S. 782 - SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000400030098-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 98
• Content Type: REPORT

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S. 782 - Specific Problems Affecting the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 1(b), while commendably protecting an employee from
compulsory attendance at meetings and lectures on matters unrelated
to his official duties, would, for example, make it unlawful for any
department or agency to "take notice" of the attendance of one of its
employees at a meeting held by a subversive group or organization.
While it is doubted that this is the intent of the bill, it clearly is one
of the effects of Section l(b).
Section 1(d), in making it unlawful to require an employee to
make any report of his activities or undertakings not related to the
performance of official duties, is similar in its effect to Section 1(b).
It poses the question of whether the Agency, having discovered that
one of its employees is in regular and unreported contact with an
intelligence agent or official of a foreign government, would be
violating the law in asking the employee for an explanation of this
relationship, particularly in the case in which the employee's
official duties do not relate to matters involving that particular
foreign government. Further, this Section is in conflict with a
long-established policy that employees of the Agency must obtain
prior approval in making public speeches or writing for publication.
a1C::F1 c::DF P ge
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These and additional restrictions are established to prevent the
inadvertent disclosure of sensitive intelligence through employee
activities or undertakings not related to official duties. Here? again
the question arises whether the Agency would be violating the law
in exerting control over these activities.
Section 1 (e) deals with psychological testing. S. 782
authorizes the Directors of the FBI, NSA and CIA, or their desig-
nees, on the basis of a personal finding in each individual case, to
use such tests for the purpose of inquiring into the sensitive areas
of religious beliefs and practices, personal family relationships,
and sexual attitudes, but it denies the use of such testing to all
other departments and agencies without regard to the fact that
employees of these departments and agencies may be regular re-
cipients of highly classified information.
Section 1 (f) establishes the same prohibition on the use of
the polygraph test as applies to psychological testing, and grants
the same partial exemption to the FBI, NSA and CIA. Again, the
use of the polygraph test in the proscribed areas is denied to all
but these three agencies, irrespective of the fact that highly sensi-
tive positions may be involved.
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r~ 3- T
Section 1(k) poses a problem for the Agency in that it would
appear to require the presence of counsel in behalf of an employee
as soon as and at the very moment that a supervisor were to ask
the employee the reasons for some suspected dereliction of duty
ranging from a serious security violation to tardiness in reporting
for duty or sloppy work habits. This provision goes to the very heart
of the continuous process of review of intelligence operations and
activities to determine their effectiveness, the quality of information
derived, and professionalism in which the activities were conducted.
Out of such interviews or postmortems there naturally evolves the
review of individual employee performance which, if unsatisfactory,
can readily result in disciplinary action. A great many extremely
sensitive intelligence operations and activities are involved in this
process and the presence of private counsel in behalf of an employee
would raise most serious questions as to the appropriate control
and protection of the intelligence information involved. There is
no desire that an employee should be deprived of the right of counsel
when appropriate, but the wording of this Section would make it
"unlawful" to ask the simple preliminary questions which are
necessary to establish whether or not there is some failure in per-
formance or dereliction of duty unless provision is made for the
presence of counsel if requested by the employee.
LY
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rte.
r .. ~ f
Section 4 of the bill would permit any employee or applicant
who alleges that an officer of the Executive Branch has violated or
threatened to violate provisions of the Act to bring civil action in the
district courts. Communist or other subversives acting on their
own or on instructions from foreign agents, could file suits for the
sole purpose of harassment based on allegations of improper question-
ing during recruitment interviews. A concerted effort of this nature
could seriously impair the orderly recruitment process of the Agency.
The will and ability of small minorities to interrupt the normal
functioning of both public and private institutions has been amply
demonstrated in recent months. There is little doubt that such
groups would be quick to recognize and exploit the weapon provided
by this Section of the bill.
Section 5. The comments made with respect to Section 4
above are only to a slightly lesser extent equally applicable to
Section 5.
Section 6. This Section grants a partial exemption to the
FBI, NSA and CIA with regard to financial disclosure and the use
of psychological and polygraph testing by requiring each of the
Directors, or their designees, to make a personal finding with
regard to each individual case that such testing or financial
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disclosure is required to protect the national security. If the
Agency is to comply with the spirit of the law, it will still be
necessary that a personal finding be made in each individual case
that such testing or financial disclosure is required to protect the
national security. Inquiry by these means into the proscribed
areas, which are the key areas of vulnerability, will not be possible
as a matter of general regulation.
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BSONNEL SECURITY AND SUITABILITY
The Agency s *pedal roe
integrity and psychological stability of its a
Priority to 1
and sx lotti
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Puts c
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but is many
national policy, military ca abilitfms,
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sibility to e e
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icts a rartt
do
y alone and in hoot
my to conf+ and deceive us; and rovi
They are thus subject to se
ioio ics.l pressures. T
FOR OFFICIAL fSE ONLY
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Modiaate super
colleagues. In these circumstances any latent
v . ral ilities and instabilities in their
cc and. be detected and exploited b an over alert
*. sny.
A. The only protectiio
i, bait in that of the Individual *0 VV
of their own, are subject to latent eaeak-
s of out sort or a
belie
seervica>e to then to Impose upon them, burdens
unfitted. perbaps leading to unfortunate
the years, w
ivaiilable, avia*d a system of sa
checks designed to Identify potential p
cause s
ensure the selectto
sseet it not only in the interest of the Agency
for them as well as for the Agency.
tid p a olo lcal tests and ,
the at ,
ploysd in the selection o
to take chances with avoidable
ne fi*Ws before they can
d with the
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!Aj
U. S.
dotted by
elr because late
by, Woke and other csseas, the Gereraas, French and Swedes,
others, he had similar experiences; and *von
rn3ae the da c e to NATO securit
espiona&e case thaam
of its perso
the Agency
procedures for ensuring the security and suits
d kao
e been developed o
ad aensitivt
rd
rss of NSA, the
R
a still not ve rsd from the effe
Age y's responsibilities
labie professional advice
of Agency management. These procedures have,
opesitio
only the tersest except one, had the full understanding and support of Ago
Any major changes in these procedsrer so ld be sdop,
siblle cG.sseq ence
FOR OFFICIA ! ONLY
T
rid Bove a nts have 0
rears the basis of
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5. Because of the nature of the Agency's work, strong
command authority is particularly essential. The provisions in
the bill permitting an employee to bring in private counsel at the
very outset of an inquiry into his performance, with the appeal
provisions permitting him to go into district court or to the Board
of Employee Rights, could cause very real problems. A few
dissident employees using either frivolous or false accusations
against a supervisor could completely undermine the authority
of a supervisor and confront the Agency with a choice between
permitting a breakdown in supervisory authority or defending the
supervisor in open court, quite possibly necessitating the disclo-
sure of highly sensitive information.
6. Of even more concern is the provision granting any appli-
cant for employment the right to file suit in district court for
alleged violations, or threatened violations, of the provisions of
the bill. The Agency in recent years has experienced consider-
able harassment by dissident minorities in its recruitment efforts
on the nation's campuses. Further, it has been brought to our
attention recently that dissident minorities have taken advantage
of a provision in the Selective Service Law permitting registrants
to examine their own files at local draft offices, with the result
that in the State of California draft boards are being so severely
harassed that they are unable to accomplish any other business.
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Recognizing the weapons provided by the appeal provisions of this
bill, such dissidents might launch a campaign of litigation virtually
paralyzing the Agency's recruiting program and severely straining
its administrative resources.
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u USE ONLY LLJJ
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Ervin bill S. 782
FROM:
Legislative Counsel STAT
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
25 February 1969
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
D
ATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
whom. Draw a line across column after each comment
)
RECEIVED
.
Mr. Karamessines
would appreciate your comment
2
L- L
specially on the notes on "CIA-
Personnel Security and Suitabilit '
3
STAT
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4.
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!^ e
S
AT
5.
b.
7.
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FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS ^ SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL
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UNCLASSIFIED