UNIQUE ASSETS OF THE AGENCY IN COLLECTION EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72R00410R000200080013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: August 21, 1963
• Content Type: MFR

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'1 *1 -a
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 21 August 1963
AFH/D/TECH/OSA/DD/S&T
SUBJECT: Unique Assets- of the, Agency in Collection
Eqem pmenProeurement
1. Introduction
A brief survey of the history development of airborne and
satellite photographic reconnaisance systems, and the reactions
of people to these, show that the CIA has some methods of operation
and procurement that give the Agency a unique status in the field.
As a result of this status, dhe AF is currently using our contracting
and security facility on some of their programs, and is in many
ways attempting to duplicate techniques of the Agency. The following
is an attempt to define the characteristics which are now so sought
after; this definition is necessary for two purposes: first, so that
we can ourselves retain this capability; second, so that partial
application by ourselves or others does not lead to disastrous
situations (e.g., one can take an excellent pudding recipe, and bake
it like a cake; result--garbage). Most oftmy familiarity with the
techniques and methods associated with technical developments come
from the contractors facility, only a small amount from experience
within the Agency.
2. Comments
First aspect of interest in Agency developments is the quick
reaction time for the initiation of development of a system.
Noticeable is the lack of full staff studies, feasibility programs,
development plans, engineering analyses, etc. Rather, one sees
the following activity: first, a qualitative establishment of a
need; second, a broad-brush definition of a possible way to fill
that need; third, obtaining a proposal from a capable contractor;
fourth, evaluation of the course of action by a very limited group
of very capable people (e.g. Land-Baker-Purcell); and fifth, the
initiation of work with a minimum of redtape. Some risks are taken
on cost; the work-statement is often ill-defined (possibly containing
some questionable items). The work is initiated, and many of these
factors are ironed out as the work progresses. An active and
determined attempt is made to maintain security by strict control
of information and limitation on numbers of people involved.
In addition, active'authority is delegated to the operating
level. Most decisions can be made immediately; a long chain of
government approvals are not generally required. Rather, the
superiors are kept informed, and can therefor re-direct if'necessary.
NRO review(s) completed.
nom-,-~
LiLL
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RECORD MEMO: AGENCY ASSETS, 21 August 1963, AFH/D/TECH/OSA/DD/S&T
2. (cont).
However, the initiation of action can occur immediately. This
authority delegation also occurs at the contractor level as well;
action is started in the direction of best estimate, consultations
occur after work is under way, or at least people have actively-
started to solve the problem. Occasionally, this leads to rather
expensive rework or redirection; generally the effort gets done
very much sooner.
Documentation is minimal. Progress reporting is done directly
by personal contact with necessary people; formally edited documents,
and veil-prepared briefing charts are not required. Unfortunately,
this requires a lot of traveling, both by the government and by the
contractors. The pace of activity is fast, on the spot decisions
need to be made (which requires on-the-spot authority): there is
no requirement to await the writing, editing, printing, transmission,
approval chain, for either reports or system changes. As a dis-
advantage, it is often difficult to state, two years later, why
something was done: often, even to state what was done.
3. Current Status* and CaserHistory
The CORONA program is, I believe, a good case history of the
initiation of development under this method of operation, and of
the slow (and inevitable?) degradation of the method. CORONA was
started initially as a short-term, high-risk development, to fill
in the community's needs during the development of SANDS (the AF
"white" reconnaisance satellite program), then falling behind
schedule. A small, competent team was assembled, and work initiated.
Additional people were brought in as needed. All concerned were
expected to contribute in any way they could, cutting across
disciplines and fields of interest. By keeping the groups small,
communications were maintained without resort to a large amount
of paperwork. Some mistakes were made; however, early flights
were possible, and some basic faults were uncovered which could
not have been uncovered without the flight experience. The life
of the program was extended; year by year, more people became
involved, and, as an operational system, tighter controls have
been imposed. The complexity and capability of the flight gear
has steadily increased; as simple items have proven out, additional
requirements have arisen.
The CORONA system has been developed with one basic ground
rule: keep it simple, to do the required task, and not try to
do the "optimum" task; the optimum can be approached, but is more
important to get the job done, than to do all jobs for all people.
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Ell,
20 August 1963
PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
ORGANIZATION PLAN AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH
THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND THE DNRO.
This memorandum for the record outlines the questions raised
by DCI concerning the above subjects.
I. BASIC OBJECTIVES
The basic purposes of the agreement dated March 13, 1963
should be recognized as the creation of a management organization
to handle the NRO under the following broad understanding expressed
in the Agreement.
Maximum use will be made of appropriate technical and
operational capabilities and resources of the DoD, NSA and
CIA to support all collection and processing projects (III-A).
Appropriate capabilities, facilities and resources of the
DoD and the CIA will be used on all flights over denied
territory (III-D).
Appropriate resources of DoD, CIA and private contractors
should be used in the planning and conduct of research and
development of future reconnaissance programs (III-H),
The DNRO is granted authority to carry out the National
Reconnaissance Program through the assignment of all
project tasks such as technical management, contracting,
etc. , to appropriate elements of DoD and CIA (IV-C).
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It was DCI's understanding that NRO would be a managing and
planning organization utilizing existing resources but would not
attempt to become a line organization duplicating existing resources,
most particularly those in the Air Force and CIA. However, NRO
has become a "line organization" and as a result has taken over
operational responsibility. The Air Force Systems Command
(General Schriever) is no longer involved and General Greer reports
directly to the DNRO. Thus the NRP has lost the input of this
organization. Similarly the Satellite Operations Center has been
made an NRO staff activity rather than a CIA operation functioning
under NRO direction.
Consideration should be given to directing NRO to revert to
the original concept covered in the Agreement which assigns to it
responsibility to plan, manage, budget and administer the
reconnaissance program utilizing available resources of DoD,
CIA, NSA, contractors, etc. for performance of the effort.
Except for the reference in I-B, "will establish as a separate
operating agency", the basic Agreement on the NRP deals exclusively
in the language of management and planning.
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 Approved For se 2QQ4~Q8/ CIA=RDP72R004100200080013-5
II. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
Guidance to the DNRO shall be furnished by SecDef as Executive
Agent and by the USIB (II-D~, and the plans developed shall respond
directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and
priorities established by the USIB.
USIB's requirements are developed by its Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance (COMDR), composed of representatives of the Services,
DIA, CIA, etc. USIB regularly reviews and passes upon COMOR's
requirements.
A recent communication to DCI from DNRO dated August 12th (with-
drawn August 19th) evidences a lack of understanding by NRO of the above
fundamental responsibility of USIB in the field of reconnaissance.
The responsibility of DNRO to the intelligence requirements as
defined by USIB should be clearly understood.
III. RELATIONSHIP OF DNRO TO SECDEF AND DCI.
The Director of NRO is charged with the responsibility of keeping
designated personnel in DoD and CIA personally informed on a regular
basis concerning the status of projects of the NRP so that such individuals
may in turn inform the SecDef and DCI concerning these activities (V-A-1).
All departments are charged with the responsibility of providing support
to the DNRO through the assignment of personnel, etc.
For several months General Carter has been acting for the DCI
on NRO matters. It has been concluded that all such activities will be
centered within CIA with the Deputy Director for Science and Technology,
Dr. Wheelon, who will be responsible to the DCI, Deputy DCI and the
CIA Policy Planning Group.
NOTE: Clarification of the type of National Reconnaissance Organization
contemplated by the agreement and adherence thereto now existent would
solve many of the problems.
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25X1
25X1
1. Basically NRO's functions can be divided into the following
general categories of activity, each of which involves planning,
management, budgeting and control of activities to be assigned
to agencies equipped to carry on the work directly or through
contractors:
a. Research and development of improved or
advanced reconnaissance systems.
b. Procurement, manufacture and testing of
approved vehicles or systems.
c. Technical direction and operations control of
developed systems or vehicles.
With reference to specific projects, the following problems
warrant immediate resolution:
The U-2 program. To meet our needs in Cuba high resolution
cameras are needed for the U-2.
Appropriate arrangements should be made to install and to
the camera and, if successful, sufficient planes should be equipped
for utilization in Cuba and perhaps elsewhere. CIA is now planning
the camera installation in a test plane in early September.
25X1
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 Approved For ase 0 , ,; -RDP72R00410 0200080013-5
25X1
2. The OXCART program.
This includes the OXCART (A-12), the
(5 reconnaissance
vehicles, two of which will be modified for TAGBOARD), KEDLOCK
(3 long-range interceptors), the R-12 (reconnaissance bomber version),
and TAGBOARD (the OXCART drone).
None of these programs will succeed unless the OXCART is
brought up to dependable, satisfactory operation at specification,
speed and altitude and this must be done without interruption. Because
of the large number of projects at Lockheed under diverse management
and Lockheed's understandable desire to give preference to the planes
offering the greatest potential business, there has been evidence of
conflicts, confusion, diversion of personnel, engines, equipment, etc.
between the various projects.
It was agreed in a meeting with the President's Scientific Advisory
Board, Secretary McNamara and DCI, and the President, on 21 January
1963 that procurement of the military versions of the OXCART would be
handled by CIA. under "black purchasing procedures. " This has been
done but management control of the projects after the contracts have
been let is confused.
3. It is recognized that the Air Force has a very important technical
input into all military vehicles, CIA a technical input to the A-12.
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It is therefore proposed that a CIA representative serve as
the Managing Agent for all work at Lockheed, that this responsibility
extend to placement of contracts, management of contracts, control
of schedules and priorities and the adjudication of problems which
arise in the plant and at the test site.
The Air Force Systems Command or other Air Force units
will assign technical personnel necessary to insure that the contractor
meets their technical requirements for the military vehicle (not the A-12).
A system must be developed to accommodate technical changes, orders
or additions, proper handling of change order contracts, extras, and
reimbursement and proper accountability therefore.
A related problem is the purchase of spare parts and supplies
for the OXCART vehicle and the military counterparts. This should
be handled through the above contract procedures with the Air Force
specifying their requirements for the military vehicles.
The above procedure will be reviewed when the A-12 vehicles
have been delivered and the total Lockheed production is devoted to
Air Force planes. There should be no delay in TAGBOARD. The 25X1
unresolved question of the disposition of 5 Air Force A-12s
two of which are to be modified to handle TAGBOARD should be resolved
and appropriate instructions issued.
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IT V8, ~4 P72R004100200080013-5
5. Technical direction and operational control of the U-2s
used for reconnaissance over denied territory (except for Cuba)
and the OXCART will be carried on by CIA in accordance with the
programs of the NRO designed to mebt the requirements of USIB.
Support for these operations will be supplied by the Air Force as
in the past.
6. Satellite Vehicles:
All satellite vehicles are considered as part of Project A
under the responsibility of General Greer. This should remain
unchanged. Satellite Operations Control Center should be moved
back into CIA because of the availability of necessary computers
for mission planning (which=a4Le-r,"w employedh the information
transmitted by Telex to the Pentagon), and also because of the
close relationship with COMOR which is of vital importance in
planning missions.
euli
Responsibility for satellite payloads for ARGON/"CORONA,
Y , including contracting and budgeting, security and
technical direction to be carried on by CIA who have been responsible
for these developments. Similarly responsibility for
will be carried on by the Air Force in the appropriate command,
all under the direction of the DNRO. 6"'4
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25X1
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8. A schedule of satellite launchings of the various types of
payloads available and for as far in the future as is possible should
be developed by DNRO and submitted to USIB for approval. Deviation
from approved schedules should be reported on a current basis.
Recogni zing that the budget implications of satellite launchings are
most serious, there should be frequent consultation between the
DNRO and DCI in the preparation of launching schedules with the
attendant budget implications to insure that the schedules as
finally submitted by DNRO for incorporation in the National
Reconnaissance Plan will meet the general requirements laid down
by USIB.
Photographic Processing Research and Development; Film
Procurement and Photographic Processing should be assigned by
DNRO to the operating agencies in parallel to their respective respon-
sibilities for "payloads". Note - Problems which have arisen through
the duplication of contracts for Photographic Process R&D between
General Greer and CIA should be adjudicated. It should be recognized
that both CIA and the Air Force, directly or through their respective
contractors, can make an important contribution in the field of
satellite photography, film improvement, photographic processing,
etc. , and arrangements must be worked out, as a matter of policy and
to be consistent with the basic NRO agreement, to "make maximum use
of technical and operational capabilities of both".
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,8,
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10. The Aircraft Operational Center located in CIA and used for
planning U-2 flights and other penetrations of denied territory except
25X1 for Cuba
25X1
25X1
missions, should remain centered in CIA
where it has been for the past 8 years. The Cuban overflights
should be handled by JRC under DNRO
guidance and in accordance with agreed procedures.
11. Future Developments:
An important area for which no plans are existent is the
handling of future developments of a type which will have a very
important bearing on our reconnaissance capability in the years
ahead. This area of activity can not be left unattended. The
areas for consideration are:
b. The implementation of the Purcell report involving
recommendations concerning the improvements of the
CORONA system (now under study by both CIA and Gen.
25X1
Greer),
c. Satellite vulnerability which was a problem
discussed at the Special Group early this year with a
report requested from the Air Force.
d. Covert satellite - Subject discussed with the
Special Group early this year but no specific action taken.
25X1
9-,
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It is my intention to attempt to convene the Purcell Panel
during the week of September 9th for the purpose of further
reviewing their report and recommendations and seeking their
advice on the adequacy or steps either taken or planned by NRO
to accomplish the improvements recommended by them.
JAM/mfb
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se 2004/08/31 CIA-RDP72ROO41
pop
20 August 1963
PROBLEMS RELATING TO.T NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
ORGANIZATION PLAN AND ITS. IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH
THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND THE DNRO.
This memorandum for the record outlines the questions raised
by DCI concerning the above sub$cts.
1. BASIC OBJECTIVES
The basic purposes of the agreement dated March 13, 1963
should be recognized as the creation of a management organization
to handle the NRO under the following broad understanding expressed
in the Agreement.
Maximum use will be made of appropriate technical and
operational capabilities and resources of the DoD, NSA and
CIA to support all collection and processing projects (III-A).
Appropriate capabilities, facilities and resources of the
DoD and the CIA will be used on all flights over denied
territory (III-D).
ppropriate resources of DoD. CIA and private contractors
should be used in the planning and conduct of research and
development of future reconnaissance programs (III-I3).
The DNRO is granted authority to carry out the National
Reconnaissance Program through the assignment of all
project tasks such as technical management, contracting,
etc., to appropriate elements of DoD and CIA (IV-C).
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LIZ'
 Approved For case 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP72R0041 0200080013-5
e
ii
It was DCI1 s understanding that NRO would be a managing and
planning organization utilizing existing resources but would not.
attempt to become a line organization duplicating existing resources,
most particularly those in the Air Force and CIA. However, NRO
has become a "line organization" and as a result has taken over
operational responsibility. The Air Force Systems Command
(General Schriever) is no longer involved and General Greer reports
directly to the DNRO. Thus the NRP has lost the input of this
organization. Similarly the Satellite Operations Center has been
made an NRO staff activity rather than a CIA operation functioning
under NRO direction.
Consideration should be given to directing NRO to revert to
the original concept covered in the Agreement which as signs to it
responsibility to plan, manage, budget and administer the
reconnaissance program utilizing available resources of DoD,
CIA, NSA, contractors, etc. for performance of the effort.
Except for the reference in I-B, "will establish as a separate
operating agency", the basic Agreement on the NRP deals exclusively
in the language of management and planning.
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 Approved For Release 2004/08/31CIA-RDP72R00410~00200080013-5
U. RELATIONSHIP WITH TFE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
Guidance to the DNRO shah be irnished by SeeDef as Executive
Agent and by the USIB (ff.D)', asrd the plans developed shall respond
directly and solely to the intelligce collection requirements and
priorities established by the USIB.
USIB's requirements are developed by its Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance (COMOR.), composed of representatives of the Services
DIA, CIA, etc. USDB regularly reviews and passes upon COMOR's
requirements.
A recent communication to DCI from DNRO dated August 12th (with-
drawn August 19th) evidences a lack of understanding by NRO of the above
fundamental responsibility of USIB in the field of reconnaissance.
The responsibility of DNRO to the intelligence requirements as
defined by USIB should be clearly understood.
M. RELATIONSHIP OF DNROTO SECDEF AND DCI.
The Director of NRO is charged with the responsibility of keeping
designated personnel in DoD and CIA personally informed on a regular
basis concerning the status of projects of the NRP so that such individuals
may in turn inform the SecDef and DCI concerning these activities (V-A-1).
All departments are charged with the responsibility of providing support
to the DNRO through the assignment of personnel, etc.
For several months General Carter has been acting for the DCI
on NRO matters. It has been concluded that all such activities will be
centered within CIA with the Deputy Director for Science and Technology,
Dr. Wheelon, who will be responsible to the DCI. Deputy DCI and the
CIA Policy Planning Group.
NOTE: Clarification of the type of National Reconnaissance Organization
contemplated by the agreement and adherence thereto now existent would
solve many of the problems.
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25X1
25X1
1. 'Bas ically NRO's functions can be divided into tho following
general categories of activity, each of which involves planning,
management, budgeting and control of activities to be assigned
to agencies equipped to carry, on the work directly or through
contractors:
a. Research and development of improved or
advanced reconnaissance systems.
b. Procurement, manufacture and testing of
approved vehicles or systems.
c. Technical direction and operations control of
developed systems or vehicles.
With reference to specific projects, the following problems
warrant immediate resolution:
The U-2 program. To meet our needs in Cuba high resolution
cameras are needed for the U-2.
Appropriate arrangements should be made to install and tes
the camera and, if successful, sufficient planes should be equipped
for utilization in Cuba and perhaps elsewhere. CIA is now planning
the camera installation in a test plane in early September.
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25X1
 Approved
For
ase 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP72R00410 0200080013-5
Pie
2. The OXCART program.
This includes the OXCART (Arl2)o the
25X1
(5 reconnaissance
vehicles, two of which will be modified for TAGBOARD),
KEDLOCK
(3 long-range interceptors), the R?12 (reconnaissance bomber
and TAGBOARD (the OXCART drone).
version).
None of these programs will succeed unless the OXCART is
brought up to dependable. satisfactory operation at specification,
speed and altitude and this must be done without interruption.
Because
of the large number of projects at Lockheed under diverse management
and Lockheed's understandable desire to give preference to the planes
offering the greatest potential business, there has been evidence of
conflicts, confusion, diversion of personnel, engines, equipment, etc.
between the various projects.
agreed in a meeting with the President's Scientific Advisory
Board, Secretary McNamara and DCI, and the President, on 2I January
1963 that procurement of the military versions of the OXCART would be
handled by CIA under "black purchasing procedures. "
This has been
done but management control of the projects after the contracts have
been let is confused.
It is recognized that the Air Force has a very important technical
input into all military vehicles, CIA a technical input to the A42.
r ~ +
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ase 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP72R0041 0200080013-5
^~ a
Pie OW
It is therefore proposed that a CIA representative serve as
the Managing Agent for all work at Lockheed, that this responsibility
extend to placement of contracts, management of contracts, control
of schedules and priorities and the adjudication of problems which
& rise in the plant and at the test site.
The Air Force Systems Command or other Air Force units
will assign technical personnel necessary to insure that the contractor
meets their technical requirements for the military vehicle (not the A-12).
A system must be developed to accommodate technical changes, orders
or additions, proper handling of. change order contracts, extras, and
reimtnirsement and proper accountability therefore.
A related problem is the purchase of spars parts and supplies
for the OXCART vehicle and the military counterparts. This should
be handled through the above contract procedures with the Air Force
specifying their requirements for the military vehicles.
The above procedure will be reviewed when the A>12 vehicles
have been delivered and the total Lockheed production is devoted to
Air Force planes. There should be no delay in TAGBCARD. The
unresolved question of the disposition of 5 Air Force A-12s
two of which are to be modified to handle TAGBOAR D should be resolved
and appropriate instructions issued.
25X1
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5. Technical direction and operational control of the U-Zs
used for reconnaissance over denied territory (except for Cuba)
and the OXCART will be carried on by CIA in accordance with the
programs of the NRO designed to meet the requirements of USLh.
Support for these operations will be supplied by the Air Force as
in the ;past.
6. Satellite Vehicles.
All satellite vehicles are considered gas part of Project A
under the responsibility of General Greer. This should remain
unchanged. Satellite Operations Control Center should be moved
back into CIA because of the availability of necessary computers
for mission planning (which are now employed with the information
transmitted by Telex to the Pentagon), and also because of the
close relationship with COMOR which is of vital importance in
planning missions.
7. Responsibility for satellite payloads for ARGON, CORONA,
and LANYARD, including contracting and budgeting, security and
technical direction to be carried on by CIA who have been responsible
for these developments. Similarly responsibility
will be carried on by the Air Force in the appropriate command,
all under the direction of the DNRO.
25X1
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ase 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP72ROO41090200080013-5
~r.
Pie
8. A schedule of satellite launchings of the various types of
payloads available and for as far in the future as is possible should
be developed by DNRO and submitted to USIB for approval. Deviation
from approved schedules should be reported on a current basis.
Recogni sing that the budget implications of satellite launchings are
most serious, there should be frequent consultation between the
DNRO and DCI in the preparation of launching schedules with the
attendant budget implications to insure that the schedules as
finally submitted by DNRO for incorporation in the National
Reconnaissance Plan will meet the general requirements laid down
by USIB.
9. Photographic Processing Research and Development; Tilrn
Procurement and Photographic Processing should be assigned by
DNRO to the operating agencies in parallel to their respective respon-
sibilities for "payloads". Note - Problems which have arisen through
the duplication of contracts for Photographic Process R&D between
General Greer and CIA should be adjudicated. It should be recognized
that both CIA and the Air Force, directly or through their respective
contractors, can make an important- contribution in the field of
satellite photography, film improvement, photographic processing,
etc., and arrangements must be worked out, as a matter of policy and
to be consistent with the basic NRO agreement, to "make maximum use
of technical and operational capabilities of both".
Approved For Release 2004/08/31 CIA-RDP72R0041OR000200080013-5
 Approved For Fuse 2004/08/31 CIA-RDP72R00410100200080013-5
10. The Aircraft Operational Center located in CIA and used for
planning U-Z flights and other penetrations of denied territory except
for Cuba
missions, should remain centered in CIA
where it has been for the past 8 years. The Cuban overflights
should be handled by JRC under DNRO
guidance and in accordance with agreed procedures.
11. Future Developments:
An important area for which no plans are existent is the
handling of future developments of a type which will have a very
important bearing on our reconnaissance capability in the years
ahead. This area of activity can not be left unattended. The
areas for consideration are:
b. The implementation of the Purcell report involving
recommendations concerning the improvements of the
CORONA system (now under study by both CIA and Gen.
Greer),
c. Satellite vulnerability which was a problem
discussed at the Special Group early this year with a
report requested from the Air Force.
d. Covert satellite - Subject discussed with the
Special.Group early this year but no specific action taken.
_9_
Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP72R0041OR000200080013-5
25X1
 Approved For Rse 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP72R00410 0200080013-5
It is my intention to attempt to convene the Purcell Panel
during the week of September 9th for the purpose of further
reviewing their report And recommendations and seeking their
advice on the adequacy or steps either taken or planned by NRO
to accomplish the improvements recommended by them.
JAM/mfb
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20 August 1963 DRAFT
Problems relating to the National Reconnaissance Orgax:iaati rs
plan and its implementation through the National Reconnaissance
Office and the DNRO.
This memorandum for the record outlines the questions raised
by DCI concerning t above subjects.
The basic purposes of the agreement dated March 13, 1963
should be recognized.
1. Maximum use will be made of appropriate technical and
operational capabilities and resources of the Department of Defense,
NSA and CIA to support all collection and processing projects (lU-A).
Appropriate capabilities, facilities and resourcesr of the
Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency will be used on
all flights over denied territory (III-D).
Appropriate resources of DeD, CIA and private cont ractors
should be used in the planning and conduct of research and development
of future reconnaissance programs (IIl-H).
The ONRO is granted authority to carry out the National
Reconnaissance Program through the assignment of all project tasks
such as technical management, contracting, etc., to appropriate
elements of DoU and CIA (IV-C).
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It was my understanding that NRC would be a managing &nd
planning organization utilizing existing resources but would not
attempt to become a line organization duplicating existing resources,
most particularly those in the Air Force and CIA. As a result
NO )as taken over operational responsibility -- the Air Force
Syetema Command (Gen. Schriever) is no longer involved.
Gen. Greer reports to the DNRC and therefore the NRC program
has lost the input of this organization. Similarly the Satellite
Operations Center, traditionally part of CIA, has been made an
NRC staff activity. Secretary McMillan states that NRC is a
`;line organization" .
RECOMMENDATION:
NRO be directed to revert to the original concept covered in
the Agreement which aseigrato it responsibility to plan and manage
the reconnaissance program utilizing available resources of Do
CIA, contractors, etc.
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Z. Guidance to the DNRO shall be furnished by SecDef as
Executive Agent and by the USIB (U.. ), and the plans developed
shalt respond directly and solely to the intelligence collection
requirements and priorities established by the USIB (KKK-B).
USID's requirements are developed by its Committee on
Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), composed of representatives
of the Services, DIA, CIA, etc. U regularly reviews and passes
upon COMQR's requiriements.
A recent communication to DCI from DNRQ dated
August 12th (withdrawn August 19th) evidences a lack of understanding
by 14RO of the above fundamental responsibility of USIB in the field
of reconnaissance.
The Director of NRO is charged with the responsibility of
keeping designated personnel in DoD and CIA personally informed
on a regular basis concerning the status of projects of the NRP so
that such individuals may in turn inform the ecDeef and DCI
concerning these activities (V-A41). Ali departments are charged
with the responsibility of providing support to the DNRO through the
assignment of personnel, etc.
For several months General Carter has been acting for the
DCI on NRGi matters. It has been concluded that all such activities
will be centered within CIA with the Deputy Director for #cience
Technology, Dr. 'Wheelon, who will be responsible to the
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DCI, Deputy DC! and the CIA Policy Planning Group.
Clarification of the type of National Reconnaissance Organization
contemplated would solve some of then problems outlined below.
Basically NRO's functions must be divided into the following:
a. Research and d*velepment of improved or
advanced recosmaissancs systems.
b, rocurement, manufacture and testing of approved
vehicles or systems.
c. Tee uical direction and operational control of
developed system or vehicles.
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With reference to specific projects, we must consider.,
a. The U-Z program. To meet IM needs in Cuba
higher resolution cameras are needed for the U-Z. I I 25X1
I Appropriates arrangements should be made
to install and test the camera and, if successful, to equip u
sufficient planes for utilization in Cuba and perhaps
elsewhere.
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b. The OXCART program. This includes the
OXCART (A-l2), the
(5 reconnaissance vehicles, 25X1
two of which will be modified for TAGBOARA)), KEDLOCK
(3 long-rang* interceptors), the R-12 (reconnaissance
bomber version), and TAGBOARD (the OXCART drone).
None of theses programs will succeed unless the ART is
brought up to dependable, satisfactory operation at specifications,
speed and altitude and this must be done without interruption.
Because of the large number of projects at Lockheed and Lockheed's
understandable desire to give preference to the planes offering the
greatest potential business, there has been evidence of conflicts,
confusion, diversion of personnel, engines, equipment, etc. between
the various projects.
It was agreed in a meeting with the President's. ;scientific
Advisory Board, Secretary McNamara and 13CI, and the President,
on 21 January 1963 that procurement of the military versions of
the OXCART would be handled by CIA under "black purchasing
procedures". This has been done but management control of the
projects after the contracts have been let is cmifused. It is
recognized that the Air Force has a very important technical input
at to all, military vehicles, CIA atecical input to the A-12.
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It is therefore proposed that a CIA representative serve as
the Managing Agent for all work at Lockheed, that his responsibility
extend to placement of contracts, management of contracts,
control of schedules and priorities and the adjudication of problems
which arise in the plant and at,, the test site.
The Air Force System. Command or other Air Force units
will assign technical personnel necessary to insure that the
contractor meets all of their requirements. A system must be
developed to accommodate technical changes and evolutionary
developments with respect to change order contracts, extras,
and reimbursement therefore.
4. A related problem is the purchase of spare parts and supplies
for the OXCART vehicle and the military counterparts. This should
be handled through the above contract procedures with the Air Force
specifying their requirements for the military vehicles.
The above procedure will be reviewed when the A -12 vehicles
have been delivered and the total Lockheed production is devoted to
Air Force planes. There should be no delay in TAGBOARD.
Technical direction and operational control of the U-2 and OXCART
to be carried on by CIA as required by DNRO, with support from
the Air Force. The unresolved question of the 5 All Force
25X1 A-12s I Itransferred to CIA, two of which are to be
_o-
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modified to handle TAGROARD, should be resolved and appropriate
instructions Issued.
Satellite Vehicles: All satellite vehicles are considered
as part of Project A under the responsibility of General Greeer. This
should remain =changed. Satellite Operations Control Center should
be moved back into CIA. because of the availability of necessary
computers for missiom planning (which are now employed with the
information transmitted by Telex to the Pentagon), and also because
of the close relationship with COMOR which is of vital importance in
planning missions.
6. Responsibility for satellite payloads for ARGON, CORONA,
and LANYARD, including contracting and budgeting, security and
technical direction to be carried on by CIA who have been responsible
for these developments. sin-X4rly responsibility
will, be carried on by the Air Force in the appropriate command, all
under the direction of the DNRO.
7. A schedule of satellite launchings of the various types of
payloads available and for as far in the future as is possible should be
developed by DNRO and submitted to USM for approval. Deviation
from approved schedules should be reported on a current basis.
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8. Photographic processing, research and development,
film procurement and photographic processing should be assigned
to the active agencies in parallel to their respective responsibilities
for payloads. Problems which have arisen through the duplication
of contracts for photographic process R & 1) between Gen. Greer
and CIA should be adjudicated. It should be recognized that both
CIA and the Air Force through the capabilities of their respective
contractors can make an important contribution in the field of
satellite photography, film improvement, photographic processing,
etc., and arrangements should be worked out, consistent with basic
NRC) agreement, to "make maximum use of technical and
operational capabilities of both`:.
9. The Aircraft Operational Center located in CIA and used for
planning U-2 flights and other penetrations of denied territory
except for Cuba
in CIA where it has been for the past 8 years. The Cuban overflights
should be handled by JRC under DNRO
guidance.
10. Future developments. An important area remains unresolved
- one for which no plans are existent - the future developments which
will have a very important bearing on our reconnaissance capability in
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b. The implementation at the Purcell report involving
recommendations concerning the improvement of the
CORONA system now under study by both CIA and
the future. This area of activity can not be left unattended. The
areas for consideration are.
Gen. Greer.
c. Satellite vulnerability which was a problem
discussed at the Special Group early this year with a
report requested from the Air Force.
d. Covert satellite - Subject discussed with the
Special Group early this year but no specific action taken.
11. It is my intention to attempt to convene the Purcell
Panel during the week of September 9 with the purpose of
further reviewing their report and recommendations and seeking
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their advice on the adequacy of stop* a +rr taken or planned
by NRO to accomplish the improvements recommended by them.
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is
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
1400066653D___
22 August 1963
DD/S&T VlW ON NRO PROBLEM
A. Reference Points
In discussing the NRO problem, the following assertions form my point
of departure. They are either self-evident, a matter of record, or
personal conviction based on reliable secondhand reporting.
1. Were it not for CIA there would today be no U-2, CORONA.
or OXCART (self-evident).
2. CIA has a demonstrated ability to identify and pursue . both
aggressively and successfully - reconnaissance programs which are
responsive to national intelligence needs (self-evident).
3. In addition, each of the Armed Services have a valid need
for standby reconnaissance capabilities to be used in tactical or
strategic warfare situations. These systems may or may not be logical
follow-outs of national reconnaissance programs (self-evident).
4. The Air Force objective - as repeatedly stated by General
LeMay - is to eliminate the CIA from all reconnaissance operations
(record).
5. If exploited, the present NRO Agreement provides the
enabling legislation by which CIA can be so eliminated, giving to the
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DNRO as it does the power to reassign programs (record).
6. By successive choice, the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office has come to be identified with the Under Secretary of the Air
Force, thereby posing an unparalleled conflict of interest question
(opinion).
7. It is clear that CIA participation in the National Reconnaissance
Program has decreased steadily and significantly since the beginning of
the NRO (self-evident).
. From the beginning, the NRO staff has been composed
almost exclusively of Air Force officers. Their advice to the DNRO
has consistently supported the erosion of CIA participation (opinion).
9. Colonel Geary, who was once responsible solely for the
essential Air Force support to CIA aircraft operations, is now also
responsible for competitive aircraft development programs under
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of record).
10. Resource allocation at Lockheed, Burbank, is sorely strained
between OXCART and the Air Force follow-on aircraft. With no adequate
mechanism to resolve schedule conflicts between CIA (Ledford) and the
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Air Force (Geary) (self-evident).
11. In the development of satellite reconnaissance systems,
CIA is now utilized by General Greer for only two purposes: (a) to
land its extraordinary contracting authorities, and (b) to carry the
security responsibility for the covert portion of his programs (record).
12. Contractors in all phases of the satellite reconnaissance
development field now look upon General Greer and the Air Force as
their sole benefactor. This follows from his assumption of technical
direction responsibility for all such programs, hard on the heels of
the satellite operation center transfer and our compliance in this
assumption (opinion),
13. The Director of NRO feels no immediate responsibility to
COMOR. He candidly asserts that COMOR has not provided - and is
not able by its constitution to provide - him with meaningful guidance
(direct quotation).
14. The DNRQ sincerely believes that his is a line responsibility
running directly to Colonel Ledford in CIA. He evidently considers it
our responsibility to supply adequate resources to Colonel Ledford to
carry out assigned tasks to him by DNRO (record/quotation).
15. The DNR?1 conaviera his decision on program allocation or
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reassignment final, and states that their challenge is unacceptable.
lb. There is an important asymmetry between the way Dr.
McMillan works with General Carter and the way he works with Dr.
Fubini. Fubini participates in the making of all decisions and
initiates many. General Carter is presented only with final decisions
which he is enjoined not to reverse (record).
B. Recommendations
In view of this extraordinary and continuing situation, I recommend for
your consideration that the following drastic steps be taken to restore
and preserve the original intent of the National Reconnaissance Program:
1. Responsibility for all reconnaissance operations - both
satellite and aircraft ? be removed from the NR.O and be assumed by
the Director of Central Intelligence as the Executive Agent. This would
involve the following specific steps:
a. Return of the Satellite Operations Center to CIA.
b. Retention of the Aircraft Operations Center in CIA, with
the exception that overt military flights, such as
BRASS KNOB, be planned and operated from JRC/SAC.
c. Establish a scheduling board in CIA which would manage
both the satellite launch schedules and aircraft flights. General
Greer would be tasked to establish direct communication with this
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board and station appropriate representatives from his
organization with it, so that the scheduling board could plan
satellite launches in light of the physical limitations of booster
procurement. stand availability and range facilities. This
scheduling board would be responsive to USIB/ COMOR and the DCI.
It would carry to the Special Group explicit plans for aircraft
and satellite reconnaissance operations.
d. Detailed planning for all covert aircraft operations would
be carried out by the CIA Aircraft operations Center. Satellite
operations would be planned in detail jointly by the Satellite
Operations Center and the operating facilities under General Greer
(Satellite Tracking Center) on the West Coast.
e. Film processing for both satellite and aircraft operations
would be managed directly by the CIA in response to DCI and
USIB requirements. Both CIA and Air Fares facilities/ contractors
would be exploited in this program, but the over-all management
and scheduling would be carried out by CIA as an intricate part of
the entire reconnaissance operations activity.
f. CIA would' take the lead in photographic equipment
development such as the present Eastman Kodak R&D contract.
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specifications so that (1) the AF can take advantage of reconnaissance
developments for its other purposes, and (2) CIA can contribute
effectively even in areas where it is not appropriate for it to
carry major development responsibility.
c. An explicit assignment of development responsibility for
a new system should then be made to either the A.T. the Navy,
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the Army, CIA
s-. The responsible agency or service should fund for the
program. contract for it. carry the technical management and be
responsible for the security in the program. The DCI should
cease to lend his extraordinary contracting authority to the AT
for program. over which he has no cognizance and should no
longer carry security responsibility in widely dispersed industrial
plants for similar programs.
4. Specific Program Assignment Recommendations:
a. Technical management of the CORONA and ARGON payloads
be transferred back to CIA.
b. Technical management of LANYARD
the AT.
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d. CIA retain the technical management of TACBOARD because
of its intimate technical and schedule interaction with the OXCART
vehicle.
e. Over-all management of the Lockheed. Burbank, effort
and priorities be vested in CIA so as to insure that the OXCART
reconnaissance vehicle is not placed in competition with large
potential, orders for the long range intercepter version.
f. Responsibility for follow-on aircraft to the OXCART
system be clearly assigned at this time to the CIA, to be pursued
jointly with the AT.
g. Responsibility for developing a covert satellite, if such
a system makes sense, be explicitly assigned at this time to the CIA.
h. Eastman Kodak film processing R&D contract be assigned
to CIA in view of its major application to the film exploitation
effort at NPIC and the recommended assignment of film processing
management responsibility to CIA noted above.
i. A competitive role in camera development be assigned
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to both CIA and the AT with the understanding that each be a party
to the other's progress in great ddsU for mutual benefit. CIA's
demonstrated ability to push the state -of-the??art hard and fast in
contrast to the Al' inertia is important. The AT should be free
to pursue camera development on its own initiative for programs
which are under its primary responsibility. i. e. ,
LANYARD, and should have immediate access to all CIA camera
developments so as to recognize and implement possible applica-
tion to their tactical and strategic requirements. The same should
be true for the Navy and the Army.
5. CIA should fund in its own budget all of those activities which
it undertakes on behalf of the NR.P. The Bureau of the Budget believes
and states that program control and financial control are indissolubly
linked. In my view, our experience in the N.RO shows that they are correct.
A joint budget should be prepared by the AV and CIA reflecting the NR.P.
and the Bureau of the budget should be encouraged to look at the total
package in this way. Ho- ever, the basic funding should be carried in the
individual services in accordance with that plan. The converse of this
agreement is that we no longer use our extraordinary contracting authority
to fence money for other Agency programs over which we have no control.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Washington
Office of the Under Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA
THE DIRECTOR., NPIC
22 November 1963
I am directing the DDNRO to make an assessment of the
adequacy of photographic imaging products furnished to
the intelligence community by the NRO. This is to be
limited to domestically processed photographic products
from NRP operations.
I would appreciate your designation of one individual
each from your respective agencies, to serve in a liaison
capacity to a small working group to accomplish this
investigation. I am proposing that this group of three
or four individuals perform their tasks via direct contact
with processing and exploitation centers. Your comments
on the attached preliminary outline of the study will be
appreciated.
BROCKWAY McMILLAN
Director
National Reconnaissance Office
cc - Chairman USIB (COMOR)
Director, Program "A"
Director, Program "B"
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ADEQUACY OF NRP PROCESSED PHOTOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS
1. Determine and report the views of principal users of
processed photographic products of the NRP as to adequacy of
these products for their purposes. Items of concern are:
a. Uniformity of quality
b. Quantities received
c. Timeliness of receipt
d. Adequacy of auxiliary data
e. Suitability of format
f. Division of processing between NRO general purpose
facilities and individual user special purpose
facilities.
2. Examine the procedures now used to assess and report
quality, and their contribution to the control of quality.
APPROACH:
Assessment and evaluation of current products, of user's
views regarding those products, and of methods and practices, by
very small group of NRO personnel via direct contacts at processing
centers and user installations. Coordination should be established
with USIB, COMOR, DIA, as appropriate.
Establish liaison directly, and also via NRO staff partici-
pation on present Ad Hoc CORONA MURAL Quality Improvement Working
Group. The assessment directed here should make use of, but not
duplicate, activities of that Group; findings of this evaluation
may be of some use to that Group.
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RESULT:
Findings in the form of recommendations for continuance
or changes to present ways and means of supplying processed
photographic products of the NRP to principal users, should be
reported to the DNRO.
Any changes required to improve the assessment and reporting
of quality, in order to insure continuned quality control, should
be pointed out.
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