THE WORLD OPIUM SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000300060030-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: October 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The World Opium Stituation
Confidential
ER IM 70-3-,
October 1970
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octiment cai twins informatirn iffecting the , itional
e of the Onito rf Statis wi.thNn the meaning r=f Title
ions 7 93 an l 7 X14_ of th ITS Code. as an >ndec3.,
Lzed nerson iS nrohihited i'v law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The World Opium Situation
Introduction
Addiction to opium-based drugs has been increas-
ing in most victim countries since World War II.
International efforts to suppress illicit drug traf-
fic currently are embodied in the 1961 UN Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The Convention encom-
passes the major aspects of previous international
agreements but also emphasizes controlling leakage
of opium from the farm into illicit channels.
To control farm leakage, the Convention calls
for establishing state opium monopolies to designate
areas for legal poppy cultivation and to license
farmers. Opium production would also be limited by
restricting exports to countries which legally ex-
ported opium before 1961: Turkey, Bulgaria, India,
Iran, the USSR, Greece, and Yugoslavia. To oversee
compliance, the Convention established the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board; however, the
Board has no enforcement powers.
Illicit opium production has continued to
flourish, however. Beyond the difficult task of
crop control there is the persistent consumer demand
and the inability of enforcement alone to suppress
illicit trade. Given its present scale, abuse of
opium-based drugs is unlikely to be lastingly
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated internally in CIA and with the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs of the
Department of Justice.
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suppressed without greater international coopera-
tion in treatment and enforcement programs as well
as in production control.
This memorandum attempts to estimate world
opium production and consumption and to describe
the illicit trade patterns and the wholesale
organization. It traces the major postwar mar-
keting changes and discusses problems involved
in controlling illicit production, consumption,
and trade in opium and its derivatives.
Production, Consumption, and Trading
of Opium and Its Derivatives
Sources and Uses of Opium and Opiates
1. Opium is produced from several varieties
of the poppy, Papaver somniferum, an annual that
grows three to four feet tall on a thin main stalk
and produces several blossoms and egg-size seed
pods. Planted mostly in the fall but sometimes
as a spring crop, it requires intensive cultivation
and much harvesting labor. About two weeks after
the blossoms fall the pods are lanced by hand and
the white latex-like raw opium oozes out and coag-
ulates. This gum is collected by scraping the
pod (see the accompanying photographs). Upon
further exposure the gum hardens into a brown
brick-like form. The chief active chemical in
opium is the alkaloid morphine, the sole source
of the drug's analgesic, narcotic, and addictive
properties.
2_. In its pure state, opium may be eaten,
smoked, or drunk. Today, eating and smoking
greatly predominate. Opium has a long tradition
in folk medicine, and addiction is to some extent
associated with alleviating physical pain in
settings of poverty and low public health stand-
ards. The habitual use of opium for nonmedicinal
purposes also reflects longstanding customs in
many parts of the world. Only to a lesser extent
does its use represent a reaction to human stress
in settings of rapid social change and the conse-
quent conflicts between traditional and modern
values.
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OPIUM POPP
The poppy flower in full bloom (left), and the
pod after the petals have fallen.
Lancing pods to allow the Scraping the raw opium
raw opium to seep out. from the poppy pod
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3. In modern medicine, raw opium has been long
superseded by its easily distilled derivatives
(opiates) which isolate the morphine. Although
most morphine is still produced from raw opium,
it is increasingly being derived from processing
poppy straw (the pods and upper parts of stalks)
which bypasses the opium stage and produces mor-
phine directly. While the use of morphine as an
analgesic has declined since World War II in favor
of synthetics, the processing of morphine into
codeine, the major anti-tussive in modern medicine,
has been on the rise. Morphine addiction is a
serious problem in only a few countries, but heroin
addiction has spread to many. Heroin, a semi-
synthetic derivative obtained by the action of
acetic anhydride or acetylchloride on morphine,
is generally regarded as having no unique medical
value and is outlawed in most countries. For the
most part heroin is produced in small, crude, clan-
destine laboratories.
4. Morphine multiplies the effects of opium
several times and heroin even more, particularly
when taken by injection. Euphoria and indifference
to pain and distress are heightened as is addictive
craving. Although a substantial portion of those
consuming opium may be classified as users rather
than addicts, those consuming morphine and heroin
are generally addicted. Heroin addiction is asso-
ciated with societies undergoing rapid social change
and the attendant conflicts between traditional and
modern values. Heroin consumption is essentially
an urban phenomenon restricted mostly to people
under 40 years of age.
5. Opium poppy cultivation is profoundly in-
fluenced by climate, terrain, and economics.
Opium poppy can be grown in a variety of soils
except it dislikes heavy, clayey, or sandy soils.
The plant thrives in warm but not humid climates
and requires only a moderate amount of water before
and during the growth cycle. Rainfall during the
harvest, however, can be disastrous since it
leaches alkaloids from the pod. Much of the some-
times irrigated flat terrain of mountain valleys,
3,000 feet or more above sea level, in the Middle
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and Far East meets the climatic and soil conditions
well, and most of the world poppy cultivation occurs
within a zone extending from Turkey's Anatolian
Plain to Communist China's Yunnan Province (see
Figure 1).
6. The two greatest concentrations of opium
poppy acreage are in India and the areas occupied
mostly by hill tribes in Burma, Laos, and Thailand.
India cultivates well over 35,000 hectares and the
other areas collectively probably even more. There
is also extensive poppy acreage in the Pushtu-
speaking area in northwestern West Pakistan and
northeastern Afghanistan (hereafter in this memo-
randum referred to as Afghanistan-Pakistan) and in
the Central Asian republics of the USSR. Turkish
poppy cultivation, a reported 12,000 hectares in
1970, is probably somewhat less than either
Afghanistan-Pakistan or the USSR. Poppy acreage
in Communist China is unknown but may well be less
than in Turkey. Iran abolished poppy production
during 1956-68 but planned to have 12,000 hectares
under cultivation in the fall of 1970. There is
relatively small acreage in Mexico and parts of
North Africa and only scattered cultivation in
South America. In all the above areas, poppy is
cultivated and harvested by hand, chiefly to obtain
raw opium. Poppy is mechanically cultivated and
harvested on a relatively modest scale in Northern
and Eastern Europe and the European parts of the
USSR to produce poppy straw for processing into
morphine. In 1969 this activity accounted for
about 40% of the world's licit morphine output.
An equally important purpose of European and Soviet
cultivation, however, is to obtain poppy seed for
the baking industry.
7. Opium poppy cultivation generally uses
only a minor share of farm land. Poppy farmers
from Turkey through India seldom plant more than
about one hectare; the major part of their land
is used to meet their own food needs, chiefly
wheat. In some areas of the Far East, however,
poppy acreage represents a larger portion of the
cropped land. Some Meo hill tribes in Northern
Thailand pursuing a slash-and-burn type of agri-
culture plant half or more of the cropped land in
poppy, with the remainder in upland rice. Since
these farmers produce only part of their food
needs, they market some opium to buy rice.
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8. A major constraint on poppy cultivation is
that it is labor-intensive. Some UN authorities
estimate 175 to 250 hours of labor are required to
produce one kilogram of opium. Although yields
vary with soils, temperatures, rainfall, and seed
quality, they can be substantially increased by
irrigation. Moreover, because poppy rapidly de-
pletes the soil, good yields demand fertilization
or, at a minimum, land rotation. While the poppy
needs thinning and several hoeings and weedings
during its growth cycle, harvesting requires the
most labor. The five or six pods on each plant
must be lanced and, usually within a 24-hour in-
terval, the gum collected. In Turkey, lancing is
commonly done at least twice (with a week interval
between lancings) but may be done six or eight
times in India. Harvesting labor requires entire
families -- and sometimes hired hands as well --
over periods extending from two weeks to two months.
Because of the tremendous labor requirement, poppy
tends to be raised only where labor is both abun-
dant and cheap. Indeed, per capita incomes range
from $370 in Turkey to less than $100 in India and
the Far East.
9. A farmer's poppy income reflects both
yields and quality, which, in turn, reflect the
intensity of cultivation and seed quality. By
weight, Indian yields are highest (20 kilograms
per hectare), in part because the opium gum is
commonly adulterated with seed, leaves, and even
foreign matter. Turkish yields in the late 1960s
ran 15 to 16 kilograms per hectare. Afghani-
Pakistani yields may approximate these but mainly
because of adulteration. In Burma, Laos, and Thai-
land yields are perhaps only 8 to 10 kilograms per
hectare. When opium quality is defined by its
morphine content, the Turkish quality is the world's
highest -- from 9% to 13%. The morphine content
in other countries generally varies from 4% to 12%.
In Turkey and India the farmer receives additional
income from the harvesting of poppy seed and straw.
10. The farm price of opium tends to fall
moving west to east in a pattern corresponding
with changes in product quality. The illicit
market price paid Turkish farmers is estimated
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to have been about $25 per kilogram during 1969
(see Table 1). In Pakistan the comparable price
averaged an estimated $12 to $15, and in Burma,
Laos, and Thailand about $12. Farm prices on the
licit market vary less markedly, except for Iran.
In Turkey and India, the only significant licit
opium exporters, the upper limit is determined by
the world market price. For Turkish opium the
licit price was about $12 per kilogram during most
of the 1960s and for Indian opium about $1 less.
Iran is a special case. When it resumed licit
production in 1969 it set a producer price of
$91.80 per kilogram for top grade opium and an
average price of perhaps half that amount in order
to discourage leakage into illicit market channels.
Prices to Farmer for Raw Opium
1969
Producing Country
Us $
per Kilogram
Turkey
Licit
11.00
Illicit
25.00
Pakistan
Licit
10.00
Illicit
12.00 to 15.00
India
Licit
10.00
Burma/Laos
illicit
12.00
Iran
Licit
91.80 a/
a. Price for top-grade opium only.
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11. Although the price declines moving east-
ward, poppy cultivation as an element of farmers'
incomes usually becomes more important. In Turkey,,
for example, earnings for the 70,000 poppy farmers
in the late 1960s averaged $70 to $80 -- about half
from illicit production. These earnings accounted
for roughly 10% of average yearly income in major
poppy-growing areas -- $700 per farm -- and perhaps
half the cash income. In India, 200,000 farms
averaged $70 to $75 from poppy cultivation. This
could easily represent 15% to 20% of average farm
income and probably most of the cash income. In
Burma, Laos, and Thailand, opium is often the
principal source of farm income to poppy growers.
12. There is no readily substitutable crop in
the main opium-producing areas that can yield a
comparable income return per unit of cultivated
land. In West Pakistan, for example, much of the
poppy area could be sown to high-yielding Mexican
wheat, but the return would be only about $50 per
acre, compared with $90 for poppy. In Turkey,
Mexican or other high-yielding wheat varieties
might be raised on some poppy acreage with returns
the same as in Pakistan. Loss of income per unit
of land would be greater, however, since average
prices for opium -- both licit and illicit -- are
considerably higher than in Pakistan. A recent UN
survey of poppy-growing areas of Northern Thailand
concluded that prospects for an alternative crop
to poppy that would bring commensurate returns are
not encouraging.
Licit Production, Consumption, and Trade
13. Licit opium production probably approaches
1,100 tons* annually, or less than half of total
world production (see Table 2). India, with
750 tons in 1968, far outranks any other country.
The USSR and Turkey, each producing on the order
of 120 tons in 1968, rank second. On the basis
of likely medical requirements, Communist China
may produce 75 tons to 100 tons. Production in
North Vietnam is very much less. Pakistan, Japan,
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia produce only small amounts
* All tonnages in this memorandum are given in
metric tons.
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Estimated World Opium Gum Production a/
1968
Metric Tons
Producing Country
Licit b/
Production b
Illicit
Production
Total
Production
India
750
175 to
200
925 to
950
Turkey
120
100
220
USSR
115
115
Yugoslavia
Pakistan
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
175 to
200
Japan
China
Negl.
75 to
100
Unknown
Negl.
75 to
100
Afghanistan
100 to
125
100 to
125
Burma
400
400
Thailand
200
200
Laos
100 to
150
100 to
150
Mexico
5 to
10
5 to
10
other c/
5 to
10
5 to
10
1,060 to 1,085
1,260 to 1,395
2,320 to 2;
480
a. Rounded to the nearest five tons.
b. As reported by licit exporting countries to the United Nations,
except for Communist China.
c. Mainly North Africa and the Near East.
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of licit opium. In 1969, when it resumed poppy
cultivation, Iran produced 9 tons.
14. Practically all licit opium is used to manu-
facture medicinal opiates. Morphine production cur-
rently runs about 160 tons per year, 40% from poppy
straw. In 1968, 30,000 tons of poppy straw were
processed, including 6,500 tons by the USSR. Other
leading processors were the Netherlands, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The opium supply is
adequate for world medicinal needs, and, although
prices have risen in the past year or so, this re-
flects no long-term shortages.
15. About two-thirds of licit opium production
in the late 1960s was sold to pharmaceutical firm,
chiefly in Western Europe and North America. India
accounted for more than 80% of such exports in 1968
and Turkey nearly all the remainder. Both countries
export most of their licit output. Communist China
exports no opium. The USSR supplements its domestic
supply with substantial imports from India. World
exports of poppy straw were 6,560 tons in 1968, 93%
from Turkey.
16. A very small amount of licit opium produc-
tion is used by some governments to provide main-
tenance dosages for registered addicts. India,
Pakistan, and Iran have such programs. India
planned to dispense two tons of opium in 1970 to
registered addicts, only a small percentage of
total consumption by Indian addicts and users.
Pakistan's program is also small. Iran began
registering addicts only in late 1969. By March
1970, 30,000 persons had registered, and by mid-
year about 50,000, or perhaps 15% of Iran's addict
and user population. Although the quantity of
opium provided by maintenance programs varies among
these countries, in each, as in other victim coun-
tries, most addicts are supplied exclusively by
the illicit market.
Illicit Production and Consumption
17. Illicit world opium production, estimated
at 1,250 to 1,400 tons annually, is concentrated
in Southeast Asia, with other areas tending to
rank in descending order of importance moving
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westward. Together Burma, Laos, and Thailand ac-
count for an estimated 700 tons to 750 tons, over
half of world output, and Burma alone about 30%.
Afghanistan-Pakistan is second with about 300 tons.
Pakistan's production -- 175 tons to 200 tons --
is about the same as India's. Turkey's illicit
output was estimated at 100 tons in 1968 and 1969.
A small amount of illicit opium is produced in
Mexico and in some South American, North African,
and Near Eastern countries. Communist China's
once vast illicit. output became insignificant in
the late 1950s. Illicit output in the USSR, the
Communist countries of Eastern Europe, and North
Vietnam is probably also insignificant.
18. There are possibly at least two million
users and addicts in the world (see Table 3). No
firm data are available for individual countries,
and estimates are based on judgments of health
or police authorities or independent observers.
Moreover, these estimates vary widely on individual
countries. Yet practically all observers agree
that the largest single group is in the Far East
and Southeast Asia and consists mainly of over-
seas Chinese. Burma, Laos, and Thailand may
collectively account for three-quarters of a mil-
lion users and addicts, with Burma having the
largest share. Hong Kong, with perhaps 150,000,
has the world's highest per capita rate of users
of opium-based drugs. The largest national user
and addict populations are in Burma and Iran, per-
haps 350,000 in each. A likely figure for :India
is 250,000 to 300,000 and for Afghanistan-Pakistan,
perhaps 100,000 to 150,000. For North America
(mainly the United States) and Western Europe the
best estimates are over 100,000 and 75,000, re-
spectively.
19. Most users and addicts consume raw opium
either by smoking or eating. From Iran through
India, eating is generally the norm, while in the
Far East and Southeast Asia smoking is more common.
In Iran and all countries producing illicit opium,
except Turkey, users and addicts are found in both
rural and urban areas and among both the young and
old. The poppy-growing tribes of the Far East, in
particular, contain sizable numbers of users and
addicts. Turkey has no significant user or addict
population, however.
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Country/Area
Annual Consumption of Illicit Opium
and Opiates and Sources of Supply
Metric Tons of Raw Opium
Users and Addicts a/ Domestic Illicit Net Illicit
(Thousand) Supplies Imports
350 Negl.
100 to 150 75 to 100
Iran
Afghanistan/Pakistan
India
Thailand
Burma/Laos
Hong Kong
Singapore/Malaysia
North America
Western Europe
Other b/
250 to 300 175 to 200 Negl.
250 175 Negl.
500 350 Negl.
150 -- 105
40 -- 30
100 -- 40
75 -- 30
More than 100 Negl. 70
a. Including heroin and morphine addicts whose consumption is converted
to units of raw opium equivalent.
b. Including Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan,
Macao, North Africa, and the Near East.
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20. The illicit consumption of opium deriv-
atives -- overwhelmingly heroin -- is now a major
problem for many countries. The United States,
with no raw opium addiction, has the largest popu-
lation of heroin addicts, which is estimated to be
more than 100,000. Some 50,000 are in Iran. The
total heroin population of Western Europe may be
around 75,000. Heroin addiction accounts for a
significant and increasing part. of the opium con-
sumed in Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South
Korea, and the Philippines. Only in Singapore and
Malaysia does morphine account for a substantial
share of opium consumption.
21. There is considerable variance in individ-
ual consumption, It varies with the form of the
drug, the way it is taken, as well as with the
severity of the habit or addiction, and, of course,
availability. Smokers may consume up to five times
more opium than eaters. It requires ten units of
opium to produce one like unit of heroin, but,
because of heroin's strength, addicts generally
consume less in terms of raw opium than do opium
addicts. In the Far East, heroin is mostly smoked
and average consumption is presumably greater than
in the West, where heroin is almost exclusively
injected.
22. Considering all these variables, only the
roughest rule-of-thumb estimate can be devised
for average illicit per capita consumption in terms
of opium. The norms provided by the Iranian main-
tenance dosage program for registered opium addicts
appear useful. These norms represent minimal
addict requirements -- a daily ration of 4.7 grams
for smokers (roughly 1,700 grams per year) and
one gram for eaters (365 grams per year). Since
information suggests that Iran has some 200,000
opium eaters and 100,000 smokers plus 50,000 heroin
addicts, who consume at a minimum about the same
amount per person as US addicts, then the yearly
per capita consumption would be about 700 grams.
23. It is estimated that about 60% of the
world's illicit opium supply is consumed within
producing countries and handled through their
black markets. The user and addict populations
of Burma, the largest single consumer among these
countries, combined with Laos, may require some
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350 tons per year. Thailand's consumption possibly
approaches 175 tons, India's is probably between
175 tons and 200 tons, and 'Chat of Afghanistan-
Pakistan about half that level.
24. The balance of the world's illicit consumers
are supplied by imports smuggled from major prodLc-
ing countries. The largest market is Iran, where
imports are perhaps 250 tons. Hong Kong probably
absorbs over 100 tons per year in terms of opium
equivalent. Other major markets are the United
States, with smuggled imports estimated at 40 tors
in opium equivalent; Singapore and Malaysia com-
bined 30 tons; and Western Europe 30 tons. Lesser
markets may take another 80 tons, including Japare,
Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan,
Macao, and parts of North Africa and the Near East.
25. The major sources of these illicit imports
in the late 1960s were the contiguous poppy-growing
regions of Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Afghanistar.-
Pakistan (see Figure 2). An estimated two-third.:
of the latter region's output -- 175 to 200 tons --
is smuggled, mostly to Iran. Burma and Laos to-
gether probably export about 30% of their combined
output -- 150 tons to 200 tons -- to other Far
Eastern and Southeast Asian countries. Thailand
consumes most of its production and exports only
25 tons to the same markets. Sixty tons of Turkey's
illicit opium production of about 100 tons in 19(8
and 1969 provided about 80% of the heroin consumed
in Western Europe and North America. The remainder
was nearly all smuggled into Iran. Small amounts
of opium are smuggled into India (mainly from
Pakistan) and out of the country (in several -ii-
rections), but on a net basis India is probably
not a significant exporter. Mexico's small produc-
tion and that of some South American countries is
nearly all smuggled to the United States. Only a
very small amount of the US heroin supply originated
in the Far East in the late 1960s. Very small quan-
tities of Western Europe's heroin came from the Far
East, India, and Pakistan. The latter two countries
also supplied small amounts to North Africa and the
Near East.
26. Except in Iran, a substantial amount of
heroin consumed in victim countries is manufactured
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abroad. All the North American supply so origi-
nates, most of it from Turkish morphine processed
into heroin in France. Other European countries
are also supplied for the most part by French
laboratories. Heroin laboratories have been ob-
served in Burma, Laos, and Thailand, and some of
their product is exported, chiefly to Hong Kong.
That colony is also a major heroin processing site
and, like France, a source of heroin exports.
Heroin laboratories also have been detected in
Mexico. In Iran, virtually all the heroin con-
sumed through the 1960s was processed within the
country from opium or morphine of Turkish origin.
Organization of the Illicit Trade
27. The illicit markets for opium and opiates
are seller's markets from which the major supplying
firms receive very high rates of return on their
investment. Supplying the US market offers the
largest scope for profits, as can be shown from
the development of the price of heroin in 1969.
Ten kilograms of opium, at a farm price of $25 per
kilogram in Turkey, when converted to a kilogram
of pure heroin, wholesales in New York for $220,000
(see Table 4). For the development of the price of
heroin in Iran, see Table 4.
28. The wholesale firms trafficking in opium
and opiates operate as oligopolies. They are large
and few enough for each to exercise considerable
influence over the local or national market.
Rarely, however, do they choose to act indepen-
dently. They normally operate in explicit or im-
plicit collusion to set prices and sometimes form
cartels to divide up national markets. The estab-
lished firms also seek a stable environment that
will allow them to restrict output of rival firms
and dependably to arrange for the handling of large
volumes with regularity. Rather elaborate organi-
zation as well as careful planning and efficiency
of operations are required. Characteristically,
wholesalers also minimize the legal risks to
themselves from engaging in criminal activity.
In some cases they may not actually come into
direct contact with the contraband product and
restrict their role to financing, negotiating con-
tracts, and arranging through intermediaries for
the collection or delivery of supplies.
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Development of Retail Price of Heroin
in the United States and Iran
1969
US $ per
Kilogram of
US $ per Raw Opium
Kilogram Equivalent
Price to farmer for opium
(In Turkey) $25 --
Wholesale price for heroin a/
(Marseilles) $5,000 $500
Border price for heroin
(New York) $10,000 $1,000
Wholesale price for heroin
(New York) $22,000 $2,200
Retail price for heroin
(New York) $220,000 b/ $22,000
Price to farmer for opium
(In Afghanistan/Pakistan) $12 to $15
Border price for opium
(Afghanistan/Iran) $80 to $110
Wholesale price for heroin a/
(Teheran)
$2,600
Retail price for heroin
(Teheran) $13,000
$260
$1,300
a. When raw opium is converted to morphine and heroin
the volume is reduced by a ratio of 10:1.
b. If sold as pure heroin. In fact, heroin is greatlj
adulterated when it reaches the addict; the price for
adulterated heroin -- 40% purity -- would be about
$88,000 per kilogram.
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29. The movement of illicit opium from Turkey
to its consumers to the east and west illustrates
the wholesale trade's high degree of organization.
Relatively small quantities of raw opium are col-
lected from farmers by middlemen -- small-scale
entrepreneurs who may deal with several villages.
The illicit drug, either as raw opium or morphine
base, eventually comes under the control of crim-
inal syndicates in Istanbul, who smuggle morphine
base to France overland via Bulgaria or Yugoslavia
and thence to Germany where other operators arrange
delivery to France or directly to Marseilles by
boat. Turkish workers in Europe may be utilized
for overland delivery and individual sailors or
entire crews for delivery by sea.
30. The morphine base exported west from Turkey
is delivered to a few nationally prominent criminal
syndicates in France which arrange to convert it
into heroin and deliver it to European and North
American markets. Delivery to North America has
been either by individual smugglers or rather
well-organized rings. In either event, during
the 1960s most deliveries were made to 10 to 12
wholesale firms in the United States and Canada
that were major elements in the organized crime
of both countries. When exporting morphine and
opium to Iran, Turkish syndicates usually arranged
for its movement to border areas and then for its
smuggling into Iran by groups of Kurdish tribesmen
via Iraq and directly by individual Turkish smug-
glers. In Iran, wholesalers sold some opium
directly to retailers and converted lesser amounts
into heroin before distribution.
31. Supplying opium to Iran from Afghanistan-
Pakistan is usually the business of tribal chief-
tains near the producing areas who in turn make
deliveries to groups that arrange transportation
across Afghanistan to the Iranian border, usually
by trucks using the cross-country northern highway.
In the border area, delivery is usually made to
tribal chiefs whose armed tribesmen take the opium
into Iran, often in quantities of several hundred
kilograms, for a small commission. For the local
black market, Pakistani tribal chiefs near the
producing areas deliver opium to rings which ship
it southward as far as Karachi. In India, smug-
gling and black marketing are major economic
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activities, and the wholesale trade in illicit
opium often is fairly elaborately organized.
32. The major flow from Burma, Laos, and Thai-
land is via the Mekong River valley. Major cities
such as Luang Prabang, Vientianne, and Bangkok are
both final markets and transshipment points. Most
re-exported opium and heroin is thence smuggled to
Hong Kong which is also a final market and a trans-
shipment point. Other shipments from Laos and Thai-
land move directly to South Vietnam and Cambodia
or through Thailand to Malaysia and Singapore and
then by boat or air to other countries. The first
major raw opium collections in Burma are made by
the so-called Kuomingtang Irregulars and the guer-
rilla armies of Shan tribal insurgents; the latter
also convey the product southward to wholesalers
in the cities, where some is converted to heroin
for the domestic and export trade. These urban
wholesalers are often prominent local businessmen.
in Laos the armed forces themselves have been both
major wholesalers and directly involved in large-
scale smuggling. In Hong Kong the most, prominent
importers and wholesalers have frequently been
businessmen whose other activities may have been
largely licit.
33. In general, wholesale organizations trading
in opium and opiates seek to corrupt government
officials at fairly high levels when possible.
Wholesalers need legal protection for themselves
and continuity for their operations. Officialdom
may be vulnerable because of the relatively large
compensation it can get for collaborating with
the major traders. For this reason, some officials
have been directly involved in marketing transac-
tions. Military officers, for example, were among
those recently executed in Iran for narcotics vio-
lations. The involvement of individual officials
and military officers in some other countries has
also been documented, as has the use of diplomatic
pouches for smuggling opium and heroin. In no
country is the illicit trade in opium or heroin
likely to flourish without the complicity of at
least a few key civil servants or police officials.
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Postwar Changes in the Opium Market
34. The world opium market has experienced dy-.
namic change since World War II. Two landmark
events were the rapid suppression of China's vast
illicit market following the Communist takeover in
1949 and the abolition of cultivation in Iran after
1955 coupled with the gradual suppression of China's
own illicit production soon afterward. Although
the increasing use of poppy straw and changes in
medicinal uses of opiates have influenced the
demand for opium, the major shifts have resulted
from government policies.
35. The market has shown flexibility in re-
placing suppliers, responding to shifts in demand,
and devising new traffic routes. The most massive
change was the sudden closure of the incomparably
large Chinese illicit market which greatly reduced
world demand for opium. In response to the aboli-
tion of poppy cultivation in Iran and the cessation
of illicit cultivation in South China, new supplies
were developed in Afghanistan-Pakistan, India,
Turkey, and the hill areas of Burma, Laos, and
Thailand. Further changes in the world distribu-
tion of opium production have resulted from a cut-
back in Turkish production, especially in the late
1960s.
Trends in Liczt Production,
Consumption, and Trade
36. World licit opium production has fluc-
tuated widely in postwar years without any clearly
discernible long-term trend. The fluctuations
may chiefly reflect changes in demand coincident
with buildups and depletions of stockpiles. Pro-
duction was high in the early 1950s -- averaging
1,100 tons annually -- probably to replenish
stocks drawn down during the war (see Figure 3).
This was followed by about a 25% drop in average
annual production until the late 1950s, after
which output rapidly reached 1,500 tons in 1960.
Output remained high until the mid-1960s but has
since fallen to about 800 tons to 900 tons per
year, probably reflecting a drawdown of stocks
by pharmaceutical manufacturers in recent years.
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 Approved For Release . l iI EI 1IJI? iB00296R000300060030-0
Figur
WORLD LICIT OPIUM PRODUCTION BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRY*
METRIC TONS
1,070
773
821
R1 714
111,098
11,498
939
*Excluding Communist China and North Vietnam.
1,003
777-M1,034
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37. Following a sharp reduction in Iran's licit
production after 1950 and its total abolition after
1955, the lion's share of licit opium production
and exports shifted to India. India's licit output
will likely further increase as a result of the
cutback in Turkish poppy acreage, from 20,000
hectares in 1967 to about 12,000 in 1970. India
by 1968 accounted for about 75% of world licit
output and exports (see Figure 4).
38. Morphine manufacture shows an upward long--
term trend; 85 tons in 1954, 120 tons by .1960, and
150 tons by the late 1960s (see Table 5). This
largely reflects a rising demand for codeine.
Codeine production climbed from 104 tons in 1960
to 136 tons in 1968. About 95% of morphine now
is converted to other substances, overwhelmingly
codeine. While opium stocks probably were used to
meet the increased demand for morphine, some of the
demand was met by the increasing use of poppy straw,
which accounted for 29% of the morphine produced
in 1965 and 39% in 1969.
World Licit Production
of Opium, Morphine, and Codeine a/
Year
Opium
Morphine
Codeine
1960
1,498
120
104
1961
1,254
116
105
1962
1,445
121
105
1963
1,171
128
119
b/
1964
940
119
109
b/
1965
901
123
112
1966
782
149
131
1967
778
143
127
1968
993
153
136
a. Excluding Communist China and North Vietnam.
b. Incomplete reporting.
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Figure 4
WORLD LICIT OPIUM EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRY
MFTRIC TONS
0 200 400 600 800 1,00.?
Turkey Others
11 755
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
ji 393
540
11600
,668
1 652
767
733
725
573
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39. The decline in the average annual production
of raw opium since 1964 eventually resulted in higher
prices. Average prices paid for Turkish exports
rose from $11.49 per kilogram in 1966 to $13.00 in
1968 and to $16.00 in 1969. The current world opium
shortage appears to be only temporary, however.
The key question for the longer term is not supply
but demand. Recently increased poppy acreage in
India should meet any foreseeable medicinal needs.
Any major market change for licit raw opium will
almost certainly depend on satisfactory synthetic
replacements for codeine. To date these have proved
to be costly. The licit market will also depend
upon whether or not rapidly expanding poppy straw
production proves technically practical and econom-
ically worthwhile.
40. The main government programs to distribute
maintenance dosages of raw opium to registered
addicts have long been declining, except in Iran.
In India, such distribution fell from 150 tons in
1950 to 34 tons in 1957 and to about a 3-ton average
since 1960. In Pakistan these sales were 14 tons
in 1957, but only averaged about 7 tons in the mid--
1960s. In both countries the decline appears to
be mainly the result of progressively higher excise
taxes on opium sold to addicts so that supplies
became cheaper on the black market. In Iran,
where the maintenance program has been growing
rapidly in 1970, addict registration reached 50,000
by mid-year. This largely reflects an intensifying
shortage of illicitly imported opium which has
driven up black market prices, sometimes beyond
the very high price for licit maintenance dosage.
The latter price is currently $230 per kilogram,
or $0.23 per gram.
41. With the Communist takeover in China in
1949, world demand for illicit opium fell markedly.
Before 1949 the Chinese illicit market was possibly
several times larger than all other such markets
combined. Some estimates place China's user
and
addict population on the eve of World War II
at
10 million. This population, mostly in
the
large
eastern cities, was supplied principally
by
im-
ports, chiefly from Iran and India, then
the
world's
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 Approved For Release rl p lf)]PM PA7j3B00296R000300060030-0
leading illicit opium producers. Other countries,
including Pakistan, Egypt, and French Indochina,
contributed lesser supplies. China's own opium-
producing areas, centering around Yunnan Province,
supplied a relatively small local market and most
of the large output was exported directly to Burma,
the rest of Southeast Asia, and Hong Kong. Some
Yunnan opium was shipped by sea to China's own
eastern coastal cities.
42. In the early 1950s, Iran remained a leading
illicit opium producer and exporter. With an esti-
mated 25,000 hectares under poppy cultivation and
a licit output averaging only 185 tons annually,
the illicit output was clearly several times larger.
In addition to supplying most of the large domestic
market, this output supplied many other markets to
the east and west. Probably the larger part of
Iranian exports moved eastward through the Persian
Gulf to Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. Toward the
west the main flows went by sea through the Gulf
and overland to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Arabian
Peninsula, and North Africa. Some Iranian opium
destined for Western Europe and North America was
processed into morphine in Syria and Lebanon and
then shipped to Italy and France for further proc-
essing into heroin.
43. India's illicit export trade began declin-
ing to its present low level in the early 1950s.
The loss of the massive Chinese market was the
initial cause. During the first half of the 1950s,
New Delhi's maintenance program -- in the past the
principal source of addict consumption -- was
already declining precipitously, and the Indian
domestic black market was becoming a major alter-
native outlet for illicit production.
44. Production from South China continued to
service the markets of the Far East and Southeast
Asia during this period, but probably at a declin-
ing rate. Although seizures of Chinese opium con-
tinued to be reported by customs authorities in
Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, illicit production
in China probably began to decline as the Commu-
nists extended their political control. In re-
sponse, production in Burma, Laos, and Thailand,
which had long been servicing the same markets,
probably began to increase as an offset to de-
clining Chinese output.
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45. Turkey, the remaining principal illicit
producer, exported virtually all its output, mainly
southward to the Arab countries that were also
being supplied by Iran. As with Iranian opium,
part of these Turkish exports went to Western
Europe and North America after processing and trans-
shipping first through Syria and Lebanon and then
through Italy and France. Some portion of Turkish
opium was aimed directly at Italy and France by
sea routes chiefly originating in Istanbul. West
Pakistan was still a minor producer and net im-
porter, depending on Afghanistan for a large share
of its own opium supplies.
From the Mid--1950s to the Mid-1960s
46. After Iran banned poppy cultivation in 1955
and Communist China acquired control over its cul-
tivation, the main shifts in world illicit opium
production were largely in response to continuing
high demand in Iran and in the Far East and South-
east Asia. To meet Iranian demand, illicit pro-
duction rose sharply in Afghanistan-Pakistan and
Turkey. To replace supplies from China and Iran
to the Far East and Southeast Asia, production
rose substantially in Burma, Laos, and Thailand.
Turkey largely filled the demand from Iran's former
customers in the West by increasing its exports
to the Arab countries, Western Europe, and North
America.
47. Afghanistan-Pakistan increasingly supplied
Iran's illicit imports after 1955, eventually an
estimated 250 tons annually. Reflecting the up-
surge in Iranian demand, illicit opium prices in
West Pakistan rose more than 250% from 1957 to
1959. By the mid-1960s, however, production had
risen sharply and the price dropped to near the
1957 level. At the same time, West Pakistan became
virtually the sole supplier to its own fairly
large domestic black market. Large increases in
poppy acreage in Afghanistan's irrigated valleys
adjacent to Pakistan were noted by several ob-
servers after the mid-1950s. Turkey largely
supplied the western half of Iran and accounted
for about 40% of that country's illicit imports.
48. With production up in Burma, Laos, and
Thailand in the late 1950s, the area became a
massive producer and the source of more than half
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the world's present supply of 1,250 tons to 1,400
tons annually. The Far East and Southeast Asia
quickly became self-sufficient in opium.
49. Since 1955, there have been some major
changes in consumption. In Iran the active user
and addict population was cut significantly --
some 350,000 compared with perhaps one million or
even more before abolition. The growth or decline
of populations elsewhere is not easily documented.
Consumption in the Far East and Southeast Asia very
likely rose substantially during the 1960s. In-
creased consumption in Burma, Laos, and Thailand
seems especially likely in view of the rise in
supply. Western Europe and North America also
experienced rapid increases in their addict popu-
lations -- almost exclusively addiction to heroin --
since World War II.
50. Heroin addiction also has grown in countries
other than in Western Europe and North America.
Before the mid-1950s, Iranian addicts were exclu-
sively raw opium consumers. Heroin was unknown
until 1953. After 1960, however, heroin addiction
spread rapidly and by the middle of the decade
probably reached its present level of 50,000 addicts.
In the Far East and Southeast Asia, considerable
growth in heroin addiction also occurred. The
observations of many specialists document this
phenomenon as do the increasing number of heroin
laboratories in the region, particularly in pro-
ducing countries and in Hong Kong.
51. In both the Far East and Iran, a shift to
emphasis on heroin consumption in urban areas has
probably been stimulated by enforcement efforts
because heroin is easier to handle by traffickers
and its consumption is less visible. However,
heroin addiction in these countries as elsewhere
also reflects basic problems of development and
health.
52. In the mid-1950s as Turkey's illicit traffic
expanded, the portion destined for Western Europe
and North America increasingly shifted to direct
overseas shipments to French ports. By the mid-
1950s -- thanks to decisive Italian enforcement --
Italy ceased to be an important processing and
transshipment point. During the 1960s, however,
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Turkish exports to Western Europe and North America
also began to go overland to Europe in increasing
amounts in response to increased enforcement in
both Turkey and France against seaborne contraband.
Also as a defense against enforcement (the amounts
are much smaller and hence easier to conceal) and
for greater profit, Turkish traffic in morphine
increased rapidly from the mid-1950s. By the mid.-
1960s, Turkish illicit exports to the West were
practically all of crude morphine. Heroin has
never been manufactured in Turkey, and Turkish
smugglers are loath to carry it, probably because
the government set very stiff penalties in 1953
for heroin trafficking. In replacing Iranian ex-
ports, Turkey came to account for about 80% of the
heroin entering Western Europe and the United States.
Throughout the 1960s, Mexico supplied about 15% of
US heroin imports and the Far East only about 5%.
Recent Developments
53. The main recent change in world illicit
production has been declining Turkish output. In
1968, illicit Turkish opium production probably
dropped sharply as a result of reduced poppy acre-
age and government purchases of a larger share of
the crop. Substantial acreage cutbacks began in
1964 but had no marked impact because, until 1968,
Ankara purchased much less than half of total pro-
duction, as indicated by the data on yields from
licit production (see Table 6).
54. With the fall in illicit output as of 1968,
Turkish illicit exports must also have declined.
The effects of reduced production on exports would
not have been felt until 1969, however -- 1968 ex-
ports were chiefly from the 1967 fall harvest. In
1969, Turkish exports to Iran were probably cut
back in favor of the more profitable Western mar-
kets.
55. In 1970, Turkish exports to Iran were cut
back sharply following policy changes in both
Ankara and Teheran. This year for the first time,
Ankara and Teheran entered into a formal collabora-
tive effort to suppress opium smuggling from Turkey
to Iran. The Turkish army and Iranian gendarmerie
agreed in January to increase cooperation and forces
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Turkish Licit Production,
Acreage, and Yields of Opium
Yields a/
Year
Production
(Metric Tons)
Acreage
(Hectares)
(Kilograms
per Hectare)
1960
365
42,000
8.7
1961
172
38,000
4.5
1962
311
36,000
8.6
1963
287
38,000
7.6
1964
83
28,000
3.0
1965
86
22,000
3.9
1966
139
24,000
5.8
1967
115
20,000
5.8
1968
122
13,000
9.4
1969
127
13,000
b/
9.8
a. Derived from official estimates of acreage and
government purchases of raw opium from the farmers.
b. Estimated.
on both sides. The result has been a severe re-
duction in smuggling across the Iranian-Turkish
border and the Iraqi-Iranian border. As a conse-
quence seizures in these areas have dwindled to
insignificance this year, reflecting a cutback in
Turkish shipments aimed at Iran. The incentive
to Turkish smugglers to ship opium and morphine
to Iran was also dampened in 1969 when Iran im-
posed the death penalty for narcotics trafficking.
56. The net effect of these joint efforts has
been a scarcity of opium and heroin in Iran. In
the 12 months ending in August 1970, the illicit
price of Turkish opium in Teheran doubled. Much
Turkish opium was available only at prices in
excess of Iran's licit price for maintenance
dosages for registered addicts. Prices for heroin,
manufactured mainly from Turkish opium and morphine.
tripled. While capital punishment and increased
border surveillance have been weighty deterrents
to Turkish smugglers, Iranian enforcement measures
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have been less effective against Afghani traders.
For example, in mid-1970, Afghani opium was still
priced well below Iran's licit maintenance price.
Iranian border seizures have risen sharply but
probably so have border incursions from Afghanistan
involving smaller shipments to thwart Iranian bor-
der authorities. The largest proportion of the
more than 40 persons executed in Iran for smuggling
since 1969 have been Afghanis. In view of persist-
ing strong Iranian demand, it seems likely that
production in Afghanistan-Pakistan is being increased
57. Turkish illicit output may have declined
somewhat again this year. A drought substantially
reduced actual yields in 1970, and Ankara decided
for the first time to try to :buy up the entire
crop. It is far from certain that the government
procurement effort will be especially successful.
If it is and because yields have been reduced,
Turkish exports to Western Europe, North America,
and the Arab countries will not be available in
the usual amounts next year.
58. During the past two years, Turkish traffic
has been the target of stepped-up enforcement by
the French and US governments. As one consequence,
some heroin-processing laboratories formerly based
in the Marseilles area are now more widely dis-
persed both within and outside France. Moreover,
the regular smuggling of heroin from Europe to the
United States has become more difficult for tra-
ditional wholesalers because of increased enforce-
ment. Therefore, the smuggling business has
witnessed the entry of new organized rings. Some
established wholesale firms, reacting to enforce-
ment pressures, have apparently chosen to disen-
gage at least temporarily while others were forced
out by successful prosecutions. The entry of
Cuban-exile smuggling groups into the internal
heroin wholesaling in the United States indicates
some disarray in the established structure.
59. Because of growing pressures to reduce
illicit output in Turkey and also in Mexico, fol-
lowing Mexican-US collaboration in Operation
Cooperation, traffickers are already seeking new
sources. Probably in direct response to Mexican
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enforcement pressures, some dealers there have
been exploring other countries for new supplies
for the US market. New heroin distilleries and
poppy fields have been observed in South America
this year. Other wholesalers are apparently
turning to the Far East for supplies. This area
is still a relatively small supplier of heroin to
the United States, but traffic has increased per-
haps severalfold this year and new smuggling organi-
zations are being formed in anticipation of sharply
increased business. The West European market mean-
while has also been obtaining increasing amounts
of heroin from Pakistan, India, and the Far East.
Controlling Opium-Based Drug Abuse
Control and Development
60. The growth of opium-based drug abuse re-
flects larger problems of economic, political, and
social development. Economic incentives remain
strong in most opium-producing countries because
agricultural incomes there are low and labor
plentiful and cheap. Complete administrative
control over poppy cultivation is difficult in
the best of circumstances and impossible in many
areas which lack national political control.
Prevailing public attitudes tend to forestall
broad treatment and rehabilitation programs. In
most producing countries the public is used to
and tolerant of widespread opium use. In many
non-producing victim countries, abuse is viewed
as criminal and the responsibility of enforcement
agencies and the courts. But partly because of
public attitudes, enforcement itself has lagged
in developing techniques appropriate to suppress-
ing the wholesale illicit trade. Progress both
in enforcement and treatment has been hampered
by inadequate international cooperation.
Dampening the incentive to Produce
61. An economic approach to controlling illicit
opium production has serious limitations. The
basic problem is that opium is almost always
produced where there is abundant and cheap labor.
Substitute crops that would earn as much or more
income than opium per farm unit are difficult to
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 Approved For Release QJM)OIII(]ICK-I' 1 iB00296R000300060030-0
find. So long as large-scale underemployment exists,
a farmer can increase his family's income by raising
poppy, natural conditions being appropriate.
62. Thus governments seeking to control produc-
tion through incentives will probably find crop
substitution alone inadequate. A program would
require subsidies -- either directly as an induce-
ment to the farmer not to grow poppy or indirectly
in the form of above-market prices for substitute
crops. Raising agricultural yields, diversifying
farm output, and establishing industry accessible
to local labor would all help. Among the major
opium-producing countries, Turkey is most advanced
economically, and further development will probably
reduce the profitability of opium production
eventually. But elsewhere, effective restrictions
on output will depend most heavily on direct gov-
ernment control.
63. Opium production is an important source of
income for individual farmers and thus a political
issue of moment in some countries. It does not,
however, benefit the national economies of any
producing country appreciably. India, the world's
largest producer and exporter of licit opium, earns
only $6 million to $7 million annually from over-
seas sales compared with total export earnings
approaching $2 billion. Income generated from
licit production -- the total returns to farmers ---
hardly exceeds $12 million annually. Turkey's
situation is similar: in 1967 licit opium exports
were valued at $1.7 million, less than 0.3% of
total export earnings. A smaller amount was earned
for poppy straw exports, but total income from
licit production was at most $3 million. If the
tribal area of Burma, Laos, and Thailand were con-
sidered as an economic region, however, opium pro-
duction there would assume more economic signif-
icance since it is a principal source of income,
at least among some tribes. It also helps insur-
gents there to finance arms imports.
Direct Control Over Production
64. Energetic national governments can stop
opium production. The problem is that the major
share of illicit output comes from areas where
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there is little or no national control, especially
those inhabited by tribal peoples. In Burma, Laos,
and Thailand, most of the producing areas are also
insurgent areas. In Pakistan, most illicit poppy
is cultivated in the settled areas of the North-
west Frontier Province where cultivators are
mostly tribal peoples, although they live mainly
outside tribal areas. Much the same situation
exists in Afghanistan. The small scattered produc-
tion in Mexico, South America, and North Africa
takes place in remote rural areas.
65. Even where control has been established,
large illicit production has occurred, as in Turkey
and India. In such countries, illicit production
originates from understating yields on licensed
or otherwise reported acreage, and/or from un-
licensed or unreported acreage.
66. Official Turkish acreage statistics are
probably fairly complete, and understating yields
appears to be the principal source of illicit
production. Until recently, most production
entered illicit channels because the state opium
monopoly restricted its farm purchases to only
the amount necessary to fulfill its export sales
contracts.
67. Very little of Pakistan's poppy cultivation
is under a formal control system, but even where
it is, a substantial portion has leaked in the
same way as in Turkey. During 1966-68 the reported
official Pakistani yield averaged 4.7 kilograms per
hectare, but this probably was only one-third the
actual yield. The official procurements mainly
represented the opium needed for the government
maintenance program for addicts.
68. In India, most illicit production probably
comes from unlicensed acreage as official Indian
yields have rather steadily averaged about 20 kilo-
grams per hectare and hence should not understate
actual yields much. As in Turkey the government's
purchasing policy largely reflects export contracts.
During the 1960s, 70% of licit Indian production
was exported.
69. There has been little leakage from Iran's
fledgling control system. Its effectiveness has
been due to the combination of high farm support
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prices for opium and extremely severe punishment
for illicit dealing in opium. A very high priority
has been assigned the new program. Responsibility
for licensing poppy acreage and collecting the
harvested opium has been vested in the Ministry of
Land Reform, which has taken elaborate control
measures. Enforcement efforts, including those
of the gendarmerie in rural areas, have been greatly
stepped up.
70. In countries where poppy is cultivated by
tribal peoples, production probably cannot be con-
trolled without extending enforcement into the
tribal areas and also socially integrating tribal
peoples into national life. Even in Pakistan this
would be a formidable and probably long-term task.
In Burma, Laos, and Thailand this kind of develop?-
ment is made even more unlikely by insurgency.
71. To control poppy production completely,
Ankara and New Delhi would have to sustain expen-
sive administrative and enforcement programs. In
the past, however, both countries have tended to
minimize such costs and hold crop collection down
near the level of export commitments. The apparent
drop in Turkish illicit output reflects improved
control, but leakage is probably still substantial.
The poppy farmer is attracted to illicit dealings
if the black market price is significantly higher
than the licit price. Iran is trying to prevent
diversion by setting very high farm prices, but
if production there becomes large, costs will be-
come significant. In view of the costs and effort
needed to control even small-scale production in
Iran, a simpler answer -- administratively and from
the enforcement standpoint -- would be to abolish
cultivation altogether. In the past, abolition
has proved feasible in Iran and more recently in
many provinces of Turkey.
Reducing Demand
72. Public attitudes toward opium-based drug
abuse have not changed very much in 20 years. In
much of the world, tolerance based on longstanding
beliefs and customs prevails. Among tribal peoples
producing opium, its use in religious ceremonies
and on festive occasions is common. Among peoples
without access to modern medicine, opium is a
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general household medicine. Belief in the efficacy
of opium as an aphrodisiac and cure-all is wide-
spread. By contrast, in most countries where heroin
addiction is the main abuse problem, public fear
and outrage tend to focus on illicit traffickers
and addicts alike.
73. Almost nowhere is opium-based drug abuse
regarded primarily as a medical problem. In the
present state of medical and social scientific
knowledge, treatment and rehabilitation costs for
entire addict populations are not predictable,
because this would almost certainly involve
treating the broader human problems of adjusting
to rapid social change and mental health generally.
The total cost could easily exceed politically
acceptable limits. The degree of public support
for new medical approaches to treatment and reha-
bilitation is far from certain. Unexpected leak-
ages from the UK's system of free prescriptions
for addicts, for example, could lessen acceptance
of further experimental programs there. In the
United States, methadone programs for treating
heroin addicts have an uncertain future not only
because medical efficacy has yet to be confirmed
but also because public support for broad-scale
coverage is as yet undetermined.
74. The fate of the maintenance program for
opium addicts in India and Pakistan suggests that
fiscal constraints can easily weaken government-
sponsored treatment programs for addicts, at least
in countries with limited resources. Pressures
to show a profit from such programs helped price
licit opium out of the market because the black
market could supply addicts more cheaply but
still realize large profits. Because the programs
declined rapidly in both countries, no adequate
test of their efficacy in diminishing addiction
was possible.
75. Iran now has the world's largest opium
maintenance program, with increasing success
judging by the rising enrollment of registered
addicts. The governing principle in the Iranian
program -- that receipts must cover costs -- has
dictated, however, the official price to addicts
of $230 per kilogram. In view of the high price
the program's success to date must be largely
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attributed to the effectiveness of police controls
over illicit imports and local production. If
illicit supplies again become more plentiful, the
program will probably fall off.
76. Breakthroughs in medical and social science
are in all probability essential before illicit
demand can be substantially reduced. Gaps in knowl-
edge of abuse patterns are formidable and probably
less is known about the medical and social effects
of raw opium -- still the main form of abusive
consumption -- than about heroin. Research on
opium-based drug abuse would undoubtedly benefit
from close links with work on psychomimetic sub-
stances.
Suppressing the Illicit Trade
77. The organized character of the illicit
wholesale trade and the political and economic
settings in which it prospers help to place the
enforcement tasks in perspective. Although its
operations are national and international in scope,
wholesaling in opium or opiates often represents
only one facet of a syndicate's criminal business
and very often not the most important part. His-
torically, the major criminal organizations in
the United States have had a near-monopoly of the
domestic wholesale heroin trade. Wholesale organi-
zations the world over frequently manage to protect
themselves politically, and this adds to enforce-
ment complexities. Finally, illicit trade in opium
and opiates is very often only part of a larger
smuggling activity. In some producing countries,
for example, a significant portion of international
trade moves through smuggling channels. When it
reaches this scale, the suppression of a single
commodity may be extremely difficult.
78. A change in the public's view of enforce-
ment is probably indispensable to more effective
suppression of the illicit wholesale trade. Just
as they tend to define the scale of treatment and
rehabilitation, public attitudes influence the
quality and amount of available law enforcement.
By and large, any citizenry wants police protection
first for its immediate safety, usually protection
against locally based, relatively unorganized
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criminal activity. There is generally little
public awareness of criminal activity organized
on national and even international lines. This
lack of awareness frequently results in a pendu-
lum effect in law enforcement administration.
Occasionally public interest in nationwide enforce-
ment campaigns is aroused, but the interest wanes
and campaigns tend to diminish in intensity and
effectiveness.
79. Most enforcement manpower now is necessarily
occupied with suppressing locally based criminal
activity, and national police organizations often
spend much of their time directly supporting local
enforcement. One effect of this focus is that,
even at the national police level, the preponderance
of enforcement against opium-based drug abuse is
directed against relatively small-scale retailers,
hired couriers, and the addicts themselves. In
most countries there is no intelligence organiza-
tion with central responsibility for operational
and analytical intelligence in respect to national
and international criminal organizations.
80. Upgrading enforcement capabilities against
the illicit trade in opium and opiates would almost
certainly presume increasing international coopera-
tion among police agencies and perhaps especially
multilateral cooperation. The recent bilateral
enforcement agreements between the United States
and Mexico, the United States and France, and
Iran and Turkey have been steps in this direction.
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81. Somewhat less than half the world's opium
production is used for licit, medicinal purposes,
chiefly to manufacture codeine. The balance -
1,250 tons to 1,400 tons annually -- is illicitly
produced and sold to meet the needs of some two
million or more users and addicts around the world.
Illicit production is now concentrated in the Far
East (the contiguous hill country of Burma, Laos.,
and Thailand) and in the Pushtu-speaking areas of
Afghanistan and Pakistan but continues on a signif-
icant scale in India and Turkey. Most illicit
opium users still take it in raw form, but a large
and increasing proportion has been using the refined
and more dangerous form of heroin. Addiction to
opium is a major problem in every opium-producing
country except Turkey as well as in many non-
producing victim countries. The United States has
the largest number of heroin addicts -- over
100,000 -- but Western Europe, Iran, the Far East,
and Southeast Asia also have large numbers. The
market for illicit opium and its derivatives is
everywhere controlled at the wholesale level by
syndicates highly organized on national and even
international lines.
82. Since World War II the main changes in the
world opium market have resulted from government
policies, chiefly those eliminating or significantly
reducing production but also enforcement policies.
Despite these actions, the illicit market. has been
flexible in replacing sources of supplies, in re-
sponding to shifts in demand, and in devising new
channels of illicit traffic. As a result., opium-
based drug abuse has been a persistently growing
international problem.
83. The growth of opium-based drug abuse re-
flects larger problems of economic, political, and
social development. The economic incentive to
produce opium remains strong in most producing
countries because agricultural incomes are low and
labor abundant and cheap. Specific problems in-
volved in controlling the illicit opium market
include the following:
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a. A purely economic approach has
serious limitations because crop sub-
stitution alone is not enough. To fully
offset the farmers" income lost by for-
going opium production, crop subsidies
would almost certainly be required. In
the long run the economic incentive to
produce opium would best be eliminated
by general economic development in poppy-
growing areas.
b. Direct administrative control
over poppy cultivation is not possible
in the major areas of illicit produc-
tion, because they are not controlled
by the national governments. Even in
countries where national governments
are relatively strong, those govern-
ments must exert costly administrative
and enforcement efforts continuously
in order to suppress illicit production.
c. A greater effort to reduce demand
itself requires public support for :Larger
expenditures on treatment. A reduction
in illicit market demand also presupposes
breakthroughs in medical and social
science and a greater pooling of inter-
national efforts in research.
d. Enforcement alone cannot suppress
opium-based drug abuse in the countries
now experiencing its worst effects.
Nevertheless, the contribution of enforce-
ment to suppression would be improved by
focusing more effort against the illicit
trade at the wholesale level and by up-
grading enforcement methods and organi-
zation, particularly at the national
police level. Increased international
collaboration among enforcement arms
against organized crime is probably
crucial to suppressing the illicit trade.
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