ERVIN HEARINGS ON PRIVACY, III TESTIMONY OF JOHN M. O'BRIEN, EDWARD D. SOHIER, AND LAURENCE F. LANE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000200160001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 19, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

19, 1971
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S 7313
with the letter and intent of the Voting
Rights Act, and
Whereas, recent judicial decisions have
raised the possibility of certain provisions of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 being applied
so as to nullify past annexations;
Now, therefore, be it resolved that the
Municipal Association of South Carolina in
31st annual convention assembled pledge its
support to a bill to be introduced into the
United States House of Representatives by
Congressman Floyd Suence, which would
amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 so as
to provide that failure on the part of the
State of South Carolina or any political sub-
division thereof to comply with any provision
of this section shall not have the effect of
interfering with, nullifying, terminating, or
rendering without force and effect any an-
nexation, on or before January 14, 1971, in
connection with any municipality in such
State;
Be it further resolved that copies of this
resolution be forwarded to each member of
the ? th (Ain; ? ? ? ?
,;arjorlf0
E TIN H ARINGS ON PRIVACY, III?
TESTIMONY OP JOHN M. O'BRIEN,
EDWARD D. SOHIER, AND LAT./-
. RENCE F. LANE
Mr; ERVIN. Mr. President, today I
would like to place in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD the prepared statements of three
former Army intelligence agents who tes-
tified this pist February at the Consti-
tutional Rights Subcommittee's hearings
into the Government's data collection
activities.
On December 16, 1970, I announced
here on the Senate floor that I had re-
ceived information which, if true, indi-
cated the Army has been extensively en-
gaged in the surveillance of civilian polit-
ical activities. My information at that
time was in the form of a letter which
I read to the Senate that day. Today,
I would like to place in the RECORD the
statement prepared for our hearings by
the author of that letter, former military
intelligence agent John M. O'Brien.
In addition to Mr. O'Brien's testimony
I think the statements of Mr. Edward D.
Sohier and Mr. Laurence F. Lane should
be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
for all Americans to read. Mr. Sohier
spent 15 months on duty with the coun-
terintelligence analysis division. During
this time he served as the only enlisted
man on a task force created by the
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence?OASCI?to handle con-
gressional inquiries into the Army's civil
disturbance program.
Mr. Lane was an infantryman but was
detailed to the Intelligence and Security
Section of the 5th Infantry Division at
Fort Carson, Colo., from December 1968
to June 1970. His testimony gives us an
Insight into the intelligence activities of
the Continental Army Command?
CONARC. -
Mr. President, the statements of these
three men plus the statements of Chris-
topher H. Pyle and Ralph M. Stein which
I introduced earlier together give us a
clear picture of how widespread the
Army's involvement in surveillance pro-
grams actually was. I ask unanimous
consent that the statements of Mr.
O'Brien, Mr. Sohier and Mr. Lane be
printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection. the state-
ments were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF JOHN M. O'BRIEN BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, FEBRUARY 24, 1971
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the oppor-
tunity to appear before you and the Con-
stitutional Rights Subcom.mitee today. My
name is John O'Brien and I served in the
United States Army for almost five years.
My last four years on active duty were spent
as an Army Intelligence Agent, the first three
in Western Germany, where I was trained as
and performed the duties of an Army Intelli-
gence Case Officer. During these three years
I worked in the defensive counterespionage
field and most of my work was directed
against non-Americans, whose activities were
thought to be inimical to the national de-
fense interests of the United States. My last
year on active duty with the United States
Army was spent assigned to Region I, 113th
Military Intelligence Group, in Evanston,
Illinois. At Region I, I performed the duties
of an Army Intelligence Case Officer. My
duties at Region I were similar in nature to
my duties while assigned to Western Europe,
except that at Region I my activities were
directed almost exclusively against United
States citizens. I was honorably discharged
from the United States Army on June 8, 1970,
with the rank of staff Sergeant.
From June 1969 until approximately De-
cember 1969, I was assigned to the Special
Operations Section of Region I. During that
period, I worked primarily in undercover
operations. These undercover operations in-
cluded the recruitment, training and con-
trolling of undercover agents utilized by the
United States Army. On several occasions. I
personally performed as an undercover agent
as part of my assigned military duties. Spe-
cial Operations activities at Region I con-
sisted of the screening, investigation, recruit-
ment, training, targeting, and controlling of
individuals performing in an undercover
capacity for the United States Army. Such
activities were primarily directed against
civilian organizations and individuals. Spe-
cial Operations undercover activities were
controlled from Fort Holabird. Prior to the
initiation of an undercover operation, an
operations plan for the implementation of
the operation was written at either the
Region or Group level and forwarded to Fort
Holabird for approval. Once approval was
authorized by Fort Holabird, all aspects of
the operation were reported to Fort Holabird.
I also assisted the CONUS/Liaison Section
at Region I. The CONUS/Liaison Section
compiled personalfa information concerning
and monitored organizations and individuals
engaged in activities to oppose the United
States military involvement in Vietnam and
in other activities and associations thought
to be inimical to the national defense inter-
ests of the United States. Individuals in-
cluded within the sphere of interest of
CONUS included Adlai Stevenson III, Abner
Mikva, the individual plaintiffs in the trial
in Chicago, and many others including, news-
papermen, university professors, public offi-
cials and businessmen. At one period in late
1969, CONUS maintained dossiers concerning
approximately 800 civilian organizations
and individuals. These dossiers were com-
monly called the subversives files. The policy
throughout Region I was to obtain any in-
formation available concerning organizations
and individuals whose names were in a
CONUS dosier. The dossiers contained, among
other things, official military intelligence
reports concerning the activities of the target
organization or individual, copies of reports
from other federal and non-federal investi-
gative agencies, and copies of photographs
taken by either military intelligence agents
posing as members of the news media or as
free-lance photographers or by members of
the other investigative agencies. The CONUS
dossiers at Region I filled approximately
nine filing cabinets with four or five draw-
ers per cabinet. All the dossiers were stamped
confidential.
The CONUS/Liaison activities in which I
participated included the monitoring of
civilian organizations which was carried out
by military intelligence personnel who
Utilized radio cars, portable walkie-talkie
equipment, photographic equipment, partici-
pation in demonstrations, and the like. Pene-
tration was carried out by participation
(without disclosure) in public demonstra-
tions and activities.
In approximately January, 1970, my duties
were changed. I was then assigned to the
Special Investigations Branch of Region I.
However, I continued at the request of the
Region I Special Operations officer to partici-
pate in certain Special Operations activities
and in assistance to CONUS/Liaison until
approximately late May or early June, 1970.
My new duties with the Special Investiga-
tions Branch included personnel background
investigations of individuals under consid-
eration for security clearance, participation
in sabotage and espionage investigations,
and the conduct of liaison with local investi-
gative agencies within the area of the
Evanston field office of Region I.
After my discharge from the United States
Army I visited Region I approximately twice
monthly until the first week of December,
1970. During these visits I learned from con-
versations with personnel assigned both to
Special Operations and CONUS that the col-
lection of information concerning the ac-
tivities of civilians was still taking place,
and that Special Operations continued to
conduct undercover operations directed
against civilian organizations.
My concern as to the legitimacy and neces-
sity of my activities while assigned to Re-
gion I began in September 1969, when I wit-
nessed the initiation of a file concerning
Adiai Stevenson III. I concluded that such
activities posed a threat to every American's
right to freedom of expression and to the
system of government under which we have
lived in the United States 'since the inception
of the United States Constitution. It is out
of concern for those rights guaranteed to
every American citizen that I sought on
December 7, 1970, by a letter to Senator Ervin,
to appear before you today, and I thank you
again for the opportunity to have done so.
STATVMENT OF EDWARD D. SOHEER
In August 1970 I was separated from the
Army, honorably, with the Army Com-
mendation Medal and the rank of Specialist
5, E-5. I had spent nearly three years on
active duty, 15 months of which on duty
with the Counterintelligence Analysis Divi-
sion (CIAD), Directorate of Counterintel-
ligence, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence (OACSI) . I had entered the
Army in October 1967, taken basic training
at Fort Bragg, N.C., and was trained as a
military stenographer at Fort Benjamin Har-
rison, Indiana. In May 1968, I joined the 902d
Military Intelligence Group, which then
had administrative control of CIAD. In
January 1970, when the 902d MI Group be-
came part of the U.S. Army Intelligence Com-
mand, CIAD remained under the control of
OACSI.
My first encounter with the so-called
CONUS intelligence program was in my first
job at CIAD. That was assisting in the prep-
aration of the two-volume publication,
Personalities, Organizations, and Cities of
Interest, called by CIAD, the Compendium.
This book, which was to be updated five
times in the period I was with CIAD, was a
compilation of information on individuals
and organizations in this country which
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May , '71
were regarded as potentially involved in
lomestic disturbances, in particular, in cone
aection with anti-war and civil rights activi-
les. (included in the lists were organizations
euoh as Women's Strike for Peace. Southern
neristian Leadership Conference, National
Association for the Advancement of Colored
'eople, American Civil Liberties Union,
quaiter Aetion Committee, National Mobili-
:ei.tion Committee (to End the War in Viet-
lam), American Friends Service Commit-
Re, and many other such peace and civil
,ighes groups, as well as more radical groups
euch as Students for a Democratic Society.
_dlack Panther Party. and Weathermen. In-
iiyiduals listed included the late Dr. Martin
'iutlier King, Dr. Benjamin Spook, Dr. Ralph
Isberiiathy. H. Rap Brown, and Eldridge
;leaver.
The Ccmpendium was very widely dis-
eibuted by OACSI. It was sent to elements
:e the armed forces in the continental U.S.
CONUS) and worldwide. It was sent to
,ither branches of the government iriclud-
mg the Justice Department (Federal Bureau
.4 Investigation), Treasury Department
Secret Service), and State Department. It
iniS Augmented five times with changes
addition!, and deletions of pages of in-
: arm:edam and, when the order was given
..0 destroy all copies of the Compendium in
,he summer of 1970. a sixth change was in
:he works. The Compendium was classified
,leeCleET.
CID a's!) provided the armed forces_and
,iranches of the government with other pub-
lications regarding this area of interest. One
vas what was called an estimate, which pro-
dded an analysis of past events in the na-
Sion and an estimate of the potential for
iotnestic disorders for the upcoming period.
believe this publication was prepared an-
wally. Its purpose was to inform the Army
eomifeende of the potential need for Army
upport required to keep the order in the
nation in ease of disorders.
OACSI, and in particular, MAD, was tasked
-vith the responsibility of providing the Army
erith information regarding potentially die-
uptmgsiaeations in the United States. Since
.he army has the responsibility of respond-
:ng to a national call for aid in restoring
erder, it needs an agency to keep It informed
the potential for that call for aid, and
:hus, the Potential for civil disturbances. In
loing. so CAC& kept a sharp eye and ear
:el potential "trouble-makers" both inclivitt-
eals and organizations, and their activities_
Much of the information was gathered by
,HAD from the press. Most of the rest of the
:a-done:lathe) was supplied by direct liaison
.11th the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
end, to a lesser extent, some other govern-
ment investigative-type agencies. By far the
lergeet sueplier of information report; was
:he FBI, from whom CIAD almost daily
received root-high stacks of information
reports. Naturally, the FBI was a re-
- intent co' CIAD report, too. but CLAD
:eceived much more than it' supplied.
Another channel of information to the MAD
analysts was through the U.S. Army Intelli-
gence Command's teletype, which would, sup-
- ey as many as 100 "spot reports" daily. These
,eports were forwarded to the Command at
Fort Holabird, Maryland, for teletype dis-
"ribution to other "interested" Army intelli-
eence and investigative agencies. In almost
ell cases, the reports concerned meetings and
minor incidents all over the country. Many
.4 them were like the one which comes to
-eine', regarding simply a meeting of 200
people in a church in Philadelphia. The re-
port would state that 200 people attended a
meeting today in such-and-such church, and,
3 hat there were no incidents. Almost all re-
ports were read and discarded by CLAD ana-
eiests, anti were generally regarded as worth-
less.
CIAD analysts working in the domestic
neld maintained voluminous files. They were
files of clippings from the press. PSI reports,
and other information from other agencies,
within and without the Army. A computer-
ized index had been prepared for the files,
though there were no computer at CIAD's
office in Alexandria, Virginia. The computer
experts at CIAD used card-pnnching and
other facilities of OAOSI in the Pentagon to
prepare the index. Dossiers were frequently
received by CIAD analysts from the U.S.
Army Investigative Records Repository at
Port Holabirci.
During the time I was at CIAD the domes-
tic intelligence program grew immensely.
When I joined the group, there were perhaps
ten members of the domestic section. When
I left there were about twice that number.
In that period the computerized index was
developed. Daring that period the number
of publications in this field produced by
?PAD grew, and the number of reports re-
ceived by CLAD analysts probably tripled.
In January 1070, OACSI was shocked by
the publication of an article in Washington
Monthly magazine by former Army Captain
-Christopher H. Pyle. OACSI put together
what it called a "Task Group" in one of its
offices at the Pentagon to work on problems
that stemmed from sudden disclosure of
Army activities in this field. The Task Group
originally numbered about eight persons,
several of whom were from CIAD. I was one,
the only enlisted member, and I joined them
originally as a typist and administrative man.
The Task Group, over the next few months,
was responsible for formulating new Army
policy to appease critics of the domestic in-
telligence program, and for replying to let-
ters from Senators, Congressmen, and citi-
zens. Although letters went out over the
signatures of Major General McChristian,
Aesistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and
others, nearly all wore produced by this small
group, put together for just this purpose.
The first reaction by CIAD to the Pyle ar-'
tiele was, in typical fashion, to sit down and
write a -paragraph-by paragraph refutation of
every charge that Mr. Pyle made, regardless
whether charges were factual, founded in
fact, or whatever. This went on for about
two weeks, but there was no end result, for
meanwhile, the Task Group had been formed
In the Pentagon to assume this function.
The Task Group answered Congressional in-
quiries and press inquiries on this area of
interest, and proceeded from the start to
deny any and all charges, funnel or other-
wise. Eventually, with more and more Sena-
tors and Congressmen interested and in-
formed, the group found it necessary to be-
gin admitting some of the charges, but the
Task Group, assumedly under orders from
above, never admitted any more than It ab-
solutely had to. It even went so far as to
provide the Army's own General Counsel with
misinformation at one point, so bent on
denial was this group. Time and time again
replies that were prepared by the group to
respond to Congressional and citizens' atilt-
Mem admitted -and denied charges at will,
disregarding considerations concerning the
truth of their statements.
This was, I believe, a natural reaction of
members of what is referred to by its mem-
bers as the "intelligence community." There
is a definite feeling of privilege among mem-
bers of this "corrununity"?privilege in re-
spect to access to information and immunity
to probing questions not only from citizens
but also from the Congress and other de-
partments-of the government. There is, with-
in the Army, a general distrust of Congress
anyway, for Congress, a body of civilians,
holds the power of funds over the military;
professional military men feel their job
would be easier without civilian interference
in military matters; this feeling is much
magnified in the military intelligence com-
munity, where it is coupled with the feeling
of privilege and immunity.
By the time of my separation from active
duty, several directives had been issued to try
to solve problems that arose out of what the
Task Group referred to as the "Pyle Case,"
because of its origins in Mr. Pyle's first arti-
cle. First. the Compendium was ordered de-
stroyed, and destruction certificates were di-
rected to be forwarded to the Task Group. I
was responsible for checking the list of Com-
pendium recipients against the growing stack
of destruction certificates, but it was gener-
ally understood that, because of a faulty
system of accounting for that particular
SECRET dooument, we were probably never
to account for all the Compendia. In addi-
tion to this problem, many recipients of the
Compendium had difficulty locating and ac-
counting for the document in their own of-
fices. It is likely that OACSI will never guar-
antee that all copies distributed have been
destroyed. Also, because the directive only
ordered the destruction of those two volumes.
not the information contained therein, I
found that at least one recipient Xeroxed its
copy of the book in order to be able to de-
stroy its one official copy noted in OACSI
records, while retaining a copy for further
use. I have little doubt that this was done
more than once. In fact, it was known at the
time that the originating office for the Com-
pendium, CIAD, had, in fact, microfilmed its
own copy of the book for the same reason
as above.
Other directives were issued during the
summer, which restricted the kinds of re-
ports that could be sent over the Port Hola-
bird teletype, the kinds of activities agents
in the field could be dispatched to cover,
restrictions on the use of covert and "under-
cover" agents, and the kinds of flies and filing
techniques that could and could not be
used for storing domestic intelligence infor-
mation.
The restrictions on the use of covert, agents
were interesting, for, each time the Army
was questioned on this subject, it immedi-
ately stated that it had express orders for-
bidding that type of activity. However, when
the press finally was able to specify some
incidents of this type of activity (for in-
stance, 116th MI Group agents in Washing-
ton. D.C., posing as newsmen with a van
marked "Midwest News," covering anti-wax
demonstrations), official Army replies stated
simply that covert agent activities had been
banned, except with the express permission
of the Secretary of the Army.
Probably the moat agile defensive moves
were made by the Army concerning its com-
puters. Replies to initial press and Congres-
sional inquiries concerning Army computers
were that there were none. period. This, of
course, was done with full knowledge that
there were computers, but without knowledge
of, or, it appears, curiosity about, the kinds
of work they were doing in the Army. Again,
after heated exchanges with members of
Congress and the press. the Army spokesmen
(again, Task Group) were forced to go out
and do some investigating on their own. The
results were as surprising to Army brass in
the Pentagon as to civilians, and shortly
thereafter, orders were issued that computer-
ized files may no longer be maintained or
initiated on domestic intelligence activities,
without the express permission of the Chief
of Staff. Again, however, there were few re-
strictions on the type of information that
may be kept in the computerized file.
Despite assurances by Array spokesmen
that improper activities have been halted
and will not begin again, my personal feel-
ing is that a careful and constant watch will
have to be maintained on the Army and
other branches of the government which
continue to harass and intimidate citizens
with irresponsibly and clumsily constructed
files. One of the most amazing discoveries I
made during this period was concerning the
nature of many of the files, and the cri-
teria used to select those individuals and
organizations "of interest" to Army intelli-
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gence. There were, in fact, no guidelines is-
sued by the Army concerning persons and
organizations of interest. Each office and
command of the Army which had flies in this
area was responsible for determining for it-.
self who and what would be included. There
were, prior to the "Pyle Case," no Pentagon-
issued directives giving criteria to be used
in limiting files. Consequently, the program
grew unchecked. With the increase in the
number of civil disturbances and demon-
strations in the nation beginning about the
time of the assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King, the Army likewise felt it neces-
sary to expand its files and information-
gathering activities. With no overall super-
vision, the agents and analysts could, in ef-
fect, expand the program as much as, and in
whatever direction, they wished.
Even after some guidelines had finally been
laid down, it was questionable how long they
would be adhered to. A career officer, a mem-
ber of the Task Group when I left, and long
an intelligence officer, told me that he did
not think the restrictions in effect at that
time would last long. He said that it is only
natural for the domestic intelligence com-
munity to want to continue expanding the
scope of its activities in order to ensure that
it is carrying out its duties effectively.
In view of the blatant lying an unceas-
ing string of mis-statements made by Army
spokesmen to Congressmen, members of the
press, and citizens during 1970. I find it dif-
ficult to believe that we can take the official
Army assurances at face value. The intelli-
gence establishment and program are too
powerful and too special to be left to their
own devices. This can be seen in the way they
have conducted themselves, essentially with-
out supervision, over the past several years.
In my estimation, some kind of civilian in-
telligence review board is needed, to watch
over all the intelligence agencies of the U.S.
government, including those within and
without the military. This could prevent the
kind of incursions into the civilian sector by
the military we have witnessed, and would
serve to make more efficient the intelligence
operations that are necessary by eliminating
duplication of efforts. Indeed, this is an im-
portant area of consideration, for it is doubt-
ful that the Army's domestic intelligence
program held any information not already
held by other organizations, such as the
F.B.I., and State and local law enforcement
agencies.
TESTIMONY OF LAURENCE F. LANE BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
01" THE SENATE .JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
- Mr. Chairman. My name is Laurence F.
Lane. I am currently employed ori the legis-
lative staff of Congressman Robert N. Giaimo
of Connecticut. Also, I am a full-time grad-
uate student at the George Washington Uni-
versity, Washington, D.C.
I served in the United States Army on ac-
tive duty from June, 1968, until June, 1970.
I was trained as an 11B, light-weapons in-
fantry soldier at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and
assigned to the 6th Infantry Division, Fort
Carson, Colorado in early November, 1968.
Soon after my arrival at Fort Carson, Decem-
ber, 1968, I was successful in my efforts to be
detailed to the 02 (Intelligence and Secur-
ity) Section of the 5th Infantry Division.
Although my records were retained by in-
fantry units?first the 2nd Battalion of the
61st Infantry and then the 3rd Battalion of
the 10th Infantry?and "on paper" I was a
member of those infoantry units, I lived in
the 5th Military Intelligence Detachment's*
* The 5th Military Intelligence Detach-
ment merged with the 241st Military In-
telligence Detachment in May, 1969. After
the 241st M.I. was deactivated in September
1969, the 5th mi. was reactivated.
quarters, and I worked in various positions
in the office of the G2, 5th Infantry Division,
Fort Carson, for the duration of my service,
i.e. December 1968-June 1970.
Being sort of a "special case," i.e. an infan-
try soldier in an intelligence unit, I per-
formed a number of functions, all closely re-
lated to the civil disturbance mission which
was levied upon the 5th Division. Under the
agreement which brought me from an in-
fantry unit to the headquarters element, I
was an intelligence analyst. Besides analyz-
ing incoming information, during the eight-
een months that I worked for G2, I per-
formed a host of related tasks including
agent and undercover duties; coordinator of
agent reports; author of special intelligence
projects; liaison vists with the 113th Mili-
tary Intelligence Group, Region IV, and law
enforcement agencies; and advisor to 02's
and other members of the Division's hier-
archy. Although the highest rank I obtained
in my tour of active duty was Sergeant, E-5,
the length of tenure at Fort Carson with the
G2 staff, the interest and' knowledge I de-
veloped, and the flexibility of my "special"
status allowed me a broad base to observe
the intelligence structure of that command
and its relationship with other commands.
I wish to share with this Committee
what I observed and a few of my experiences.
I have divided my presentation into four
parts: First, I will attempt to explain, briefly,
the historical perspective of my activities. To
indict the military's intrusion into domes-,
tic civilian affairs without attempting to de-
fine a frame of reference would be an in-
justice. Second, I will review the intelligence
gathering structure as viewed from a di-
visional headquarters. I am certain a few of
my observations from the divisional level
will conflict with information presented
from Army area commands and nationwide
commands. My third section, discussing the
phases of duty I experienced may account
for the discrepancy of information concern-
ing the intelligence gathering structure, i.e.
the structure and direction of activities were
directly related to the personalities in com-
mand. Fourth, I present a chronology of my
activities to illustrate the workings of mili-
tary intelligence.
Before I proceed, I want to make it per-
fectly clear to the Committee members that
I do not have any "grudges to bear," nor a
"cross to burn" against the United States
Army. My purpose in testifying before this
august body is to help make sure that our
Constitution is observed by all. I am deeply
concerned that serious errors in judgment
were made which led to encroachment on
the liberties of many Americans. I have of-
fered my limited information not only to this
Committee, but also to the investigators for
the Department of Defense in order to help
discover the depth of the intrusion and the
causes. Underscoring this principle, I have re-
frained from naming superior officers and
fellow workers to avoid misinterpretation
and charges of character assassination.
I am certain the testimony by officials of
the Department of Defense will document
the rise of urban and campus violence as the
impetus that thrusted the military into es-
tablishing an intelligence network monitor-
ing the activities of civilian organizations
and maintaining dossiers on private individ-
uals. I will not belabor that point; however,
allow me to specifically address the nation-
wide trend to the Perspective from Fort
Carson, Colorado. October, 1968. was an un-
usual month for Fort Carson. The Command-
ing General of the 5th Infantry Division was
relatively new to the fort, and his G2, a
Lieutenant Colonel, had recently returned
from overseas. Media news reports and trans-
mitted messages from intelligence commands
forecasted rising violence. Demonstrators
were organizing to storm the gates of the
fort, or so it was reported. The National
Students for a Democratic Society conducted
a National Council meeting at the Boulder
campus of the University of Colorado, and
urged an offensive against the military. Dem-
onstrations followed the National Council
meeting on the campuses of Colorado Col-
lege, Denver University, Colorado State Uni-
versity, and the University of Colorado. Con-
fronted with these reports, officials at Fort
Carson over-reacted. The development of an
intelligence gathering network tailored to
the needs of the 5th Infantry Division en-
sued. This intelligence system was designed
to supply the headquarters with information
pertinent to the protection of Fort Carson,
the protection of servicemen within the sur-
rounding communities?defined as the State
of Colorado, and to supply adequate in-
formation to fulfill the civil disturbance mis-
sion of the 5th infantry Division.
The intelligence function of the 5th In-
fantry Division was the responsibility of the
02 (Intelligence and Security) Office of the
General's Staff. At the disposal of the 02
was a small office staff for operations and
the 5th Military Intelligence Detachment.
The 5th Military Intelligence Detachment,
with an average strength of forty men, was
divided into sections by skills. Two of these
sections were directly utilized by the 02 in
the intelligence gathering function?the Or-
der of Battle Section was utilized to augment
the G2 Operations staff in analysing, dissemi-
nating and filing intelligence, and the Coun-
ter-Intelligence Section was utilized to gath-
er raw intelligence.
Part of the recent investigation by the De-
partment of Defense centered on the use of
personnel of the 5th Military Intelligence
Counter-Intelligence Section to obtain raw
intelligence on civilians. Guidelines report-
edly were established which prevented the
use of tactical units from interfering with
the areas of operations of non-tactical in-
telligence commands. The intelligence gath-
ering mission in Colorado by the military
reportedly was the responsibility of the Den-
ver based Region IV Headquarters of the
113th Military Intelligence Group. Field of-
fices of the 113th M.1. were maintained in
Colorado Springs and Fort Collins, besides
the Denver headquarters. Whether the 5th
M.I. was in violation of standing orders or
whether it was not is a mute point. The
Counter-intelligence Section actively en-
gaged in off-post, civilian oriented intelli-
gence collection. I will comment further on
this point in a few minutes.
In addition to the information developed
by counter-intelligence operations, intel-
ligence was gathered through other military
channels, media reports, liaison with law en-
forcement agencies, research, and personal
observations. The 5th Infantry Division was
linked to intelligence commands by teletype.
Nationwide reports were transmitted as
events occurred and summarized periodically.
Classified reports were received through the
facilities of the communications center.
Weekly and monthly reports of civil dis-
turbances and related intelligence were re-
ceived from the Headquarters of the major
Army areas. Liaison was maintained between
the 02 and the offices of the 113th M.I., Re-
gion IV. The 5th Division was only a phone
call away from Fort Holabird, and it utilized
the services of Fort Holabird to obtain spe-
cial reports, classified dossiers, and computer
readouts as the need arose. I might point out,
that often the special reports and dossiers
were received by the G2 Section unsolicited.
A major source of information for the pub-
lications of 02 was the news media. Newspa-
pers were received from over twenty cities.
These papers were read, clipped, and classi-
fied. Television and radio news specials were
often monitored as an important source. An
informal liaison?sanctioned but not or-
dered?was maintained with the local law
enforcement agencies to include the Colorado
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A. 7316 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE /Way 19, 971
aprings Seederal Bureau of Investigation
eleld Office, the Colorado Springs Police De-
oartment, and the El Paso County Sheriff's
Ince. The other two inputs in the intelligence
orocess, research and personal observation.
tare related to the interests of the individ-
?els performing the analysis.
The ire-riming information was processed
in the Ger Operations Section reinforced by
be members of the 5th Military Intelligence
r ceder of Battle Section. The combined op-
eration was divided by Army Areas, with a
eeecitic section devoted to special group
enalvsis. This operation produced a civil
ilisturbanise summary which was circulated
seroesth the headquarters staffs, major com-
mands of the Division, had disseminated to
lith Army Headquarters, 113th MI. offices and
tt.her units with a civil disturbance mission.
ehe summary was produced weekly, with
:rariations of daily and tri-weekly publics-
lion depending upon the demands of the
readquarters. Special reports, analyzing ape-
rifle civilian organizations or reviewing the
eetivities of individuals or studying events,
were occasionally disseminated.
A comelex filing system was established
-0 store intelligence for future reference.
Stud cross-tiles were maintained on inch-
eiduals. reties, and organizations. Each card
indicated where source material was stored,
J_e. spot reports, newspaner clipnings, agent
ssports, eva Clippings and teletype reports
acirmally were categorized chronologically.
enereas, agent reports, dossiers, and other
:developed information were filed by sub-
nut. The maintenance of the file systems
iieearne a major task. The disinterest of the
elerks to tabor at file maintenance led to a
large backlog and eventually to the dee-true-
ion of the cross-file system. I might inter-
_rent, the cross-file system was developed by
e Lieutenant and he persisted in his interest
'e maintaining it. Soon after his discharge.
e'en 1969_ the system was re-evaluated in
ight of the burdens of maintaining it, and
s was eliminated. In place of the complex
.iroes-die index, the new officer-in-charge in-
eeituted a work-book system where incoming
inteltigence was categorized by Army Areas
tabloid work-books.
The collecting, processing and dissemina-
seen of intelligence went through numerous
phases during my eighteen months with G2.
harries in direction and interests were re-
lated to tee civil disturbance mission of the
_eh Infantry Division, but, they were even
inose directly related to the nersonnel in
euthority Simnly stated, the operations of
e-a eth tseilitary Intelligence Detachment
end the .42 Operations Section of the 5th
infantry Division were an extension of its
iseclershin personnel and not a part of any
nyramiceo national military conspiracy.
Hoi h conmanders of the 5th Infantry DM-
ton and Fort Carson under whom I Served
eare ambitious Generals with successful
nilleary careers. A civil disturbance mission
eas levied on the division and these men
-sere responsible for accomplishing that rids-
-eon Their determination to be totally pre-
tared plaecel a major burden on the G2 (In-
ie.:lige:nee and Security) Section of the Gen-
:runs Staff. Faced with the resnonsibility to
r_cop the commander informed, the intent-
;once seatern including linkage with the
.lational intelligence system and the gather-
ng if raw intelligence developed.
If served under four G2's, each a Lieutenant
iolonel filling his requirement for staff duty,
'rho attitude of these men was fundamental
in moldier the intelligence operation of the
42 Operations section and the 5th MI. I
../aS brought to the 02 staff by a very driv-
ing, deeply concerned and dedicated Lieu-
anent Colonel, Recently returned from Viet-
-am, this gentleman was attempting to se-
are the greatest amount of intelligence
ihat he could in order to be an effective ad-
elsor to the Division Commander. He worked
lee staff hard, but he worked harder. His
initiative prompted the build-up of an intel-
ligence structure designed to analyze na-
tionwide events an.d to monitor local activ-
ities. The second 02 inherited the informal
structure developed under the first, and he
attempted to institutionalize it. Versed in
counter-intelligence operations in foreign
countries. the second 02 showed displeasure
with the diverse opinions which flourished
under his predecessor and he immediately
took steps to purge dissent within the staff
and to limit the excess to raw intelligence
on a need to know basis. Mistrust was evident
in relationships with other intelligence
agenices and with law enforcement agencies:
Under the second G2, who served from
March 1969 to September 1969, the intelli-
gence gathering mechanism reached its
zenith. Agents were placed in Colorado
Springs for extended periods, agents fol-
lowed agents from other military intelligence
operations, and ari agent was even placed
undercover in the officers' housing area of
the fort. The command of 02 changed in
late September. The incoming G2 was prob-
ably best characterized by his own quote?
"You don't seem to understand. Larry, I
don't want to be 02!" During his tenure
which extended to January 1970, intelligence
operations were cutback. In January. 1970,
the 02 position again changed. The incoming
03 shared the concern of many of us on the
staff that intelligence operations had vio-
lated basic civil liberties. Programs were con-
solidated with a direction on military af-
fairs and the specific civil disturbance mis-
sion levied on the Division.
As much as the direction of the intelli-
gence structure relied on the leadership of
the 02, it also paralleled the initiative of
junior officers who oversaw specific intelli-
gence functions. Por instance, I have al-
ready mentioned that the cross-file index
system was maintained under order of the
Lieutenant who instituted it. The work
hook system and the investigation of relay-
ing incoming information into a computer
system (which was never done, but seriously
studied) were projects favored by the Cap-
tain who commanded the 5th Military In-
telligence Detachment. The informal liaison
with the offices of the 113th MI. and law
enforcement agencies was established and
maintained by an experienced counterintel-
ligence agent, The need-to-know limitations
imposed under the second G2 and the cloak
of mistrust surrounding agent activities were
acceptable to the officer who commanded
counter-intelLigence during this period. At
the same time, the scaling down of the in-
telligence operations under the third and
fourth, 02's was encouraged by the almost
fetal turnover of junior officers in the G2
Operations Section but impeded and fought
by the 'ambitious commander of the 5th MI.
Thus far in this presentation, I have at-
tempted to inform you of the analytical
framework of intellieence operations in Col-
orado. However. if I share with you a chronol-
ogy of my activities and a discussion of a
few select operations, I believe that you will
have a better understanding of the func-
tional nature of the operation.
When I joined the 02 Operations staff in
mid-December, 1968, two officers and two
men had just started molding the intelli-
gence machine which we affectionately called
the "monster." The month before, a Brigade
of troops had been placed on full alert to
cope with a demonstration of several hun-
dred outside of the gates to the Fort. Rumors
of violence magnified by the rise of student,
Chicano and Black groups laid heavy de-
mands on the G2 to provide timely intelli-
gence to the Commanding General. Promi-
nent in the 'news yras the trouble at the San
Francisco Stete College. Two questions asked
were, what is happening and will Federal
troops be needed? Based?on the intelligence
reports transmitted across the teletype hook-
up, 6th Army summaries, and newspaper ac-
counts. I *rote a paper analysing the vio-
lence. Although the sources were rather in-
adequate, I attempted to be analytical and
to develop a Model of campus violence that
could be applicable to other situations. My
effort was appreciated. the G2 was pleased,
and the Commanding General was convinced
that we were on top of the situation.
Colorado College sponsored a "Symposium
on Violence." The Symposium attracted many
leading spokesmen for the New Left in-
cluding Mike Klonsky, National Secretary,
MS; Jon Sunstrom, spokesman for the East
Side New York Service Organization; Arnold
Kaufman, a founder of the teach-in move-
ment; John Sack, an outspokesn critic of the
war in Vietnam and author; Ivanhoe Donald-
son, a founder of SNCC; Richard (Dick)
Gregory, comedian and civil rights activist;
Andrew Kopkind, staff writer for the "New
Republic"; Richard Flair ke, an early anti-war
critic; Sidney Peck, co-chairman of the Na-
tional Mobilization Committee to End the
War in Vietnam; Joe Boyd, reportedly a
member of the Denver Black Panther orga-
nization; and numerous other spokesmen on
violence as a tactic. An elaborate intelligence
operation was instituted to cover the event.
Agents from the 113th MI field office in Col-
orado Springs and the headquarters in Den-
ver covered the event for the purpose of
feeding information to the intelligence com-
mand. The 02 at Port Carson mobilized the
few agents of the 5th Military Intelligence
Detachment and of the then separate 241st
Military Intelligence Detachment to monitor
the activities of the Symposium in order that
the Commanding General be forewarned of
possible violence. Another analyst, a Harvard
graduate who was a reservist called to active
duty, and I, were asked to attend the sym-
posium not as undercover agents, but as ob-
servers. Our mission was to interpret the
week of lectures, panels, and performances
within the perspective of national and state-
wide trends.
Viewed as an intelligence operation, the
symposium coverage WAS excellent. The in-
formation transmitted to Port Holabird in-
cluded daily summaries of activities and
rumors of upcoming demonstrations. A vol-
ume of information was compiled to include
agent reports, pictures and the two inde-
pendent appraisals of tee symposium. This
report was forwarded up the intelligence
chain of command and most likely made its
way to Fort Holabird.
Two quick sidelights come to mind. Dos-
siers were ordered on the participants of the
symposium from Fort Holabird. I forget
which dossiers were received and which ones
were not, however, one dossier which we did
receive summarized the intelligence back-
ground material on civil rights leader Dick
Gregory. The dossier eves So tainted that it
was unusable. I was amazed that the dossier
from Fort Holabird was completely subjec-
tive, based on unsubstantiated infor-
mation and unreliable sources with no at-
tempt to be objective. Attempts were made
to link individuals to rommunist organiza-
tions through a process of guilt by associa-
tion, whether association was a fact or not.
The pattern set by the summaries of infor-
mation utilized for the Colorado College
Symposium, i.e., unreliable and unusable in..
formation, continued throughout the period
that I was with G2. Most of the information
contained in the printed dossiers from Fort
Holabird lacked any intelligence value.
Secondly, the Colorado College Tiger
proudly displayed a Picture of the agent
from the 113th M.I field office in Colorado
Springs the week following the Symoosium.
In the subsequent editions, there were com-
ments from the editorial staff of the paper
and from students questioning the role of
the military intelligence on campus. The de-
bate culminated in an article written by
someone from the Fort Carson headquarters
documenting monitoring of campus events.
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January was a month of rising publicity
'or the Students for a Democratic Society.
rhe small chapter at Colorado College at-
racted a number of state and national SDS
milers. The G2 was concerned about the
mild-up. I was asked to research the Stu-
tents for a Democratic Society and to write
study of the organization, nationwide and
tatewide. Several agents were assigned to
nonitor the activities of student activists
,t Colorado College. Their reports, which
ncluded summaries of SDS activities as well
S other campus groups?including one re-
tort on a debate conducted at the school
rith the Young Republicans participating,
,ere' forwarded through the intelligence corn-
sand with a copy normally being made
.vallable for my use. I was encouraged to
ttend functions at the school and to main-
am n friendships with student activists. Be-
ng an infantry soldier by assignment, I did
rot need to establish a false identity or justi-
[cation for attending functions. A few serv-
cemen normally attend campus functions. In
act, the presence of these servicemen has
een cited as the reason for military intern-
ence surveillance. As for the counter-intelli-
ence agents who attended these functions,
ome used a "cover" such as students from
ther campuses, free-lance photographer, or
'hippie" Special attention was given to
unctions which attracted nationwide spokes-
nen for various causes, especially anti-war
.auses. Keeping track of the whereabouts of
tational SDS leaders and local radical stu-
tents was extremely important. The emerg-
ng racial and Mexican-American movements,
specially campus organizations of Blacks
lid Chicanos, received great attention. Anti-
var elements in the commuoity were viewed
vith great suspicion. During this period of
ncreasing activism in Colorado, at least twice
: was questioned by agents from the Federal
3ureau of Investigation regarding individuals
>bout whom they were concerned.
In late February, the first of my research
nojects was completed. I had compiled a
:ixty-nine page review of the National Stu-
lents for a Democratic Society. Copies of
the publication were sent through the in-
;elligence command. Four months later, Fort
iolabird published a similar document?
>lagiarized in part?not only reviewing the
>ackground of the Students for a Democratic
3ociaty, but also listing known (unsubstan-
lated) members of SDS chapters through-
mt the nation. The Fort Holabird document
vas cross indexed by state and school.
Preparation and research for my second
uport, an in depth view of the Students
!or a Democratic Society as it related to Colo-
ado included a week of "liaison" in Denver
>nd a week of "liaison" in Fort Collins. 0111-
dally, I was sent on temporary duty to the
.13th M.I. Group, Region IV headquarters
tnd field office. However, my visitations not
mly included utilization of the files of these
>ffices but also meetings with police and
:ampus officials in Boulder, Denver, and Fort
Yollins, Colorado. Both weeks, with a rent-
-car paid for at Army expense, I was en-
ouraged to visit campuses and rekindle my
riendship with activists. The result of my
esearch was a book, approximately 115
>ages in length, detailing the growth of the
mganization in the state, activists involved,
ailed organizations, and a chronology of
notest meetings and demonstrations in the
tate from 1965 on. This publication was
iso forwarded through the intelligence corn-
nand. It is my understanding that both of
the publications were santized (de-classi-
led by removal of any reference to the mill-
ary or to the author) and made available
u a Congressional Committee investigating
3ampus violence.
A third paper was written summarizing the
.nforrnation developed in the two previous
mblications and attempting to analyze the
movement. Several of the conclusions were
objectionable to the political views of the
G2. I refused to accept the criticisms espe-
cially those which the evidence I gathered
disproved. Many of my recommendations
paralleled the conclusions Of the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence. The third paper was never fi-
nalized.
As I mentioned earlier in this presenta-
tion, the second G2 for whom I worked was
suspicious of dissent, and mistrustful of oth-
er intelligence-gathering activities. During
his term of service as 02, the counter-intelli-
gence section grew to over thirty men. The
tactical responsibilities on the on-post coun-
ter intelligence operation were minimal while
the section was extremely overstrength. The
answer was to use these men to monitor the
activities of activists in the community.
Deep concern was expressed in particular in
a family extremely active in the anti-war
movement in Colorado Springs. Files were
maintained on the family as well as a pho-
tograph book to make sure they were easily
identified. Individuals who attended SDS
meetings or Radical Education Programs
meeting were of great interest. The small, but
vocal anti-war faction within the commu-
nity Was viewed as a major threat.
It was about this time, that the jurisdic-
tional battle between the 113th MI, and the
02, 5th M.I. broke into the open. Two agents
from the 5th M.I. Counter-intelligence Sec-
tion attended the state SDS Convention, Col-
orado State College, Greeley, Colorado, in
mid-April. The 113th MI. commander had
cautioned the G2 that having personnel there
would be a violation of an informal agree-
ment between the two intelligence units.
The 02 sanctioned the mission of the two
agents, and upon their return a report was
filed by the 02 of the intelligence command
listing the source as "two reliable sources,
no further identification." The squabble de-
veloped into a game similar to two kids
throwing mud at each other. The passing
of information through liaison all but
ceased. The G2 authorized the semi-perma-
nent off-post activities of at least two
agents. Their job became one of beating the
113th MI. to the information and the mon-
itoring of the activities of 113th MI. per-
sonnel.
The classic illustration of the "spy versus
spy" activities occurred at a demonstration
in Colorado Springs?Fort Carson area, in
mid-September 1969. Rumors of a huge dem-
onstration bringing as many as 5.000-10,000
participants spurred the fort to an unusual
state of preparedness. Elaborate preparations
were made to monitor events. A newly in-
stalled Citizens' Band radio setup to in-
clude mobile car units and walking units
was used. The demonstration, which had na-
tionwide billing, attracted intelligence per-
sonnel from neighboring Air Force installa-
tions, NORAD, law enforcement agencies,
1113th mi. Region IV, and even two Navy
intelligence officials from somewhere on the
West Coast. The preparation included a spe-
cial assignment crew with the mission to
monitor the activities of the other intelli-
gence personnel and, in particular, the per-
sonnel of the 113th M.I. To make a long
story short, 119 demonstrators participated
in the protest. Of the 119 individuals at the
B Street Gate to Fort Carson, almost one-
half (53) were intelligence gathering per-
sonnel or representatives of the press. At-
tempts to tape the speeches of well-known
activists produced 45 minutes of the best
sound effects of helicopters?at least six were
airborne. The commander of the 113th M.I.
walked into the 02 Operations Command
Post just in time to hear one of the special
assignment crew caution the headquarters
that he was headed that way.
The following story may add another light
touch to this testimony, but it further sub-
stantiates my conclusion that individual
commanders forced the active role of military
intelligence: Torn Hayden, founder of SDS
and a new left activist, made a comment in
a speech in Chicago, I believe September
1969, that 400 escapees from the Fort Carson
stockade were battling infantry troops from
the 5th Infantry Division in the Pike Na-
tional Forest in the vicinity of Pike's Peak.
The only reason the Army did not use na-
palm against the escapees, according to Hay-
den, was that the battle was too close to
tourist areas. The Commanding General was
made aware of Hayden's statement?prob-
ably through the media?and immediately
called the G2's office and wanted to know
who the 400 escapees were!!!
The activities of the G2 Operations staff
shifted with greater emphasis on civil dis-
turbance target areas, rather than the ob-
session with Colorado activists. However,
during the Fall, 1969, the Counter-Intelli-
gence Section of the 5th MI. remained inter-
ested in local, off-post issues. There was great
interest in rumors that efforts were being
made to establish an anti-war coffee house in
Colorado Springs. Also, during the Fall, an
"underground" newspaper, aboveground, ap-
peared on the fort and throughout the local
community. Counter-Intelligence operations
were particularly interested in military per-
sonnel participating in these reportedly
"anti-military" programs, but concern was
also expressed about civilians involved.
It was reported that a bar which had re-
cently come under new management was the
rumored coffee house. Counter-intelligence
agents were directed to check it. I was in
the area that evening and stopped out of
curiosity. There sat six counter-intelligence
agents, the owner and myself in this dingily
lighted dive making small talk but attempt-
ing not to let on that you knew who the guy
next to you really was and what he was doing
there.
Eventually, a coffee house did get estab-
lished in Colorado Springs. Once established,
the coffee house became a center of interest
for the counter-intelligence personnel. The
interest continued until after I left the fort.
Rather than attracting numerous dissident
soldiers, I might add, the coffee house be-
came a home for many high-school aged
aativists. The appeal of the coffee house was
undermined less from the constant surveil-
lance than from an on-post experiment by
a Chaplain who used part of one of the serv-
ice clubs as a controlled "coffee house."
The massive nationwide Moratorium Day
activities caused a flurry of activity for the
staff of 02. The 02 Operations personnel
worked overtime to monitor the thousands
of teletype reports documenting all aspects
of the nationwide anti-war observances. Lo-
cally, the counter-intelligence personnel
monitored events in Colorado Springs, to
include a rally at Acacias Park and an indoor
program at Shrove Chapel on the campus of
Colorado College. I attended the evening pro-
gram at Shrove Chapel as an observer not
as a member of military intelligence. How-
ever, the counter-intelligence personnel were
there on assignment. They monitored speak-
ers, relaying information back to Fort Car-
son via the mobile unit's Citizens' Band ra-
dio. Emphasis was placed on interpretation
of speeches, especially if anti-draft policies
were advocated. Attending servicemen were
identified for further questioning on their
motives for being at the anti-war rally. One
of the counter-intelligence agents had his
camera equipment in an attempt to take pic-
tures. His efforts were prevented by an ener-
getic cameraman from the local college news-
paper who almost blew the agent's cover in
a snapshot which appeared in the paper's
next edition. The picture missed the agent's
face--he was hiding behind me and another
member of the 02 Operations staff?but the
caption properly identified him as falsely us-
ing an identification card from another uni-
versity. I was debriefed the next morning by
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S 7318 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--- SENATE May i., 1971
counter-intelligence personnel to ascertain
if I had additional information to that which
they had collected.
The intelligence gathering effort lost mo-
mentum during the last six months of my
military duty. Counter-intelligence person-
nel with whom I maintained closed ties were
coming east for additional intelligence
courses end the direction of counter-intern-
e:Race operations was turned to on-post prob-
lems. The 02 Operations duties underwent
a reorganization tailored to target cities for
civil disturbances rather than a macrocosmic
view M activism. Combat intelligence train-
ing, a normal function of an Order of Battle
Section of Military Intelligence, was stressed.
The arriving 02 had doubts about the need
.for wide-ranging, large-scale intelligence op-
crations and many of the personnel were
new replacements who did not care for office
work or veterans counting the days until
discharge from active duty.
attempts were made to have the men cir-
cumvent the January 1970 order to dispose
of unnecessary and untimely intelligence on
-civilian activities. One Captain, the ambi-
tious officer whom I have described above,
instructed the analyst to copy the informa-
hon from spot reports verbatim and place
it in the work-books thus, the requirement
that spot reports be destroyed within 90 days
would be followed, but the information
would still be available. This suggestion was
ignoreci more out of slack leadership than
out of c oncern for violation of regulations.
As for :.:nyself, I inherited the Boy Scout
troop for dependents operated on the post--
I had been an assistant scoutmaster?and de-
voted most of my full-time efforts to keep-
ing the -roop running with little concern for
the intelligence operation.
In preparing this testimony, I have at-
tempted to highlight many of the activities
of a divisional level military intelligence unit.
Several candid observations can be drawn:
First, the system was very inefficient. The
carelessness and haphazard manner of gath-
ering intelligence should arouse grave con-
cern. The characterization of military in-
telligence as a "keystone cop" operation
would be acceptable if it were not for the
fact that the information gathered, stored
and utilized violated individual privacy and
it was undertaken in complete seriousness.
The agent recording information might have
been hopelessly inept at his job, but the ma-
terial he gathered whether reliable or not,
was forwarded to higher command. The in-
formation sent to Fort Holabird might have
been totally erroneous, but it Was trans-
mitted to units with a civil disturbance mis-
:dofl and placed into the computer system as
eubstantiated facts. As I mentioned, the units
with a civil disturbance mission would rely
on the teletype reports, along with Oplans
end intelligence estimates based on computer
;alliterate to develop procedures to quell dis-
turbances within given target communities.
Thus, the careless gathering of intelligence
seriously threatened the performance of
troops m actual civil disturbance operations.
Strain e the carefree, covert intelligence
operation encroached on the rights of many
Americans. No recourse or right of challenge
was available to the individuals upon whom
reports were gathered. erroneous reports
were not only misleading for military com-
manders, but they were a serious threat to
many civilians. There is no assurance that
any of es may not have been falsely Identi-
fied and therefore suspected of disloyal ac-
tivities. One cannot laugh-off as "keystone
cop" an Intelligence gathering system upon
which actual "combat" missions relied and
which encroached on our Constitutional
rights.
Third, the individuals who directed the in-
telligence gathering operation and those who
had the need for the intelligence were most
instrumental in determining the extent of
intrusion on civil liberties. As noted, local
commanders over-reacted to having insuffi-
cient information, to perform their domestic
responsibilities. Volumn instead of quality
reportedly impressed officers in command
and thus, the intrusion on civil liberties
prospered. The need for quantity increased
the number of reports containing erroneous
information. The need for quantity sparked
mistrust and jurisdictional squabbles be-
tween units engaged in the intelligence
operation. I even, venture to say, that the
need for quantity instead of quality?more
than any other single factor?gave the sys-
tem its particular character.
In closing, I want to reiterate that I come
before this committee today not to cast
atones at the military, but instead, to shed
light on an intelligence gathering operation
which expanded beyond its needs and its
controls. As the encroachment upon the
domestic sector soared, the intelligence net-
work was flooded with useless information.
lerroneaus information forced additional in-
trusion of civilian privacy as military units
preferred to develop their own intelligence
rather than rely upon the developed informa-
tion of other commands. Thus, a vicious cycle
ensued. Attempts to limit the intelligence
+system led to jurisdictional squabbles
similar to the one I have described between
the 5th MI. and the 113th M.I. Region IV
headquarters. Controls were poorly enforced
and thus, they were often ignored.
Hopefully, the :public disclosure of the in-
telligence gathering operation will break
the cycle of intrusion. These hearings will
point out to the military the folly of main-
naming a domestic intelligence operation us-
ing untrained personnel, unsubstantiated in-
:formation and ill-suited regulations to assist
in civil disturbance missions. Furthermore, I
am hopeful that these hearings will point out
no all Americans the serious dangers of com-
promising our Constitutional rights in the
name of false security. Covert intelligence
operations, military or civilian, must cease
if the Constitution is to be upheld. In-
dividuals must have the right to challenge
Information collected by government
agencies to Insure that we are innocent until
proven guilty; instead of suspect until
proven otherwise.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
FORMER SENATOR TAFT SPEAKS ON
FOREIGN POLICY
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in the
:RECORD at this point an address delivered
by the former Senator from Ohio Mr.
'Daft in the Senate on January 5, 1951.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
,JONSTRUCTTJE CRITICISM OF FOREIGN POLICY IS
ESSENTIAL TO TILE SAFETY OF THE NATION
Mr. Term Mr. President, I ask unanimous
consent that I may address the Senate.
The VICE :PRESIDENT. If there are no further
requests for insertions in the RECORD or for
submission of other routine matters, the Sen-
:ator from Ohio is recognized.
Mr. Tear. Mr. President. I wish to thank
the majority leader for his action in opening
the floor of the Senate for debate before the
President's State of the Union's message.
In view of the crisis in which we find our-
selves today, the President may well take
:longer for the preparation of his message, but
certainly that should not prevent disoussion
of vital national issues on the floor of the
Senate.
During recent years a theory has devel-
oped that there than be no oreticism of the
foreign pokey of the administration, that
any such entices= is an attack on the unity
of the Nation, that is gives aid and com-
fort to the enemy, and that it sabotages
any :idea of a bipartisan foreign policy for
the national benefit. i venture to state that
this proposition is a fallacy and a very dan-
gerous fallacy threatening the .very exist-
ence of the Nation.
In very recent days we have heard appeals
for unity from the ad rainietration and from
Its supporters. I suggest that these appeals
are an attempt to cover up -the past faults
and failures of the administration and en-
able it to maintain iite secrecy which has
largely enveloped our foreign policy since
the days of Franklin I). Roosevelt. It was a
distinguished Deanocrat, President Woodrow
Wilson, who denounced secret diplomacy and
demanded open convene= openly arrived at.
The administrations if President Roosevelt
and President Truman have repudiated that
wise democratic doctrine and assumed com-
plete anthoritty to melee in secret the most
vital decisions and commit this country to
the most important MCI dangerous obliga-
tions. As I see it, Members of Congress, and
particularly Members of the Senate, have a
constitutional obligateen to reexamine con-
stantly and discuss the foreign polity of the
United States. If we permit appeals to unity
to bring an end to that criticism, we en-
danger not only the eonstitutionel liberties
of the country, but even its future exist-
ence.
I may say that I hope the debate will oc-
cur on the floor of the Senate. I was in-
vited to speak over the radio tonight fol-
lowing the speeches by former President
Hoover and Mr. Dulles, and I declined be-
cause I fele that a statement of flereitgn policy
by a Senator ought to be made on the floor
of the Senate. I think there ought to be a
continuous discussion of that policy during
this session of the Senate.
Certainly When policies have been de-
termined, unity in execution is highly de-
sirable, and in the preparation for and the
conduct of War it is essential. During recent
months, the Republican minority has joined
in granting to the President those powers
which may be necetssary to deal with the
situation. We have not heeatated to pass a
draft law, a law grarreng extensive powers of
economic control, and almost unlimited ap-
propriations for the Armed Forces. No ac-
tion of the minority can be pointed to as in
any way blocking or delaying the mobiliza-
tion of our resources and our Armed Forces.
If there has been any delay in the rearming,
it has been in the adnainistsative branch of
the Government.
But it is part of our American system that
basic elements of foreign policy shall be
openly debated. It Is said that such debate
and the differences that may occur give aid
and comfort to our possible enemies. I nuns
that the value of such aid and comfort is
grossly exaggerated. The only thing that can
give real aid and comfort to the enemy is
the adoption of a policy which plays into
their hands as has OUT policy in the Pair
East. Such aid and comfort can only be pre-
vented by frank criticism before such a
policy is adopted.
Whatever the value of unity, it is also
true that unity carried to unreasonable ex-
tremes can destroy a country. The Kaiser
achieved unity in Germany. Hitler again
achieved the same unity at the cost of free-
dom many years later. Mussolini achieved
unity in Italy. The leaders of Japan through
a method of do-called thought control
achieved unity in Japan. In every case, poli-
cies adopted by these enforcers of unity led
to the destruction of their own country. We
have regarded ourselves as safe and a prob-
able victor in every war. Today it is just as
easy for us to adopt a false foreign policy
leading to the destruction of our people as
for any other nation to do so. The best safe-
guard against fatal error lies in continuous
criticism and discussion to bring out the
truth and develop the best program.
I have referred to the general tendency
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