THUNDER IN THE MOUNTAINS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP73-00475R000201600007-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 6, 2014
Sequence Number: 
7
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 20, 1965
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP73-00475R000201600007-2.pdf150.94 KB
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-I- -I- NTildrtIJPPIC Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/06: CIA-RDP73-00475R000201600007-2 E-.P 20 1965 Thunder in the Mountains Buried deep in central Vietnam's dark-green highlands is the dusty little outpost of Buon Brieng. Buon Brieng's whitewashed flagpole flies the red and yellow flag of South Vietnam and its thatched-roof longhouses are jammed with grinning, mahogany-tinted war- riors who are being trained to fight the .1 Viet Cong by the green-bereted men of the United States Special Forces. Last week, however, Buon Brieng was off limits to U.S. newsmen. .The reason: a rebellion there, hushed up until recently, now threatens to spread across the high- lands, sweeping up the 700,000 mon- tagnard tribesmen who inhabit nearly half the total area of South Vietnam. Brieng's revolt lasted just three days. No one was injured, and the camp's defense was relatively undamaged. But when the rebellious tribesmen saun- tered back into the bush, after eating their fill, they took 200 rifles with them. With them, too, went 185 montagnard Special Forces trainees. And it could happen again almost anywhere in South Vietnam's thinly populated highlands. "They can take over any camp they want to without firing a shot," admits a worried American. "They" are FULRO (the United Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Race), ...an organization dedicated to achieving F. political autonomy for the montagnards. 7.rhough it has only 2,000 membei'll FULRO claims wide support among the montagnards, particularly those of the relatively sophisticated Rhade tribe. Whatever FULRO's strength, it rests on mutual suspicion between the monta- gnards and the Vietnamese proper-a sus- picion based on ethnic difference and maintained by the French in colonial, days. In this quarrel, the Americans, ' who won montagnard affection for their efforts to arm the "yards" against the Viet Cong, are caught in the middle. And further complicating the problem is the fact that the Viet Cong have prom- ised to give the montagnards autonomy if they help to establish a Communist government in Saigon. Last week, after shucking off some Am ricqii agent-s7aiiii-ane ,avyjay from TJLRO NEU;VVvEmes Merton Perry spent'. -i6Veral ivitry-ipokeiiiign 'fa th-e-olga"diiitioti in" ment cannot accept the unreasonable demands of FULRO. FULRO leaders will be sorry if they continue their past activities." American officials, blamed by many South Vietnamese for "coddling" the montagnards, are nervously advising unity as the cure. The American closest , to the scene is Col. Laurence S. Browne, I a chunky, blue=e-yerfaiiTs-Mer-Who is senior adviser to the South Vietnam- ese 23rd Division. Browne doesn't # believe the FULRO leaders are Com- munist but adds: "If they ain't with us, they're against us." Accordingly, there- fore, BronciejavorS the strong-hand.s?L, icy adysicat9d.R1(11:076iith7fetnarnese. Beyond this, Browne vanfs no publicity He .,has made IT-paffully .clear that : newsmen are ,u'liWelCorile: An American captain' at Buon Brieng sent a message. to Saigon last week, asking that in? Montagnards: 'If they ain't with us, they're against us' the highlands capital of Ban Me Thuot. -"The- Mari 'from FULRO was a young, sturdy Rhade in tight, tan Levis and an old U.S. Army fatigue shirt. He had a confident manner, a quick smile, and his frankness was sur- prising. He came directly to the point: FULRO, he told me, is anti-Viet Cong. irwsiitrurfight the Viet Cong. But it wants to fight directly at the side of the Americans. FULRO, ' he added, can count -on the support of nearly all the Rhade, as well as other tribes." Patience Runs Thin: Though FULRO aims at full autonomy, its leaders realize. the war makes this unrealistic at present and have scaled down their demands in recent talks with the South Vietnamese government. But whatever concessions FULRO believes it has made, there are ominous signs that Sai- gon's patience is exhausted. Last week, Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky publicly v/arned the montagnards: Me govern- journalist be permitted to visit the camp. "If necessary, ground all aircraft," he begged. But South Vietnamese and Americans alike, while professing confidence that a widespread flare-up can be avoided, are , obviously worried. And the gravity of ? the problem is illustrated by the fact - that, except for regular South Vietnam- ese army units, the defenses of Darlac province, the center of the Rhade tribe, . depend almost entirely on montagnards. If they are alienated, or forced into the Viet Cong camp, Darlac is, quite simply, lost. And any use of violence ? against FULRO would almost certainly lead to a general uprising, which would accel- erate the slide. If the South Vietnamese can somehow steal the montagnard revo- lution from the Communists, the threat will end. Otherwise, that whitewashed flagpole at Buon Brieng may soon be flying the gold-starred, blue . and red Bag of the Viet Con in Dart - aniti7ec-1 CODV Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/06 : CIA-IRDP73-00475R0002016-00007-2