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February 11, 1971
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oVe For Release 2IttiMaWaP ity on the court was astounding. The lost 16 of 18 points in dropping four straight grandstand sits tornorrc ars Arthur Ashe, a S 13 ityego __Twory oo 2-2 rt z .y 11, 1971 players were a credit to the game and their countries. Aside from Buddy Piintlac, Inc., the organizations contributing to the tourne- Merit were the VA. Lt ns station, the Greater Washington Tennis Association, the District of ,olumbia De- partment of Recreation, the National Capital Park Service, the bistria of Co- lumbia Public Schools, 'Etna the District of Columbia Youth Opportunity Services. Assisting were the Courte "or Patrol, the Metropolitan Boys Club, and the Police Boys Club. The LOUrnanlerlf received prominent coverage in the: Washington newspapers, and Sunday's play was Shown live on the Eastern Educational Television Network?WLT4, channel 2?. Thus, the tournament had official and voluntary support from a variety of sources. ? Mr. President, You and others in this Chamber may be aware of my feelings with respect to football and baseball, especially if the competition involves team from Minnesqta. I am certainly not blind, however, to the civic conscious- ness revealed in the account which I have just given you of an attempt to en- gage the interest of inner ,city youth in a major sport which should be more arkd More accessible to people in our crowded cities. I hope that tournaments of this kind will stimulate demand for tennis courts and equipment throughout the cities of this land. We can only applaud the expressed wish of the tournament planners that out of such eyents will one day come "the Austin Carr, of tennis" in Washington. For that matter, another Arthur Ashe would do just fine. Mr. President, I request unanimous consent that certain items concerning the inner city tennis tournament be printed in the REcoap. There being no objection, the material Was Ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Washington Posti Feb. 8, 1971] TizenzartER RULE BaINGIS Costgusiort: FILLQL TURNS ASIDE KOCH IN FIVE-SET TENNIS FINAL (By Mark Asher) Jaime Fillot of Chile continued his high level of tennis and defeated Thomas Koch of Brazil, 6-1, 3-6, 6-4, 6-T, 6-4, for the Buddy Pontiac International, championship yesterday at McKinley High School. The even match between two South Ameri- cans, who had split six previous encounters in the past two years, turned on Koch's con- fusion about the rule on who serves first fol- lowing a best-of-nine-point tiebreaker game. Koch served the final three points and staved off a quadruple match point to win the fourth-set tiebreaker, 5-4. The tiebreaker ? is counted as a single game and in this case was counted as Fillol's service, game. According to the rules Koch should serve the next game. But Fillol was given the balls and served the first point of the fifth set before Haig Tufenk, the umpire, rectified the situation. Koch had won the point, which raid not cotipt. "I was confused," the long-haired Brazilian Said. "When I served, I really wasn't in it." awnoz 1440BLEVIS HURT , KOCh 1.0St hiS ARVApe and evil player then proceeded thold serve for.the remaindqr of the ins 331.4 Koch npted he nevey should bays been An such a predicament becauSe lie ;Qat 4-P advantage in the third ,aet when he ran into service,problems and Tufenk explained the tiebreaker situation: "The problem is that neither the players nor the bellboys know the rules. It's the first time the tiebreaker has been used in Wash- ington." The tiebreaker is newly implemented on the indoor circuit this year as the game of tennis reaches Streamlined proportions for television and attempts to lose its country club image. EVERYBODY CONFUSED Coincidentally, this player confusion arose at the nation's first professional indoor tour- nament at an indoor city facility. If the play- ers were confused, imagine the confusion of the inner-city youth to whom the tourna- ment was directed as a pilot project to expose them to the sport. Following the match, one youngster turned to a reporter and asked, "Hey, mister. Who beat?" In an informal survey, the youngsters in the crowd of 1,200 were most confused by tennis' traditional scoring system, which scores four points as 15, 30, 40 and game. They also wanted to know most about how much money the players make. The scoring 'sYstem made about as much sense to most of the 400 youths as the scor- ing in a cricket match does to the average American. Bill Gaskins. the tournament director, said he would favor experimenting with a sim- plified scoring ;system next year. In addition, both he and the players did not object to noise during the match. Both Fuilol and Koch stopped play fre- quently yesterday. But Koch noted this was not because of the noise, but because of the movement behind the court, making it diffi- cult for the players to follow the flight of the ball. As for money, ,rinol won about $20,000 last year. He is not considered among the world's 25 best players. The $1,500 he pocketed yes- terday was the biggest payday of his career. Koch won $1,000. The match was the first loss in Washington by Koch, the winner of the 1969 Washington Star International. Jim Osborne and Jim McManus of the United States defeated Alan Gdsbert and Manuel Orantes of Spain, 3-6, 6-3, 6-3, for the doubles title. BUDDY PONTIAC INC. WELCOMES AMERICA'S FIRST INNEIt-CY.CY TENNIS TOURAMENT It is seldom that an individual or an in- stitution is presented the opportunity to make a major contribution to an important cause. With this thought in mind, I should Like to assure our honorary chairman, Mayon* Walter Washington, our distinguished guests and all of the students attending the matches, that it Ls our sincere pleasure and our privilege to be associated with this event. We are extremely grateful to Mr. William Riordan, player chairman for the U.S.L.T.A. for bringing to us an outstanding field of players; to the Greater Washington Tennis Association for their fund raising support; to Henry Kennedy our chairman for his ex- pertise and general assistance; and certainly to Dr. James Jones, Director of Youth Op- portunity Services, and his competent staff, who did so much to make ours a "first class" tournament in every respect. As one who was born, schooled and has worked in the "inner city" during his en- tire lifetime, I can speak from experience regarding our progress to date and what still lies ahead in order to make our city into a model for the entire nation. In receat years we have accomplished much, primarily through the utilization of government funding. In the future we may accomplish much more through the involve- ment of private' Industry in neighborhood and youth projects throughout our city. Our secret hope is that somewhere in the boy who can go to the .?:?1 o of professional tennis, but be that as it 'al -nr, we are certain that our matches and c ir high school ten- nis clinics will provide -rt artainment, chal- lenge and personal fulfi n ent to the youth of our Nation's Capital . . . none deserve more. Sincerely, MORI. .1, W. COHEN, President, Eta .a a Pontiac, Inc. WASHINGTON, D.C. I am happy to serve a honorary chair- man of this Inner City er nnis Tournament that will stimulate !rite] s in tennis among inner-city residents. We welcome to our cit t iese international tennis stars?representii ;even countries? who will participate. Thi ..1.? wide-range repre- sentation and outstandisg skills will provide an arena in which youni ninds can be chal- lenged, international gi ici will fostered and tennis promoted. We are extremely grs _ined that our Na- tion's Capital has been A.ected as the inau- gural city for this event liopefully, as a re- sult of our efforts in tt, s first "Inner-City" Tennis Tournament, nt st year we will see similar programs institi tc?I in other major metropolitan areas tb o ,gh the nation. Proceeds from this to ha iament will go to the Washington Inters( iclastic Tennis As- sociation to aid our on-i .a ig inner-city ten- nis programs. This tournament is m (.1,? possible through the concerted efforts of 3t-5cly Pontiac, Inc., the United States Lawn T nnis Association, the Greater Washington T nnis Association, the D. C. Department of ucreation, National Capital Park Service, D c. Public Schools and the D. C. Youth 0 apartunity Services, with the assistance of Courtesy Patrol, the Metropolitan Boys aida and the Police Boys Club. This is another fine i ,laniple of business. government, communit ,,rganizations and individual citizens worki lg together to better our community. Mayor WALTE ! 4. WASHINGTON. One of the more gratif. it g aspects of being a professional tennis ?L?yer is watching interested youths devei ,p .ng their athletic talents in pursuit of I se,. oming top-notch competitors.I ran conficfc at that seeing many of the world's top tenn s players in action during this tournament 1 not only provide exciting sports enterta ,iinent for all but will inspire many poten ally great athletes living in the inner-city o become seriously Interested in the game i" ? ennis as well. Professional tennis, I] :e football, basket- ball and baseball, now 1. rovides an excellent living -for any underpr?v1(eged youth who works hard and makes ?t to the top. But more than that, the p 1y -deal demands of tennis help develop a het, rt ,y mind and body for every boy or girl whc D.iys the game. I am very happy to w? [come the many Washington area public a ?hool students to this great new tournam( di You will be see- ing outstanding champ ?Ths competing for the title and prize mone none to compete here next year and c1-11 enge this year's winner. All of us owe r c:-:bt of thanks to Buddy Pontiac, Inc., f??r their successful effort to bring big-time es ids to the Wash- ington inner-city. Everyone cannot beco at a championship tennis player, but each c is can be a cham- pionship person?and I s's what it's all about! rey, , .????111MISION=.10/? ARTHUR ACHE. T SONTAY PRIS )lr CAMP RAID Mr. FULBRIGHT.-_ I fr President, Mr. Stuart H. Loory, one a tie mostpercep- z, Approved For Release 2000/09/08.: CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050002-2 February 11, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE reality which the computer can deal with 4ust because the computer can do so. The 101adividual?the point off the curve?be- =lee an annoyance." slannetar ANS PRIVACY OF INFORMATION Another area of critical concern to those responsible for managing the massive ma- chinery of our society relates to protecting the privacy of the individual and the cor- porate entity. The trend today is to gather vast amounts of information so that certain functions may be expedited. In government, the handling of social security, census, and economic data requires huge information processing establishments. In the private realm, hundreds of applications now involve ADP, including such large volume areas as payroll, credit checks, insurance, and indus- trial inventory control. The need for?and control of?these data are commencing to receive, deservedly, a great deal of attention. Some critics of large scale data collection and computer manipulation speak in terms of the Orwellian 1084 controlled state. Others can accept the necessity of acquiring data necessary for managing, through improved planning, our society, but believe that the present approach to the problem is not well thought out, and should receive cognizance at the highest level of government. Many hard questions have been put to those de- signing the census data collection forms, and a second wave of concern now is evident as summary data is being made available for sale by franchised disseminators. Where do we draw the line on what is demanded of the private citizen, or the cor- poration? Should not the individual be able to refuse to answer certain questions about his past, and do so without penalty or cen- sure? In some instances, today, information collected from citizens for one purpose is then vended to others for completely differ- ent purposes. The built-in protection inher- ent in the decentralized, paper-oriented files of the past now is being obliterated by the capacities and capabilities of computer- supported information systems. The ele- ments of our society are entitled to privacy, and the integrity of any files containing in- formation on their past activities or present status deserve the utmost protection. It is not enough simply to indulge in fatu- ous generalities about protecting the privacy of the citizen. There are identifiable forms of safeguards which can do much to guaran- tee personal and corporate privacy. In a study prepared for the Congress?entitled "The Federal Data Center: Proposals and Re- actions"?several such safeguards are noted: 1. Legislative and administrative regula- tions, already in effect in some agencies, could be augmented and strengthened. 2. Establishment of uniform, multi-agency criteria controlling "need to know" both for government and other data users. 8. More explicit explanation of the scope and nature of the data available, thus re- ducing the number of unnecessary or illogi- cal requests by users. 4. Creation and uniform use of classifica- tion and coding systems, to include the as- signment of unique accession codes and in- dicators to privileged data elements. 5. Establishment of an expert in-house group for receiving, trabscribing, and refin- ing the request for information from the sys- tem according to the needs of the users and existing regulations. O. Employment of "a number of servicing procedures based upon computer technology that can satisfy the needs of the user in most cases without violating disclosure regula- tions. 7. In some lnatances, data' reduction by design can be performed thus transforming absolute figures to percentages, increments to gross and vice versa. S. Anonymous sampling, with the removal of identifying data elements already has been used; here again the need for a uniform Fed- . eral set of procedures and criteria is appar- ent. TSCI-INOLOSY BEGETS RESPONSIBILITY The management of information and knowledge is a selemn responsibility. The mutual education of the lawmakers and technologists during this forum must con- tinue, for none can gainsay the crescendoing effect of computers, communications and cy- bernetics on this and succeeding genera- tions. This must be a matter for all to ac- quaint themselves with, for everyone is af- fected. On some occasions in history man has been called upon to answer a "call" largely on faith, This led to the witticism that "Man is ready to die for an idea, provided that idea is not quite clear to him." Those existing in our "one world" know without question that empathetic interaction be- tween individuals, groups, and nations is on the upturn, and that the trend is irreversible. Each new challenge requires a wrenching change in our patterns of behavior or insti- tutional modes of operation. While none of us can sasess fully the im- pact of this burgeoning technology on the nation and its peoples, we must strive to manage wisely. The ways in which we use the atomic generator, the laser, the electronic computer. will result in more than surface reverberations. We are closer to manipulat- ing our future than ever before, and there must be a conscious connection in our lead- ership actions between the thought, the de- sire, and the end result. While most of our national planning will and must be directed toward tangible, material enda, there is a greater responsibility. There is an overriding Moral imperative to examine with excruciat- ing-thoroughness the rationale for our tech- nological programs, the direct and side effects of their execution, and the imprint which will be carried forward into the future. This will require the finest effort on the part of all facets of our society, and will result in action based on reason, and not futility. BUDDY PONTIAC INNER CITY IN- TERNATIONAT., TENNIS 'IOURNA- MENT IN WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, over the weekend of Febr rary 5 through 7, a notable event took place in Washington, D.C. Twelve accomplished professional tennis players, including the top-ranked player in the United States, competed for $10,000 in prize money on a synthetic court laid over the basketball floor of an inner city high school gymnasium. This tournament, the Buddy Pontiac, Inc., Inner City International Tennis Classic, was designed to bring first-class tennis to youngsters who may get no closer to the game in their ordinary lives than a blacktop playground or the side wall of an apartment Wilding. A lot of dedication and idealism went into this tournament, and I believe that the re- sults wore most encouraging. Donald Dell, the 1968-69 Davis Cup captain and a longtime Washington area resident has often spoken of the need to bring tennis to the ghetto instead of waiting for the inner city black players - and spectators to make their way out to the suburbs. Until this was done, he felt, tennis would remain a rich man's sport in the eyes. of most blaelr citiz,ens. The few, like Arthur Ashe, who overcome in- numerable handicaps to rise to the top in American tennis, would only prove the rule that tennis is a country club activity. Bill Riordan, who did so much to make Salisbury, Md., the. capital city of U.S. indoor tennis, put his influence to work as president of the International Players Association and player coordinator for the T.Y.S. tennis championship program. He lined up the 12 ; layers who came to Washington on February 5. Next year he hopes to bring the inner city tennis tour- nament concept to a total of 13 American cities. This is a hopeful development, among other things because it is not a moneymaking venture for the promot- ers.. McKinley Technical High School, at Second and T Streets NE., is not the kind of place where you expect to see a tennis tournament. Although the court surface was excellent, there was too little room for the players along the sidelines and behind the baselines. The linesmen got in the way of sharply angled shots. High lobs bounced off the over- head lighting. Spectators constantly moved back and forth and talked almost incessantly. In other words, the audi- ence treated this much as they Would a baseball or basketball game, where for- mal etiquette hardly exists. The great thing about it, however, was the attitude of both the players and the spectators. Not a single player expressed annoyance over crowd behavior or the constricted space around the court. To all appearances each of them realized that sacrifices had to be made for the purpose of' presenting the best image of professional tennis to an audience which was largely unfamiliar with it. Although spectators had to be cautioned from moving directly in the line of sight of the players during the final singles match, the general deportment of the small crowd was excellent. When the youngsters and their parents overcame the mysteries of the scoring system, they followed the play with intense interest and genuine appreciation. -Attenda:nce was sparse until the last day even though most of the seats were free of charge. On the first day, large numbers of young people were bused in. The audience was predominantly black, which was just what the tournament or- ganizers had intended. Mayor Walter E. Washington, honorary chairman of the event, was present for part of the final match on Sunday. The players came front Brazil, Chile. the British West Indies, Canada, Paki- stan, Spain, and the United States. The best U.S. player was No. 1 ranking Cliff Richey, who lost a hard-fought semifinals match to the eventual winner, Jaime Fillol of Chile. Two other U.S. players included seventh-ranking Jim Osborne of Honolulu and ninth-ranking Jim McManus of Berkeley, Calif. The high point of the weekend was the five-set final between Fillol and Brazil's "Tiny Tom" Koch--pronounced "Kosh"--on Sunday. Koch, trailing two sets to one, broke Fillol's serve in the fourth set to set up a tiebreaker, which he won by a single point to even up the match. He was unable to hold off the Chilean in the fifth and final set. The crowd was treated to brilliant play. Both players wanted badly to win, but they never compromised their fine sportsman- ship. They executed sharp volleys, crisp overheads and passing shots; their agil- . Approved For Release 2000/09/08 ; CIA-RDF'731300296R000300050002-2 t , Arove For Releas' 20a0/09/08 CIA-RDP731300296R000300050002-2 February11, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE tec ing friendly goverilments against inclp- to contribute intelligence on t tive journalists in Washington and a'rep- resentative of the Los Angere,s has written an excellent account of the recent raid on the gbrit'437 PiisOnr I ask unanimous consent that the ar- ticle he printed in the ItEcoRn. There being no objection, the 'article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STORY BEHIND RAID ON SONTAY PRISON (Stuart H. Loory) Blackburn was namedSAVSA. WA_SHINGTON.?When Secretary of Defense SACSA, the office, was created by President Melvin R. Laird testified that the Adminis- John F. Kennedy early in hia administration tration had no waY of knowing for 'certain to systematize the United States' role in deal- that Ainerican prisoners Would be fciund at ing with insurgencies throughout the world. Son Tay last November, he was understating WAPPAar BIBLE an Intelligence problem that gives American military planners the shivers. Afnoug all the other problems of fighting the war in Indochina, the problem of divin- ing the intentions; -plans and movenients of the North Vietnamese has been the toughest. That problem made the commando raid on the small Compound only 23 miles west of Hanoi one of the biggest gambles in Ameri- can military history?a gamble decided on by President Nixon for trying to get cap- tured Americans out of North Vietnam but also for what one high Administration has'balled qranscendent reason." Officially, the Son' Tay raid was conducted for one reason only?to rescue American prisoners. Transcendent reasons ale ad- mitted only for the deepest background. But since the Administration admitted they ex- isted, others have been speculating on what they might have been. - Idea No. 1: The American military ma- chine, caught in a "dirty, grubby war" that no one wants, scarred by the tragedies at My Lai and stOries of other atrocities, con- demned at home and facing serious dissen- sion in the fled, needed an act of heroism to boost its morale. Idea No. 2: the Nixori Administration, having helped create a prisOner-of-war lobby ? since grown impressively Vocal, felt the po- litical need ab respondto Its demands that sornething be done for the 339 Americans living under cruel conditions in North Vietnam,,IdeaN: 3: The President had to show the North Vietnamese that they could not count on using the prisafiers as hostages for a po- litical settlement embarrassing to the United States, that he would take steps as drastic as invading North Vietnam to secure their freedom. The President's gamble tailed. TO 'under- atand why, follow It froth its inception late last May in a little-known office on the ninth corridor of the Pentagon's first floor.: ? Office 1E90 is marked ."SACSA." The acro- nym stands for Special Assistance for Coun- ter insurgency and Special Activities." It was SACSA that conceived, planned, or- ganized and oversaw the Son Tay operation. SACSA is both a_ military ?Meer iind the Office The directs : The officer, at the time the Son TO raid was conceived, was Bri:g. Gen. Donald DunwoodY Blackburn, a 54-year-old . infantryman" whose career has such great storybook qualities that it has been the sub- -pat of a book and a movie?"Blackburn's Headhunters?' . - " As a first lieutenant, Blackburn arrived in the Philippines in October, 1941, to become an adviser to the Philippine army. The fol- lowing April he evaded capture by the 'Ja- panese' on Bataan Peninsula, disappeared into the jungles of northern Luzon, organized a small guerrilla force of primitive tribesmen who were just beyond the practice of head- hunting and fought a backwoods cainpaign against the a:pane-de untilThe war ehded. aBlaciabatan heeanae One cl,the recbgnlzed experts in "special Warfare,' the nallitary's euphemism for American involvementln pro- lent revolution. In 1957. when the 1954 Geneva accords which settled the French Indochina war were being honored mostly in the breach by all involved. Blackburn joined the American military assistance advisory group in South Vietnam to help shore up the Saigon govern- ment of Ngo Dinh Diem against the then- budding Viet Cong insurgency. In August, 1969, after a series of assign- ments in the United states and Vietnam, SACSA*s doctrine was originally set out in a three-inch thick volume that became the bible of special warfare. Originally that bible dealt mostly with counterinsurgency. The early cOurtterin-surgeoev doctrine was based on the simple premise that American technology?the same know-how that would land a man on the Moen and create a ma- chine-aided life of comfort for consumers? would conquer insurgencies_ To gain superiority over a guerrilla who has lived in a region for years, you need only fight him in the dark, provided you can see and he cannot, the doctrine said. So radios were developed to penetrate the jungle canopy, helicopters that fly 80 m.p.h. over areas where guerrillas move on foot were brought in. Heat-seeking infrared sensors for detecting enemy campfires were' developed. The enemy found it relatively simple to deal with Western technology. Learning of the campfire detectors, for example, he sim- ply ordered no campfires could be built with- in a mile of camp, and that rendered in- frared sensors relatively useless. So the insurgency in South Vietnam, in- stead of being brought under control,- devel- oped into the longest war the United States has ever fought. The few thousand Ameri- can advisers of the early 1960s grew into a force of over half a million ground troops. By the time Blackburn established him- self in the Pentagon's Room 1E962. counter- insurgency had passed its heyday. THINKS ABOUT CONTRIBUTION . . Last May, as concern over the fate of American war prisoners iii North Vietnam was, rising throughout the country and the military, Blackburn began to think about what contribution of his office could. make. Blackburn studied What was thelt thop of Son Tay and the other known North Viet- namese POW camps and decided that, if prisoners were held at Son Tay. it was the only location where a raiding party could land. The other known prisons are all in downtown Hanoi. In June, he presented the idea of liberat- ing some American prisoners to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and received permission to conduct a "feasilaility study." "The initial phase started in June," Blaciaa burn told the Times. "We really wanted to satisfy ourselves on the American prison- ers. . . ." Blackburn had consummate faith in the ability of the military to do the job without outside help. During the feasibility study, he called on the Ventral Intelligence Agency only minimally. Working from reconnaissance photographs, the DIA built a scale model of the tiny com- pound, which was just over a half acre in all, :the size of a medium-priced suburban housing lot, measuring 185 feet from north to south and 132 feet from east to west. The model was accurate right down to the loca- tion of branches on the trees. "the CIA had a minimum participation in It," Blackburn said. But the agency was apparently not asked e key ques- tion: were there or were there (o prisoners at Son Tay? The feasibility study was ()doted in July and submitted to the Jo. A Chiefs of Staff and Laird, Mr. Nixon da 'it see it. Neither did Henry A. Kissinger I r. Nixon's chief foreign policy adviser, not a iyone else on the National Security Coin' i staff. Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chit r an of the Joint Chiefs, and Laird epprov the feasi- bility study and gave the go-a e d for the drafting of a plan sometime in Blackburn's team wrote a 200 ae plan, a second-by-second scenario for la attempt. complete down to the assignma for each person and each piece of equiprr aa involved. It even included proposals or i ersionary air strikes over a wide area of at n North Vietnam. "The further we got into tilt C.atails, the more feasible the whole thi g became,' Blackburn said. "We had the al ar broken down second by second. It was - five sec- onds from the time the choppe 3 (nded un- til we entered the first building w lere there were guards." The detailed Son Tay plan v a? approved by Moorer and Laird in early Ar st(ac and, on Aug. 8, Air Force Brig. Gen. Le (a J. Manor and Army Col. Arthur D. (Bull) nons were selected as commander and aty com- mander of Joint Contingency 7 vac Force Ivory Coast, with orders to cart iit Black- burn's plan. Manor, 49, commander of th ,r Force's Special Operations Force, head v irtered at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., was c o en by the Air Force for the job. His a it 'bion was natural. The SOF, formerly nar (e? the Spe- cial Warfare Center, was estabh b in 1961 as the Air Force's contribution t ( carrying out the original SACSA doctrin Simons, 52, like Blackburn, Ind asperience in small-force operations going I. to World War II in the Pacific, where he ae ted as an officer in the Rangers?the fo a 'inners of the Green Berets. In 1961, he went to Laos as p rt of the White Star Mobile Training T a. . to help shore up the anti-Communist a lian gov- ernment in its civil war. In 1961 a went to Vietnam where, according to son a (-ports, he played a role in infiltrating i ielligence teams into North Vietnam. :Before Laird,and Moorer apprc( e the plan. they presented it to the Presided who also approved. There is some indicatt r Ihat Kis- singer was not told of the plan E. 'sat point. when all the momentum began U- the raid three months later. ASSEMBLED IN PANHAN By Aug. 21, Joint Contingenc ?.(sk Force Ivory Coast-101 men in all, It -I) of whom ? would actually land at Son Ta issembled at Eglin, an 800-square-mile n e vation in Florida's panhandle. The go-ahead for training thi- I ery Coast task force was made on the ' as umption" that prisoners would be found v Son Tay. Actually, based on the record, I( e appears to have been a far better chant hat there would be no prisoners found. "We've drilled a lot of dry .r 'Is there," Blackburn said, admitting Ci ally that each time American authorial s 5taged a rescue based on intelligence into :Lion they had received, the raida 'came x late. Blackburn lent credence to-tl _s judgment when he told his interviewer _ 1 (;) several rescue attempts had been ma e in South Vietnam and none had been sue ea aul. American prisoners were 5 -I-. at never found where they were repor to have been. The "almost" is sknifical] In July, 1969, the South Vieti u tese army learned from a defector, that Sps, Larry D. Alke_n of New York City, an a if (ntryman, who, had been captured two incarns earlier, i$ Approved. For R le#se 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 ? Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050002-2 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE February 11, 1971 S134 tvaa being, held by the North Vietnamese :Wirth of the town of Tarriky in the northern 'part or South Vietnam. A joint South Viet- namese-Arne11cm rescue attempt was or- , garriZed. Aiken was rescued?unconscious. The North Vietnamese had bashed his head in when the rescuers approached. The rescue was publicized; Aiken's death, three weeks 'later, went unreported. Several of the nine former American pris- oners who? have been released by the North Vietnamese, other militaly officials and some who are knowledgeable about prisoner-of- war procedures now privately predict that future rescue attempts would result in grave danger to captives in North Vietnam. "It is a bunch of crap that the prisoners would be shot up," Blackburn said. "I would have bet a year's salary that, when we got in there, not one would be hurt. There wasn't any way those guys could have been hurt. The enemy would have had to break into those cell blocks just like we did. And he wbuld have been worrying about his own hide." TOB HARDER IN NORTH VIETNAM If gathering accurate intelligence about the enemy in South Vietnam is impossible, it is doubly so in North Vietnam. One former general with long experience in Vietnam said, "Every jot and title of in- telligence we get out of there is stale. It can't be fresh. If it is fresh you can be sure it's been planted to deceive us." Blackburn said intelligence for the mis- sion came from three sources?interrogation of captured North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam, captured documents and re- connaissance flights by American aircraft. Captured documents and the captured North Vietnamese who carry them can hardly give an up-to-date account of what is happening in the north. It takes a mini- mum of three months for the typical North Vietnamese soldier to march down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Aerial reconnaissance is another matter. The information that jet spy planes pick up can be carried back to South Vietnam, Thailand or some carrier at sea, processed and transrnittea to Washington in hours. Since World War II: American optical and aeronautical technologists have worked mir- acles with photography. Camera-carrying aircraft can snap Stereo pictures from which interpreters can later divine such minute details as the size of bricks in a wall, vege- tation on the ground, construction mate- rials in a building. DETERMINE BUILDING HEAT From infrared scanners, they can deter- min whether a building is heated. Prom a series of pictures that would re- veal traffic patterns, personnel movement, even such items as how garbage is disposed of, an experienced interpreter can make good deductions about what is going on on the ground. There are two general hitches in aerial reconnaissance, as far as North Vietnam is concerned, and one particular hitch relating to Son Tay. First, like so much in the Vietnam war, American reconnaissance technology was simply too sophisticated. "They have consistently underflown our capability," Anirom H. Katz of Los Angeles, formerly of the RAND Corp. and a specialist in reconnaissance technology, said, "For example, we are set up to spot trucks and they use bicycles. They operate just be- low our threshold." After the Son Tay raid, Laird lamented that the technological approach had indeed not gone far enough. A camera that could see through roofs, Laird told the Senate For- eign Relations Committee, could have indi- cated for certain if there were prisoners at Son Tay. Laird's assertion is open to question Pie- tui es are only as good as the men who read them. That is the second hitch. A see-through camera might show people. Interpreters would have to have enough experience in studying North Vietnam to say whether the human forms are American prisoners. The reconnaissance photos of Son Tay showed, according to Manor, that the topo- graphical features of the courtyard were changing but the interpreters guessed wrong about the meaning of the change. They assumed that the changes, which showed a vegetable garden growing, were re- lated to activities of the prisoners. EXPERIENCE NECESSARY To do a good job of interpreting photos of North Vietnam, interpreters with experience on the ground there are necessary. The United States has few, if any, such men. Patrick J. McGarvey, a former emplose of the Central Intelligence Agency and the De- fense Intelligence Agency tells the story of how interpreters, in early 1966, were search- ing pictures for targets of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam. In one picture, they spotted a huge, heavily guarded compound at a village called Clitynh Los. The compound was isolated, ringed with barbed wire and included a number of build- ings. Inside the compound were areas shut off from each other with more barbed wire. The conclusion of the interpreters, McGar- vey said, was that the installation was a di- vision headquarters. And so, a bombing raid was ordered against it on May 6, 1966. A few days later the North Vietnamese charged that the United States had bombed a leper colony at Clayish Loc, killing 80 pa- tients and wounding 34. Privately, according to McGarvey, the Pentagon later conceded the error. The photo interpretation for the Son Tay mission was done by Christopher R. Guen- ther. For ,years Guenther has worked in DIA as an air defense specialist, studying pictures of the North Vietnamese countryside, pick- ing out installations that would be of dan- ger to American planes flying missions over North Vietnam. He would not consent to an interview, but it is known from others that his work with the pictures shed no light on the question of whether there were prisoners at Son Tay. It was more concerned with the operational aspects of the raid--getting the commandos in and out safely. The particular reconnaissance problem of Son Tay was that too many overflights would have alerted the North Vietnamese to im- pending danger. Laird, however, testified that reconnais- sance photos were the prime source of intel- ligence for the mission. Neither the White House nor the Penta- gon has disclosed the latest date on which the Administration knew for certain that Americans were being held at Son Tay. SPOTTED AS POW CAMP IN 1967 Defense officials have said that it was spotted as a POW camp as far back as 1967. There has been one published report that last September a North Vietnamese defector, Tran Thuai, told American psychological wssrfare officials that in 1067 he was a prison observer at Son Tay, which he knew as Lamson I. Actually Thuars account was given to American intelligence experts earlier and was part of the intelligence report Blackburn received in May. Officially, Pentagon spokesmen say they cannot disclose the last date on which they knew prisoners were at Son Tay because that, in turn, would _compromise intelligence- gathering procedures. It is not unfair to speculate that it would prove a source of embarrassment to the Pentagon as well. The assumption can be made that the last definite date was before 131ackburn even started studying the feasibility of the raid. In fact, it might have been the informa- tion on which he originally began the study. Once training began toward the end of August, the matter of whether there were prisoners at Son Tay became, in. a sense, secondary. The operation had achieved a life of its own. The mission planners were aiming toward two possible dates?they called them "win- dows." One was in October and one in No- vember, when a quarter moon would be shining on Son Tay--a moon bright enough to give some light but dim enough to cover movements of the raiders. The October date was scrubbed because of weather forecasts. .At least, that is the of- ficial version. The possibility must be raised, however, that such matters as the impend- ing congressional elections in the United States played some role in putting the raid off. ABRAMS WAS NOT INFORMED At that point, not even Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, commander of all Americans in Southeast Asia, had been informed that the raid was in prospect. In early November, Blackburn and Manor flew to Saigon and briefed Abrams and Oen. Lucius D. Clay Jr., commander of the Ameri- can air forces in Southeast Asia, on the plans. There has been one report that Abrams op- posed the idea. Blackburn said that is not so. Abrams, he reported, listened to the brief- ing, received the request for the accompany- ing air support that Clay's men would have to give, and then said: "You certainly seem to have thought of everything." Only a few days before the mission, the raiders were moved from Eglin to Thailand. At that point they still did not know they were going to penetrate so deeply into North Vietnam. "Simons told them just a few hours before they took off," Blackburn said, "and they all stead up and cheered." On Nov. 18, Mr. Nixon discussed the forth- coming raid with Laird, Moorer, Kissinger and William P. Rogers, secretary of state. Only Rogers and U. Alexis Johnson, under- secretary of state for political affairs, from the State Department knew about the plan. How, when or why Rogers and Johnson were told is not known. Blackburn said the planners deliberately tried to cut out civilian agencies of government for security's sake? not because they were not trusted, but just to be extra careful. ? ADVISERS KEPT IN DARK On Nov. 19, at a regular meeting of the National Security Council, Mr. Nixon appar- ently decided to keep even those most trusted advisers in the dark. Instead of telling them openly what would happen the next day, he slipped Laird a note saying that, regardless of the outcome, the operation had his whole- hearted support. The next clay, Friday morning in Washing- ton and Friday night in Southeast Asia, the troops were making ready to board their large, jet-powered HH-53 helicopters. At bases in Thailand and on carriers at sea, the aircraft thas would provide the cover and fly the diversionary strikes were ready to go, And at still other air bases, about 250 American planes were getting ready to strike a massive bombing attack on targets in southern North Vietnam, allegedly in retali- ation for the shooting down, the week before, of an American reconnaissance plane by the North Vietnamese. At about the time Simons was briefing his men in Thailand, Mr. Nixon was in the White House reviewing a weather report from the field. It was satisfactory anti, in a formality, he gave the final "go" signal. The raid itself is history. As American planes flew the diversionary strikes over a wide area of North Vietnam from Hanoi to Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP731300296R000300050002-2 ebruary for R6-leadip rgleiM-ilirof30290A9np0050002-2 ? China Sea, firing live missiles at radar -tes AO well as lighting dummy flares, the 1.1cling party, protected. by fightei planes, tcked its way down the upper 11.q 11.iver and zoomed in on on Tay. 0- A chopper landed at '2':113 a.m. Saturday (midafternoon in Washington), an& within five seconds, the first empty cell was entered. Ivory Coast task force knew in an !natant that the camp had been empty for some time?"probably three months" as Manor said later. The raiders had a high-level audience half a world away. In the National Military Com- mand Center in the Pentagon, a group of men clustered -around a loudspeaker, Present were Laird, Blackburn, his deputy, 'Col. Ed- ward E. Mayer, Moorer and the other mem- ber of the Joint Chiefs, RUNNINO ACCOmIT GrvEF About 11 a.m. Friday In Washington, a 12,000-mile direct line had been opened from Manor's secret Ivory Coast headquarters in Southeast Asia to the command cenfer in the Pentagon's basement. And on that ;line, Manor gave his superiors a running account of the mission from takeofT to touchdown at Son Tay, from expectation to disappoint- ment,. from the first "zero-zero" reports to the conclusion. Manor thought those first reports iiro'm Son Tay were garbled and refused to believe them, He passed this disbelief on te Wash- ington. 1Vioorer, at the Command center, in turn gave periodic reports to, 'the White House. It is uncertain whether he talked? directly to the President, but most of his reports were helleved made to Brig. Gen. Alexander Haig of Kissinger's staff. A controversy developed over how closely Richard Helms, director Of the CIA, or his organization wad' consulted on the /aid, after The Times published the fact -that he was not involved in the tInal consideration. and Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, complained to Laird about this at a -hearing. Laird told the committee that he :liad ad- vised Helms and consulted with hirn, on the raid "four or five weeks" hefore it tock place. (By that time, the training at Eglin was well under way.) Later Laird told newt-men, "I well remem- ber sitting in my office with the director of ? the Central Inteligence Agency as we waited for the helicoptersto take- off at Son Tay,' as we waited for tiemto Cross the: border, as we waited for our firit reports as to whether or not POWs had been rescue il at Son Tay. I can well remember listening to the Clock tick as we waited for those messages." Actually, according to one source, Helms had One to Laird's office on a different matter and Laird, after the first preliminary re- ports indicating no prisoners had been found at Son Tay, left the command canter in dis- appointment, knowing no prisoners had been rescued, and went back to his office -to meet Helms. And so the clock ticked away on the Son Tay raid, leaving nothing to be done but to bring home all the commandos and decorate them fox their heroism?and to explain the escapade to the American people and the world. What did it all mean? "It certainly put the prisoner-of-war issue on the ?rent pages," a senior military official COrinnan,ted, ' nefgre tile raid, you could not get any 'interest at all in POWs and now everyone's talkinkabout them." 5 ?.0.r...poGgs POWs. certainly, are on the front pages I", IN( Whether that halp in securing their release is problematic. One can argue that. gro to such pressure only lay Ina ing the prisoners a more important bargaining counter in any negotiation to end the war.. It showed Hanoi that no part of its ter- ritory was invulnerable to American attacl;," another senior military. officer said. However, it also revealed to Hanoi that Atherican intelligence on what's going on in the north is so poor , that, even Vth the most careful planning and coordination and most masterful execution, American mili- tary operations in the north cannot achieve their goals. It showed the wives of the prisoners and the prisoners themselves that we care, and that will boost morale, Laird has said. The wives have, for the time being, been asSuaged. No one can say, however, whether the prisoners have been given new hope. Most of the nine Arrierican prisoners who have been released so, far say North Viet- namese security is eo, tight in the prisons that the Americans there still know nothing of The abortive rescue aitempt. LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it is only proper, considering the pride W3 all have of our own Nation as a symbol of freedom and justice, that we com- memorate the 53d anniversary of Lithu- anian independence. ? Lithuanians have had a long and rich hiitory in their continuing struggle for freedom and independence. It was just a half century ago that the courage and determination of the Lithuanian people were rewarded with the establishment of independen3e for their homeland. This achievement was realized after many years of suffering at great human costs?both in terms of body and spirit. Once having achieved independence, Lithuanians sei, up a constitutional gov- ernment, a model of democratic ideals. Freedom of speech, assembly, and re- ligion were the foundations of free Lith- uania. Yet, in only .a, few short years, the hard-won freedom of the Lithuanian people was brutally snuffed out by the Stalinist government of the Soviet Union. In the 26 years since the end of World War II, Lithuania has remained an imprisoned state, a satellite of the SoViet Government, , We must all recognize, Mr. President, that it is indeed a credit to the coura- geous Lithuanian people, that after all these years they have maintained their freedom in mind and spirit. The con- tinued determination of Lithuanians to win back their freedom and independ- enCe is an example for the entire world, an, inspiring torch lighting the way for all men in the unending struggle for the freedom and the natural rights with which every man has been endowed. Today, all Americans join in the con- tinuing hope and determination of the Lithuanian people that someday soon freedom and independence for Lithuania wil) be more than the echo of an eternal dream; that the dream will become a long deserved reality., SENATOR SCHWV.K.ER' SUPPORTS 11QI13,CT EIACTIciN OF Tgg PA,Esz- Dtrair. Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, it is a privilege for me again this year to join the distinguished majority leader (Mr. MANSFIELD), the distinguished Senator from Indiana (Mr. HAYTI), and Many other Senators, in ci,sponsoring Senate S 1335 Joint Resolution 1, proposin : constitu- tional amendment to provide for the di- rect election of the President and Vice President. Last year, I testified be ni e Senator BAYH'S Subcominittie on _C.-.0r:stitutional Amendments in favor of t 2.iL proposed constitutional amendment, tad I was gratified with the thoroughi,e ,s and dis- patch with which this subcommittee and the entire Judiciary Commit e, were able to report it to the Senate '(-) full con- sideration. Unfortunately, . .through the use of the Senate filibuster, N2 were un- able to follow the Members the other body and bring this propos :1 to a vote. Thus it is heartening to ei that the momentum will be maintain ef, this year. In my testimony last year I stated my beliefs, which I still strongly maintain, that, first, a national Pres 4 mit should be selected by the direct wL. of the peo- ple of our Nation, that, secon,i, it is im- perative for us to .change tip current electoral college system to eiiminate the possibility, which currently eq_ists, of a candidate winning the popnlrr election but losing the electoral colle re vote, and, that, third, there is a neeo to increase the sense of personal pirticiila, ion by the voters in their role in selectilg the Presi- dent of the United States. There is one new factor in cow national electoral system which, I i:&:ieve, adds even more weight to these till ee consid- erations: the lowering of the voting age to 18 in Federal elections. i?lot, only are there more voters who now w-11 partici- pate in selecting the Preside It but there will be thousands of new yen em s who will want their individual vote t( c wectly in- fluence the outcome of the p -esidential election. The fact remains thrt unrim' the exist- ing electoral college unit ride whereby the plurality winner in a Sa? e receives all the electoral votes i)f the sitate each voter who casts a brllot .: or someone other than the plurality winner- is, in effect, disfranchised, Although the pro- portional plan, whereby the t ites' elec- toral votes are cast in prop( non to the number of votes each candir a e receives in the election, and the d gi:let plan, whereby the electoral vote f riach con- gressional district is given to h.' plurality winner in that district, are Ix tL improve- ments over the current unit rule, I feel strongly that if we are going,' to reform our system, we ought to take :1 e full step necessary. I cannot stress enough that the elec- toral college concept was cr. cc Led in an era when travel and corn n inications were in their infancy and v-thm such a representative system was th ,rily feasi- ble way to insure that the v Ill of the people was being exercised. Jut today, when Presidents can instanji, travel to any section of the country ':nd when the modern media allow a 'resident to have an instant national c ir stituency, the need for a two-stage el, CI on is re- moved. The people of a congr ional dis- trict directly elect their Rep!?e-,entative; the people of a State directl Ilea their Senators and Governor; the sante logic that resulted in our Pound n. Fathers Instituting these systems clic a es, in my view, that the, people -of olx Nation r i! Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-14DP73B00296R000300050002-2 APProved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050002-2 6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE should likewise be able to directly elect their President. The Joiht resolution has been changed since it was originally introduced last ear, and I commend the sponsors of the resolution for making a number of im- portant improvements and for building upon the experience of last year's debate to create a stronger measure, which I hope will have a better chance for speedy Pasage? First of all, providing for an auto- matic formula as a substitute for an ac- tual runoff election, in case no one can- didate receives 40 percent or more of the popular vote, is a constructive change. Under the revised amendment, the can- didate who receives the largest vote, but who does not receive 40 percent of the popular vote, is still the winning candi- date if he would have had a majority un- der the electoral college system. An important factor of this alternative tabulation is that it does not apply to a candidate who has received less than a Plurality of the popular vote, and thus the electoral college formula cannot be applied to give the Presidency to a can- didate who came in second in the popu- lar vote. A second important factor in this run- off provision is that the electoral votes of each State are applied automatically, eliminating any "deals" or maneuver- ing between candidates. I feel this formula for a runoff is a significant step toward meeting the ob- jections of critics of the direct election system, who feared chaos from the sit- uation where a candidate did not receive a clear majority of the vote. The combi- nation of a plurality of the popular vote, and a majority of the States, can help insure that the Pr?dent-elect is truly the choice of the majority of the people in our Nation. In addition, this resolution has been strengthened this year by changing the system by which a President is chosen by the Congress When there is no clear winner in the popular vote or electoral college runoff formula. Rather than having the choice made in the House of Representatives alone, utilizing a unit system by States, the final determination will be made by all Senators and Repre- sentatives, in joint session, voting indi- vidually. / support this change. Finally, the resolution is improved by Providing for the elimination of some of the most glaring inadequacies of the electoral college, in case the direct elec- tion proposal has been ratified by the necessary three-fourths of the "States, but has not taken effect at the time of a presidential election. By binding each elector of the electoral college, the "faith- less elector" problem is eliminated. And also, even with an electoral college sys- tem, in this interim situation, a failure to obtain an electoral college majority would result in the election of the Presi- dent by a joint session of Congress, with each Senator and Representative voting separately, Mr. President, all elected officials must do eVerything in their ability to restore the confidence of the nubile in our gov- ernmental Institutions, and to make our electoral process fair and? representative of the will of the people. In my judg- ment, there is no step which can do'more to accomplish this than eliminating the archaic institution of the electoral col- lege and approving the direct election of the President. The issue has been thor- oughly studied and debated in recent years. Now is the time for action. THE GREEK MILITARY DICTATORSHIP Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, for a long time I have been concerned with our policy toward the Greek military dicta- torship, which in fact negates both the spirit and the objectives of the Truman Doctrine of 1947. That is why today I would like to bring to the attention of the senate two very interesting and use- ful documents which I do hope President Nixon and his foreign policy advisers will have a chance to study: First, an article written by the well-known syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert lstovak, published in the Washington Post of January 51, 1911, concerning- the tragic but also most revealing Elias P. nernetricopoulos affair. Second, a state- ment addressed to the North Atlantic Assembly signed by 21 distinguished for- mer Greek cabinet ministers, both con- servatives and liberals, and repreienting a very wide spectrum of the political life of Greece, which was brought to my at- tention by my good friend Elias P. Demetricapcados a leader of the Greek resistance movement. I ask unanimous consent that thcy be printed in the REcoaa. There' being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: SENATOR FULBRIGHT VERSUS THE JUNTA (By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak) Political reaction here against the dicta- torial military regime in Greece has reached such a peak that Sen. J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is quietly sending two committee investigators to Athens for an on- the-spot probe of how U.S. policy is being carried out. What has moved Fulbright and other com- mittee members is accumulating evidence that the military junta show no intentton of keeping its agreement with President Nixon Of last Sept. 22. On that date, Mr. Nixon de- cided to resume full-scale arms shipments to Greece?a clear signal that the junta had worked itself back into the good graces of the United States. In return, the junta pledged political reforms, including release of political prisoners and a move toward democratic elections. That end of the bargain is not being kept. Moreover, there is deepening suspicion on Capitol Hill that U.S. Ambassador Henry Tares, is too close to the colonels. To make the committee's investigation, Futbright has assigned two top investiga- tors?Richard Moose and James Lowenstein, both ex-Foreign Service officers, They will proceed to Athens in the first on-the-spot congressional inquiry since the military dic- tatorship took power in a 'bloodless coup d'etat almost four years ago. Their last as- signment was U.S. policy in Cambodia Although Fulbright has been brooding about the junta for many months, the recent tragedy involving the leading anti-junta Greek exile, Elias Dernetracoaules, played a significant part in the decision to dispatch Moose and Lowenstein. February 11, 19', Despite direct intervention of the St Department, Dernetracopoulos was unable obtain an advance safe-conduct pledge fro, the junta to visit his dying father in Decen ber. One result of that was a letter to Fin bright from three U.S. senators suggesting that Tasca be summoned to Washington for testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee. Fulbright's respo ase to the three Demo- crats?Sens. Frank Moss of Utah, Mike Gravel of Alaska and Quentin Burdick of North Da- kota?stated that "the nature and conduct of U.S. relations with she junta have long been a source of consternation to me." He said that the Densetracopoulos incident "is simi- lar to many others in the past few years." Fulbright's subsequent decision for a com- mittee probe in Athens carries the most seri- ous implications for the junta and its souring relations with the Nixon administration. anus' ALTERNATIVE Despite veiled threats of retaliation against congressmen who oppose President Nixon's $5 billion revenue-sharing proposal, the political prognosis today is that the plan will die a slow and (in Congress) unlamented death. The veiled threats, emanating from ad- ministration backers, hint that recalcitrant members of Congress may get redistricted by angry state legislatures into new and un- friendly districts. Almost all congressmen will be vulnerable to redistricting this year or next to take account of the 1970 census. But the chance of that actually happening Is zero. In fact, even if proponents of the plan could prove that it will happen, the op- position of both Rep. Wilbur Mills of Ar- kansas, powerful chairman of the Ways and Means Committee that will handle the Pres- ident's general resenue-sharing plan. and Rep. John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin, ranking Republican member, assures the plan's de- feat in the House. Moreover, intimates of Mills predict that he is moving toward a substitute plan that would have roughly the same result as Mr. Nixon's general revenue-sharing proposal: gradual federalizing of the welfare program, with Uncle Sam picking up most or all the state' welfare bill, now running at $7.3 billion a year. Some governors have been lobbying for just such a change for years. Switching from the present welfare program to Mr. Nixon's Fam- ily Assistance Plan, passed by the House but not the Senate last year, would cost the fed- eral government an estimated $4 billion ex- tra in the first year?but would not reduce state welfare costs more than $1300 million. A footnote: The President's "special" reve- nue-sharing plan?grouping present and nar- row categorical grant programs into six broad functions such as education and transporta- tion?has a far better prospect in Congress. I will not go to the Ways and Means Com- mittee. STATEMENT ADDRESS SD TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY (THE HAGUE, 1970) BY 21 FORMER GREEN MINISTERS 1. The undersigned Greek parliamentar- ians, residents of Athens, who have been ministers of Greek governments in the last ten years, address themselves to the parlia- mentarians of the NATO Assembly and in- voke, on the occasion of the 1970 meeting in The Hague, their moral support in the pur- suit of the implementation in Greece?a member of the Atlantic Alliance since 1952? of the objectives proclaimed in the preamble of the Treaty, namely the defence of Democ- racy, Freedom and Human dignity, which were all dismantled in Greece on 21 April 1967 by a coup of a small group of ambi- tious army officers who, under the pretext of a communist revolution, turned against the King, the then legal government and the ex- Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050092-2 \-1)45214 . pprovec*irror Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP731300296RAO 00050002-2 THE EVENING STAR DATE eiort. 7/ PAGE Son Tay Data Was 6 Months Old By SEYMOUR M. HERSH special to The Star The White House relied on basic military inteliigence that was at least six months old in approving the unsuccessful com- mando raid in November on the Son Tay prisoner of war camp inside North Vietnam. Interviews over the past two operation and construction of months revealed that the Pen- the Son Tay prison. The detailed any further proof that Amen- ;agon's first information about information even included what cans were, in fact, being de- the &xi Taz camp-23 miles kind of locks were on the cell tamed inside Son Tay. #0:t citraboi?Wdsjfliect hi doors and where they were 10- In essence, the high-risk oper- a irtigner hiorTE-Vietnarciese caled. tion was staged?with approval prison guard who was captured' By July, the interrogation of i during the U.S.-South Viet- the prison guard had been corn- namese invasion of Cambodia pleted and the Air Force was in May, 1970. ordered to initiate a series of The guard, whose capture was aerial overflights over the Son considered highly classified in- Tay prison. At no time before the actual invasion of the prison?on Nov. 20, six months after the guard's capture?was the military able to establish formation, provided military in- telligence teams with invaluable information about the location, 177. so). rervIrra-rriti r , c ro Ste - 1ed, the geog cliange-d 4 inteifsive investigation into 1141 sgirtn?rtinch to everyone's re. on Tay raid is a serious indict-1 lief?and the courtyard suddenly ingnt of the practices and opera- took on "that well-worn look," tlork of the Defense Intelligence as one analyst described it. ency, which was in charge of By now it was August and the elligence for the mission. , White House was approached. The DIA's photo analysts Briefings were presented to somehow interpreted what President Nixon and Henry Kis- turned out to be a vegetable gar- 1singer, the President's adviser :growing inside the Son Tay on national security affairs. The found as evidence that !President was, according to la- rican prisoners were inside , ter White House accounts, "en- area. 1thusiastic" about the idea and _ e is the story of the plan- !authorized full-scale planning ning behind the Soli Tay opera-1and training for a search and !rescue mission. The cloak-and-dagger opera- tion was code-named the Joint Contingency Task Group Ivory Coast, and training i began in Au- tion: olhe capture?or defection?of tIle , North Vietnamese prison - guard in May, 1970, was a niajOr achievement; such men were never sent by Hanoi into 1 gust at Eglin Air Force Base n $euth Vietnam because of the Florida. Optimism was rising in- higher risk of capture. At least side the government; it was the !PW:e POW camps previously first time that the military had vire? known to exist inside the established a n intelligence limits of Hanoi, but the loca- I "book" on a POW camp not in- of other facilities las not 'side the Hanoi city limits. wn. Despite this, the military 1 But there were many basic long been seeking pertnis- ' intelligence problems that were to raid one of the known 1 never overcome. For one thing, S. no one had established beyond a !reasonable doubt that the Son Clue to Inadequacy j Tay prison was holding Amen- One clue to the inadequac3i of !cans. tie 'over-all American intelli- tice operation inside North etnam emerged from the fact at the Pentagon learned about lie Son Tay camp from the cap - from President T b on?although the only facts kLav, n were those supplied by the former prison camp guard. Yet, there wi s no available evidence indicati ig that the mili- tary planners " al,!w" that the Son Tay camp lid not contain prisoners, as er. . J. W. Ful- bright, of Arkant as chairman of the Senate Fo eign Relations Committee has publicly charged. What does e ,p Lge from an See SON T V Page A-4 I "We had a hypothesis based on various sources of informa- tion," said one analyst who worked on the project, "but as far as being able to say, 'Hey, ,b tired guard. Son Tay area had, there go two more guys into the In 'fact, tong been known to the !camp' ? well, we couldn't." The telligenee community and ire- official added: liefitIy photographed. 1 "Our situation was this ? so a ccording to defense sourcs, river comes out and floods ? 4Ae major military construction and so they (the North Vietnam- program, manned by .a force ?i 1 ese) move the pilots out. The i estrnated 15,000 Chinese tom- ; place overgrows. It looks bad. rimhists, got under way there In j Bingo. The grass starts to wear Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 19o5 or 1966. The area also OC- dame the site of a MIG base ly in the air war and was a y target area during the oui In) The Central Intelligence Agen- cr had been unable to de- velop any solid information al)out prisoner-of-war camps. Beginning in the mid-1960s, it had attempted unsuccessfully to infiltrate highly trained teams of South Vietnamese into North Vietnam. Most of the groups?known in the intelligence community as 13611 Teams"?were dropped by parachute in the Red River Delta, northwest of Hanoi, but quickly became, as a former agent said, "ground up like hamburger. They'd get wrapped # in two or three days," he added, largely due to the high State of internal security in the North. l' In July 1970, the military asked the Central Intelligence Agency for any information it had on the physical makeup of Son Tay, but that apparently as the extent of the CIA's in- volvement. :The raid on Son Tay was to be an all-military affair, with over-all direction and planning from the Pentagon's counter- insurgency office and intelli- gence from photo interpretation supplied by CIA. Early Photographs down again. Hey, it looks good. It's a 50-50 chance they moved crowd on the -elipse during the I base this on." them back." hlarch on Washington (the l In fact, the Pentagon had no There were, apparently, only a ant-War demonstration in No- few cautious doubts raised ? vertiber, 1969) ? it was an Air largely because the high secrecy Force picture published in a lot of the operation kept details of newspapers. Now, don't ask away from many officials who ;'anybody to break down how might have pointed out more many of the people were Ne- vigorously the fact that the miliagrOes and how many were Cau- tary was planning a high-risk ,casians. We just can't do it. But raid on the basis of evidence after they left, you sure could indicating that weeds and grass tell that they were there?the had been trampled. grass would be all trampled." ,, . A similarly trampled appear- Previous Mistakes arte, was evident in what There had been previous nais- searbed to be a grassy area in- takes based on aerial photo- side the tiny Son Tay compound. graphs. , ' Shock For Military One former intelligence offi- cial recalled the time that photo The aerial photographs also interpreters spotted an enclosed established that the guard tow- campand basic layout of Son Tay area in North Veitnam er$ with a double barbed wire fence. were very similar in design to After observing it for a while that of the POW camps inside Hanoi. It was agreed?without; they concluded it was a base with some military significance ever seeing an identifiable pris- and targeted it for a bombing oner?that the Son Tay facility raid. was an active POW camp for l_ ,era "A few days later," the ee " :sArnicns. ometime in the July-August cial said, "North Vietnam began period, the military, got a shock claiming we had bombed the when, during a period of heavy death ward of a leper colony, flooding of the Red River Delta, Intelligence got fooled." the camp suddenly was vacated. The 101-man joint Air Force- The changing geography of the Army commando team took off camp was apparent: the tram- in helicopters from its base in pled look disappeared. - The early reconnaissance pho- tographs of the prison camp in- dicated that it was still in heavy use and were highly encouraging te-the iliab $14-Eciatilgon- Way skilled team was careful- ly assembled; men were hand- picked from offices throughout the Pentagon and assigned to the secret operation. The planning was rigidly bur- eaucraticized for security rea- sobs: One group of men worked oh means for getting the rescue team safely in and out of North Vietnam; another group did the day-by-day analysis to deter- Mine a crucial fact?were the pilots there? Jae evidence that the photo interpreters viewed as encourag- lag, however, was far from defi- nite proof that the captured pi- lets were at Son Tay. One man who worked on the Son' Tay project, attempting to explain its failure, argued that pleat? reconnaissance is not an n way of knowling if American prisoners had been inside the camp at all ? even before the flooding -- since the captured : guard last work there early in I 1970. Intelligence men in the Penta- gon later were able only to con- clude that the base had either been closed permanently or tem- porarily. "Was it being refur- bishe d? Was it being disinfected? We didn't know,' Said one of the men who took part in the planning. The Vietnamese guards in the camp had AK-47 automatic ri- fles, the standard Chinese weap- on not usually given to local troops in North Vietnam, a fact that led many analysts to decide that they were a small house- keeping team, perhaps waiting for the prisoners to return. The last overflight of the pris- on, concluded just hours before the operation began, still showed signs of occupation ? the "well-worn look." Despite the failure, most member of the planning and in- telligence teams took solace in the demonstrated ability of American commandoes to pene- Thailand early on Nov. 20. Ac- When the flood waters reced- trate North Vietnam's air space cording to many published ac- counts, the team arrived unde- tected and landed inside the small Son Tay compound. No prisoners were found, but the men noticed that most of the open space inside the prison was being used by the North Viet- name,se for a carefully cultivat- ed vegetable garden. 'Well-Worn' Garden Intelligence analysts later con- cluded during post mortems on the raid that the "Well-worn look," which had become so clearly discernible after the July-August floodin g, might have been a result of the garden- ing efforts. More disturbing was the possi- bility that the prisoners could have been transferred from Son Tay in August, just after the flooding began and just as the commando team began its ar- duous training for a mission al- ready doomed. During a little-noticed news conference at Eglin Air Force Base in early December, Brig. science at all despite Gen. LeRoy Manor, head of the commando team, told newsmen: "We weren't able to tell exactly when they moved the prisoners of war . I say it could have been about three months. And this is a judgment, and I have nothing absolutely definite to - pread beliefs of the gener- blic so conditioned to de- dons of miraculous close- from "eye in the sky" cam- ea 100 miles up. The source added: ake that hoto raph of the Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RIM7,3138S0&50002-2 NEW YORK TIMES iXOn Sending British Exp) ert on New Saigon Study , stU'Lc. je to T41 Yoxlc 'Saks ',$HINGTON,. Jan:- 15 ? ?-410241,11k4ir ish ' - . 0 - ? ? 0 on errill wa ? ? ? 'ext ? e ur en evaTuation ? :on ovemmen s .1.0. ? e t. et. Nun s, . pim.m.;747llit;r1 ? d - ? -; ?1. ants sard that tPritis qTert *theta Ad4i1K5tiiiiiPlynforrn- would also loote into e joint Amerkan-SoUth YleZatnIse lice _And. Pacification activities, which range from efforts to Wipe but the Communist politi- cal organization in the South to operation of South Vietnam- ese prisons with United States assistance. State, _Department officials said that the proposal for Sir Robert to, accept another mis- 'slon by the Sawn Government with the conciirrence of the IJnitecl ,States, ' :They Said-tfie' request Was forwarded_ by Ellsworth T. Blinkt:', the American Ambas- sador m:$aigon, in a message to President -Nbcon earlier this month; Sir?Ito ert unertool? five- week secret migsion fgr Presi- se-nrt fxon last autumn 7? his second vsit to south Vietnam in a year?but it war not clear for what specific reasons he and his group of British police specialists had been asked to go back after so short an in- terval. There was strict secrecy here surrounding Sir Robert's trip. But the speculation in informed rguarters is that both Mr. Bunker and the Administration were eager to have an up-to- date independent evaluation of the progress of pacification and related public safety efforts. It Is felt such an evaluation is needed before decisions are made on additional with- drawals of American troops from South Vietnam. Another possible reason for the mission is that the Civil Operations and Rural Develop- ment Support Program, which is in over-air charge of pacifi- cation, is to be reorganized, effectiye March I, as the Com- munity Defense and Local De- ,Olopment Program. Other informed sources said that both the Administration and Ambassador Bunker still appeared to be troubled by the relative lack of success in the destruction of the secret Com- munist network in South Viet- nam. This has a bearing on the larger aspects of pacification 4nd on the Vietnamitation gram, under which South Viet- namese forces are gradually replacing American combat units. The problem of the Com- munist organization in South Vietnam was reportedly a principal theme of the report Sir Robert presented to Presi- dent Nixon at a secret con- ference last Oct. 13. The New York Times last Dec. 2 reported that Sir Robert had gone to South Vietnam on a Presidential mission. The Times article said Administra- tion officials had asserted that his report underlined the failure to eradicate the Com- munist network. The next day, however, in confirming the existence of the Thioinpson report, the White House press secretary, RonaTcl L. Ziegler, said that "the over- all thrust of the [New. 'York Times] ,story, which leads to the impression that the pacifi- cation and Vietnamization programs are not doing well, Is an incorred impression." Mr. Ziegler refused to de- scribe the content of the re- port on security grounds. In an interview with the Asso- ciated Press last Dec. 13, Sir Robert declined to comment maw on that part of the T1f?earticle that dealt with the failure to destn y Jie Com- munist subversive o g nization. He said, however, :hat the Vietnamization an, pacifica- tion policies were unassail- able by the enemy. In mid-December ;ecretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird summoned to Wasl r gton the head of the Civil Operations and Rural Sup- port Program, E. Col- by, to discuss the la Ification problems. According t ? Admin- istration informant, this re- view included ques 'cis about the Communist network raised in the Thompson tport. Officials here said today that Sir Robert's new mi si in would deal with United q ites and South Vietnamese ' 3 Bee and public safety" prog a ns. This appeared suggest that Sir Robert a,,,d his ad- visers?who were riot identi- fied ? would cont prtrate on pacification and, jii ticu1arly, on the problems ai ne Com- munist undergrounc The allied progra 1 to eradi- cate this organizat al4 is run jointly under the nn-p of Op- eration Phoenix 1:03 he Civil Operations and Rur Develop- ment Program and t. ie South Vietnamese Nationa Police Di- rectorate. Although the Civil Operations group is h -iaded by a tivillan, Arribass?dc,r Colby, most of its personnel engaged [11 Operation ?hoer': ;.s drawn from the Defense pepartment and the _ elligenie Agency: Officials inclicater, tat the ThompHl. mission would concern itself ith other )hases of the Antri,an and ;south ,Vietnamese -olce and mblic safety pragp rr s Both the National tolice Di- ectorate and the, .1 ohth Viet- iamese prison sypt"'t m are ad- rised and support, d by the hiblic Safety Office o= the Ad- ninistration. far. ,4!-e national )evelopmental und aver-all Lirection ,Mnliaisaior Col- group.. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP731300296R000300059409-9 PliA477I ,-JAGED11 T HE WA SHINGT ON POST DATE k WAS ashingion Merry.Go-Itound '141 pOST Monday, krtch 22. D11. nt Data Cramps Parts Negotiators Pia Anderson pla Aegetiatorn In Paris have been restricted to the c,rie intelligence t tiv war they are sup- -i Oiling, This has me grumping inside a'e z,(4 ? ? a ion over the diffi- o negotiating in the ,delegation re- a routine intern- -4=lil ' 114 dealing with the I I! rh foks.:10,0 sbiammil- plans, Tos.ffican ? - ? ngencY plans and --,I?jofriFelItie document's:? _ -..paill7.714 ? aris. _ %ILjii qS at1115 i-i.nm reraft remnlaqk ppginApubo. ether tacVcal tar- Vietnam in, late Okt.11001.4 for example, nii assatior 15avid X. -TT -? nuiletely13r, sur- ? recelved h irst attacks tkA1111Ei tuamese. 'him poorly pre- andle the Istorth ci- egation's protests ? Cornmunipt nego- a ors e oose a propaganda blast, threatening to stonewall the talks. Ambassador Bruce asked Ur- gently for more details about the raids. He needed the back- ground information to help him respond to the Commu- nist charges. His request was forwarded by his military liaison man, Lt. Gen. Julian Ewell, in a "flash" message to the I'enta- gon. Admiral Thomas Moorer, the Joint Chiefs chairman, sent back a detailed account trary evidence from ex-CIA men, State Department in- formants and classified U.N. dpeuments. ? The poet's theory is that th CIA has been compelled t help the opium farmers in the mountains of Northern Laos in order to keep them fighting the Communists. The CIA has raised a 10,000. man army from these Meo of the raids from the Washing- tribesmen. With out their ton Post. The reply was re- opium trade, they might re- garded in Paris as an insulting quire massive U.S. economic message to Bruce that he aid. ? should be satisfied with what Informants have told Gins- he reads in the newspapers. berg that the renegade Chinese Nationalists in North- ern Laos and Thailand also make their living from opium The CIA would like to keep - Poet's New Quest Beat poet Allen Ginsberg, the unhappy hippie, his ern- -barked upon the new role of these Chinese active, too, investigative reporter in pur- against the Communists. suit of evidence that the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency is Poet's Transformation supporting the opium racket we discovered Ginsberg's in Laos. , transformation from poet to Ginsberg, sandalled and bald-i muckraker when he came to ing, his long beacd streaked] our office, clad in his hippie with white hairs, has even, garb, seeking proof of his own managed to interview the se-1 opium story. To our surprise, elusive CIA director, Richard I his detailed files and probing Helms, about the CIA's sus-! questions were thoroughly pected opium smuggling. professional. Helms vigorously denied his He asked us for a copy of a _ agents are 'ping opium out ofjetter that has disappeared Laos. But tThsberct grail:IT-Om the files of Senate Gov- lected a thick iaaciet. 61-514Crtunent Operations Subcorn- 1. ;Ij mittee. The tette written by a former CL ? employe* named S. M. Mu; rd, charges that South Vic tram's Vice President Ngu r Coo Ky once flew opium ?ur of Laos. The New Yor. Times and Ramparts magazi ic which are also working oi the opium story, had called u3 about the letter. But Gins ie,-g came to our office and p, e:?sed in per- son for the miss n . evidence.. We dug a ph, tt Ad of the letter, addressei? to former Sen. Ernest Cri 47,ning CD- Alaska) out of ou ?lea. It told how Ky, during I is missions as an Air Force .o onel, "took advantage of thi z ituation to fly opium from L aos to Sai- gon." My associate, I, -4 Whitten, verified several lei ails in the letter but could one up with no additional evii eiwe that Ky engaged in opiu ii smuggling. The colorful So it Vietnam- ese Vice Preside .t also denied the charge. But the rag, .e- i. bearded Ginsberg tucked a ropy of tius letter into his imptessive port- folio and strode 0.,If for an in- terview with Wa!tor Pincus, a former Senate ?:-Ici;-eign Rela- tions investigate- with inside Information on Ii id, whine. 1971, Bell-MeClur 5 -ndicate, Ina. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 S 7036Approved For Releasee nerable to observation by other, intelligence means at our disposal." The Administration's sensitly4y in public discussion of advances In seiswic research was illustrated by the fact that the Penta- gon, according to Senator Case, 'Iripped out" a section summarizing the findings on the Woods Hole conference from a report sub- mitted to the Senator. As a result, Senator Case said, he turned to "nationally recognized authorities," many of whom participated in the conference, for a summary of the findings. In their summary, they said, "The essence of these findings is that there are two signifi- cant developments which make it much more feasible to distinguish between seismic dis- turbances caused by earthquakes and those caused by nuclear explosions. "One of the developments noted was that new technology has revealed that explosions cause much smaller waves in the earth's crust than do earthquakes. A complemen- tary and equally important finding Is the ability to detect smaller seismic disturbances than had heretofore been possible." THE WHALINQ INDUSTRY Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, many peo- ple today believe that the whaling busi- ness disappeared with the sailing ship. This view is entirely wrong and unfortu- nately is a tragic misconception. The whaling industry has continued at such a pace that whales are now, and have been for some period of time, an endan- gered species. During the 1960's the total number of whales killed was the greatest 10-year kill ever made. In 1933 almost 29,000 whales were killed, yielding 2,606,201 barrels of oil. In 166 almost 58,000 whales were killed, yielding 1,546,904 bar- rels of oil. While almost twice as many whales were killed in 1966 as in 1933, only half as much oil was gathered, which obviously means that whale hunters are killing smaller whales in larger numbers. Scientists have predicted that main herds of whales have been brought to near extinction in the Antarctic. They have further predicted that if a 5-year moratorium on whaling had been estab- lished in the Antarctic between 1962 and 1967, the industry could have been har- vesting the maximum sustainable yield from 1967 onward. But a moraterium was not established arid it is now estimated that it will take 50 to 100 years to bring back the Antarctic whale stocks to the same size that they might have reached between 1962 and 1967, In March of this year Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans announced that he had ordered an end to American participation in the destruction of the great mammals. However, despite the general recognition that all species of whales are endangered, Secretary Stans has now bactracked and issued a license to Del-Monte Fishing Co. of Richmond, a California firm, permitting the firm to engage in the 6-month season on fin- back whales and the 8-month season on Sei and Sperm whales, The season be- gan on April 1. This is indeed a disappointing develop- ment and I believe places in question the ability ,of this administration to handle the discretionary powers of the Endan- gered 'Species Act, On March 23 I introduced S. 1315, a bill that would prohibit Americans kill- ing ocean mammals, including seals, apsesiWAIRR1312RgflA3jEl,N50002-2 Nay 17, 1971 walrus, polar bears, as well as whales. Even though the total U.S. kill of whales in 1970 came to only 125, the United States lost the opportunity this year to lead all other nations in stopping the killing of this endangered species. Other countries killed over 20,000 whales in 1970 and it is quite obvious that the pro- tection of whales cannot be achieved unilaterally, and that Russia, Japan, and Norway, the major whalers, must join in the endeavor. My bill attempts to reach this problem by requiring the State Department to initiate an inter- national treaty halting the slaughter of ocean mammals. Also my bill would help to remove the economic incentive for these other countries to continue the needless slaughter of ocean mammals by banning the importation of all products of these animals. Last month while in Eastern Europe meeting with officials on East-West trade, I met with high ranking Russian officials in the Ministry of Fisheries on the problems associated with the killing of ocean mammals and the proposals in my bill. They agreed that public opinion requires more effective measures against taking ocean mammals. They also in- formed me that their ideas and the ideas in my bill had much in common; how- ever, they were insistent that any meas- ure in this area must have the adherence of all concerned nations. The Russians have taken the lead in protecting the polar bear since 1956. I believe that it is essential that imme- diate hearings be held on S. 1315, which is cosponsored by 24 other Senators and which has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman DAVID PRYOR, Democrat of Arkansas, and Is cosponsored by 20 House Members. Stronger action than that taken by Sec- retary Stans is certainly called for in view of the growing threat of extinction of all o an mammals. \ITI'HE WAR IN INDOCHINA Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, on May 13, Robert Shaplen, one of the most experienced and perceptive observers of the war in Indochina, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Be- cause I agree completely with Mr. Shan- len that "the Vietnam war, always essen- tially a political one, is rapidly becoming more political"; that "we do not under- stand much about the Vietnamese"; and that we should stay out of the process of accommodation through which the Viet- namese must work out their political dif- ferences, I have introduced a Resolution creating a congressional commission to implement a policy of strict U.S. neu- trality in the coming South Vietnamese elections. The purpose of this Commission is not to tell the South Viet,namese how to run their elections, but to keep us out of those elections. Mr. Shaplen has pointed out that many South Vietnamese believe that the United States is backing the Thieu government "to the hilt." Unless we act e to dispel that impression, we will once again have interfered with a political event that is best left to the South Viet- namese themselves. I find Mr. Shaplen's testimony to be a most constructive addition to the debate over the future course o our Indochina policy, and mask unanimai consent that It be printed at this poin in the RECORD ? There being no objec the state- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATEMENT OF ROBERT SHA N, BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON Fr .7S.ETGN RELATIONS, MAY 13,1971 Mr. Chairman, members ), the Commit- tee: I wish to thank you f( r ,-our invitation to testify at these hearing,. f have been a member of The New Yorke :raft since 1952 and the Far Eastern corn _ipondent of the magazine for the past nine y-ars, but I am appearing here today on a n. vate basis. My experience in China and Southeast Asia dates back to 1945. My visit to South Vietnam was in June 1946. i was there most recently, and in Laos an Cambodia, in March and April of this year. I am the author of The Lost Revolution, Ti ,o out of Hand, and The Road From War. I shall address myself firs. to the Vietnam war, specifically to the subj( et of these hear- ings?how to end it--and t ie-i to the prob- lems of Southeast Asia in general. Ending the war as soon as possible is only a neces- sary first step to dealing wit he vital ques- tion of re-formulating ou whole foreign policy-making process, not 'my with regard to Asia but to the rest of the world as well. My own position on the vietnam war has been as follows: I believed in the original Vietnam commitment. and %lade I think we have made many disastrou. mistakes since we became involved in that :vi?going back to 1945-46 but particularly s :14:e 1954?I still feel we had a legitimate init al political con- cern. But that concern Sb ruld have been limited, in its expression a id implementa- tion, to a military assistan -e and advisory program, stressing u nconv .tVlonal rather than conventional warfare 3.ei-hods, and to programs of economic and 'a cial aid. The continuation of these progr: collectively, should have been predicated on the amount and substance of political ad social reform the Vietnamese undertook. Imfortunately, we set no such standards aci went ahead anyway, and once involved i was difficult to avoid becoming more invc-/ved. Hindsight criticism is easy, but this was our first big mistake. I was against the bombint c f North Viet- nam and the overcommitment of American forces in the South. It is pro; 'al?ly true, how- ever, that had it not been fo the number of American troops in the cons try in 1965 and 1966 it would have been in two, from the highlands across to the oast, and most of the northern half of South V'etnam would have fallen to the Commums's. But after that, strategically and tact ceily, we con- tinued to rely far too much c irepcnver and airpower, including indiscrin 'nate bombing. If we helped save a series of 'is popular gov- ernments, we increasingly all ,nated millions of South Vietnamese by our overpowering but invariably ineffective tt? inconclusive military actions, despite th. act that we killed several hundred thouseno North Viet- namese and Vietcong. Simi -toreously, we tried to ameliorate the destru ti 'n we caused by constantly shifting progra o:. of so-called pacification. Real social ant. ( conomic re- form, including land reforn "thould have been far better conceived an :mplemented far sooner. Most importantl the task of training the Vietnamese to th. alone, with modern weapons including M-16 rifles, should have been undertak( n immediately after the military crisis of le 66, not sev- ral years later, as happened. ter the 1963 Tel offensive. Nowadays, our otiated efforts to bring about Improvements 'n security and evelopment, and to turn Si e war over to viethamese, are an part of what we call Vietnamization. Because of 1 1.e, heritage of Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 May 17, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE none to Latin America, critics consider the flame is not worth the candle. NEW FLOW POSSIBLE It is possible that the winding down of the Vietnam war may produce new flows of arms to Latin America. Certainly many Latin nations have demonstrated that they will buy arms elsewhere it they cannot get them from the U.S. But this has not happened yet and ' it may never happen. What of the defense of the Panama Canal and of the hemisphere in general? CINC- SOuTia has no role in the canal defense. The small infantry units in the Canal Zone do not need a Joint Staff to supervise them and the brigade would not be affected by departure of the Southern Command. Air defense is handled by Strike Command in the U.S. and there are no combat aircraft stationed in Panama. The Navy command for defense of the region is in Puerto Rico. Similarly the training centers for Latin officers and men would not be affected by terminating the role of the CINCSO1TTII staff. These could continue functioning with- out the generals and admirals and so' could the procedure of sending Latin officers to school in the 'United States. The armed forces have waged a strong bat- tle to keep their Southern Command head- quarters intact and have cut the milgroups to half the strength of three years ago. But it now appears that even though some of the structure may remain, the unwieldly head is doomed to go for much the same reasons that the cavalry finally got rid of horses. AD HOC COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS SUPPORTS GENOCIDE CONVENTION Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, The Ad Hoc Committee on the Human Rights and Genocide Treaties has worked long and hard in the fight to get the United States to ratify the United Nations hu- man rights and genocide treaties. I am very pleased to be working with and sup- ported by such a fine organization. Betty Kaye Taylor, executive secretary of the committee, wrote a letter which was published in the New York Times Mag- azine on Sunday, May 2, supporting my efforts to get this country to ratify these vital treaties. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that this letter and a correction, be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the mate- rial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: AD HOC COIEMITTEE ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENOCIDE TREATIES, New York, N.Y., May 11, 1971. Senator WILLIAM PROXMIRE, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR PROXIVIIRE: Thank you for your letter of May 7th indicating that Martin H. Webster's letter about the Beverly Hills Bar Association plebiscite had been placed In the Congressional Record. I was, of course, delighted to see this. I trust that you've already seen my letter ila the New York Times Magazine Section of May 2nd applauding your efforts on behalf of the Genocide Convention. I regret that the Times failed to correct the figure I submitted on the number of times you had spoken on the Human Rights Conventions. I called in a correction as soon as this mistake was brought to my attention but the Times failed to take note of it. I hope we get the Treaty ratified -before this "erratum" becomes fact. Sincerely, BETTY KATE TAYLOR, Executive Secretary. RE: PROX1VIIRE'S STUBBORNNESS To THE EDITOR: Sohn Herber's fine article on Senator Wil- liam Proxmire ("What Makes Proxmire Run." April 4) failed to mention one other out- standing example of the Senator's reliance "on the power of argument." On Jan. 11, 1967, Senator Proxmire served notice that he would remind the Senate daily of its failure to approve U.S. ratifica- tion of several U.N. human-rights treatie3, notably the Genocide Convention. Since making that pledge, he has spoken 5,520 times. And now, after 20 years of delay, the Foreian Relations Committee voted recently to send the Genocide Treaty to the Senate for consent to ratify. "More obdurate, more obstinate, more stubborn"?yes! And right on! BETTY KAYE TAYLOR, Executive Secretary. ATOM TESTS NOW IDENTIFIABLE Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, scien- tists can now discriminate between earthquakes and the smallest nuclear tests conducted underground by the two super nuclear powers, the United States and the U.S.S.R. This important break- through was discussed last summer in a special meeting sponsored by the De- partment of Defense at Woods Hole, Mass. Identifying atomic tests removes one of the last obstacles to a ban on under- ground testing of nuclear weapons, and might very well lead to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. I have always favored such a treaty, but only when competent scientific opinion held that underground explosions could be identi- fied. With that possibility now here, I earnestly hope that the United States will take the lead toward negotiating a comprehensive test ban. Such a treaty would be a boon to the people of America and of Russia as well as all of mankind. I ask unanimous consent that a New York Times news story on this matter be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: CASE CITES GAINS IN TEST DETECTION (By John W. Finney) WASHINGTON, May 6.?Senator Clifford P. Case said today that scientists had made so much progress in distinguishing earthquakes from underground atomic explosions that it should now be possible for the United States to enter into a treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests, As the basis for his contention, the New Jersey Republican cited unpublished conclu- sions reached by seismic experts at a confer- ence last summer at Woods Hole, Masa., sponsored by the Defense Department. The conference, according to a summery made public by the Senator, concluded that the ability to identify seismic disturbances had been tremendously increased as a result of research during the nine years since the limited test ban treaty was agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Implication he drew from these con- clusions was that the problem of monitoring underground nuclear tests had been solved to the point where the United States could consilder entering into a comprehensive test ban. Because of differences between the United States and the Soviet Union over the inspec- tion required to check on underground ex- plosions, the 1963 test ban treaty excluded S 7035 underground tests and was limited to ex- plosions in the atmosphere, in space or un- der water. On the basis of the reported improvement in detection and identification, Senator Case concluded that it should now be possible to monitor a ban on underground tests with two or three on-site inspections a year. This, he noted, was the number offered at one point by the So viet Union in the ne- gotiations in 1962. The offer was rejected by the United States, which, on the ratio of one inspection for every 10 unidentified seis- mic events, demanded seven on-site inspec- tions a year. After the American rejection, the Soviet Union withdrew its offer. In recent years Moscow has taken the position that seismic advances now permit an underground test ban to be monitored wholly through national detection systems operated by each country. The Nixon Administration continues to hold to the position of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations that on-site in- spection is still necessary. An official of the Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency said that there was "gen- eral agreement" that there had been "sub- stantial Improvement" in seismic detection but not enough to warrant a change in the American position. Congressional pressure, however, now seems to be mounting on the Administration to re- examine the long dormant issue, which in re- cent years has been overshadowed by a pre- occupation within the Government with the strategic-arms limitation talks with the So- viet Union. At the Geneva disarmament conference, the United States and the Soviet Union are coming under similar pressures from the nonaligned states to re-examine their posi- tions on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Case statement coincided with an announcement by Senator Edmund S. Mus- kie of Maine that the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Subcommittee on Disarmament would hold hearings on various possible arms con- trol steps, including a comprehensive test- ban treaty. Senator Maskie is the chairman of the subcommittee, and Senator Case is the ranking Republican. FIRST DETAILS ON CONFERENCE Senator Case's statement provided the first detailed disclosure of the results of the Woods Hole conference, called by the Penta- gon's Advanced Research Projects Agency to review progress made in the seismic research program known as Project Vela. About $300- million has been spent on the project since it was set up in 1963. Senator Case said that "authoritative re- ports" he had received about the seven-day conference "indicate that our capacity to distinguish between earthquakes and nu- clear explosions has improved 10-fold since 1963." As a result, he said, the time has come for the Foreign Relations Committee to explore "whether a comprehensive test-ban treaty may now be possible." According to Senator Case, the Woods Hole conference concluded that the annual num- ber of unidentifiable seismic disturbances in the Soviet Union above 4.0 on the Richter earthquake scale has been reduced from about 75 in 1963 to 25 now. A nuclear explosion producing 4.0 on the Richter scale corresponds to an explosion of one or two kilotons, equal to that of 1,000 to 2,000 tons of TNT, in granite. In dry, porous soil, which tends to muffle the shock waves, 4.0 on the Richter scale would correspond to a 20-kiloton explosion? the size of the Hiroshima bomb. But a summary of the Woods Hole con- ference presented to Senator Case pointed out that such desert-like soil "to the depth which Js necessary, is rare in the Soviet Union and such testing would be very vul- Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 May 17'ed For ReleaseaffiffilnoRIARWM9296fflini3pp050002-2 confusion and experimentation, Vietnarniza- . tion remains a cloudy concept. Politically, I think our efforts have also been ineffective and often damaging. We tried to force-feed the Vietnamese western- style democracy far too quickly, before their Institutions were able to cope with it. We should have started creating the Conditions for building traditional village democracy, horizontally from the ground up, instead of imposing a new system vertically, from the top down. It is partly for this reason, and becauee of the physical damage we have wrought, that the good we have done social- ly and economically has been more than off- set by the bad. There is no political cohesion and not enough comprehension and motiva- tion for -Social and economic changes to be- come sufficiently meaningful. This does not mean that we will leave Vietnam without some improvements and hopes for the future; but for what we put in we are coming out ' with very little, including scant knowledge of the mistakes we made. Few lessons have been learned. Two major events of the past year, name- ly the invasion of the Cambodian sanctuaries and the incursion into Laos, have not con- tributed sufficient positive results to war- rant the negative ones?of at this late junc- ture taking the initiative in further widen- ing what has always been an Indochina war, long recognized by the Communists as such. Once we were over committed, we would have done far better to attack the sanctuaries and the Ho Chi Minh Trail area much ear- lier, in 1967 or 1968, perlaps even to have risked blockading the ports of Haiphong and Sihanoukville, instead of bombing the North. We thus fought the wrong kind of war in several ways. We have continued, all along to teach the South Vietnamese to fight a conventional War instead of a 'People's War of counter-insurgency. This is another reason I remain skeptical about the success of Viet- namization. The only real and practical so- lution in Vietnam is one of political accom- modation. I shall come back to that later. Your Committee is considering a number Of bills and resolutions that deal both with the question of ending the war and avoiding overcomMitments in the future, partly by limiting the prerogatives and powers of the President and re-affirming the obligations of Congress. There has been considerable de- bate about establishing cut-off dates?that Is, dates for the total removal of all Ameri- can forces in Vietnam. ,1 can readily under- stand the overwhelming desire of the Ameri- can people to get out of Vietnam as soon as possible. However, it is far easier to fan into a quagmire than to get out of one. It is not stmply a question of prolonging the agony, ours and theirs. The basic question, even at this eleventh hour of our misbegotten in- volvement, is how to get out in such a way as to preserve whatever chance there may be for the Vietnamese to reach a political set- tlement among themselves without either permitting the Communists to take over the country or having the war continue in- definitely. The people of South Vietnam, for the most part, are eager to have us leave. But whatever the mistakes of the past, most of the Vietnamese, like most of the re- maining Americans in Vietnam, also feel that the schedule of total withdrawal should and cannot be too precipitately advanced. Im- moral and distasteful as the war has become, we cannot get out, lock, stock and barrel, overnight. It is not just a matter of ad- mitting our lack of success gracefully, of atoning for disgraceful My Leis, Or of cut- ting our losses. Beyond being physically im- possible, overnight withdrawal would create complete chaos in Vietnam. It would drop cur prestige in the rest of Asia, as well as elsewhere in the world, to a new low. Like it or not, we cannot escape amount of rem- nant responsibility, including the respon- sibility to repair as much of the damage we have done as possible, both physical and One may still ask, however, if the pace of withdrawal cannot be faster and if a reason- able cut-off date cannot now be set. While I have been critical of the Cambodia and Laos operations, I feel that, by and large, President Nixon's Withdrawal policy so far has been reasonable. But it can at this junc- ture be stepped up and it should be more clearly defined. Although the most elite forces in the Vietnamese army suffered severe losses In the Laos operation, seven of the eleven Vietnamese divisions are currently rated good or better by our top American military ex- perts. Having been taught to fight the wrong way, they are at least now beginning to fight the wrong way right, that is to say, conven- tionally or quasi-conventionally. This may not be much but it is all we can do at this late date. Whether the Vietnamese can change later is up to them?certainly the vast majority of our military establishment has proved itself incapable of changing its theories and methods of indoctrination. The President has recently announced an- other reduction of 100,000 men, bringing the total to 184,000 to be left in Vietnam by De- cember 1st, 19'71. He has continued to link the question of total withdrawal with the prisoner issue, and he has said that some American troops will remain in Vietnam un- til the prisoners are released. While he has refused to set a date for complete with- drawal, on the grounds that this would play into Hanoi's hands, it has been widely as- sumed that there will be no more than about twenty or thirty thousand troops in South Vietnam by mid-1972, or certainly by the time of our Presidential elections. Whatever moral justification there is to the position we have taken on prisoners, we cannot move Hanoi by pleading or threatening or by mili- tary action, such as the Son Tay raid, to change its attitude on this matter. Hanoi continues to maintain that the prisoner is- sue, like others, has to be part of overall negotiations to end the war and must be preceded by our total withdrawal. But on occasion, Hanoi has indicated a willingness to accept the "principle" of complete with- drawal, in other words, an announced sched- ule pointing to a cut-off date. I think it is illusory to suppose that we can strike a bargain with Hanoi about mutual troop withdrawals preceded by cease-fires. What I have described elsewhere as the mi- rage of "the wonderful world of cease-fire" was based on my conviction that, even if there should be a formal halt to the fighting, vio- lence at varying levels will inevitably con- tinue in Indochina for years to come, and no one will ever collect all the guns there and put them in nice little heaps. They will be buried for use another day, as they were in 1954. It is illusory to believe that the Com- munists do not still want to dominate all of Vietnam, and most of Laos and Cambodia, either through force or through political sub- version, Furthermore. Hanoi knows pretty well the number of troops, more or less, we expect to have in Vietnam by mid-1972. It is hard to keep secrets in America. There- fore, I feel that the President could more sharply define his schedule of withdrawal at this point without giving too much away. Or he could move secretly to deal With Hanoi on this subject, and with the prisoner issue very much in mind. Perhaps he has already tried to do this. I do not think that, at present, it would materially help matters for Congress to interfere with the President's activities in this respect. I Would, however, favor a resolution calling upon him to move in that direction as fast as possible and requesting him to consult at regular intervals and in confidence with Congress, on a bi-partisan basis. The Vietnam war, always essentially a political one, is rapidly becoming more po- litical. It is also at the moment reassuming S7037 the shape and substance of guerrilla con- flict, part of what the Cc o soloists call protracted warfare, Including naditary, polit- ical and diplomatic action. 7 as North Viet- namese and the Vietcong trc with some important exceptions, are breaking down into small units of five to fifty n er The orders have gone out to "legalize s t least fifty percent of their political cad --that is, to have them work their way is sc the govern- ment system, including the lc :to self defense forces, and to live openly while still deal- ing covertly with one supe; on a city block or in a rural hamlet. For the moment anyway, Hanoi has determined to subvert and control the South, or as much of it as possible, by these slower me- iacds, although eventually what is called the General Up- rising and/or General Offensi,,e such as was attempted, and failed, during Tst, 1968, may again take place. The emph .s!s once more Is on urban struggle, even shtle the rural struggle also continues. I am lsy no means sanguine about the prospecss of peace in Indochina. A far-flung guerril a war may very well continue between the Con munists and the nationalists long after ws- t re gone, and embrace Cambodia?Laos is scanewhat dif- ferent because the frarnewora tor re-estab- lishing a coalition governme rt exists there, under the 1902 Geneva formula. However, while we have always underes mated Hanoi's threshold of pain?the Laos incursion and the current level of activity ()I tie part of the Communists in South Vietnam are the latest examples?it is also true t Ito the North Vietnamese are weary of thi oar and that they have faced, and are Isms facing, by their own admission, some ravea economic, management and morale probket as. They, too, are scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel?seventy percent of these now work- ing In the fields of North Vietnam are women. Therefore, I feel that Hanoi may in time welcome at least a hiatus, or a truce, which might, under the best condi tens, lead to a process of accommodation in -h South. This would not negate the protracsel war theory, but it could alter its consequences. Because of that possibility, I believe .h it the fewest number of troops we leave m Vietnam the soonest, the better it will la a small con- tingent of American forces sl ould remain long enough to protect the somber of Amer- icans who stay in Vietnam in necessary tech- nical and advisory roles, an'i o serve as a rehabilitation and reconstru, = an corps, but I see no need for American combat forces beyond the end of this yeas: as ic combat support elements as well she old be reduced by then to an absolute mini: o in, perhaps a few battalions. By the end CC 972, or early 1973, no more than a few thoossnd volunteer advisers and technicians an ,ehabilitation personnel should remain?ths f ,rmer will be necessary to complete the t. sl of teaching the Vietnamese to use what ae have given them. The Vietnamese cannce . -a fact, afford to pay for the kind of war oney are now fighting. One would like to Is m that by that time something more will ha e been learned about People's War. Far nt rs Vietnamese officers than most of the An eiscan military establishment supposes are ncw ready, willing and eager to re-organize and -li-n down their army and auxiliary forces t sineet the de- mands of People's War. If maommodation and political solutions don't w ak, that will be the only way the South a'S tnamese can fight for their survival. Ho "ever, properly executed, such a reorganizatie a muld in time become part of the accomny cis tion process, to include Vietcong elements. Accommodation in Vietnem can be at- tained in various ways. It c-an start at the top, with an agreement between the Saigon government and the Provisioaa_ Revolution- ary Government of the Comb u mists, to start negotiating. It can, and shot Id be preceded by a serious attempt by whas er Saigon re- Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 Approved For Release Innninainst ? _ IMIQR50002-2 S 7038 CtigaMTOSMTPRI.1391 May 17, 1971 gime is in power to accommodate with the heretofore neglected elements in Vietnamese society?the Buddhists, the members of the Coo Dal and lioa Hao sects, and the mon- tagnards, which together comprise a major- ley of the South Vietnamese population. These are things we should have urged force- fully long ago, applying our political lever- age, instead of simply pouring aid into Viet- nam unconditionally?I should add that I s believe in aid without strings under certain circumstances and in certain places, but Vietnam was not one of them. We no longer have much leverage left, but we can still try the art of persuasion more subtly at all levels instead of simply telling people in Independ- ence Palace in Saigon, whoever they may be, how well they are doing and what else they ought to do, and then retiring, amid nod- dings of Vietnamese and American heads, to the embassy, believing we have accomplished our objectives. This is part of the whole American myth of diplomacy in Vietnam that has led us to wear blinkers for fifteen years. Considering how long we have been there, we do not understand much about the Viet- namese. One year or eighteen months tours Of duty are not conducive to acquiring knowl- edge or fostering patience. Accommodation can also take place at the village level, which I consider most impor- tant. There Is no doubt thwt life for many Vietnamese in the Delta, for example, has improved materially in the past two years? as I have said, not everything we have done, not all aspects of pacification, have been bad. Canals and roads are open, markets are busy, because security in most places has improved. But that doesn't mean most of the population supports the government of Pres- ident Nguyen Van Thieu. My own scorecard would still read pro-Communist fifteen to twenty percent, pro-Thieu fifteen to twenty percent, and the rest generally uncommit- ted. But if the government does something about the everlasting and evermore deeply imbeddel corruption, and ,implements land reform properly, which so far is not the case, and if it really sees to it that honest elections are held at all levels, then accommodation becomes possible, both with the uncommit- ted and with those legal Communist cadres who begin to see that life on the non-Com- munist side of the fence is better for them and their families. But that will take time, and it is a Vietnamese problem, not ours, though we have certainly abetted corruption. However, it furnishes another reason for our getting out as quickly as possible and letting the Vietnamese solve their own problems in their own way. While the Communists have refused to participate openly in the Vietnamese 'elec- tions that have been held in the past and are to be held this summer and fall, for a new House of Representatives in August and for the Presidency in early October, they will Undoubtedly participate covertly. They will try to get their sympathizers into the House and, if he runs, they will most likely vote for General Duong Van Minh for President, even though he has abjured them and spoken out against coalition government but in favor of peace. Obviously, the Communists would favor the strongest peace candidate. I would like to express my approval of the resolution introduced by Senator Stevenson or for a similar version, for the establishment of an American observation group from Con- gress this year far more sophisticated and knowledgeable than the groups that so cur- sorily watched the elections of 1966 and 1967. What is required is not only Congressional observation but some tough professional ad- vice and participation. It will still be im- possible to avoid some rigging, but at least this can be reduced. To inspect the elections properly would require teams of experts in each province down to the village level?a costly undertaking. But having spent as much as we have already in Vietnam, I think we are justified in coming up with some final appraisals of our 'own, however, incom- plete though they may be. If we can obtain evidence of rigging, then we will know how and why we have failed in prematurely forc- ing democracy on Vietnam, If Thieu is re- elected and the election is judged reasonably fair, then Hanoi's position in refusing to deal with the Saigon regime is less tenable, and the force of world eminton, including Moscow's if not Peking's, assumes a new perspective. If Thieu is defeated, by Minh or by Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, the same would be true. There are some recent signs that the Com- munists may favor aegotiations next year, perhaps even late this year, though there is also doubt about how serious they would want to be. But there is talk in Paris, as well as elsewhere, of a new Geneva type con- ference. The decision in Hanoi to eliminate candidates previously chosen from the South, in the elections held in North Vietnam in April of this year for a new National Assem- bly, was presaged on a desire to allow the Pro- visional Revolutionary Government in the South more leeway to talk with members of the Saigon government. Hanoi would cer- tainly maintain Its domination of the P.R.G., but even the semblance of independence, and the indefinite postponement of the issue of unification of the North and South, would help. There is some continuing evidence that, despite their adamant publiastand, the Com- munists might talk secretly with Thieu, if he is re-elected, probably with Minh, and even with Vice President Ky, who often tendseto fly like a hawk but also to coo like a dove. All of this is further proof that the Vietna- mese, all of them, are tired of the big war and again underlines the advisability of our getting out as soon as feasible. This does not contradict my fears that violence will con- tinue, for the Vietnamese seem to have a self-destructive streak in them which defies western comprehension, though we are self- destructive enough in our own ways, too. The North Vietnamese are like military lem- things, willing to die to the last man down the Trail; the South Vietnamese are political lemmings, seemingly incapable of getting to- gether and forming a truly representative government. They might have done better if we had left them alone In this regard and not imposed our western ways upon them, there- by inhibiting what might have been a more natural political, even revolutionary devel- opment in the South. Yet despite this lem- ming concept, one must admit that the Vietnamese have a tremendous capacity for survival, contradictory as this may sound. Vietnam is full of such contradictions. In any event, I do not think we will easily strike a bargain with Hanoi based on the troop withdrawal question alone. It is better to set a firmer timetable of our own and then wait and see, and hope, letting internal political-developments and the accommoda- tion process take their course. Hanoi's de- mand for a nrovesional coalition government could still then shift to acceptance of a mixed electoral commission in the South which would be tantamount to temporary coalition, if such a commission were given broad quasi-legislative powers to determine, for example, the bona fides of political parties, including the Communist party. I do not think we should concern ourselves with this queseon, and similar ones, beyond the use of persuasion, once we have nego- tiated our own way out of Vietnam and solved the Prisoner issue. I think Hanoi means what it says about the prisoners - that once we are definite in saying when we'll leave, the issue can be negotiated, be- fore others. This would then be a parallel approach to the natural but slower accom- modation process in the South. I doubt that a residue of American advisers and tech- nicians would be a stumbling block, not so long as Peking and Moscow continue to play such an obvious role in North Vietnam, The question of our continued use of air power must be settled, however. Here, I think, we must be RS firm, as we can be in making clear that we intend to stop the bombing anywhere and everywhere. The Vietnamese air force has improved rapidly, though it has so far proved itself incapable of waging sophisticated helicopter warfare. It, too, must be left to fight on its own, if necessary, certainly within one year, with continued technical assistance, including spare parts. But the bombing by Americans of all areas of Vietnam, while it has staved off defeat time after time through the years, has become one of our principal national disgraces. Ultimate defeat in an extended guerrilla conflict will never be avoided that way, no matter how many North Vietnamese we kill, or how many South Vietnamese civilians accidentally. The sporadic bombing of North Vietnam at this late date, in re- prisal for attacks on reconnaissance planes or other pretexts, gains us very little and merely stiffens morale in the North further. Your chairman has aSked me to speak about "the current situation in Southeast Asia and the probable consequences of vari- ous policy alternatives." I think we should do all we can in Laos to further the possi- bilities of re-establishing the 1962 coalition and to bring an end to the separate war that is being waged in that unfortunate country. There are increasing signs that the North Vietnamese want to colonize at least the eastern half of Laos. The nation's de facto partition under a coalition government in Vientiane is probably both inevitable and de- sirable, given the circumstances, and it seems doubtful that the North Vietnamese will withdraw their troops from the country be- fore some sort of negotiations get underway. They are now deadlocked because Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma demands such a withdrawal first, and the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese are equally adamant in demanding a cessation of American, Lao, and Thai bombing. The bombing in Northern Laos should be stopped, even though it would undoubtedly lead to some further mili- tary expansion and consolidation by the Communists, both in the north and south, around the administrative capital of Vien- tiane as well as the royal capital of Luang Prabang and the entire area of the Bolovens Plateau in the south. But, it could probably be contained and negotiations could then almost surely take place. The proferred good offices of the International Control Commis- sion have been all but rejected but there remains a chance that they might at a cru- cial moment be used. A new Geneva Confer- ence that dealt with the Laos question first could possibly pave the way for a Vietnam solution. Cambodia is more directly a part of the Vietnam war. Nevertheless, a political resolu- tion is possible there too, though its outlines are fuzzier than in Laos. The Cambodians can accommodate with each other, to include the natave Cambodian Communists but prob- ably not the Sihanoukists. At least one such attempt was made a few months ago, in the jungles of Pursat province, but it failed when bombers attacked Communist elements near- by, resulting in the assassination of tlre five government representatives. Although I op- posed the invasion, our role in Cambodia to- day is justified, it seems to me, in that we are helping the Cambodians help themselves through a program of military and economic assistance. However, there are signs already that we wil make the same mistakes we made in Vietnam?in emphasizing conventional rather than unconventional methods of war- fare and in not using our leverage of aid to end or at least limit the amount of continu- ing corruption and to encourage a quicker pace of political re-organization and progress in the formation of an efficient republican form of government. The illness of Prime Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 May le,kpitipyed For ReleastRff69fteliltagilB235.gpftp3ii050002-2 Minister Lon ,No1, obviously regrettable, nevertheless ha a offered a fresh otiportunity to bring into ale government some of the younger and more far-seeing political ele- ments who have been Ignored so far or rele- gated to minor roles. I is too soon to tell if the new cabinet chosen last week is suffi- ciently representative, but it would not ap- pear to be so. What is the importance of Southeast Asia to the United States? This, of course, is some- thing we have to determine generally before we can be specific about programs and policies. There are many pressure pointe in the world and we cannot be equally concerned about all of them, or be a policeman all over the globe. I have always considered Southeast Asia, along with the Middle East and Ger- many, to be three top critical areal for us, as Americans. It is part of our fundarhental his- toric involvement in Asia, whieh is and should continue to be concerned With China, first .and forenaost. The recent events in- dicating a relaxation of China's hostile attitude are certainly encouraging, although I do not think we should delude ourselves about long-range Chinese intentions. By in- viting some ping-pong teams and carefully selected groups of western correspOndents to China on guided tours, the Chinese have gained a hundred Million dollars worth of publicity, or more. One should not gainsay that, but it remains to be seen how much further they will go, and it remains to be seen whether we will now be willing, as we should have been before, to welcome China into the United Nations and to work toward some sort of solution to the knotty Taiwan prob- lem that will relegate the Taiwanese govern- ment to a necessary secondary role akin to Byelorussia's thus still recognizing its right to a seat in the General Assembly. Opening up trade is the lesser part of the equation. Taiwan may very well in the future be part of a single China, as both Taipei and Peking maintain, though they. naturally approach the question from different viewpoints. The essential fact remains that China is a great nation and the Chinese are a magnificent people who cannot be ostracized or ignored no matter what form of goverment they have. If this is true of the Russians, it is equally true of the Chinese, and it has taken us far too long to admit this blunt fact to ourselves. Our relationship with Japan is next in Importance. The Japanese economic thrust into. Southeast Asia today is coniparable to its military thrust thirty years ago. Tokyo's relationship to Peking remains almost as un- defined as ours. Our military alliance with the Japanese is in the process of tenuous re- adjustment. These are all factors that will have a bearing on events in Southeast Asia in the years ahead. The Nixon Doctrine, by itself, is not clear enough to serve as a per- manent guideline to policy. It is all well and good to say that we will help these nations that help themselves. There are many un- certain factors and possibilities that remain. What sort of permanent system Of bases are we seeking, if any, on the Asian mainland, or close to it? What sort of naval screen do we want to maintain? Is there a need to maintain a floating force of Marines or to keep other elements stationed in or close to -Asia which can be used in emergencies, as President Kennedy did with the Marines in Thailand ten years ago? The Kennedy ploy worked at that time and might work again under similar circumstances; but we cannot foretell. That brings up the ticklish question of insurgency. When does insurgency reach a level' 'definable as invasion? Supixise North Vietnam or China decides to give more sup- port to the Thai Communist insurgents, now Increasing their smallpox pattern of resist- ance throughout Thailand. We will then be up against some difficult decisions. Probably we will maintain our agreements with Thai- land affording us the use of the air bases we built in that country, as well as retain our options in the Philippines. But if the num- ber of insurgents in Thailand doubles, and includes elements of other nations, do we put the bases to use again and start bombing the rebels? There is nothing in the Nixon Doctrine that indicates the answers. What it comes down to, bluntly, is whether we will decide that a specific nation is 'worth saving' in its own right, and whether to act or not is in our national in- terest. I personally feel that, in addition to sustaining our diplomatic-political and eco- nomic-social posture, we should maintain some sort of military shield in and around Asia, to include the Philippines and Thai- land. In the interests of continuing to im- prove our relations with China, I think we khouId withdraw from our military position In Taiwan, but maintain some naval forces In the South China Sea. Our continuing Partnership with Australia is essential. Our relations with Indonesia, which comprises half of Southeast Asia's total population of a quarter of a billion people, are also impor- tant, and what we nave done to spur In- donesia's economic recovery, in concert with eight other nations of the world, particu- larly Japan, has been a significant contribu- tion to Southeast Asia's well-being. The sta- bility of Indonesia may well determine the Stability of the rest of the region, and in many respects Indonesia holds the key to regional cooperation which is proceeding, albeit slowly. If we cannot definitely predict what we might do if certain situations arise, in South- east Asia or elsewhere, we can take steps to clarify our policymaking methods and the scope of our potential actions. I do not think the President's hands can or should be tied so firmly that he cannot move in emergen- cies without Congressional approval. There can, however, be limits set to what the Presi- dent does on his own, limits as to time and as to the extent of his initial commitment of forces. Nothing as broad as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution should again be passed, and I doubt that it would. But we must do some- thing to improve the poor relationship be- tween the Executive and Congress, which has acquired a guerilla warfare character of its own. Further, there is a tremendous need to redefine the role of various agencies in the government. If the State Department should make and execute foreign policy, what should the role be of the National Security Council and the President's personal advis- ers? What should the role be of the CIA? Should it be purely an intelligence gathering agency, or should it also have operational functions including counterinsurgency ones, and should it play a part in building politi- cal institutions in certain countries where our interests are deemed at stake? We will be faced with repeated conventional as well as unconventional situations in the future, and if we are to avoid more Vietnams we will have to set our own institutional house in order first. It seems to me that this commit- tee, as well as the Committee on Govern- ment Operations, should jointly devote -themselves to this task. The latter, some ten years ago, held significant hearings and ob- tained some highly enlightening testimony on the subject of foreign policy making pro- cedures. But little or nothing happened about it all. As a nation, we have a deep self- expiatory streak: we seem to think that the mere process of laying our souls bare, of spelling out what's wrong with the way we do things, settles the matter. I would strongly S 7039 recommend that the oreign R lations Com- mittee consider seriously Si: .17, measures as that introduced by Senate ,lagleton and others and then go further a studying the role of the dozen or so gove: lament agencies and branches involved in I .e making and execution of foreign policy. A careful con- sideration of President Nixo new plan to reorganize foreign aid would oe just one step in this direction. There are many more steps necessary. The alternat of just going along as we have, depending .n the personal- ties of Presidents and the wl--m is of Congress reflecting the many moods o merica, could be disastrous. We cannot re ,o once our role in the world and retire, at t, of disillusion over Vietnam and other issl,eE, to anything approximating a Fortress An sine position? there are, fortunately, few s), that we are about to do this. But only i ?larifying our purpose and intent and mak al a far greater effort than we have so far to ,tel ermine which agencies of government haw t e right to do what, and what the extent a) ,d limit of those obligations are, can we briog order out of the embittered post-Vietna, a period. Thank you. THE KENNEDY PR} :S. DENCY Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on March 30, I inserted in tie CONGRES- SIONAL RECORD a book iew on the White House relationsh p between a President and his persc 121 staff. Mr. Kenneth P. O'Donnell, a i ose adviser to President Kennedy, tool ,'xception to the review, feeling it did not accurately reflect the Kennedy year To make public Mr. O'Donnell's opin- ion on this issue, I ask his corre- spondence with me be rrinted at this point in the RECORD. There being no objector , the corre- spondence was ordered tx i.e printed in the RECORD, as follows: KE,NNETH P. 0 D)NNELL, Boston, Mass.. Adril .19, 1971. HOC. FRANK CHURCH, U.S. Senate, Senate Office Bu? ?cl Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR: I have re. d the Congres- sional Record of March 30, It 71 and, needless to say, it very much disturk eel me. Mr. Baker and Mr. Petal ire long-time acquaintances of mine, bu ! am slightly taken aback by the lack of pee oracy in their statements. They quote Si great length George Reedy who, in my o ii ion, discusses a White House that never ex while John Kennedy was President. I and all of my colleagues recall hours upon hours of debates, di aossions, argu- ments and disagreements b. ween ourselves and the President of the Dlited States out of which emerged a policy. 1-,eard very few "yes sirs" and the President s otld not have tolerated them. Every Ti lay morning President Kennedy met a the Congres- sional Leadership and discu .5( .1 and argued and debated the policies of t te United States Government. John F. Kennely as you know, was a oOnstitutionalist who Oneved totally In the balance of powers bet ye =11 the Execu- tive, Legislative and the C itrt. There are those who have criticized h s legislative ac- complishments without yak ci y but it was because he always attemptec t.. reach an ac- commodation with the legis l tve branch of the United States. The Life article described 3?,mns to me to prove the President's oonsi le .ation of the United States Senate, Senat Ar Mansfield; as Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2 s 7040 Approved For Releas0^^/ CONGRESSIONALRK 7c33310829601g02,N050002-2 /Our rtoreselatative, brilliantly presented your views and brought great influence to bear ttptin the -President of the United States. it so happened that their views and almost all of ne on he White House staff (or shall We say, courtiers) were in total agreement that we shotikt not involve ourselves in any military contact in Viet Nam. I am disappointed that Mr. Baker and Mr. Peters used the word "war" because there was no "war." There were 16,500 Americans in Viet Nam as I recall, Prior to the Presi- dent's assassination, Mr. 1VIcliamara had an- nounced the withdrawal of 1000 American Advisors, There had been 43 Americans who had lost their lives in the years John P. Kennedy had been President (which is 43 too many) but there was no war. He pro- mised that there would be no war and I am Shocked that two distinganshed journalists would allow the Congressional Record to be used to confuse history. I have read George Reedy's book with great interest, and he describes the Johnson Ad- ministration but not the Kennedy Adinin- istration. I have had the privilege of serving with both, and one of George's points is quite ? important. Under the Johnson Administra- tion, they did all "yes sir." That was not true in the Kennedy Administration and obvi- ously was not true in the Eisenhower Admin- istration as witness the resignations of Gen- eral Ridgeway and General Gavin. As one who served in the White House un- der two Presidents, I have one suggestion . . . that those who disagree with their Chief in matters of great public policy should have the courage and do have the obligation to resign and present their opposition to the public. In this way, they truly serve this great Republic. Sincerely. KENNETH P. O'DoNNELL. APRIL 30, 1971. MT. KENNETH P. ?DONNELL, Boston, Mass. DEAR KENNETH: I have read your letter in which you take issue with the book review by Mr. Baker and Mr. Peters which I in- serted in the Congressional Record of March 30, 1971. I can understand why you feel that the article may have had relevancy to the White House under President Johnson, but that it did not correctly describe the staff relation- ship with President Kennedy, As one who feels that the Kennedy Presi- dency was a generally bright episode in an otherwise dreadful decade, I would be happy to insert your reply to the Baker-Peters ar- ticle in the Congressional Record, along with explanatory introductory remarks. I would not do so, of course, without your permis- sion, yours being a personal letter. I shall await word from you. Sincerely. PRANK CHURCH. Bosrou, Was., May 4, 1971. Hon. Pawls Cnuacn, U.S. Senate, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR: Thank you very much for your reply, and I would be delighted if you would be willing to place in the Congres- sional Record a contrary viewpoint. As I have simmered since reading the article and well recall the violent discus- sions on the Missile Crisis where Governor Stevenson and some others were almost in- volved In fisticuffs, I pall at this kind of dis- tortion of history. I remember the vigorous exchanges con- cerning the use of American military power, the' use of tactical air weapons and the al- most violent responses of the civilian mem- bers of our military establishment. I recall vividly where the President, unlike some of his successors, sought the advice and con- sent of the Congressional leadership at meet- hags in the White House where the argu- ments and discussions were furious and, per- haps never resolved. In my four brief years in the White ITOU3O, I again reiterate, the President made the ultimate decisions but neither the Congress nor his staff were subservient. With my deepest respect. Sincerely, KENNETH P. O'DONNELL. PAUL A. HOMO, JR., KNIGHT IN THE ORDER OF ORANGE NASSAU Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, it Is a source of pleasure and pride to me when a fellow Alabamian is singled out for honor in recognition of extraordinary achievements. Recently, a distinguished citizen of Mobile, Ala., received such an honor from Queen Juliana of Holland who, by royal decree, designated Paul A. /Ratio a Knight in the Order of Orange Nassau in recognition of his out- standing services as an honorary consul for the Netherlands at Mobile. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that an article which appeared in the Mobile Press on Friday. May 7, 1971, describing the circumstances of this award be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Mobile Press, May 7, 1971] MOBILIAN Now SIR PAUL ROIMO?NETHER- * LANDS CONSUL KNIGHTED He went to a birthday party in honor of the queen, discovered he was the guest of honor and emerged as a knight. Paul A. Boulo Jr., honorary consul for the Netherlands at Mobile, today proudly wears the medal designating him, by royal decree of Queen Juliana, a Knight in the Order of Orange Nassau. Boulo received the honor at a reception at the World Trade Club in Houston, Tex., from F. A. Hoeffer, consulate general of the Nether- lands, before 300 applauding guests on April 30. Boulo has been notified by Nether- lands Ambassador R. B. Baron von Lyiaden that the queen's decree bestowing knight- hood upon him will be forwarded to Mobile. The award is the highest civilian honor the queen can bestow in recognition of services to the crown and country. Boulo's knighthood came from distin- guished consular services at Mobile since 1953. He became honorary vice consul then, succeeding his father in the position after his death. Boulo's friends say the queen could not have honored a finer fellow. He suffered a crippling automobile accident several years ago, but declined to bow to fate and accept the life of an invalid. Today he gets about on a cane, continues active direction of his company, Paul A. Boulo, foreign freight broker and forwarding agent. He pilots his 50-foot yacht, the Lyreb, entertaining customers aboard, and inciden- tally does a good job of selling the Port of Mobile. The Boulos have been associated with the sea and the waterfront for generations. Boulo has documentary evidence in his possession indicating that one of his ancestors was in the Holy Crusade to Siria Pulgline in 1250 A.D. and commandel a Geonese galley in the Battle of Malonia. The name originally was Ballo, but was later changed to Boulo after his. great-grand- father Philip Boole, a merchant seaman, emi- grated from Italy to Mobile in 1825 and es, tablished a ship chandlery and bar near the waterfront. His grandfather owned sailing ships that plied the coastal trade, and his May 17, 1971 father carried on a freight forwarding busi- ness, which Boulo continues to operate. So now it's Sir Paul Boulo?and his friends salute him with delight. Boulo has served in numerous civic and sports organizations and the queen's recognition adds new honors to a distinguished career. HARPER COLLEGE GRANTED UN- QUALIFIED ACCREDITATION Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, 6 years ago, the State of Illinois took a ma- jor step to increase the availability of higher education for Illinois citizens by enacting the Illinois Public Junior Col- lege Act of 1965. Since then, our State system of community colleges has ex- panded and improved at an impressive rate. One of the most brilliant examples of what has been accomplished is the re- cent accreditation granted to William Rainey Harper College in Palatine, Ill. Harper, established by voter referendum in 1965, is the newest Illinois college to be so honored. In January of this year, the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools granted full ac- creditation without qualification to Har- per. Mr. President, at this point, I ask unan- imous consent that the news release an- nouncing the association's action be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the news re- lease was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: COMMUNTTY COLLEGE PRESIDENT, ROBERT E. LAHTI, ANNOUNCES THAT ACCREDITING BODY'S ACTION IS "WITHOUT QUALIFICATION" William Rainey Harper College in Palatine, public community junior college (District #512) established by voter referendum in 1965, has been granted full accreditation by the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Harper is the "youngest" public two-year Institution operating under the Illinois jun- ior college act of 1965. Rock Valley College in Rockford. (District #511), which also received fun accrectition this week, was established one year earlier than Harper. In announcing the action by the accredit- ing body, Robert E. Lahti, Harper's president, stated "Harper has reached this important milestone with .all due haste for a new in- stitution which has taken on the challenge of providing comprehensive community col- lege services to its constituencies." He added that the North Central Association had fully accredited Harper "without qualification." According to the Harper president, full ac- creditation means that the college's credits and quality of instruction have unquestioned reciprocity among all Institutions of higher education. "This is, of course, most impor- tant to our students and their families while at the same time it is a tribute to our faculty," at the same time it is a tribute to our fac- ulty," he said. Dr. Lahti added that accredita- tion also means that a faculty is "more free" to pursue innovative approaches to the learn- ing process. The North Central Association based its decision to accredit Harper partly upon the report by a six-member examining team which visited the college on January eighth and ninth. "The decision was also based upon an exhaustive self-study of Harper by the college faculty last year and my own ap- pearance before a final examining board in Chicago earlier this week," Dr. Lahti ex- plained. Conclusions stated in the North Central report of its January visit to Harper stated, Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2