CONVERSATIONS WITH JOHN GOLDSMITH, OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE STAFF, RE POSSIBLE SECRET SENATE DEBATE ON LAOS -- 23, 24 AUGUST 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000200010100-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 100
• Publication Date: August 26, 1971
• Content Type: MFR

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26 August 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversations with John Goldsmith, of the Senate Armed
Services Committee Staff,re Possible Secret Senate
Debate on Laos -- 23, 24 August 1971
1. In discussing the above subject on 23 August 1971, Mr. Goldsmith
made the following points:
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a. The original "Symington amendment" imposing a
$200 million limit on expenditures in Laos for FY 72 was
not offered in Committee. What was offered was a provision
that would have made it impossible for us to fund the[
but this was voted down.
b. In view of this there is no telling what kind of new
restrictions on our Laos operations may be introduced on
the floor when the Senate reconvenes.
c. In the event of a secret session to discuss Laos,
Senator Stennis should be prepared for all kinds of questions,
including questions about sensitive Agency operations, the
Agency budget, etc. In response to such questions, the
Senator plans to say that he will discuss them with individual
members but does not consider them appropriate for general
discussion.
2. Mr. Goldsmith speculated that the following questions might
arise in a secret session:
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b. In the event of death or injury, what benefits are
they entitled to and from whom?
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4. Mr. Goldsmith and I further pursued the same subject at lunch on
24 August during which I explained the Agency's reluctance to get "out front"
in defending their Laos operations against congressional critics. I said it
seemed to me this was a question of national policy on which our top policy
makers should speak for the Administration. Mr. Goldsmith agreed, and
among the possibilities we discussed, without being sure of their feasibility,
was a letter from the President, either to Senator Stennis or to the Senate
leadership, which might be used in Senate debate on the subject and could
include the following points:
a. The history of our Laotian involvement, particularly
including an explanation of why the Geneva Convention necessi-
tated action of a covert or nonattributable nature.
b. The related requirement for elaborate steps to protect
friendly cooperating governments, who were also party to the
Geneva Convention, from embarrassment.
c. The effectiveness of our Laotian operations in tying
down a substantial North Vietnamese force, preserving the
fragile status quo in Laos, and thus limiting Communist
options in the overall Indochina situation.
d. The possibility that any change in either the ground rules,
or the U. S. commitment, in Laos might foreclose certain
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Presidential options at a critical moment when the U. S.
is engaged simultaneously in major troop withdrawals in
Indochina and in the initial stages of a dialogue with Peking.
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JOHN M. MAURY
-J Legislative Counsel.
Distribution:
Original - Subject
1 - Ex/Dir-Compt
1 - OG C
1 - DDP
1 - Chief, FE
1 - OLC Chrono
O LC / JMM: j and
S.CIIET
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