WHITE HOUSE SAYS RAID WAS FULLY COORDINATED

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CIA-RDP72-00337R000300050004-7
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9
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August 25, 2000
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4
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December 4, 1970
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proved For Release 2000/d9Pf4 :`~. A-RDP72-OO337ROOO3OOO5OOO4-7 White House nlaii!taincd of the raid's possibility in Thursday that there had August or September, two been "full coorciinat,ion or three months before it find discussion" among all occur"red,' but. was not iiitere=ted agencies of therc!t:ter consulted. government on the plan At the Defense Depart- n,in of"the ra.ict at the Son ment, ' Jerry Friccllicinl, 'r'ay prison camp in North Vietnam Nov,. 20. deputy assistant secretary White Ifouse :Press Sc- for public affairs, when ).et cry R o 11 a 1 c1 Ziegler asked for comment on The Wade the statcment in Times' story-, said: "I cat.- C:onuiientin; on an article not address the CIA's ac_ti- in. Thursday's editions of vitics or the lack thereof he Times, arhich report- . lao comment." cd that I're:..ident Nixon On Wednesday, a White i? n ci Defense ? ` ccret ry I i o u s e spokesman told Iel'dn H. Laird had given The Time.: "I won't .=ay the go-ahead for the raid, one way or another whe- V,Tkh failed to liberate tiler the CIA was involved. any U.S. prisoners. with I just can't talk about it." out cots ultin,g the Central Intei.iigonce Agency. Ziegler said, 11 can teal you ~.x'ithout getting into a specific di,a:ux ion that there was full coordina? tion and di:-cus i.on All. all perti!!etlt; ;envies in eluding the CIA" on the raid. Ziegler declined to specify when or how often the CIA was consulted on the Son Tay mission. The 'l'imes reported-- and Ziegler did not deny 1VA lI1NGTON -- The tier the CIA was advised. Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP72-00337ROO0300050004-7 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP72-00337R000300050004-7 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP72-00337R000300050004-7 ZOS A GE ES T11, IS. Anoroved For Release 2000/09 1W~C9 RDP72-00337R000300050004-7 fi ;i Ir _rE:`? n ii t ;:r .c s F ;; j~ ;) 7 i~ ~~ it Ja 11 [i t' ss i l lj 1 , d 4 1ql! 6 (~ ?-~ ? ~l ~ } ~ ~ ~ Y, r'~ '' ~.(^yy -?~ )" "4 A~ ~`~ tit f -'~ k,~ i g ii k~_+a ! - 1 fir: 1c~r ~i E~1 11 III' DA', 'ID KRASLOZV '11mc, wash;n,!Dn 13urcau Chirt WAFI-IIy,'u7i?0\-Pre ident Nixon and Defcnse f'ccrctarv llclvhl R. Laird gay e the o allcad ceder for the raid on the fine '1'h1y POII ci;mp in North Vietnam hlilhoiit consult- ing the Central Intelligence \gency, The 'T'inges has learned. Key senators who have been con- cerned about the possibility of an in- telliUence. failure and who have been quietly pr?ol.diilt; into the background. of the mission were incredulous when they learned, that the CIA was not involved. t, It's absolutely incredible," said one influential senator familiar' with defense and intelligence matters and who has not been critical of tile Ad- miliistratioll's l)ullcy in ietnalll. "What the hell do we have a CIA and a director of central intelligence for'? ,Ili conccivable' Without CIA A former senior offic?i it who had been intimately aware of the opera- tions of all government intelligence agencies for years said he would find it "inconceivable" to launch something like the Son Tay r a i d without bringing in the CIA. Senate sources indicated that CIA Director Richard Reims may have been advised of the Son '1'ay opera- tion in its early planning stage --per- baps in August or September--but that neither lie nor the CIA was further consulted before the Nov. 20 raid at the camp, just 23 miles west of Hanoi. What is particularly troubling to competent observers in Congress and elsewhere in the gover'ilnlent is that They have believed for 601A_e Ea F h'orei;il I?elatiol.ls Conlnlit- Ice Nov., 24. .The, critical question in this. regard carne up in the following exchaiige be- twecn en. John Sherman 'Coopert.R-Iy.) and Laird: Cowper: "Are you able to state the period of time in days bet grecn the date I.Wlien prisoners of war were idctltified as"being at this camp and the elate of your 111issiQll? years that the CIA has had agents in North Vietnam. What information the CIA had or alight have been able to obtain from agents or by other means oil wile- ther U.S. prisoners werc at Son Tay before the raid was ordered could not be determined. The CIA declined to comment on that or on the question of whether it had been consulted in the Son 'Pay A Defense Dcpaitnleilt spokesman said "we absolutely won't tali, about "tile nature or source of the most 1?e- cent Official intelligence available to Laird and upon which he relied in recollllllenciling exeCutiOn of the Soil Tay mission.. 11,'hite mouse 'Can't Talk' A White House official said, "I won't say one way or another wile.. ther the CIA was involved. I just can't talk about it." Other sources said they were cer- tain that other than interviews with the nine U.S. prisoners released by North Vietnam Laird relied on in- formation supplied by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence aria of the Pentagon. "I can assure you," the White House official said, "that the inter' ligencc available. to the President on this matter was as good as it could have been." That is precisely the question that has caused deep, concern in Coil- gress, the State Department ~1nd elsewhere since the Son Tay raiders returned empty-handed and since Laird's vague testimony on the in- telligence issue before the Senate Laird: "Well, that. Would be very difficult. Of course, we know that, for a f a c t, prisoners were there because of tfte illfor- lllatloll frolll the very felt' prisoners who have come out of \ornl Vietnam. But to gig e the dates and the inovemcllts of PO\\'s, we do not have that kind of intelligence on the ground. - "That cap~lbilify would he a tremendous asset., just as the capability of having a camera that would see through the roofs and into the cells would be a terrific asset. Rut we do not have that in the intelligence conlnluni- ty at the present tillie.". .50.50 Chance. Cooper: "Then it was "largely -the photographs of the camp iiself which led you to attempt the rescue nlissiQll?" Laird: "I'liRt was, the o v e rwhelming evidei ?e was, of course, attributed to the very fi;ie aerial re- connaissance which we had of the area Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP72-00337R0003000v 004LI" I.,aird4e?i~,o,~~t4,l.;~lt&r '11"h"oC/ CIA-RDP72-003378000300050004-7 otlt ills . not fault: the intelligence were Laird, Secretary of that was supplied to us" Stale William P. Rogers, even. though no POWs Henry A. Kissinger, Mr. were found. Nixon's adviser for nation.." A White House official a] security affairs, and e m p ha.sizcd Wednesday Adm. Thomas lI o o r e r, that the President knew chairman of the Joint. Then lie ordered the raid Chiefs of Staff. there was only a 50-50 "INO c li a it c e that pi-isn ieos Significance' were still at the camp, but Asked why Helms or that. he Believed it was some other CIA represen-? ~iortIi trying. tative was not present, a Even within the AdiniR ?'hite House official said: nisuation, kry officials are It doesn't m,-an a thin;. It has.absoltitely no signi- troubled over the itiiphca- ficance." tions of launching an open- helm: did attend a Na- ation as sensitive as the tional Security Council Son ?1"ay raid without tap- meeting with the Pres- ping the resources of the ideiit the following days but the Son Tay miszion government's principal in- vas not discussed. telligenc.e arm, the CIA. ' The White lieu=_e official ,The general feeling is, at confirmed a published re- the-very least, that it was imprudent. question Heillaiils "1. can't understand it," said one qualified State Department official. "It might not have made any difference in the end. The decision might have been the same. The DIA (De- fense Intelligence Agency) might well, have had the best available information. But not to seek the coun- sel_of the agency whose business it is to find nut ghat is happening in oth- er countries is certainly a departure .fram estab- lished and sound practice in national security deci- sion-making." NVhy the CIA was not consulted is a question that may well be put to t h e Administration by either the Senate'Foreign Relations' Committee or t?Se Senate Armed Servi- es Committee. While the White House and the Defense Dcpart- n.ent will not acknow- ledge that the CIA* was ex- cluded from the Son Tay operation, at least in its critical stages, it is conced- ed that the agency was not represented at, the "deci- sion meeting" with the President two clays before the raid. ? port that the President. slipped Laird a note on Soli Tay during the meet- P;irapbraziiig the Pres- ident, the official said Mrr?. Nixon wanted to assure Laird that Inc believed the planning of the mission to be carried out the next day-had been superb and that there would he no se- cond-guessing by the Pres- ident no matter how it turned out. Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP72-00337R000300050004-7 (.C 5 1:1;u114. i 111,] a. works for SOl11e tllll . .I )e- n ~ ~ -sA could safely pierce North tailed target information 914 Vic nag r' fL a d r was available Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RQ ?i ~a ~ -~Loto r'eeonnais- However, the view of a natural complement to sauce plane was lost over SAIGON 0111'1.1ON- i _Nixon.- Laird. awareness tale major air strikes of North Vietnam sov. 13, j Y S yi1s -:iS Iii I EOitGJ i'lCJ'TIiUR Times Stall 1'.rilci- SA.IGON---Soule intelligence ex- perts in Saigon--while denying spe- cific knowledge of the event--think it is almost certain that leaders of the cominanci.o raid on Son Tay knew the camp was empty.; It is inconceivable to some old hands knowledgeable about clandes- tine operations in Vietilalll that a raid o ?fsuch importance would be mounted on the basis of three- week-old intelligence-as the Pentagon's public statements seem to indicate. It is equally inconceivable that up- to-date aerial photos were not avai- lable to Prig. Gen. LeRoy J. i`,Ianor, who masterminded the swoop on the prisoner of war camp 23 miles west of Hanoi. Detailed Pictures Obtained that the prisoners had been moved was indirectly supported by the raid's leader, Col. Arthur D.,Si- nlons, in his press confer- ence. statements in Wash- in-ton after the raid. Asked if he blamed the ab- sence of prisoners on an intelligence failure, he re- plied: "I am not sure what you mean by* an intelligence failure." He was then asked if earlier remarks that the prisoners had been gone for three weeks indicated a lack of daily aerial re- connaissance of the camp. Ile replied: "I cannot comment on the question." Laird added: "We were reasonably confident that t h i s particular location had been used." Men associated with ef- forts in South tirletilalll to rescue prisoners point 'olit that being reasonably con- fident a site had been used in the past would not meet the absolute intelligence Even though the \c-eather was bad requirements one would in the region prior'to the raid, it was normally expect for such a not that bad all the tinge.. Further- ill is si.on. more, a.er'ial reconnaissance would Official spokesmen at not have disclosed American inteli- the headquarters of U.S. tions. U.S. planes have, been photo- G e n. 'Creighton W. graphing, or trying to find, prisoner Abrams have consistently camps for four years. Startlingly cle- refused. all comment on tailed pictures can be obtained from the Son Tay raid, Similar- planes flying, miles overhead. ly, the headquarters of Air If this scenario is true and reaso- Force commander Gen. nably recent photos were available, Lucius Clay is under or- it follows that Manor as well as Se- ders to say absolutely cretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird nothin' a'' and PI'esidtalt Nixon were well aware that American prisoners at Privately, however, offi- Son Tay had been lno%,cd. cers in both headquarters a t bite House have been engaging in official firmly denied, as did Defense some occasionally far-out Department spokesmen, speculation speculation. It may be that the President and Laird knew more than speculation, but no prisoners would be found at Soil no one will admit to any Tay but orc':crcd the raid for other' hard knowledge of the Son reasons, Tay raid and it is likely ("The President reali ed there that such information is would be other benefits from the restricted to only a hand-' mission," the ,}'elite Iiollse official fled of very, top-ranking said, "but the primary purpose was people. to free. our prisotisrs even though This speculation holds bast, such photo recon- there was the clear possibility all that the Son Tay raid was naissance information was along that no one would be at the a carefully prepared e;_er- almost routinely released camp,") CISC to demonstrate to ;, dal""Olt Itl a n o n d.1' Intelt1E'\\?:, with the men showed that the preparations had been met.iclllous, The chances Haigc,i that U.S. force., Sources in Sai ,on sa of getting in and getting Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RQR72? i 3YROOO3((0 t h e d e 1' e ~.7Clb ~ raids had bColl in the 7{cellcnt, and this was certainly a major fac- tor. i-f Nnv. 21-2,, which were That incident provided largely mounted for the justification for the raids same purpose. and was sewed upon im- The intent was to show mediately by those offi- YIanoi that despite con- cers at 7th Air Force who tinuing troop withdrawals already had been advocat- from South Vietnam, the illy a strike. Nixoti Administration was ' capable of powerful retail No one in Saigon is align and was willing to spealking' officially on the risk considerable world spbject of just when the wide displeasure in using Soil Tay raid ineca'rne part it. of the picture. Prepara- Some sources_ c?onsicler? Lions for that also had that Laird's original con- been underway for several ten Lion drat the raids were months, according to the centered on missile and Pentagon. It Wild been eon- antiaircraft positions was ceived as far back as Au- a smokescreen, The real g'ust' - target was the supply litre The decision to stage the running pow n the coast two raids simultaneously which was oulgin, with was natural, military offi- East bloc trucks and other ccrs say, once it. was decid- supplica being stockpiled ed to retaliate for the loss for movement over the Mu of t h e reconnaissance- Gia Pass onto the IIo Chi plane. Minh Trail. The planners in Wash- It is known that the Air ington, however, had to be Force had been itching to aware that.the raid on Son -get at these supplies for lay probably would have s e v e r a'l weeks Mort more widespread reper- North Vietnam shot clown essions in hanoi than file a reconnaissance p 1 a n e air raids below the 19th Nov. 1+i - the incident parallel. w h i c h olii.wardly trig- Retaliatory air r a i a s gereci the aerial spectacu- have been staged f re' lar.ol Nov. 21-22, quentty anti the people of the north are accustom-r. Damage Unreported to then]. 'Hanoi's prcaia- Since the air raids on ganda machine also Ira- Nov. 21-22, the Air Force mentioned c o in m a n d o has released no assess- raicls in the past, but these in e n t of the d a in a g e were, by inference, coas- caused. Nor has there tal probes designed to been any indication as to botage",roads and bridge:. hoer many planes struck The 1 a a din of unl- SLlpiliy dumps and how formed American soldier many went after missiles in. helicopters a bare and antiaircraft sites. miles from Hanoi is anot.h- Sources in Saigon say, er matter. It was a clear however, that the total demonstration that instal- number of sorties flown lations almost anywhere over North Vietnam was in. the north are about 400. It is likely that le to similar attacks. This a majority of these strikes point was hot dependent went against supply ontherescue ofanypriso- clumps after the first wave ners at all . of planes struck antiair- T 'h a t -is why in a n y craft defenses, knowledgeable people in Spokesmen at 7th sir Saigon believe the raid Force headquarters in Sai- went on rearclles.s of the goo say that; any bomb ca- presence of r prisoners. rage assessment, known in Air Force jargon as Son T-a y had be(n I7DA will have to come cased' since last Aug ;1st and later Pentagon infni- from \?lashin?ton In the DEC 1970 Approved For Release 2000/69/14: CIA-RDP72-00337R00Q3000?OOQ4- 7 the North Vletndine e, 'a5 y t~\ 7t ( ~1n r r: / 1 ` t said several 1"; e( 1C5. I1'0 1" ~:~ el .. ?:i Fi ~~ E [; ~. / ~ r i - t L H \i 'Y bably as Iol-g as three a result of the raid, would r ; ? months. But again this is a. be even more strict in 1 ?ianor S no s Shit of C;~ptins at About Saimme, Tiille Raiders Went Into Trail-iincj B3.'. STUART 11. LQOItY :EGLIN AIR F O R C E BASE, Fla. -- American .prisoners of war "probab- ly" were being removed from the Son Tay camp in North V i e t n a in, about three months ago, just about the time a group of coinmandos started train- ,in- for a rescue mission, according to Big. Gen. Leroy J. Manor. The general, who coni- lnlanded the daring mis- sion, made the rct-elatlon at a press conference here .Wednesday in which he also disclosed for the first time that fhe courtyard inside the supposed prison had been converted into a '.garden Blot" but that this Iiad not. been detected by- Anmer?ican intelligence. In fact, he 'indicated, photographs which showed the topographical changes inside the com= pound were misinterpret- ed. "I would not say that the intelligence on the camp was not good," Manor said in replying to a question, "in that it had been identi- fied some time ago as a prisoner of war facility. Unfortunately we were not able to tell exactly landed inside the camp, they found that what.they thought from photographs was a prison courtyard had been turned into a? garden plot, according to the general. "T h e r e was evidence that the inside of the com- pound had been tilled and a garden plot had been planted inside the corn- pound," .Manor said. . Later when asked if ae- rial reconnaissance photo- 9 raphs had indicated the agricultural use to which the area had been put, Manor ann.''crcd that the 'photos :hawed us there was activity in the corn- pound. This would lead one to believe that that ac- tivity' was caused by pri- sioners of war if you as- smile that this was a priso- ner of war facility." His words here, once again, were confirmation that the raid was planned on an "assumption that the prisoners were in the compound but no hard esidence. ' Manor would not say, as other officials have re- fused to in the past, what the last date was that the United States had definite. information that prisoners were being kept at Son Tay. when they moved, the pri- Prison Layout s o n e r s of w a r. That's Asked what evidence the mighty difficult to tell." commandos had founds af- The general saws no in- ter they had landed that telligence breakdown indi- the commpound. which mea- cated in the fact that the stared 1S5 feet, by 132 feet, prisoners cnulcl have been had been turned into a moved as much as three P0-A%1 facility, -anor an- months before his men sw?ered: swooped clown on the tiny "The only ?c v i d e n c e compound only 23 miles found that it was in fact a west of Hanoi on Nov. 21 prisoner of war facility in the hope of liberatidg as was the type of construc- many as 100 Americans. . tion, the size Of the cells GAjpprM .d For R' I $; , nr o /a ` t fi t h th l , enmen ts e en e s it was evacuated, this is rather indefinite answer their security around pri- because the type of con- son camps. struction that is used in The general said, that part of the world trill however, that he -knew of .deteriorate rather rapidly no plans for future raids. when it is not being used." President Nixon, Laird If the prisoners had in- and Ambassador David K. decd been taken out three E. Bruce, head of the months before the raid, A m e r i c a. n negotiating that would I:ace been ex- team in Paris, have all left actly the time training for open the possibility of fu- `t-he mission began in the tore raids to liberate uris.o- scrub lands of this; vast Hers. base--tile largest single fa- When a reporter asked citify in the Air force, ;Manor why it would not covering; 144 square miles be feasible to land "a divi- .along the Gulf of Mexico lion" or an "Army size in Florida's Panhandle. unit" in North Vietnam to Secretary of Defense rescue prisoners, the ge= Melvin R. Laird has testi- fled a replied: Pied that he gave the go. "I would hope that it ahead for training for the would be feasible," con- mission Aug. 11 and that tinning: actual training b e g a n "Speaking from a per-so- Aug. 20, three months to real point of view, yes, I de- the day that President finitely would recommend Nixon gate the final au- more" such. raids. thorization for the raid. '1?hrrs, if Manor's esti-? mate is correct, the whole operation, which stretched halfway around the world in scope and involved all t Ii r e.e military services, was doomed from the be- g 11111ing. While the newly' in- stalled garden plot was growing at Son Tay, the commandos and their Air Force transport t e a in s were practicing for the raid. Tuley constructed a rough dummy of the com- pound and made, accord- ing to Laird, some 130 practice assaults at night- time. Precise Training The training, Manor re sealed, was so precise that experts here even deve- loped a way to simulate the light of a quarter moon as it would shine on Son Tay the night of the mission. 't'hen, before the detach- ment left for Southeast Asia, the whole facility was dismantled to 'main tarn security. - . Despite all the problems with locating the prisoners, Manor said he would not only be willing to do it all over again but that'it was his lersanal belief that fu- C1AeRDP714e0Q337R000300050004-7 should be attempted. He v Ili S "" ~i'? d DAILY NEWS Approved For Release 2000/00/'RIDP72-003378000300050004-7 GIs CHARGE U.S. I-VA111 CRIMES . 11-1111 1 L_ By JE3tttY OPPENHEIME'?R A night in a room with pythons, bamboo .shoots' placed under the fingernails, dunkings in human excrement, water torture and "the Bell Telephone hour" are methods used b;' Army interrogators to force* information from suspected enemy soldiers, according to a group of anti-oar Vietnam veterans. The allegations were made yesterday at the second session of the National Veterans' "In- quiry into U.S. War Crimes," being held thru today at t e Dupont Plaza Hotel. The forum is aimed at arousing public opi- nion to the groan's contention that the alleged My Lai massacre was just one incident in de facto policy of war crimes committed by U.S. troops in Vietnam. Members of the group c,,,-,tend that Lt. Will-1i iam Calley, accused of killing 102 u.en, wom- en and children in the village of `rlv Lai, is a scapegoat for high logel commanders. Steven Noetzel, of Floral Park, N.Y., a for- mer Special Forces intelligence specialist, tes- tified that in November, 1963, he was with a group of soldiers 'transporting 16 suspected Viet Cong soldiers by helicopter to an interro- gation point. He said that when they arrived at Tan Son Nhut Airport only four of the suspects re- mained. "They pushed the other 12 out over the Mekong Delta. A colonel asked what, hap- pened to the other prisoners and he was told they tried to escape." Mr. Noetzel, father of three and an employe of the Bell Telephone Co., said he didn't wit- ness the incident, "but I saw flesh on the door jamb and blood on the floor" of the helicopter. He said the door gunner told him that the men had been pushed out. White working with a psychological warfare team, Mr. Noetzel said lie had the opportunity to witness the day-to-day operations of the Special Forces in the IV Corps area. He claimed that he saw suspected Viet Cong placed in barbed wire cages with their hands tied behind their backs and covered wth mos- quito-attracting liquid, and detainees thrown .blindfolded into rice paddies filled with human waste when they refused to answer questions. . 'At one camp, Mr. Noetzel said, two or three prisoners were placed overnight in a room containing a python snake. "We could heat' KENNETH B. OSBORNE them screaming all night." He said he saw two such snakes ranging in length from 8 to 16 feet. Kenneth B. Osborne, not studying at the International Service School at American Uni- versity;, said he served in Vietnam from Sep- tember, .1967, to December, 11168, as an intelli- gence specialist working in an undercover ca- pacity. He, sid he lived in Da Nang "under a cover name" recruiting and training South Vietnamese agents, in cooperation with the CIA. Mr. Osborne testified that he witnessed de- taincees thrown out of helicopters twice during April, 1968, near Da Nang. He claimed the acts were committed "by Marine enlisted men on orders from their lieutenant. I was there to observe. During my 15 months in Vietnam I was responsible for deaths." Several times, Mr. Osborne said, the CIA asked him "to terminate agents with preju: dice," which he described as CIA jargon for killing an agent. After receiving one such or- der, Mr. Osborne said he told the man to leave the area because he did not want to kill -him. Another time he wa told "to terminate with prejudice" a .Chinese woman who was acting STEVEN -NOETZEL as his contact with other agents. "They felt she was too cross-exposed to our activities," he said. He said he also witnessed bamboo shoots stuck under the fingernails of suspects and, in one instance, a sharpened ?ocden dn,Al forced into the car of a man who. later died. The so-called "Bell Telephone hour," according to Mr. 'Osbornee, was the placement of live wires from a field telephone to the feet, hands, ears of prisoners, Gordon S. Livington, of Baltimore, identified himself as' a 1SS0 graduate of West Point and a physician who steed during 1968 with the 82d Airborne as a regimental surgeon. The outfit was commanded by Co.. George S. Patton, 3d, who is now a brigadier general serving in Ger- many. Mr. Livingston, now' a resident in psy. chiatry at Johns Hopkins, said that the slogan of thee outfit was "to find the bastards and pile on." He said that in February of 1969 he wit nessed a chaplain in the unit "praying for , big body count at the nightly briefings." Mr Livingston recited the prayer which he al legedly heard: "Help us, oh Lord, to fulfill the standing order of this regiment. Give us t i wisdom to find the bastards and pile on. Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP72-00337R000300050004-7 xl~ ;j 1970 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP72-00337R000300050004-7 `.how P.O.W., Camp Raid, Was Flawed By WILLIAM 13EECHER with about 10 large' helicop? Spea;ar to TN' New York Tlmes ters from a base in Thailand. WASHINGTON, Nov. 25- Several of the helicopters The planners'of the comman- were empty; they were to do raid on a North Vietnam- have been used to bring out Tese prison camp last weekend the 70 to 100 prisoners who had to take into account the were thought to have been !position of the moon and So- there. viet satellites and to gather The sources pointedly re men from all over the world. fused to say whether, any Details of the raid on the North Vienacese guards had ;prisoner-of-war compound at been captured and brought Sontay, which is about 23 out for questioning. miles west of Hanoi, emerged Such riven might be expect- from interviews with knowl- ed to provide information on edgeable officials. when the Americans had been Both the rescue attempt andrrioved from Sontag, the kind the air strikes some hoursof treatment they had received later in the southern prov- there, and procedures normally inces of North Vietnam were executed in nearly flawless followed in moving prisoners from one camp to another. fashion, the planners said. Men had been taken from But both operations fell short assignments all over the world of militar, et ~c t n been lnvolvea in sending small American and South Viet- namese intelligence teams into the north. SOG stands for Studies and Operations Group. Its assign-) ment throughout the war has; been to move into Laos, Cam-; bodia and North Vietnam to gather military intelligence on eluded about 80 men, sources' say, including administrative personnel. Sontay was one of a half. dozen or so prison camps con sidered for the mission. It was selected, sources say, largely because it had. sufficient flat space around it to permit the landing of enough large heli- such things as location of thought to be housed inside. enemy troops, supply dumps I One major concern was-that and concentration of air de- the lumbering helicopters,] fences. h i ? (skimming the treetops on a' s v . Colonel Simons, w ' years old, has had a long career of difficult special as- signments. In 1961, he was in. charge of Operation White Star, a combined Central In- telligence Agency - Special, Forces effort to organize Meo tribesmen In Laos to harass and spy on Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese activies. Because of his special ex- perience, Colonel Simons was the man quickly chosen to lead the raid when the attempt was first seriously discussed early land, might be detected and, attacked by North Vietnamese MIG fighters, or that the task force might be attacked as St left. For that reason, a number of diversionary flights were flown by Navy aircraft, drop- ping flares, jamming North Vietnamese radar and other- wise causing the North Viet- namese to direct much of their air force and attention out to sea during the Sontay raid. 3 k, - '' for the 'Sontag mission, one 'The 50 or so men, who land- even from behind a Pentagon ed at 2 A.1n. Saturday, Hanoi; desk. The bulk of most, 110W- time, at Sontay soon discov-'ever, came from Fort Bragg, ered that the prisoners were N. C., where the Army Special no longer at the camp. And Forces has its headquarters, the bombing Florida, home of the Air Force's so hindered by had weather special air warfare tess,.s. that they were ended after Most of the training was con- only about 250 strikes---in- ducted at Eglin. The planning stead of the planned 500-- was so detailed that a full-scale reproduction of the prison camp had been made. .-the layout gleaned from re- 'There were so many corn- connaissance photos-was con- plex factors that had to be co- structed and every phase of the ordinated," one source said, operation rehearsed again and "weather, the phase of the again. moon, the availability of Navy Mock-Up Camp Destroyed fighters to provide diversions Then the mock-up 1-ikon and to be ready to bail the ,camp was destroyed for fear, team out if it got into 1\4IG however remote, that Soviet trouble." spy satellites might pick it up "The factors simply weren't Sontay might be a target for right until last Saturday," he some future American rail of declared: some sort. "We had to wait for just "We also didn't want to keep the right weather window and it up any longer than necessary window over Sonta ," In case any prying eyes at Eglin moon y might see what they weren't another ..source said. "The. supposed to," one source said. weather ha+l to be open Security was so tight' that enough to move in our chop- the planners are convinced pers and have visibility for there was no advance leak of our covering fighters. The the mission. Rather, they be-1 lieve, the prisoners were moved moon had to be just right so. to another camp for prosaic. that it gave our men enough reasons, perhaps because Hanoi; light in which to operate, but, felt it could save some money' very little for the enemy to by consolidating two camps +` 'discover their approach. It The Sontay raid was not the was just a coincidence that first time Americans have the rescue effort at' Sontay slipped into North Vietnam dur- and the air. raids in the south- ing the war. In 1965, Col. ern panhandle came during Arthur D. Simons, the man who! the same weekend." led the raid on the camp, had A waning half-moon was been in charge of a group this year by senior. military jets was kept ready to speed men of all four services. to Sontay if the raiders were Decides on Small Team atacked by enemy fighters. They were determined that, since Hanoi had shown no disposition to exchange Ameri- can prisoners for the 8,000 ,North Vietnamese and 17,000 Vietcong prisoners in South Vietnam, an effort must be made to free them forcibly. A total of 378 Americans are believed to be prisoners in North Vietnam and 958 more are missing, some of whom also may be in captivity. Some senior officers even talked among themselves of an amphibiQus landing by a Marine division in North Vietnam aimed at so unnerving Hanoi's, leaders they might quickly sue for peace and release all rprisoners. (But these and other officers, convinced that the White ]House would never permit such a widening of the war, argued that,the job could be done by small hand-picked teams, using surprise to over- whelm local guards and extri- cate the prisoners by helicopter. They laid this 'second pro- posal before Secretary of De- fense Melvin It. Laird in late spring or early summer. In Au gust, he approved assembly and training of a special task force, called Joint Contingency Task Group Ivory Coast- Brig . Gen. Leroy J. Manor, 49, commander of the Air Force Special Operations Force at F ,1in, was picked to com- mand the new group. It in- up when 1AV0'Svdl~06rre~ease~0` ': CIA-RDP72-00337R000300050004-7 Apro~ved For Releas From News 17iseaLches Critics of the administration clashed with Its supporters in the Congress yesterday over whether the unsuccessful American raid on a North Vi- e t n a in e s e prisoner-of-war camp betrayed an intelligeace failure and jeopardized the lives of American prisoners. Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield (Mont.) ques- tioned "the reliability of our n"T 001 9 1 ~-RDE72-00337 R000300 "It was a bold effort by corn rageous men who would do it again-and I hope they do," Dole said. "How many men must die in prison camps, how many ,:omen must be told they're must be told they're father- intelligence" in raid "'? 1 re we --1-c some 1'e w S bef r C S, o camp that had been vacated ?"o e asked in the l D spouse o fdr several weeks. He and Sen. Senate. George D. Aiken of Vermont,, ranking He said if new opportunities Republican on the: rescue attempts should e t Foreign Relations Committee, for occur, the United States expressed concern for the should take them. safety of Americans still held "That doesn't mean any en- prisoner by North Vietnam. " la "That of the war," y Sen. Charles II. Percy (R-lie said. Dole said he had talked IM) said he was earlier with three women turbed our intelligence was not whose husbands are prisoners accurate" and termed the of war, and "I'm willing to ac- ac- raid adangeroas military esca- cept their statement that 'it's lation of the war. Senate GOP leader Hu -h to have my husband die gh Scott and House GOP whip in a rescue attempt than rot to Leslie Arends attacked critics death in a prison camp'." of the raid. "A11 the cloves cm- "We're not talking about an mediately fluttered their effective a ay of bringing feathers and took a nose dive American prisoners of war at the President," said Scot. back when we disagree about "I wonder what they would be this venture," Muskie said, saying had several hundred "...If we're going to respond American prisoners have been to all our frustrations about found and released," said Ar- the war... by encouraging ends. such military efforts as this Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D one, (what) were doing is em- the senior Senate Republican was both applauded and criti-. said in a speech. cized Mansfield said it would have been in the national interest for the President to have briefed congressional leaders in advance of the prison camp raid but added: "I can see rea- sons why the commando at- tempt had to be kept under strict secrecy." Scn. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) also raised the ques- tion of the effect of the raid on the safety of American prisoners. "All of us are greatly concerned about the' safety of the men - not just the immediate but their long- term safety," Kennedy said. Sen. Birch, Bayh (D-Ind.) accused the administration for taking what he called a "John Wayne approach." But Scott said it was more important than ever to try to get American prisoners out of North Vietnam because they are being tortured, inade- quately fed, and kept in nar- row cells in violation of the Geneva convention fr?? Ih- Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford of Michigan called the sortie "a great effort to try to rescue some of those -being held." He said he hoped for "Wetter intelligence" in any fu- ture similar operation Rep. Robert L. Leggett (D- Calif.) described the raid as "a first-magnitude blunder from, the very beginning." Had there been any prisoners there, Leggett said, the North Vietnamese guards probably would have shot them as soon as the raid was discovered If the North Vietnamese re- taliate against other prisoners, Leggett added. "it will be a high price to pay for some- one's desire to be a hero." Rep. John V. Tunney (D- Calif.) called the raid "faulty in conception and . . . faulty in ? execution." Tunney, Cali- fornia Senator-elect, claimed it was based on bad intelli- gence and could endanger the lives. of other prisoners. Maine) said a repetition or we course that can escalate the treatment of POW's. prison can ip raid would be whole war." Scott said he suspects that "risking an escalation of the the wives and mothers of Muncie as,,-:Ed whether, if war. the mission was in fact a sym- American prisoners "are on the paSenate ssion floor for the pris- Muskle - holirc demonstration of Ameri- our side in this." said id comp as can concern, "did we in the Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D. gnats, and opposition opposition to the Wash.), a senior member f o practices of the North Viet process incur risks which run namese, "should not blind us counter to the objective of the Armed Services Commit- to the follies of the adminis?' bringing them home?" tee, also called the effort to tration's latest military adven- In a Senate speech, Mans- free the prisoners "sound, pru- ture. ' field said; "I admire the cour..deurt and sensible. "I am troubled ... that even age of the commandos ... It "I believe the action here was a bold stroke. But I raisewas fully warranted," he said. a success in this instance "I believe everything would still have been a failure questions as to the reliabilityshould of our intelligence," be done to free our prisoners." for hundreds of other prison Aiken urged both the Sen?Askecl whether he feared pos- ers," he said, because it fro'- ate and the administration tosible reprisals against U.S. that disrupts chances for a ne- exercise restraint in their dis-prisoners, Jackson said', "One. gotiated settlement that would ? has to take a calculated risk." free all the prisoners. consign of the new events but he questioned Mr. Nixon's fail-' In the Rouse also, thQ raid key Sen ) de- - ri t o members Robert Dole (R-Kan r o ess i s C ti . . . ongr po s ac on on.. h fended the raid, saying Ameri- "No President in these times cans are dying in North Viet" can ever hope to fashion for- namese prison camps, and the eign policy in the inner sanc- United States cannot wait in- tum of the White House with- definitely for negotiations to out risking grave repercus- make some progress. signs at home and aboard," Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP72-00337R000300050004-7