U.S. PENNY PINCHING IN LAOTIAN WAR IS TOO FINE TO STOP RED OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73-00027R000100030008-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP73-00027R000100030008-0
-xland. Evans. and Robert Novak
U
So Penny Pinehihg in Laotian War
Is. Too Fine to Stop Red Offensive
VIENTIANE; Laos - A MMM Vietnamese assault on Pak-
5,000=man increase in the sane last week was repelled
hard-tire s s e d Royal Lao
army is . being blocked be-
cause_., the war in Laos,
though vital to the enor-
mous U.S. commitment in
Vietnam, is financed on a
pinch'penny basis by Wash-.
ington.
The5,000 new soldiers, on
top of the present 55,000-
man Royal army and 40,000
irregulars, are needed to
cope with the greatly esca-
lated invading army of near-
ly 70,000 North Vietnamese
(plus; ineffective Pathet Lao
Communist guerrillas, vari-
ously'estimated between 20,-
000 and 50,000). But so great
are Washington pressures to
hold down spending in Laos
that chances are Uncle Sam
won't produce the money.
The problem is by no
means limited ' to troops.
U.S: 'officials, slowly losing
ground against the North
Vietnamese invaders, must
coax and tease for weapons,
aircraft, and other equip-
ment:-What's worse, with
the new isolationism run-
ning high in Washington
and the Senate Foreign Re-
lations? Committee's unveil-
ing of, the previously covert
U,S. `operation here, money
available.; for Laos may be-
come,- tighter still.
Yet, ;Laos is critical to the
over-all fate of Indochina. As
its prgblems.mount in South
Vietnam, North, Vietnam has
nearly, four. regular divisions
.pintod. down in Laos.. With-
iout. the U.S:financed Lao
resi:roti~nce;' Hanoi: not only
could transfer most of these
troops? to South Vietnam but
also .might pressure the
Vientiane government into
demanding an end to U.S.
bombing of the Ho Chi Minh
-trail in southern Laos.. .. .
Considering these stakes,
the shoestring Ame rican
budget in Laos -less than
$500 million a year-makes
the operation a model. in,
cost effectiveness. For `eix-
ample', the 40,000,irregulars
(including Gen.. Vang Pao's
Meo guerrillas) are advised
by fewer than 250 operatives
of the' Central 'Intelligence
Agency.
More important, Laos
demonstrates that the U.S.
can effectively fight Cool-
munist insurgency without
sending nine U.S. army divi-
sions into battle. No con-
script U.S. soldier has been
by Lao troops and Lao air-
craft (dispatched from Vien-
tiane) without a single
American adviser in the act.
Nobody is calling the Lao
soldier a tiger, but there
has been improvement, Lao
troops-at least those with
an M-16-no longer run at
the sound of Vietnamese
footsteps.
Far into the future, how-
ever, U.S. aid will be essen-
tial, If it ends, the North
Vietnamese would need
barely four months to liqui-
date the war in Laos. Even
the present level of U.S. aid
may be inadequate to pre-
vent disaster.
The only recent relaxa-
tion in this pressure was a
move by some North Vietna-
mese regulars from south-
ern Laos into Cambodia,
again demonstrating t h a t
this is one large Indochinese
war.
Just how clearly the Nix-
on administration envisions
Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos as part of the same
war will determine the ulti-
mate outcome here. Having
unsuccessfully attempted a
covert operation in Laos,
Washington now confronts
the need for greater spend-
ing here just as political
pressures at home are run-
ning in the opposite direc-
tion.
? 1970. Publishers-Hall Syndicate
killed in Laos, The Amer-
ic4ns taking the risk here
are Army and CIA profes-
sionals.
But Washington may be
drawing the pinchpenny
concept too fine to stop the
Communist offensive in
northern Laos. Lao forces
are outgunned as well as
outnumbered. In a pleading
tone, political figures and
generals from Prime Minis-
ter Souvanna Phouma on
.down stressed to us the des-
perate need for better arms.
Only 21,000 M-16 rifles
have been squeezed out of
Washington, and at least 10,-
000. more are essential right
now. For budgetary reasons,
Washington has flatly re-
fused to supply the potent
M-60 machine-gun. The con-
trast with profligate U.S.
military spending in Viet-
nam is stunning,
ALL THAT HAS really
kept the Lao army' in the
fight has been airpower, es-
pecially b o m b i n g strikes
flown by Americans. But
this too is a hand-me-down
affair. Requests from U.S.
officials' here for bombing
runs are handled by Gen.
Creighton Abrams in Sai-
gon, who naturally gives the
Vietnam war priority. Ac-
cordingly, when a recent
Communist truck c o n v o y
was spotted heading toward
Vang Pao's embattled base
at Long Tieng and an air
strike. was requested, no
planes were made available.
The chance was lost. It was
not.the first such lost op-
portunity.
Actually, there are incipi-
ent signs of self-sufficiency
by the Lao army. A North
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THE WASHINGTON POST
5/1/70
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100030008-0