JOURNAL - OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP73B00296R000200010086-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 18, 2003
Sequence Number:
86
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 8, 1971
Content Type:
NOTES
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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 2
Wednesday - 8 September 1971
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4. Called Jim Gehrig, Staff Director, Senate
Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, to say that I had gotten word that
Charles Lombard, Minority Counsel for the Committee, would call me shortly
to request that he receive an Agency briefing. Mr. Gehrig indicated this
involves something of a problem in that Lombard is trying to set himself
up as an independent staff director for the Minority. I suggested that in
view of this, Lombard be briefed jointly with Gehrig if and when Lombard
had obtained the proper clearances. Gehrig said this would be a satisfactory
solution and requested we proceed with the clearances.
In a later conversation with Mr. Lombard, I explained that
additional clearances would be necessary for the briefing he requested, and
as soon as these had come through we would be glad to brief him and Gehrig
jointly. Lombard seemed satisfied with this solution.
5. Mr. C. B. Morrison, in the office of
Senator Allen J. Ellender, advised that the movie film which Senator Ellender
took on his trip in 19.56 and which he mentioned to the Director at our last
budget session was available. I picked up six reels of this film today which
will be sent to Graphics for screening.
6. In response to his request, I left with Ed Braswell,
Chief Counsel, .Senate Armed Services Committee, a blind memo commenting
on the accuracy of the Tad Szulc column in the New York Times on the Soviet
25X18 military aircraft programs (specifically the "Backfire"). Braswell is very
much interested in this and asked if we could provide him with data on the
characteristics and performance of the "Backfire. "
I advised Mr. Braswell that.the Director has no objection to our passing
to the State Department the basic paper on Laos which we prepared for Braswell's
and Senator Stennis' use. Braswell said this was perfectly all right with him.
I advised Mr. Braswell of a call I received yesterday from John Lehman,
of the White House staff, on a letter which the President has received from
Senator Stennis. (See Memo for Record of 7 September.)
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7. Miss Karen Rothrock, in the office of
Representative James Fulton (R., Pa. ), without identifying the applicant,
asked me if I could clarify the reasons why an applicant was not offered a
position and in this connection read me a copy of the reject letter sent by
I told her that based on the information she had given me, I
could only assume that the reason was asi had stated--that we
just did not have a suitable vacancy and that she would appreciate that we
have many more applicants than vacancies. This seemed to satisfy
Miss Rothrock as she said this was what she had expected.
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SOVIETSAID 1'OFLV
BIG NEW BOMBER;
POLICY SHIFT SEEN
Supersonic Craft Believed
to Mark Departure From,
Stress on Missiles
By TAD SZULC
Speclal to The Niw Y 19mes
WASHINGTON, Sept. 4-The
Soviet Union has test-flown a
swing-wing supersonic strategic
bomber that Western military
intelligence specialists believe
marks the emergence of an en-
tirely new Soviet air weapons
system.
Although the Nixon Admin-
istration has been aware for at
least a year that the Russians
have been developing the plane
and that protoypes of the first
Soviet intercontinental bomber
have been tested in flight prob-
ably since last March, the
Defense Department has main-
itained secrecy about what it
1knows of the new plane.
But data concerning the new
plane obtained from intelligence
quarters in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization indicate
that the bomber - designed to
fly at. twice the speed of sound
and equipped for low-level
penetration of enemy defenses
- could become fully opera-
tional late in 1973 if Moscow
has already made the decision
,for military production.
A Change In Trend
The apparently successful
development of the plane,
which NATO calls Backfire,
has profound implications for
the strategic power balance
between the United States and
the Soviet Union, for the arms
limitation talks now under
way in Helsinki and for United
States domestic political and!
economic problems.
It signifies a change by the
oviet Union away from the
end of recent years when
oscow and Washington
emed to be de-emphasizing
anned strategic bombers in
avor of ballistic missiles and
sophisticated nuclear war-
eads.
The only strategic jet bomber
,in the United States arsenal is
the subsonic B-52, designed
some 20 years ago.
While preliminary work on
the swing-wing B-1, conceived
as a replacement for the B-52,
began last year, this plane
could not become operational
before 1978, assuming that
both the Nixon Administration
and Congress authorize further
development programs.
B-1 Controversial
The B-1, which is expected
to cost at least $11-billion to
be fully engineered, has become
the center of major political
controversy here. The Air Force
ultimately wants to order 240
of the B-1's.
In arguing for the B-1, the:
Defense Department has never-
theless refrained from an-
nouncing that the Russians
have developed the Backfire.
There have been no published
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Continued From Page 1, Col. 3
against targets in Western Eu- 000 feet-with less fuel con-
rope and Asia, notably in sumption.
China, although it would have The Soviet Union has had
a high-altitude attack capabil- several years of experience in
veports in the West on the
-Backfire's existence, which is
believed to be known only to
high-level NATO officials and
the United States Government.
The B-1 would have charac-
teristics and performance simi-
lar to the Backfire even though
the United States is at least
-..five years behind the Soviet
Unioz4 in-developing new stra-
tegic bombers.
But a Defense Department
spokesman refused yesterday
to discuss the Backfire on the
ground that it was "off bounds"
as a sensitive intelligence mat-
ter.
U.S. Program Accelerated
Other officials declined to
say whether last year's re-
ported discovery by eWstern
intelligence that the Russians
were far advanced in their
new strategic bomber was the
reason for the' Defense Depart-
ment's accelerated program to
develop the B-1.
A secret report issued last
March by th eGeneral Account-
ing Office, . the Congressional
watchdog agency, charged that
the Pentagon had accelerated
work on the B-1, ignoring high
costs and accepting lower per-
formance standards.
The Backfire is believed by
NATO specialists to have been
planned as both an aerial
launcher for nuclear guided
missiles and as a classical
"free-fall" carrier for hydrogen
bombs.
These specialists believe that
the Backfire could best be used
ity against the United States
if it were based in the Arctic
regions or refueled in flight. -
Apparently Designed by Tupolev
The Backfire, NATO experts
said, appears to have been de-
signed by 82-year-old Andrei N.
Tupolev, the Soviet Union's
leading aircraft designer, who
also developed the TU-144 ?u-
personic transport.
This conclusion was drawn
because a backfire prototype
was first observed by NATO in
telligence in July, 1970, on the
ground near the Tupolev air-
craft plant at Kazan in Central
Asia.
The Backfire also has a
structural resemblance to the
TU-22 medium bomber. Like
the TU-22, the Backfire is 131
feet long and is believed to be
powered by two Kuznetsov tur-
bofan afterburn engines mount-
ed on the aft fuselage. These
engines, each with a 26,880-
pound thrust, are also used on
the TU-144 supersonic trans-
port.
U. S. Swing-Wing Better
The Backfire's swing-wing
angle is said to 'be shorter than
the angle planned for the Unit-
ed States B-i. Western experts
said that only the outer section
of the Backfire's wing Is mov-
able. On the B-1, the whole
wing would be retractable.
. The advantage' of a swing-
wing design is that it allows an
aircraft to cruise at high alti-
tudes-presumably above 50,-
with the Sukhoi 7 and 7B
fighters.
The Backfire, therefore, is
the first swing-wing strategic
bomber ever produced. The
Soviet TU-22 is a fixed-wing
bomber.
Based on the first visual ob-
servation of the ,Backfire in
flight last March in the area
of the Ramenskoye test cen-
ter near Moscow, NATO ex-
perts believe that Soviet en-
gineers have probably solved
most of the development prob-
lems.
B-1 Order Reduced
Th first flight by a B-1 pro-
totype is scheduled for the
summer of 1974, and complete
flight testing for air-worthiness,
performance and flight load is
planned for January, 1977.
To reduce expenditures, the
Pentagon has cut the experi-
mental order from seven pro-
totypes to three.
NATO experts believe that
the Backfire is now undergoing
weapons testing after its suc-
cessful test flights.
No details re available, as
to the BackHre's armament,
but the presumption is that in
addition to standard nuclear
bombs it will be equipped with
the Soviet equivalent of the
United States nuclear air-to-
surface Short Range Attack
Missile (SRAM).
The SRAM is also controver-
sial here. Its development cost
has risen from $330,000 each,
as estimated in 1965, to nearly
$1-million this year. The Air
Force plans to order 1,900 of
these missiles even though the
current cost is exclusive of
nuclear warheads.
The backfire is also expected
to be armed with short-range
and long-range air-to-air bomb-
em defense missiles similar to
those being developed in the
United States.
Subsonic Flight Sought
To achieve low-level penetra-
tion of Western defenses-one
of the Backfire's principal po-
tential missions is subsonic
flight-the, Soviet bomber is be-
lieved by NATO officials to
carry 1,000-mile-range turbofan-
powered decoy devices loaded
with electronic jammers to con-
fuse radar tracking. Similar de-
vices are being developed here
for the B-1.
Backfire may be assigned to the
Soviet Navy for action against
aircraft carriers and other war-
ships as well as to the Soviet
Long-Range Aviation for strate-
gic and tactical missions.
Because of intense heat at
supersonic speeds, the leading
edges of the Backfire's wings
and sections of the fuselage
are said to be made of titanium,
a heat-resistant metal.
But` in order to reduce costs,
the use of titanium planned for
the B-1 was reduced this year
from 45 to 20 per cent. The
precise titanium rato on the
Backfire is not known here.
Specialists said, however,
that if excessive cost-cutting is
applied to the B-1, it may be
inferior to the Backfire.
The General Accounting Of-
fice said in its report that the
defense department inprogram-
ming the B-1., "has not ensued i
elimination of past problefs of
major weapons acquisition --
cost growth, scheduled slippage
and/or performance degrada-
tion."
The reports of the Backfire's
test flights came within days
of the conclusion by the Inter-
national Institute of Strategic
Studies in London that both
the United States and the So-
viet Union are cutting back on
their manned strategic bomber
forces while concentrating on
intercontinental missiles. The
institutes issued its conclusions
on Thursday in its annual mili-
tary-balance survey.
The emergence of the Bacl
fire appears to support tt
arguments of many top Unite
States Air Force commander
notably at the Strategic A
Command, that the Unite
States must not altogether saA
rifice its manned bomber for(
in favor of missilery. The Strs
tegic Air Command's fleet c
B-52's was reduced in the la,
year from 405 to 560 planes.
In this controversy, the Pei
tagon settled for a mixture c
missiles and bombers, wit
Deputy Secretary of Defens
David Packard strongly adv(
sating the development of th
B-i to sustain a manned bombe
force through the nineteer
eighties.
The B-I program is opposes
however, by the White Hous
Office of Management an
!Budget as well as by a bloc o
liberal Senators.
Drawing. of the Soviet swing-wing. bomber called "Back- ed that becausejof its low-level
fire." The dottedA s W r b.W6e2x6u4 /'14~eU( tPbP7` `ff6b~3J6R 200010086-5