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et:t.tik air101.0% Approved For Release 2000/09/08 NEW YORK TIMES SENATE, 47 TO 44, KILLS FUND CURB ON VIETNAM WAR Rejects an Amendment That Money COuld Be Used Only for Withdrawal By JOHN W. FINNEY Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Oct. 28?The uossayjajaraczyza, lav zejArtna a- przipaud gmandrnerit that woulc?_laye satafied that the auski Lit Idgez_ast. jagjunda_in Indo- china exceyt to with4raw American forces. The Senate action represent- ed a major Administration vic- tory in the running battle with the doves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The withdrawal amendment, sponsored by Senators John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, and Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, had been included by the Senate Commit- tee in the $3.2-bi1lion foreign aid authorization bill. Amid threats that President Nixon would veto the bill if the Cooper-Church amendment re- mained, Administration forces in a series of close votes suc- ceeded in deleting the amend- ment from the bill. Scott Motion Wins the Senate Re ublican the..034PaZACI=11--alaartrItTIP ?The Administration, mean- while, maintained an outwardly neutral stance as Senators James L. Buckley, Conservative- Republican of New York, and Peter H. Dominick, Republican of Colorado, introduced four amendments to limit United States contributions to the Unit- ed Nations. The amendments \vere a reaction to the General Assembly's expulsion of Na- tionalist China Monday. In the first vote on the United Nations issue, the San- late defeated, 55-28 one of the ;two Buckley amendments, ,which would have cut $102-mil- lion from so-called voluntary contributions to the United Na- tions Development Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization's world food pro- gram. Javits Protests Senator Buckley said that his amendment was "not intended as a punitive measure" but rather reflected nothing more nor less than a loss of confi- dence in the United Nations. Senator Jacob K. Javits pro- tested that approval of the, Buckley amendment would be, interpreted as an act of "pet-j ulance" against the United Ned dons' for expelling Nationalist China and warned, "If we take' this road we're doing ourselves - a grave disservice." "We can take on the world - If we wish or we can live with the world," Senator Javits said. Put off until tomorrow were votes on the other Buckley amendment as well as on the two Dominick amendments. The second Buckley amendment, which is believed likely to be approved, calls upon the Presi- dent to negotiate a reduction In the annual United States as- sessed contribution from the current level of 31.52 per cent of the United Nations budget to net more than 25 per cent. The two Dominick amend- ments were more restrictive. One would require annual Con- gressional authorization for the mandatory or assessed contri- butions, which totaled $111.8- million in 1971, as well as for the so-called voluntary contri- butions, exceeding $223.5-mil- lion this year, to various spe- cialized agencies of the United Nations. The second Dominick amend- ment would specify that the share of the United States voluntary contributions to the specialized agencies could not exceed the United States share of the mandatory payments to the United Nations budget. The effect would be to reduce the United States contributions to the specialized agencies, which now rely upon the United States for about 40 per cent of their budgets. : CIA-RDP73130029pR0003000500014 DATE -)Y1 :1 PAG I Atter a White House confer- elite, Senator Scott told re- porters that the Administration was taking "no position" on the Buckley and Dominick amendments. Another Amendment Deleted The White House, however, made a major effort to defeat the Cooper-Church amendment on Indochina as well as an- -,ther Foreign Relations Com- Mittee amendment, which would impose a $250-million ceiling on all military and eco- nomic aid to Cambodia in the current fiscal year. lirau_slusLagdgaLax-aDAW for brpakfast briefing Tirsriry Tnceingpr +be Xxagidant:s......13,1LbanaL.SiCaZity adviser, ator is- president wou I veto t e sr- sign aid bill if the two amd- rnen ? 44,w.qj'he EffirimiStrati the SelMon or said, would "rather have no bill at all than a bill that re- moves opportunity for further negotiations in 'Paris." The foreign aid bill has al- ready been passed by the House. Among those attending the Whte House meeting were Senators Lawton Chiles, Demo- crat of Florida, and Llloyd M. Bentsen, Democrat of Texas, both of whom had been ex- pected to vote for the Cooper- Church admendment but voted against it. Combined with the absence from the Senate of Sen- ators Fred R. Harris, Democrat of Oklahoma; George Mc- Govern. Democrat of South Da- kota, and Janie' K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii, that was enough to assure a rare mar- gin of defeat of Cooper-Church amendment. bdrninicfratjon failed, r b a52-3 vo e in .its an amend- ,.. r.piliTag or militant ano- nomic spending in Cambca. tet-atirrni-vre-Vitrfr47-1TM- agreed o mm 4 s..4,0 apan4--O A 1 amount t e r $' ig Vrh" " Pln in Cambodia this fiscal year. In another t. -..ory for the Administration, h Senate, by a 43-40 vote, -ited a com- mittee amendm n that would have repealed t e 1955 resolu- tion authorizint -? he President to use the arme .orces to pro- tect the securits Taiwan and the Pescadores I ,lends. Before the mted Nations vote expelling ??1. ationalist Chi- na, the commit of voted to re- peal the resol, ti in regarding Taiwan as a st o toward curb- ing the warma dog powers of the Presidency. Tie Nixon Ad- ministration ha i -aken the po- sition tht it v at- not relying upon the autho it o fthe reso- lution and had at , objection to its repeal. In the wake f the United Nations vote, I, wever, pro-Ad- ministration Si ai tors objected that repeal of the resolution on Taiwan wolk- be untimely and would be re erpreted as a sign that the i inited States would no longer stand by its commitments t he defense of Taiwan. The defeat 1 the Cooper- Church am e id tient today marked the Ii si time in two years that th loves on the Foreign Relat ors Committee have failed in tieir moves in the Senate to i apose legislative restrictions or the President's authority to tkdertake military opeations in In loohina. Still remain ng in the bill was an amend rit nt by Senator Mike Mansfie!1, the majority leader, setting fcrth the policy that the Unit" d States should withdraw all it, forces from Indochina in ix months, sub- ject only to t le release of all American pri ;oilers of war. Rather than fighting the amendment or the Senate floor, the Administr ition decided to rely upon a S in ite-House con- ference come tee to modify the amendme 1, as was done when a si ii ar Mansfield amendment a attached to the draft extex sin Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 DATE PAGE THE WASHINGTON POST Senate Kills Curbs On War. Aid, 47-44 By Spencer Rich Washington Post &aft Writer In a major but bitterly con- tested victory for President Nixon yesterday, the Senate stripped from the foreign aid bill restrictions " on funds for U.S. military operations in In- dochina. By a. 4740-44 vo.jke_Sen- ainrove an nt Minority Leader thigh Seut.t.4.1.a.?1.1c.11/444-4...reerisie41 1.114-aaild.-11,1=a4Ltadi, all muds for further U.S ina?pgatigaiazadagLe.,112_Anklo- .4.1j.ina_excapt-lor-tibet...p4opese ofaughar.aluitzlia.k.aoPs? Scott said the provision, sponsored by Sens. John Sher- man Cooper (R-Icy.) and Frank Church (D-Idaho), was abso- lutely unaccerifabIe to the President and would wreck ne- gotiations for a peace settle- ment and preclude any aid to Cambodia and Vietnam even after U.S. troops were with- drawn. "This bill is not going anywhere if this amendment is in it," he said. "It will be ve- toed. in another vote on a pro- posal which was stimulated by the ouster of the Nationalist Chinese from the United Na- tions Monday night, the Sen- ate rejected by a 55-to-28 vote an amendment by Sen. James L. Buckley (Cons.-N.Y.) to slash $101 million of the $139 million authorized in the bill for U.N. technical assistance (D-Nev.) requiring the Presi- dent to suspend foreign aid i any country that expropriate:. the property of U.S. citizens without compensation. The provision is aimed at Chile. Under existing law--the so- called IIickenlooper provision -the President ,ts given di';- cretion whetlier- to .cut of; aid to expropriating nations; ow Cannon amendment removes Ws discretion and requires him to stop aid. teiA4...:_lerokozer-Church noxision was remoqc4,:ten. No W. Rifec,,es (171.Wvo *teed an ainendment_ta qtrip gut another administrAtjananP- posed provision that haLl been Inserted by the Foreign Ite-a- ti OIlS" ? se al ? - :I: ? tYSjjconomic and military aid te Cambodia to 5250 million, jtfprl of the 2dmInigtrtjOfl's promad-$241 iaillion 'llive-MeCee-ameadmel2Lwas keiseter1,52_to_5jaLoilly StuartSymington ofir a lkter amendment to raise the Cgi1ll21-13LIIIL221.)232=11141 to exactly the o 63,4nl million acought-A h N n Y Tnis- tretioa.- whludruat4tad Astetionig of the_absent. See- l Sersdees _Lagar t- tee_Sjaeliman Joho Stennis rIe to developing nations. - - aijnto give the adrnirdstra- Scott had Old reporters ' earlier that the administration: tinn_11)-the-lunds it warted neither favored nor opposed ?I for military _and- economie d. this and other amendments re- ducing U.S. conceibutions to the U.N. Other amendments to cut U.S. funds for the United Nations sponsored by Buckley and Peter Dominick (R-Colo.) were not palled up ior votes last night by their sponsors. Approved late yesterday by a 4740-33 vote was an amend- ment by Howard W. Cannon to.d.paalig--w-the-horr-Noi-gov- ernment as long as the nrinci- iettingAgeil- dminis- unds it wants-assumifl the Sym- Itreri.9:ceillnWar 140;1.ay-1 ?itst Congeessfor axkv-thing The Scott amendment kill- ing Cooper-Church was the crucial vote as far as the ad- ministration was concerned. cott nact been warning his colleagues for two days that Mr. Nixon would veto the whole foreign aid bill-or per- haps seek to defeat it in the Senate and depend on emer- gency financing for the aid program for the rest of the year-if the Cooper-Church amendment were not removed. Scott said the Cooper- Church provision would weaken the President's posi- tion in peace negotiations, ap- pear to be a "public expres- sion of lack of confidence" in the way he is handling the 'lending of the war and a curb Ion the use of U.S. air power, !both to protect U.S. soldiers ' withdrawing from Vietnam and "to achieve our national objectives in Indochina." Both Church and Cooper strenuously denied that their oposal, which the Foreign Relations Committee ap- proved, 11 to 5, was a repudia- tion of the President. Churn said the provision was an at- tempt to assert the power of the purse in foreign policy, an attempt to make it easier po- litically for the President to get out of Indochina by offer- ing to "share the blame" for withdrawal. But most of all, both sena- tors said, the Cooper-Church provision-which set no final date for getting out-was de- signed to assure that the with- drawal by the United States would be absolute, leaving no residual U.S hues, or U.S. air, sea or logistical support for further war anywhere in Indo- china. The amendment would also have barred any U.S. air I t or other support operations ' once U.S. ground forces are out. "There are great pressures I on the President to leave a re- sidual force of ... 50,000 men . air support, logistical sup- (port; if that becomes the pol- icy, we may remain indefi- nitely," said Church. Cooper said it was precisely because they did not want to hamstring the President in his program of withdrawing ground troops that his provi- sion had been left with no noel withdrawal date. Presi- dent Nixon has said that the United States would not fi- nally get out of Indochina un- less U.S. prisoners are first re- leased aid in a position against the IC er-Church pr was intended two condition by law. The admi leashed a het beat the Coop sion, includim meeting with sistant Hear yesterday by tors. Although th 44, the real tually razor-cl At the end call, the vote favor of kill Church provh lotions Chair bright (D-Ark against killire his vote, mak order to make to force recon initial vote. A move to 1 h Vietnam is o defend itself r:ft. The Coop- '!ion clearly o nullify those ,f withdrawal lit tration un- ? campaign to T Church provi- I White House p-esidential as- k. Kissinger shout 20 sena- vote was 47 to n trgin was ac- )s,- - one vote. f the first roll w ts 46 to 45 in al the Cooper- ?t. Foreign Re- n J. W. Ful- , ,vho had voted then switched trf. it 47 to 44, h mself eligible ,ineration of the h wart reconsid- 'SUED -WOUIV-118 i.suie2g uOfl -elquipasi punoj 2tnpu la ?TOMO atn OSIOA -aa T TV& Rola-8aq am trim 4A a it, ?rnrriati. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE PAGE Senate Vote On Change In, Aid Bill snc toted Press Here is the 47-to44 vote by which the Senate adopted yes- terday an amendment by Sen. Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) to ittrike from the foreign aid bill the Cooper-Church provision cut- ting off funds for all U.S. operations in Indochina ex- cept funds for withdrawal: DemocratsFvrm Fon 17 Allen (Ala.) Er Bentsen (Tex.) F ulbrIght (Ark.) Bible (Nev. G a mbrell (Ga.) Byrd (Va.) Hollings (S.C.) Long (La.) BC.YarinrioniT(NVv.) McClellan (Ark.) Chiles (Fla.) McGee (Wyo.) Eastland (Miss.) Sparkman (Ala.) Eilender (La.) Republicans Fort 30 Ailott (Colo.) Griffin (Mich.) Beall (Md.) Gurney (Fla.) Bellmon (Okla.) Hansen (Wyo.) Hrusice (Neb.) Bennett cute, Boggs (Del.) Packwood Ore.) Brock (Tenn.) Pearson (Ken.) Buckley (N.Y.) Roth (Del.) Cook (KY.) saxbe (Ohio) Cotton (N.H.) Scott (Pa.) Curtis (Neb.) Smith (Maine) Dole (Kan.) Stevens (Alaska) Dominick (Colo.) Tbft (Ohio) Fannin (Ariz.) Thurmond (S.C.) Fong (Hawaii.) Tower (Tax.) Goldwater (Ariz.) Young (N.D. Democrats Against: 33 Anderson (N.M.) Mondale (Minn.) BIM (Ind.) Montoya (N.M.) Burdick (N.D.) Moss (Utah) Muskie Main.) Church (Idaho) Cranston (Calif.) PNaesisotott (W(R.ls6 Eagleton (MO.) re Gravel (Alaska) Pelt ( ..) Hart (Mich.) Proxmire :Vie.) Hartke (Ind.) Randolph W. Va.) Hughes (Iowa) RIbtcoff ( rut.) Humphrey (Minn.) Soong (Va.) Jordan (N.C. Stevenson (III.) Kennedy (MUS.) symington (Mo.) magnuson (wash.) Talmadge (Ge.) Mansfield (Mont.) Tunney (Cal.) McIntyre (N.H.) Williams (N.J.) Metcalf (Mont.) Republicans Aealflet: 11 Mathias (Md.) Percy (ill.) Aiken (Vt.) Brooke (Mass.) Case (N.J.) Schwelker (Pa.) Cooper (Ky.) Stafford (Vt.) .) Hatfield (Ore.) Welcker (Conn Jults (N.Y.) -FT-aright (D-Ark.) switched hje vote In favor of the, amendment ter the purpose of making ? motion tO re- consider the vote. Not voting but anounced u paired on the amendment (pairs are Used to denote opposing positions of Water)) when one or NMI are absent): Jackson (D-Vvash.) esr net Harris (D-Okla.) molts?. Not vo,ing not paired but anitotinced as for Me amendment. Jordan. (R-Idatio) and Miler (.Iowa). Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP7IBSIO763p00300050001-31 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE t PAGE Fulbright Sees Aid Approval Interim Plan To Curtail ? Military Items By John P. MacKenzie Washington Post Staff Writer ? Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) said yesterday that "some form of interim pro- gram" for foreign aid may be worked out--minus the Nixon administration's "em- phasis upon the military" and other controversial features. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee, said his committee will discuss today salvaging many of the "least controversial" aid items in the wake of Friday's stunning 41-to-27 vote to kill the administration's aid pro- gram. The administration mean- while made plans for a pro- posed continuing resolution to maintain the current pace of foreign aid funding beyond its Nov. 15 expiration date, giving the White House and Congress time to devise an aid plan for the future. White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler said Presi- dent NixOP, assessing the "se- vere implication" of the Senate vote, conferred with William E. Timmons, his as- sistant for congressional rela- tions. Timmons in turn spoke with Senate Minority Leader) Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) and House Minority Leader Gerald Ford 1 Fulbright warned that a flati continuing resoffltion would face strong atteimits to amend it oil the Senate floor to elimi- nate funds for what many senators con4der -"the of this program for the military domination of other countries" while maintaining "real aid" I to the economies of underde- veloped lands. Interviewed on "Face the Nation" (CBS, WTOP), Ful- bright said he saw no need for a filibuster to prevent exten- sion of military aid to Greece and countries in Southeast Asia. He listed among the "least controversial" items aid to Is- rael and continued help for Palestine and Pakistan refu- gees. Fulbright called the Senate vote one of the most encourag- ng things that has happened n Congress in recent years, in assertion that the "old ype" of aid sometimes called welfare imperialism" would e scrapped and "a new sp- inach taken." He said President Nixon's ingry reaction to the United iations vote expelling Taiwan as one of many factors con- ributing to the foreign aid ?ote. He charged the adminis- ration with "over-lobbying" ind "pressure" tactics in both he United Nations and the ;enate and said the methods iackfired hi both places. See FULBRIGHT, All, Col. 1 tne charge Ambass t-I Gen" ush said, "That ,s Sala ppie say (ft e esident) didn't do enough *ad therefore the foreign aid 31 died. itou get it coming One way aud they slug you an- other." rtlush, appearing on "Issue' Id Answers" (ABC, WMAI.) said administration official: took a middle course of lobby ing vigorously "for the things they believed strongly." He said that although the admin istration failed "you are going to see a continuation because there are a lot of humanitat- ian things in there." I Support for several non-mil- itary aid items was voiced yes tkrday by Sens. George S cGovern (D-S.D.) and arles Percy (R-Ill.). 'Mc- Govern, a presidential eandi- date, said he would offerilegis- , lation today to restore refugee , aid and aid to Israel but bar military help for the "repres- sive" Greek regime. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B90294R000300050001-3 NEW YORK TIMES DATE ( keiV I PA FULBRIGHT SEES CONGRESS VOTING INTERIM AID PLAN But Indicates Opposition to Administration Package of Military Assistance SENATE UNIT SITS TODAY Chairman Pledges Support of Relief for Refugees and Aid to Israel By BERNARD GWERTZMAN Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 ? Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chair- man of the Foreign Relations Committee, predicted today that Congress would approve an interim solution to keep foreign aid alive, but he indi- cated opposition to the formula being devised by the Nixon Administration. 1?,14.44laggas_I22220141.1e of the leaders in the_agnit4e's dafeat of the_Adrainiatraticues fqggjgn aid bill Friday.jjat, pledged his personal backing for...vz la at. _hecalled t controversial" eaneets....44or- Oen aid, such as lief and and military aid to Israel. But, affirming his well-known opposition tat ot5e7_,Aaaariegn military assistance 43adagealaks, l, crud h ?tlaat?akd- ministration efforts ja_zrag,ip a II ? - ?? ? ? ? ri am sod T ang?p c eireee wonidgin bt 4e' fe?Lby the muld 4LICAlat-Prndura-A-1Q3B fight, Expiration on Nov. 15 Administration sources said today that they hoped to push through a resolution to extend economic and military prod grams for 90 days after thd existing continuing resolution expires on Nov. 15. This would continue aid at the rate ei? last year's expenditures, or $2i billion a year. In addition, officials plan ask for a supplemental appropi A nation of lion for Pakistani refugee relief and $150-million for South V1et4 ' namese economic programs. Approval of that package would carry the aid program into 1972, by which time the Administration would have a new coordinated program to of- fer Congress, aides said. Senator Hugh Scott, Repub- lican of Pennsylvania, and Sena- tor Jacob K. Javits, Republican ,of New York, have already in- Idicated their desire to carry ;the Administration's fight for a !continuation bill. Fulbright Indicates Opposition I But Senator Fulbright, reflect- ling the views of the liberals 'who opposed the aid bill, large- ly because of anger over the I Administraton's role in Cam- 'bodia, Laos and South Vietnam, indicated that he would not support such an administration package. The Senator appeared on the Columbia Broadcasting Company's television program, "Face the Nation." Senator Fulbright said thot when the Foreign Relations _ Committee met tomorrow morn- ing, its members would discus :- the situation and see w tat could be done. laawn41 say?withp,pjajAv- Iked to II ? ? ?? - rinrdr71 ? probably will - arn / YI?S.c.14: The coi----iii?nittee -chatman. "?. "There are various ways of ap- proaching if: We do not like-1 do not like?the continuing yes- olution approach." . "I am thinking generally along the lines of an interim program which would take care of those parts of the program which are the least controver- sial," he said. "There are such things. The children's program is universal- ly applauded, the Palestinian refugees, the Pakistan refugees. No one is opposed to them. A number of things of this char- acter can be put together.' Cites Military Domination "The really controversial things," he said, "are the use of this program for part of the military domination of other countries." Critics of the Administra- tion's bill cite the fact that some 55 per cent of the $3-bil- lion dollar request was for military aid. Asked if he would support a filibuster on the Senate floor if the Administration intro- duced a continuing resolution, Mr. Fulbright said that that depended whether the Adminis- tration would seek to keep things as they are now, with military aid included. If the Administration did so, he said, he predicted "great opposi- tion." Israel, he noted, was "a spe- cial case," and should be sup- ported. A Turnhis Point In general, Mr. Fulbright ex- pounded his own critical think- ing about the way American foreign policy had developed in the postwar years, particu- larly his view that the defeat of the foreign aid bill was something of a turning point. He said the vote was "the beginning of a new era?a change in our basic foreign policy." Foreign aid, he said, started out as a worthy endeavor, but "turned into a tool of the cold war." He said it was a form of "welfare irriperialism" by which the United States exerted influence on many countries. .J think Thiq is the becinnin pf a re-emainAtian nf ur for- eip'n nnlirv." he raid. "This is of it an im ortgnt ye dominate hthpr rim intripq arid thpm hp Rnhcervient to carazill." Senator Fulbright rejected suggestions that the vote was indicative of a newrise in iso- lationism in the country: "the idea of neo-isolationism is ab- solutely a misuse of language," he said. Citing his support for the recent passage in the Senate of a $2-billion appropriation for international organizations?as distinct from direct aid, which he largely opposes?he said: "The true internationalist is the one who wants to interna- tionalize these things, who sup- ports things like the United Natinns or the International Bank." Direct aid, he said, is "a vehicle for imperialism, not internationalism." He said tt a the military sec- tions of the A .-1 bill were used "for the in 't) incing and per- petuation of a isiting regimes." "This has l sett part of the policy of p e crvation of the status quo, tl c prevention of any change ix so many coun- tries that I eel change," Sen- ator Fulbrif al said. "And this has?this h; .;enerally, I think ?eroded tic basis for the, whole grog at " i. Bush Se Hope for Aid In ano itr development, George Bus a iiie United States representat a at the United Nations, t o) caring on the American lr Adcasting Com- pany's pr.( im "Issues and Answers," ;au there had been much disc( ni nit with the for- eign aid pi ip cam, "but I think in the final aaalysis, when cairn and consi a ation take over, that there v ill be a program because pt le recognize there are some ft ndamental things being dont Caere that affect the self-intere: of everybody in our count- a Mr. Bus said that the Ad- ministratit a would take into considerat a some of the, complaint itade by Senator Fulbright a id Senator Mike Mansfield t e majority leader, but that' ' are not going to forgo OUT ,bligations around the world e are not going to withdraw Asked 0 le felt there was a mood of i olationism in the country, I r Bush said: "I think some feel ti at way and I think the Fresh j t is determined that. that mot 1. not be furthered." Mr. Nix( t, he said, "realizes that we a root withdraw into some Fm r .ss America." Senatm eorge S. McGovern, the only 'It sidential hopeful on record a; 1 1st the foreign aid bill, we: at of Washington Friday ni the vote was taken. But h ,ssued a statement today th tIre would introduce a bill I miorrow that would restore a $300-million credit to Israe -a- purchase of air- craft, c rn inue assistance to Pakistan lefugees and bar aid to the trek regime. He also said hi bill would contain' funding o the United Nations,1 at prese t levels. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 NAppipveici fpr,igg lease 2000/09/08 : CIAALF731300"296*R00030005A901,-3 !NIXON WILL IGNORE CALL BY COWES FOR VIETNAM CUTS Signs Money Bill Including Request for Early Pullout Linked to P.O.W. Action HE REBUKES THE DOVES House Then Rejects June 1 Halt in Funds for War but Trims Pentagon I3udget By JOHN W. FINNEY Special to The New York Times ASH1EI Nov. 17? President Nixon, in at= e ta....cangreSailanal?dOle& =peed today that he would disre:ard an amendment set- ? rtommtwgi 'arra ed should be with- drawn promptly orThao- clip. subject only to the re- le?ase of American nrigIALea of That restriction was con- tained in a military procure- ment authorization bill that the President signed into taw today. tives, responding to a Presi- ? hat such le is- io r the.saarcalwegotiated set- gatkin a victory by refusing to Wail opin.a -after - 1. Two Days of Debate Byq,...23114, -LOA vote the House rejected an amendment to the defense appropriations bill that would have provided that none of the funds could be used to finance military combat or support operations in or over Indochina"after June 1 it American prisoners of war had been released by then. The amendment was offered by, Republican Edward P. Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts. After two days of debate the 'House went on to pass the ,bill, which provides $71-billion iin new funds for the Pentagon ?about $2.5-billion less than requested by the Administra- tion. The vote was the first direct test of Congressional reaction to Mr. Nixon's announcement last week that 45,000 troops would be withdrawn in the next two months but that a residual force would be main- tained in South Vietnam until there was a negotiated settle- ment of the war. The relatively one-sided vote indicated that the Administra- tion was still in control in Congress on the Vietnam issue, particularly in the House, which has been more hawkish than the Senate. Since the last test in the House in October ? when a non-binding amendment on trOop withdrawal was defeated by a vote 215 to 193 ? the doves have lost strength, large- ly because of many members, reluctance to cut off funds for the war. The apparent effect of the President's statement challeng- ing the withdrawal policy laid down by Congress was to hard- en the lines between the execu- tive branch and the doves and to encourage a new Senate move to impose a policy of complete withdrawal on the President. ips - e .W4y reaches the ahe_slafense a? a ro t 'Frs. an /1112Y,D-11.,CAPears1 amendment specifiving th t the =Min can use_the 1.11641.4o-agithilta21"taa14-4:441? Mr. Nikon's statement, issued by the White House press office a few hours before the House vote, was made as he signed the bill authorizing $21.4-billion in weapons production and re- search by the Pentagon. Congress had attached a i- fi?tah- ? .I 1 ?? 0 ? e The amendment, still in the Senate-passed bill, calls for total withdrawal in six months, con- tingent on the release of pris- oners. As modified in a Senate- House conference, it declares it to be "the policy of the United states to terminate at the ear- liest practicable date all mili- tary operations of the United State in Indochina and to pro- vide for the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United States military forces at a date cer- tain, subject to the release of all American prisoners of war." Mr. Nixon, in his statement, did not take direct notice of the fact that the modified amend- ment represented a statement of national policy rather than just an expression of Congres- sional opinion. But he made it clear that he did not feel bound by it. "To avoid any miscon- ceptions," the President em- phasized that the Mansfield amendment, in his opinion, "ex- pressed a judgment about the manner in which the American involvement in the war should be ended" but "does not rep- resent the policies of this Ad- ministration." - amen kment h ? co d , antinglaap g , orce or e qct and it ? oes 4ot ? ? II a ? CO ?c .t th way in which t e war s ould ? ? ? bigittig the bm?cofitdining Mans- field amendment, therefore, he said, "will not change the poli- cies I have pursued and that 1 shall continue to pursue toward this end." "Our goal?and my hope?is a negotiated settlement provid- ing for the total withdrawal of all foreign forces, including our own," the President said, "for the release of all prison- - ers, and for a cease-fire throughout Indochina. "In the absence of such a settlement, or until such a-set- tlement is reached, the rate of withdrawal of U.S. forces will be determined by three factors: by the level of enemy activity, by the progress of our pro- gram of Vietnamizationsand progress toward obtaining the release of all of our prisoners wherever they are in South- east Asia, and toward obtain- ing a cease-fire for all of Southeast Asia." 'Hinder Rather Than Assist' Mr. Nixon added that "legis- lative actions such as this hin- der rather than ?assist in the search for a negotiated settle- ment." Basically the same argument was used by the Administra- tion's supporters in opposing the Boland amendment. Repre- sentative Gerald R, Ford, the House Republican leader, said it would stop troop withdraw- als and jeopardize efforts to free the nricnr... the Pr I.,cratic side of the Et-e-tire et tilki7rwarte. H. ort-o-f? e:-as, t of ous-e-211V 121'? tea ktrnuk eqpse- s;encg,5" mstat 2--tbn? then .pire 11P it jilt. Atilt!! of the Arguing 111 t his amendment would "imi le nent" the policy contained in the Mansfield amendment Mr. Boland said a fund cutoff was necessary be- cause the I resident, in his lat- est troop-w thdrawal announce- ment, had 'o?ffered no encour- agement bout ending the United Stat Is military role" but had talked ilL terms of main- taining a r siclual force. "The wa to bring the war to an end mid secure the re- lease of pr- icaers of war," Mr. Boland add "is to set a date for Americ?n withdrawal." To applause from the Demo- cratic side 'qr. Boland found it "incomp ?ehensible and inde- fensible" f ir the president to say he w,,u d "ignore a law passed by ngress." Senator ;rank Church, Demo- crat of Id aho, who will lead the move ii the Senate to impose a f Ind cutoff, protested in a stater ent that "the Mans- field amer dment is now part of the law a Id, as such, is not subject tt dismissal by the President.' Noting bat Mr. Nixon had accused Via: the amendment was not '$ir ding, Mr. Church asked: "Vt hut is he going to do next? Thpatch Henry Kis- singer, hi. 'oreign policy ad- viser, to C ipitol Hill to disband the Congr ;? "It is t le height of fashion these day: in Southeast Asia to establit it one-man rule, one- man elet Ions, and disband pie's a ;semblies. It has hap- pened in outh Vietnam, in ambodia a Id in Thailand to- ay. But ,u s is a government f law." Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 U?ZiAa?der"^. THEANsupyRkFica-NRpl8w 2000/09/08 : clmtpp714948Rproo3nwool-3 House Rejects End-the-War Move Again By Richard L. Lyons wmhinsion post Staff Writer The House approved a $71 billion defense appropriation bill yesterday after decisively defeating another end-the-war amendment. The bill was passed by a vote of 342 to 51 and sent to the Senate, where the amend- ment will be offered again. It would have forbidden using any of the $71 billion for U.S. combat operations in Indo- china after next June 1. Yesterday's effort was the fourth in the House this year to set a deadline for ending U.S. military involvement in Indochina. In the previous three votes the war opponents' strength had incresed from 158 to 176 and then to a high of 1b3. Yes- terday the rising trend was halted. The vote was 238 to 164. Both Rep, Edward P. Boland (D-Mass.), sponsor of yester- day's amendment, and Minor- ity Leader Gerald R. Ford (R. Mich.), who opposed it, said this was the toughest antiwar provision ever put before the House. It would have invoked Congress' constitutionai con- trol of the purse to cut off See DEFENSE, A9, Col. 1 DEFENSE, From Al ltial election day. Jacobs said Imost people believe President funds, an at the President Nixon will end the war before the election. "I offer this just to make sure," he said. Jacobs was beaten, 161 to 52. Mahon's committee cut the administration's Defense De- partment spending request by $2.5 billion, but it is still $1.5 billion above last year's fig- ure. Inflation was cited as a principal reason. Rep. Les As- pin (D-Wis.) said that since the i war is ending and the size of the armed forces will be small- er this year than last, the new budget should not be any larg- er. His attempt to cut back to There was some question ,as, t year's figure was beaten. whether Boland's amendment could not have ignored. Pre- vious votes were on. policy directives which he might have been able to get around. A spokesman for Common Cause, a citizens' lobby, which fought for the funds cutoff, said that when it came down to this tough decition, a num- ber of House members appar- ently did not want to take the responsibility of withholding funds 278 to 114, would require total withdrawal upon release of all American prisoners. Boland insisted that it did, but opponents insisted that it did not. Ford also argued, as leaders of both parties in the House have all year, that setting a deadline would tie the hands of the President in trying to negotiate withdrawal of troops by both sides and release of prisoners. Ford said the Presi- dent would be going to Peking and Moscow with "one trump card less . . . If you want the prisoners back, defeat the Bo- land amendment," he urged. Rep. George H. Mahon (D- Tex.),.' Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, said the President is ending the war and will have with- drawn 80 per cent oi the peak American troop strength by February. Adoption of the Bo- land amendment would "make it cert fl that our sacrifice and a losses have been in vain," he said. But Etep John Flynt (D-Ga.), arguing for the amendment, said the armed threes are be- ing denied needed new equip- ment because et billions of dollars b e tag 4-poured down the rathole" in Vietnam. . Rep. Andrew Jacobs Jr. (D- Ind.) offend nother amend- ment that would have ordered all U.S-. troops out of Indo- china by heXt Nov.7, presiden- The bill would provide $21 billion to pay and support an armed force of 2.5 million $20.4 billion for maintenance and operation; $18.2 billion to buy new major weapons such as planes, ships and missiles, $7.5 billion for research and development; and $3.8 billion for pensions. All efforts to cut the bill or to delete specific items, such as $800 million to buy the new F-14 Navy fighter plane, were defeated. The closest vote was 211 to 183, defeating a prof] bition on any president sene ing troops into combat for longer than 60 days withoi approval by Ci?ngress. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 vm.a. tztj:A? Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP731300i296R000300050001-3 THE EVENING STAR r)A TE PAG Soviet on Arab Jets By GEORGE SHERMAN lAmeri Star Staff Writer Secretary of State William R Rogers has sought personally t warn Soviet Ambassador Anat ly F. Dobrynin about the dan- gers of escalating Soviet air- plane deliveries to Egypt. Roaers? at an unpublicize meetine in his office mnrednes- day. informed II of ?th Jigle_TUI6 bomber- reconnaissance *lanes have ar- rived at airfiel andria since Nov. 1. They repre- sent the ifrst rraler_augefie- -(lixer-Y---13)?Et from ?see auce-luly. Planes Fire Rockets More important, these planes called "Badger," are equipped for the first time in Egypt to fire air -to-ground "kennel" rockets. The medium-range $ sonic plane, akin-TO- he outdated B-47 in the Amencan arra1, nas neen licpd previnusly ' re- cvnaissance over the Mediter- ranean against tne bttrintet. Dobrynirr,71=rolid, did not offer Rogers any explanation of the new deliveries or why the planes have been given the addi- tional missile capabilities. ? shows torn F-4 supersonic jet fighter- flown by bombers to Israel. pilots and, like le Yesterday, Bray said that ers already in since Nov. 1, "we have received bear Egyptian markings. indications of some augmenta- is not Sur tion of Soviet aircraft in Egypt." ___arrLeaa He added that "we are going to since the see whether these deliveries is on the may not have opened a gap in t what we have described as re- to be used as straint." taerliuers against either Step Up Pressure rtaval targets or Sloy7-r-nOvidk ts of the israell forties teethe But neither Bray nor any oth- er U.S. official said the new The recent deliveries come as TU16 deliveries upset the mili- an embarrassment to the admin- tary balance. Because the 1301- istration. On Monday, in an in- er is described as a "jalopy," terview in U.S. News and World even equipped with missiles, and Report, Rogers had noted that because of the small number U.S. findings up to Nov. 1 were added so far, officials are skepti- that the Russians had been exer- cal that they will have much cising "some restraint" in ship- new military impact. ment of arms to Egypt. The decision by the adminis- That same day, department tration, however, has been to spekesanan Charles W. Bray III bring maximum pressure on the indicated that because the U.S. Russians, through public expo- felt the Middle East situation sure, to prevent further aircraft was still in military balance, deliveries. The U.S. government Washington was still deferring still is unsure about the Soviet decision on sending more Phan- tian President ?rwar Sadat Oct. 14, to strength( n Egypt militari- ly. Yesterday, t le chief State De- partment aid( in the Middle East, Joseph . Sisco, Israeli A mbas .1( tor Yitzhak Ra- bin to give IF n the American information .,bilut the new planes. After Vi ehalf-hour meet- ing Rabin, illF; returned from a five-day visit t lirael, said he is convinced Sol ie deliveries of supersonic jets have continued?M contradiction to the State Der J'ment position. Rabin also ,ad he did not be- lieve the Ri :4( rs assessment t that the milit . situation was in balance. e, en before Nov. 1. He said Isr le has learned "not to take lo for an answer" in its dealing:, v ith the U.S. on aircraft purch.s?s. The Rogers 0 Ibrynin meeting on Wednesda was their first alone since Ai ust. In prepara- tion for the a ,nounced Nixon visit to Mosc w next May, the pledge, given to visiting Egyp-t-two discussed f, r more than the Middle East- r linly East-West force reductio .s al Europe. Delays moy U.S. The admin st -ation has been disturbed by Aioscow slowness in respondim t overtures from NATO on mi la al and balanced "orce reducte rk in Europe. Rog- ?ts asked D-o ynin why the So tiet gavernn 1. still had not al- owed the ?,./ TO "e x p1 o r- ,r"?former NATO secretary eneral Man to Brosio?to visit loscow for i, it al soundings. Dobrynin pears to have re- ponded that i. is just a matter f time. Ye terday, Bray said lat "we an c mfident that Bro- io will be to ng to Moscow." le also sal( he United States elieves Bre -is will be able to ive an initi d assessment to the meting of I A ro foreign minis- Hs on Dec. t. The Rogei robrynin meeting s also a ba 'k irop to the strong 2riticism th, ecretary of state issued yeste d iy of Senate ap- propriation nmittee moves to cut 60,000 f om the 310,000-man American f, -t e in Europe. Rog- ers, speakin irough Bray, said unilateral Q1 F would undermine the Presidf et s efforts to get i"reciprocal i gotiated actiions" with the Re - ins in Europe. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 E 43414,p proved For fte1esestaitiM09/138calit-RDIMBOMERPM0005099,1g3/3, :1971 field, outdoor theatre, basketball court, swimming pool, tennis court, parking lot and even benches and a picnic area. They'll make a plaster of paris model and paint it. All these learning experiences are part of an educational idea dreamed up by James Moffett and he wrote a book about it called, "Student Centered Language Arts Curricu- lum." In essence, it says, take what children are doing, what they like to do and go from there. The Bartlett School, to go one step further, is planning to launch an open class- room by the end of the year. CTC HAS PROGRAM Community Teamwork Inc. already has a skills training program. CTI pays a per- centage of the intern's salaries. This is not teaching per se, but "presenting a learning experience," similar to the way pioneer chil- dren in the start of this country learned things by watching or helping their parents. But, again, each program, designed by the professional staff, is built around the inter- ests of the children . . . that's the impor- tant aspect. The interns see what the children need . .. then the professionals de- sign a program to fit it. Afterwards, said Lynn Packard, the professionals, ". . . guide them (the interns) but we don't tell them." Mrs. Packard is working with a girl who had trouble understanding logical sequence. She played checkers and chinese checkers with the girl to show her consequences and planning. And the end result, believe it or not is language arts. Language is nothing if not sequential. To communicate well, one must explain well and logically. All these programs thus relate in the end to a better ability in language, clear thinking and being able to picture things in the mind which is only, after all, imagination. Man thinks and then he makes or says. It's that simple. At the Green School, it's much the same, but the learning experiences are presented next door at the Smith Baker Center. A girl, blindfolded, is rubbing her index finger over felt letters on a cardboard piece. Before she couldn't read letters. With this method, she can now recognize 35 words. All this In a mere five weeks. She's transforming a sen- sory touch into a visual image in her mind. Ronald Platt, her intern, is helping. Intern Gerry Paquin has a genius on his hands, one Danny Gagnon in the fifth grade. Danny didn't like to read last summer. Now he memorizes books verbatim. It was Check- ers and chess for the first two weeks, then a story board (sounds and pattern kit) in which Danny decided what each character was doing and wrote a sentence about it. Now he takes the characters and makes up stories, poems and even songs, and types them out. Under a "Little Miss Muffet" character, Danny wrote "a girl saw a bug." Another sentence shows "a boy being burnt by a fire dragon." Danny was writing a song about a king, a ghost and a piema,n as he was visited by this reporter and was much too busy to bother explaining it all. His intern is frankly amazed at his scope of learning. It just took that personal interest to bring it out. "He uses me as a kind of dictionary," said Paquin. A picture story by Danny, will be made into a five-act play and slide show. In another room, a video projector shows stories but draws no conclusions in the narration. Children make up their own end- ings. At the Smith Baker Center there are a lot of materials and the children are free to pick what they want. Gagnon's brother, Mark, is only in the second grade, but he has been designing a fancy soapbox derby racer and checks it out after each redesign in the aisles of the cen- ter's auditorium. His cart has steering wheels front and back. Note that the interns don't tell the kids how to do something, but offer suggestions as to result. Mark redesigns by seeing a problem, defining the problem, and figuring a way to beat it. His intern, Mrs. Elmer Hall gives him lots of attention and praise and might help him define the prob- lem after he's discovered it, but he decides how to solve it. It's the freedom that's important. Another boy, Joseph Sullivan in the fourth grade is making a lighthouse out of this same mechanical advantage kit. And on stage, ladies and gentlemen, pre- senting those great American actors, Bruce Callicutt, Manny Athenais, Eileen Call and Albert Potter wowing their two intern help- ers as they devise a play on the spot. Callicutt is the lunch thief, Athenais catches him, Call had her lunch stolen and Potter is "Frank", the one who saw the lunch thief break a window. One of the interns plays the prin- cipal and the action is hot and heavy. The kids really get fired up and for all intents and purposes the play is real. They make up their lines as they go along. A teacher in the program noted, "Young- sters get very little air-time, time to express their feelings at home or in large classes. Here they do." In the old days, children were supposed to be seen and not heard. At Model Cities Educa- tion, they'i?een, heard, helped and ap- preci d. ETNAM: PAST AND PRESENT HON. BARRY M. GOLDWATER, JR. OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, May 12, 1971 Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. Speaker, dur- ing the past decade there has been much rhetoric relative to the facts on the Viet- nam war. Unfortunately, both the facts and Vietnamese people have been lost in the shuffle from the debate emanating from both sides. What America needs is less hawks and doves and more owls. We need to approach matters wisely, not from emotion ridden ideas. For far too long we have attempted to view the situation through Western col- ored glasses. This is very naive and un- wise. It is interesting to note that the average Army basic trainee receives no relevant information about the Vietnam- ese people; their culture, values, or tra- dition. This is like sending a man un- armed into a political revolution warfare situation. Understanding these afore- mentioned facts are as important as his rifle and his knowledge of how to use it. Certainly this is shocking but it has been a prevalent Western attitude too long. The following information was pre- pared from the best sources available on the Vietnam history and conflict. I wish to present this material in the hopes that this one candle will help to diminish some of the darkness surrounding the true situation in Vietnam. The material follows: VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE 1954-70 THE GENEVA ACC0RD'S-1954 The Geneva Conference held in 1954 to settle the Indochina War resulted in Accords signed by only two powers: France and North Vietnam. The Accords provided for a military cease-fire, a regroupment of military forces, the provisional division of Vietnam into two zones divided at the 17th parallel, and the free movement of the population between the two zones for a period of 360 days. The Ac- cords also called for the creation of an In- ternational Control Commission (Canada, Poland and India) to a mentation of the provisio In declarations attacI (and unsigned by any po lated that free elections accordance with dem, should be held in July States and South Vietn: effective United Nations pervision for these electie then and now, totally re. in Vietnam. The U.S. a therefore refused to sigi Accords. No powers signs tions attached to the Accr ,pervise the impie- :d to the Accords vers), it was stipu- M secret ballot in ea rtic procedures 1956. The United in each had urged el ification and su- n., North Vietnam, ected any U.N. role ad South Vietnam he 1954 Geneva I he final declara- rear. NGO DINH .11 M In South Vietnam, the oc:itical focus rest- ed on Ngo Dinh Diem. Iran was appointed Prime Minister of the 5- ate of Vietnam by Emperor Bao Dai in 1954 before the Geneva Accords were drawn up. Be was supported by the United States as esult of his long record as a nationalist, r or -Communist po- litical leader. Diem was r.ot an American puppet nor was he Cardi la Spellman's silly putty. He had only come to the attention of Americans in 1951 but Dent was the son of the grand chamberlain )f the emperor at the Imperial Court in Int city of Hue in Central Vietnam. Born i Ito a family which had a long tradition of a holicisrn (nearly two million Vietnamese 1r South Vietnam today are Catholic) Dia i was educated at the same high school the I lo Chi Minh had attended in Hue city. Diem became well-knot n throughout Cen- tral Vietnam as a dedicatt d. honest and com- petent nationalist. In 19O, following service as a District Chief, Diet .'s talents come to the attention of the Frei al, administration. The French subsequentl ,isfered Diem the position of Minister of i merlon Diem took the post on condition the t he French grant genuine concessions tow rc increased Viet- namese independence. IN: en it became clear that the French had no mentions of keep- ing their word, Diem resig after 18 months of service warning the French that they would lose their hold on ac tnam-as a result of denying Vietnamese ieal role of par- ticipation. In 1940, Diem refused v ith equal stub- borness to collaborate wh Is the Japanese oc- cupation forces in Vietna:n He remained an obdurate Central Vietn rmese patriot. In 1945, Diem's brother was buried alive by Ho Chi Minh's forces in Nor Is Vietnam?a fact that Diem never forgot m forgave. Ho later offered Diem a position ]n North Vietnam's short-lived "coalition" rcr.-ernment. Diem refused the offer. THE EMERGENCE OF THE 4 01 IMUNIST THREAT In 1951, Diem was encc mitered by Ameri- can scholars in Tokyo. H N., as searching for help for Vietnam, just as Ho Chi Minh had left Vietnam in 1912 ne, er to return until 1941. Subsequently, Diem "ane to the United States. He felt the need or help was more urgent than ever due to 1 ie events that had taken place in Southeas Asia. A coalition government formed with n: tionalists, Com- munists and neutralists I Iianoi by Ho Chi Minh had been destroy d in six months during the summer and a It trim of 1946 and Ho Chi Minh had abolish al the Communist party which had only a ev months before destroyed the nationalists in the coalition. By 1951, with Mao Tsal.1 irg in control of the Chinese mainland at d involved in the Korean War, Ho Chi M had felt bold enough to abolish the hr a,i national front and resurrect the Commt, iLt party in pub- lic position of leadershil Named the Lao Dong (Workers) Party, a: Vlarch 1951 this antagonistic non-Vietnam -s' organism once again was in the saddle. ( k heory of a Ger- man named Hegel and a 'tson of a German named Marx was going to or. translated into a dictatorship of the pro] 'teriat on the un- willing backs of a people war were fighting for genuine Vietnamese a lependence and Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 /1/ay 13, 1593PmecLtardW(gEkl6grgPORM&I--CARAP73ABOn , _40?800030005000t4347 tecting the rights of our citizens and the principles of American justice without which democracy could not survive. All too often, our policemen are critized un- justly. They are rarely recognized for the services they perform. As we witness the increase in domestic ills?such as drug abuse, violent crime, and civil disobedi- ence?the role of the policeman in our society becomes all the more important. Rural America is not isolated from the domestic problems which plague the large urban areas. All law enforcement agencies share common responsibility regardless of their locale and that is to protect the public domain. They have ful- filled that responsibility in an exemplary manner. During this National Police Week and throughout the year I know that all law-abiding citizens join with me in saluting our law enforcement agencies and in pledging our continued support of them in the same loyal manner as they have served us. MODEL CITIES?NEW CONCEPT IN EDUCATION HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE OP MASSACHUSETTS ES THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, May 11, 1971 Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, there is cur- rently underway in Lowell, Mass., a most unique program in education, operated under the auspices of the model cities program and with the leadership of its education director, Patrick J. Mogan. The individual skills education pro- gram, as it is called, seeks in new and highly creative ways to enhance the learning process and to make the learn- ing experience a more successful and cer- tainly a more enjoyable one, for both the disadvantaged child as well as the ex- ceptionally skilled one, and for teacher as well as pupil. It calls on the abilities of a corps of high-trained professional specialists, and with financial assistance from Commu- nity Teamwork, Inc., is able to combine learning with teaching for some 15 in- terns. The program is being successfully em- ployed as a supplement to standard teaching practices in several schools and will be expanded in the future. Indeed, I look forward to more of the same re- sults that have been described in the fol- lowing article from the Lowell Sun. It makes for heartening reading, and I am pleased to include it at this point, for the attention of my colleagues: [From the Lowell (Mass.) Sun, Apr. 15, 19711 MODEL CITIES?NEW CONCEPT IN EDUCATION (By Lee Wood) Lowaia.?The scene is one of utter con- centratioh. As one enters in Bartlett School, three young boys and a young man are hud- dled on the floor, in the hallway, near a win- dow. On the floor is a map of Lowell. On top of the map is a transistor radio, laying on its back. What is happening? Simple. The boys are learning the direc- tion of the radio stations on the map. This leads to eaplanatiorts by the young man of the directions streets are laid out and even- tually into mapping. The approach is to take what the boys are interested_ in and go on from there. And it works. Ten minutes later Wayne Colby has the avid attention of the three boys as he explains the layout of the City of Lowell. Saturday, he and the boys will take a hike, make a tape of the sounds heard in the woods during the hike and take slide pictures. Later they will narrate a slide show and talk of what they saw and heard. Wayne Colby is an intern. But not in a medical hospital. He's one of 15 interns, all studying to be teachers, that are led by three professional specialists and two staff ad- ministrators in a highly effective Individual Skills Education Program through the auspices of the Model Cities Program. At the Bartlett, just one of seven schools to eventually enter in the program, 44 students were deeply engrossed in writing plays, put- ting out a newspaper, designing a town, learning word combinations and making col- leges among other subjects. Step by step they were allowed to make decisions and work to- ward a reachable goal . . . all based on their own interests. Students are free to roam around and look at the other projects. But most were so interested in what they were doing that they had to all but be pried loose to talk about it. The groups are gathered in bunches of one to three children per intern. The results have been good. One boy re- fused to read in school. Now he can memorize entire short books and narrate the story back verbatim into a recorder days later. He's writing plays and songs. A girl, who somehow couldn't get the shape of letters clear in her mind, has learned to recognize 35 words on sight in a couple of months. Four children at the Green School are act- ing out plays on the spot, improvising their feelings, problems and imagination in such a way that one feels the play is real. Each group of children is making a book as a history of his project and Polaroid pic- tures and illustrations are profuse through- out each book. INTERNS AGED 18-27 The interns range in age from 18 to 27. Most come from the Acre and this is where the program is oriented. Each presently han- dles 12 children overall, in four programs of one hour each. The idea, mainly, is to use a series of steps in learning for skill develop- ment. The programs are designed. by professional teachers who circulate through the rooms the cafeteria at Bartlett) while the interns help the students. The program offers assist- ance to all sorts of children, from those with reading disadvantages to those of exceptional skill. It is a service to the-school ... giving chil- dren individual attention for at least three hours per week, Monday, Wednesday and Fri- day and is meant as a supplement rather than a replacement for standard teaching practices. One result is to boost language arts. The interns learn just as much from the kids as vice-versa and it helps them to win credits toward their teaching certificates. Mr. and Mrs. Leonard K. Eisenhood are developing a bi-lingual approach. Both are fluent in Portuguese, Spanish and French besides their native English, and both have been involved in the Migrant Education Pro- gram and have college degrees. The three professional teachers all with Master's degrees, are: Sister Frances Gill with 35 years in the education field and co- ordinator for the Mor-Harris, with a back- ground in Just about everything, including exceptional students (both retarded and highly intelligent), the Bartlett and Green School coordinator and Lynn B. Packard, with teaching credits in Holland, this state and in newspaper work and communications. PATRICK MOGAN DIRECTOR Patrick J. Mogan, the director of educa- tion at Model Cities is well known in Lowell and was the assistant superintendent of schools in this city for four years. His assist- ant, Peter S. Starnes, is a Harvard University graduate, attended Massachusetts State Col- lege at Boston for his Masters in Education and is going for his doctoral degree at Boston University. Mogan personally picks the interns whose greatest qualifications seem to be their pa- tience, quiet competence, ability toadapt to the directions in which the children want to go and most of all to their way of relating to the kids as people-to-people rather than teacher-to-student. There is a built in evalu- ation program as each student is rated on an attitude scale. Hey wait! What's that kid doing over there? He's destroying- a tree. Nope. That boy is breaking branches off a small dead tree on the school stage. And he will take those pieces of stick and will build a log cabin. This will be included as part of a model village (in plaster of pails) to include other houses built with rocks and other materials. It allows the youngsters to learn how a basic material ends up as part of an overall fin- ished product that is still a part of a larger product, the community. LEARN TO RE LATE The boys and girls, in this program, get to relate to other youngsters and adults in a unique way. It's free expression on their part. Intern Ross Hanvey is helping Michael Lau- rent in the 5th grade, and 5th graders, Daryl Phillips, Dolores Sylvester and Debra Fierley. The program has shown a gradual growth in the children's work and their books. Another example: An intern brings in a motorcycle helmet full of collages to show the children just one of the ways art can be done with collages and one end use of same. But what are those sixth graders doing playing with blocks? Isn't that childish for their age? Not at all. Calvin Burdick and Robert Daigneault are doing free expression with blocks. They make individual buildings with these plastic parts, draw a picture of the building, then make another until they have a picture made of a small city. And when it's finished, it will be their city, that they made themselves. "This gives them a concept of the way a city is structured," said Bud Prevette, the intern. "They're able to see one-way streets and the reasons for them, for instance." One girl is off by herself typing a story (-typewriters are very common in the pro- gram), Steven Cochran, fifth grade, is de- signing a puppet stage for his group's pup- pet allow. COMPOSE PLAY Meanwhile, Tina Cox and Paula Camille, both sixth graders, have composed a 17-char- acter play about drugs. "This is to prove that drugs aren't any good," said Tina. The girls are leaving the play ending open so the audi- ence will think about it. Intern Albert Kehoe is helping them. He said it will be a three act play and the girls have even made the characters :sign "contracts" so the players, "hate to show up." Intern Mrs. Elmer Hall is assisting Barbara Burdick, Efry Stavroulias, Christine Minezzi and Cathy Kanellos in making a newspaper to be called, "The Legend.." It will be an-all- girl newspaper and articles will include items on the four seasons, the different projects at the Bartlett School, poems, the girls' play, plus reviews of other plays, and even a fash- ion section. Sixth graders Charles Cooper and Phillip Ting:as don't like the North Common area. So, they're redesigning it to be a recreation center. Intern Patricia Brogan said they even want to put a plastic dome over it for all- weather protection. The boys outdid them- selves with the design to include: a baseball Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 :WOW* ;AMR Tf, 11111111111.111111111111111M1111111111111141111111111111111?11 May 13, 1fP1Pr?vectgRIG5ggffisteli2PCPAPWRI?_:_9130gPUIPitigage00030005000114649 fought against the Lao Dong Pat y Two di- visions of North Vietnamese re ;trar army troops were sent in to suppress 1) is rebel- lion, but the troops could not er s -the fact that the people of North Vietnarr v. ere emu- lating the revolts flaring in Polan ; nd Hun- gary a half a world away again he same system of totalitarian Communis This was the atmosphere in 1) 56 when the North Vietnamese might otr: 'r vise have held the Geneva-prescribed ele tims. The precincts in North Vietnam r ens rotten. There were no model unificati n elections - there either. Ho wept on natio; al radio in North Vietnam and apologized lr errors and mistakes of the land reform o> ecutions: "My children, Land Reform is lie hot soup, it must be taken slowly." GI Giap, hero of Dienbienphu and Defel st Minister of North Vietnam apologized bef a formal meeting of the Party Congress, s' re :sing that the murders and tortures that 1 at occurred during those two years were a r n it of over zealous actions. the freedom in village self-government terms that has characterized the three regions of Vietnam for centuries.) The Lao Dong Party was in fact but another reincarnation of the first political brainchild of Ho Chi Minh fresh from his 1923-25 training in Moscow?the Indochinese Communist Party of 1930. DIEM AND 9'HE U.S. Diem's quest for U.S. support was redou- bled after the emergence of the Lao Dong Party from behind the mask of the broad national front against the French in March 1951. Diem was favorably regarded by Sena- tor John F. Kennedy, Senator Mike Mans- field and a host of American political spokes- men who regarded him as a genuine Viet- namese nationalist. In 1954, the United States decided to sup- port Diem for the post of Prime Minister when he was being considered by Emperor BaO Dai for that job. One reported French reaction to Diem's selection was: "He is the last cigarette in the pack." It was a French estimate that Diem would last only a few weeks. Diem proved to be adept at survival, becoming Prime Minister in 1954 and in 1955 defeating Bao Dai in a national referendum for the position of President. Diem remained President of South Vietnam until November 1963. REBUILDING IN THE SOUTH As President of South Vietnam, Diem was able to restore telecommunications, rebuild roads, triple educational enrollment, increase health facilities in the countryside, re-settle nearly a million refugees, meet the chal- lenges of armed political-religious sects threatening the government's authority, de- stroy the Binh Xuyen, (a Mafia-like organi- zation which controlled the opium, gambling and prostitution in Vietnam which was one of the troublesome legacies from the days of French control) and register a very large in- crease in rice production. Diem had set South Vietnam on an impressive course of economic reconstruction. Professor Hans Morgentha,u lauded Diem and his impressive efforts in 1956 as "a living miracle." THE DEMISE OF VILLAGE ELECTIONS On the other hand, confronted by the il- legal presence of some 5,000 Communist troops in five hold-out areas in South Viet- nam, Diem was deeply worried about security in the countryside. He reacted by repressing political opposition. In June 1956, Diem abolished village self-government in South Vietnam. The election of village councils had been a cherished Vietnamese tradition dat- ing back to the 1600'3. Diem's action though perhaps understandable in terms of mili- tary security opened a deep political vul- nerability in the countryside which the Com- munist cadres skillfully exploited during the following three years. It should be noted that the many local grievance groups that existed in the countryside proved to be fertile tar- gets for the Communist organizers who were determined to prepare the political battle- field in South Vietnam. DIEM AND THE GENEVA ELECTION ISSUE Control Commission teams which were sup- posed to be available to all. Only those who could reach the ICC teams in the former French-held areas of the Red River Delta had much chance of stating their choice. Others forged papers and tried to slip past the Com- munist Party security squads which sought to prevent such contact. U.S. OPINION ON THE 1956 ELECTION ISSUE Diem was adamant in. his reservations. It was certain that the Communist regime would regiment more votes at the ballot box than the South's voting age population could match. The ICC with its pro-Communist Polish representatives could not provide any assurances of a free electoral test. Without U.N. supervision, Diem felt any elections be- tween North and South would be meaning- less. American spokesmen such as Senator John F. Kennedy and Senator Mike Mansfield agreed. They continued to press for an elec- tion formula calling for effective interna- tional supervision and warned against "forc- ing Diem" into these rigged and unrepresen- tative elections. THE POST-GENEVA RECORD The fact that South Vietnam had never signed the Geneva Accords, added to the strength of Diem's refusal to submit to the Communist demands on this issue. By July 1956, France, one of the two signatories of the Accords, had departed South Vietnam and North Vietnam had consistently violated important provisions of the Geneva agree- ment by several significant policies. More than 5,000 regular army troops loyal to the Lao Dong Party, the Communist Party of North Vietnam, were left in the South in 1954 -55. Their refusal to regroup to the North as the Geneva Accords had prescribed provided North Vietnam with a built-in military threat to South Vietnam's develop- ment and survival. The size of North Vietnam's regular army at home was trebled in open defiance of spe- cific stipulations in the Accords that no in- crease would take place. In South Vietnam meanwhile, 685 U.S. military advisors were assigned to training tasks in answer to a request by President Diem and in accord- ance with the Accords provisions permitting rotation of training personnel. At the same time, South Vietnam's regular army was reduced in size to keep within the Geneva stipulations even though neither South Viet- nam nor the U.S. were signatories to the Ac- cords. Diem had profound concern about any election contest with North Vietnam. He knew the record of North Vietnam's Stalinist regime ruled out the possibility that the North would hold democratic and free elec- tions by secret ballot. The record of Ho Chi Minh's systematic betrayal of Vietnamese nationalists to the French during the pre- vious decades was further cause for caution. Diem also knew that the North (even after the flight of nearly a million refugees to the South) simply outnumbered the South in terms of voting population. Ho Chi Minh had violated the Geneva Accords signed by North Vietnam on the stipulations concerning free choice of movement for the people of the North and the South. Communist roadblocks prevented most of the people of North Viet- nam from ever reaching the International INSIDE NORTH VIETNAM 1954-1956 Ho Chi Minh's regime in North Vietnam by 1956, was experiencing widespread unrest and resistance to the bloody "land readjust- ment" campaign which killed small farmers and landholders as a preparatory step to turn their lands into collective farms. There were a minimum of large landlords in North Vietnam which had traditionally been a? country of small farms and land worked by the owners. Nevertheless, more than 50,000 people were executed by the Communist Party campaign in two years. By 1956 more than a half a million people were in forced labor camps or re-education centers and countless families had been destroyed by wives being forced to -divorce their husbands who had been branded "reactionaries." In August 1956, intellectuals in Hanoi publicly demanded the overthrow of the Lao Dong Party publishing their demand in the news- paper "Nhan Van" (Humanity). The Lao Dong Party closed the protesting newspapers and periodicals, suppressed the university students and jailed the dissenters. REBELLION IN NORTH VIETNAM-1956 In November 1956, despite regime apolo- gies for the "tortures and murders" of the previous two years, the farmers of Ho Chi Minh's home province of Nghe Anh, rose against their Stalinist masters, seized guns from the Communist Party armory and HO CHI MINH When Ho took power as a C Immunist leader in North Vietnam in 195.1 le had al- ready traveled a long and specs) road. He had been born in 1890 with the ni-me: Ngu- yen That Thanh. (Nguyen W to Will Be Victorious). In his lifetime he vc old adopt and discard 21 aliases to mask ; identity. His father was a functionaire ai d was alter- nately working for and being p 'o..ecuted by the French. In 1912 Ho left VI, train under an alias as a cabin boy on a Fre ship and in time sailed from Marseilles, F -a.lce on the maritime routes that took hLi to Africa, New York City and London. In tl e years of World War I he was in France ?re he was known as Nguyen 0 Phap tg-iyen Who Hates the French). In 1919 he re ited a top hat and tails and attempted o present a petition for Vietnam's indepen ie Ice to the Big Four peace conference mei- ti g at Ver- sailles. They were too busy to a e ALIAS NGUYEN Al QI.B In 1920, re-inforcing his yea s of contact with the Socialist movement i T.urope, he attended the socialist Congre s at Tours, France and when the meeting ol t into two factions, he followed the Comrr ,11 ist faction into session and became a four ii ig member of the French Communist Part- 'le adopted the name: Nguyen Al Quoc E:guyen the Patriot). His French Communi t 'arty roots would show clearly years later a hen he, in 1946, negotiated the return o he French to Vietnam (the French Corn annist Party felt it had a good chance o 'onquering France by parliamentary actice 1 1946 and issued orders that year to th ? Vietnamese Communist Party that "unde :o circum- stances should any attempt be :la tde to pre- vent the return of French tr.ops to Viet- nam in 1946"). Ho Chi Minh ia--gained the French in to get the occupyim Chinese Na- tionalist troops and influence 31 t of North Vietnam. Southern Commun :t: protested the entire arrangement chargir go with be- ing a nation seller and a betn yer. This was not a new allegation on Ho's re ?ord. After the 1920 founding o he French Communist Party, Nguyen Al ni.)0 was sent to Moscow to the Lenin Instil rt for train- ing at the Toiler of the East Sc hool. There from 1923-1925 he refined h s skills as a Communist organizer. In 1925, he was assigned to 'a iton, China as a member of the Russ' An Consulate headed by Borodin. Nguyen A: Quoe was listed as a clerk and an inter) reamr, but his real job was to organize Comm n st activities in Southeast Asia. One of Ngt ei Al Quoc's first acts upon arrival in Canto v as to invite to Shanghai the leading Viet, at aese fighter against the French, Phan Bc -emu. Chau had been leading the strugg .r1 against the French for more than 25 yea. qiside Viet- nam. Nguyen Ai Quoe's org, inzation sold Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 E 4h0Proved For R -3 ce*MIZE2s9959NC/Ricc*F_DFD7R9,?941ipeOm03epp050004(1y 13, 1971 Phan Bel Chau to the French security police 'SITE LEGACY or NGUYEN AI Quocsatese Front and the believers in local grievance in Shanghai, China in 1925. A trip to talk After France lost at Dienbienphu in 1954 causes. Once again the Front, well along the shout revolution had ended in betrayal and nationalist struggle against the French was ond the Geneva Accords were signed in road to what it assumed to be victory, was Prance and North Vietnam, Ho had a difficult effectively abolished in favor of Party control weakened by the actions of the Communist time explaining to the Southern Communist of policy and apparatus. erganizer, Nguyen Ai Quoc. Two hundred movement of his organization why. having THE CRUCIAL YEAS 1954?sHouLD THE NORTH - other ether nationalists of various parties were lost the war in 1954, France was to be per- ERN ARMY GO IN? subsequently invited to China by Nguyen Ai netted two more years to hang on in South In 19C4 most of the effective Southern Quoc to study revolution. After a year's Vietnam. One reason was that the Sov:tet study at Whampoa Military Academy many of manpower pool cf re-groupees that had been Union had insisted that Ho give France two them refused to join the Communist move- sent North for training in 1954 had been more years in Indochina as an incethive for mans and they too were betrayed to the used up. There still had been no uprising the French to vote against the European De- French Surete as they attempted toof the masses in South Vietnam to the Corn- tense community plan then being considered munist banner, though Diem was increas- clandestinely return to Vietnam. Nationalists in the French Parliament. Thus it was for ingly unpopular as a result of his deterior- who had thus encountered Nguyen As Quoc's the International Communist prierity of organization had the contemporary opinion ating administrative apparatus in the coun- weakening the Western European defenses trysicle and those who carried out programs that Nguyen Ai Quoc was betraying Viet- which denied the 250 Soviet army divisions, Siamese nationalism not fostering it. Nguyen that Ho Chi Minh sold out the liepes of in negative fashion using his name. POT the Al Quoc had to flee for safety to northeast tee Southern Communists. North the real question was: "if Southern Thailand when the coalition arrangement be- cadres trained in the North are now in short LAD NEWS POR THE SOUTHERN COMMUNISTS tween the Chinese Nationalists and the supply, could the regular Northern army Chinese Communists broke down in 1928. Between 80,000 to 100,000 Southerners had be sent in to wrap up the war fast?" In 1964, T EIE "DEATH" 01' NGUYEN AI QUOC teen ordered to go North at the time of the Lao Done Party moved the NVN army Geneva to train and prepare in the North into training camps preparing for such a fn 1930 Nguyen Al Quoc held a Congress of for the return-to South Vietnam to organize shift in policy and in September and ?e- ine quarreling factions of the Indochina the Communist vote in the South in 1956. tober 1964 the first regular units of the Communist groups in Hong Kong. There he For these Southern Communists who were North Vietnamese Army began to move down founded the Indochinese Communist Party in North Vietnam, the North's land reform the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos and thus surfacing his Communist allegiance so revolt and the Party's eroded political con- into South Vietnam. The numbers increased repugnant to Vietnamese nationalists. In dition were bad news. The need was plain, as she months went by. From an initial ad- 1933 Nguyen Al Quoc was reported dead and The balance between HOr'S problems and vance party of 300 in November and Decem- his death was accepted as genuine by COM- Diem's progress had to be corrected by a her 1964, the Northern involvement rose to inunist and non-Communist Vietnamese shift in tactics. several thousand by the spring of 1965 and alike. The Communist Vietnamese were grieved, but the nationalist Vietnamese were SZTURN TO THE SOUTH TO ORGANIZE AND KILL eve:ntually to the 10 divisions (160,000 men) in the South today. It was these troops, more restrained in their mourning since the The Southern Communist re-groupees, betrayer of their colleagues had passed to trained in North Vietnam went back into the wearing uniforms and insignia, coming in regular unit formations, that constituted the his next reincarnation. Some were plainly South to focus the local grievances in the beginning of an actual invasion of the South relieved that the leading menace to the villages of the countryside, to organize re- sistance to the central Government 1/1 South by the North. The pattern of the war had nationalist movements was gone. They buried changed. Vietnam, and to kill by assassination and their grin:lees with the memory of Nguyen Ai Quoc. terror those serving the government cause THE U.S. REEPONSE?MISCALCTJATE ON AL/AS HO CHI MINH al the countryside. It was this pattern, using BY T:HE NORTH lie 5,000 hold-out stay-behind Communist The U.S. was now to be tested. Did it mean After the false report of his death, snxms that Ho had ordered to remain in what it had always said? Would the South Nguyen Al Quoc, under a variety of other s.row in the South, that enabled these local Vietnamese be overrun? The North could well aliases worked in Thailand, Malaya, and the ,aouthern re-groupees to carry out their tasks, reflect in 1970 that they had made a major Soviet union. In 1941, eight years later, They killed the corrupt first, the efficient miscalculation in 1964. For the U.S. response Nguyen Al Quoc emerged from a Chinese eecond and never touched, the mediocre. A with the combat forces arriving in March Nationalist prison and under the alias of Ho lot of Vietnamese started to get medicare in and June 1965 prevented the collapse of Chi Minh?"Ho who is determined to be en- I be performance of their tasks simply to get South Vietnam and remains today the ma- iightment"?was sent into Vietnam by the 1.0 the next year. The killings started in 1957. jor element blocking a North Vietnamese O.S.S. to organize an escape net for allied The Communists never publicly mentioned military victory on the battlefield. Moreover, pilots in Japanese occupied North Vietnam, Communism nor did they create a public in 1969 President Nixon's Vietnamization pol- ite was also sponsored by a Chinese nation- Communist organization. They simply rode icy for the first time turned priority atten- allets warlord who wanted to wrap IED North the tiger of local grievance, joining and sup- tion to the training and equipping of the Vietnam for himself as a V-J day present. porting whatever the local organizations and South Vietnamese in a role of leadership As Ho Chi Minh, new in name and appear- memories would respond to and at the same which places the burden for the defense of mice (tuberculosis had aged and emaciated time the network of clandestine Communist the South on the shoulders on the South- him, prison had grayed his hair) encoun- agents and membership spread carefully in erners. The on-going U.S. troop reduction is tered Vietnamese nationalists, he avoided any a technique the Communists professionally timetabled to enable the South-to prepare to identification with Nguyen Al Quoc's record, called "bead-stringing." There was much meet this challenge. Such a shift can only downgraded the Communist Party Nguyen local grievance to exploit. The scene Was represent anathema to the North. For Al Quoc had created and asked people to set for the next three years of Communist Southerners have never in 2,500 years of loin in a Front against the Japanese. Under assassinaticn, terror and organizing. them Vietnamese history been ruled by Northern- this name and with this' organizational grew increasingly repressive in response to ers and a trained and equipped Southerner mask, Ho Chi Minh became the war hero and the deteriorating security situation, in his own back yard is the strongest psy- liberation hero of most Vietnamese. (Not , chological barrier to a North Vietnamese inril 1960 in public print in Hanoi did Ho cREATION OP THE NLP?A N OTHER "FRONT' regular army intruder into the South. That Chi Minh admit that he was Nguyen Ai In December 1960 the National Liberation is why the North has attempted to preserve Quoc.) Front was formed since Diem was nearly the fiction for so long that it really has no BEHIND THE MASK?THE COMMUNIST oeerthrown by a coup the previous month troops in the South and at the same time has PARTY 0"14 the Communists were still publicly op- insisted that the U.S. must withdraw uni- e -as ing entirely through the diversity and laterally and precipitately get out so that Consistently throughout the years from variety of local grievances. They had to have there will be a guaranteed Southern collapse 1941 through 1945, the Communist move- a national organization that the people could of the non-Communist nationalists. That is ,nent hid under the mask of a Front. In 1945 join if Diem was toppled. The National Lib- the only way North Vietnam (with the mask with the Jaoanese surrender the Commu- eration Front was a spin-off of Ho Chi Minh's of the NLF shredded and torn by the Tet nist movement emerged, entered a coalition long experience in masking his unpopular offensive of 1968 which resulted in the ex- government in 1946 which was nationalists, Communist Party's identity behind broad ecution by the Southern Communists of communist and neutralist in representa- popular facades. But the- people's Revolu- 5,700 people in the city of Hue in 26 days of Lion. In six months, the Communists had tionary Party (PRP) was also included in- occupation) can hope for a military saccess murdered, arrested or terrorized the nation- side the Front. This was in fact the Southern in South Vietnam. They had never thought alists into flight, and the iron control of the branch of the Lao Deng Party and ite con- the U.S. would in fact come to the aid of any had been established. However, when troiling role in the Front, which was largely South Vietnam with troops when for seven the war with the French began a month later, a propaganda facade and apparatus, became years South Vietnam was being cut to pieces Ho once again found it necessary to abolish painfully evident in 1962 when the PRP an- and the U.S. had tent only a few advisors. publicly the Communist Party and create a flounced publicly that it was a "Marxist- Now the North is equally worried about how broad popular front which nationalist non- Leninist Party, the vanguard of a Commu- to get the Americans out fast. President Communists could be expected to join. flls R,evolution." This was sad tidings for the Nixon has indicated that one of the ways ,',1i,4111110#111.11101111WEOWEIN Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 EIMMIIIIIMERMIN4111111111011111111110RIMMEmillminwillem4mm,,,,,E"Mowoorotit 40,,Eio4NommilmoololEMEMMEEmenteximmitu alloolnmariptuswii May 13, 1 that the war can be most speedily resolved is by meaningful negotiations at Paris or elsewhere. If the Hanoi leadership refuses to negotiate then the Vietnamization program will be a constant reminder that as they dally, the South Vietnamese who have a deep residual abiding rivalry with the North are being given more time and tools to get ready. NEW POLITICAL GROWTH AT THE RICE ROOTS IN THE SOUTH-1967-1970 It is in this context that the series of elections from the village to the Presidency in South Vietnam should be viewed. Village self-government is back. The present Saigon leadership reincarnated this venerable Viet- namese tradition in 1967. It also fostered a budget and leadership role for the _village councils that more appropriately equate with the 20th century needs for services and de- velopment. Village elections were held in 1,000 villages in 1967. Another 1,600 villages were able to conduct elections as a result of the inability of the Communist forces to keep government contact away from the vil- lages following the 1968 Tet offensive which cost the Communist more than 230,000 dead and opened up, as a result, communications and access to nearly 1,000 more villages in the following six months. Thus 2,000 of the total 2,300 villages in South Vietnam today have ignored Viet Cong threats, have voted for their own local leadership and are busy 'trying to rebuild their own local society de- spite the decade of war. The national elec- tions, which also have ignored the VC have resulted in a House and Senate, a Presidency and Vice Presidency being created and candi- dates elected. In the summer of 1970, 1,000 villages held re-elections for their councils. With five candidates trying for each seat available the 44 province councils (they ad- vise the 44 province chiefs or governors) were elected, and in August 1970 30 seats of the 60 seat South Vietnamese Senate were the subject of re-election. Sixteen, ten-man slates vied for the three ten-man slate posi- tions contested, and the winning slate was the Buddhist, with Opposition Independents second and a pro-Thieu slate third. Even the losers said this was the most honest election in their experience. provegRoggirmAlowymo_:_ciAIRDE73iBD0296R0003000500014351 THE NORTH /WIER tie The establishment of an Indoc dna Peace In the North, Ho Chi Minh died in 1969. Conference; His heirs debate the correctness or the blun- Negotiation of an agreed timets 31. for the der of the policies of 1964, the sending of complete withdrawal of all U.S. I it ies from Northern troops and the resulting cost of Vietnam on the basis of North its tnamese the war at home. Hanoi has lost its major reciprocity and international ver 11( ation; industrial development throughout the coun- A fair political settlement ref -iciing the try. More than 700,000 Northern regular ar- will of the South Vietnamese per pi., and of my soldiers have been killed in the South. all the political forces in South 'X ie nam; Since 1968, the Northern wounded are corn- The immediate and unconditir iv I release lug home bearing witness by their condition of all prisoners of war by all side. of blindness, loss of limbs or crippled con- The United States has also s ipported dition to the fury of the battle. Since 1969, South Vietnam's proposals of Ji iy 11, 1969 calling for free elections in whici i 11 people and parties of South Vietnam, in ieeding the National Liberation Front (NLF - ean par- ticipate and for a mixed electoral :o nrnission on which all parties including t ie NLF can be represented to work out the I todalities and verification procedures for siich elec- tions. death benefit payments have been instituted to the families of Northern soldiers killed in the South further surfacing the public knowledge about the terrible human cost of Northern invasion of Soutn Vietnam. During the time of the bprabing of North Vietnam by the U.S., the war was described as being a resistance against American air raids aimed at softening up the North for invasion. The fact that Northern draftees had been sent to South Vietnam was not publicized. Northern sons were defending the coast against such an invasion. Today with the bombing ended. Northern families ask why their sons have not returned since the post-bombing condition of North Viet- nam is described by Northern writers and dramatists as ''a time of peace." In some plays and short stories in North Vietnam, there is often a subtle protest role surfaced. The "mother" saying: "Why should I send my son South, so many have gone, so few have returned." In the same pattern, there are hippies in Hanoi, sons of the elite, or drop-outs from the revolution whose dress and life style infuriate the party. In 1971, a rock and roll band was sentenced to 15 years for playing "golden music" in psyche- delic cellars in Hanoi luring the youth from the path of revolutionary endeavor. Above all, there is the debate within the Party about the priorities of the war in the South and the need to build and reconstruct in the North. There are constant warnings in the Hanoi Party press to tight the increased corruption and decay that is appearing in the society. The events of 1970-71 concerning Cambodia and Laos offer little comfort to the Lao Dong Party and the 21 million people of North Vietnam under its rule. The war and its costs are very real. Yet for Hanoi there is still no victory in sight. THE BIG QUESTION FOR HANOI In 1971, the whole country of South Viet- nam votes again for the Presidency, the Vice Presidency, the Lower House of the National Assembly and the village councils in 1,000 villages. The big question for the Southern Communists is what role they will play in these elections. The U.S. and South Vietnam have offered them a chance to negotiate, to cease firing and come in and compete politi- cally, joining in determining the arrange- ments for the rules and the supervision of the balloting. Hanoi and the VC have re- jected these proposals and instead repeat the tired refrain that the U.S. should simply unilaterally get out and that prior to any elections a coalition government of "progres- sive" forces must be imposed upon the people of South \Vietnam as we go. Yet non-Com- munist nationalist South Vietnam remem- bers the brief coalition experiences with North Vietnam's Communists in 1946 when the nationalists were terrorized and deci- mated within six months. And South Vietnam remembers the preview of Communist rule in the city of Hue where In 1968 5,700 people were executed by local Communist forces during 26 days of occupation. The U.S. is willing to talk about any settlement that preserves for the South the right to choose its own path free from outside attack, there will be no surrender. North Vietnam didn't make it through a military invasion of the South and she will not be allowed to pick up the victory politically by a U.S. cut and run. The South Vietnamese will have their increased capabilities, their test and their choice. THREE-DIMENSIONAL FOCUS?NEGOTIATION AND VIETNAMIZATION These are some of the factors which make it necessary for those who seek to under- stand this problem to place the Vietnamese in three-dimensional focus. This is unlike any war or situation we have ever encoun- tered and that is why President Nixon has decided to follow a policy that on the one hand offers peace through negotiation and on the other continues to turn responsibili- ties over to the South through Vietnamiza- tion. ALLIED PEACE STEPS In addition, the United States h is under- taken major steps toward pea e. Each of these steps was urged by the ciiimmunist side and its American support as con- structive contributions designed cs it, only to reduce U.S. involvement but a cc to open the door to negotiations. These si ip, include: The 1968 halt to the hombi g of North Vietnam. Agreement on the participatioi r the NLF in the Paris talks; U.S. agreement to the princi lc of troop withdrawals; U.S. troop withdrawals total it g 265,000 by May 1,- 1971, to reach a tot 1 if 365,500 U.S. troops withdrawn by Demi ;la ir 1, 1971. The authorized ceiling for U.S. ii itary per- sonnel in Vietnam will have d 'tipped from 549,500 in January 1969 win 1 President Nixon took office, to 184,000 1 y December 1971. Further reductions are ex' ted under the Nixon Administration's Vi 0 amization program; A series of de-escalatory steps u istantially cutting back B-52 activity and U S. tactical air activity in Southeast Asia; Appointment of a new senior it ,istiator in Paris. SETTING A DATE IN VIETNAM?THE IMPACT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS Setting a date for a unilateral, final and total withdrawal of all American forces from South Vietnam will undercut the Allied effort to negotiate a just peace and will end any incentive whatsoever for Hanoi's leaders to negotiate seriously. It will deliver the victory the Communists have no hope of achieving on the battlefield and which they have never dared to seek via a test of verifiably free po- litical competition. ALLIED PEACE PROPOSALS President Nixon, supported by South Viet- nam's President Tbieu, on October 7, 1970 proposed a five point program for a just peace calling for: An internationally supervised cease-fire in place throughout Indochina; COMMUNIST INTRANSIGI 511 Hanoi and the NLF have r 1eted these and all other proposals and ste a for peace: They refuse even to considi r the Allied proposals as agenda items at the -'aris talks. They have continued to rejei t ill notions of reciprocity, verifiably open e ections or international verification. Despite their promises, th y refuse to negotiate with the Governmen r Vietnam. They demand that the United S ;bates com- mit itself unilaterally and um :a ditionally: To total unilateral withdraws ; f all troops and war materiel, and the d iniantling of all 'U.S. bases. To the overthrow of the b ad ers of the Government of Vietnam (Pi ,s dent, Vice President and Prime Minister . to the arbitrary imposition if a so-called "coalition" government establ led prior to any elections and in the Wiser sic of any in- ternational verification. It wo ilc, consist of the NLF's "Provisional Revell ti inary Gov- ernment" and various persona ie defined in the NIS's views as "really stan ii g for peace, independence, and neutrality.' In exchange for such a tc :a unilateral commitment by the U.S.. Hamsod the NLF have pledged absolutely nothi ig They have - at best indicated that if all is s was done they might "discuss"?i.e. nc -elease?the prisoners of war. While Hanoi continues to den- that there is a single North Vietnamese ?Sher outside of North Vietnam, 100,000 Nor ih Vietnamese soldiers are in South Vietnam lil,000 are in Laos and 50,000 are in Cambo is continuing to wage wars of aggression Against North Vietnam's neighbors. Approved For, Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 E 434sproved ForIftiggrittgigifylipigtuadis-RqPt731300296f000p0050001-3 In assessing the unwillingness of th Vietnamese Communists to accept the men Vietnamese of reciprocity, cease-fire, open politica competition, international verification, etc one must look at their record. First, the Politburo of Hanoi's Lao Don (Communist) Party has massively violated all the international agreements it has signed concerning South Vietnam, Laos and Cam- bodia while it denies that it has a single soldier outside of its borders. Second, Hanoi's self-proclaimed Marxist- Leninist ''peoples' dictatorship" has never dared risk the revealing political litmus test of tolerating the slightest diversity, political competition or international inspections in areas under its control. In contrast with South Vietnam's diverse political parties, highly competitive electoral system and live- ly parliament and press, Hanoi runs a Stal- inist state on the basis of a single slate of candidates, a dormant parliament and total police control. The Hanoi regime is built on the liquidation of all earlier non-Communist "coalition" and "Front" partners and on total monopoly in all political, economic, cultural and military affairs. Third, the southern branch of Hanoi's Lao Dong Party, the Peoples' Revolutionary Par- ty of the National Liberation Front, is a self- proclaimed Marxist-Leninist party. It is com- mitted, as it demonstrated via systematic political assassinations in the city of Hue during the 1968 Tet offensive, to imposing a rigid Communist "peoples' dictatorship" upon the South Vietnamese. Fourth, far from involving simply a small Independent group of nationalists fighting a -civil war" in South Vietnam, tens of thou- eands of Communist Hanoi's regular army troops have for years carried on assassina- tion and warfare against North Vietnam's neighborsVietnam's interna- tionally recognized borders. Fifth, along with their masters in Hanoi, these North Vietnamese forces are dependent on the doctrines, the diplomatic support and for 100% of their arms on the two Commu- nist super-powers, the Soviet Union and Com- munist China. Those who urged Allied submission to the demands of the Vietnamese Communists would do well to consider whether the hy- pocricies involved in those demands should not be rejected in favor of a rational, recip- rocal approach. If the Hanoi leadership can obtain a uni- lateral U.S. withdrawal date without under- taking its own withdrawals and accepting the principles of international verification, open elections, prisoner releases, etc., it will have no incentive whatsoever to negotiate seri- ously and will be encouraged to continue its war policies. To undercut the chance for a just settle- ment and to accept the enemy's unilateral demands, would be to betray President Nixon's solemn pledge of May 14, 1969 that the United States, understanding the stakes and sacrifices involved, has "ruled out either a one-sided withdrawal from Vietnam, or the acceptance in Paris of terms that would amount to a disguised defeat." ? x ensions of 'emar s May 13, 1971 e U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR SHARPLY REDUCED I Redeployments: During 1970, about 135, ? 000 US troops redeployed. US troop strengtl at the close of the year was 335,000, compare) g to the 543,000 peak strength in April 1969. A( of March 20 there were about 313,000 troop Iii country, a 22,000 man reduction since tin beginning of the year. By May 1971, III strength in Vietnam will be below 234,001 men?the lowest level since July 1966 ant about half of the peak strength two year: PROGRESS IN VIETNAM rhe war in South Vietnam has wound down to a point well below the levels of pre- vious years as a result of progress in Viet- namization and reduced enemy strength and capability. As a result, the US involvement in the conflict has dropped sharply. The mo- mentum of the pacification program was preserved during 1970, the economy of SVN t is beginning to show signs that stability will return, and the political climate is viable. No discernible progress has been made in Paris, despite President Nixon's five-point peace proposal, which provides a fair and a equitable basis for a negotiated peace. g ? US Combat and Non-Combat Deaths: US combat deaths in 1970 were the lowest of any years since 1965. They were 55% below 1969 levels; 71% lower than in 1968. rn the last half of 1970 they were 54% below the first half rate and were lower than any six month period in the past five years. Combat deaths in December were tower than in any month since October 1965. Since the first of this year combat deaths have averaged about 44 per week (even lower than the 51 per week during July-December 1970). Non combat deaths have declined at about the same rate as US troops have redeployed--despite press allegations to the contrary. Sortie Rates: In 1970, US planes flew 36% fewer attack sorties in SEA than in 1969. They flew 45% fewer sorties than. in 1968. The con- sumption of air munitions showed similar declines (1970 was 25% below 1969, 27',l t be- low 1968). In South Vietnamalone, 52% fewer attack sorties were flown than in 1969 and 53% less than in 1968. So far this year, we have flown one-fourth the number of attack sorties in SVN that we flew last year. And, despite a great deal of air support to ARVN in Laos recently, the 2S5Dtwide attack sortie rates are down about Costs: The cost of the war to the US de- clined about $5 billion during FY 70, and will drop about $4 billion further in FY 71. We expect war costs to decline an additional $3 billion or during FY 72. To date, esti- mated savings as a result of Vietnarniza elan. since 1968 are $10 billion. IETNAMIZATION/PACIFICATION GOING WELL in the southern half of the country, partly due to the outstanding success of the Cam- bodian operations. i; A survey of the rural population reveals that economic problems (concern over rising 5. prices) have superseded physical security as 3 their greatest concern--a further confirma- tion of pacification progress. 3 ENEMY STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES LIMITED The enemy has moved away from a mili- tary type conflict, turning to guerrilla war- fare in most areas. Battalion sized enemy at- tacks declined more than 60% during 1970; only one was reported in South Vietnam dur- ing the last half of 1970, none thus far in 1971. The enemy has been primarily using terror and harassment?targeting Territorial Forces (RF/PF), paramilitary forces and civilians, while avoiding Regular Forces?a possible sign of weakness. There were about 103,000 enemy killed in action in 1970 compared to 157,000 in 1969, and 18.1,000 in 1968. The 34% decline in 1970 is further evidence of the winding down of the war. Enemy infrastructure (VCI), the political and subversive machinery, remains a serious problem, but is estimated to have declined about 20% in strength during 1970. The Gov- ernment of Vietnam is increasing the pressure on this subversive threat, mainly by improv- ing the National Felice forces. THE ECONOMV OF SVN IMPROVED Economic Reforms: Rampant inflation and the economic instability generated by the war have led to recent reforms in exchange rates, advan ce deposit requirements for financing certain imports, and increased interest rates. These economic reforms were taken to dampen inflation, increase GVN revenues, and to strike at the black market for US dollars goods.and The reforms have temporarily stabili Zed the Saigon retail price index, and dramatically cut black market conversion of dollars into piastres. Serious economic problems remain, bas- ically the result of a growing GVN budget deficit and the long range need to promote sound economic development. U.S. Embassy, MACV and USAID advisors continue to work with GVN officials in efforts to extend the recent reforms, establish a sound tax struc- ture, foster economic development and ex- ports, and attract private investment capital. The Rural Economy: Despite the problems noted above, a quiet economic revolution has taken place in rural Vietnam. While urban income has declined from inflation, the peas- ant has been getting higher and higher prices for his rice and his real income has risen significantly. The shift stems from four factors: (11 in- creased security in the countryside, (2) road networks re-opened or built, enabling the peasant to get his rice to market, (3) the translates' revolution whereby his radio tells him the latest prices of rice in the cities and thus improves his ability to bargain with the rice buyers, and (4) the new "miracle" rice. 1450 miles (2400 km) of roads have been built and opened. An additional 360 miles (600 km) are currently under construction, to be built by mid 1972, The GVN will main- tain about 2000 miles (3200 km) of all weather roads in 1971. "Miracle" rice (a fast growing, disease resistant variety) was cultivated on more than 700,000 acres in 1970. Current programs call for expanding production to 1,858,000 acres in 1971-72, This year Vietnam will pro- duce enough rice to feed itself. The recently enacted land-to-the-tiller pro- mam will ultimately Nest ownership of about 1,250,000 acres of rice land in more than 300,000 rural families. Through 30 Novem- ser 197(1, 20,552 titles for 68,666 acres were ssued be 17,049 farmers. Nearly one million term of land are Scheduled for distribution n 1971. The program Is expected to be corn- Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVIVAF): Strength increased 7% in 1970, and 15% since U.S. redeployments began in July 1969. Most of the increase occurred in the forces necessary for pacification--Re- gional "and Popular Forces (RF/PF). The tempo of RVNAF' operations has increased as they assume the major burden of the war: RVNAF' now accounts for more than 60 `,'; of the reported enemy killed in action. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF): The num- ber of aircraft has increased nearly 70% since Vietnatnization began. Total VNAF sorties flown during 1970 increased 64% com- pared to 1969, and are holding at those levels so far this year. Vietnamese Navy: The majority of U.S. naval assets in RVN has been turned over to the Vietnamese. The U.S. naval effort within South Vietnam is now limited to an advisory and support role. (There are, of course, U.S. Navy ships operating in waters off the coast of Vietnam.) Pacification. During the 1 year period of U.S. redeployments, pacificatzon progress ( as measured by the Hamlet Evaluation System-n-.. 1979) continued. The HES/70 A-B-C (rela- tively secure) score rose 14 percentage points (to 95% ) ; the A-B (secure) score gained over , 20 points. Captured enemy documents con- ; tinually confirm the success of the GvN , pacification program by exhorting their cadre o attack it. Experienced observers returning to Viet- : nam after long periods out of the country unanimously agree that security conditions 1 n the countryside are better than ever before, i nd that the allied main force military I ampaign has achieved most of its objectives i Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 e.s,a0eNesseemeeveaseameasweelesassalimiasimaemenseammeeseemeememaimatie .iosetwooma ettemovessoraion wpm mmnimmoo .sosemPumumwmfonikomusumm. May 13, AA:sproved Release_2000./ftgina Rnp CONGRESSloNAL-Icrxx?pni -.1-,37serrssou apusoo00300050001-134353 plete by the end of 1973 at a cost to the GVN of $400 million (the US, subject to Congres- sional approval, is to provide $40 million for the program) . THE POLITICAL SCENE NOW LIVELY Elections of senators, provincial councils, and local officials took place in 1970. All of the elections were judged reasonably fair, even by the most critical observers. More- over, there were indications of increased in- volvement and sophistication on the part of the average citizen. For example, more than 60% of the rural population now feel that the way to remove ineffective or un- popular officials is to vote them out in the next election. In 1971, the Vietnamese are scheduled to elect the entire (187 seat) lower House and the President and Vice-President. Election- eering has already begun. Thus far, the three candidates mentioned most frequently for the presidency are President Thieu, General Minh and Vice President Ky. The An Quang Buddhists emerged as a powerful interest group in the Senate elections and are ex- pected to be a strong factor again this year. Enemy attempts to disrupt the elections in 1970 were inconsequential. It is possible that they intend to play a larger role in 1971. PROSPECTS U.S. redeploym6nts coupled with Vietnami- zation, will continue during 1971. The en- my is expected to continue his wait-and-see strategy, largely avoiding military action in RVN. Despite President Nixon's five point peace proposal; a ceasefire in place, an Indochina peace conference, negotiation of a timetable for complete U.S. withdrawal as part of an overall settlement, search for a political set- tlement fair to all parties, the immediate and unconditional release of all POW's held by both sides', the Paris peace talks continue to be stalemated. The proposal provides the basis for meaningful negotiation, if only the other side were willing to engage in serious talks. It recognizes the desire of the Viet- namese people and the rest of the free world for an end to hostilities, recognizes that a permanent solution must encompass the whole of Indochina, and recognizes the existence and continued involvement of the other side in the political future of South Vietnam. It does not call for a surrender or even tacit admission by the other side of their deteriorating military and political sit- uation. It assures that the interests of all parties to the conflict can be acknowledged and served. VIETNAM BIBLIOGRAPHY General surveys Bain, Chester, Vietnam: The Roots of Con- flict, 1967. $1.95. (Prentice-Hall Inc., Engle- wood Cliffs, N.J. 07632) Trager, Frank. Why Vietnam?, 1966. $4.95. (Frederick A. Praeger, I 1.1 Fourth Ave., New 1969. (Center for Research in Social Systems, Trail in Lacis demonstrated the growing 5010 Wisconsin Ave., Washington, D.C. 20016) strength of the South Vietr ar lese forces Hosmer, Stephen. Viet cong Repression in facing the best of the enen e remaining and Its Implications /or the Future, 1970. forces on the enemy's terrain 1 erge stocks $8.50. (D.C. Heath & Co., 125 Spring Street, of war materiel were capture c - destroyed, Lexington, Mass. 02173) several tens of thousands of e ,sealties were Pike, Douglas. Viet Gong: The Organization inflicted on North Vietnam forces and and Technique of the National Liberation Hanoi's offensive timetables ' 'e Le set back Front of South Vietnam, 1966. $2.95. (MIT by a year. At the same time set 'is ly was pro- Press, Massachusetts institute of Technology, vided to South Vietnam's pop died regions Cambridge, Mass. 02142) and American troop reductime plans were The Vietnamese people safeguarded. And even in the midst of ev, e. 'south Viet- Hickory, Gerald. Village in Vietnam, 1964. nam has continued its path of e( nstitutional $3.45. (Yale University Press, 149 York St., development. The National le ,embly, the New Haven, Conn. 06511) Supreme Court, and the locall e.ected coun- $4.95. (Alfred A. Knopf, 201 East 50th St., playing increasingly importe it roles. Last ells at hamlet, village and pn el Lee level are Sheehan, Susan. Ten Vietnamese, 1967. New York, N.Y. 10022) August's Senate elections we re marked by The early years the participation and victor .d the Bud- Shaplen, Robert. The Lost Revolution, dhist opposition slate who till Lel the elec- 1966. $2A5. (Harper st Row, Scranton, Pa. tions fair, and political pal inpation and 18512) progress are expected to con rite as South Scigliano, Robert. South Vietnam: Nation Vietnam approaches new na o eel elections Under Stress, 1964. $2.9b. (Houghton Mifflin this fall. Co., 53 West 43 St., New York, N.Y. 10036) The U.S. has maintained I I exible nego- Fall, Bernard. Viet-Nam Witness: 1953-66, tiation posture in Paris in thi- e- ent that the 1966. $6.95. (Frederick A. Praeger, 111 Fourth other side will recognize the d ,sirability of Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003) concluding the war througl F erious nego- Higgins, Marguerite. Our Vietnam Night- tiations rather than prolong 'd combat. mare, 1965. $6.95. (Harper & Row, Scranton, President Nixon on Octob Lr 7, 1970, an- Pa. 18512) nounced a five-point propc La for a just Tanham, George. War Without Guns, 1966. Peace in Indochina calling I ,r (1) an in- $4.95. (Frederick A. Praeger, 111 Fourth Ave., ternationally supervised cea e- ere in place New York, N.Y. 10003) throughout all of Indochin ts part of a general move to end the wa Si Indochina: The Southeast Asia context (2) establishment of an I ,dechina Peace Warner, Denis. Reporting Southeast Asia, Conference; (3) negotiatior - .1 an agreed 1966. $10.50. (Tri-Ocean Inc., 62 Townsend timeable for complete recipn .1:e withdrawals St., San Francisco, Cal. 94107) from Vietnam; (4) a fair ,elitical settle- Shaplen, Robert. Time Out of Hand, 1970. ment reflecting the will of - te South Viet- $2.95. (Harper & Row, Scranton, Pa. 18512) namese people and the potieal forces in Nuechterlein, Donald. Thailand and the South Vietnam; and (5) the immediate and Struggle for Southeast Asia, 1965. $6.50. (Cor- unconditional release of all re ;tillers of war nell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. 14850) by all sides. Leifer, Michael. Cambodia: The Search for The President has also e 'poorted South Security, 1967. $6.00. (Frederick A. Praeger, Vietnam's proposals of Jul L 11, 1969 and 111 Fourth Ave., New York. N.Y. 10003) October 8, 1970 calling for re' elections in which all the people and i :Le-Ldes of South V1E1NA NI Vietnam, including the Nat real Liberation President Nixon has taken a number of Front, can participate, all -1 for a mixed significant steps toward ending the war and Electoral Commission in w 11,11 all parties winning the peace in Vietnam. The United can be represented. States is fighting to deter North Vietnam's In his February 25, 197, sport to the aggression, but at the same time is attempt- Congress, President Nixon eceunted major Ing to achieve a just and honorable peace. steps toward peace taken b ' ? he Allies. Vietnam has shown steady progress in the "Since 1968 the U.S. h .s done almost two years since President Nixon took office everything that various p, el ies-including in January 1969 and since the Vietnamiza- Hanoi-told us would kin' negotiations. tion program got underway. We halted the bombing al a other acts of The phased reductions under the Admin- force against North Vietna. i. We agreed to istration's Vietnamization program reduced NLF participation in the Re els talks. We the authorized American troop ceiling of agreed to the principle of w thdrawal and 549,500 and in-country strength of 542,000 made initial withdrawals of is lerican troops. men in January 1989 to 335,000 by January We made substantial with in wals, soon to 1971 and to 284,000 by May 1971. On April 7, total 265,000. We agreed ir peinciple to re- 1971 the President announced a further re- move all our troops. We tor e a. series of de- duction to 184,000 by December 1971. escalatory steps, such as ( it ling back our American combat deaths had been reduced B-52 and tactical air sort es And we up- York, N.Y. 10003) from the levels of 14,561 or 278 weekly in pointed a new senior neg( .l,, tor in Parise' Fall, Bernard. The Two Vietnams, second 1968 to 4,183 and 80 weekly in 1970 and were "These steps, except for t le bombing halt, edition, 1967. $7.95. (Frederick A. Praeger' 111 averaging 40 or fewer a week in early 1971. were unilateral measures, e 's ened not only Fourth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003) In 1968 the war was costing an additional to reduce our involvement. but, also to open Fishel, Wesley, ed. Vietnam: Anatomy of a $22 billion. In early 1971 the additional costs the door to negotiations. F Lc 1 of them was Conflict, 1968. $5.95. (F. E. Peacock Publish- are running at half that and are steadily de- urged by the other side i . t constructive em, 401 West Irving Park Road, Itasca, Ill. creasing. contribution. None of the ,i. has generated 60143) Since security in the countryside has sub- movement by the other siC .? Thompson, Sir Robert. No Exit From Viet- stantially improved, local and national goy- It takes two to negotiate b er, thus far the nam. 1969. $4.50. (David McKay Co., 750 ernments are perterming with increased a- Communist side has. reje( e I each of the Third Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017) fectiveness and a number of agricultural and Allied proposals and conti elire to press its Duncanson, Dennis. Government andRev- economic programs are underway. attacks. As a condition lo ( yen discussing oiution in Vietnam, 1968. $9.50. (Oxford Uni- With carefully tailored U.S. assistance un- these proposals, they ins- s' ' hat we accept versity Press, 1600 Pollitt Drive, Fair Lawn, der the Vietnamization program, South their demands for total a ,6 unconditional N.J. 07410) ' Vietnam's regular and local forces have U.S. withdrawal and end tl e Vietnamization. The Contmunist sphere greatly increased their capabilities and have assistance program for the p 'tor removal of Hoang Van Chi. From Colonialism to Com- taken over the major share in effectively de- the elected leaders of the (lovernment of munism: A Case History of North Vietnam, fending their country against North Viet- South Vietnam and for tee imposition of an 1964. $6.50. (Frederick A. Praeger, 111 Fourth nam's attack. NLF run "coalition" !-,overs a, at prior to any Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003) The limited cross border operations against elections. Spinks, Charles et al. The North Viet- North Vietnamese bases along the Cam- Finally, any evaluation el' the American namese Regime: Institutions and Problems, bodian border and against the Ho Chi Minh role in assisting the Sou e. Vietnamese in Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050001-3 E 435#Pproved For89.tteisAM0A99/1918 ? g.1-RpP73J300296R000300050001-3 1CD ? xtenszons Of Remarks May 13, 1971 their struggle against North Vietnam's ag- gression must consider the fact that the South Vietnamese people have much to fear from the pattern of massive repression sys- tematically practiced by North Vietnam's Communist Party. In North Vietnam this Stalinist Party operates a "peoples' dictator- ship" which permits no forms of opposition or diversity. Its liquidation policies against its short lived "coalition" partners of 1945- 1946 and of those who differed with Commu- nist policy after 1954 in the North are mat- ters of public record. It is this record and the record of the party's southern branch, the Marxist-Leninist Peoples' Revolutionary Party of the so-called National Liberation Front (who in the city of Hue, for example, Systematically assassinated thousands of their opponents) that perhaps explains South Vietnamese desire for help in resist- ing Hanoi's armies and its front. In his February 25, 1971 report to the Con- gress, President Nixon restated the goals of American policy in Indochina. "I will continue to do what is necessary to protect American men as they leave Viet- nam. Throughout I will keep the American people and the Congress fully informed. "A negotiated settlement for all Indochina remains our highest priority. But if the other side leaves us no choice, we will follow the alternate route to peace?phasing out our involvement while giving the region's friend- ly countries the time and the means to de- fend themselves." VULTURES TOO FULL TO FLY HON. CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER OF NEW JERSEY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, May 12, 1971 Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to comment briefly on the situa- tion in East Pakistan, or Bangla Desh as the Bengalis and their supporters prefer it to be called. On May 11, my Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on Asian and Pa- cific Affairs held a hearing on this mat- ter. We were scheduled to meet May 13 to hear the witnesses from the Depart- ment of State and the Agency for Inter- national Development in executive ses- sion and professor Robert Dorfman of Harvard University in open session. Un- fortunately, that day of nearing Must now be postponed and it will be re- scheduled as soon as possible. Whatever the politics involved in this region, I firmly believe that one of the great human tragedies of modern times may be in the process of being created. As additional background material for the continuing debate over the American role and the role of the world community in mounting a humanitarian assistance program. I would like to call my col- leagues' attention to the testimony of Senator EDWARD M. KENNEDY before my subcommittee yesterday, a position paper of the Ripon Society dated April 3, and a news dispatch from the Washington Star of May 12. The phrase in the news dispatch about "vultures too full to fly" may be re- garded as vulgar by many people un- familiar with the history and the poten- tial for tragedy in this region. However, it does graphically reflect the position of many who are intimately familiar with past events and with informed future predictions. Mr. Speaker, I ask that the materia referred to be inserted into the RECORD at this point, as well as my opening state- ment at the hearing yesterday. OPEN/NG STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN C OR - NEL/US E. GALLAGHER The Subcommittee will come to order. We are beginning hearings today looking into the situation in East Pakistan with particular emphasis on the related problems of refugees and famine. I think it would be useful to briefly sum- ize events leading to what may be one of the worst human tragedy in modern times. In November 1970 a cyclone and flood killed thousands in East Pakistan and crip- pled the main port of Chittagong. The recent fighting has prevented most crops from being planted. Because East Pakistan is a food deficit region in the best of times, as many as 30 million people may starve, according to reports said to have been submitted to the Agency for International Development and the World Bank. Right now, refugees are streaming from East Pakistan into India at the rate of 60,000 each day, swelling the already strained Indian food supply by an estimated 1.5 million new mouths to feed. The refugees and the potential famine are the result of civil war which broke out on March 25, 1971. While politics of Pakistan and the Subcontinent are not the focus of this hearing, it is important to remember that in the election for a National Consti- tutional Assembly in December 1970, the Awarni League captured 167 of the 169 seats contested in the East. Ths gave them an absolute majority of the 313 seats contested in all of Pakistan. While the government of Yahya Kahn now is in apparent control of the cities, those Who embrace autonomy for Bangles Desh claim the countryside. Factually, the coun- tryside of East Pakistan is the equal of the countryside of South Vietnam in providing natural surrounding for insurgency and the fighting thus far has produced reports of savage atrocities on both sides. 1 hearings will underscore the urgent need to further encourage the initiatives underway to meet the needs of the Bengali people. Official reports from our government and elsewhere express very serious concern about the condition of the people in East Pakistan. These reports say that within a month the condition of the people will become "acute". The precarious situation which exists today Will evolve into a nightmare of death for millions?unless immediate and concerted efforts are made to meet the needs of the people involved. Although reports from East Pakistan sug- gest that violence has subsided considerably, reports also indicate that feelings are tense between the people and the army of the central government. In fact official reports to our government suggest that the great bulk of the population is alienated, perhaps for- ever. Regretably, this ca.n only complicate, and perhaps delay, the organizing of a mean- ingful relief program, and the solving of those political problems which generated the recent violence. Moreover, reports also indicate that the army effectively controls only the cities and towns, and that throughout most of the countryside, government administration and services do not exist. The transportation and distribution of available foodstocks and medical supplies are at a standstill?even in the area struck by the cyclone last fall, where conservative estimates say a million persons have been solely dependent for their survival on effective relief operations. Food reserves? not confiscated by the army?are very low. The tragedy, finally, has now spilled over into India, which so far has found it neces- sary to give asylum to nearly 2,000,000 refu- gees?of whom at least 526,000 are in camps. The recent daily influx into India has re- portedly been some 50,000. The State Depart- ment informs me that the influx will con- tinue at a high level, "at least until the beginning of the monsoon in a few weeks, when both military operations and travel will become more diffibult". The continuing heavy influx of refugees into India is a stark re- minder of how bad conditions have become in East Pakistan. Over the last month I have repeatedly communicated my ccncern in these matters to officials in the Department of State and elsewhere, in an effort to encourage and sup- port reasonable initiatives by our government and the international community to help meet the urgent political and humanitarian problems in East Pakistan. I have strongly believed these initiatives should be taken through the United Nations. On the humanitanan problems, at least, some progress is being made. On the Indian side of the border, and at the invitation of the Indian government, representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are eurrently assuming relief needs and develop- ing a plan of international action. According to a coramunication I received from the De- partment of State this morning, our govern- ment has "authorized up to $2.5 million in food and other assistance as our initial con- tribution to the international relief effort." While the UNHCR effort is being organized, the U.S. is providing emergency food assist- ance for 217,000 refugees in West Bengal. The food assistance is being distributed by CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and Church World Service/.Lutheran World Federation. Far less progress in meeting relief needs is being made in East Pakistan. Initiating an adequate relief program is undoubtedly be- ing hampered for a number of good reasons? but, on the basis of talks I have had, the primary cause may very well be a simple lack of candor in recognizing the vast dimension cf human need brought on by the conflict. Let us not quibble over how we label the situation. Whether we call it a minor dis- turbance, a disaster, or an emergency?the Putting this together, we seem to have a situation which is potentially equal, in terms of human misery, to a combination of Vietnam and Biafra. Because of our military aid to the Central Government it appears that our arms, in conjunction with those supplied by other governments, are being used to defeat the people who won the elec- tion. While these and other questions are as important as they seem to be unanswerable at this point, our focus is the immediate threat to the lives of millions. To emphasize that concern, we are very pleased to wel- come this afternoon Senator Edward M. Ken- nedy of Massachusetts. His Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Judiciary Committee has produced extremely valuable information about the impact of policy on people and the dimensions of the suffering and the dis- location in countries where war has been conducted. The humanitarian aspect of the East Pakistan situation must be considered by all the parties involved and it will be a great pleasure to hear Senator Kennedy dis- cuss the information developed by his Sub- committee. STATEMENT OF SENATOR KENNEDY ON CR/SIS IN EAST PAKISTAN BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here this afternoon--because, as Chair- man of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, I share your deep concern for the victims of natural disaster and civil war in East Pakistan. I am hopeful these hearings will contribute toward a better understand- ing of the undeniable problems which exist In relieving this basically humanitarian problem. And I am also hopeful that the Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 LIZEK4 T HE wAVRTgsgoic&pilpase 2000/09/08r:)/94-RDR3k0g9911000300050001-3 F GE Key U.S. Official Sent to Highlands By Peter Osnos Washington Post Foreign Service SAIGON, April 27?John Department desk officer for Paul Vann, perhaps the most Caribbean affairs. Long, experienced senior American sources said, will be reassign- civilian in Vietnam, is being ed outside South Vietnam. sent to head the pacification As he has in the delta (and program in the troubled Cen- before that in the Saigon re- tral Highlands. gion) Vann will oversee the Informed American sources highlands branch of the or- said today that Vann, who has ganization called Civil Opera- directed the U.S. pacification tions Revolutionary Develop- effort in the Mekong Delta ment Support (CORDS), the since February, 1969, would regional and provincial teams take over the new post in the of American militarymen and second half of May. civilians who advise the Viet- Overall, the neavily popu- namese on everything from lated delta countryside is con- land reform to police training. sidered the securest in South The job is known by the Vietnam, while some of the acronym "depcords" and is least pacified areas of the filled by civilians, while the country are in the highlands, regional commander is always Observers here saw the shift a military man. Vann is the of Vann, who has been in only one of the four present South Vietnam both as a sol- depcords who had any experi- dier and civilian for most of ence in Vietnam prior to tak- the past 10 years, as recogni- ing the job. tion that the situation in the The pacification chief in the highlands requires special at- northern sector of South Viet- tention. nam was the director of AID Known administratively as in Panama and his counter: Military Region Two, the high- part in the Saigon region wait lands covers a broad band of ambassador to Gabon. 13 provinces across the central Vann, a blunt-spoken ener7 part of South Vietnam from getic Virginian, is one of the the Laotian-Cambodian border few American officials here to the South China Sea, whose reputation has been In the past month, the enhanced by his work in enemy has concentrated its of- South Vietnam over the years. fensive actions in the area, es- As a lieutenant colonel in the pecially around Fire Support early 1960s, he fell out cif Base 6 in western Kontum favor with the U.S. military Province and Phunhon district establishment because of his in the southern part of Pleiku critical assessment of the way Province, things were going. U.S. advisors in Phunhon He returned in 1965 as al- estimate that Vietcong and vilian to work for CORDS and North Vietnamese activity, lately has become known ai a which included a siege of the prime exponent of "the ew district headquarters on optimism"?the notion that March 15 and occupation of at the war has been turn d least nine villages, has set around, for a variety of miii- back pacification there at tary and economic reasons, n least a year. favor of the Saigon govern- Vann, 46, will be replacing /tient. Edward T. Long, 48, a career Vann is often mentioned as foreign service officer who a possible successor to Ambas- came to Military Region Two sador William E. Colby as last June from a job as State head of CORDS countrywide. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 UtASLA Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 411,--1-4-- -7 Soviets Seen Sending SA-3s to Hanoi LoNtxp;, April 26 tUPI)?1 l The Soviet Union is sending l 11 SA-3 surface-to-air missiles l \ l and Soviet "advisers" to Northl Vietnam to reinforce its defen- ses against possible new U.S. I air attacks, SEATO sources l said today. ?'i The sources said the advis- ers are to help install the mis- siles and train Vietmanese i crews Lu operate the sophisti- I rated rockets. Egypt is the only other tuountry known to , have been pi uvided with SA-3. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP731300296R000300050001-3 N.*p,pcs:,(y5AFoir,vRejease 2000/09/08 : CIA7RDP73B00296R00030N50001-3 parts question their effective- ness so far arid' are skeptical about the soundness of the new plan. Their main criticism is that the whole pacification effort depends too much on the 8,000 United States officials and ad- visers in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Sup- port programs, an agency known as CORDS. .I.b.e.agencv. which supervises not, 'ects_ fromloe o rura economicro ams, PACIFICATION PUSH BEGUN IN VIETNAM New Program, Most Costly Yet, Aimed at Vietcong's Political Apparatus By TAD SZULC specie to The New York Times WASHINGTON, April 6?The most ambitious and costly paci- fication program yet planned for South Vietnam has been put into effect by Saigon and Wash- ington. Reportedly costing the United States considerably more than $1-billion and Saigon an undis- closed sum, the 1971u- aity_Datense and Local Devel- opment Plan would FratiTy ex- pand pacification activities, which are aimed at destroying Communist subversive forces and widening self-government and development. The 304-page plan, a copy of which was made available to The New York Times, lists as the "top priority" for the year the "neutralization" of the en- trenched Vietcong political ap- paratus. Authenticity Confirmed The authenticity of the docu- ment was confirmed by Admin- istration sources who declined to discuss the contents because of the plan's confidential char- acter. Already in operation since March 1, and endorsed by the American command in Saigon, the new plan is reportedly the subject of wide controversy among United States officials, some of whom term it unrealis- tic and artificial. Administration officials were unalprovide....nest tiguLfs I to the United States pravi- ? gat pacification programs, but financed almos entire' in its an ,iarv. sec aspects ,bz the Defense Deprt- -runt and the C,enfriTI:Intelli- Itcy?wAs inItal_Mgre cojoltly ecause of its increased atc2Re. Acknowledging for the first time that the activities of the Vietcong apparatus remain a major problem in 8 of South Vietnam's 44 provinces, includ- ing four an the allegedly paci- fied Mekong River Delta, and that South Vietnamese forces often prefer to "accommodate, rather than resist, the enemy," the plan provides for: (Expansion of the People's Self-Defense Force?the civil- ian antiguerrilla combat or- ganization in rural areas?from 500,000 to four million. Women would be enlisted in combat units and childr& of bothi sexes over the age of 7 in sup' porting units. (Establishment of an elab- orate "people's intelligence net- work" to inform on enemy ac- tivities. (Elimination an the year 'starting last month, through killing or capture, of 14,400 Vietcong agents under expan- sion of the three - year - old Operation Phoenix, an intelli-1 fence-gathering program thati is supported by the United States military. Wider Social Benefits The new pacification plan.' which went into effect March 1,, also seeks to complete the pro- gram of holding elections in all villages and hamlets: spur land reform by setting a goal of dis- tributing nearly a million acres of land to farmers. and widen social benefits. This would be done by providing new assist- ance to ? 216,000 war veterans, and increasing aid to 43,002 disabled soldeirs, 33,743 par- ents of dead servicemen, 71,005 war widows and 284,000 war orphans. In addition, the plan hopes to resettle 430,000 war refugees in new homes. Other innovations in the 1971 pacification plan include pro- grams for ethnic minorities and for cities where crime is in- creasing. Endorsed by Abrams Elaborated upon by the South Vietnamese Government approved by President Nguyen Van Thieu and his Cabinet and fully endorsed by Gen Creighton W. Abrams, the United States conunander in Vietnam, the plan is designed to dovetail with the Nixon Ad- ministration's policy of Viet- namization, under which com- bat responsibilities are being gradually assumed by the South Vietnamese forces. While the Administration here and the Saigon Govern- ment report success for paci- fication programs that 13egan in 1969, some American - ? ?e Danartment ra ntel' t.gence Agency oug_ it inducesna-is?of t State Department - the ? ? - ?. ? - call . eisc7 ense etas.. .11 it' I ta es los.= onAency. rom the field Indi- a* the CORDS officials are _ errects on c rity Orate peo- ple. The mc t effective way of assuring sen n ay of the Viet- names:: pc'ctr: is to keep enemy fora i-way from them and by ner Lrilizing the Viet- cong infraF trneture. Without the V.C.I., -ncmy main fortes cannot al nan intelligence, manpower , na food, nor will they be at a to prepare the battlefield or move.' The plan strphasizes that the "strategic c-mcept of national security" is not dependent on the preset of American forces and 'plves the way for the transfe f the responsi- frequetttry not aware of thel true state of affairs in districts and villages and that their col- leagues in civilian government and the police fail to carry out their tasks. Critics of the pacification program point to this state- ment in the 1971 plan: "In some areas, the people are reluctant to associate with the Government of Vietnam l'or fear of retaliation by the enemy. Civil officials often be- come the target of enemy ter- rorism and assassination and thus are reluctant to perform their goVernment tasks. "Some police hesitate to con- duct operations against the V.C. because they fear retaliation, and local security forces; under the threat of terrorism, often accommodate, rather than re- sist, the enemy." The critics raise the question of what will happen if CORDS is phased out and ask whether, as an alternative, the agency may not have to be maintained in South Vietnam indefinitely. Three Major Objectives As expressed in the 1971 plan, the over-all concept of pacification consists of the three objectives of "local self- defense, local self government and local self-development." The philosophy of the pro- gram is stated as follows in the plan: ''In his efforts to achieve political control of the Repub- lic of Vietnam, the enemy at- tempts to demonstrate that the Government of ?Vietnam is not capable of governing the country or of providing credi- ble security to the - people. His offensive operations an the re- sultant reaction operations by friendly forces produce adverse PP bility for e unity from mili- tary agenci o civilian ones." To assist this proposed trans- fer and su),ervise the new po= lice fund"( ns the South Viet- namese ant I 'tilted States Gov- ernments a-,e turned to Sir Robert Th, meson, the British counterinst -gcncy expert. Sir Robe t. who carried out two confic r nal missions for President I i) on in Vietnam in 1969 and IF. 70, has been in Saigon sin e February. In an interview i i imbed in the cur- rent issue ( f U.S. News & World Rep rt, Sir Robert said that Saigoi s ability to counter subversion las steadily im- proved all nr time." The, peel nc Won plan empha- sized that n-ong the 1971 tar- gets is the eduction of "enemy terrorist i .cnients" to 6,010. The (locus Cit did not report how man) iich incidents oc- curred in 1970, but said that the curren target was to re- duce them by 75 per cent in "secure air -a ." and by 50 per cent in art' at "still undergoing pacification Statistic included in the plan showed thi t the military region that inch ds 15 provinces south of Saigon and in the Mekong D poses the most serious set arty problems. The delti has been declared by the Sa gen Government to be virtuall pacified, except for U Minh I crest area, and all Arnerican u't *las left the area in 1969. 3,ut the plan reports serious pr)b,ems with an en- trenched 1, ieTcong apparatus in the prov nt es if Vinhlong, Dinhtuong I ienhoa and Anxu- yen. Simi IT problems are re- ported in linhdinh province in the centra r art of the country and in Qui ni nam and Quangtin Provinces n the northern part, adjoining he deittattarized zone. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 . Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP7313002961RA/IN.Q.00W05.91?101,A-3 GE 1 THE. YOAK DATV 4r ` 7 Text of Mansfield's Pullout Amendment Spedaq. to The New Yu& Tapes WASHINGTON, June 22 ? Following is the text of the Mansfield amendment adopted today by the Senate calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina within nine months subject to release of all prison- ers of war. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States In Indochina, and to provide for the prompt and orderly with- drawal of all United States military forces not later than nine months after the date of enactment of this section subject to the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government. The Congress hereby urges and requests the President to Implement the above ex- pressed policy by initiating immediately the following actions: 1. Establishing a final date for the withdrawal from In- dochina of all military forces of the United States contin- gent upon the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces al- lied with such Government, such date to be not later than nine months after the date of enactment of this act. 2. Negotiate with the Gov- ernment of North Vietnam for an immediate cease-fire by all parties to the hostili- ties in Indochina. 3. Negotiate with the Gov- ernment of North Vietnam for an agreement which would provide for a series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United States military forces from Indochina in ex- change for a corresponding series of phased releases of American prisoners of war, and for the release of any remaining American prison- ers of war concurrently with the withdrawal of all remain- ing military forces of the United States by not later than the date established by the President pursuant to Paragraph 1 hereof or by Etch earlier date as may ne agreed upon by the nego- tiating_ parties. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP731300296150300p?0001-3 kii.7; Nei; W YORIK DATE dr WV ii 'LG 61/91?,Wilr" MAlls o WASHINGTON, June 22 ? The Senate adopted today an amendment calling for the with- drawal of all American forces from Indochina within nine months if American prisoners of war are released. Over Administration opposi- tion, the Senate by a vote of 57 to 42 accepted the troop- withdrawal amendment to the Selective Service Bill that Was offered by Senator Mike Mans- field of Montana, the Senate Majority Leader. The Mansfield Amendment must still be passed upon by the House once the Senate cOM- pletes action on the bill extend- ing Selective Service for two more years. Whether the arriend: meat would be accepted by the more hawkish House was ques- tionable. Opposition Is Certain In a House-Senate confer, ence, the amendment was cer- tain to be opposed by con- ferees from the House Armed Services Committee. But a shtft of some Southern conservatives in the S, nate to suppert the Mansfield Amendment raised the possibility that in a floor fight a similar shift might oc- cur in the House. The White House press sec- retary, Ronald L. Ziegler, said that the amendment was not binding and that President Nixon would continue his pres- ent policy. Mr. Ziegler added, "it states what 57 Senators think our policy should be. It is not the view of the Congress as a whole." Adoption of the Mansfield Amendment represented the first major victory of critics of the Vietnam War in months of attempting to find some legisla- tive formula to end the war. The amendment would estab- lish the policy that the United States should "terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations" in Indo- china and undertake "prompt and orderly withdrawal" of all American forces within nine months after enactment of the amendment. The withdrawal would be made conditional; upon the release of all Amen' can prisoners of war held by North Vietnam. In In line with this policy, the amendment calls upon the President to establish a final date for troop withdrawal. to negotiate an immediate cease- fire with North Vietnam to be followed by "phased and rapid" withdrawal of American forces in return for phased release of American prisoners of war. No Fund Cut-off Date Unlike other troop-withdraw- al amendments that have been rejected by the Senate, the Mansfield AAmendment would not cut off the funds to require a withdrawal by a certain date. In a Senate reluctant to use the Congressional power over appropriations to impose a withdrawal schedule on the President, this feature of the Mansfield Amendment was in- fluential in persuading 11 Sen- ators, largely froth the South, who last week had opposed the cGovern-Hatfield Amendment, which would have required withkawal by the end ol the year. _ The Mansfield Amendment, however, is more bindine upon the President than a sense-of- the-Senate resolution in that it establishes a policy of with- drawal within nine months, subject only to release of the prisoners. As interpreted by Mr. Mans- field, the amendment would fill the policy void created, by the repeal last year of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution, which gave approval to all necessary steps taken by the President to repel Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Since the repeal of the Ton- kin resolution, President Nixon has been relying upon his in- herent powers as Commander in Chief to take all necessary steps to insure the safety of American troops as they are withdrawn from Vietnam. Should the Mansfield Amend- ment be adopted by the House and then the legislation signed into law by the President, Mr Nixon, it is argued by Senator Mansfield, would then in effeei have accepted the policy ot withdrawal laid down by Con. gress and his authority would be limited to withdrawing the troops, subject only to the re- lease of the prisoners of war. At least in principle, the pace of withdrawal could no longer be linked to the ability of the Saigon Government to survive af.fitAe factors in the Ad- mitteneation's present with- drama schedule, along with the releaanof prisoners. The ametede ment would also establish a definite deadline for withdrieW- al, something the Administra- tion has opposed on the ground that such a step would under- cut the peace negotiations North Vietnam. in a statement issued fin- mediately after the vote, Sen- ator George S. McGovern, Dana- eerat of South Dakota, aid that the adoption of the Mansfield Amendment was "a clear state- ment in favor of the baeic McGovern-Hatfield amendment --establishment of a date cer- tain for the withdrawal of all American ground and air forces from Indochina conditional only upon release of all U.S. prison- eis of war." The Senate action, he said, was "a clear repudiation of the Administration's so-called 'Viete naintation' formula" for with- drawing. "It serves notice on the President," he said, "that if he continues to pursue that course he will do so in defiance of a strong majority in the Senate." Senator Mark Hatfield, Re- publican of Oregon, hailed adop- ting' of the Mansfield Amend- ment as "an historic action a!- ter years of apposition to our involvement in Vietnam." Senator Hatfield said that while much remained to he, done, a first step has beeU taken "that assures us that onr policy can be changed by the will of the people." By a 55-to-42 vote, the Sen- ate. last week defeated the amendment cosponsored by Senator McGovern and Senator Hatfield th ye cu off funds for deployment of troops in Indochina by the end of this year. But today, several Senators who normally support the Ad- ministration's Vietnam policy switched to support the Mans- fieliamendmput. These includ- ed Ileyd M. Bentsen of Texas, RAM Y. Byrd of West Virginia, David H. Gioia Ernest F. Hot'. Carolina, Len Idaho, John e Arkansas, Win of Virginia, and enadge of Geori The Mansfie was adopeed ai tion forces, tie able parr amen ing, succeeded feating an a, would ha' e rec al of all troc months, with 11 the withdrawal be susperded within 60 dap "firm commite all Amerii The etinanu; sponsored by e W. Cook if Kc Stevens id A whom are Rep attempt lo bl? Stevens amen( John Stennis chairman of tilt Services Comm that the provis commitment" t nam be replace of the prisoners prtested teat el Stennis emeno "gut" his amei ting up n ire tion. e of Georgia, e of South e Jordan of acClellan of in B. Spong Jr -J. amen E. Tal- .a I amendment c Administra- consider- y maneuver- n narrowly de- eedment that ii ed withdraw- ? within nine -rovision that d 'aniline would orth Vietnam cid not give a e le' to release s.,ners of war. .t was co- o cons Marlow Lecky and Ted sea, both of 'limns. In an ei the Cook- e nt, Senator )f enate Armed :e a, proposed au of a "firm e North Viet- by "release" e.enator Cook ,ffeat of the et was to iant by set- a: -eible condi- The Stennis a ? dment was irst rejected I a 51-ito-48 ate. But then a a series of hree close vote:, the Senate econsidered and finally adopt- d the Stennis inenciment by 50-to-49 vote. In the votes, Cl ator B. Ev- rett Jordan, Den 0( rat of North arolina, switcht J his position o assure adopt(ii of the Sten- is amendment. A It award, Sen- ator Jordan, who .a week vot- d for the McG o. ern-Hatfield amendment. expeii ied that he had misundersto d the import of the Stennis E. n ndment on the first vote. H isisted that Senator Stennis a. not talked to him between n votes. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 Vo A iV r I t? A-ye2E A./0 FOR Till Aso NDMENT?S7 Anderso, ' NM 1 lAaguuson (Wash.) aV .1 Marl,9,1d (fiant) Bentsen ( lex.) mci. lelian (Ark.) Bible (Ncv.) McGovern (S.D.) Rurdick (N.D.) McIntyre (N.H.) Rvrd (W. Va ) Metcalf (Mont.) Cannon (Nev.) Mondale (Minn.) (lilies (Fla.) Montoya (N.M.) Church (Idaho) Moss (Utah) Cranston (Calif.) Muskie (Maine) I- aglefon (Mo.) Nelson (Wis.) f ulbrIght (Ark.) Pastore (R.I.) Cambrell ,Ga.) Poll (R.I.) UraVel (Alaska) Proxmire (Wis.) Harris (04,1a.) Randolph (W. Va.) .Hart (Mich) Riblcoff (Conn.) Hark e (Ind.) Soong (Va.) . . Hollings (').C.) Stevenson (114.) Hughes (Iowa) Symington (Mo.) Humphrey (Minn.) Tatmadge (Ga.) Inouye (Hawaii) I .inney (Calif.) .lorden (NC.) Williams (N.J.) Kennedy (Mas.) Republhans-12 Aiken (Vt.) Mathias (Md.) Brooke (Mass.) Pearson (Kan.) Case (N.J.) Percy (III.) Hatfield (Ore.) Sc hweiker (Pa.) Javits (N.Y.) Stevens (Alaska) Jordan (Idaho) Young (N.D.) AGAINST THE AMENDMENT-42 Thlriarrats-10 Allen (Ala ) Jackson (Wash.) Ryrd (Val Long (La.) ) astiand (Miss.) McGee (Wyo.) I: ITender (La.) Sparkman (Ma.) Ervin (N.C.) Stennis (Miss.) Republicans-32 Al(ott (Col.).) Goldwater (Mi.) Bake; (Tevn.) C?rittin (Mich.) . BellMon (Okla.) Hansen (Wyo.) Bennett (Utah) Hrushka (III.) Boggs (Doll Miller (Iowa) Brock (ten. ) Packwood (Ore.) Buckley (N.Y.) Prouty (Vt.) Cook (Ky.! ixoth (Del.) Cooper (KY.) Saxhe (Ohio) Cotton (NFL) Scott (Pa.) Curtis (Neb.) Smith (Maine) Dole (Kan.) -let (Ohio) Dominick (Colo.) Thurmond (S.C.) Fannin (Az ) ' o,,er (Tex.) Fong (Hawaii) ?::1; kor (Conn.) Abseui Muodl 1 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP731300296R000300050001-3 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP731300296193149?0001-3 THE NEW YO:RX TIMES DATE 'ACE HOUSE REJECTS by taking to the floor to argue that the establishment of a withdrawel deadline would 'in- terfere" with the Paris peace VIETNAM plluolli ndeizgotAiamtioenrscaanndliv"ecsoul" d jeopar- VOTED BY Mr. Albert found himself vot- sENATE ocrats. A total of 143 Demo- ing with a minority of Dem- crats and 33 Republicans voted for what was, in effect, the Mansfield amendment while 83 Democrats and 136 Republicans voted against it. To Conference Next The issue now goes to a Senate- -House conference committee to reconcile differences between the Senate and House versions of the bill both of which extend the draft authority for two more years. House managers of the bill, such as Representative F. Ed- ward Hebert of Louisiana, chairman of the Armed Serv- ices Committee, hinted at the possibility of a compromise on the language of the Mansfield amendment. But if the amend- ment is weakened significantly in conference, the bill faces a probable filibuster when it re- turns to the Senate floor. As a result, there was a Continued on Page 37, Column 4 I Amendment for Withdrawal Based on P.O.W. Release Is Defeated, 219-176 By JOHN W. FINNEY Special to The New York Timex WASHINGTON, June 28 The House refused today to ac- cept a Senate amendment call- ing for withdrawal of troops from Vietnam in nine months if American prisoners of war were released by North Viet- nam. By a 219-to-176 vote, the House defeated a motion call- ing for acceptance of the Sen- ate troop withdrawal amend- ment to the Selective Service bill. The amendment, sponsored by Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader, was adopted by the Senate last week by a 57-to-42 vote. For the critics in the House of ?the Vietnam war, the vote was their best showing in near- ly two years of trying to press the issue. They gathered 20 more votes than on a similar but more binding troop with- drawal amendment that was re- jected by the House two weeks ago. They contended that if it had not been for absentees their total would have been around 190, just 14 short of a majority. White House Victory But the vote was still a clear victory for the White House, which worked actively to de- feat the Mansfield amendment in the House. President Nixon, for example, called Speaker Carl Albert this morning, ask- ing him to intervene in the de- bate against the amendment. Mr. Albert then split with the -Democratic leadership in the Senate as well as with the Democratic whip in the House, Representative Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. of Massachusetts, growing likelihood that Con- gress would not extend the Se- lective Service taw befbre the present draft authority expires at midnight Wednesday. Draft calls have been set for July and August, but Selective Service officials have said they did not plan to induct anyone until the draft authority was renewed. Under existing law, the system could still draft college students and others who have been de- ferred. Conferees Hampered Ordinarily, the conferees, drawn from the House and Sen- ate Armed Services Commit- tees, could be expected to op- pose the Mansfield amendment. But both sides now find them- selves circumscribed by the votes in the House and Senate. The Senate conferees can- not yield too quickly on an amendment adopted by a de- cisive margin in the Senate. And the House conferees can point to today's vote as a rea- son why thy should not yield. Critics of the war are holding i he threat of a Senate filibuster over both sides if the con- ferees fail to reach an accept- able compromise. As in the past, the House leadership resorted today to procedural moves to prevent a direct up-and-down vote on the Vietnam issue. A motion instructing the House conferees to accept the Mansfield amendment was of- fered by Representative Charles W. Whalen Jr., Republican of Thrt io. Rather than permit a di- e vote on the Whalen mo- tion, Mr. Hebert moved to table, or lay aside, the motion. It was :he Hebert tabling motion that vote. was adopted by the 219-to-176 Against Instructing Throughout the debate, Mr. whert and the Republican lead- ership posed the issue not so much as whether the Mansfield amendment should be accepted but rather whether the House nr.iould instruct and thus, as they put it, "tie the hands" of the House conferees. With this argument they were appealing to the traditional reluctance of the House to instruct conferees o accept a Senate amendment. "In the interests of this coun- try." Mr. Hebert pleaded with the House, "don't shackle me. Please don't put the handcuffs or. my conferees." In a similar vein, Representa- , /VA Gerald R. Ford of Michi- gan. the House Republican ea der, asserted that the con- terees should be given a "free1 1 hand" to see .hather they, could work out tii to "reason- able" substitute yr the Mans- field amendment The amendment v ould estab- lish as "policy" ti is withdrawal of all American f trees from Indochina in nine n onths, sub- ject only to the e ease of all American prison e s of war. It also calls upon th Presiden to negotiate a c a e-fire with North Vietnam, t. he followed by the phased v it idrawal of American troops n return for the phased rt?least the prison ers of war. Leading the arg r clit for the amendment, Mr C Neill said it would give th louse a chanc to "reaffirm Cs avressional re- sponsibility in tie formation of American policy "Just as we 'e e irresponsi- ble in letting t se war start," he told the lit "let us b responsible in oiling it." Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3 te64.-s Nigmcccmft -qE4ILitlease 2000/09/08 : CIA)RDP7013246-kb0030005900V3-2-- C.I.A. Says Plan Seeks to Embarrass U.S. By TAD SZULC Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, July 8? The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Nixon that the new Vietcong peace proposal is aimed at embarrassing the United States "both at home and overseas" and encouraging the opponents of President Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam. Other negative comments on the plan were contained in a detailed analysis submitted to Mr. Nixon and other top Ad- ministration officials last Friday a day after Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, the chief Vietcong dele- gate, offered her proposals at the Paris talks. The agency's evaluation, ac- cording to senior Administra- tion officials, was one of several top-level studies of the Communist plan on which President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers based their decision to in- struct the United States dele- gation in Paris to seek further clarifications today from the COmmunist side in "restricted sessions," or private talks. Reservations Expressed The evaluation as well as the parallel studies prepared in re- cent days by the State and De- fense Departments and the Na- tional Security Council staff Kissinger joins Mr. Nixon and upon whom Hanoi and the Viet- conciliation and r iasonable- cong had looked with favor in ness without comr iting Hanoi to anything specie ' The analysts ,1 Is warned against pitfalls in lb Commu- nist proposal for e, asing the American prisonen h. exchange for the withdraw. of United States troops fr er Vietnam under a set dead' -11 This has appeared to be the n ost attrac- tive aspect of Mrs B nh's peace package. But the analys s said that while "the formu d on on the prisoner-release it estion is new," the Comm n-st demand on total United Si ales military disengagement "i is firm as ever." "Moreover, by n luding for the first time civil at as well as military prisoners tie Commu- nists are openin -, the whole thorny problem ,f the Com- munist civilian a die who are now held by Saigr ' it said. Mr. Rogers in San Clemente on Sunday. The next screduled session of the Paris talks is next Thursday. Mr. Kissinger, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, visited Saigon last weekend and is to confer with Mr. Bruce in Paris on Saturday. Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, whose gency was reported to have rafted the first analysis of he Vietcong plan, participated n the discussions on the United bites response to the Commu- nist proposals after he flew to San Clemente with President Nixon and Mr. Rogers last Tuesday. Officials familiar with various Administration evaluations of the Vietcong plan said that the C. I. A. analysis was "perhaps the most pessimistic?but also the most realistic?of the lot." Its over-all conclusion, con. Wined in the first paragraph of the document, said: "The Vietcong's new seven- point proposal softens the Communists' position on the prisoner-of-war release but re- tains and amplifies a very tough line on United States die-I engagement from the war. In addition, it repackages Hanoi's demands for a political settle- ment in South Vietnam in a have expressed ,numerous seri- superficially more attractive ous reservations about the Viet- fem. cong plan. New Nuances Recognized But all the studies also found said here about the Bruce pro- new elements in the plan. The __The anal. y?sis recognized, hovel that it soften?' the Cornmu- posal that "we regret that the nist position on the American smith Vietnam" Vietnamese and the Viet- % thec are lt,o ne, C.LA. paper, for example, noted envueran'er on on a political settlement eNarth The principal features of Mrs.; ong did not respond affirma- s. ommunest poe.i two new nuances on the }limn plan were the Commit.- 0? s?." pseufhgaetsttghoeny prisoners of war and presents -fa itclovreitirnuteotothhisowill /1, South Vietnamese political set- tlement. For, this reason, senior nist readiness to start releasing Nixon Expected to Walt - ? ' mg officials said, the Administra- tion chose to seek to engage in what officials here termed "meaningful negotiatione' Senior officials emphasized that they did not consider the fact that the Communists had not responded immediately to the proposal for "restricted" sessions, made today in Paris by David K. E. Bruce, the chief United States negotiator, as an outright rejection. < They said that "something resembling a negotiating proc- ess may be in the making." At San Clemente, Calif., where President Nixon and Mr. Rogers conferred for the third time this week on strategy in the Paris talks, a White House spokesman, Gerald L. Warren, said that Mr. Bruce was at- tempting to start "meaningful negotiations." The State Department press officer, Charles W. Bray 3d, the past. The analysis said that the Vietcong plan's first "new nu- ance" was that instead of de- manding a coalition regime in Hanoi, it "simply demands that the United States 'cease back- ing the bellicose group' headed by Thieu." The other nuance, it said, is that the Communists no longer ask a "three-segment" regime, including Communists, but a broad "government of national concord" to be negotiated by the Vietcong with a "post-Thieu administration." "The Communists seem to be trying to leave the impression that the form of government is open to negotiation," the docu- ment said. "Moreover, the lan- guage of this section?and in- deed much of the statement? is cast to convey an image of United States war prisoners as American troops begin with- drawing from Vietnam after a date "in 1971" is set by Wash- ington, and the dropping of the Communists' long-standing in- sistence on a coalition regime in Saigon as the condition for a political settlement. But after analyzing the plan, the C. I. A. offered this assess- ment of the Communist motives in presenting their July 1 pro- als- ,l`The Communists doubtless hope that their iniatiative on the prisoners?coupled as it is with a 'restatement of their basic position on United States withdrawals?will make things awkward for the United StisteS Government both at home and overseas." "They may also believe that their political proposals will appeal to many in the United States who are looking for a face-saving way out of the war. Highly-place! ,ofilicia s cated their belief that President Nixon would refrain from pub- licly expressing his views on the developments In ' the talks until the situation became "much clearer" through public or private exchanges In Paris. They said that only after such clarifications would Mr. Nixon address the nation on Ithe state of the negotiations. ,They recalled that last year he had waited nearly three weeks after the Communists presented their peace plan on Sept. 17 before making his counter- proposal on Oct. 7. "At this stage, we are not I prepared to reject or to accept 1 anything as a package," a senior official said. "We are looking and we are probing because this is the business of diplomacy." Other officials said that the negotiating situation would be reviewed again when Henry A. They probab y are a -le hoping that the new prop s I will fuel worries in Saigon e eit Wash- ington's longer-ter 4,upport. "The new form .1.a for a po- litical settlement 1 outh Viet- nam, by its fuzz a is and air of reasonablenese designed both to encoureee Individuals in South Vietnan ehose sup- port of the war - wavering and to give sorn immunition to those who are cl eady work- ing to build an ai u Ihieu, anti- war constituence Coincidence 4 Beliefs This aspect o re analysis was knowe :e ncide with the belief in oth r Administra- tio n quarters tie L he Commu- nist peace plan ,s launched, at least in part, I nfluence the outcome of the etober elec- tions in South 1- it nam, where President Nguye -'Ian Thieu seeking re-elece In this conte: t, the analysi: noted that "am e ni other thing the Communists s,.em intent 01 creating the imT re ,sion that thi election of Bi Mirth coulc prove an heiti. 1 step tower( peace." "Big Minh" is Gen. Duong Van Minh, a p itential but ure declared presid indal candidate Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050001-3