about strategic weapons
Is not entirely like a poker game?both sides
can lose.
Finally, it is true that it may be politically
difficult to resume our strategic programs at
the end of a 24-month moratorium period,
even if we have not been able to negotiate in
the meantime a larger and more lasting arms
control agreement, but the risk is by no
means equal to the risk we run in letting
present events take their course, and it must
be left to our best judgment at the end of the
moratorium period whether our security
interests do or do not require a resumption of
efforts to build MIRV and additional ABM
systems under the conditnns that then pre-
vail.
Hopefully, it might be possible during the
24-months to work out the complex require-
ments for a freeze on strategic capabilities,
and perhaps even to move toward some re-
ductions, Without the moratorium, however,
time would work against she possibility of
any such agreements.
The moratorium proposal, and the SALT
neogtiations generally, hove an important
place in the framework of a larger conception
of our long-term relations with the Soviet
Union. Given the present Internal political
conditions in the SovieL Union described
earlier, is dote not seem likely that an ease-
ment of political rivalry between the two
countries can be expected in the near future.
But progress in SALT, eg toward a mora-
torium on all.RV testing does not require a ..
detente, since the mutual interest in damp-
ing down the strategic arms race exists
whether tensions in othei fields are high or
low. There is a tendency current now in
the Soviet Union to link progress in SALT
with our policy toward Ch ins; and a tend-
ency in this country to tie SALT to Soviet
restraint in the Middle :east or some other
problem.
This would represent a serious error of
judgment in either direction, for OUT secu-
rity interest in the success of SALT is not
and should not be made dependent upon
other problems, and this is equally true for
the Soviet Union. However, if the SALT nego-
tiations prove to be successful over a period
of time, it is possible that the level of ten-
sion may be reduced sufffilently to open the
way to an improvement in our relations with
the Soviet Union. This ie best viewed as a
series of stages over a fairly long timespan.
SALT is the major business of the present
stage. If it is successful. it may open the
way to en intermediate stage whose main
business would be to introduce some re-
straints into our deepseated political rivalry.
This would in turn open up possibilities for
more substantial cooperation, involving
trade and technology, and hopefully com-
mon action through the United Nations in
peace-keeping arrangements, economic de-
velopment, and environmental problems.
This longer-term perspective would, how-
ever, be extremely remote if we have not
succeeded in the months arimediately before
us in Leveling off the Si rategic arms race,
beginning with AllieV. And this will not
be possible without vigorous action on the
part of those who perceive that at this
moment and on this subject the rational
self-Merest of the United States and the
Soviet Union meet.
Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President., last
I want to comment on the apparent di-
versity about the treatrient of a subject
in an article in the New York Times yes-
terday. The article was about the report
of the General Advisory Committee on
Disarmament appointed by the Presi-
dent. In the first paragraph, the article
states:
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
April 9, 1970 Approved ForaitliegotagPaVitORAW)117_23MATi000300040009-3
A prestigious administration advisory
committee has recommended that the
United States propose to the Soviet Union
an immediate moratorium on further devel-
,opment of strategic weapons when the talks
on control of arms resume in Vienna next
week.
That, I think, 4 an overstatement?
at least according to Mr. Chalmers Rob-
erts who writes in today's Washington
Post that an immediate moratpritun,was
not recommended. But I think even,W1-
der the interpretation by Mr. Chalmers
Roberts, the idea of a moratorium is
implicit in the report of the committee
which has not yet been made available,
at least to me or to my committee. The
idea is to have an ultimate, agreement of
this kind, rather than putting it into
effect now as a condition for fruitful
talks. This is the significance of the re-
port, and I think the Senator from Mas-
sachusetts and the Senator from Ken-
tucky were conscious of it. I only call
It to the attention of the Senator.
I do not think the report of the Gen-
eral Advisory Committee is inconsistent,
as it is described in the Wsashirigton
Post. It simply does not go the same
route of proposing a moratorium as a
preliminary agreement, at the com-
mencement of the talks or the initiation
of the talks, to be in effect during the
talks.
That is the significant difference. The
proposal that the Senator from Ken-
tucky and the Senator fronliMassacim-
setts have made is extremely innovative
and very important. If the Senate adopts
it, as I hope it will, I think it will be a
great incentive to the President Avid
others who are involved in the negotia-
tions to move in this direction and
thereby make it possible to reach an
agreement. If something like this is not
done, I think the chances of reaching a
really important agreement are much
less propitious. We are much lets likely
to get an agreement if, continuously
throughout the negotiations, changes
are made, such as the deployment of
MIRV's or increasing the number of
ABM's.
So I could not let this occasion pass
without pointing out the significance of
agreeing to the resolution.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULI3RIGHT. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Washington.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I am
confident that all Senators share a deep
concern that the SALT talks come to a
successful conclusion and want to en-
courage a promising environment in
which to negotiate an arms control
agreement. As I understand it, Senate
Resolution 211 is intended to express that
sentiment.
While we can hope that the effect of
the resolution will be to impress upon the
Soviets our sincere desire to facilitate
agreement, we should be aware that its
generality is reminiscent of earlier rheto-
ric on arms control and could strike them
as disingenuous.
I share with my colleagues the hope
that we and the Soviets might find the
basis for an agreement that will stabilize
the strategic balance.
I believe I am expressing the view of
an overwhelming number of Senators in
Identifying the maintenance of an in-
vulnerable retaliatory capability as the
principal instrument of such stability.
It is my understanding that the senti-
ment expressed in the resolution is in-
tended by its sponsors as a declaration
of serious purpose?a declaration to sup-
port the President in his search for an
agreement. No one has argued that the
resolution should be seen as an instruc-
tion to the U.S. delegation to the talks.
This is right and proper. The resolution
is generalized; instructions are specific.
The resolution is painted with a broad
brush while negotiations themselves and
the instructions on which they are based
are, like an Indian miniature or a Flem-
ish painting, painstakingly crafted line
by line with a single-bristle brush.
Mr. President, the general language in
which the resolution is phrased admits
of widely varying interpretations, and the
extraordinarily thin record of testimony
on the resolution as presently before us
does little to clarify some important con-
siderations.
As I understand the intent of the reso-
lution, particularly as it emerged in dis-
cussion on the floor last Friday?April
3, 1970?it is unequivocal on a central
point: the proposal for an interim freeze
is mutual; it will be proposed by the
United States if, and only if, the Soviet
Union will agree; and if, and only if,
appropriate verification is available to
assure compliance.
Moreover, the sponsors, by respecting
the principle of stable deterrence and by
failing to specify details, have properly
left to the President the determination
of a detailed negotiating position con-
sistent with the strategic posture of mu-
tual deterrence.
For example, I understand that the
sponsors of the resolution do not mean
to imply an open ended suspension?
that, on the contrary, it is their intent
to facilitate an arms control agreement
and that the nature of an interim pro-
posal and its duration should be consid-
ered instruments toward this end. This
suggests that any resulting mutual sus-
pension would be directly related to the
nature, pace, and extent of progress to-
ward the conclusion of a negotiated
agreement.
I believe that support for the sentiment
expressed in the resolution can be made
without prejudice to the difficult task of
negotiating with the Soviets the shape
and content of a formal arms control
agreement. We must be careful to dis-
tinguish here between an instrument
that some hope will facilitate an agree-
ment and the formal, safeguarded agree-
ment itself.
Mr. President, I would point out that
among the many problems?deriving
from the generality of the resolution?
is the failure to distinguish between
stabilizing and destabilizing strategic de-
ployments. A resolution such as this, had
it been brought to the floor after careful
and deliberate hearings reflecting testi-
S 5499
mony from divergent points of view,
would certainly have included considera-
tion of this fundamental issue.
It is because the only construction that
I an able to put on the resolution is
the expression of support for the policy
of the United States to negotiate with
the Soviets on all offensive and defen-
sive strategic weapons systems, that I
am able to add my vote for affirmation.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me for one brief ques-
tion?
Mr. JACKSON. I yield.
Mr. STENNIS. I have listened care-
fully to the Senator's speech. I think it
is clear, but on the question of funds
that we may have in an authorization
bill to develop MIRV further, for in-
stance, leading to its deployment, the
Senator would not think, would he, that
in adopting this resolution the Senate
would in any way go on record as oppos-
ing or being committed against the au-
thorization of such funds?
Mr. JACKSON. No. We are not pass-
ing on any strategic items, as I interpret
the resolution.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, earlier in
the debate the distinguished Senator
from Washingon (Mr. JAcKsoN) pres-
ented us with some very cogent remarks
with regard to the nature and scope of
the pending resolution. He highlighted
the fact that the intent of Senate Reso-
lution 211 is absoluely unequivocal on
one central point. As Senator JACKSON
observed:
The proposal for an interim freeze is
mutual; it will be proposed by the United
States if and only if the Soviet Union will
agree; and if and only if appropriate veri-
fication is available to assure compliance.
I want to associate myself with this
observation and to make it very clear
that it is only upon this basis that I in-
tend to vote for Senate Resolution 211.
Mr. President, I recognize the fact that
the legislative situation has been rather
disruptive during the last few weeks be-
cause of other important matters before
the Senate which have been the subject
of unanimous consent agreements. But I
am compelled to observe that the sub-
stance of this resolution, in my judgment,
is more in the area of the national de-
fense of this country that it is in the area
of foreign relations. I am sorry that the
resolution was not considered by the
Armed Services Committee for their con-
sidered judgment on the merits and scope
of the language contained in the opera-
tive features of the resolution itself. I
must observe that some of the state-
ments that I have heard here on the floor
during the debate are in my opinion and
to my best knowledge of the situation
not in accordance with the facts as they
relate to the relative defense posture of
the United States and the Soviet Union.
Once again, I must indicate my full
accord with Senator JACKSON'S earlier
statement that "the general language
in which the resolution is phrased ad-
mits of widely varying interpretations,
and the extraordinarily thin record of
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For ItefteRMERR:frit-NB7_22%1RAITIO0300040009-3Agyra. 9:1970
S 5500
testimony on the resolution as presently
before us does little to clarify some im-
portant considerations." I am certain
that if the Armed Se rvices Committee
had the opportunity to conduct hear-
ings on Senate Resolution 211 that the
record on which Senators might have
based their judgment with regard to the
wisdom of the resolution might indeed
have been more complete and more
satisfactory.
Because Of the fact that the resolution
only pertains to mutual action between
the United States and the U.S.S.R. with
regard to offensive and defensive strate-
gic weapon system deployment. I do not
believe that it will jeopardize the position
of American negotiators at the SALT
talks. Each of us here recognizes the in-
credible responsibility these people bear
in these negotiations, and the fact that
the very future of mankind may rest
with them in achieving meaningful she-
cess in the SALT neeotiations with the
Soviet. Likewise, none of us would do
anything to make their task more cliff' ?
cult. I believe that 'isolable action on
the pending resoluticn may provide a
clear indication that a mutual, rather
than unilateral, freeze of offensive and
defensive strategic weapon system de ?
ployment is the path leading all of us to
a more stable and a more hopeful future.
Mr. carroN. Mr. President, the Sen-
ate Resolution No. 211 is, of course, of-
fered with the best of motives and for
an objective in which we all concur and
the attainment of which we ardently
hope and pray for.
But I believe the Senate should have
in mind certain questions about this Pro-
cedure and what a precedent of this kind
could cause or help to cause in the future
conduct of our foreign relations.
Because of an episode that occurred
on the floor of the Senate back in 1925,
when I was sitting on one of those di-
vans as an aide to a Senator, and because
of speeches that lingered long in my
memory by Senettor William Fe Borah,
the chairman of the Committee on For-
eign Relations, and Senator James A.
Reed of Missouri, one of the great legal
minds and one of the great parliamen-
tarians of our time in 3ervice in this body,
this resolution gave me some concern.
In order to verify my own recollection,
I spent Some time consulting the seccnd
volume of Haynes on "The Senate of the
United States" with respect to the situa-
tion of the Senate advising the Presi-
dent in advance on treaties or the nego-
tiating of treaties. There are two or three
precedents I would like to mention at this
time.
In the first place, of course, Haynes
states flatly in interpreting article II of
the Constitution, section 2, paragraph 2,
as follows:
There is no question that the Senate has
a right so far to initiate a treaty or propose
ono for consideration of the President.
But he goes on to say:
It is within the President's discretion to
determine how much cciasidera,tion they shall
receive. On rare cases the Senate has offered
to advise (I) that the negotiation be entered
upon, or (2) that they not be Undertaken.
Then, there are a couple of incidents
I think should go into the RECORD at this
time. On March 3, 1888, the Senate passed
a resolution that the President "be re-
quested to negotiate a treaty with the
Emperor of ,China containing a provision
that no Chinese laborer shall enter the
United States."
This was a more urgent and specific re-
quest than the one which had been ad-
dressed to President Jackson. Five days
later, President Cleveland replied that?
The importance of the subject referred to
in this resolution by no means has been ovet--
looked by the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment, charged. under the Constitution
with the formulation of treaties with for-
eign countries.
He added that? ,
Negotiation with the Emperor of China
a treaty such as is mentioned in said
resolution was commenced many months
neo, and has been since continued.
He intimated. that information as to
the progress of such negotiations would
have been available to any Senator who
sought it, and expressed the hope that
such a treaty would soon be concluded
as would "meet. the wants of our people
and the approbation of the body to which
it will be submitted for confirmation."
While neither Jackson nor Cleveland
questioned that the Senate's action was
within ite rights, the tone of the latter's
Message seems to indicate that he con-
sidered the Senate's resolution an im-
pertinence.
More important than this, in 1816, the
question was again thrust upon the Sen-
ate's attention by the action of Rufus
King who had himself been an influen-
tial member of the Federal Convention
and who later served in various diplo-
matic capacities.
Dissatisfied with the treaty of C3M-
merce and navigation, to which the Sen-
ate had just given its consent, he in-
troduced a resolution that the Senate
"recommend to and advise the Presi-
dent of the United States to pursue fur-
ther and friendly negotiations with His
Britannic Majesty" for six purposes
which he enumerated. This resolution
was referred to the Committee on For-
eign Relations, from which a significant
report was made, February 15, 1816, by
its chairman, Senator Bibb, to the effect
that the proposed advice was uncalled
for, since in the opinion of the commit-
tee the Executive had already made
every effort to accomplish the objects
mentioned in the resolution. It con-
tinued:
The President; is the constitutional rep-
iesentative of the United States with regard
to foreign nations. Ile manages our concerns
with foreign nations and must necessarily
be most competent Sc' determine when, how,
and upon what subjects negotiations may be
urged with greatest prospect of success. For
his conduct he is responsible to the Con-
stitution. The committee consider this re-
sponsibility the surest pledge for the faith-
ful discharge of his duty. They think the
Interference of the Senate in the direction
of foreign negotiations calculated to dimin-
ish that responsibility and thereby to im-
pair the best security for the national safety
The nature of transactions with foreign na-
tions, moreover, requires caution and unity
of design, and their success frequently de-
pends on secrecy and dispatch. A division of
opinion between the members of the Sen-
ate in debate on propositions to advise the
Executive, or between the Senate and Exec-
utive, could not fail to give. the nation with
whom we might be disposed to treat the
most deckled advantages. . , The commit?
tee are therefore of the opinion that the
resolution ought not to be adopted.
This report seems to have made a
strong impression on the Senate. Action
upon King's resolution was postponed
once and again, and finely, on his own
motion, was put over to a date sure to
fall after Congress had .tdjourned.
Thirty years later, in 1846, when the
Oregon controversy wa.i, at its height,
President Polk headed off a project for
the Senate's intervention. When Cal-
houn and another Sent tor laid before
him a proposal to bring forward a reso-
lution in executive sessiee of the Senate,
advising the President to reopen negoti-
ations on the Oregon question and settle
it by compromise, he told them that he
thought it inadvisable. He asked them
if they were sure such a resolution could
command a two-thirds majority, and
pointed out the fatal consequences if it
should receive a smallee vote, since the
result would be known in the streets and
to the British Minister in 24 hours. He
also warned them that some Senators
might vote against the resolution on the
ground that it was inexpedient, since the
negotiation was in the hands of the Ex-
ecutive.
Mr. President, I am sorry to tax the
patience of the Senate but those prece-
dents indicate that while the Senate has
every right under the Constitution to
advise the President regarding treaties
and negotiations leading to treaties,
there is an element of danger in exer-
cising that right publicl and with open
debate on the floor of the Senate.
The incident I refer to that lingered
In my memory for so many years and
came to my mind so quickly when my
attention was first directed to this pend-
ing resolution; was at the time Calvin
Coolidge was President .tnel negotiations
were underway for the Kellogg pact, on
arms limitation, A resolution was offered
in the Senate advising the President as
to certain aspects of nepotiations on this
disarmament agreement, and in a sense
warning against certain dangers to the
national defense and national security
of this country.
/Immediately, Senator :Borah of Idaho,,
chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, took the floor. He was followed
by Senatcr Reed. They did not question
the right of such a resolution to be in-
troduced, but they insisted that if it
were to be considered, it must be con-
sidered behind closed doors, in executive
session of the Senate, with no one al-
lowed in the galleries and no one allowed
on the floor of the Senate other than
Senators and officers of he Senate. 'Their
suggestion or position prevailed. I did
not hear the rest, because I was one of
the attaches who left the floor. But the
consideration was belted closed doors in
executive session, and n as never given to
the newspapers.
It was more possible in those days to
have an executive session without it being
leaked to the press.
Mind you, Mr. Presdent, I am not
saying that there is anything inherently
dangerous in the present resolution as
revised by the committee, but I do want
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : bIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
April 9, .1970 fehR9,34%0?MERDRANNIVR000300040009-3 S 5501
merits assuming that it is fine, any time, into executive session there must have scholarly discussion of this problem.
to exercise this right and do it in open been something grave and sinister in- I can see that there are certain session. To To start advising the President volved in the resolution. lutions which could be adopted by the
of the United States, whoevor he may be, Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senate, which could be very objection-
about what the Senate's idea is on what Senator yield on that point?
? ' able to an Executive, and could cause
M COTTON Please, let me finish difficulties in his negotiations with other
'f
Approved Fetsftifitst
to call attention to the general state- have been thought that since we went a very interesting and, I might say,
he should seek in negotiating wi
foreign power is an approach that should
be used most sparingly.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. COTTON. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Since I made such
a statement, which I think was proper,
perhaps I should say first that I would
have had no objection to an executive
session of the Senate. I would have wel-
comed it, because there is always bet-
ter attention and more attendance when
We have an executive session than when
we have an open session. I did not think
of that. Second, I think there is much
difference between the circumstances
in 1926, under Mr. Coolidge, and those
at present.
One reason the Senate and the For-
eign Relations Committtee feel it is their
duty to make suggestions is the deplor-
able condition in which the country
finds itself. We have been at war or in
a crisis situation for 25 years. We have
spent so much money that we are almost
bankrupt. Yesterday afternoon we de-
bated a bill, as a result of inflation tak- might be called disagreements that I
Ing its toll, which we had to pass under would not care to have the neighbors
very stringent conditions and with very hear.
little consideration, I refer to the pay When the Senate is arriving at its col-
bill. lective wisdom, I am not sure that the
I think under the conditions in which things we say, as they are reflected in
the country is now operating many Sen- the foreign press, behind the Iron Cur-
ators feel that they owe a duty to give tam n and in the other powers of the world,
their advice, because, goodness knows, although they demonstrate our democ-
during the last few years, under Execu- racy, are always helpful in accomplish-
tive leadership, particularly since 1965, ing the purpose that we all desire.
we have been in a very difficult situation. Mr FULBRIGHT. Why did not the
I must say I do not think the Senate
is impertinent in offering it. If there
were no problems in the country, and
we were Just out making trouble, I
think the Senator would have a good
point. I have a good deal of respect for
the good sense of the Senate.
I agree that an executive session is ad-
visable. I would have welcomed it on
this on any other resolution of this char-
acter, because I think we get more at-
tention and because the Senate will act
more sensibly in an executive session
than in an open session. In nearly every
executive session I have attended, there
has been much more attention paid and
the attendance has been much better
than any open session. So I agree With
that statement of the Senator.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, may I
say to the distinguished chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, first, that
I was not referring to any particular
statement by him. I would not presume
to try to admonish the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, and my
enior in the Senate for whom I have
the greatest respect. That is not my pur-
pose. clearly and distinctly stated that constituted any reflection on the great none
uieie
in thd case of this particular resolution Committee on Foreign Relations, and to follow it, I thought we could respect-
in its present form it is innocuous enough certainly not on my friend from Ken- fully suggest that an explanation would
so I would not suggest that it was nee- tucky, to whom I now gladly yield, be in order.
essary to debate it in great Secredy. In Mr. COOPER. May I say, first, that I I make this explanation to the Senator
fact, if we had done so, some damage am glad I stayed in the Chamber and from New Hampshire thinking that it
could have occurred because it might heard the Senator, because he has made bears, in part at least, on the troubled
this thought. The Senator from New countries. But, on the other
Hampshire did not refer to this or any there is some course of action which the
other resolution as being impertinent. Senate believes in very seriously, and _
That was Haynes quoting President with concern, which leads them to pass
Cleveland and President Jackson, who such a resolution, I would think that
were known to be men of rather blunt concern of the Senate would overweigh
methods in stating their views. That the problem about which the Senator
was their suggestion, and certainly not from New Hampshire has spoken.
the suggestion of the Senator from New I do object, with all deference, to my
Hampshire. friend's designation of the resolution as
So I can assure the distinguished being "innocuous." I may say we in-
chairman that, as far as the resolution tended it to be very broad and very
in its present folm, I was not concerned; strong?so strong that it would cover
but there were several statements?not and, if agreed to by the Soviet Union,
just from the Senator from Arkansas? result in suspending the deployment of,
that just seemed to assume that, at will, all offensive and defensive nuclear sys-
we could advise the President on these tems.
matters in public session. I do not think that would be very in-
As for the collective wisdom of the nocuous. I think if agreed to, it would be
Senate, I entirely concur with the dis- a? very far reaching, forward step, one
tinguished Senator from Arkansas. I, too, that would help the security of our coun-
have great confidence in the collective try and perhaps limit the danger of a
wisdom of the Senate. I have great con- nuclear war. So I think it is a very im-
fidence in the wisdom of my wife, but portant resolution.
from time to time we have had some Mr. COTTON. I apologize to my friend
little conversations or discussions that from Kentucky. I withdraw the word
"innocuous." In fact, if I understand cor-
rectly, he greatly improved this resolu-
tion. I could not possibly have voted for
it in its original form, but I am certainly
willing to vote for it in its present
form.
When I u-,ed the word "innocuous," let
us say I meant that under no circum-
stances could it be harmful, rather than
to say that it was unimportant. I shall
come to that in a moment, after discus-
sing very briefly the resolution itself.
?
then? I would have been pleased to have Mr. COOPER. To be very fair about i ,
Senator suggest an executive session,
it. I think it is broader in its coverage, and
Mr. COTTON. I have said that on this stronger, and better for the security of
occasion there was no reason for it. our country, because it covers the Soviet
What I am trying to do is to get into the systems as well as the systems of the
RECORD that I hope this action will not United States, if agreement can be
be taken as a precedent, so that any reached.
Senator who feels we ought to advise the Mr.-COTTON. Mr. President, I yield to
President about the conduct of some the Senator from Michigan.
negotiations or some treaty will not feel Mr. HART. Mr. President, it had been
that it is all right to plunge in and my intention to suggest?and I hope the
introduce a resolution, proceeding to President will regard this as support for
debate it in public, his undertaking the first step needed to
That is all I sin seeking, stop the arms race?or to point out, that
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think the it would cost nothing for us to find out
Senator from Kentucky, who, of course, if the Soviet Union would respond af -
was one of the fathers of this resolution, firmatively to our suggestion that we
did an innocuous thing. To say it is in- would stop if the other fellows would
nocuous and irrelevant, I think, is quite stop; and that if, on the other hand,
inappropriate. This resolution is neither we go ahead with deployments on both
irrelevant nor innocuous, sides, the dollar cost is frightening and
Mr. COTTON. The Senator knows very the hazards to survival even more
well I have not said it was irrelevant. frightening.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator said it Then I was going to suggest that if,
was innocuous, I think, notwithstanding what I expect will be
Mr. COTTON. What I have said was the overwhelming vote of the Senate rec-
not intended and could not possibly have ommending this course, the President
I cl ,cl he was not going
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
S 5502 Approved For Rel
ogeNtatagnAiic,1Wedi.b??33MACTi?0040009-3
Apra 9; 1970
area to which he had addressed himself,
and he might want to find, either in
Haynes or in his own memory, some
reasons that might indicate that it would
be inappropriate to suggest that the Pres-
ident might explain to us why, if he
thinks the overwhelming number of us
supporting this resolution are wrong,
why we are wrong.
Does this give the Senator any hang-
up, in the light of the sensitivity that he
is reminding us attaches, always, when
the Senate seeks to participate, in execu-
tive seSsion or open session, in the formu-
lation of treaties?
Mr. COTTON. What does the Senator
mean by "httngup"?
Mr. HART. Is the Senator bothered?
Is he nervous? Does he need his tensions
eased? Does it cause him to feel upset?
I am calm and placid as a millpond.
Mr. COI-TON. Mr. President, let me ex-
plain to my friend from Michigan that
when I used the word "innocuous" which
was somewhat offensive to my friend
from Kentucky, I meant that to me, this
resolution was only asking the President
to do exactly what he is intending to do,
and is devoted to. That is my
understanding.
The reason I began to give the sub-
Ject some attention was this: I started
to receive letters from constituents who
were exceedingly alarmed and dis-
turbed?as we all are about the arms
race?asking me to add my name as a
sponsor to various resolutions.
I read the Brooke-Cooper resolution as
it came from committee, and the title
still seemed to indicate?the title has
now been corrected by aznendment--that
it might be a resolution in favor of uni-
lateral
cessation as far as 1VIIRV a
various other weapons are concerned.
The resolution itself, as drafted in t
committee?I understand at the sugge
tion of the Senator from Kentucky?sa
no such thing. It simply asked the Pre
ident to seek immediately an agreeme
with the Soviet Union that there be
mutual cessation of the testing and th
deployment of these weapons.
I do not object to that. I am sure it
the hope and prayer of every one of u;
and it is my information that this
exactly what the President wants to ac
coinplish. Those close to him have Ind"
cated that it is his ardent hope and h
welcomes this resolution.
However, I did decline the suggestio
that I become a sponsor. I said in in
reply that I would undoubtedly vote fo
this resolution but that I did not car
to be a sponsor because the resolution i
its present form seemed to me?whil?
do not say this is the purpose of it
to enable every Senator who sponsore
it and every Senator who voted for it to
assure his constituents that he struck
great blow for peace and has done some
thing to promote disarmament, and tha
it actually Is nothing but a pious wish
expressed to the President that he suc-
ceed in doing something whic.h he is very
anxious to do. To me, that is the sit-
uation.
I simply intended to vote for the res-
olution and say nothing. But whatever
happens here today with this resolution,
I want the RECORD to show that it is the
hope of this Senator that it will not be
taken as an established precedent for
resolutions advising the President in ad-
vance on negotiations and treaties and
foreign affairs in the open Senate.
Mr. HART. As I understand the Sen-
ator from New Hampshire, he senses,
he believes, that the two points made
in the resolution represent the Presi-
dent's intention?or "desire" perhaps is
the better word.
Let us assume, however, that we go
to Vienna and we do not make the first
offer; we do not say, in effect, "Look,
let's stop now. What to you fellows say?"
Let tis assume this does not occur. If t
does not occur, then, as I interpret
the Pr?dent does not agree with t
resolution.
Under those circumstances, does
Senator think it disrespectful or out
order or damaging to the interests
this country for the Senate as we a
prove the resolution to suggest that
explanation would be in order?
Mr. COTTC)N. After the negotiation
Mr. HART. Yes. If the majority of
are wrong, let us be told by the Pres
dent why we are wrong.
Mr. COTTON. There has been no su
gestion on the part of the Senator fro
New Hampshire that anybody is wro
in supporting this resolution. There h
been a suggestion that the resoluti
is asking the President to do what
is most anxious to do, anyway.
The President of the United Stat
in lila obvious anxiety--and I underli
"obvious"?to have the negotiations
Vienna be successful, and to stop t
arms race between the Soviet Union an
the United States, has been willing to
nd a long way to achieve a limitation
nuclear arms.
he With respect to the ABM, I stood
s- the President; I voted for the initi
Id ABM's last year. We were told that
s- was necessary to assemble a couple
nt them and this was the only way to to
a their effectiveness. I supported the
e But the President very plainly stat
last year that one reason why he w
is pushing the ABM's was that he wante
to put the emphasis on purely defensiv
Is weapons. He did not want to antagoniz
- or alarm the Soviets by speeding up of
- fensive systems.
This Senator happens to think the
we should not allow the Soviets to g
n ahead of us in nuclear submarines. Thi
3' Senator does not happen to agree wit
r the rosy picture presented by the dis
e tinguished Senator from Massachu
n setts?,j am sorry he is not in the Chain
e ber at this moment--about how we a
ahead of the Soviets in all these field
d and that we might be wise to let them.
catch up so that there would be an even
a balance and then there would be a bet-
- ter chance at arriving at an agreement--
t a properly policed agreement, I think he
said?in the matter of limitation of nu-
clear weapons.
This Senator does not serve on the
Committee on Armed Services; he is not
on the subcommittee that deals initially
with our national defense on the appro-
priations. He does serve on the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy. He has
heard classified information from the
hat
it,
his
CIA and from others as to the situation
In comparing the Soviet power and our
own, and this Senator does not agree
that we are in a position of complete
safety at this moment.
But the fact that the President is so
anxious that he is willing to postpone,
for example, adding more submarines
to our fleet, that he is shying away from
offensive weapons and again trying to
place most of his reliance on one more
ABM, indicates to this Senator that he
is so anxious that he leans over back-
ward in the matter of placing his eggs
in the basket of the conference at Vi-
enna. This Senator respects his inten-
tions, although he does not go all the
way with him. -
I do not see how any Senator could
the say that this resolution is really neces-
of sary to spur the President on when the
of President is, in the opinion of some of
p- us?neglecting national defense while
an seeking an arms agreement.
Mr. HART. Mr. President (Mr. SPONG),
s? I would hope the President would recog-
us nize that the Senate's voting and sup-
i- porting this resolution is a first step to-
wards stopping the arms :ace.
g- We do not know if Moscow will respond
m to that first step, but it will cost nothing
ng to find out, If Moscow says "Yes," it
as could bring benefits beyond dollar corn-
on putation.
he On the other hand, the costs of go-
ing ahead with deployment of MIRV's
es and ABM's on a stepped-up arms race,
ne diminished chances for successful dis-
in armament talks, and billions of dollars
he wasted on weapons which, if they hap-
d Pen to work, will soon be outdated and
ineffecti
of Neither our Nation nor the world can
afford that cost?nor the frightful hazard
by to the survival of life that such a race
al represents.
it We do not know if Moscow will re-
of spond to that first step, but it will cost
at nothing to find out. If Moscow says,
in. "Yes," it could bring benefits beyond dol-
-d lar computation.
as On the other hand, the costs of going
d ahead with deployment of MIRV's and
e ABM's are a stepped-up arms race, di-
e minished chances for successful disarrna-
- ment talks, and billions of dollars wasted
on weapons which, if they happen to
t work, will soon be outdated and ineffec-
o tive.
a Now I come to the point that I indi-
h cated to the Senator from New Hamp-
shire I had contemplated reaching. If,
- nonetheless, the President concludes that
- he shall not follow the course, I believe,
e the Senate is about to recommend, I
s would hope that an explanation would
be made, not that I am suggesting our
judgment today necessarily would stand
the test of the President's informed ex-
planation of why our position is wrong,
but I think that all the people of this
country, certainly those of us in the Sen-
ate, should have the benefit of an expla-
nation, if, in fact, the President concludes
that this initiative should not be .taken
in Vienna.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I agree
with the Senator from Michigan. I am
sure that the President does. I am not
quite sure in my mind whether it
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
ItesA5R42ittglAliPE7VIIVA
Aprit 9,1970 Approved FOF.Alift
strengthens or weakens the President's
position, when the Senate says to him,
"Please, Mr. President, please, please,
beg the Soviet Union to join us in an
immediate limitation of armaments.
I do not think he needs that. However,
that is a matter of opinion.
Mr. COOPER obtained the floor.
Mr. JKVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield to the Senator
from New York.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I would
like to suggest to the Senate that the
Brooke resolution should be adopted, and
adopted by an overwhelming vote of the
Senate. In my judgment, it will elevate
the sights of the whole world, includ-
ing the SALT negotiators who might not
now think so. It goes to the real issue
which is before us, which is to stop be-
fore we are over the edge of the abyss.
That is the whole purpose of the res-
olution as drafted by the Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) originally,
with the most gifted addition made to it
by the Senator from Kentucky (Mr.
COOPER), which represents his thinking
and, in my judgment, the thinking of the
whole committee.
I do not know of any single thing that
has more potential to bring about a suc-
cess in the SALT talks than the adop-
tion by the Senate of the resolution by
a resounding vote.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, on next
Thursday, April 16, the SALT talks will
begin at Vienna. The preparations made
by the U.S. Government for these nego-
tiations have been long and extensive.
They have been underway for well over
3 years. Events such as the transfer of
office from one administration to another
in our country, the tensions that arose
from the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and
other issues of disagreement, have held
back the opening of these negotiations.
But for the first time in the 25 year's of
the nuclear age, the United States and
the U.S.S.R. have agreed to meet and
consider ways of halting the costly and
dangerous mad momentum Of the
clear arms arms race.
The confidence of both the United
States and the U.S.S.R. have in their
respective strategic nuclear strength
must be reflected in the willingness of
both nations to consider seriously a halt
to the arms race. The national confi-
dence and strength of both leaderships
is bound up in these talks. The way we
approach these negotiations will tell a
great deal about the possibilities of ;their
successful outcome.
The military strength of both the So-
viet Union and the United States to de-
stroy each other and civilization as we
now know it is undoubted toth the
United States and the Soviet Union have
the certain means of destroying each
other many times over.
There are those who claim we have
fallen behind the Soviet Union in nu-
clear destructive ability. It is true ,that
in some categories the Soviets are ahead
in numbers. But in no category d9 we
have less than the assured, ability to de-
stroy the Soviet Union many times over
and kill hundreds Of millions of their
people.
The United States possesses 1,054
ICBM's, many of which are armed with
MRV warheads. It has about 550 long-
range bombers which can reach any part
of the Soviet Union. We have 41 nuclear
submarines armed with 656 Polaris
launchers, many of which are armed
with MRV nuclear warheads. We have
thousands of tactical nuclear weapons
in Europe and elsewhere that can be de-
livered upon the enemy by a variety of
means and kill scores of millions of the
Russian people.
The Soviet Union possesses a nuclear
arsenal of greater total megatonnage but
less overall delivery capability. But the
delivery capability they possess is
enough?more than enough to kill scores
of millions of people in the United States
many times over. They have about 1,200
ICBM's, 150 long-range bombers, and
about 10 nuclear missile submarines.
They have IRBM's and MRBM's and
many tactical nuclear weapons that can
be used upon the countries that border
the Soviet Union.
Our Government's ability to verify with
reasonable certainty what the Soviet
nuclear system can do to destroy the
United States is of a nature and quality
we can have confidence in. The Secre-
tary of Defense regularly reports on those
capabilities of the Soviet Union. The de-
structive arsenal of the United States is
known to the world.
While our ability to destroy is assured,
out ability to prevent catastrophic war
is in grave doubt. This is the great weak-
ness in the security of both nations. For
as our development and deployment of
strategic weapons increases our security
diminishes. This is what the talks at
Vienna ought to achieve?a lessening of
that danger. Both the United States and
the Soviet Union can race one another,
matching technological advance with
technological advance. Science has given
us the ability to kill more people with
greater reliability, accuracy and in-
genuity than ever before. The prospects
for continuing this grim ingenuity for
overkill are contained in the next round
of the arms race?a round which will
begin unless SALT succeeds. Unless we
agree at SALT, ABM, MIRV's, FOB's,
ULM's will be deployed in the sea, on
land and in the air with increased lethal
capability.
If we are confident of our ability to
destroy, we should be firm in our deter-
mination to achieve, if at all possible,
success at the talks. The United States
should at the outset of talks at Vienna
next week propose a mutual halt to the
further deployment of strategic nuclear
weapons so that a comprehensive arms
limitation agreement can be worked out
in certainty and with care. The United
States should not with fearful caution
enmesh itself in complexities and doubts
by being tentative in its proposals. The
issue is clear; our strength is certain;
the action called for, is, I believe, appar-
ent to all.
I urge the President to examine with
grave weight the sense of the Senate con-
tained in Senate Resolution 211, and
propose the mutual suspension of all fur-
ther deployment of nuclear weapons. To
make such a proposal 'at the outset of
1j000300040000-3 S 5503
talks will test Soviet intentions and, just
as important, make clear to the Soviet
Union our own purposes. It is the course
of reason, it is the course of security.
I wish to address two or three points,
particularly in view of the questions
asked by the Senator from Mississippi.
I would like to make it clear, as has been
made clear by all the speakers, that the
resolution calls for mutual action by the
United States and the Soviet Union. It
is not a resolution which provides for
unilateral action by the United States.
We who support this resolution have
felt that this is the best time to make
such a proposal, of mutual action by the
United States and the Soviet Union. We
urge this mutual pact for the same reas-
ons that the SALT talks are possible.
At the present time, the Soviet Union
and the United States have confidence in
their strength and have the knowledge
that further development of nuclear sys-
tems make it only more difficult for
agreement. So they have decided to talk.
The President of the United States, in
commenting in a press conference-on
this resolution, termed it "irrelevant,"
but I would like to say that I have talked
with the President of the United States.
He does not consider that it is irrelevant.
He said the purpose of the United States
at the SALT talks was the same purpose
contained in the resolution. There is an
important distinction to be made, how-
ever, between making the proposal at the
beginning of the negotiations, and going
through a difficult process of verification
over a long period of time in which many
changes in the situation are possible.
We feel that this is a time when our
present means of verification can be most
confidently relied upon. This is a time
when the United States and the Soviet
Union both have reliable means of verifi-
cation, but if the deployment of strategic
nuclear systems continues while the talks
are going on, we may reach a point
Where reliable verification will not be
possible and, therefore, agreement will
be difficult if not impossible.
Mr. President, I simply stress the fact?
and the true fact?which has been de-
veloped so many times in this Chamber,
that both the United States and the So-
viet Union have the power to destroy
each other, even if one is the subject of
a first strike. We have certain knowledge
of our ability to kill, to destroy each
other, and to destxoy civilization as we
know it. But our ability to prevent a
catastrophic nuclear war is in grave
doubt. Unless agreement can be reached
in these talks we will continue on, with
all our grim ingenuity for overkill, to
the next round of the arms race, a round
which will begin unless the SALT talks
succeed.
Unless we agree at SALT to halt the
arms race, ABM, MRV, FOB's, and others
will be deployed on sea, on land, and in
the air, with increasing lethal capability.
Mr. President, I have urged, as all of
us who favor the passage of this resolu-
tion have urged, that the President take
note of and heed the sense of the Senate,
and propose the mutual suspension of all
further deployment of offensive and de-
fensive nuclear strategic weapons.
To make such a proposal at the outset
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
S 5504 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
utthssiONAL RECORD -- SENATE April 91 1970
,
of the talks will test Soviet intentions
and, what is just as important, make
clear to the Soviet Union our own pur-
poses. I think it is the course of reason
and the course of security for this Na-
tion. I hope that the reasons I have stated
may have some bearing upon the judg-
ment of the distinguished Senator from
Mississippi and others, and that they
will support the resolution, because it is
one which imposes action mutually upon
both countries, and which, if successful,
would provide security for our country
and, I believe, hope for the world.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, al ter these
hours of debate, virtually all has been
said that need be said. I hope that this
body, very soon, will agree to the Brooke-
Cooper resolution, and that it will serve
as a guide for all Americans, and most
particularly for the President, who oc-
cupies the most troubled post of all in at-
tempting to evaluate what prudence and
history will expect of us at Vienna.
Senate Resolution 211 expresses the
sense of the Senate that prompt negotia-
tions be urgently pursued between the
United States and the Soviet Union to
seek agreed, negotiated limitations on
strategic offensive and defensive arms.
The President has stated frequently that
he has no quarrel with that portion of
the resolution. But he has been silent on
the second resolving paragraph, which
makes all the difference. It calls on the
President to propose to the Soviet Gov-
ernment an immediate suspension by
both parties of the further deployment
of all offensive and defensive weapons
systems, not as the result of long and
deliberate negotiations, but as an in-
terim measure, in order to insure that
an atmosphere conducive to successful
negotiations be created.
If such a freeze is not put into effect
immediately, it is 'hard to see how the
talks can get anywhere. In the absence of
a suspension of further weapons deploy-
ment on both sides, neither will have
much interest in negotiating itself into
a position where it might find itself dis-
advantaged by some new development on
the other side.
Mr. President, this is the phenomenon
that Dr. Herbert York last year graphi-
cally described as "the fallacy of the last
move." Absent a moratorium, such as
we call for in this resolution, each side
will continually feel compelled to take
"one last step" to place itself in a "su-
perior" position by some new weapon de-
ployment. It is, therefore, imperative
that we now take the initiative and say,
"Let us stop now. What do you say?"
Until that step is taken there appears to
be no way of blocking the continued
arms spiral. Today, both sides view
themselves in a position of general par-
ity, and for that reason, an immediate
freeze is possible as are later negotia-
tions.
We hear reports that the Soviet Union
might respond in kind to any construc-
tive U.S. initiative at SALT. Yet, the ad-
ministration declares itself unwilling to
go to Vienna with a constructive pro-
posal, preferring instead to sit back and
await a Soviet offer. Thus, both sides-are
apparently caught in an Alphonse-Gas-
ton Act. That act was amusing when
I was a kid reading the funnies. But it
can incinerate mankind, if in fact it is
played at Vienna.
The two new weapons developments
proposed by this Government are not
needed now. That they are being pressed
on the eve of the resumption of SALT is
very disturbing.
Mr. President, we think we are con-
fronted with urgent issues every week
in the Senate. Yesterday we dealt with
what is thought to have been an urgent
issue. I believe it was. I think it had a
significant bearing on the future of life
here at home. I think the Senate acted
responsibly. What confronts us today is
an opportunity to give guidance to the
President with respect to something that
will affect us, as did the nomination of
yesterday, intimately here at home, but
which likewise involves intimately the
lives of men and women who do not even
know of the existence of the Senate of
the United States; arid there are plenty
of them, whether we are conscious of it
or not. There are men and women who
will never know this resolution was de-
bated here today, but their lives and the
future of their children may hinge very
importantly on the wisdom with which
we approach this vote.
As far as the plan to deploy Minute-
man III with its MIRV's is concerned, it
makes no sense at all: If SALT succeeds,
the Soviet Union will not deploy ABM's,
and we will not need MIRV's to pene-
trate them; if SALT fails, the U.S.S.R.
will soon attain the capability to de-
stroy our Minutemen they will be vul-
nerable and obsolete, and the money will
have been wasted.
The same holds true for the Safeguard
ABM. I need not recount the many argu-
ments we made against it a year ago.
I will only say that the case the ad-
ministration is now making for continu-
ing phase I?the defense of Minuteman
sites in Montana and North Dakota?
is weaker than ever. Equally important,
the case has certainly not been made for
the requested expansion to begin to pro-
vide protection against a future Chinese
threat. Against either a Chineae or So-
viet threat, the proposed system will be
effective only if the threat is tailored to
the capabilities of the defense, surely
an absurd justification for any weapons
system.
And, again, if SALT should succeed,
we would not need the ABM; and if it
should fail, the Safeguard ABM will not
do the job.
So I, therefore, am forced to con-
clude that the continued pressure for
these weapons programs on the eve of
SALT is both unwise and counterpro-
ductive. As Mr. McGebrge Bundy stated
yesterday in testifying before the Sen-
ate Disarmament Subcommittee;
There is no evidence at all that pressing
the deployment of systems we do not yet
need is likely to have a constructive effect
on Soviet behavior in SALT . , . many of those
who urge this tactic are men who do not
want SALT to succeed.
Mr. President, I want SALT to suc-
ceed. The , Brooke-Cooper resolution
points the way.
. Mr. President, I congratulate the Sen-
ator from Massachusetts.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the names of
the Senator from North Dakota (Mr.
Boarucx) and the Senator from Wash-
ington (Mr. MAGNUSON) be added as co-
sponsors of Senate Resolution 211.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SAXBE). Without objection, it is so or-
dered.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have
conferred with the Senator from Mas-
sachusetts, and I want to make clear to
him and to others that I have no com-
plaint at all about the committee juris-
diction on this resolution. Unquestion-
ably, I think, the primary jurisdiction is
with the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions. I think the Committee on Armed
Services also, on this question of deploy-
ment, has a jurisdiction Frankly, if I
had known earlier about what the con-
tents of the resolution were, and when
it would come before the Senate, I would
have made a motion to transfer it, for a
few days' consideration at least, to the
Committee on Armed Services.
At any rate, I have this to say about it
now, Mr. President: A 'very laudable
thought is behind it, as I have said here-
tofore. I feel, however, that right at the
very edge of these negotiations, the re-
sponsibility for which the President has
to carry, we ought not to be passing any
resolution except to say, "Mr. President,
we are behind you. We are behind your
motives, and we are behind you."
I shall not stop to argue that further.
The language of the resolution is very
broad, from my viewpoint, and I regret
that I cannot support the resolution
under present conditions.
One thing I have in mind is that we are
going to have before us within a few
weeks bills providing money, or, author-
izations, at least, for deployment of vari-
ous kinds of missiles. I tnink the facts
will demonstrate how important they are
for our own defense, and I do not want
to have any personal entanglements on
me in connection with sponsoring the
measures that the resolution suggests.
I do not want other Senators to feel,
those who see fit to vote for this reso-
lution, that they are in any way commit-
ting themselves to be opposed to author-
ization of funds that may be contained in
bills which are considered necessary for
our own defense. There are several of
them, of the most far-reaching conse-
quences.
So, under those conditions, I shall op-
pose the resolution. I thank the Senator
for yielding me time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do
not wish to take further time, if other
Senators have further comments. I would
only reiterate further what has already
been stated. If anyone else wishes to
speak on the resolution, I do not wish
to take up the time.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Alabama.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I want to under-
stand one thing. As I understand this
resolution, we are not proposing to do
any of this on a unilateral basis.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Absolutely. The lan-
guage is very explicit that this is mutual.
It might be said that it is unilateral in
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
9,1970 Approved FetgpyingsM/10/40E.MABDPMQ(k313KR000300040009-3
Aprir -
the sense that we take the initiative.
The report states that. It is because we
are presumed to be more pdwerful,
richer, and so forth. We spend more
money. Somebody has to take the initia-
tive. We make the proposal, but nothing
will be done under it unless there is
reciprocity.
Nobody is proposing unilateral dis-
armament, a unilateral freeze, or any-
thing of the sort.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I am glad to hear
the Senator say that. From my reading
of it?.:and I was in the committee when
the discussions were held?/ wanted to
be sure that was absolutely clear. I have
a great deal of sympathy with what the
Senator from Mississippi has just said.
I would dislike very much if something
is not done over there before these other
matters come up, to have this brought up
as being a declaration that we were op-
posed to those things.
I am in favor of our continuing our
strength until there is a willingness on
the part of both sides to let down on it.
But I think we have to guard ourselves
very carefully in that regard.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I say to the Senator
that 'nobody is suggesting that we dis-
arm. But there is a feeling in many cir-
cles, on the part of many people, that
you just cannot make any kind of agree-
ment with Communists. There is a feel-
ing of defeatism in other circles, among
people who want to make an agreement,
that because of the overwhelming power
of those who are oriented toward the
Military Establishment, you cannot get
It. For example on our delegation to the
Vienna talks there is Mr. Nie, who
was Deputy Secretary of Defense for a
long time, and for a number of years in
the recent past his orientation has been
primarily in this area. There is Mr. Har-
old Brown, who was Secretary of the Air
Force, I believe. He was also a very Im-
portant official in the Defense Depart-
ment. There is General Allison.
So I regret that people who are in-
terested in defense seem to give the im-
pression that they do not want to make
any agreement whatever, under any cir-
cumstances, with Communists. If this is
true, if this is the way it is going to be,
It is an utterly hopeless thing to curtail
the arms race.
I put in the RECORD a moment ago the
figures of the extraordinary expenditures
all over the world?over $1,000 billion
since 1964. These figures are from our
own Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.
If we are going down this road, and
the people who are in control of the
major part of our Government are un-
willing to make an agreement, and if we
mouth a few pious hopes now and then
but are unwilling to take an initiative, I
do not see any hope for an eventual solu-
tion of our problems.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. vu.LBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. PASTORE. I think the Senator
from Arkansas has emphasized this al-
ready, but it is my understanding that
whatever agreement is reached is pot
predicated upon good faith.
Mr. FULBRIGHT, No.
Mr. PASTORE. It has to be by proper
verification.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. By the words of the
resolution.
Mr. PASTORE. In order to make sure
that there will be no cheating:
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.
I say again to the Senator that the
only reason it is so timely, and the talks
are timely, is the development of MIRV.
It makes that very point extremely
difficult.
As a matter of fact, the original resolu-
tion of the Senator from Massachusetts
was directed solely at MIRV, and I think
one of the principal considerations was
the difficulty of verification of MIRV
deployment. Until they are at the point
of being deployed, I believe they can be
verified, due to our highly complex meth-
ods of verification.
This question is dealt with quite ex-
plicitly in the report. Just to tie that
point down, I read from page 5:
But it is also clear, and must be empha-
sized in this report, that a suspension of test-
ing and deployment of multiple independ-
ently targetable reentry vehicles could not be
sustained for long in the face of the de-
ployment by the Soviet Union of large num-
bers of missiles, such as the 58-9, or the
development and deployment of new stra-
tegic defensive systems by the United States
or the Soviet Union.
That is why it is so important to make
this proposal in the beginning. If the de-
ployment of MIRV's is begun, then the
question of verification becomes infinitely
more difficult. That was the testimony
of some of the best witnesses we had in
the scientific field. I think that this is
one of the most important considera-
tions.
I yield the floor.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the Sen-
ate is once again reasserting its preroga-
tives with respect to U.S. foreign policy.
La,st summer we adopted the so-called
National Commitments resolution, de-
claring that U.S. military or financial re-
sponse to events in other nations shall
be subject to action by both the execu-
tive and legislative branches of govern-
ment. I supported that resolution be-
cause I felt strongly that the Congress
took a back seat to the President for 8
years. Considering the dilemmas in Which
we soon found ourselves, that was too
long a period a acquiescence.
Today we are considering another res-
olution, this one regarding the suspen-
sion of further deployment of offensive
and defensive nuclear strategic weapons
systems. Mr. President, I regard this
problem as one of paramount impor-
tance to world survival. Nations have
come much too close to the perilous point
of self-extermination.
Senate Resolution 211 urges prompt
negotiations between the United States
and the Soviet Union in order to limit
strategic weapons systems. President
Nixon is already one step ahead in this
regard. Constructive preliminary talks
have been held in Helsinski and further
talks are scheduled for Vienna. The
President regards these negotiations as
the most crucial ever undertaken by any
nation. I remain cautiously optimistic
that the United States and the Soviet
Union can reach a mutually agreeable
S 5505
settlement if these negotiations continue
to be held in the serious vein for which
they were intended.
Senate Resolution 211 also urges the
President to propose to the Soviet Unien
an immediate suspension, by both na-
tions, of the further deployment of all
offensive and defensive nuclear strategic
weapons systems. All this, of course, will
be subject to national verification or
some other method of observation and
inspection. I regard this particular direc-
tive as one which seems to be the key to
the strategic arms limitations talks?
SALT.
President Nixon, during his news con-
ference of June 19, 1969, said:
We are considering the possibility of a
moratorium on tests as part of any arms con-
trol agreement. However, as for any uni-
lateral stopping of tests on our part, I do
not think that would be in our interest.
I am in full agreement with the Presi-
dent on this point. I believe that the
United States can propose to the Soviet
Union a bilateral cessation of the further
deployment of strategic weapons sys-
tems. This proposal might be made at the
next round of SALT meetings as part of
an entire package of suggestions to halt
the arms race. I believe that remains one
of the major goals cif the Nixon ad-
ministration.
My earlier concern with respect to the
original wording of Senate Resolution
211 has been alleviated. I do not want to
tie the President's hands in his search
for peace. I want to provide him with
every tool he needs to assure the world's
future generations of a peaceful coex-
istence among all nations. The resolution
as presently drafted gives the President
the flexibility he needs.
Mr. President, I have read the pending
resolution very carefully. I note that with
each redrafting, it has attracted addi-
tional support, now comprising about
one-half of the Senate. I believe that
its adoption by the Senate will serve as
a useful and unrestrictive guideline for
the President- in his efforts to halt the
spread of nuclear weapons. I have al-
ready notified the distinguished author
of this resolution, Senator EDWARD
BROOKE, of my desire to be added as a
cosponsor. I urge the Senate, for the
sake of generations yet unborn, to adopt
this resolution by an overwhelming mar-
gin. Let us all continue to take the offen-
sive in the search for peace.
A NEW ERA OF NATIONAL SECURITY : THE SEN-
ATE AND A MUTUAL STRATEGIC FREEZE
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the dis-
cussion of Senate Resolution 211 has al-
ready developed the essential issues which
the proposal raises. Last Friday's impor-
tant debate covered a broad range of
considerations. It made clear the reasons
why this resolution has been reported
without a dissenting vote in the Foreign
Relations Committee.
Senate Resolution 211 is an historic
successor to past Senate actions on arms
Control. During the 1.960's the Senate
twice passed similar resolutions which
paved the way to ultimate adoption of
the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and
the Nonproliferation Treaty. Such ex-
pressions serve the interests of American
diplomacy in several ways, but most es-
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
,?J
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
S 5506 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE Apra 9, 1970
peeially by providing an indication that guished authorities as Dr. Gordon Mac- culations about "the possibility of victory
the Senate will support the efforts of the Donald, now a member of the Council in a thermonuclear war. Judging by
Executive to reach agreement with the on Environmental Quality, Dr. Herbert everything, a new spiral in the arms race
Soviet Union on limiting the arms race York, former Director of Defense Re- would not change the essence of this
that threatens both countries. Thus, this search under President Eisenhower, and correlation."
resolution can bolster the President's dip- Dr. Freeman Dyson, the noted scientist This, then, is the context in which the
lomatic posture in the vital Strategic of Princeton University. All are agreed SALT effort begins. That it is beginning
Arms Limitation Talks which begin in that a ban on MIRV testing and deploy- at all is, in my judgment, a direct reflec-
Vienna on April 16. inent is feasible, verifiable, and impor- tion of a common recognition that the
Senate Resolution 211 is a simple state- twit to the national security of both arms race is futile and wasteful, that it
ment. It recognizes that the United ourselves and the Soviets, adds nothing to the security of either
States arid the Soviet Union both possess The SALT discussions could usefully side, and that a mutual limitation of
powerful nuclear deterrents today, It explore a variety of means for increas- strategic weaponry would be adrvan-
recognizes that this rough strategic hal- ing confidence in the verfication sys- tageous to both countries.
ance in fact improves the prospect for tem. I have proposed, for instance, that But this unprecedented political con-
mutual agreement to avoid further costly the two sides agree to announce all mis- sensus between the Soviet and American
and wasteful spirals of weapons expendie site tests, to test over agreed ranges leadership may be overwhelmed by the
tures. It recognizes that the pace of tech- where each could monitor the other's pressures of a technology which has
nology is such that this diplomatic oto- tests in detail to consider exchanging brought us to the verge of a new era in
portunity must be seized before fleW observers or installing suitable instru- military systems. If a general freeze is
teclmologies and new deployments alter ments at the major test facilities in both not established, the United States will
the strategic balance and undermine the countries. These and other ideas for im- continue with plans to deploy its MIRV
prospects for joint limitation of nuclear proving verification of a MIR-1T test ban systems. In response the Soviet Union
forces, deserve thorough study in SALT, as do will no doubt insist cm perfecting and
This resolution is a sensible reinforce- all aspects of verifying a general freeze deploying its own MIRV weapons. With
ment of what President Nixon has al- arrangement. No one can deny that the Soviet MIRV weapons entering the force,
ready declared is the administration's issues involved in the SALT negotiations the U.S. land-based missile force will
purpose in the SALT negotiations. On require solutions in which both parties become increasingly vulnerable and we
March 21, the President stated that the have high confidence, shall have to take countermeasures,
United States is prepared for either a Let me underscore several points which either by changing the mix of our offen-
comprehensive or a system by System are at the heart of Senate Resolution sive forces, by expanding ABM defense
agreement in SALT. As the President put 211. The eloquent chairman of the Fqr- of the Minuteman, or by other means.
it so succinctly: eign Relations Committee stated its pur- These actions in turn are likely to en-
our goal certainly is to limit bAh offensive pose well when he said that it seeks "to gender Soviet force changes, probably in-
and defensive missiles, and li the S0v1.2:t provide the negotiators in Vienna?both creasing the total number of delivery
Union has the same goal, we will make a American and Soviet?with a chance to vehicles as a hedge against the new un-
bargain.
negotiate on firm ground instead of on certainties connected with MIRV, ABM,
The resolution now before the Senate shifting sand." The impending deploy- and ether systems. In short the chances
would lend the weight of opinion in this silents of MIRV and ABM systems threat- for a general arms limitation will be in
body, which must ultimately ratify any en to complicate the SALT negotiations danger of coining unstuck,
agreement reached in SALT, to this immeasurably. In the face of this pros- To forestall this risky cycle, a mutual
essential goal. It would advance this Na- poet, it would be prudent and safe for freeze proposal is timely and needed Sen-
tion's commitment, accepted in the Non- both sides to halt further deployments ate Resolution 211 is a vehicle by which
proliferation Treaty, to pursue with the for at least an interim period while the the Senate can share with the President
Soviet Union mutual efforts to curb the diplomats seek to devise durable barriers the burdens of advancing this urgent
nuclear arms race. It would add a sense against future expansions of the stra- proposal.
of urgency by stressing that the negotia- tegic forces. If such a freeze is not agreed If the Soviet Union accepts the pro-
tions should seek agreement on a mutual to, and it is a truisni that it can scarcely posal, as I believe its own national in-.
suspension of further deployment of all be agreed to if it is never proposed, the terests dictate, the security of both our
offensive and defensive nuclear strategic problem of stabilizing the arms balance countries will be enhanced. The Soviets
TNeapOns systems. Such a general freeze will grow more intricate and the prob- would suspend deployment a the SS-9
would be subject to national verification ability of eventual agreement will be re- system which, if deployed in numbers
or other measures of observation and in- (tuned. and equipped with accurate MIRV's is
spection as may be appropriate. The logic of a mutual freeze as a considered the prime threat to the U.S.
In the opinion of informed officials and means of buying time for diplomacy to Minuteman force. It would also stop add-
experts, such a freeze proposal could be seek lasting arms centrols can be stated ing to its nuclear submarine fleet, which
verified by so-called national means, in many ways. Perhaps the simplest is viewed as a growing threat to the U.S.
which is a term of art referring to both formulation is the best. As President strategic bomber bases and command
side existing intelligence capabilities. Nixon indicated last March, both the and control facilities. Furthermore, its
However, the negotiators are left ample United States and the Soviet Union now ABM system would be limited to the in-
latitude to define additional means of possess credible deterrence. That is, both significant number of weapons which we
verifying compliance and for reducing countries have sufficient nuclear weapons are now confident we can penetrate with
the uncertainties which might arise in to guarantee that, if attacked, they can existing U.S. forces. In return the United
this connection. For example, I have long deliver devastating retaliation against States would have only to cease plans
argued that a suspension of further tests any adversary. Both countries will do to deploy MIRV and ABIVI, which are in
of multiple independently targetable re- whatever is necessary to see that they fact intended primarily as responses to
entry vehicles is a critical requirement retain such an assured capability to the prospective Soviet ABM and MIRV
for impeding deployment of these paten- retaliate. systems. If the latter are forestalled by
tally destabilizing systems. Informed Yet both countries now acknowledge a mutual freeze, it is self-evident that
technical testimony favors the concha- that there is no profit in endless increases the United States can a tfely and wisely
.son that a MIRV test moratorium could in their force levels. Former Secretary refrain from deploying weapons which it
be verified by each side's present intel- altiNamara's description of the "mad will not need.
ligence networks, momentum" of the arms race has been There is, of course, a legitimate ques-
Dr. Jack Ruina, former director of echoed by Foreign Minister Gromyko's tion as to the effect of this proposal on
the Advanced Research Projects Agency statement that the arms race has long the U.S. negotiating position in Vienna.
and now a ranking consultant to the ad- since become "lunacy". This same con- After deliberate study over many months,
ministration, has made this point ens- elusion has been voiced by the authorita,- the Committee on Foreign Relations con-
phatically in testimony before the For- Live conunent in Pravda of March?, 1970, eluded, as I have, that the suggestion
eign Relations Committee. He has beer, which stressed that the present strategic made by the resolution would be highly
supported in this view by such distill- balance makes quite unrealiStic any cal- constructive. It would convey the Sen-
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
At 94 1970
-
Approved FothisgmtARIWOliefft9P/%0A3N000300040009-3
ate's appreciation that the impending
deployments of MIRV and ABM may
well energize diplomacy at this decisive
iuncture of history, while actual deploy-
ment of such systems could frustrate
SALT. We have arrived at a fragile
moment which we must either grasp
by a bold initiative or see it fall victim
to our own hesitation.
Of special significance in tendering
the Senate's advice to the President on
this matter is the fact that a general
freeze on offensive and defensive weap-
ons deployments is actually more easily
verified than a plan to limit only one
aspect of such weapons. Under a mutual
suspension of this kind, there are many
indicators to tell whether the parties are
complying with the agreement. Thus, we
would be able to monitor not only the
nature of Soviet missile tests, but wheth-
er they are attempting to increase clan-
destinely the total number of ABM radars
or missiles, or the number of land-based
offensive missiles, or the number of mie-
sile-launching submarines.
Evidence of violation on any one of
these aspects of a freeze would be a signal
alerting the other party. If there is
strong mutual interest in maintaining
the freeze, each side would find it in its
interest to reassure the other about any
questionable activities that might tempt
a party to withdraw from the agreement.
Thus there could well emerge powerful
incentives for building mutual con-
fidence in the agreement, rather than
bearing the hazards of seeing the under-
standing collapse amid charges of at-
tempted evasion. I would consider this a
major advantage to the proposal.
Another way of examining the recom-
mended mutual suspension of strategic
deployments is to ask what the situation
will be in the absence of such an arrange-
ment. If one is prone to be apprehensive
about relying on national means to verify
Soviet force levels under an agreed freeze,
one should be doubly apprehensive about
having to do so in the absence of such an
agreement. Yet that is precisely the situ-
ation today, and it will prevail indefini-
tely unless SALT is successful. Our own
force planning is based heavily on such
intelligence estimates, with all the at-
tendant doubts and anxieties about
whether we are doing too much or too
little.
As I have said, Senate Resolution 211
leaves the President wide authority to
seek the verification arrangements he
considers necessary, but it is fair to Point
out that a great deal can be done on the
basis of national means of intelligence
and that those means can be vastly
strengthened by a prudent limitation of
the type suggested. For example, today's
surveillance systems can provide reliable
estimates of the total number of offen-
sive missiles in the Soviet inventory. Yet
the capability to provide an accurate
count of such weapons will decline in the
future if mobile land-based ICBM's or
deceptive basing techniques are intro-
duced. It is precisely those kinds of con-
cepts which a freeze could help head off.
The mutual suspension of further stra-
tegic deployments could do a great deal
to reinforce the advantage both sides now
possess in being able to determine inde-
pendently the relative balance of forces.
To the extent that uncertainty about the
balance develops, the likelihood of de-
stabilizing changes in the forces grows.
In addition to the extraordinary co-
sponsorship which Senate Resolution 211
has attracted, its wide support in the
Senate is reflected in that fact that the
Foreign Relations Committee reported
the measure without a dissenting vote.
Similarly, it is most significant that the
Democratic Policy Committee has made
clear by its unanimous endorsement the
bipartisan backing Senate Resolution 211
enjoys.
The President now knows that he can
seek a mutual suspension of deploy-
ments of strategic weapons with the
overwhelming support of both Republi-
cans and Democrats. That is a welcome
reinforcement of the vital tradition of
bipartisan foreign policy which has con-
tributed so much to American security
over the years.
I might add my own satisfaction, as a
member of the Armed Services Commit-
tee, that my colleagues on that body
have shown increasing support for this
resolution. In addition to a number of
members who have indicated their inten-
tion to vote for the resolution, several of
those who serve on the Armed Services
Committee?Senator SYlVIINGTON, Sen-
ator YOUNG of Ohio, Senator INOUYE,
Senator McIrTryaE, and Senator SCHWEI-
Km?have joined as cosponsors. It is
clear that many of the most informed
and concerned Senate authorities on na-
tional security issues recognize the de-
sirability and urgency of seeking the kind
of stable strategic arrangements pro-
posed in Senate Resolution 211.
I would like to inject one further
thought concerning the kind of proposal
suggested by the resolution. It is re-
ported that some members of the admin-
istration feel the United State should
wait and see what proposals the Soviet
Union advances at Vietnna. Apart from
the possibility that the Soviets may adopt
a parallel reticence and that the SALT
talks may then be paralyzed by a use-
less and tiresome waiting game, there is
an obvious absurdity to this suggestion.
It is best revealed by the recent acknowl-
edgment by a high administration offi-
cial that, if the Soviet Union made the
proposal outlined in Senate Resolution
211, the United States would certainly
be responsive.
Thus, there is precious little logic to
risking a complete failure of the effort
in SALT by a kind of diplomatic brinks-
manship in which each side hesitates
even to make a firm proposal, preferring
to let the other country bear the imagi-
nary onus of making the first proposal.
This is outrageous, especially when one
realizes that both nations have a para-
mount and mutual interest in such a
joint arrangement. In adopting this res-
olution, the Senate will be assisting the
President in perceiving the fundamental
interests which should govern the United
States in making such a proposal.
Let me address explicitly a few con-
cerns which have been raised about the
duration of the recommended strategic
deployment standstill. Some have been
apprehensive that the United States
would somehow get locked into an open-
ended halt, with public opinion making
S 5507
it difficult for the United States to dis-
engage even if the Soviets were engaging
in certain ambiguous or threatening ac-
tivities. Nothing of this sort need occur.
First of all, the President has ample
authority to define the duration of the
mutual suspension at the outset by
specifying that it should last, for exam-
ple, for 18 or 24 months, with an exten-
sion dependent on further progress in
the SALT negotiations.
Second, even if the proposal is not tied
to a specific time period, the resolution
in no way limits the President's capacity
to determine the exact verification re-
quirements which would permit mutual
restraint to continue. As many of us have
made clear, we believe much can be done
by means of national intelligence sys-
tems, but it may well be that, as SALT
proceeds, more detailed arrangements
for mutual verification will prove pos-
sible. Both countries could surely exer-
cise mutual restraint for a limited time
while detailed arrangements are per-
fected in the SALT talks.
Third, should the President at some
point judge that the mutual suspension
could not be continued without undue
dangers to our national security, he
would undoubtedly make the necessary
decision to resume U.S. deployments. It
is reasonable to hope that if confronted
with such an immediate prospect of a
resumed arms race, the Soviet Union
would recognize its larger interest in
ceasing any suspicious activities or in so
clarifying them as to make it possible for
the United States to continue abiding by
the mutual restraints. But if the Soviets
failed to do so, no one would expect the
President to accept unwise risks to our
security. If in his judgment, whether or
not supported by public opinion, the
risks of delaying additional deployments
outweighed the risks of a resumed arms
competition, every Member of the Sen-
ate knows that the President would take
appropriate action.
Thus, the supposed hazard of an un-
reasonable, open-ended freeze being im-
posed on the President by an unknowing
public opinion is nothing more than a
bogey-man. The alleged risks of such a
development are trivial when compared
to the predictable risks of carrying the
present strategic competition into the
dangerous, shifting terrains populated
by MIRV and ABM.
These then, are some of the considera-
tions which have led so many Senators
to support Senate Resolution 211. In no
sense can it be considered a step toward
unilateral disarmament. Indeed the only
unilateral proposal being made is by
those who urge unilateral changes in the
present strategic balance before the
SALT negotiations even have a chance
to address the issues. Prime examples of
this tendency are the plans for the pre-
mature and unwise deployment of the
U.S. MIRV and the continued, counter-
productive increases in the Soviet SS-9
force.
Senate Resolution 211 is a well-found-
ed and reasoned exercise of the Senate's
historic responsibilities in the field of
foreign policy. The choice of the risks
which the United States will bear in in-
ternational affairs is a task which this
body, as well as the President, must
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Rgigase 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
S:5508 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 9, 1,90
share. This resolution advances a modest
proposal and indicates that the Senate
will support the President in seeking a
mutual freeze on further deployments of
strategic weapons, including particularly
MIRV and ABM. As one means of verify-
ing compliance with an agreement not
to deploy MIRV, the legislative history of
Senate Resolution 211 makes clear that
a MIRV test limitation should have high
priority in the SALT negotiations. The
vital objective is to stabilize matters
where they stand so that the SALT ne-
gotiators will have a chance to shore up
the present strategic balance by erecting
durable means of verifying a freeze for
the long haul.
Will the Soviets accept such a mutusil
freeze? No one knows for certain, but I
am convinced that they may very well
respond affirmatively. I have reviewed
the exchanges at Helsinki with some
care. I am satisfied that there is no suffi-
cient evidence to conclude that the Sov-
iets would not be interested in such a
proposal. Within this larger framework,
I think it especialy important to note that
there is no sound reason to conclude that
the Soviets are indifferent to MIRV or
ABM, as some commentators once sug-
gested. Indeed, high officials of the ad-
ministration have privately indicated
that the Soviets now appear interested
specifically in a possible MIRV limita-
tion, which would be accomplished by the
general freeze proposal set forth in this
resolution. Since the Soviets fully under-
stand that U.S. restraint on MIRV will
require Soviet restraint on Al3M, they
have no doubt that both offensive and
defensive systems must be limited, if
there is to be agreement.
The only way to determine whether
the Soviet Union is Interested in a mu-
tual strategic freeze is to make the pro-
posal. If Moscow rejects the plan, there
will still be an opportunity to explore
more limited undertakings on a system.-
by-system basis.
More than most Americans realize, the
future security and well-being of our
country hinge on the outcome of the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The
Senate has the power and the privilege
to serve thnse great interests by lending
its advice to the President on the pro-
found issues of strategic arms control.
Senate Resolution 211 is a prudent in-
strument for that purpose, and I com-
mend it to the Senate.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I rise
to support Senate Resolution 211 and te,
urge the President to offer the Soviet;
Union a prompt interim halt to offensive
and defensive weapons deployment. I
think it would be a grave error if we
undermined the upcoming SALT talks?
perhaps oour last best hope of ending the
aims race?by an unnecessary deploy-
ment of MIRV and Safeguard.
The administration apparently takes
the position that we should go ahead with
MIRV and Safeguard until the Russians
propose a comprehensive arms control
agreement. But this position makes no
sense at all. Why should we wait until
the Russians make an arms control pro-
posal? Are not we the leaders in man-
kind's struggle for peace? Surely this is
not the time for the administration to
participate in an Alphonse-Gaston rou-
tine.
Furthermore, the Russians have given
sonic indication that they are interested
in a comprehensive freeze on weapons
systems. An obviously high-level article
in the March 7 edition of Pravda
acknowledged the danger of a new spiral
in the arms race and the need for arms
control. It suggested that "honest talks"
would lead to "agreed solutions."
Now, of course, the Pravda article may
be completely insincere. The Russians
may have no intention of entering into
a serious arms control agreement. But
why not put the Russians to the test?
Why not offer a:n interim halt in the de-
ployment of offensive and defense weap-
ons systems and take the initiative for
peace? If the Russians reject our initia-
tive, they will stand condemned in the
eyes of the world. But let us make sure
that the United States cannot be con-
demned for inaction in the quest for
peace. Let us call for an end to arms race,
and let us call for it today.
The administration has never ex-
plained why it is necessary to deploy
MIRV's as early as this June. Indeed, the
administration has never satisfactorily
explained why we need to deploy MIRV's
at all. The original purpose of MIRV was
to counter a massive Soviet ABM system.
But this system was never built. We are,
therefore, overreacting to a threat which
never materialized, just as we did in the
1950's and 1960'e. Instead of acting with
a new realism, we are simply repeating
old mistakes.
There is no danger that our security
will be jeopardized if we fail to deploy
MIRV now. As Rathjens and Kistiakow-
sky have pointed out:
There is little doubt that ctirrently de-
signed U.S. MIRVS could be deployed on a
time scale [which is] short compared with
that required for deployment of any sig-
nificant Russian ABM defenses. Accordingly,
there is no need for any MIRV deployment
pending firm evidence that the USSR is be-
ginning the construction of such defenses.
We will always be able to deploy MIRV
if that should prove necessary.
The risks we take if we insist on pre-
mature, unnecessary deployment of
MIRV and, Safeguard, and if we under-
mine the SALT talks, are staggering.
First, there is the risk of spirally arms
costs which will make it impossible for
us to meet our pressing domestic needs.
At the present time, the strategic forces
budget of the United States amounts to
about $9 billion per year, excluding some
rather large items forwarheads, research
and development, and communications
and intelligence activities; $9 billion is
more than twice what the Nixon admin-
istration accepted to spend this year on
education. It is over seven times more
than the Nixon administration intends
to spend next year on crime reduction.
But, if we do not limit arms control ex-
penditures in the near future, it is esti-
mated that outlays for strategic systems
could double by the mid-1970's. Eighteen
billion dollars a year in Federal tax rev-
enues would become unavailable to meet
domestic needs.
The second risk we take by unneces-
sary deployment of MIRV is even more
ominous. The new buildup in the arms
race would increase tensions between the
United States and the Soviet Union. It
would reduce even further the possibility
of Soviet-American cooperation in the
Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, if both super powers con-
tinue to develop new and more sophis-
ticated nuclear weapons systems, there
is a danger that the present nuclear bal-
ance will be upset, or will appear to be
upset, and that one of the powers will
embark on a reckless military adventure.
Harold Brown, former Secretary of the
Air Force, has made an important obser-
vation in this regard. It is true that if we
have an arms control agreement, the
Russians might make clandestine im-
provements in their weapons systems, al-
though the advent of satellite surveil-
lance reduces this possibility. Dr. Brown
points out:
nut, it seems at least as likely that, in the
absence of an agreement, they might make
a sudden massive effort to tilt the balance
In their favor.
Mr. President, the Nixon administra-
tion must do everything in its power to
make the SALT talks a success for peace.
The proposed deployment of MIRV and
Safeguard is a step toward disaster. It
substantially increases the risk that the
dreaded arms race, with all its costs and
all its dangers, will continue to plague
mankind for generations.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, the
resolution presently pending is certainly
laudable in its purpose to limit the es-
calation of the arms race. I noted with
interest that recently the President's
Policy Advisory Committee to the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency has
similarly recommended that the United
States propose to the Soviet Union an
immediate and mutual hen to missile
deployment. I am sure that no one in
this body would take issue with the ob-
jective sought by these recommenda-
tions.
However, I have grave reservations as
to whether or not the approach will be
successful in view of the historical prece-
dents set by the Soviets in this regard. In
1958 when President Eisenhower an-
nounced that the United States would
discontinue further testing of nuclear
weapons in the atmosphere for so long
as the Soviets did likewise? the morato-
rium was unilaterally broken by the So-
viets in less than 3 years. Consistently
for the past two decades the Soviets
have rejected any suggestions regarding
surveillance and onsite inspection.
On the other hand, every time efforts
are initiated concerning arms talk, we
hear that the United States should im-
mediately suspend all technological de-
velopment of its weaponry or the Soviets
will not meet us at the negotiation table.
This assumption has always proved in
error. The pending resolution was intro-
duced on June 17, 1969, with the urgency
stated that unless it was adopted the
pending Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks would be in jeopardy. The talks
went ahead on schedule and the second
round is to convene on April 16 with-
out the benefit of this resolution being
passed. During the ABM debates we also
heard that unless the requested authori-
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Apri1,9, 1970 Approved FedRAWLSgSF8PAPRC6ItteaRAN
AWR000300040009-3 S 5509
zation were defeated we would deter ne-
gotiations.
In short, I do not believe that his-
tory favors these arguments or encour-
ages optimism as to a meaningful agree-
ment with the Soviets.
Recognizing these points, however, I
still share the hope of my colleagues that
Meaningful progress can be made in the
arms talks. The thrust of Senate Reso-
lution 211 contains, in my judgment,
sufficient caveats to insure protection of
our national interests. Obviously, the
concept of simultaneous cessations of
the operational testing of MIR,V is
meaningless without realistic protection.
National verification or other methods
of observation and inspection as may
be appropriate called for in the resolu-
tion offers a vehicle to explore the true
intention of the Soviets and their willing-
ness to achieve the goals sought. With
this point fully in mind I offer my sup-
port to the resolution and sincerely hope
that my pessimism will be proved un-
founded.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I un-
derstand that there will be no more
speakers, so when I get through 1. will
put in a quorum call, to start voting at
4 p.m.
I Want to emphasize that the one
?thing unilateral about this resolution is
that the Senate of the United States,
and hopefully the U.S. delegation to the
Vienna conference, will be taking the
initiative to propose a mutual freeze.
Every action contemplated will be taken
by both countries?no country will take
a risk the other, ceuntrY refuses to take.
We are not advocating disarming uni-
laterally. Nobody in this body would
stand for that. What we are trying to do
is to break the deadlock which exists, to
try to give encouragement to the Presi-
dent and his delegates at Vienna, and to
try to do something constructive in help-
ing to bring about an end to the mad
momentum which seems to have gripped
the two major powers in the world?the
Soviet Union and ourselves?to the end
that perhaps there will be salvation at
the end of the road, rather than de-
struction.
We have now begun to walk the cor-
rect pathway to that end. The adoption
of this resolution will represent a major
step along that road.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I aik
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded and that,
with no further speakers, the vote begin.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, It is so ordered.
The first question is on agreeing to the
committee amendment in the nature of
a substitute.
The committee amendment in the na-
ture of a substitute was agreed to, as
follows:
Rep/veci, That it is the sense of the Sen-
ate that promp t negotiations between the
Governments of the United States of America
and of the Union qf Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics to seek agreed limitations of both offen-
sive and defensive strategic weapons should
be urgently pursued; and
Resolved further, That the President
should propose to the Government of the,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an im-
mediate suspension by the United States
and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics of the further deployment of all offensive
and defensive nuclear strategic weapons sys-
tems, subject to national verification or such
other measures of observation and inspec-
tion as may be appropriate.
? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion now is on agreeing to the resolution,
as amended.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask for the yeas
and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this
squestion the yeas and nays have been
ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. STENNIS. (after having voted in
the negative). On this vote I have voted
"nay." I understand that the Senator
from Connecticut (Mr. RisicoFF), if
present, would vote "yea." I have given
him a live pair, he being absent. I, there-
fore, withdfaw my vote.
Mr, ERVIN (after having voted in the
negative). I voted "nay." I voted "nay"
because I think this is a matter for the
executive branch rather than for the
legislative branch. The distinguished
Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNU-
SON) is necessarily absent. I am advised
that if he were present he would vote
"yea." I have agreed to give him a live
pair and, therefore, withdraw my nega-
tive vote.
Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the
Senator from New MexiOck (Mr. ANDER-
SON) , the Senator .from Nevada (Mr.
BIBLE), the Senator from Connecticut
(Mr. Dom)), the Senator from Missouri
(Mr. EAGLETON) , the Senator from Mis-
sissippi (Mr. EASTLAND) , the Senator from
Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) , the Senator from
Nevada (Mr. CANNON) , the Senator from
Washington (Mr, MAGNusoN), the Sen-
ator from Connecticut (Mr. Rnacorr),
the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Rus-
SELL ) , and the Senator from Texas (Mr.
YARBOROUGH) are necessarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE) and the Sen-
ator from Rhode Island (Mr. FELL) are
absent on official business.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Connecticut
(Mr. D000) and the Senator from Texas
(Mr. YARBOROUGH) would each vote
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) IS ab-
sent on official business as observer at the
meeting of the Asian Development Bank
in Korea.
The Senator from Kentucky (Mr.
COOK), the Senator from Colorado (Mr.
Dammam) , the Senator from Wyoming
(Mr. HANSEN) , the Senator from Cali-
fornia (Mr. MURPHY) , and the Senator
from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily
absent.
The. Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
MUNDT) is absent because of illness.
If present and voting, the Senator
from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) , the Senator
from Colorado (Mr. bommacx), the Sen-
ator from Wyoming (Mr. litirrszic), the
Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
MUNDT) ? and the Senator from Texas
Mr. TOWER) would each vote "yea."
The result was announced?yeas 72,
nays 6, as follows:
[No. 128 Leg.]
YEAS-72
Aiken
Allott
Baker
Bayh
Boggs
Brooke
Burdick
Byrd, Va.
Byrd, W. Va.
Case
Church
Cooper
Cotton
Cranston
Curtis
Dole
Ellender
Fong
Fulbright
Goodell
Gore
, Gravel
Griffin
Gurney
Allen
Hellman
Harris
Hart
Hatfield
Holland
Hollings
Hruska
Hughes
Jackson
Javits
Jordan, N.C.
Jordan, Idaho
Kennedy
Mansfield
Mathias
McCarthy
McClellan
McGee
McGovern
McIntyre
Metcalf
Miller
Mondale
Montoya
Moss
NAYS-6
Fannin
Goldwater
Muskie
Nelson
Packwood
Pastore
Pearson
Percy
Prouty
Proxmire
Randolph
Saxbe
Schweiker
Scott
Smith, Maine
Smith, Ill.
Sparkman
Spong
Stevens
Symington
Talmadge
Tydings
Williams, N.J.
Williams, Del.
Young, N. Dak.
Young, Ohio
Long
Thurmond
PRESENT AND GIVING LIVE PAIRS, AS
PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-2
Ervin, against.
Stennis, against.
NOT VOTING-20
Anderson
Bennett
Bible
Cannon
Cook
Dodd
Dominick
Eagleton
Eastland
Hansen
Hartke
Inouye
Magnuson
Mundt
Murphy
Pell
Ribicoff
Russell
Tower
Yarborough
So the resolution (SJ. Res. 211) , as
amended, was agreed to.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
move to reconsider the vote by which
the resolution was agreed to.
?Mr. I3ROOKE. Mr. President, I move
to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the amendment to the pre-
amble was agreed to. ?
The preamble, as amended, was agreed
to as follows:
Whereas the competition to develop and
deploy strategic weapons has reached a new
and dangerous phase, which threatens to
frustrate attempts at negotiating sig-
nificant arms limitations and- to weaken
the stability of nuclear deterrence as a bar-
rier to war;
Whereas development of multiple inde-
pendently targetable reentry vehicles by
both the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion represents a fundamental and radical
challenge to such stability;
Whereas the possibility of agreed controls
over strategic forces appears likely to
diminish greatly if testing and deployment
of multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicles proceed;
Whereas a suspension of flight tests of
multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles promises to forestall deployment of
such provocative weapons; and
Whereas a suspension of such tests could
contribute substantially to the success of
the strategic arms limitation talks between
the United States and the Soviet Union:
Now, therefore, be it
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The title
as proposed to be amended will be stated.
The bill clerk read as follows:
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-R0P72-00337R000300040009-3
S 5510 Approved For ReleksgAMM9NRHMMt-80_3_3WiOn0040009-3 April 1970
Resolution expressing the sense of the Sen-
ate on suspension of further deployment of
offensive and defensive nuclear stiategic
weapons systems.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I call up
my amendment to the amendment 1,o the
title,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The BILL CLERK. The Senator from
Iowa (Mr. MILLER) proposes an amend-
ment on page 4, to strike the last two
lines and insert in lieu thereof the fol-
lowing:
The sense of the Senate on mutt al sus-
pension of further deployment of offensive
and defensive nuclear weapons spats= by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and
by the United States.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, this is a
perfecting amendment to accord with the
other provisions of the resolution and
also with the colloquies conducted on the
floor of the Senate.
I have discussed the amendment with
the distinguished prime sponsor of the
resolution and with others. I,understand
that it is acceptable to them.
The PRESIDING OloriCER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from Iowa to the amend-
ment to the title.
The amendment was agreed to.
The title, as amended, was agreed to.
PROGRAM
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I should
like to address a question to the distin-
guished majority leader.
Would the distinguished majority lead-
er be good enough to advise us of the
further program for today and there-
after?
Mr. MANSeIELD, Mr. President, in re-
ply, for the information of the Senate,
in addition to the Peace Corps Act, as
amended, Calendar No. 768, H.R. 15349,
the Railroad Adjustment Board, will be
taken up tomorrow.
On Monday it is anticipated that we
will take up Calendar No. 760 (S. 2846),
the mental retardation bill; Calendar No.
747 (S. 3637), the equal-time bill.
On Tuesday we will take up Calendar
No. 763 (S. 1814), the public ownership
of the D.C. Transit System, and will fin-
ish the equal-time bill if it is not com-
pleted on Monday.
Following that, on Wednesday, we will
consider Calendar No. 773 (S. 721.1, the
credit card bill.
On Thursday, we will consider Calen-
dar No. 764 (S. 3685) , the mortgage
credit bill; Calendar No. 712 (S. 1148),
the Virgin Islands Act.
On Friday we will consider Calendar
No. 564, H.R. 9477?the Umatilla Indian
Reservation bill.
This is the best I can do in a defhaltive
way as to stating what the schedule will
be.
Mr. scam Mr. President, I say to the
distinguished majority leader that I am
glad I asked the question.
I thank the Senator from New Hamp-
shire.
MESSAGE :MOM THE HOUSE
A message fpm the House of Repre-
sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the House
had passed the bill (S. 3690) to increase
the pay of Federal employees, with an
amendment, in which it requested the
concurrence of the Senate.
The message also announced that the
House had disagreed to the amendment
of the Senate to the amendments of the
House to the bill (S. 2601) to reorganize
the courts of the District of Columbia,
and for other purposes; agreed to the
conference asked by the Senate on the
disagreeing votes of the two Houses
thereon, and that Mr. McMittAN, Mr.
ABERNETHY, Mr. DOWDY, Mr. CABELL, Mr.
NELSEN, Mr. HARSHA, Mr. BROYHILL of
Virginia, and Mr. HOGAN were appointed
managers on the part of the House at
the conference.
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES SALARY ACT
OF 1970
Mr. MeGEE. Mr. President, I ask the
Chair to lay before the Senate a message
from the House of Representatives on
S. 3690.
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be-
fore the Senate the amendment of the
House of Representatives to the bill (S.
peso) to increase the pay of Federal em-
ployees which was to strike out all after
the enacting clause, and insert:
That this Act may be cited as the "Federal
Employees Salary Act of 1970".
SEC. 2. (a) (1) The President shall increase
the rates of basic, pay, basic compensation,
and salaries (as such rates were increased by
Executive Order Numbered 11474, dated June
18, 1989) contained in the schedules listed
in paragraph (2) of this subsection by
amounts equal, as nearly as may be practica-
ble and with regard to maintaining ap-
proximately equai increments within any
grade, level, or class of any such schedule, to
6 percent.
(2) The schedules referred to in paragraph
(1) of this subsection are as follows: the
General Schedule contained in section 5332
(a) of title 5, United States Code; the Postal
Field Service Schedule and the Rural Carrier
Schedule contained in sections 3542(a) and
3543(a) , respectively, of title 39, United
States Code; the schedules relating to certain
positions within the Department of Medicine
and Surgery of the Veterans' Administration
and contained in section 4107 of title 38,
United States Code; and the Foreign Service
schedules contained in section 412 and 415
of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.
(b) Rates of basic pay, basic compensa-
tion, and salaries of officers and employees
paid under the schedules referred to in sub-
section (a) of this section shall be increased
initially under conversion rules prescribed by
the President or by such agency as the Presi-
dent may designate.
(c) The increases made by the President
under this section shall have the force and
effect of law and shall be printed (1) in the
Statutes at Large in the same volume as pub-
lic laws, (2) the Federal Register, and (3)
the Code of Federal Regulations.
Szc. 3. (a) The rates of pay of personnel
subject to sections 210 and 214 of the Fed-
eral Salary Act of 1967 (81 Stat. 633, 635;
Public Law 90-206), relating to Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation County Com-
mittee employees and to certain employees
of the legislative branch of the Government,
respectively, and any minimum or maximum
rate, limitation, or allowance applicable to
any such personnel, shall be adjusted, effec-
tive on the first day of the first pay period
which begins on or after December 27, 1969,
by amounts which are identical, insofar as
practicable, to the amounts of the adjust-
ments under this section for corresponding
rates of pay for employees subject to the
General Schedule, by the following author!-
ties?
(1) the Secretary of Agriculture, with re-
spect to individuals employed by the county
committees established under section 590h
(b) of title 16;
(2) the Comptroller of the Senate, with
respect to the United States Senate;
(3) the Finance Clerk of the Rouse of
Representatives, with respect to the United
States House of Representatives; and
(4) the Architect of the Capitol, with re-
spect to the Office of the Architect of the
Capitol.
The provisions of this section shall not be
construed to allow adjustments in the rates
of pay of the following officers of the United
States Rouse of Representatives: Parliamen-
tarian, Chaplain, Clerk, Sergeant at Arms.
Doorkeeper, Postmaster, and the four Floor
Assistants to the Minority whose position
titles formerly were Minority Clerk, Minority
Sergeant at Arms, Minority Doorkeeper, and
Minority Postmaster.
(b) Notwithstanding section 665 of title
31, the rates of pay of employees in and un-
der the judicial branch of the Government,
whose rates of pay are fixed by administra-
tive action pursuant to law' and are not
otherwise adjusted under this section may be
adjusted, effective on the first day of the
first pay period which begins on or after
December 27, 1969, by amounts not to ex-
ceed the amounts of the adjustments under
section 2(a) of this Act for corresponding
rates of pay. The limitations fixed by law
with respect to the aggregate salaries pay-
able to secretaries and law clerks of circuit
and district judges shall be adjusted, effec-
tive on the first day of the first pay period
which begins on or after the date on which
adjustments become effective under this
section, by amounts not to exceed the
amounts of the adjustments under this sec-
tion for corresponding rates of pay.
(c) The rates of pay of United States at-
torneys and assistant United States attorneys
whose annual salaries are fixed pursuant to
section 548 of title 211, United States Code,
shall be increased, effective on the first day
of the first pay period which begins on or
after December 27, 1969, by amounts equal,
as nearly as may be practicable, to the in-
creases provided purstaisit to section 2 of
this Act for corresponding rates of pay.
(d) Notwithstanding section 665 of title 31,
the rates of pay of employees of the Federal
Government and of the government of the
District of Columbia whose rates of pay are
fixed by administrative action pursuant to
law and are not othertvlse increased pursuant
to this section are heraby authorized to be
Increased, effective on the first day of the
first pay period which begins on or after
December 27, 1969, by amounts not to exceed
the increases provided pursuant to section 2
of this Act for corresponding rates of pay in
the appropriate schedule or scale of pay.
SEC. 4. (a) An increase in pay, compensa-
tion, or salary which becomes effective un-
der section 2 of this Act is not an equivalent
increase in pay within the meaning of sec-
tion 5335 of title 5, United States Code; or
section 3552 of title 39, United States Code.
(b) Nothing In this Act shall impair any
authority pursuant to which rates of pay,
compensation, or salary may be fixed by ad-
ministrative action.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this Act?
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
April 9, 1970 Apprty9-46itiflemioftwagb:_goppivai-sowoosioaut0009-3
E 3027
Two had ignored it. The third accorded it
two grudging inches in the third section.
But there was a picture of three hippie
students being arrested at San Francisco
State. There was a picture" of another group
of young radicals giving the "Black Power"
salute outside the Be]. Air, Md., trial of H.
Rap Brown. There was a picture of girls in-
volved in the "Women's Liberation Move-
ment."
But there was no picture of a 15-year-
old girl kissing her president, no picture of
three boys and two girls who shared $13,500
in VFW college scholarships for their scripts
on "Freedom's Challenge." There wasn't even
a story.
The veterans were angry at the newspapers
in Washington. Perhaps it's time that all of
us in the press took another look " hat's
news."
STATEMENT OF McGEORGE
BUNDY
HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM
OF NEW TOME
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, April 9, 1970
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr, Speaker, the SALT
talks will be resumed in Vienna next
week, The United States must adopt a
position of flexibility and compromise if
these important talks are to succeed.
The distinguished president of the Ford
Foundation, McGeorge Bundy, testified
yesterday before the Subcommittee on
Arms Control, International Law and Or-
ganization of the Senate Committee of
Foreign Relations. I believe his remarks
are of great significance and I include
them at this point:
STATEMENT O' MCGEORGE BUNDY
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-
Conimittee: I am happy to accept your invi-
tation to testify on the arms race, and I am
particularly happy to appear in company
with Dr. York. I would like to associate My-
self strongly with his basic argument.
My broad view of the arms race was stated
last October in an article in Foreign Affairs,
and to save the time of the Committee I
would like, with your permission, to offer that
article for the record instead of repeating it.
Its principal conclusion was simply that the
strategic arms race between the United
States and the Soviet Union has gone too
far, threatens to go further, and should be
stopped by an early agreement between these
two great powers. Since then SALT has be-
gun in a businesslike way, and our Govern-
ment is now considering what its position will
be as the talks resume in Vienna next week.
My own strong belief is that the best next
step for the United States in this field is to
follow the course proposed in Senate Resolu-
tion 211. That Resolution first states the
sense of the Senate that prompt negotiations
be urgently pursued between the two great
powers, and on this point I think there is
little or no disagreement among Americans.
The second part of the Resolution expresses
the sense of the Senate that we should now
propose an immediate suspension by both
sides "of further deployment of all offensive
and defensive nuclear strategic weapons sys-
tems. An excellent basic argument in favor
of this Resolution is developed in the report
submitted by Senator Fulbright, and I will
not Waste your time by repeating it. Let me
rather offer ten brief comments on the sig-
nificance of your Committee's position.
1. I assume that in passing Senate Resolu-
tion 211, the Senate will be uging the Presi-
dent to propose to the Soviet Union the
mutual suspension of these deployments for
some reasonable term during which further
progress could be made toward a definite
agreement. There are some who suppose that
the word "moratorium" implies a form of
permanent self-entanglement, but as I un-
derstand it no such self-entanglement is
either necessary or intended.
2. I strongly support the statement in
the Committee Report that an agreed sus-
pension of deployment of strategic systems
will necessarily imply a suspension also of
tests?as well as deployment?of such emerg-
ing systems as MIRV. The Committee Re-
port makes the correct connection between
the Soviet SS-9 and the American MIRV.
This connection goes both ways. Just as the
Soviets must limit SS-9 if they wish to stop
MIRV, so I believe that if we are to get any
early limit on SS-9 deployment, we ourselves
must place MIRV on the bargaining table.
3. I believe that there will not be much
progress in SALT until the United States
Government is prepared to make a specific
proposal. I think the odds are heavy that it
will prove wise and right for us to move
first. The Committee has heard the sensitive
and perceptive testimony of Professor Mar-
-shall Shulman on Soviet attitudes towards
-arms negotiation. I share his view that So-
viet wariness is rit least equal to our own.
Our experience, understanding and present
strength make it-right for us to take the
initiative.
4. Specifically, I believe that as a part of
any proposal for an agreed moratorium the
United States should take a first step by
announcing a suspension of its own deploy-
ment of ABM and MIRV for a limited time.
Such a time could and should be
relatively brief, and its extension could and
should depend upon the promptness and
seriousness of Soviet response. There might
be some marginal inconvenience for our de-
fense organization in such a suspension, and
our already overwhelming' strategic war
plans might need marginal revision if specific
planned deployments are delayed?but there
is no real and present danger in such a lim-
ited suspension, and if we want results in
SALT, we should try it. How long such a
trial should be, and precisely what it should
include, are matters I do not attempt to
cover, since it would be unwise for a private
citizen to try to define the exact length and
direction of any first step. My point is simply
that we should begin by an action as well as
a proposal.
5. This belief rests not on any sentimental
notion that we must be more virtuous than
the Russians, but rather upon the deep con-
viction that effective limitation and reduc-
tion of the strategic arms race is an objective
deeply in our own national interest as well
as the interest of all mankind. It is wholly
false to suppose that the national security
is always served by adding strategic weapons
and never by their limitation. In the world
of the 1970s the truth is more nearly the op-
posite. We have more than enough strategic
weapons today. The addition of new systems
which will inevitably produce further Soviet
systems is not the road to safety for anyone
in any country.
6. In particular we should be on guard
against the notion that it is useful to press
the development or deployment of any given
weapons system because of its value as a bar-
gaining-counter for SALT. It is quite true
that if we get nowhere in SALT and if Soviet
strategic expansion continues, we shall have
to take careful stock of our own needs. But
there is no evidence at all that pressing the
deployment of systems we do not yet need
is likely to have a constructive effect on
Soviet behavior in SALT. There are times and
topics for toughness with Moscow, but SALT
in April is not one of them, and many of
those who urge this tactic are men who do
not want SALT to succeed. It will be very
hard to get a good agreement even if we do
only what we have to do, It will probably be
impossible if we provide unnecessary am-
munition to Soviet weapon-lovers by press-
ing our own deployments relentlessly
throughout the talks.
7. In moving toward effective limitation of
the arms race, we shall need to be alert and
skeptical against distractions and diversions
from those whose special interests may be
threatened. The history of arms negotiation
includes many examples of efforts by the
partisans of particular weapons systems to
prevent any agreement at all. During the
negotiations before the Limited Test Ban
Treaty, for example, it was suggested that
the Soviets might obtain some decisive ad-
vantage by secret nuclear tests conducted be-
hind the sun or by the construction of un-
derground holes so big that the very exist-
ence of a test could not be detected. These
arguments now rest properly in the dustbin
of dead fantasy. But now new dangers are
depicted in the effort to justify a refusal to
limit or delay our own new weapons systems.
Such arguments should be subjected to most
meticulous and skeptical analysis, and in
such study the role of the Congress is of
high importance.
.8, There is a particular danger in the un-
critical acceptance of doctrines of strategic
superiority?or even sufficiency?which may
be used by zealous men in support of their
own preferred weapons. This is as true of
the Eisenhower Administration's belief in
"prevailing" in a general war as it is of
later doctrines of "assured destruction" and
"damage limitation." All of these forms of
words can be used to justify excessive ex-
penditure on unnecessary strategic systems.
At present there are four new criteria of
strategic sufficiency, but the Administration
has not told us what they are. According to
press reports, these criteria include "as-
sured destruction," "hostage equality,"
"crisis stability" and "third country pro-
tection." If the Administration and the Con-
gress are not alert and watchful, criteria like
these can be protective umbrellas for un-
checked strategic expansionism. They can
also be roadblocks in the way of arms limita-
tion. They deserve public discussion. My
own conviction is that the realities of stra-
tegic nuclear weapons are not subject to
control by such verbal formulae. In the
language of Justice Holmes, I believe that
criteria like these tend to be spiders' webs
inadequate to control the dominant facts.
9. The main proposition which we need
to understand in order to limit the dangers
of the nuclear age is that enough is enough.
The Soviet Union and the United tSates
have long since reached and passed
that point. Each is now able to do totally
unacceptable damage to the other, no mat-
ter how a nuclear catastrophe begins. Sane
political leaders on both sides know this
reality for what It is. It is of course possible
that some still unknown technological de-
velopment might genuinely disrupt this
fundamental parity, but there is no evi-
dence whatever that any such development
is likely in the present decade. So we have
enough, and more than enough, and we are
on the edge of a most unstabilizing and
dangerous escalation. Now is the time to
stop.
10. The Committee Report recognizes what
I would like to emphasize in closing: that
while citizens can comment and the Senate
can advise, only the President can decide.
It will take negotiation to reach agreement,
and the official position of the Government
of the United States can be stated to the
Soviet Union only by our President and his
authorized agents. The President must
choose the timing and the shape of any in-
itiative he takes; In the end his leadership
is what will decide. As he considers the pos-
sible choices and deliberates on decisions
which have not yet been made, the Presi-
dent is entitled to the thoughtful advice of
the Senate, and in this field, where the
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
E 3028 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extensions of Remarks April 9, 1970
weight of bureaucratic influence has hietori-
cally been heavily on the side of arms as
against arms control, such advice can be of
particular value to him. The easy course is
always to avoid decisions; politically the
argument for weapons is easy, and the argu-
ment for acts of restraint is hard. A I'resi-
dent who wants to take the lead needs an the
help he can get. The Senate can give such
help, and in this situation it is obviously
the duty of citizens to respond to the Sen-
ate's request for their honest views. I have
stated mine, and I will be glad to try to
answer your questions.
HELLS CANYON NATIONAL
RECREATION AREA
HON. AL ULLMAN
OF OaEGON
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, .4pri/ 9, 1970
Mr. 'ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, in a recent
article in the Oreg'onian's Northwest
magazine, Willis Hobart describes the
unique beauty of the Hells Canyon por-
tion of the Snake River, which separates
Oregon and Idaho. .Elowever, as Mr. Ho-
bart explains:
Today only about 120 of the entire 1000
miles, lying in the Middle Snake and Hells
Canyon area atilt characterize the churning,
ruggedly beautiful river that Captain Wil-
liam Clark first named the Lewis, for his
explorer partner Mariwether.
I fully understand Mr. Hobart's sense
of urgency about designating and pre-
serving this natural treasure. For this
reason, I have introduced a bill, H.R.
16437, to designate the "Hells Canyon
National Recreation Area."
My bill differs from other measures
that have been introduced to deal with
the future of the Middle Snake region.
It provides for intensive recreational de-
velopment of part of the area while set-
ting aside a large area in its present
roadless state. The recreational develop-
ment will in no way detract from the
natural beauty of the canyon. It will ex-
tend the enjoyment of the area to those
people who would otherwise be prevented
from viewing this spectacular creation of
nature.
I would like to reprint excerpts from
Mr. Hobart's article at this point of the
RECORD SO that my colleagues will have a
better understanding of the country we
are trying to protect and designate for
future generations.
The excerpts follow:
HELLS CANYON OF THE SNAKE
Hells Canyon of the Snake?merely its
name signifies the treachery encountered by
the earliest explorers. Most saw it not merely
as a wasteland but truly Hells Canyon, a na-
tural barrier of magnificent proporeions,
challenging safe passage to the Willamette
prairies or local gold fields. But the Indians
saw it as the "Holy Mother Snake", a bounti-
ful provider of game, salmon, steelhead,
sturgeon and more?a twisting, roaring, tur-
bulent oasis in .an arid land that normally
averages only around 12 inches of raenfall
annually.
It is a stream replete with historical events
ranging from the encampments of the Lewis
and Clark Expedition at the mouth of the
Clearwater River to the U.S. Army's tragic
persecution of the Nez Perce Indians. Tiling
of the white mart's maltreatment, Chief
Joseph led his men, womeli and children in
1877 across the swollen waters of the Snake
near Dug Bar without loss of tribesman or'
horse on their historic 1000 mile "strategic
retreat" for freedom, a feat that has been
/ikened to the ancient Greek's Retreat of the
Ten Thousand. Later the proud Nez Perce (a
name derived from the 'misnomer "Pierced
Noses") were finally forced to surrender only
a few miles from the Canadian border's
safety. e
Petroglyphs, early Indian drawings pains-
takingly etched on scattered rocks, hint of
the area's rich archeological history dating
back several thousand years to the conti-
nent's earliest inhabitants. Of an estimated
200 archeological sites, the number systemat-
ically excavated and studied can almost be
counted on the fingers of one hand. Hope-
fully, future investigations in the area will
provide greater insight into man's earliest
life and movements in North America.
Other early explorers of the river included
Wilson Price Hunt, Robert Stuart and Cap-
tain B.L.E. Bonneeille who wrote in 1833
that "Nothing we had ever gazed upon in
any other region could for a moment com-
pare in wild majesty and impressive stern-
ness with the series of scenes Which here at
every turn astonished ovraeenses and filled
us with awe and delight."
Much of the Snake River today would be
virtually unrecognizable to pioneers who
first fought that pristine stream. While
two-thirds of the entire Snake Basin is
range and forest, cne-fourth is now domi-
nated by agriculture, principally irrigated
crops, livestock and dry-farmed grain.
The river has been dammed, polluted, di-
verted for irrigation, municipal uses, to cool
a nuclear plant, paper and pulp production
and other industrial purposes. Thus by the
time its waters merge with the Columbia,
they've seen a lot of use. Yet the remaining
wild water, characterized by Hells Canyon's
churning rapids, polished boulders, and white
sand beaches, are surprisingly clean, attesting
to the river's natural ability to cleanse it-
self, given the chance.
In size, the entire Snake River Basin ri-
vals New England and New York State com-
bined. Among Northwest rivers, the Snake
is second only to the Columbia and provides
fully one-fifth the Columbia's total flow.
Springing from the Yellowstone-Teton area
of Northwest Wyoming, the Snake swings to
the southwest through Idaho's Burley-Twin.
Falls regions, circles to our border, heading
north to pick,up this state's Owyhee, Malheur
and Powder rivers amid Idaho's Bruneau, Wei-
ser and Payette rivers, tripling in size in the
last fifth of its course. And it also is here
along this last one-fifth of its, journey that
the Snake enters Hells Canyon, the deepest
verdant gorge on this continent, at 6550 feet,
more than twice as deep as our average
coastal mountains are tall. Mary's Peak, tall-
est of the Coast Range at slightly over 4,000
feet elevation, would be completely engulfed
in Hell's Canyon, it's top only a tiny plateau
nearly 2,500 feet below the Canyon's rim.
Too many view Hells Canyon in only one
of its many facets, either its spectacular
depth its fish or its wildlife or recreational
resource, the wild Snake River itself or its
power potential, But it is as a whole that
it's uniqueness genuinely stands out. Com-
pressed within its scope from river to rim,
the canyon progresses through all six North
American "life zones" end their character-
istic fauna and flora, ranging front the
desert-like Sonoran zones at or near the
river's edge to the Alpine tundra atop the
Seven Devils Mountains.
Many of its slopes below 4,000 feet are
carpeted with grass and have been grazed by
livestock since the mid-1800's. Timber adds
flavor to the scenery over 4.000 feet, unlike
the more barren appearing Grand Canyon
of the Colorado or the Black canyon of the
Gunnison. Climate too may seem a paradox
having snow on the rim at times yet Me-
tering under 100 degreer. F. temperatures at
river's edge in mia-sumn,er.
Today .only about 120 of its entire 1000
miles, lying in the Middle Snake and Hells
Canyon area still characterize the churning,
ruggedly beautiful river that Captain Wil-
liam Clark first named the Lewis, for his
explorer-partner Meriwether. That this re-
stricted area remains much the same today
as before may only be due to its remoteness
and comparative inaccessibility?character-
istics which still provide much of the Middle
Snake's charm.
Native wildlife incluces the black bear,
mule deer, elk, mink, river otter, racoon,
cougar, bobcat, coyote and farther down-
stream, the rarer Northwest or Idaho white-
tail deer. Eagles, ospreye and peregrine fal-
cons, among our rarer birds, share the winds
with vultures, cliff swallows and many more.
Here too, the chukar partridge, a bird intro-
duced about 15 years age, has found a good
toehold and prospers. Quail, grouse and many
others call the area home. Altogether, more
than 150 different species of birds have been
counted in the area.
Common to all wildlife and birds however,
is the need for living space?nesting areas
for birds in summer and 'wintering range for
wildlife. Conservationiets estimate that
nearly 12,000 acres of irreplaceable wildlife
habitat would be lost if the area were to be
flooded, an especially severe blow to big game
annually crowded down from summer pas-
ture by snow.
Native salmon and stee..head have received
their share of concern since plans began for
construction of Bonneville Dam In the 1930's.
But with only a 60-font head, that dam was
to confuse its critics, little impeding the up-
stream passage of migratory game fish
through its new ladder facilities. On the
other hand, the second major Columbia darn,
Washington's 316 foot Grand Coulee, did in-
deed halt upstream pasasge, effectively block-
ing 1,140 miles of spawning streams, And at
any rate, the general trend for the salmon
and steelhead of the Columbia system has
been downhill.
Today the Snake (primarily its lower seg-
mnent) remains the best producer of salmon
and steethead in the entire Columbia River
system. Of this, Idaho's Salmon River, im-
mortalized as the "River of No Return," is
by' far the Snake's most important fish-pro-
ducing tributary which -would be blocked by
the proposed China Gardens re-regulating
dam, planned in conjunction with the High
Mountain Sheep Dam.
Water temperatures can be very critical
for salmon and steelhead, since they require
relatively cool water for successful migra-
tion and spawning. Underscoring this prob-
lem was the month-long delay in Chinook
salmon migration in 1957. That run remained
In the Columbia's cooler waters until the
Snake's temperature dropped to an accept-
able level. Cause of the abnormally high
"thermal pollution" is Irrigation and im-
pounding of the stream by such upstream
reservoirs as Brownlee and Oxbow.
But for the white sturgeon of the Snake,
this wild stretch of river is abojet the only
thing between it and extinction. They too
have been in a general decline and this year
both Oregon and Idaho moved to give them
full protection there by banning their re-
moval from the stream. AS -early as 1933, Her-
bert Sheldon Lampmart, reporter for The
Oregonian and wild life authority, observed
that the sturgeon fisheries of the Columbia
system were virtually extinct and that ". . .
few of these fish of any great size remain."
Truly they are a fish of another age and their
physical characteristics have changed little
In many thousands of years. Though unre-
lated to sharks, they possess such general
similarities, as a cartilaginous skeleton
(rather than bone), a sickle-shaped tail, and
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
April 9, 1970
(Prose Editor-Geographer Sorensen was
elected to state our case because of the ex-
tensive field research he conducted in the
area during recent months.)
As a geographer, this editor has described
the Blue Earth River system as, "a typically
dendritic basin that drains large areas of
Waseca, Faribault, Martin and Wantonwan.
Counties where topography is relatively flat.
Along the stream courses, the surface is
'deeply channeled from 40 to 75 feet at the
headwaters to 150 to 200 feet near the Minne-
sota Valley.
"The Le Sueur and Watonwan Rivers are
the largest tributaries of the Blue Earth
River. The Maple and Cobb Rivers feed the
Le Sueur River and Perch Creek empties into
the Watonwan..
"In the lower courses the streams have
eroded their steep sided valleys through un-
consolidated glacial drift and into the under-
lying rock formation exposing Onita dolo-
nite and Jordan sandstone."
While the descriptive professional jargon
adequately serves the prupose of informing
the scholar, it fails to reveal inherent beauty,
solitude and source of joy and quiet pleasure
that is the Blue Earth River Basin. More
tragically, it fails to tell of the God-awful
eyesore the Corps of Engineers proposes to
create in its transformation of our valley
into another of its monstrous projects.
Since childhood I have walked throughout
the valleys, sometimes with rod or gun,
through woodlands, fields and pastures. I
have taken small mouth bass, walleye and
channel cat from clear pools of cool waters
and picked up agates and fossils from many
clean gravel bars. I have tasted sweet and
cold spring water flowing from the rock as I
drank in the beauty of the wooded slopes
and sheer clay banks rising from the water's
edge, and here I have found peace.
The Corps proposes to transform these
many hundreds of acres of habitat for deer,
beaver, fox, mink, muskrat, hare and human
into a widely fluctuating pool bounded by
ugly drowned timber, mud flats, mud slides,
and drowned ski slopes devoid of life.
The clay cliffs will slump and drowned
grassland will slide down lubricated clay
slopes into a turbid lake out of the ecological
balance needed to support game fish in what
was and could again be one of the best small
mouth bass streams in America, and pos-
terity will never know the joyous awe of
standing on a precipice towering one hun-
dred feet above the emerald ribbon that is
the Little Cobb as it meanders toward the
Blue Earth.
It is for them and us we ask, Please don't
do it.
In addition, I also wish to insert two
articles concerning the Plaintiff which
appeared in the February 21 issue of the
Mankato Free Press, Mankato, Minn.
These articles attest to the excellence of
this college publication:
"PLAINTIFF" WINS ALL AMERICAN
MAGAZINE HONORS
"Plaintiff," Mankato State College's stu-
dent edited .literary magazine, has been
awarded All American honors by the Associ-
ated College Press rating service for the fall
1969 issue. '
The high rating is the sixth national honor
the magazine has received since being es-
tablished in 1964.
The 52-page magazine, which contained
poetry, fiction, essays, woodcuts and Photog-
raphy, was edited by David Hunter, a senior
from Mankato.
Other staff members included associate
editor?Ted Anderson, a senior from Man-
kato; art editor?Mike Griffin, a senior from
Minnetonka; poetry editor?Loren. Burkel,
a senior from Mankato; and prose editor?
Ed Sorensen, a graduate student from St.
Peter.
ApPrceMAINMPlatiiiiii CAgREUfzi:ViaraNO040009-3 -E
Advisers for the current year are Lawrence
Holmes, associate professor of English, and
Dr. Heino Ambros, associate professor of
political science.
MSC PLAINTIFF EDITORIAL STAND
AGAINST DAM
The winter editon of the Plaintiff, Mankato
State College literary magazine, will carry an
editorial opposing the Blue Earth River dam
proposed, by the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers.
Prose editor Ed Sorensen, a geographer who
has done extensive field research in the
valley, predicts the corps' proposal will trans-
form many hundreds of acres of habitat for
wildlife and humans into "a widely fluctuat-
ing pool bounded by ugly drowned timber,
mud flats, mud slides, and drowned ski
slopes devoid of life."
"We feel that America s :been raged
fer lnog enough and t projects under-
taken in the na ? progress are eroding
the last remnant of a once lovely continent,"
says the editor'
"We fur-the ? elieve that with our resources
dwindling, a ernative solutions are less ex-
pensive in eal cost even when the initial
cost is high"
EAST
EAST ORA GE COUNCIL SUPPORTS
REGISTER RG VOTERS IN POST
OFFICES
HON. JOSEPH G. ISH
OF NEW JERSEY
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATI
Thursday, April 9, 1970
Mr. MINISH. Mr. Speaker, I should
like to bring to the attention of my col-
leagues the resolution adopted by the
council of the city of East Orange, N.J.,
and its mayor,, William S. Hart, Sr., on
March 10, 1970.
This resolution supports the principle
of providing the facilities of the U.S. Post
Office for voter registration, thereby
making registration as effortless and
easily available as possible.
Legislation to provide for this system
is pending before the House Elections
Subcommittee, which, I hope, will give it
swift and favorable attention. The res-
olution of the East Orange council
follows:
RESOLUTION 1-116, CITY COUNCIL OF
EAST ORANGE
Whereas, all citizens should exercise their
right to vote; and
Whereas, many such persons have not
taken advantage of their right to vote by
reason of their failure to register; and
Whereas, the Congress of the United States
of America has before it proposals that legis-
lation be enacted to provide for the regis-
tration of voters at the various U.S. Post Of-
fices during regular business hours; and
Whereas, many of our citizens frequent
premises of said U.S. Post Offices; and
Whereas, the use of such U.S. Post Office
facilities would aid in the registration of
voters and provide better representation upon
elections of persons to office and the resolu-
tion of public questions,
Now, therefore, be it resolved, That the
Congress of the United States be and it is
hereby urged to pass legislation providing for
the use of U.S. Post Office facilities for the
registration of voters; and
Be it further resolved, That copies of this
resolution be forwarded to the President of
the United States, the President of the U.S.
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, Senators Williams and Case of
New Jersey, and Congressmen Minish and
Rodino of New Jersey.
I hereby certify that the above is a true
copy of Resolution 1-166 adopted by the City
Council of East Orange, March 9, 1970, and
approved by the Mayor, March 10, 1970.
In testimony whereof, I have hereto set my
hand, and affixed the corporate seal of said
City, this 11th day of March AD. 1970.
City therk.
LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY
HON. JOHN D. DINGELL
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, April 9, 1970
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, Febru-
ary 16, 1970, marked the 52d anniversary
of Lithuania's declaration of independ-
ence. In commemoration of Lithuania's
Independence Day, Mayor Roman S.
Gribbs of Detroit, Mich., issued a procla-
mation saluting Detroit residents of
Lithuanian extraction. Similarly, the
Detroit Lith.uanian Organizations Cen-
ter adopted a commemorative resolution.
So that my colleagues may have an
opportunity to be familiar with these
two documents, I insert their texts at
this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
PROCLAMATION?CITY OF DETROIT, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE
LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY,
FEBRUARY L6, 1970
Wher s, the hearts of all loyal Lithuani-
ans are specially stirred each year at this
time bee. use February 16 marks the date
52 years ego, when Lithuania declared its
independ rice from Czarist Russia, and
Where.., despite three totalitarian regimes,
includin the present yoke of Communist
control, his gallant people's fervent cry for
liberty as not been silenced, and
Wh eas, the United States government
supp ts the belief of Lithuanians every-
whe e in the eventual re-establishment of
Lit uania as a free and sovereign state by
refusing to recognize its incorporation into
the Soviet Union, and
Whereas, this year, Lithuanians of the
Detroit metropolitan area will commemorate
the anniversary of their declaration of inde-
pendence on Sunday, February 15 at the
McAuley Auditorium at Mercy College
Now, therefore, I, Roman S. Gribbs, Mayor
of the City of Detroit, do hereby proclaim
February 16, 1970 as Lithuanian Independ-
ence Day in Detroit and salute all Detroit
Lithuanians on this very special day for their
shining example of patriotism for their be-
loved homeland.
Given under my hand and seal this 29th
day of January, 1970.
ROMAN S. ORIBBS, Mayor.
LITHUANIAN INDEPENDEKCE DAY RESOLUTION?
FEBRUARY 16, 1970
Unanimously adopted at a mass meeting
of Americans of Lithuanian descent and
their friends, living in the Detroit Metro-
politan area, sponsored by the Detroit Lithu-
anians Organizations Center, held on Sun-
day, February 15, 1970, at 3:00 P.M. at Mercy
College of Detroit, McAuley Auditorium, De-
troit Michigan, in commemorating the 52nd
anniversary of the establishment of the Re-
public of Lithuania on. February 16, 1916.
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
op- ApprovedifoN4ibmg
re"
Whereon, the Communist regime did not
come to power in Lithuania by lega:: or
democratic process; and
Whereas, the Soviet Union took over Lithu-
ania by force of arms in June 1940; and
Whereas, the Lithuanian people are strong-
ly opposed to foreign domination and are
determined to restore their freedom and
sovereignty which they rightly and deserved-
ly enjoyed for more than seven centuries in
the past; and
Whereas, the Government of the United
States maintains diplomatic relations with
the government of the free Republic of
Lithuania and consistently has refused to
recognize the seizure of Lithuania and forced
incorporation of this freedom-loving country
into the Soviet Union; and
Whereas, the House of Representatives and
the United States Senate unanimously passed
a resolution urging the President of the
United States to direct the attention of world
opinion at the United Nations and at other
appropriate international forums and by
such means as he deems appropriate, to the
denial of the rights of self-determination
for the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia, and to bring the force of world opin-
eon to bear on behalf of the restoration of
ehese to the Baltic peoples; new. therefore
be it
Resolved, that we, Americans of Lithu-
anian origin or descent, reaffirm our adher-
ence to American democratic principles of
government and pledge our support to our
President and our Congress to achieve last-
ing peace, freedom and justice in the world;
and be it further
Resolved, that President Nixon continue to
carry out the expression of the United States
Congress contained in 1i. Con. Res. 416 by
bringing up the Baltic States question in the
United Nations and demanding the Soviets
to withdraw from Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia and be it finally
Resolved, that this resolution be submitted
Into the Congressional Record, and forwarded
to the President, United States Senators
from Michigan, Members of the V.S. Con-
greets from Michigan and the press.
R. S. SAKIS, Chairman.
HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN AS-
SEMBLY ON ARMS LIMITATION
OW WISCONSIN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, April 9, 1970 ,
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, earlier
this week the American Assembly on
Arms Limitation issued a report on the
outlook for arms limitation with refer-
ence to the strategic arms limitation
talks?SALT--scheduled to resume April
16 in Vienna.
The report represents the view of a
group of highly qualified and knowl-
edgeable private citizens who met earlier
. this month under the auspices of the
American Assembly of Columbia Univer-
sity. Their deliberations, which were
chaired by the Honorable Adrian S.
Fisher, dean of the Georgetown Univer-
sity Law School and former Deputy Di-
rector of the Arms Control and Dis-.
armament Agency, resulted in several
recommendations.
The most important of these was a
ball to the President to propose to the
Soviet Union, on a reciprocal basis, an
immediate interim halt in the deploy-
ment of strategic offensive and defensive
weapons and of tests of multiple war-
heads. The group further recommended
that, to give the proposal a chance of
success, that the impending deployment
of U.S. MIRV's?multiple independently
targeted reentry vehicles?be postponed
for 6 months.
I believe it would be wise for the Presi-
dent to heed this proposal as he deter-
mines the final decision on what the
U.S. negotiating position will be at the
SALT talks In Vienna.
Last year the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on National Security Pol-
icy and Scientific Developments held ex-
tensive hearings on the diplomatic and
strategic impact of MIRV's. After hear-
ing testimony from a number of eminent
witnesses, both in and outside the Gov-
ernment, the subcommittee unanimously
reached the following conclusions:
(1) By its nature, MIRV may increase the
temptation for a preemptive first strike;
therefore, IVIIRVing of existing missile forces
will pose a substantial threat to the present
nuclear balance.
(2) The deployment of MIRV systems by
either the Soviet Union or the United States
would increase the difficulties for achieving
meaningful arms control and could well
touch off a costly escalation of the nuclear
arms race.
(3) As both sides continue to test multi-
ple-warhead systems, the opportunity to halt
this development is fast slipping away. It
may not yet be too late to reach a workable
agreement with the Soviet Union on a mutual
testing and deployme:at moratorium.
(4) In order to obtain an adequate, en-
forceable moratorium, it is essential that
certain collateral agreements also be reached
by both sides.
(5) Because of the evident complexities
involved in achieving a safe, effective, and
meaningful agreement halting the testing of
MTRV's, that objective can best be accom-
plished within the framework of the strategic
arms limitation talks (SALT) between the
Soviet Union and the United States.
Basing its judgment on those con-
clusions, the subcommittee further rec-
ommended that the executive branch give
a high priority to proposing a MIRV
freeze at the initial session of SALT.
Although this position was acknowledged
as a prudent one by some administration
officials, including, reportedly, the Sec-
retary of State, the United States did not
ultimately make an arms freeze pro-
posal at Helsinki.
Mr. Speaker, time is fast running out
on any opportunity to obtain a MIRV
freeze and a meaningful halt in the
arms race. I am hopeful that the Presi-
dent will demonstrate a sincere dedica-
tion to the cause of arms control and
long-range national safety, and seek a
reciprocal freeze on strategic weapons
systems, as recommended by the Ameri-
can assembly group.
At this point, I am pleased to include
the report of the American Assembly on
Arms Limitation, together with an in-
troduction by Mr. Clifford C. Nelson,
president -of the American Assembly:
THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON ARMS
LIMITATION
(By Clifford C. Nelson)
These pages contain the views of a group
of Americans who met March 31?April 2, 1970,
at Arden House, Harriman, New York, to con-
sider the outlook for arms limitation. The
iiprii 9, 1970
meeting was held with immediate and time-
ly reference to the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks, scheduled to resume in Vienna.
April 16. Reference was also made to the
broader problem of slowing down the arms
race and to the effect of military expendi-
tures on national resources.
The meeting was held under the auspices
of The American Aesenibly of Columbia
University, which regularly convenes for the
purpose of focusing attection on issues of
public importance. The recommendations oi
this Assembly were adopted in the plenary
session of April 2, after two previous days of
discussions as a committee of the whole.
(Because of the urgency of the topic, stand-
ard American Assembly procedures were
modified somewhat for the occasion, and the
number of participants was reduced ac-
cordingly. Many had taken part in earlier
American Assembly programs on arms: Arms
Control, 1960, and Nuclear Weapons, 1966.)
Adrian S. Fisher, dean of the Georgetown
Law School and former deputy director of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, prepared a background paper as the
basis of discussion.
As a non-partisan educational institution
The American Assembly takes no official
stand on the opinions herein, which belong
to the participants in their private capaci-
ties. They represented themselves and not
necessarily the Institutions or persons with
whom they are associated.
FINAL REPORT OP THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY
ON ARMS Lraaneersou-1970
At the close of their discussions the par-
ticipants in The American Assembly on Arms
Limitation-1970 reviewed as a group the fol-
low statement. Although it represents gen-
eral agreement, no one was asked to sign it,
and it should not be assumed that every
participant necessarily subscribes to every
recommendation.
We call upon the President of the United
States to propose to the Soviet Union, on a
reciprocal basis, an immediate interim halt
in the deployment of strategic offensive and
defensive weapons and of tests of multiple
warheads. To give this proposal a chance of
success, we ask the President to defer for six
months the impending deployment of Mul-
tiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Ve-
hicles (MIRVs) ?
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are
resuming in Vienna at a time when man-
kind has a unique opportunity to end the
nuclear arms race. At present there exists a
roughly equal and relatively stable nuclear
balance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. A rare
coincidence of favorable political and stra-
tegic conditions provides a real but fleeting
opportunity for agreement between the U.S.
and the 'U.S.S.R. to halt the arms race in
both quantity and quality of weapons, and
then to diminish the threat to mankind
posed by existing weapons, Whether agree-
ment can be reached we do not know, but
wisdom and common sense require every
plausible effort to exploit the present promise.
This opportunity will be put in jeopardy
If the U.S. soon deploys Multiple Indepen-
dently Targetable Re-Eartry Vehicles
(MIRVs), or proceeds with plans for a modi-
fied Phase II Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile System (ABM), or if the Soviet Union
extensively tests large ICBMs (58--9) with
multiple warheads (which may not them-
selves be independently targetable but may
well be steps in the development of a Soviet
multiple independently targetable delivery
system).
The introduction of M'IRVs into the pres-
ent nuclear relationship would have the ini-
tial effect of substantially increasing the
number of deliverable nuclear warheads
available to each side. MIRV program will
take on new dimensions at missile accuracy
increases. When this oceure, it becomes pos-
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
A
Appr&sidGFREsIltpsia2ytyp/20 : CLA-RDP72 s-00332R000300040009-3
E 3043
ORD ? Extension of Kemarks
t-V 1V1
Bible for one side I/it strikes first with mis-
siles armed with NfIRVs to take out more
than one missile site with a single attack-
ing missile. The obverse of this frightening
coin is that each side may fear that, unless
it strikes first, the MIRVed missiles of the
other side may be able substantially to elim-
inate its own land-based ICBM force, with
the other side still having substantial ICBM
force left in reserve.
New and worrisome uncertainties would
enter' into the strategic calculations. For ex-
ample, Secretary Laird has testified that 420
Soviet 58-9s with three warheads of five
megatons each and an accuracy of one quar-
ter of a mile could eliminate all but 50 of
our Minutemen. Similar calculations by the
Soviet Union would show that if the U.S.
were to MIRV its Minutemen with three
warheads, with yields approximating a quar-
ter of a megaton each and having an ac-
curacy of one-tenth of a mile, it could by us-
ing 580 Minutemen, eliminate all but '70
or so of the Soviet missile force.
Whatever their validity such calculations
make it clear that both sides would feel
more secure if neither one had a MIRV. The
U.S. plan to deploy MIRVed Minuteman III
in dune of this year, within two months
after the beginning of the talks, may well
close the door, on this possibility. Although
the generation of MIRVs which would be de-
ployed would not be capable of a first strike,
this step would cast serious doubts on our
seriousness in pursuing SALT. This would
present the U.S.S.R. with a fait accompli.
One of the most important things that the
SALT talks could accomplish is to prevent
the deployment of MIRVs. This opportunity
should not be lost.
We in the American Assembly therefore
call on the President to postpone this de-
ployment for six months. Such deployment
at this time would not contribute to our
Security. Far from improving our bargain-
ing Strength at SALT proceeding with that
deployment would make negotiations more
difficult, and would invite the Soviet Union
in turn to present us with faits accomplis.
No harm can result to our strategic posture
by such delay, which will involve only a
handful of land-based missiles in a MIRV
program that is already being widely ques-
tioned as unnecessary, wasteful, and certain-
ly premature, since the large Soviet ABM
program it was designed to penetrate does
not exist.
We also suggest that current U.S. and
Soviet testing of multiple warheads com-
plicates the political and strategic climate
on which these negotiations depend. We
urge mutual restraint in this regard.
We also urge postponement in implement-
ing the proposed modified Phase II of the
Safeguard System. The argument that go-
ing ahead with this program would
strengthen our bargaining position at Vienna
is not persuasive; authorizing armaments
so that they can be included in a disarma-
ment program soon reaches the point of
diminishing returns. If both sides play this
game, SALT will result in an increase in the
arms race. Going ahead with modified Phase
II Safeguards so soon after Phase I had been
made a separate program would belie %e
promise of deliberate consideration upon
which that separation was in part based. It
would more likely give the Soviets the im-
pression that the U.S. was determined to
push the complete Safeguards program to
a finish, come what may. This would make
success in SALT less rather than more likely.
These measures of restraint will give our
negotiators a chance. But the negotiation of
a treaty at the SALT talks will be difficult
and complex and may take years. To keep
the present opportunity from eroding dur-
ing this period, an interim halt is necessary
to prevent any substantial changes in the
rough strategic balance which now makes
such an agreement possible.
We therefore urge the President of the
United States to propose to the Soviet Union
on. a reciprocal basis, an immediate two-year
suspension of the deployment of strategic
offensive and defensive weapons and of the
tests of multiple warheads. Specifically we
propose that during this two-year period
interim halt there would be:
1. No testing of any multiple warheads,
whether MRV or MIRV;
2. No deployment of multiple warheads;
3. No new deployment of land-based inter-
continental ballistic missiles;
4. No construction of Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile radars or deployment of anti-ballistic
missile interceptors;
5. No new "starts" on constructing subma-
rines for launching ballistic missiles.
In such an interim agreement we see no
necessity for limits on air defenses or on
new bomber construction because develop-
ments in these areas do not carry an immedi-
ate potential for upsetting the present stra-
tegic balance.
The short term of the agreement and its
comprehensive quality would simplify the
requirement for inspection. From the stand-
point of the U.S. security, compliance with
these provisions can be adequately deter-
mined by national means of verification. In
particular, the halt in Soviet buildup of
ICBMs and SLBMs, including the 58-9, could
be verified. With regard to the restrictions on
multiple warhead testing, however, to en-
hance confidence during the interim halt, an
understanding that missile tests will be pre-
announced and restricted to designated
areas may be desirable.
The restraints that we propose and an
agreed interim halt would create an environ-
ment of stability and mutual confidence. In
such an improved climate more lasting
agreements, taking account of new tecno-
logical and political developments, could be
achieved.
We have not attempted to blueprint the
details of a more permanent agreement;
planning for it should take account of what
is learned during the interim halt. Some of
the major issues which would need to be
taken into account during the negotiations
of a treaty are:
1. ABM levels. A key question appears to
be whether some level of ABMs is necessary
for the U.S. in light of the developing Chi-
nese nuclear capability. We believe that an
area ABM is not vital to protecting U.S. in-
terests in Asia and that we should be pre-
pared to accept a mutually agreed zero ABM
level if it improves the prospects for obtain-
ing an effective agreement with the Soviet
Union. Without an ABM, deterernce is as
effective against China as against others;
and a Safeguard system designed for area
defense aginst the Chinese may, in the eyes
of Soviet planners, pose a threat to their de-
terrent.
2. Control on Missile Testing. A ban on
MIRVs would require a prohibition on all
multiple warhead tests and limits on a num-
ber and location of all missile tests. We be-
lieve that such controls would be feasible
and desirable.
3. Reduction. We believe that the U.S.
should seek agreement on reduction in num-
bers of strategic systems. In particular the
U.S. should consider proposing the phasing
out of fixed land-based missiles which will
become increasingly vulnerable even if
MIRVs are banned.
Depending on how these and related issues
are resolved, a whole range of agreements is
possible. One type of agreement which most
of us would favor would seek to freeze the
existing situation by banning MIRVs and
ABMs. A second type would concentrate on
banning ABMs and phasing out fixed land-
based missiles if It does not prove possible to
ban MIRVs. A third type would focus on
freezing numbers Of offensive missiles and
limiting ABMs if it is not possible to ban
MIRVs and if the judgment is reached that
an area ABM against China is needed. On our
current understanding of the issues most of
us favored the first type of agreement.
* *
We believe that the initiatives and agree-
ments we propose will enhance U.S. security
by improving the prospects for peace. These
efforts can also lead to the wise and prudent
use of our national resources. The expendi-
tures thus avoided would amount to at least
several billion dollars a year in the short run
and much more in the long run if the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. enter into a new and cost-
lier phase of the arms race. The SALT talks,
and the clearer assessment of our real se-
curity requirements which may result from
those talks, may prevent these expenditures.
More of our resources can then be devoted
to human neeas, both at home and abroad.
This is an important aspect of our national
security. Unless urgent social needs are met,
our national security may be progressively
undermined, not by external threats but by
failure to meet internal and justifiable social
needs.
The negotiation of a treaty to end the
arms race will involve many complex tech-
nical details. But the overriding considera-
tions are not technical; they are deeply po-
litical. They require a fresh and clear re-
assessment of the fundamentals of U.S.
security.
We must recognize that it is at least as
dangerous to focus on "worse cases" as it is
to overlook significant threats to our deter-
rent. If one proceeds from the most pessi-
mistic view of U.S. capabilities, and the most
generous view of the Soviet capabilities, one
arrives at a U.S. second-strike posture that
may look to the Soviets so much like a first-
strike posture that they will be inclined to
increase their own forces, thereby continuing
the arms race and increasing the danger of
nuclear war. In fact, the proper test for the
adequacy of U.S. nuclear retaliatory power
is not the U.S. worst estimate of its effective-
ness, but the Soviet estimate of the damage
it would suffer in a nuclear exchange. That
estimate will not be based on assumptions
that take the Soviet performance at its best
possible level and the U.S. performance at
its worst. If we arm against a "parade of
imaginary horribles" on the part of an ad-
versary, the adversary will do the same, and
we will have devised a sure prescription for a
dangerous and wasteful a:rms race.
We have made this mistake in the past,
from a misdirected sense of caution. In the
interests of our own security we must not
make this mistake again. We must end the
nuclear arms race.
PARTICIPANTS IN THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON
ARMS LIMITATION-4970
Adrian S. Fisher, Dean, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law School (Discussion Leader and
Director of Drafting).
Alexander, Archibald S., Bernardsville, New
Jersey.
Bader, William B., New York.
Broomfield. Lincoln P. Center for Inter-
national Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Brown, Courtney C., Editor, Columbia
Journal of World Business.
Daniloff, Nicholas, United Press Interna-
tional, Washington, D.C.
Dudman, Richard, St. Louis Post Dispatch,
Washington, D.C.
Finkelstein, Lawrence S., Center for Inter-
national Affairs, Harvard University.
Fischer, Benjamin B., Harriman Scholar,
Columbia University.
Fitzgerald, Ernest, Businessmen's Educa-
tional Fund, Washington, D.C.
Gulick, Lewis, the Associated Press, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
2D02/03
E 3044 Approved FegNease a 0 ? CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
RESSIONAL KECQRD? Extensions of Remarks
Halperin, Morton H., The Brookings Insti-
Union, Washington, D.C.
lienkin, Louis, Hamilton Fish Professor of
International Lair & Diplomacy, Columbia
University,
Herzfeld, Charles- Ma Technical Director,
Defense-Space Group, ITT, Nutley, New Jer-
sey.
Knorr, Klaus, Center for International
Studies, Peineeton University.
Manton, Thomas 13., United Church of
Christ, New York.
McDermott, Rev. Patrick P., S.J., Assistant
Director, Division of World Justice & Peace,
United States Catholic Conference, Washing-
ton, D.C.
Patfrath, Leslie, President, The Johnson
Foundation, Racine.
Palfrey; John G., Professor of Law, Colum-
bia University.
Parrent, Rev. Allan, Department of Inter-
national Affairs, National Council of
Churches, Washington, D.C.
Per:singer, Mrs. Richard, Chairman, Com-
mittee on. Public Affairs, National Board of
the Y.W.C.A., New York-.
Posvar, Wesley W., Chancellor, University
of Pittsburgh.
Rathjens, George W., Professor of Political
Science; Massacausetta Institute of Tech-
nology.
Scoville, Herbert, Jr., Carnegie Endowment
for IntereationaLPeace, Washington, D.C.
Shulman, Marshall Ds, Director; The Rus-
sian Institute, CI:aural:dm University.
Stone, Jeremy J., International Affairs Fel-
low, Council on Foreign Relations, New York.
Stuhler, Barbara, Associate Director, Min-
nesota World Affairs Council, Minneapolis.
Yeernolinsky, Adam, Professor or Law,
Harvard-17 eversity.
LAWS AND RULES FOR PUBLICATION OF
THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
CODE OF LAWS OF TEla UNTTED Sraree
TI'ILE 44, Sea-Vox 181. CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD; ARRANGEMENT, STYLE, CONTENTS,
AND retersxEs.?The Joint Committee on
Printing. shall have control of the ar-
rangement and style of the CONGRES-
SIONAL REeoRn, and while providing, that
it shall be substantially a, verbatim re-
port of proceedings shall take all needed
action for the reduction of_ unnecessary,
bulk, and shall provide for the publica-
tion of an index of the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD semimonthly during, the sessions
of Congress and at the close thereof.
(Jan. 12, 1895, c. 23, e 13, 28 Stat. 603.)
TITLE 44, SECTION 182b. SAME; ILLUS-
TRATIONS, MAPS, DIAGRAMS.?Nu mapsedia-
grams, or illustrations may be inserted in
the REcoen without the approval of the
Joint Committee on Printing. (June 20,
1936, C. 630, 1 2, 49 Stat. 1546.)
To provide for the prompt publication and
delivery of the CONGRESSIONAL REemsn the
Joint Committee on Printing has adopted the
following rules, to which the attention of
Senators, Representatives, and Delegates is
respectfully invited:
1. Arrangement of the daily Congressional
Record.--The Public Printer shall arrange
the contents at the daily CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD as follows: the Senate proceedings
shah alternate with the House proceedings
In order of placement in consecutive issues
insofar as such an arrangement is feasible,
and Extensions Of Remarks and Daily Digest
shall follow: Provided, That the makeup of
the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD shall proceed
without regard to alternation whenever the
Public Printer deems it necessary in orderto
meet production ant delivery schedules.
2. Type ancastjae.--The Public Printer shall
print the report of the proceedings and de-
bates-or the Senate and House of Representa-
tives, as furnished by the Official Reporters of
the CONGRESSIONAL E,,COUD, in 71/2 -point type;
and all matter a:selected in the remarks or
speeches of Members of Congress, other than
their own words, and all reports, documents,
and other matter authorized to be inserted
in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD shall be printed
in 61/2-point type; and all rollcalls shall be
printed in 6-point type. No italic or black
type nor, words in capitals or small capitals
shall be used for emphasis or prominence;
nor will unusual indentions be permitted.
These restrictions do not apply to the print-
ing of or quotations, from historical, official,
or legal documents or papers of which a
ilteral reproduction is necessary.
3. Return of manuscript.?When manu-
script is submitted to Members for revision it
should-be returned to the Government Print-
ing Office_ not later than 9 o'clock pen. in
order to insura pubileation_in the CONGRES-
SIONAL RErORD issued on the followinamorn-
ing; and if all, of the manuscript is not fur-
nished at the time specified, the Public
Printer is authorized to withhold it from the
CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD for L day. In no case
will a speech be printed in the CONCURS..
SIGNAL Beeman of tha day of its delivery lithe
manuscript is furnished later than 1.2 o'clock
midnight.
Tabular matter.--The manuscript of
speeches containing tabularatatements to be
published in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD shall
be in the hands of the Public Printer not
aster than 7 ()alba p.m., to insure publica-
tion' the tollewing morning., When possible,
manuscript copy for tabular matter should
be' sent to the Government Printing, Office
two- or more days it advance of the date of
publication in the CONGRESSIONAL Mame.
Proof will be furnished promptly to the
lifember of Congress to he submitted' by him
instead of manuscript copy when he offers it
air publication in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
5. Proof farnisheiL?Proofs. of "leave to
print" and advance speeches will not be fur-
nished the day the manuscript is received but
will be submitted the following,day, whenever
possible to do SO wItlIout causing delay, lathe
publication of, the. regular proceedings of
Congress. Advance speeches shell be set in
the CONGRESSIONAL Mama style of type, and
not more than six sets of proofs may be fur-
nished l to Members without charge.
6. Notation of withheld remarks.?If man-
uscript or proofs have not been returned in
time for publication in the proceedings, the
Public Printer will insert the words "Mr.
addressed the. Senate. (House or Com-
mittee). His remarks will appear hereafter
in Extensions el Remarks" and proceed with
the printing of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,
7. Thirty-day limit?The Public Printer
shall not publish in the CONGRESSIONAL
Risecan any speech or extension of remarks
which has been withheld for a period ex-
ceeding 30 calendar days from the date when
its printing was authorized: Provided, That
.st the expiration of each session of Congress
the time limit herein fixed shall be 10 days,
unless otherwise ordered by the committee.
8. Corrections.?The permanent CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD is made up for printing and
binding 30 days after each daily publication
.s issued; therefore all corrections must be
sant to the Public Printer within that time:
April- #-.40.14 7 0
Provided, That upon the final adjournment
of. each session of Congress the time limit
shall. be 10. days, unless otherwise ordered by
the committee.: Provided further, That no
Member of Congress shall be entitled to make
more, than one revision_ Any revision shall
consist only of, corrections of the original
copyy, and shall not include deletions of cor-
rect material, substitutions for correct ma-
terial, or additions of new subject matter.
9. The Public Printer shall not publish in
the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. the full report or
print of any committee or subcommittee
when, the report or print has been previously
printed. This rule shall not be construed to
apply to conlerence reports.
10.(e). Extensions of Remarks in the daily
Congressional Record.? When. either House
has granted leave to print (1) a speech not
delivered In either House, (2) a newspaper or
magazine article, or (3) any other matter not
gernuine. to the proceedings, it shale be pub-
lished under Extensions, of Remarks. This
rule shall not apply to quotations which form
part of a speech of. a Member, or to an au-
thorized extension of his own remarks: Pro-
vided, That no address, speech, or article
delivered or released subsequently to, the sine
die adjournment of a session of Congress may
be. printed in. the CONGRESSIONAL Riseento,
100). Makeup of the Extensions of Re-
marks.?Extensions of Remarks, in. the CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD shall be made, up by
successively, taking first an extension from
the copy. submitted by the OfficiaL Reporters
of anal-louse and then an extension,from the
copy. of the other House, so that Senate and
House extensions appear alternately, as far as
possible. The sequence for each House shall
follow as closely as possible; the order or
arrangement in which the, copy, comes from
the Official Reporters of the respective
Houses.
The, Official Reporters of. each House shall
dessig.nate and distinctly (nark the lead item
among their extensions- When both Houses
are in. session and, submit extensions, the
lead. item shall be, changed from, one House
teethe other in alternate issues, with the in-
dicated lead item of the ether House appear-
ing in second place. When only. one House
is in session, the lead item shall' be are ex-
tension submitted by a Member, of the House
in session. This rule shall not apply to
CONGRESSIONAL, RECORDS printed, atter the
sine die adjournment of the Congress.
The Public Printer shall withhold any
Extensions of Remarks which:, exceed eco-
nomical press fill or exceed; production limi-
tations. Extensions' withheld for such reasons
shall, be printed in the next issue of the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD iimnediately follow-
ing the lead items as indicated by the official
reporters.
11(a). Remarks under 5-day rule..--Re-
marks printed under the 5-day rule shall
appear in the proceedings of the daily issue
of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, suitably idea-
titled as such, following Special Orders for
the day.
11(b). Remarks in t ribute to deceased
Members.?Remarks of Members in tribute
to deceased Members or farmer Members of
Congress shall appear in the proceedings of
tee daily issue of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
following Special feeders of the day.
12. Official Reporter.?The Official Report-
ers of each House shall indicate on the manu-
script and prepare headireni for all matter to
be printed in. Extensions of Remarks and
shall make suitable reference thereto at the
proper place in the proceedings,
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
-
April 9, 1970
country's 57 million bicyclists and tricyclists) residents own cars and where bus and taxi
have been enthusiastic backers of the bike, service is practicoally nonexistent.
"John Lindsay remains a strong advocate of The Smithsonian Plan combines three
bike routes in New York City. In fact, hi- different types of bicycle paths into one in-
cycles have traditionally been one of the few tegrated system. Where traffic is heavy and
points of agreement among New York may- sidewalks are wide enough, bicyclists will
oral candidates. Following the 1965 munici- travel on the side walk. In other plaees, the
pat elections, the New York Post commented bicycle will share the street with automo-
that Bill Buckley's prbposal for an elevated bile traffic. Along particularly busy road-
bikeway along Third Avenue may have been ways, the proposal suggests that special bike
the most reasonable suggestion advanced in paths?paved areas, about six feet wide, run-
the entire campaign. While this may be more ning parallel to the road-ibe--Cons ted.
of a reflection on New York City than it is The Smithsonian Plaia fakes extensiv re-
Mr. FONG. Mr. President, the na-
on the bicycle, it is indicative Of the fawn- cautions for the bicyClists' safety. Where r tional campaign to preserve and improve
ing attention that candidates tend to pay to possible, the proposed routes run along si
--ctl, our environment has inspired a lead-
bicyclists. 'streets rather than major trunk lines. Where" Hawaii composer, R. Alexander An-
On the national level, Stewart Udall has bikes must attire the road with heavy auto-
been a strong supporter of bicycling as the mobile tralinc, the streets will be clearly derson, to write a song entitled "The Sea,
the Sky, and the Mountains." Its theme
only way to offset "the tyranny of the auto- identifledjand motorists will be reminded to
tch 'Ph lan emphasizes is that these great natural blessings may
Approved For Releas R000300040009-3 S 5477
CONGETMi8VAT/RC. eff1-1-/F7iN9RW
native in sight, the demands for recognitionlai7.
a price tag, with no readily available
of "Pedal Power" become less and less funny.
Bicycles are not a panacea for the traffic
problems, but, given the chance, they can
help. It is time for commuters and commu-
nities to give bikes a chance.
THE SEA, THE SKY, AND THE
MOUNTAINS
mobile." Lyndon Johnson waxed almost po-
etic in a message to Congress: "I see an marki
America where our air is sweet to breathe to b
and our rivers are. clean to swim in. I see and
an America where [there arel bicycle paths
running through the hearts of our great mean
cities. . , The forgotten Americans of today hazards
are those who like to walk, hike, or ride
bicycles. For them we must have trails as
- well as highways."
With bicycles, as with everything else, talk
has been more plentiful than action. There
is still nothing like a national plan for com-
muter bike routes. On the local level, how-
ever, much has been done, and there are
In fact "bike ways"?especially designated,
clearly marked routes?running through the
hearts of many of "our great cities."
One of the most ambitious and most suc-
cessful bikeways runs through downtown
Chicago. An extensive system of bike routes
leads through several city parks and along
the lake shore. As is the case in most other
cities, Chicago started its bikeway project
strictly for recreation purposes, and then ex-
panded it as shoppers sfnd commuters began
to use the routes, too. The city now has 36
regularly traveled bike routes.
And Chicago isn't all. You can commute
from Cambridge to downtown Boston on a bi-
cycle path that runs along the Charles. Mil-
waukee has 64 miles of marked bikeways.
Cities all over norida have responded to the
possibilities of bike commuting. Miami is the
hub of an extensive system of bicycle routes
connecting the central city with outlying
suburbs. Bicycles are so common in Florida
that the Coconut Grove National Bank has
set up pedal-in teller windows at its branches.
?
br rid identification of routes in order be ours for as long as man has the will
a
dge the visibility gap between bicycles
otorists.
hington is a city on a river; the river
bridges; and bridges mean special
bicycle commuters. The Smith-
t d this rob-
The most carefully planned and most in-
structive program for bicycle commuter
routes is a proposal prepared earlier this year
by three yourfg staff members in the Divi-
sion of American Studies of the Smithsonian
Institution. The Smithsonian Plan was de-
signed specifically for Washington, D.C., but
Its approach and general strategy make it a
good model for cities everywhere.
The Smithsonian Plan calls for a radial sys-
tem of routes bringing commuters from vari-
ous sections and suburbs to a common axis?
in this case, the Mall?running through the be explored not only in Washington but in
central business district of the city. It is every city that still puts a premium on such
designed to serve shoppers, tourists; and an outmoded commodity as pure pleasure.
schoolchildren, as well as thousands of COM- This ferry proposal represents all the best
muters. features of bicycle commuting in general?it
The Smithsonian Plan is modular. It can is simple, inexpensive, and rather quaint,
be started on a relatively modest scale and Perhaps, but at the same time obviously
augmented in phases. The initial "pilot" feasible and emminently reasonable. City
phase of the project, which is under con- planners who are racking their brains to find
sideration among city officials now, would simple, feasible, and reasonable solutions to
- provide routes from three residential areas? their traffic problems might do well to study
Capitol Hill, Georgetown, and 'Arlington, the Smithsonian Plan and to consider the
Virginia? to the Mall. These first routes can bicycle.
11 or rem- the idea of giving the bicycle serious thought
sonian plan
lem in a delightfuT-waThey propose that
a special ferry service be eRrblish.ed to bring
bicyclists across the Potomac to anorfro.z the
Virginia suburbs. They have even fouflt?..,a
ferry boat?the S.S. Old Duck?which wag-
recently taken out of service and docked at
a backwater in the Washington Navy Yard.
The authors of the Smithsonian Plan have
recommended that the District of Columbia
put the Old Duck back in service as a bicycle
ferry.
To date, nobody has taken the suggestion
seriously. Everybody knows that ferry boats
were pronounced dead by the city planners
eons ago. Ferries were a victim of progress;
in this era of convenience the river ferry is
an obsolete as?well, as the bicycle.
The irony here, of course, is that the on-
ward thrust of "progress" has brought us to
the point where the Old Duck is a quicker
and more convenient form of transport than
any of its vaunted successors. No doubt the
planners can prove conclusively on paper
that the idea would never work. But ask
a commuter--the Old Duck would make
sense to somebody who actually makes the
trip twice a day.
And what a wonderful trip it could be. To
ride a bike to the river bank, chug across
the river on the faithful old ferry, pedal
down the gangplank and on to the office?
it's the kind of thing you'd pay $2.50 to do
at Disneyland, and you could do it every
day, twice a day, in the heart of the city.
With a little imagination, the city could
make some money in the process. It would
be easy to serve a continental breakfast on
the trip across the river, and in the after-
noon the ferry could become the club car
of the cycling set.
In short, the Old Duck we be a
portunity to put some fun into work-
aday grind. The possibilities?for the city
and commuter?are endless. They deserve to
to preserve and protect them.
"Alex" Anderson's song is his latest
In a long list of successful compositions.
Among his most popular hits are "Lovely
Hula Hands," "Cockeyed Mayor of Ka-
unakakai," and "Mile Kalikimaka,
each of which has sold more than a
million records.
I congratulate him on composing a
m,ew song with an important, timely
niNsage. It is a song which the com-
pose\ says "will best suit those singers
with robust voice who can stand up and
really deliver a message."
I ask', unanimous consent that the
words or. "The Sea, the Sky, and the
Mountain" be printed in the RECORD.
There lAing no objection, the words
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows: ;
be expanded logically in definite steps into In the light of our collective motormania,
an extensivey
dential areas. The expanded system also in- may be hard to accept. But as space to move
eludes bike routes leading downtown from and to park the automobile in downtown
areas runs out as clean air begins to have
THE SEA, SKY AND THE MOTJNTAINS
(By it. Alexander Anderson)
The sea, the ky and the mountains
Must never c ange, will never change
If man has t will to preserve them,
To keep thei always the same.
Golden suns me, welcome rainfall,
Cooling sea eeze sweeping the land,
Lakes and r vers ever flowing
From the onutains to the shore
Keep the unpolluted, unsullied, undefiled.
Protect al God's creatures,
Birds up the sky, fishes and wild things
Do not 1 them die.
And t sea, the sky and the mountains
igh,
Let n preserve them,
Lea to conserve them
T ave.to hold them forevermore.
pocket areas in the inner city, 'where few
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If not, morn-
ing business is concluded.
WAIVER OF THE GERMANENESS
RULE
Mr. MANSI,IELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Pastore rule
on germaneness, which I understand be-
gan operating some minutes ago with-
out our being aware of it, not be con-
sidered to have begun operating until
now.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
- Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R00,0300040009-3
S 5478
Approved For Reesmedifl.02/03/20 ? CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3
tssIoNAI. RECORD? SENATE April 9, 1970
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE?EN-
ROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION
SIGNED
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the
Speaker had affixed his signature to the
enrolled, joint resolution (S.J. Res. 190)
to provide for the settlement of the labor
dispute between certain carriers by rail-
road and certain of their employees, and
it was signed by the Acting President pro
tempore (Mr. ALLEN).
.sifezT
SUSPENSION OF FURTHER DEPLOY-
MENT OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFEN-
SIVE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC WEAP-
ONS SYSTEMS
The ffenate resumed the consideration
of the resolution (S. Res. 211) seeking
agreement with the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics on limiting offensive and
defensive strategic weapons and the sus-
pension of test flights of reentry vehicles.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the vote on the
pending business occur not later than
4 o'clock p.m. today. This, I understand,
has been cleared on all sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I suggest the ab-
sence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
SALT ANIT THE FTJTITRE FOR STRATEGIC
ARMAMENTS
Mr. MUSKIK Mr. President, it is now
almost 25 years since the first atomic
bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. In
that quarter-century we have added
enormously to our arsenal of nuclear
weapons; we have increased the num-
ber and types of delivery systems. The
Soviets have entered into nuclear com-
petition until now both the United States
and Russia have the capacity to destroy
each other and much of the rest of the
world.
Because we have lived so long with the
threat of nuclear war, and because we
have become accustomed to the ingeni-
ous and terrible weapons which made
such a war possible, we sometimes act as
if the threat did not exist, and we be-
have as if the expansion a our nuclear
capacity were essential to our security
and national welfare.
The fact is, Mr. President, that more
nuclear weapons do not buy more secu-
rity. The only value in having nuclear t
weapons is to discourage and deter 0th- f
ers from attacking us. We and the Sovi- i
ets have ample numbers of deliverable b
weapons to serve that purpose today.
Adding a ,new generation of nuclear S
weapons adds to the danger of global dis- s
aster without increasing national secu- r
rity, and it decreases our capaeity to deal d
with those social and economic problems
which plague our country and many
others.
But we and the Soviets are in real
danger of launching our countries into a
new round of futile, dangerous, and po-
tentially disastrous; competition in nu-
clear weapons. At the same time, we
have an almost unique opportunity to
reach an agreement with the Soviets on
arms control which can reduce the clan-
ger r of nuclear destruction, without
lessening our national security and with-
out diverting $20 billion a year from the
needs of people.
In the years since 1945, our sizable
lead in nuclear armaments has meant
that proposals to control the strategic
arms race had little chance of succeed-
ing. Now, in 1070, there is the first clear
opening. There is both a situation of mu-
tual deterrence and an acceptable parity
of nuclear strength between the United
States and the Soviet Union. This
unique and fleeting opportunity must not
be allowed to slip away through design
or delay. We can act promptly and de-
cisively without coniinitting ourselves
hastily to any fmal solutions.
The choice that presents itself is not
that of simply talking to the Russians at
length while the arms race continues, or
seeking desperately to reach what might
be an inadequately thought-out agree-
ment. There is a third choice--taking
steps now to preserve the opportunity
for effective agreement without locking
ourselves into a final position.
Reasonable equality is the all-impor-
tant new element in 1970. Today the
United States and the Soviet Union are
roughly equal in technology and in the
destructive power of deliverable nuclear
warheads. A condition of mutual deter-
rence has prevailed for many years, be-
cause deterrence does not depend on
even rough equality. The likelihood of
any appreciable nuclear devastation by
retaliatory attack is a powerful deter-
rent to the first use of nuclear weapons.
But although relatively little opposing
nuclear strength IS enough to deter, sub-
stantial equality must be reached before
both parties will be willing to negotiate.
With the balance as it now exists, neither
side need fear that an immediate halt to
the arms race will mean permanent in-
feriority.
The present situation of nuclear bal-
ance is adequate for our own security
needs. We can never hope to do much
better and we can do a lot worse. Both
sides have learned the costs and the
dangers of attempting to win the nuclear
race. It is a race with no finish line and
the runner in second place always has
time to close the gap.
It is therefore in our interest to end
the arms race and we should do it now.
If it continues, we both at best will con-
mile to squander our resources in a
ruitless drive for meaningless superior-
ty. At worst, time will run out for us
oth?and for mankind.
There have been indications that the
oviets recognize that security is not
yrionymous with nuclear superiority. A
Kent Pravda article on the SALT talks
atecl March 7, 1970 was notable for the
absence of the traditional propaganda
theme of "general and complete disarm-
ment." Instead the article extolled the
virtues of restraint and limitation, and
talked sensibly about parity. It noted
that "a new spiral in the arms race could
not change the essence of this balance"
and that "none of the weapons systems
now seemingly within the reach of this
or that side can change this fact."
I do not know President Nixon's per-
sonal views on the question of seeking
nuclear superiority. But to the extent
that he recognizes the search for such
superiority to be futile and self-defeat-
ing, his actions are either inconsistent or
incomprehensible.
His vague demands for linking SALT
to the settlement of other political issues
complicate the negotiability of SALT
without making the other issues more
negotiable.
His criteria for what he calls nuclear
"sufficiency" insofar as they are under-
standable can undermine stability and
create a climate of unfounded fear about
mutual deterrence.
His negotiating tactics and tentative
approach are allowing the essential con-
dition of mutual security to slip away.
While the actions of the Soviet Union
have been equally ambiguous, it is not
clear whether this is a cause or a conse-
quence of the Nixon administration's pol-
icies. The continuing Soviet missile build-
up and most especially their recent SS-9
deployments do not square with their
hints of stabilizing the strategic balance
as expressed in the Pravda article.
I Nam not prepared to disregard their
missile buildup or the possibilities for
mischief in their position. But neither
am I willing to dismiss the possibilities
for serious negotiations. My point is that
we do not have to argue about interpre-
tations of Soviet motives. SALT provides
an opportunity to assess their real posi-
tion and see if we can do business to-
gether.
I do not want to assign, blame for the
past 25 years of the arms race. It is un-
knowable and unnecessary. I do not
want to have to engage in guessing games
about President Nixon's goals and stra-
tegy. I want to do something about the
here and now.
The way to start ending the strategic
arms race is to seek agreement with the
Soviet Union to an immediate and mu-
tual interim strategic standstill. This
would mean freezing the present stra-
tegic nuclear balance in all of its dimen-
sions. It would mean time to make sound
and lasting decisions later. It would pre-
serve negotiating opportunities.
This standstill would encompass all
further deployments of offensive and de-
fensive strategic weapons system and all
testing of MRV's and MIRV's. Because
of the totalityf '
pe, because of the
necessity of its taking effect immediately,
and because of the complexity of the
issues involved, I believe that the mutual
freeze should first be introduced for a 6-
month period. Starting with a 6-month
period would not by any stretch of the
imagination impair the security of either
the United States or the Soviet Union. It
would also enable both sides to determine
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040009-3