SENATE VOTES CURB ON PAY TO VIET ALLIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070015-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 21, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

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WASHINGTON POST
Senate Votes
Curb on Pay
To Viet Allies
By Spencer Rich
? Washington Post Staff Writer
The Senate plunged into a
new debate yeiterday on pro-
posals to restrict US. finane.
ing for what critics call "fon
eign mercenaries" fighting in
Indochina.
By voice vote, senators lip,
proved an amendment forbid
ding U.S. payinents of Special
t Korean or any other
troops
for Thai,
troops in excess of the combat
pay levels being received bY
U.S. soldiers.
Foreign Relations Commit
tee Chairman J. W. Fulbright
(D-Ark.) said a subconirnitte
headed by Stuart Symington
(D Mo) had, with extreme difJ,
ficult y, extracted statistll
from the administration. '-
See DEFENSE, Al2, do
Yti
DATE AV4
'
revealed that a Thai
t nant general fighting in
11 Vietnam would receive
$5,400 a year in U.S.-financed
special combat pay, while an
American officer of equival-
ent rank got only $780 extra.
Fulbright said the American
people, unaware for years of
the secret agreements with
Thailand, the Philippines and
South Korea "Were ?cohtinually
told by their leaders" that
in Vietnam represented ?recog-
in Vitnam represented recog-
nition that all Asian nations
had a stake in Vietnam. That
stake, it now turns`ottt, was in
good part money." ,
Fulbright also called up a
second and much farther
reaching "anti-mercenary"
amendment to the $19.3-billion
defense procurement bill. It
would prohibit U.S. financing
of Vietnamese or Thai mili-
tary operations on behalf of
either the Cambodian or Lao-
tian governments. A vote on it
may collie today.
Fulbright said its purpose
was to make sure that the
U.S., without congressional as-
nt, does not begin financing
tnamese or Thai military
tures that could escalate
it in Laos, risk provok-
ed China into interven-
-there or involve the U.S.
aid to South Vietnamese
rces?"in propping up the
Lbn Nol government" in Cam-
bodia "through third parties."
The Senate Armed Services
Committee, in its report on
the proprement bill, had in
eluded a paragraph attempt-
ing to make clear that funds
should not be used to finance
thlth Vietnamese interven-
tion on behalf of the Cambo-
dian government.
But Fulbright said this
should be made applicable to
both Thai and South Viet-
namese troops and broad-
ened to include intervention
on behalf of Laos,.
The excess pay amendment
was accepted by Armed Serv-
ices Committee Chairman,
John Stennis (D-Miss.), who
said he would be glad to take
it to a House-Senate confer-
ence but ?6 feti fie could
insist on f milication to
existing agreements with for-
eign nations. He gaid, how-
ever, h? would ask for its an-
plieatidn to future payment
agreeinents and would also
seek full reports from the \ ad-
ministration on details of
agreements.
Earlier yestercity, the Sen-
ate debated for hours an ad-
ministration-oppoSed amend-
ment by Mark Hatfield (R-
Ore.) and Barry Goldwater
(R-Ariz.) to experiment with
the concept a an all-volunteer
army. Hatfield said the amend-
ment would ,raise military pay
now and thus allow the Pen-
tagon to determine ? a year
before the current draft law
runs out?whether added in-
ducements would make it pos-
sible to depend on volunteer
only.
Objecting, Edward M. Ken-
nedy (D-Mass.) said cyllege
students, in the current war
time situation, would simply
not volunteer and "we're go
ing to have the poor people
of this country end up being
the volunteers" to "fight rich
men's wars." Stennis predict.
ed the war "will continue for
some time under the policy
The President" and volun-
teers would not fill manpower
needs.
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PAGE 1
1
6 Agnew to Visit 2 Recipients
1 Two of the three countries
that received overseas or per
1 diem allowances from the
United States for the troops in
Vietnam?Thailand and South
Korea?are to be sto
Jij W
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? r
YORK TIMES
SENATE ASKS CURB
ON WAR PAY GOING
TO VIETNAM ALLIES
Votes to Forbid Allowances
? Higher Than Those Paid
American Soldiers
By ROBERT M. SMITH
SPecial to The New York, Times
WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 ?
The Senate voted today to bar
the United States from paying
larger allowances to ?allied:
troops in Vietnam than it pays
to American soldiers.
Special allowances have been
given three countries ?Thai-
land, South Korea and the Phil-
ippines ? for troops that they
sent to Vietnam. It was dis-
closed in testimony before a
Senate subcommittee that the
allowances granted to these
troops exceeded the allowances
paid to United States military
personnel in Vietnam.
The allowance- for G.I.'s, for
example, was put at $65 a
month, but "twice that for
Thai and South Korean troops,"
the committee was told.
The Senate, which has been
caught up in wrangle after
wrangle on amendments to the
military procurement bill, took
only 50 minutes to debate the
proposal, offered by Senator J.
W. Fullbright, Democrat of Ar-
kansas. The Senate then passed
the amendment by unanimous
voice vote.
The only Senator speaking
against the proposal was Strom
Thurmond, Republican of South
Carolina. Mr. Thurmond urged
that "nothing be done to? cause
these 69,000 troops from free
world countries to be with-
drawn."
In presenting-his amendment,
Senator Fulbright pointed out
that a Senate Foreign Relations
subcommittee discovered in
hearings last fall and winter
that the United States was pay-
ing allowances to allied troops
that were about double the
allowances paid to its own
servicemen.
State and Defense Depart-
ment testimony before the sub-
committee on United States
security agreements and com-
mitments abroad disclosed that
while Thailand was paying its
majors $98 a month in base
pay, the United States was pay-
ing them $180 more in over-
seas allowances. Thailand was
paying its privates $26 a month;
the United States was paying
them $39 more a month.
AecOrdifig to testimony at
the hearings, the Philippines
r I
was paying its captains $125 a
month, and the United States
was paying them $150 more a
month. The Philippines paid its
master sergeants $53 a month,
and the United States was pay-
ing them $76 a month.
Senator Fulbright alsoointed
outthat each South Orn
a,
Ic
soldier leaving South Vietnam
got 40 cubic feet of personal
cargo space on the ship taking
him home. The Koreans use
the space, the Senator said, to
take home American beer, C-ra-
tions, cigarettes and Amerthan
electrical products.
"It is time," Senator Ful-
bright said, "to stop tnakin
mercenaries out of allies, an
allies out of mercenaries. You
should not pay overseas Or
combat pay to a foreign soldier
more than to an American sol-
dier."
Senator John Stennis. Demo-
crat of Mississippi, who heads
the Armed Services Commit-
tee, agreed: "I'm in'tpre-Sted
with it, and if some adjustment
can be made consistent with
our honor, I'd like to see it
done."
Senator Stennis promised he
would try to get the House of
Representatives to go along
with the provision in the joint
conference committee that will
haVe to try to work out an
agreement between the two
houses on the final military
procurement bill.
But Senator Stennismade
? two admonitions: That the
United States would?haVe to
observe any commitments it
might have already made, and
that some delicacy might be
necessary since American
forces are leaving Vietnam. As
he put it, "We are withdraw-
? ing, and I don't feel we should
.go in there with a meat axe."
Goldwater Backs Amendment
Senator Barry Goldwater,
Republican of Arizona, said he
agreed with the amendment
and asked whether it would be
"improper to ask either the
Department of State or the De-
partment of Defense to make
reports on what foreign troops
are paid."
"You talk about getting re-
i5orts," Senator Fulbright re-
plied. "It took six months to
get this one report" for the
subcommittee last fall. The
Senator noted, at another point,
that "Congressional approval
was neither sought nor given"
for the allowances.
Senator Fulbright also said
that the quarterly reports the
Defense Department did sub-
mit to Congress grossly under-
estimated the actual outlays.
He said that a report done by
the General Accounting office
for the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee found that the United
States had given the Philip.
pines $40.8-million from the
fiscal year 1966 through the
second quarter of 1970, while
the Pentagon reported having
provided only $17.3-million.
Urging that the Senate not
take hasty action against al-
l**, Senator Thurmond said:
"1.-1e induced them to help us.
TY:ey are helping to bail us
out."
This brought Senator Charles
H. Percy to his feet. "We are
there helping them," the Illinois
Republican declared. "They are
there protecting themselves.
We are not in danger."
Senator Fulbright said sev-
- .oral times that the allied troops
were not in Vietnam to fight
but were only there for their
propaganda value.
"The Filipinos didn't do an
Iota of fighting," he charged
"We paid them very well to gc
down there and sit on their he.
hinds."
In regard to the Thais, hi
quoted what he said was tin
remark of an American sol
dier: "The only way you car
get the Thais to fight is to Pu'
a PX between them and thi
? VC."
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President Agnew's fort oming
trip to Asia.
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August 21, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 13953
should we fail to continue to hope and
pray that freedom will be restored to
Czechoslovakia and the other nations
subject to Soviet domination.
A TRIBUTE TO THE PEOPLE OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, on this
August 21 it is fitting that we pause and
Pay tribute to the people of Czechoslo-
vakia; for it was 2 years ago today that
the Soviet-led forces of the Warsaw
Pact occupied Czechoslovakia and pro-
ceeded tot bring to an end the Czecho-
slovakia experiment in liberalization.
Much has been written about this
latest tragedy for Czechoslovakia. Care-
fully recorded in the press, in periodical
literature, and in books are the develop-
ments of these past 2 years during
which the Soviets have succeeded in un-
doing the work of the reformers and re-
turning the country to its former path of
rigid orthodoxy. Symbolically, this task
was completed by Prague's acceptance of
the "Brezhnev Doctrine" as formulated
within the recently concluded Soviet-
Czechoslovak treaty.
An important point about the events
prior to the Soviet intervention was the
dramatic manifestation of the Czecho-
slovak desire for freedom. The pressure
for reform came from below, from the
people, and was translated into political
action ironically by a Communist lead-
ership that itself could not escape its
awesome influence.
What was taking place during the few
months prior to the intervention was the
resurgence of the irrepressible spirit of
freedom that is deeply rooted in the peo-
ples of Czechoslovakia.
On this anniversary, therefore, let us
turn our thoughts to the people of
Czechoslovakia and once more dedicate
ourselves to the proposition that one day
they will regain their freedom.
FLIGHT SERVICE STATIONS OB-
SERVE GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY?
AIR TRAFFIC SPECIALISTS PRO-
VIDE VITAL SAFETY EFFORT -
Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, this
week marks the golden anniversary of
flight service stations, a far-reaching
network of 340 facilities operated by the
Federal Aviation Administration to pro-
vide a wide range of aeronautical serv-
ices.
Originally established by the Post Of-
fice on August 20, 1920, to support the
early airmail service, these facilities have
phased from bonfires to beacons to broad-
casts. From wireless to computers they
have bridged civil aviation's communi-
cations and navigations gap?from the
primitive "spark" and "arc" transmitting
devices to solid state and remote con-
trol equipment.
The original string of 17 airway radio
stations, for the most part, stretched over
desolate wilderness and high mountain
passes. Some stations were accessible
only by mule train; others by skis and
sleds. The one room shacks were drab
and drafty, generally manned by a lone
operator who worked 7 days a week on a
split shift. His communications equip-
ment was sketchy and primitive. Four of
the original stations have been in con-
tinuous operation since 1920: Elko, Nev.;
Rock Springs, Wyo.; Salt Lake 'City,
Utah; and Washington, D.C.
Like the first airmail pilots and other
pioneers of flight, the men and women
who kept them flying?the ground sup-
port specialists, the airway radio oper-
ators?were equally intrigued by avia-
tion. They had a mission and they pro-
vided a service. Their work began before
dawn and it ended after dark. Quite lit-
erally, they laid the foundation for to-
day's airway network.
The Federal Aviation Administration
this week is commemorating the first 50
years of flight service stations, with a
series of national events including open
houses, radio and television programs,
and other community festivities.
But amid the visitors and public at-
tention, the quiet, resolute work of FAA's
4,600 air traffic specialists continues. Over
the counter, over the phone, or over the
radio flight service specialists are provid-
ing assistance around the clock to safe-
guard our Nation's pilots. Specialists of-
fer thorough preflight briefings and
weather forecasts; alert airborne pilots
by radio of expected weather conditions
and assist them in charting alternative
courses; and broadcast information
about special airport conditions and nav-
igational aides that might be temporar-
ily out of commission. And if a pilot runs
low on fuel or gets lost, the calm, steady-
ing voice of the air traffic specialist is
with him in the cockpit to guide him out
of danger. Help is just the push of a
microphone button away.
I congratulate FAA Administrator
John H. Shaffer, and the employees of
FAA, particularly the flight service sta-
tion personnel, on this 50th anniversary
of Flight Servide Stations.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that my congratulatory telegram to
the West Virginia Flight service stations
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the telegram
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Atrousr 20, 1970.
To Mr. Clyde E. Brown, Chief, Federal Avia-
tion Administration Flight Service Sta-
tion, Wood County, Airport, Parkers-
burg, W. Va.; Mr. Louis C. Rech, Jr.,
'Chief, Federal Aviation Administration
Flight Service Station, Wheeling-!Ohio
County Airport, Wheeling, W. Va.; Mr.
Richard Johnson, Chief, Federal Aviation
Administrtaion Flight Service Station,
Mercer County Airport, Bluefield, W.
Va.; Mr. Goodwin Glassman, Chief,
Federal Aviation Administration Flight
Station, Kanawha County Airport,
Charleston, W. Va.; Mr. Maurice J.
Genthon, Chief, Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration Flight Service Station,
Elkins-Randolph County Airport, El-
kins, W. Va.; Mr. R. T. Underwood,
Chief, Federal Aviation Administration
Flight Service Station, Tri-State Air-
port, Huntington, W. Va.; Mr. James
Coleman, Chief, Feder.al Aviation Ad-
ministration Flight Service Station, ,Mor-
gantown Municipal Airport, Morgan-
town, W. Va.; Mr. Brooke E. Ettinger,
Chief, Federal Aviation Administration
Flight Service Station, Martinsburg
Airport, Martinsburg, W. Va.:
My congratulations and commendation
are extended to you and through you to per-
sonnel of your station on fiftieth anniver-
sary of flight service stations. FSS activities
are vital to the safe and efficient operation
of our airport/airways System. Being a con-
stant traveler in both commercial and pri-
vate aircraft, I am keenly aware of your re-
sponsibilities and the outstanding perform-
ance and edication of FSS personnel.
, JENNINGS RANDOLPH,
U.S. Senator.
THE IMPORTANCE OF LAND RE-
FORM IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Mr. MAGNUSOk. Mr. President, this
year, an event of fundamental signifi-
cance has taken place: the National As-
sembly of South Vietnam has passed,
and President Thieu has signed, what
the New York Times has termed "the
most ambitious and progressive non-
Communist land reform program of the
20th century."
There can be no doubt that this action
should have taken place long ago?I
have been attempting to persuade the
State Department on this point for many
years. But there can also be no question
that past failure to enact a land reform
program in South Vietnam should not
dissuade us from taking action to speed
up implementation of the "Land to the
Tiller Act," while land reform is possible
and still important. The benefits of rapid
implementation of land reform could be
considerable, both in terms of American
lives saved and in terms of the future
stability of South Vietnam.
Land reform is not a simple issue;
many people who would support it if they
fully understood its significance are
mi-
certain about many facets of the pro-
gram. The questions that land reform
poses can and should be answered, be-
cause understanding the importance of
land reform is critical to understanding
the nature of the forces at work in South
Vietnam and in modernizing nations
throughout the world.
My remarks today have this aim: to
explain the significance of land reform
in modernizing nations generally; to re-
capitulate briefly the history and pros-
pects of land reform in South Vietnam
particularly; to explain why land reform
can and should be carried out there ir-
respective of the time table for American
troop withdrawal; and to demonstrate
that such reform is truly in the best and
expressed iterests of the people of South
Vietnam, regardless of the government
that is in power there at the present time
and regardless of the nature of any gov-
ernment that may come to power in the
future.
My earnest hope is that Senators and
their staffs will take the time to review
these remarks, and to see how land re-
form in South Vietnam is compatible
with each of the many views about the
war in South Vietnam held by members
of this body. This is not a partisan issue,
nor an issue that will divide supporters
and opponents of the President's war
policies?something that a glance at the
list of supporters will indicate immedi-
ately. At the very least, the Senate should
ponder the importance of land reform so
that conflicts like that in Vietnam can
be avoided or minimized in the future.
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S 13954 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Al,gnst 21. 19; 0
iae 111;9i aber oil my staff suggested that
tine ispeeth should be entitled. ?What
env,. Always Wanted To Know About
tenni Reform, But Were Afraid To Ask,"
w that I could profess such complete
iniowlecee of this highly complex sub-
ject. I canaot, hoieever, and what follows
ie Gray a, very brief and simplified de-
stai otion of land reform and its impor-
tehie. I shall be happy to refer Senators
or their staffs to a more complete list of
studies upon request. I mud, mention an d
Week Prof. Roy Prosterman from the
University of Washington who has
helped me and many other Senators un-
derstand the importance of land reform
concept and as a means of providing
and economic stability for many
countries in the world, including South
Vietnam,
1., -5, TIE CON cEPT Or 1 AND REFORM : ITS EIGNI1,1-
, MODERN WING NATIONS GENERAL LN
Whether we refer to the nations 01.
lie Third World as -"modernizing,"
"emerging," or -developing," we can
easily recognize that the types of change
a nation experiences on the road from
tradition to modernity are difficult ones
that may cause tremendous political in-
si.ability, The process of change involves
the disruption of traditional institutions
anti relationships that provided conti-
nuity and stability in the past. It is dur-
ing thie transition- phase from tradi-
tional institutions to more modern ones
that a de-yeloping nation is most prone
to -violence, insurrection, and retailution,
the urban sector of modernizing na-
tions, important new political groups
emerge during the process of moderniza-
tion and make demands upon the gov-
ernment and the political system. These
groups -lnclude a proletariat, industrial-
ists, merchants and financiers, students.
intellectuals and a military establish-
meet. The competing demands and vary-
ing strengths of these urban groups fre-
quently lead to urban unrest or rebel-
lion, which in turn may lead to a sac-
ceseion in governments or ruiing elites.
fiecause most modernizing nations are
predominantly rural, however, and be-
eause the impact of the central govern-
ment On these rural areas is generally
alight such disruptions or rebellions
salient chenge the fundamental charac-
ter of the nation. Governments can and
do enatete without affecting the way of
life that. the great mass of the country's
populace have followed for centuries. Be-
cause tee countryside remains passive
during the early stages of moderniza-
tion, urban uprisings or unrest are seen
aX '11111(1 and unavoidable by most stu-
dents M nevelopment.
It is the countryside. not the city.
tiltai the future course of a modernizing
nation s determined. Rural or agrarian
disruption, unlike urban disruption, is
voidable---in a manner I will discuss
thertly---but the relative dominance of
the rurni elements in a modernizing :na-
tion makes the impaet of such disrup-
tion massive if it should occur.
hr ui al sector, like the urban sec-
(01 . must undergo fundamental changes
IW fog medernization. Unlike the urban
isictor, however, the rural sector is char-
acterized by only one traditional "fist-
isinen Ooi. rna)or importance: the pattern
of landownership. In almost all tradi-
tional societies, the bulk of the land is
owned by a small class of wealthy land-
lords. while the vast majority of those
who actually till the soil do not own the
land they work. As the modernizing in-
fluence spreads to the countryside, and
as the desire for change accompanies it.
it is this traditional landlord-tenant re-
lationship that becomes the focus of
peasant unrest and revolutionary efforts.
The peasant has a simple goal: to gain
control of the land he tills. This simple
redistributive aim of the peasant be-
comes a powerful force as the burden
of rents, taxes and labor, and the uncer-
tainty of tenure with which the tenant
lives, become intolerable.
It is this universal objective of the
peasantry, combined with its great num-
bers, that makes the peasant a most
volatile and critical element. The peas-
ant's allegiance will belong to the party
that gives him his land; as Mao Tse-
tung writes:
Who ever solves the land question will win
the peasant.
The crucial question for a moderniz-
ing nation is whether the peasant is
promised his land by the government or
by those whose aim is to overthrow the
government.
It is this battle for the allegiance of
the rural population that distinguishes
contemporary guerrilla warfare in mod-
ernizing nations from traditional war-
fare between two sovereign nations.
Rather than being faced with a military
threat from foreign troops, the govern-
ments of many modernizing nations find
themselves facing what is primarily a
political/military threat from native
guerrillas. These guerrillas do not ini-
tially attack government troops--they
are far too weak and far too few in num-
ber to dissipate their resources at this
stage. Instead, the guerrillas seek to build
a political base of Support in the coun-
tryside, among the peasants who are in-
creasingly dissatisfied with the central
government and its failure to bring about
agrarian reform. As one expert has writ-
ten:
Currant guerrilla warfare is the logical
and planned result of building upon a foun-
dation of peasant discontent over land ten-
ure and the society shaped by it.
This antigovernment guerrilla war-
fare takes the form of convincing the
peasantry that the revolutionaries,
rather than the government, can best
respond to the peasant's needs. One of
these needs is the need for protection,
and the terrorist activities of the guer-
rillas during the early year.; of the con-
flict?including the assassination of vil-
lage headmen and even some peasants?
are designed to demonstrate that the
government cannot or will not defend the
peasantry, and that it is useless for the
peasant to look to the government for
protection or control.
A less publicized, but much more sig-
nificant, eleffie:nt of antigovernment
warfare is the promise of the guerrillas
to turn the land over to the peasants.
This has been a central theme of every
major revolution or revolutionary at-
tempt in the 20th century. The revolu-
tionaries promise, and often carry out
even during the conflict, land reform on a
large scale. In contrast to the pledge and
performance of the revolutionaries, the
central government frequently uses its
force to continue the hated institution
of tenancy and the domination of the
despised landownine classes_
Communist revolutionaries, from Lenin
to Mao Tse-tung and Fidel Castro
have recognized the ability of the peas-
antry to be mobilized as a force for
revolution through the land tenure issue
Lenin also recognized the ability of the
central government. to command the
peasant's loyalty through land reform.
and so undermine the revolution?that
is why, in prerevolution days, he de-
spaired of the revolution's success in the
face of the redistributive Stolypin Re-
forms. Had Stolypin not been assassi-
nated in 1911, the course of the Russian
Revolution might leave been a very dif-
ferent one.
Mee and Castro made effective use of
the land reform issue to build a powerful
base, of support in the countryside, al-
lowing the revolutionaries to receive
supplies, information, and hiding IN hen
necessary. In Mexico and Bolivia, how-
ever, where land reform had been car-
ried out by non-Communist revolutions.
the immunity of the peasantry to Com-
munist revolutionary fervor has been
recognized by Communist and non-Com-
munist leaders alike. Che Guevara him-
self bemoaned the conservative ori-
entation of the Bolivian peasants, and
attributed that orientation directly to
the land reforms that had been carried
out.
Mexieo and Bolivia are the exceptions.
however. In many other nations, the rev-
olutionary forces have not only prom-
ised land reform, but have carried it our
in the areas within their control. Unfor-
tunately for the peasantry, however, the
aftermath of successful Communist rev-
olutions has always been the brutal and
bloody collectivization of peasant-held
agricultural lands. This was true in the
Soviet Union, in China, in Cuba, in North
Korea., and in North Vietnam. This col-
lectivization process not only deprives
the peasants of the land they held briefly_
but invariably results in wholesale
slaughter of those who resist. Nonethe-
less, because "few peasants are histo-
rians," the appeal of the revolutionary
slogans guarantees substantial peasant
support for anti-government forces, par-
ticularly where the government has
failed to undertake a competitive land
reform program of its own.
Nowhere has the appeal of land re-
form promised by the antigovernment
forces been greater than in South Viet-
nam, where landownership is blata.nts
inequitable. The Vietcong, and the Viet-
minh before, them, have actually given
land over to the peasants in those prov-
inces where they have control. Not only
does this drastically reduce whatever in-
centive the peasantry may have had to
support the government, but it has made
possible a high level of recruitment for
the Vietcong. As one American military
official has written, the Vietcong recruit-
ment effort is simple: "The movement
gave you your land: now give us your
son."
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A government faced with a revolution-
ary threat during the early stages of
modernization is thus faced with a bat-
tle for the support and allegiance of the
peasantry. The alternative to allowing
the peasants to become revolutionaries
is, in theory at least, a simple one: the
government must carry out reforms that
give the land to the peasants. By doing
so, the government gives the peasants a
stake in the defense of the country, and
insures that they will be an antirevolu-
tionary force. As Samuel P. Huntington,
a distinguished student of developing na-
tions and the past chairman of the Gov-
ernment Department at Harvard Univer-
sity has written:
The peasantry . . . may be the bulwark
of the status quo of the shock troops of
revolution Which role the peasant plays is
determined by the extent to which the exist-
ing system meets his immediate economic
and material needs as he sees them. These
needs normally focus on land tenure and
tenancy, taxes, and prices. Where conditions
of land-ownership are equitable and provide
a viable living for the peasant, revolution is
unlikely. Where they are inequitable and
where the peasant lives in poverty and suf-
fering, revolution is likely, if not hthritable,
unless the government takes prompt meas-
ures to remedy these conditions. Ho social
group is more conservative than a landown-
ing peasantry, and none is more revolution-
ary than a peasantry which owns too little
land or pays too high a rental. The stability
of government in modernizing countries is
thus, in some measure, dependent upon its
ability to promote reform in the countryside.
IL OBSTACLES TO GOVERNMENT-INTTIATED
LAND Foam
As Huntington has written, in the ab-
sence of land reform, the peasants may
be the key to revolution?or with land
reform?the key to stability. Given the
crucial "awing role of the peasant, land
reform is thus the most important non-
military activity that a government 4 a
modernizing nation can undertake. Why
then is government-initiated land reform
so rare a phenomenon in the 20th cen-
tury?
The answer to this question is not that
government leaders, as a group, have
failed to perceive the importance of land
reform?in fact, the opposite is true. But
understanding the needlor land reform
and carrying it out are two separate is-
sues. History is replete with examples of
leaders who have tried valiant& to bring
about land reform, but who have been
unable to surmount the obstacle S in the
path of this reform and who have con-
sequently been overthrown or deposed.,
The reasons why governments fail to
carry out land reform even when they
understand its importance are both po-
litical and financial. In most traditional
or transitional societies, the landowning
classes are a powerful political force with
substantial bases of support in the cab-
--Viet, the assembly, or the court. Land re-
form is impossible without the acquies-
cence?voluntary or compelled?of the
landowning class. Compulsion is rarely
possible, because of the landowning class'
political strength, and "voluntary acqui-
escence to land reform hinges on the gov-
ernment's ability to compensate the
landlords for the lands to be distributed.
Persuasion of the landlords to accept
land reform has thus been possible pri-
marily in those nations?notably the oil-
producing nations of the Middle East?
where the government has sufficient rev-
enues to make land reform attractive to
the landowners and peasants alike.
Sometimes the recognition that the al-
ternative to land reform is revolution,
and that revolution means the confisca-
tion of land without compensation, has
made landlords more receptive to the
government's program. As Prime Minis-
ter Amini told the landowners of Iran:
Divide your lands or face revolution?or
die.
Land reform has traditionally foun-
dered, therefore, when the government
of the modernizing nation has been too
weak to confiscate the land and too poor
to pay for it. This has meant, unfortu-
nately, that the two conditions under
which land reform has been most suc-
ceasfully carried out are revolution and
foreign occupation. Communist revolu-
tion has betrayed land reform in the end,
as we have seen, although non-Commu-
nist revolutions such as those in Mexico
and Bolivia have achieved more lasting
results. Foreign occupation has produced
results?in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan?
for the simple reason that the occupying
power is not committed to the landown-
ing class and that an occupying power
generally has the financial capability to
carry out a land reform program of
sweeping proportions.
Fortunately, however, a willingness to
provide financial assistance can be just
as effective trs occupation, and a good
deal less repugnant to both the foreign
power and the country in which the re-
forms are to be carried out. The United
States has recognized this periodically,
as when we offered $60 million to the
government of Peru to implement land
reform there.
Land reform assistance from the
United States is a route that can and
should be followed in South Vietnam. It
is now consistent with the aims of the
South Vietnamese Government, the de-
sire of the peasantry, the position of the
landlords, and the goal of this Nation to
end our military involvement in South
Vietnam as quickly as possible. The rea-
sons for this will be explored in the next
section of my remarks.
In summary, land reform is the single
most important nonmilitary activity of
a developing nation faced with a revolu-
tionary threat. The success of the land
reform effort will determine whether or
' not the peasants become a force for po-
litical stability or a force for revolu-
tion?and the peasantry is generally the
most crucial force in determining the
future of a modernizing nation. Leaders
of moderninzing nations, as well as their
revolutionary opponents, 'have generally
recognized the importance of land re-
form, but few governments have been
able to finance such reform through their
own revenues, and fewer still have been
able to induce the landowning classes
to accept land reform in the absence of
adequate compensation. Foreign assist-
ance, whether through military occupa-
tion or financial aid, has been the single
most effective agent for the implemen-
tation of land reform, short of revolu-
tion. Such land reform' has been
instrumental in bringing political sta-
bility to otherwise unstable societies.
Land reform made possible by foreign
assistance or by non-Communist revolu-
tion has been a form of "preventive
medicine" for revolution?cheaper by
far than subsequent attempts to "cure"
revolution by military means. In short,
land reform determines, in Huntington's
words, whether the peasants will be the
bulwark of the status quo or the shock
troops of revolution.
III. LAND REFORM IN SOUTH VIETNAM: PAST AND
PRESENT
I recognize that for many people it is
a long step between supporting land re-
form in principle and supporting land
reform in South Vietnam, particularly
land reform that is to be partially fi-
nanced with American funds. I would be
the first to admit that the major impact
of land reform in South Vietnam would
have been 10 years ago, if it had been
carried out at that time, rather than to-
day, when the conflict is advanced.
There remain many reasons why the
United States should help implement
such reform today, however. Later on in
my remarks, I will point out that by so
doing, we not only will not prolong our
military involvement in South Vietnam,
but instead may hasten our departure
and reduce our casualties substantially.
And the price of land reform in Vietnam,
will be less than the price paid by the
United States in two days of combat.
Circumstances are now such that the
only remaining obstacle to successful
land reform in South Vietnam is the
potential lack of capital on the part of
the government there, and all relevant
parties?the peasantry, the landowners,
the government of South Vietnam, and
American AID officials?are prepared to
implement a sound program, already
passed into law, as funds are made
available.
The peasants of South Vietnam have
a proverb that is filled with meaning
for the situation today:
He should own the land who rubs it
each season between his hands.
This centuries' old feeling helps ex-
plain why the peasantry has always been
the key element of the indigenous anti-
government forces in South Vietnam?
since historically the land has not been
owned by those who till it, and since
the government of South Vietnam in
the past has made no effort to redress
this wrong the peasants feel.
In two areas of Vietnam where the
Vietcong are particularly Strong?the
Mekong Delta and the Central Low-
lands?statistics demonstrate vividly the
basis of peasant discontent. In its per-
centage of landlessness, the Mekong
Delta is one of the five worst areas in
the world: 73 percent of the peasants are
substantially dependent on tenant
farming. They pay, on the average, 34
percent of their income in rent to the
landlord, who provides few or no inputs.
They exist on the land without any as-
surance that they will be "allowed" to
remain on the land the following year.
If the crop should fail, the rent is still
due. Virtually no disposable surplus re-
mains of the crop, even in years of bum-
per harvests, after the landlord has been
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paid. Conditions in the Central Low-
lands, where rents may exceed 50 per-
cent of the crop, are no better. Because
of these and similar conditions, the Viet-
namese peasants in the Stanford Re-
search Institute field survey named land
ownership five times more often than
physical pecurity as a matter of chief
concern to them.
Despite these incendiary conditions,
until recently neither the Government of
South Vietnam nor LISAID officials have
undertaken serious attempts to bring
land reform to South Vietnam. The con-
trast with the Communists could not be
more vivid. As Robert Sansern wrote:
The Americans offered the peasant a con-
t;titution; 'the Viet Cong offeren hint his land
and with it, the right to survive.
The result, of course, has been that na-
tive guerrillas have always made up a
huge percentage of the foices working
for the overthrow of the South Vietnam-
ese Government.
The Vietcong, like the Vietminh be-
fore them, have skillfully manipulated
the peasantry by promising and carrying
out land reform in those areas under VC
control. The peasantry, in return, have
supplied the bulk of the Vietcong fight-
ing force, and have actively aided the
Vietcong by providing and caching ;sup-
plies. These same peasant guerrillas have
been responsible for the laying of mines
and boobytraps that have resulted in
more than half of the American casual-
ties since the Tet offensive. These cas-
ualties, of course, have been greatly in-
creased because peasants hostile to the
American and ARVIN]. forces have failed
to warn our troops as they entered areas
in which the land mines and boobytraps
were placed.
The Communists seized the initiative
in the battle for the peasant's allegiance
soon after World War IT. The Vietminh
carried out land reform on a massive
basis at a time when they controlled 60
to 90 percent of South Vietnam. In the
North, the Vietminh land reforms were
cruelly and brutally, reversed in the col-
lectivization process than began after
North Vietnam was constituted in 1954.
In the south, however, the peasants in
Vietnimh territory were allowed to hold
on to their lands?until the Diem govern-
ment of South Vietnam began to reassert
control. As Diem's troops regained
province after province from the Viet-
minh, the landlords were restored to
power and the peasantry resubjugated to
the yoke of tenancy that the Communists
had lifted from them years earlier.
For this reason, the Communists hat e
remained identified in the south as the
agents Of land reform, while the govern-
ment has long been known ste the author-
ity responsible for keeping the landlords
in power. With the government enforcing
the rural status quo, and with the Com-
munists promising?and delivering?
land to the peasants, it is no great won-
der that the peasants hate harbored,
aided, and fought on behalf of the Viet-
cong.
Although President Diem i.trid Presi-
dent Eisenhower initially make token
statements about the importance of land
reform, both Saigon and the American
command lapsed into the belief that this
was a more or less traditional military
struggle to be settled by traditional mili-
tary means; the fallacy of this approach
has been amply demonstrated by the
elusiveness of that "light at the end of
the tunnel." When 'pacification" has
meant landlords following triumphant
American troops back into villages "lib-
erated" from, Vietcong control, it is no
wonder that the pacification program has
not realized our expectations for it.
The first real indication that Saigon
had become aware of the importance of
land reform did not come until January
of 1968. At that time, President Thieu
undertook a massive land reform effort
io win back the support of the peasan-
try. Former French lands, held by Diem
the immediate past, were distributed
to the peasants at an impressive rate.
The following table demonstrates the
dramatic progress made by this program,
once it was aggressively undertaken:
land distribution in South Vietnam: 1968-69
[Acres distributed]
January-June 1968 20, 000
July-December 1968 40, 000
Tanuary-August 1969 90, 000
September-December 1969 90,000
Not only did Thieu distribute the
former French lands, but he decreed that
..andlords should no longer be restored
'n areas that came under the control of
ARVN forces. To insure that landlords
whose properties had already been re-
stored did not evict tenants in anticipa-
tion of future land reforms, Thieu also
decreed an occupancy "freeze" to keep
all tenants on the land he hoped?and
still hopes?to give to them. Although
there were some reversals in this pro-
gram, by late 1969 it was obvious that
Thieu intended to make good on his
new-found Pledge to give the lands to
the peasantry and to win their support
for the struggle against the Vietcong.
The most significant among these
many significant changes of attitude in
Saigon was the passage, in March of this
year, of a sweeping land reform program.
President Thieu personally rallied sup-
nort in the National Assembly of South
Vietnam, and. the result, as I stated at
the outset, was one of the most dramatic
and thorough land reform programs of
the twentieth century. This plan, if fully
araplemented. will pat ownership of all
land directly into the hands of the peas-
ants tilling it, at no cost whatsoever to
he peasant. The "land to the tiller"
erogram can be substantially imple-
mented within the coming year and in
lime for the next harvest, if financial
,upport from the United States is forth-
eoming.
Because of the importance of this
land to the t:iller" program, and because
lapid implementation of the program
will be the goal of all Senators interested
in this program, I ask unanimous con-
sent to insert at this point in the REC-
ORD a description of the various titles of
this act, prepared by Prof. Roy Proster-
rnan of the University of Washington
haw School. A review of these sections
will allow the Members of the Senate to
I amiliarize themselves with the sections
if the "land to the tiller" program, and
to see that it is a practical plan with
promise of being highly effective.
There being no objection, the review
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
Sec-rune LEVIEW
Articles 1 and 2 establish the operating
principles, including an initial recognition
of the priority, as benefic aries, of "those peo-
ple actually cultivating"; the intent to af-
fect, without any limit: ;1011 by way of re-
tained acreage, "lands which are not directly
cultivated by landowner .''; the resolution to
" (e) liminate tenancy" a hich, like the actual-
cultivator arid zero-ratan don principles, un-
derlines the universal application of the pro-
gram to both secure and insecure areas; the
principle of "distributioe free of charge" and
that of "fair compensation" to landlords:
and the inclusion of "communal ricelands"
further underlining the universality of the
distribution.
Article 3 confirms that not only "riceland"
but also "secondary cropland" will be af-
fected. The exclusions i Article 5 make it
clear that this means Si. lastantially all land
not used for industrial crops or orchards.
Again, .Article 3 underlie es that both public
and private lands are affected.
Article 4 takes care of some of the admin-
istrative problems experienced under the
Diem law, notably by requiring that a trans-
fer to be given effect mite) be regstered (not
just dated in the parties.' own documenta-
tion) "prior to the promulgation date of this
law." This becomes mosl important in con-
junction with the exclusion from the law.
in Article 5, of up to 5 hectares per family
of "ancestral worship lar d." While there is
some ambiguity, the intent of the drafters
was pretty clearly to excl ode front considera-
tion any "ancestral worselp" land not regis-
tered as such, prior to Match 26, 1970. Other-
wise, a vast administrative snarl would open
up as landlords pushed fraudulent claims for
exemption of five hectares. (Paced with such
a snarl under the 15 hectare "ancestor wor-
ship" lands exemption le Diem's; Ordinance
57, which did not require a previously reg-
istered claim, the administrators ultimately
decided that all claims would be allowed
across-the-board, effectieely increasing the
100 hectare retention limit to 115 hectares.)
The other significant exemptions of Ar-
ticle 5 are lands "presently directly culti-
vated by landowners- (and under the occu-
pancy-freeze decree, there should have been
no change in who "presently" cultivates since
April 1959), up to a maxi. num of 15 hectares,
and religious-organization-owned lands, a
minor concession economically but a major
one in Thieu's effort to set the Vietnamese
senate to approve the bill.
Article 6 sets the prim plc that changes in
use will not suffice to invoke the Article 5
exemptions.
Article's 7 through 11 establish the prin-
ciples of landlord compensation, basic pro-
vision to be for compensation at 2],e times
the annual paddy yield, paid 2C% in cash
and aoe in bonds matuang over eight years
and bearing 10% interest. (In the legislatve
process the bonds were deprived of an infla-
tion-proofing feature, bet given a higher
interest rate.) Bonds are transferrable, but
will probably be sharply discounted at least
until significant U.S. f .11tdIng s appori hs
been voted.
Article 12 introduces 2 hectare and 1-hec-
Wre limits on the amounts of land that can
be receit ed. by families in the Delta and Cen-
tral Lowlands, respective v, This is a rednc-
lion from 5 and 3 hectete limits in Thieu's
original bill, and would pose a massive ad-
ministrative problem if literalle enforced
(Since administrators aeald then have to
measure, and change the SIAO and shape, of
many presently occupied tracts). But the
miserable state of the cadastral records al-
lows indulging the present presumption?in
the absence of a new, uniform and thorough
c#Ndastral survey, which must came years in
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the future, if at all?that all tracts are in
fact less than the limits: To use such a sim-
plifying presumption is well within the para-
meters for administering Vietnamese land
laws, and use of the presumption or some-
thing like it is essential to the overriding
purpose of the legislation. It appears that
something close to this will in fact be done.
Article 1.3 nnderlines that the "present
tiller" is number one in order of priority.
There may be occasional departures from
this at village level, but any departures that
were sure to happen probably happened at
soon as a given village was administratively
reoccupied by daylight, and the guidelines
from Saigon should be firm on the legisla-
tive standard, (Incidentally, it is the gen-
eral consensus that there are very lew sol-
diers who have been totally separEited from
their former lands. Most already occupy land
through proxies in the immediate family, so
that someone already is on the land to make
their claim under the "present tiller" cate-
gory)
Article 14 cuts off all taxes on the recipi-
ents, including property tax during the first
year. The purpose of this was to give the
new owners the siMplest possible message:
you don't pay anything to anybody.
Article 15 tracks other nations' land-re-
form laws in providing for direct cultiva-
tion and a bap on transfer (for 15 years) by
the new owners. Article 16 confirms exist-
ing decrees in ending payment on former
French and Ordinance 57 lands.
Articles /7 th,rough 20 set a credible scale
of penalties, including fines up to 200,000
piastres for landlords' efforts to interfere
with implementation, and a special penalty
of expropriation wholly withont compensa-
tion for any landlord who makes a false
claim of self-cultivation to attempt to in-
voke Article S. . ?
? Article 21 provides broad power to regulate
implementation by decree, and Artica 22
cancels all contrary provisions of law.
After concluding this analysis of the
"Land to the Tiller" program, Professor
Prosterrnan noted:
Considering the pressures against a viable
bill which came from many quarters in the
legislature (including both the landlord:.
related interests and politicians who feared
the program would give too broad a base
of popular support to President Thieu), the
result is a remarkable tribute to Thieu's
persistence and to the strength of his recog-
nition of just how important this program
can be to the survival of a non-communist
Vietnamese government.
The bipartisan group in the Senate
that has urged greater American assist-
ance for this program shares a similar
recognition of just how important this
program cari-be. Flexibility will be pro-
vided both to our Government and to
the South Vietnamese in settling upon
an effective payment mechanism.
The details of the payment mechanism
will be discussed at a later date. The aim
of my remarks in this section has been
to demonstrate that, whatever our views
of the present government in Saigon',
land reform is a worthwhile program
that American assistance can make pos-
sible--and the price of that assistance is
almost insignificant in comparison with
the price of continued combat. Land re-
form is obviously in the best interests of
the peasantry of South Vietnam, regard-
less of the fate Of the South Vietnamese
government. Land reform is also in the
best interest of the United States, Which
seeks to end its involvement in South
Vietnam and at the same tirne provide
for some small measure Of stability in
that war-torn nation following the de-
parture of American troops.
V. WILL LAND REFORM IN SOUTH VIETNAM
PROLONG AMERICAN TROOP INVOLVEMENT?
It is entirely conceivable that some-
one who understands the importance of
land reform in modernizing countries,
and who recognizes the potential for land
reform in South Vietnam, still might
oppose American assistance to implement
this plan. Such a position is commonly
advanced by those who fear that land
reform in South Vietnam will prolong
American involvement there and delay
the date when all American troops can
be brought home safely.
Let me state flatly that if I believed
land reform would in fact prolong or
deepen our involvement in Vietnam, I
would oppose it. I would like to see all
of our men home as quickly as possible.
The facts simply do not bear out the
contention that land reform will cause
any delay in American troop withdrawal,
however, even under the terms of the
most ambitious plans.
The land in South Vietnam can be
given to the peasantry before next sum-
mer, and in fact should be carried out
by this winter for maximum effective-
ness. Admittedly, registration of the
lands given to the peasants will take a
bit longer, but neither this nor the trans-
fer of the land to the peasants requires
the presence of American troops. Not
only would successful implementation of
this plan not delay the departure of
American troops, but it could cut our
casualties from land mines and booby-
trops, and even reduce dramatically the
recruitment ability of the troops wepave
been fighting. The Vietcong obviously
fear this, and they have undertaken a
major campaign to try to persuade the
expectant villagers that tht, land reform
plan will not be carried out as promised.
There are several reasons why the
land reform program will not delay our
withdrawal.
First, American troops will not be
needed in order to implement it?this
can be performed by Saigon officials in
conqert with the USAID mission in
Saigon.
Second, the upcoming harvest season
is from December to March. It is during
this period that the peasants, who now
anticipate receiving their land from the
government, should have their desires
realized. American financial assistance
on the order of $100 million?to be paid
only as the program is implemented, and
not all at once?can make possible suc-
cessful land reform for the majority of
peasants within areas of ARVN and
American control.
Third, the result of these reforms
should be a reduction in the Vietcong
recraitment rate, and a corollary in-
Create in the support and loyalty that
ARVN troops can command in the coun-
tryside. Reform is essential if the Viet-
namese are ever really to bear the bur-
den of maintaining the independence
and stability of their own nation.
Fourth, as I mentioned earlier, more
than half our casualties since the spring
of 1968 have come from such essen-
tially local activities as the placement of
mines and booby traps. Land reform, by
winning the support of the peasants, will
cut down on peasant participation in
such activities and increase ARVN and
American knowledge of where traps
have been laid; this will reduce the
deaths and maimings that such traps
have produced in tragic numbers.
For all of these reasons, then, those
who want to increase dramatically the
rate of American troop withdrawal?and
I am one?will find that land reform is in
concert with this objective. Those who
favor a more gradual timetable will find
that land reform improves the "Vietna-
mization" program and leads to reduced
American casualties. Land reform, then,
is one program that everyone can agree
upon, if we discard the fears and miscon-
ceptions that surround this vital pro-
gram.
VI. IS LAND REFORM "IMPERIALISTIC"?
It seems appropriate to close by look-
ing at land reform from the perspective
of American foreign policy as a whole.
Our young people today, and many mil-
lions of their elders, are justly concerned
about America "imposing" her will and
her ideas about "democracy" on the peo-
ples of the world. These critics have
argued?none more ardently than the
Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT)
in his book?that America should not
seek to make over the rest of the world
in her own image. From this general
position, many specific criticisms of our
actions in Vietnam may be drawn.
To this I can only respond that I am
no great admirer of the 'Thieu-Ky gov-
ernment or its domestic policies?I have
recently written President Thieu to ex-
press my strong objections to the "tiger
cages" of Con Son Island and other vio-
lations of personal and political liberty.
Yet land reform is ,not ,meant primarily
to benefit Thieu and Ky?it is meant to
benefit the peasantry of South Vietnam,
the people on whose behalf we undertook
this costly war.
These people make up 60 percent of
the population of South Vietnam, and
they want land reform. The landlords
are willing to accept land reform under
the conditions of the "land to the tiller"
program. Even the enemies of the Gov-
ernment have promised land reform,
although we have ample reason to believe
the promise is a deceitful one.
In short, land reform is truly desired
by the people of South Vietnam?there
can be no doubt about that?and in help-
ing to implement land reform, the United
States is not "imposing" any unwanted
social reform on the people of South Viet-
nam. To help a nation fulfill domestic
policies demonstrably favored by vir-
tually all elements of that nation's pop-
ulation is not imperialistic, but rather a
responsible form of international assist-
ance.
I will go one step further and suggest
that helping implement land reform is
the type of activity that the United States
should engage in throughout the world.
We cannot and should not be the "world's
policeman," but we can and we must
be a constructive force in the world com-
munity of nations. Every student of the
developing nations knows that they will
not develop without substantial assist-
ance from the industrialized nations. The
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leaders of the developing nations recog-
nize this, too. The issue America faces
in the latter portion of this century is
not whether we should have a role in
international affairs, but rather what
form that role should take.
In the past, the major "assistance" the
United States has provided has come in
the form of warfare and military aid. If
the tragedy of Vietnam has taught us
anything?and I pray that it has?at is
that an over-reliance on military "solu-
tions" is an inadequate substitute for
aiding a nation in making the economic,
social, and political reforms that will
enable it to make the transition to mod-
ernity. This transition may not be peace -
ful?although we can always work and
hope for peaceful change. But the tran-
sition may not take place at all, either
peacefully or with localized disruption,
if the United States and the other in-
dustrialized nations abdicate the role of
cooperative assistance.
The United States must not react to
the Vietnam morass by abandoning its
efforts to be of assistance to the nations
of the Third World. We cannot remain
aloof from the problems, the deprivation,
or the aspirations of these people. Our
foreign policy must attempt to find non-
military means to assist these nations,
preferably in concert With other mem-
bers of the international community. By
looking ahead, by dealing with the causes
of violence rather than the symptoms, we
can make our foreign policy more re-
sponsible. Land reform?not alone in
South Vietnam, but in Latin America
and elsewhere in the Third World?can
be a useful, appropriate, relatively inex-
pensive, and nondestructive method of
assisting the modernizing nations.
Finally, a7nd most importantly, unlesa
we broaden our conception of foreign
policy to include land reform, we may
risk more Vietnams in the years to come.
The consequences of such continued ig-
norance and intransigence Will therefore
be the same as the consequences, both
international and domestic, of this hate-
ful war. Our Nation, and the nations of
the world, cannot afford such a perilous
future. The first step toward avoiding
other Vietnams, belated as this step may
be, is land reform in South Vietnam. I
earnestly hope that the Senate will recog-
nize this fact, and act swiftly to make
the 'land to the tiller" program a suc-
cess.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I
support the statement of the distin-
guished senior Senator from Washing-
ton (Mr. Maorensort) concerning land re-
form in South Vietnam.
I am a strong support of the South
Vietnamese land of the tiller program.
For the past decade and a half, a nuns-
bar of Americans, beginning with the late
President Eisenhower, have spoken of the
need for such a program.
The land of the tiller program is de-
signed to transfer the ownership of an-
proximately 21/2 to 3 million acres of land
to some 1 million tenant and refugee
families. I am convinced that this will
give the tenant farmers?who comprise
one-third of the total population of
South Vietnam?a lasting stake in their
Government.
But this program must be speedily im-
plemented. By giving the peasants a
stake in the preservation of their coun-
try, rapid implementation of land re-
form offers the possibility of a significant
shift in peasant allegiance toward the
Central Government.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD an
article I wrote last year for the Ripon
Society Forum, outlining the urgent need
for land reform not only in South Viet-
nam, but in other quarters of the world.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
LAND REFORM: THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION
Over the past 60 years, four great civil
wars have erupted and claimed over a mil-
lion lives apiece?in Mexico, beginning in
1910; in Russia, starting in 1917; in China,
beginning in the 1920's; and in Vietnam
starting in 1945?with an even more virulent
phase beginning about 1960. Each of there
PM essentially a peasant revolt.
The Mexican Revolution Was reformist but
Largely nonideological, and it created one of
Latin America's most politically stable and
economically progressive regimes. The other
three uprisings occurred under Communist
banners, and brought into play successively
greater degrees of American involvement?
culminating in the tragedy of Vietnam,
which has thus far cost nearly 40,000 Ameri-
can lives and more than 100 billion Ameri-
can dollars.
But for all our knowledge about thee()
peasant revolutions, we have not fully under-
stood what has happened and why. And I fear
that until we do, we are doomed to repeat
our Vietnam experience again and again.
RITRAL REVOLT
Let us first be sure that we understand the
largely agrarian nature of. these revolutions:
Mexico, in 1910, was two-thirds rural,
with 95 percent of its rural population liv-
ing as landless peons or as sharecroppers.
The spark of revolution came after the In-
dians' last remaining lands had been seized
by speculators, when a presidential eondl -
date offered to give back the land. Zapata
accepted the offer.
Russia, in 1917, was 80 percent rural.
Roughly three out of every five rural families
were landless. And, though Karl Marx had
written in the Communist Manifesto of the
"idiocy of rural life," one of Lenin's.two great
decrees in the first week of the October
Revolution vested immediate ownership of
all land in those who actually tilled it. With-
out the peasants' support of the revolution
the ensuing civil war would have had a dif-
ferent result.
China, beginning in 1927, was the scene
of Mao's explicit break with the Marxist con-
cept of revolution based on the urban in-
dustrial proletariat, and of his effort to
fashion a peasdnt revolt. With an 80 percent
rural population, three-quarters of which
VMS landless, China was ripe for revolution.
Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to fight Mao's land
reform with military hardware lost a nation
of half a billion people in two decades.
Vietnam, from 1945 on, saw an application
of much the same tactics that had suc-
ceeded in China. In the Viet Minh stage, the
promise of land-to-the-tiller was effectively
tied to a nationalist revolution. Here again,
80 percent of the population was rural, and
the bulk of that segment was substantially
landless (tenant farming accounted for
around 50 percent in the central and north-
ern reaches, and for nearly 75 percent in the
populous Mekong Delta). The prognosis for
revolution was again excellent.
A DOZEN VIETNAMS
Today there are dozens of Mexices and
Russias and Chinas and Vietnams in the
making. Three-fifths of the tote : population
of the developing nations is neral, and a
staggering percentage of these people are
landless laborers or tenteit farmers. In places
like Vietnam, these fanners may pay one-
third to one-half of their tiny crop in rent
every year to an absentee landlord. In re-
turn, they are granted no security or tenure
whatever. Or, if their situation is like that
of laborers on Latin American plantations,
they may make $15.00 e month to feed toad
clothe a whole family.
These discontened p-Asants are search-
ing for a better life---art I wearever the Com-
munists offer it, they ru -h to the Communist
banner.
A paradox arises, however, when one con-
siders further our four great revolutions. The
Mexicans kept their promise; they redistri-
buted half the crop latel in the country. so
that 75 percent of the mini families now own
their MD land. The pleased peasants not
only have refrained faun overthrowing a
Mexican government ter half a century,
but they have also mo: i than tripled their
agricultural production ti ace the 1930's; and
their higher incomes hove fueled the growth
of urban industry to su, ply consumer goods
and agricultural inputs A similar promise
was made and kept in Bolivia?with less
bloodshed--and made and kept without any
revolution at all in eapan, Taiwan (ten
years too late), South Korea, and Iran. Such
a promise has recently been made in Peru.
tINKEPT PLCMISES
But the Russians, Chinese, and North
Vietnamese didn't keep their promises; once
the revolution had succeeded, they launched
into e second stage of -land reform," which
involved the collectivization of holdings
under the state as a kind of sut er-landlord.
The Russian "land refor 0" killed or deported
millions; the Chinese keled 800,000 or more;
the No, Vietnamese, 50 000 to 100,000. This
was the "land reform" path also followed by
the Cubans.
And the peasants' unhappiness with the
arrangements in these ceuntries could be de-
tected in their drastic: ny reduced produc-
tivity. Russia took until 1853 to return to its
1928 (pre-collectivization) level of agricul-
tural production. China is about even now.
Taiwan. by contrast, has doubled its rice
production since the land-to-- the-family-
farmer reform has began. Cuba is still be-
hind the pre-Castro lev:d.
Thus, we have a re-her strange set of
facts:
1. Mexico, Japan and .yther countries have
carried out massive land reform basically on
the family-farm patter o and have reaped
the twin benefits of long-term political sta-
bility and a sustained increase in production.
2. Russia, North Vietnam, and other coun-
tries that have rutlalea colleetivized the
land have secured a can sistently miserable
production record from I heir sullen peasants.
3. Nonetheless, those nho call themselves
Communists have been able in much of the
developing world?including Vietnam and
Latin America?to hold themselves out as
the genuine agrarian relorrners.
AN ArrECTIVE ALTERNATIVE
The problem, it seems to me, is that the
United States has not effectively offered an
alternative; and until we do, we will be
faced with a continuous series of Vietnam-
type .crises built on peasant unrest around
the world.
Our alternative is land reform?broad land
reform., with fair compensation to the land-
owners, that gives the great mass of peasants
a stake in their society and an incentive to
produce. Land reform eradicates the key
appeal that has been used in starting "wars
of national liberation"; and it can "revoIu-
tion-prodf" the developing world against
such enticements, as it has most notably
clone for the Bolivian peasant against the
call of Che Guevara and for the South Ko-
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rean peasant against the efforts of the North
to start a behind-the-lines "people's war."
There is,no sounder, higher-priority use of
our foreign aid dollar than in the reform of
land tenure. We must think in terms of four
related ideas Ili order to use that land re-
form dollar most effectively and with maxi-
Minn leverage:
1. Information. We are woefully short of
detailed data on the land-reform problem
arOlinti the world. Too many political officers
In overseas embassies send back their assess-
ments of rural unrest based on what they
have heard at English-speaking, urban cock-
tail parties?instead of on what they have
observed while bounding along back roads
in a Jeep.
In Latin America, a preliminary assess-
ment based on non-government scholarship
indicates that countries on the "critical list,"
as prime candidates for peasant-based re-
volutions over the next decade or so, include
Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Most of Cen-
tral ,America. In Asia, the list includes the
Philippines, Indochina, India, Pakistan, and
Nepal. Systematic gathering of comparative
data on tenancy, agricultural labor, land
Values, credit needs, and related matters in
these and other developing countries should
be initiated at once.
2. Compensation. In most nations, politi-
cally viable, non-revolutionary land reform
programs must first assuage the landlords'
doubts that the bonds ,they receive for their
propertIr will ever be paid off. To resolve
these doubts, a central element in our land-
reform strategy should be the creation of a
multilateral agency to acts as guarantor of
land reform bonds issued by individual
Countries. Under such a plan, the U.S. could
pledge one dollar to the capital of such an
agency for every dollar (or two dollars) put
up by other developed countries and for
corresponding, though lesser, amounts Put
up by the -developing nation.
NORTILEAS'T BRAZIL
Brazil, for example, 'badly needs a land
reform program in its teeming Northeast,
where 70 percent of the 30 million popula-
tion is rural and 70 percent of that element
is landless. ACCOITling to a preliminary esti-
mate, it would cost about $1 billion to carry
Out such a program over a period of seven
to ten years. If the Brazilians wanted help?
and most of the nations in Brazil's position
are desperate to find a way out consistent
with. not bringing their governments crash-
ing down?they would enter into an agree-
ment Isrith the insuring fund. For an ap-
proved Plan (one giving the bulk of its bene-
fits 10 the landless tenant and plantation
worker), the fund would guarantee the prin-
cipal and interest of the land reform bonds
to be issued.
The chief source of bond retirement would
be a sinking fund established under agreed-
upon rules, into which the peasants would
make payments for their land over a period
of perhaps 15 years. Meanwhile, the original
landowners would know that the interna-
tional community stood behind the bonds
(which, however, they would be allowed and
encouraged to transform into needed non-
inflationary capital goods from the start).
Very preliminary calculations suggest that
$1 billion of land reform in Brazil could be
bought at a net outlay by the U.S.--through
the international fund?of only $100 to $200
, For the above-named "critical"
coWitries as a group, preliminary data sug-
gest tht land' reform with a gross cost of
some $6 to $8 billion would likely ""revolu-
tion-proof" most of the developing world for
the next couple of decades, and that the net
cost to the U.S.?through the fund?would
probably be less than $2 billion, or what it
costs us to fight in Vietnam for a month.
3, Credit. The fund, should also be a ve-
hicle for credit and supporting services to
the smallest farmers. Too much U.S. agri-
culture credit assistance?including that for
the "miracle" rice and wheat programs?ap-
pears to be going to the solid, traditionally
creditworthy farmer, and not to be benefiting
the masses of rural poor in any way. (Even
if more rice is produced, they still can't af-
ford to buy it.) Credit might be generated
partly by fund guarantees to commercial
banks, and partly by direct establishment of
a revolving fund to be replenished by pea-
sant repayments. For the "critical" coun-
tries, this package of supporting services
might come to a further $3 to $4 billion with
a net U.S. outlay of less than $1 billion.
4. Bilateral aid. In a few spots, notably
Vietnam, our support for land reform will
have to be quick and bilateral. The failure
to carry out land reform sooner is perhaps
the greatest tragedy of the whole Vietnam
involvement. Fortunately, the Vietnamese at
least seem to be moving strongly on a radi-
cally simplified, sweeping land reform pro-
gram, with a total cost of $400 to $500 mil-
lion (no peasant repayment, since we are
conapzting with a purportedly "free" Viet
Cong program). The U.S. should bear as
much of this as needed?the whole amount
is a week's cost of the war?to keep the pro-
gram moving fast.
AVOIDING NEW TRAGEDIES
In certain proximate countries, like Pan-
ama or the Dominican Republic, a few tens
of millions for land reform now may help
avOld tragedy in the 1970's; and strategic
considerations may suggest immediate bi-
lateral assistance.
In summary, with the right priorities and
with imaginative programs, and at a total
cost of perhaps $3 billion spread over a de-
cade or more, the U.S. can become the
"champion" of land reform; help bring about
markedly increased political stability in the
developing world; and help motivate a
marked increase in agricultural production.
For a tiny fraction of what it has cost us
in Vietnam, the United States can buy in-
surance against future Vietnams, and can
bring a higher standard of living and a more
meaningful existence to millions of people
whose lives are now more reminiscent of the
Middle Ages than the 20th Century.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that there be printed
in the RECORD a statement prepared by
the Senator from Maine (Mr. MusmE)
and the article entitled, "Real Land Re-
form Comes to Vietnam," as requested
by Senator MusKiE.
There being no objection, the State-
ment and article were ordered to be
printed in the RECORD, as follows:
REAL LAND REFORM COMES TO VIETNAM
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, during the past
year I have spoken several times on the
great importance of United States support
for a comprehensive program of land reform
in South Vietnam. I join today with Sena-
tors Magnuson and Packwood in reempha-
sizing the broad implications which such a
program can have for termination of the
conflict in Vietnam.
It is clear that whatever policy the United
States pursues in disengaging from this
war, an increasing burden and responsi-
bility must fall upon the South Vietnamese
themselves. It is also clear that this respon-
sibility must include broadening the base of
support for the central government, whoever
may be at the head of that government.
The fighting and killing in Vietnam can
never be brought to an end without a politi-
cal settlement of some sort. That settlement
'mist necessarily be based on winning the
support of the Vietnamese peasant, Who
today has little stake in the future of his
country.
A successful land reform program offers
a unique possibility for winning this sup-
port. It could provide the incentive neces-
sary to stabilize the political situation in
South Vietnam, As Senator Magnuson and
Senator Packwood have pointed out in their
remarks, the promise of land tenure has been
a key weapon in revolutionary movements
during this century. Vietnam is no excep-
tion.
In the August 9 edition of the Baltimore
Sun there was an article on land reform by
Professor Roy Prosterman, who has been
very influential in the development of the
land to the Tiller Bill signed into law in
March, 1970, by President Thieu. Professor
Prosterman has provided a thoughtful and
concise analysis of the historical background
leading up the present program of land re-
form, which President Thieu initiated. In
commenting on the significance of this pro-
gram and the failure of the Diem regime to
carry out land reform in the 1950's, Professor
Prosterman states that, "indeed, if the Com-
munists had been deprived of their chief
selling pont in the South Vietnamese coun-
tryside through effective land reform, it is
probably true that there never would have
been a war."
Turning to the possible impact of a suc-
cessful land reform effort, Professor Proster-
man further states that for the first time,
Saigon has the opportunity to "come to grips
with the focal issue in the countryside, the
one that has supplied the chief Viet Cong
appeal to the peasantry."
I urge my colleagues to consider the argu-
ments presented in this article. Land reform
In Vietnam is long overdue. The United
States must provide its full encouragement
and support for implementation of this pro-
gram as rapidly tie possible, if the impact of
land reform is to be fully realized.
REAL LAND REFORM COMES TO VIETNAM
(fly Roy L. Prosterman)
An editorial in a major daily in late March
called the new South Vietnamese land reform
law "the most important news to come out
of Vietnam since the end of the Japanese
occupation." They may not have exaggerated.
Lack of landownership among the peasan-
try formed a basic part of the Communist ap-
peal in Russia, China and Cuba, so it should
be no surprise that it has performed a paral-
lel function in Vietnam in the hands both
of the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong.
Tenant farming is the biggest occupation
in South Vietnam, with close to a million
Vietnamese families, or about 6 million peo-
ple in a population of 17 million, dependent
on it. The Mekong Delta, where about 70 per
cent of the farm families are primarily de-
pendent on farming tenanted land, has one
of the highest proportions of tenant farmers
in the world. The typical delta family lives
on 31/2 acres, pays a third of its crop to the
landlord (who supplies no inputs of any de-
scription), rarely has any surplus beyond its
immediate nutritional needs, is evictable at
will and is held for the rent even in the case
of crop failure. In Central Vietnam, the
typical tract is 2 acres and the rent averages
half the crop.
For years the Viet Minh and then the Viet
Cong were allowed to hold themselves out to
these people as land reformers, who would
drive away their landlords and give them
their land while the successive Saigon gov-
ernments were identified as pro-landlord.
DIEM'S DISASTBR
In retrospect, the most disastrous of all Ngo
Dinh Diem's policies in the late 1950's was
probably that which promoted return to the
landlords of the extensive lands purportedly
distributed by the Viet Minh to the peasantry
in the 1945-1954 period and reassertion of
the landlords traditional 'rights over their
former tenants. The promotion of this worse-
than-useless program?with the co-operation
of American advisers who were unwilling to
push for the major land reform that our top
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Aug itst 21, 1970
policy-makers wanted?was surely one of the
me-eminent disasters of postwar American
foreign aid.
Diem's failure to act was doubly tragic be-
cause the Communists in the North were car-
rying out their usual second-stage land re-
form?collectivization, as in Russia, China
and later Cuba?which defeated most of the
expectations that had lead, peasants to sup-
port the revolution. As elsewhere, collectivi-
zation was violent, unpopular and disastrous
for production.
Diem might have looked, as an alternative
for the South, toward any of the massive
democratic land reforms that had already
been carried out in the Twentieth Century in
Mexico, Bolivia, Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan. But Diem failed to profit by example.
He stood with the landlords and we stood
with Diem and as we moved into the 1960's
the revived Communist movement was once
more offering land to a population whose en-
tire security and livelihood were bound up
with their relation to the soil.
Little wonder that the common recruiting
appeal in wide areas where Viet Cong land
reform was in effect was "the movement has
given you land, give us your son," as it was
put by Marine Lt, Col. William Corson in
"The Betrayal,"
Or that the late Bernard Fall called land
reform "as essential to success as ammuni-
tion for howitzers?in fact, more so."
Or that Douglas Pike, probably our leading
authority on the Vies Cong, describes their
indoctrination system as "based on vested
interests in land."
Or that field interviewers in a 1967 Stan-
ford Research Institute study found that
Vietnamese tenant farmers named landown-
ership five times as frequently as physical
security as a thing of crucial concern to
them.
Of that over half of those bearing arms
against us in Vietnam, main foree and guer-
rilla units taken together, are still today
native South Vietnamese.
Or that over half of all American casual-
ties in the last two years have been due to
such essentially local guerrilla activities as
planting mines and booby traps--the vil-
lagers then standing silent as we walk into
them.
Or that virtually no main force activi-
ties could take place without the essential
advance work done by the local villagers in
carrying in and burying supplies and am-
munition at intervals along the line of
march toward the military objective.
Indeed, if the Communists had been de-
prived of their chief selling point in the
South Vietnamese countryside through ef-
fective land reform, it is probably true that
there never would have been a war. Presi-
dent Nguyen Van Thieu himself made sub-
stantially that observation in a epeach given
January 18, 1968.
The failure from 1955 well into 19613 to
come to grips with this problem is so com-
plete and so numbing that one must mental-
ly prepare to receive the pleasont shock of
the facts from recent months.
Now, at long last, the South Vietnamese
government, under strong pressure from
President Thieu and with newly firm Amer-
ican support, is preparing to offer the peas-
ants as much as the Viet Cong have seemed
to offer. Much more, in fact, for the Saigon
land reform program is not meant to be
renewed by collectivization. Since coming
to grips with the fundamental need for land
reform in early 1968, President Thieu has
successfully pushed through five critical land
reform measures:
FIVE MEASURES
I. At the end of 1968, he ended the in-
credible, self-defeating practice by which
landlords had been returning to reassert
their "rights" to land, often riding into
newly secured villages in South Vietnamese
Army jeeps,
?
2. In April, 1969, he put a freeze on all
rights to land. occupancy, pending passage
of new land reform legislation. Preliminary
field observations have indicated this freeze
to be well-publicized and quite effective.
3. In June, 1069, he began an accelerated
d,stribution of government-owned lands free
of charge. Since then, over 300,000 acres have
been distributed to the benefit of nearly
100,000 former tenant-farmer families.
4. In July,' 1969, he presented the land-to-
the-tiller bill to the National Assembly.
After a desperate fight against landlord in-
terests and political opponents, the bill was
passed in March. This measure, which the
New York Times has editorially called "prob-
ably the most ambitious and progressive non-
Communist land reform of the Twentieth
Century," is the keystone of Mr. Thieu's ef-
forts. It embodies a drastically simplified
program which will distribute virtually all
tenanted land in the country to the present
tillers free of charge and with fair payment
by the government to the landlords. Owner-
ship of over half the cultivated land in the
country will change hands and a million
tenant-farmer families?a third of the na-
tion's population?will become full owners.
The total price tag of about $400 million
it equivalent to around five days' cost of the
war. U.S. support?in the form of productive
commodities to generate piasters?for some-
where between a quarter and a half this
amount will be asked from Congress in the
coming months and it is to my mind un-
doubtedly the biggest bargain of the Viet-
nam War; preliminary measures have already
been introduced in both houses with ex-
tremely broad bipartisan support.
5. Last June, he further simplified the pro-
gram's administration by decreeing an im-
mediate end to all rents without formalities,
!each as Western-style land titles.
A number of factors have combined with
the program's enormous simplicity and the
major results already achieved to give even
tee most jaded observers real hope that this
package of measures will be largely effective
by the next main harvest from December
through February.
EXCELLENT PROSPECTS
There are excellent prospects that the great
majority of South Vietnam's million tenant-
farmer families will be free of rents they
would otherwise pay and will regard them-
selves at definitely on the road to full owner-
ship under policies sponsored by Saigon.
Those living in Viet Cong-controlled areas
will consider themselves definitely freed from
the prospect that Saigon's control means the
landlords' return and confirmed in possession
of the land they are tilling.
If Saigon can carry it off, what conse-
quences can be expected? There would appear
to be several, each of potentially far-reaching
importance:
For the first time, Saigon will have suc-
cessfully come to grips with the focal issue
in the countryside, the one that has supplied
the chief Viet Cong appeal to the peasantry.
A significant spectrum shift in allegiance
among Vietnam's 6 million tenant-farmer
people can be expected in Saigon's direction.
This shift will have not only a political
dimension, but a significant military dimen-
sion. Notably, tenant farmers and sons of
tenant-farmers, who are the largest rank-
and-file group in the South Vietnamese Army
and in the local militia, are more likely to be
motivated to fight if they have a stake in
their society, which is probably of more fun-
damental irnpOrtance to the success of "Viet-
na.mization" than whether the recruit gets
an M-16 to replace his M-1. Moreover, peas-
ants who regard Saigon as the source of their
land-ownership are more likely to take the
risk of supplying intelligence. At the same
time, the root of peasant motivation to sup-
port the Viet Gong in a variety of ways will
he significantly weakened.
MIGHT HELP PAR CS TALKS
The prospect of such a massive, grassroots
shift in peasant support is one of the few
things that can be visualized which might
supply enough bargaining leverage to get the
Paris talks moving again. Indeed, former
Paris negotiator Cyrus Vence suggested last
fall that the offer to hold back on imple-
mentation of the land reform in historically
Viet Gong-controlled areas could become a
powerful bargaining lever, once the land-to-
the-tiller bill had been pessed.
Land reform, at last, and tragically late,
appears to have come to Vietnam. But even
at this date it is, withoue exaggeration, one
of the major events of the war,
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
10 A.M. ON MONDAY, AUGUST 24,
1970
Mr. MANSFIELD. Me. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, instead of corn-
ing in at 11 o'clock on Monday next, the
Senate, when it completes its business
tonight, stand in adjournment until 10
o'clock on Monday morning next.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN-
ATOR PACKWOOD ON MONDAY
NEXT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mi.. President, I ask
unanimous consent that immediately
after the disposition of the Journal and
the unobjected to items on the Calendar
on Monday next, the distinguished Sen-
ator from Oregon (Mr. PAcKw000) be
recognized for not to exceed 1 hour. He
in turn will be followed by the Senator
from Arkansas (Mr. FuLBRIGHT).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF
ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS ON
MONDAY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that on Monday
next, at the conclusion of the remarks
of the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. F.:UL-
BRICHT), there be a period for the trans-
action of routine morning business, with
statements therein limited to 3 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS,
1971
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the pending
business be laid aside temporarily and
that the Senate proceed to the consider-
ation of Calendar No. 1129, H.R. 18127
and that it be laid down and made the
pending business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPONG). The bill will be stated by title.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
H.R. 18127, an act making appropriations
for public works for water, pollution corns' e.
and power development, including the Corps,
of Engineers?Civil, the Panama Canal. the
Federal Water Quality Administration, the
Bureau of Reclamation, power agencies of
the Department of the Interior, the Tennes-
see Valley Authority, the Atomic Energy
Commission, and related independent agen-
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070015-3