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December 20, 2016
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October 25, 2006
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November 23, 1970
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Approved For.Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100020028-9 SECRET /SENSITIVE OLC 70-0831 23 November 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: DCI Briefing of Defense Subcommittee of Senate Appropriations Committee - 19 November 1970 1. On 19 November the Director appeared before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The session lasted from 1552 until 1805 hours. A technical sweep of the room, 5-126 in the Capitol, was conducted and the room was kept under technical monitoring throughout. Discussions included No material. Highlights of the session are summarized below. transcript was taken. 2. Present from the Subcommittee for all or part of the briefing were: Allen J. Ellender (D., La.), Acting Chairman John Stennis (D. , Miss.) John O. Pastore (D. , R. I.) Mike Mansfield (D. , Mont.) Milton R. Young (R., N. Dak. ) Margaret Chase Smith (R., Me.) Gordon Allott (R., Colo. ) Roman L. Hruska (R., Neb.) Ex Officio Members present were: Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) Strom Thurmond (R., S. C-) 3. Present from the Subcommittee staff were: William Woodruff, Counsel Francis Hewitt, Assistant Clerk Approved For Release 2AWtn y ?7ry'qW0296R000100020028-9 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100020028-9 SECRET /SENSITIVE 4.. Accompanying the Director were: Lawrence K. White, Ex/Dir-Comet George Carver, SAVA 1 --1 John M. Maury, Legislative Counsel 5. The Director's presentation included those portions of his prepared briefing dated 19 November 1970 (on file in the Office of Legislative Counsel) concerning the Middle East, Indochina, Chile, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuba, and Communist Military Activity. (He did not use the section on the Cuban political situation. ) 6. During the discussion Senator Young asked and the Director said they had been informed of them in advance and had not reacted to them. In response to another question by Senator Young, the Director said the Israelis could destroy the Aswan Dam if they wished. 7. In response to Senator Ellender's question the Director said we had good reason to believe the Soviets had continued to supply missiles and related equipment for installationin the "standstill" zone after the cease fire in Egypt. Speaking to another question, the Director said the SA-3's in Egypt were still largely manned by Russian crews. 8. Senator Ellender asked why the Russians continued to supply SAMs to the Egyptians, and the Director speculated that they wanted to protect their very substantial investment in the Middle East, and couldn't afford to let their Arab allies go down the drain. Senator Ellender observed that "this goes back to our refusal to help them with the Aswan Dam. " 9. After hearing the Director's prepared remarks on Chile, Senator Ellender asked whether, and how, the Soviets had assisted the Chilean leftists. The Director mentioned financial and propaganda support in particular. Senator Ellender asked whether we had not SECRET /SENSITIVE Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100020028-9 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100020028-9 SECRET /SENSITIVE supported the other side in Chile to at least the same extent the Russians had supported the leftists. Senator Pastore asked whether the coup was engineered by Moscow or was a popular reaction against the status quo. The Director suggested it was partly both. 10. Senator Symington questioned the Director's statement that Chile had been moving steadily toward the left--he wanted to know whether "toward the left" meant more democratic or more totalitarian. The Director said he was only trying to note the trend toward more nationalization and governmental control. Senator Symington said the trend toward more government control could take place under both rightist and leftist governments, so that shouldn't be the test of who we help. 11. Senator Pastore emphasized the danger that we might fail to recognize truly popular revolutions and label them Communist- inspired. The Director acknowledged this danger but pointed out the U. S. had been trying to respond to legitimate popular aspirations by promoting liberal reforms through democratic rather than totalitarian means. 12. Regarding the Cienfuegos situation, Senator Jackson asked about secret negotiations like those in 1962. The Director said there were apparently no formal written agreements but there were, in addition to public statements on both sides between Washington and Moscow, normal confidential diplomatic exchanges. 13. Senator Jackson said he understood that as a result of operations in Cienfuegos the Russians could, base their nuclear sub- ma.rines there at any time. The Director said they could indeed, but they still didn't have the facilities necessary for maintenance and support- -equipment to remove and replace the missiles themselves, or overhaul the reactors. SECRET /SENSITIVE Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100020028-9 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100020028-9 SECRET /SENSITIVE 16. Senator Thurmond came back to the question of whether there was a "written agreement" between the Soviets and the U. S. on Cuba and the Director said he was aware of no specific document, but the State Department would be the final authority on this. 17. Following the Director's testimony on Indochina, Senator Symington called me aside to ask me to bring to his office later a copy of the chart on infiltration which was displayed on the viewgraph. 18. Senator Symington asked the Director what he meant by saying we were trying to get down to "an advisory level" in Indochina. The Director said he assumed this contemplated a sort of residual, non- combat MAAG. Senator Symington asked how many air strikes we were now conducting over Cambodia and Laos. The Director said he didn't have the precise figures but there had been some cutback. 19. In response to a question by Senator Young, the Director explained the former importance of Sihanoukville in Communist logistics, noting that earlier estimates on this point had been substantially too low. Senator Mansfield commented that since CIA had not been operating in Cambodia they had been saved from responsi- bility fo.r'what happened there. SECRET /SENSITIVE Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100020028-9 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100020028-9 SECRET /SENSITIVE 20. Follow up action: a. Senator Symington's request to examine a copy of the chart indicating infiltration rates in Vietnam. (This was done on 23 November. 1970.) JOHN M. MAURY Legislative Counsel Distribution: 1 - Subject (via DCI) 1 - DD CI 1 - Ex/Dir 1 - DDI 1 - SA VA 1-ER ,'`1 OLC Chrono SECRET /SENSITIVE Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100020028-9