S.782 - SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000400030024-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 24
• Content Type: REPORT

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S. 782 - Specific Problems Affecting the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 1(b), while commendably protecting an employee from
compulsory attendance at meetings and lectures on matters unrelated
to his official duties, would, for example, make it unlawful for any
department or agency to "take notice" of the attendance of one of its
employees at a meeting held by a subversive group or organization.
While it is doubted that this is the intent of the bill, it clearly is one
of the effects of Section 1(b).
Section 1(d), in making it unlawful to require an employee to
make any report of his activities or undertakings not related to the
performance of official duties, is similar in its effect to Section 1(b).
It poses the question of whether the Agency, having discovered that
one of its employees is in regular and unreported contact with an
intelligence agent or official of a foreign government, would be
violating the law in asking the employee for an explanation of this
relationship, particularly in the case in which the employee's
official duties do not relate to matters involving that particular
foreign government. Further, this Section is in conflict with a
long-established policy that employees of the Agency must obtain
prior approval in making public speeches or writing for publication.
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These and additional restrictions are established to prevent the
inadvertent disclosure of sensitive intelligence through employee
activities or undertakings not related to official duties. Here. again
the question arises whether the Agency would be violating the law
in exerting control over these activities.
Section 1 (e) deals with psychological testing. S. 782
authorizes the Directors of the FBI, NSA and CIA, or their desig-
nees, on the basis of a personal finding in each individual case, to
use such tests for the purpose of inquiring into the sensitive areas
of religious beliefs and practices, personal family relationships,
and sexual attitudes, but it denies the use of such testing to all
other departments and agencies without regard to the fact that
employees of these departments and agencies may be regular re-
cipients of highly classified information.
Section 1 (f) establishes the same prohibition on the use of
the polygraph test as applies to psychological testing, and grants
the same partial exemption to the FBI, NSA and CIA. Again, the
use of the polygraph test in the proscribed areas is denied to all
but these three agencies, irrespective of the fact that highly sensi-
tive positions may be involved.
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Section 1(k) poses a problem for the Agency in that it would
appear to require the presence of counsel in behalf of an employee
as soon as and at the very moment that a supervisor were to ask
the employee the reasons for some suspected dereliction of duty
ranging from a serious security violation to tardiness in reporting
for duty or sloppy work habits. This provision goes to the very heart
of the continuous process of review of intelligence operations and
activities to determine their effectiveness, the quality of information
derived, and professionalism in which the activities were conducted.
Out of such interviews or postmortems there naturally evolves the
review of individual employee performance which, if unsatisfactory,
can readily result in disciplinary action. A great many extremely
sensitive intelligence operations and activities are involved in this
process and the presence of private counsel in behalf of an employee
would raise most serious questions as to the appropriate control
and protection of the intelligence information involved. There is
no desire that an employee should be deprived of the right of counsel
when appropriate, but the wording of this Section would make it
"unlawful" to ask the simple preliminary questions which are
necessary to establish whether or not there is some failure in per-
formance or dereliction of duty unless provision is made for the
presence of counsel if requested by the employee.
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Section 4 of the bill would permit any employee or applicant
who alleges that an officer of the Executive Branch has violated or
threatened to violate provisions of the Act to bring civil action in the
district courts. Communist or other subversives acting on their
own or on instructions from foreign agents, could file suits for the
sole purpose of harassment based on allegations of improper question-
ing during recruitment interviews. A concerted effort of this nature
could seriously impair the orderly recruitment process of the Agency.
The will and ability of small minorities to interrupt the normal
functioning of both public and private institutions has been amply
demonstrated in recent months. There is little doubt that such
groups would be quick to recognize and exploit the weapon provided
by this Section of the bill.
Section 5. The comments made with respect to Section 4
above are only to a slightly lesser extent equally applicable to
Section 5.
Section 6. This Section grants a partial exemption to the
FBI, NSA and CIA with regard to financial disclosure and the use
of psychological and polygraph testing by requiring each of the
Directors, or their designees, to make a personal finding with
regard to each individual case that such testing or financial
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disclosure is required to protect the national security. If the
Agency is to comply with the spirit of the law, it will still be
necessary that a personal finding be made in each individual case
that such testing or financial disclosure is required to protect the
national security. Inquiry by these means into the proscribed
areas, which are the key areas of vulnerability, will not be possible
as a matter of general regulation.
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