INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS SERIES NO. 6 THE FRENCH-TURKISH CONNECTION: THE MOVEMENT OF OPIUM AND MORPHINE BASE FROM TURKEY TO FRANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: December 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

((11 ~~ '' nn cc 1 V
Approved For Release 2002/Oil 0170N1~$DQ296R000300070022-8
Publications and Related Papers
in the International Narcotic Series
BGI GR 71-4 - The Illicit Production and Movement of Opiates in Latin
America, January -1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM.
BGI GR 71-5 - Opium Production and Movement in Southeast Asia, January
1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
v BGI GR 72-1 - Opium Production and Movement in the Near East and
South Asia, July 1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM.
/ ER IM 71-102 - Recent Trends in the Illicit Narcotics Market in Southeast
Asia, May 1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
(International Narcotics Series No. 1)
v ER IM 71-155 - Chemical Requirements for Opium Refining in Southeast
Asia, August 1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
(International Narcotics Series No. 2)
ER IM 71-166 - Paraguay - Heroin Crossroads of South America, August
1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
(International Narcotics Series No. 3)
ER I1'f 71-197 ? The Cocaine Situation in Latin America, October 1971,
CONFIDENTIAL.
(International Narcotics Series No. 4)
ER IM 71-212 - Opium Poppy Cultivation in Northern Thailand, October
1971, CONFIDENTIAL.
(International Narcotics Series No. 5)
ER IM 71-236 - The French-Turkish Connection: The Movement
of Opium and Morphine Base from Turkey to
France, December 1971, CONFIDENTIAL
(International Narcotics Series No. 6)
Approved For Release 2002/01/0 N296R000300070022-8
UWU
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
International Narcotics Series No. 6
The French-Turkish Connection: The Movement of Opium
and Morphine Base from Turkey to France
Confidential
ER IM 71-236
December 1971
Approved For Release 2002/01/02: CIA-RDP73B#R 300070-8
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
WARNING
This document coutane information affecting the ii.icim al
defense of the United States, within the meaning of 'l itl(
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its cont'ut-+ to or rc-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Eaduded I on, ouroTm&
downgrodng and
dedeu.Gcor;oa
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For ReleasC Ds ' /b'dlb Eb li1Z3B00296R000300070022-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1971
THE FRENCH-TURKISH CONNECTION:
THE MOVEMENT OF OPIUM AND MORPHINE BASE
FROM TURKEY TO FRANCE
Conclusions
1. Opium and morphine base move in a steady flow from Turkey
to Western Europe despite tighter international narcotics controls and
stepped-up customs enforcement. French heroin traffickers continue to
receive adequate quantities of raw narcotics materials at approximately the
same prices as in 1960. The smuggling of morphine base directly between
Turkey and France or West Germany has become the most common
smuggling pattern.
2. Overland transport of narcotics by cars, trucks, and buses now
appears to be the dominant means of smuggling. Smuggling by sea, the
leading method of moving narcotics into France a decade ago, has become
secondary although still the source of sizable quantities of narcotics.
Smuggling by air, now a poor third, could increase because of lax customs
procedures at most European airports.
. 3. A striking development in recent years is the emergence of West
Germany as a major narcotics storage and staging area. The entry of large
numbers of Turkish and other Near Eastern workers into the West German
labor force in recent years has facilitated this development. These workers
as well as certain German nationals have become important links in the
narcotics chain connecting suppliers of raw materials with the processors
of finished product.
:Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research
from information contained in the investigative files of the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Bureau of Customs. It has been
coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence as well as with the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Bureau of Customs.
Approved For Releas% 1 f?3p5,ftW3B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release B0ONW&D. .1NiB00296R000300070022-8
4. French heroin traffickers are currently purchasing as much opium
and morphine base as possible in order to build up their stocks of narcotics
raw materials before licit Turkish opium production ceases at the end of
1972. The sparse information available on the future plans of traffickers
suggests that they will turn first to Yugoslavia as an alternative source of
supply. This action will have a minimal impact on the patterns and
techniques of smuggling now existing in Europe. If adequate supplies are
not forthcoming from Yugoslavia, however, these traffickers may turn to
either Pakistani-Afghan sources or Southeast Asian sources. This would cause
a major realignment in the smuggling routes now serving French traffickers.
Discussion
Introduction
5. The largest heroin addict population in the Western World is found
in the United States, although neither the raw materials for heroin nor
its processing centers are located there. Most heroin found in the United
States has traveled through an international narcotics pipeline largely
controlled by Turkish and French connections before distribution by major
US narcotics syndicates.
Approved For Release et?1 J2,5 f {~PR7 B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release 26Y1&iflIYl>~,'B~0296R000300070022-8
6. The complex set of procedures involved in bringing the raw heroin
materials to the processing centers and from there to the street vendors
is not a smooth and continuous flow of product from supplier to consumer.
Each phase represents a separate and independent process or transaction
handled by various groups brought together by the alluring profits this
traffic offers.
7. Raw materials for most of the heroin entering the United States
originate in the opium poppy fields of Turkey. The opium is purchased
from Turkish farmers by opium traffickers who often convert it into its
concentrated morphine base powder form. The opium or morphine base
is then resold to Turkish morphine base exporters who serve as the central
connection between the suppliers of the raw materials and the French
importers and processors. Although most of the opium and morphine base
entering France comes from Turkey, some of these materials are also
imported from Yugoslavia. Small quantities of opium and morphine base
reportedly have also been imported from the Far East.
8. Once the opium and morphine base is smuggled into France, it
is converted into its heroin form. The heroin is then smuggled into the
United States where it is diluted, distributed, and diluted again before being
sold to the addict. This memorandum reviews those operations of the
international heroin pipeline controlled by French-Turkish connections and
discusses opium production and morphine base conversion, the structure
and function of the trafficking system, the smuggling of narcotics, and the
outlook for this pipeline over the next few years.
Supply, Demand, and Control
9. There is no way to determine precisely how much opium has
been produced in Turkey in recent years. The only accurate figures on
this subject reflect the amount of opium purchased by the government of
Turkey from authorized producing areas. Between 35% and 60'/(% of Turkish
opium production probably entered the illicit market in the past. The illicit
markets for Turkish opium are France and Iran.
10. Although figures on the flow of illicit opium are not available,
there is virtually a constant demand in France for Turkish opium, and a
continuous effort is made by Turkish suppliers to meet that demand. Over
the year's this supply apparatus has become better organized in order to
increase the volume of traffic on a year-round basis. A major opium
trafficker operating in the interior of Turkey, for example, may be capable
of handling up to 25 metric tons of illicit opium per year, while a major
French morphine base importer may import three tons of morphine base
per year. In addition to the constant cycle of orders and deliveries,
Approved For Release ;"/1 f gDV1v ffA1 002968000300070022-8
 Approved For ReleaCee Z E I IF 73B00296R000300070022-8
additional supplies of opium and morphine base reportedly are being
stockpiled in one-half ton to two ton quantities in storage depots located
in West Germany and Turkey.
11. Increasingly stringent international narcotics controls have
undoubtedly created more problems for the traffickers. These controls,
however, are believed to have succeeded in interdicting only a small
percentage of the opium and morphine base traveling from Turkey to
France. The approximate amount of morphine base seized in various
European countries over the last several years is shown in the table. Despite
the progressive increase in the amount of narcotics seized, no critical
shortage of these raw materials has been observed on the illicit market.
12. Tighter international controls on narcotics have not significantly
raised the price for opium or morphine base over the last 10 years
(Figure 1). The average price for illicit crude opium purchased in the
interior of Turkey has actually dropped about 20%, from an average $28
per kilogram in 1960 to about $22 in 1971. The cost for one kilogram
of morphine base purchased in Turkey has decreased by about 30'/.- from
an average of about $500 in 1960 to about $340 at the present time.
Although the reasons for these price decreases are not clear, they may at
least partially stem from larger-scale trafficking and better organization.
13. French traffickers now pay an average of about $800 for each
kilogram of morphine base purchased and delivered directly from Turkey.
This is only about 15% higher than the price paid in 1960. This increase
may be due to higher courier fees and transportation costs brought about
by stricter international narcotics controls. Morphine base purchased
through a middleman in West Germany will usually cost at least 50% more
than when purchased directly from Turkey.
Opium Production
14. In early 1971, about 90,000 Turkish farmers cultivated opium
poppies in the only seven provinces in western Turkey where such
cultivation was allowed. The poppy is usually grown by small farmers who,
because of the amount of labor needed, devote about one-half acre of their
land for poppy cultivation. The opium poppy is now grown on some 15,000
hectares of farmland in four provinces.
15. Opium is collected by incising the poppy pod before the seeds
ripen (Figure 2). In Turkey, this process is usually performed twice a year -
around July and March. If the pod has been carefully slashed, a clear or
white latex-like substance will begin to emerge. As the latex accumulates
on the outside of the pod, it begins to evaporate, solidify, and darken.
Approved For Releat 2QQ211a.'LLQk; CJA,:.RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73BOO296ROO0300070022-8
Morphine Base Seizures
Kilograms
Year
France
Turkey
West
Germany
Italy
Yugoslavia
Lebanon
Syria
Other
Total for
Year
1971 (Jan-
520
180
180
0
N.A.
0
N.A.
(Bul311ia)
1,191
Aug)
1970
386
32
2
146
24
16
N.A.
0
606
1969
284
53
200
0
0
0
N.A.
0
537
1968
30
215
7
0
0
19
N.R.
0
271
1967
136
138
19
(Spain)
1
1966
54
61
0
7
(Belgium)
36
Total
1,410
679
408
163
51
45
39
348
3,143
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73BOO296ROO0300070022-8
 Approved For Release(20N(H9JDDBOO296ROO0300070022-8
Average Price for One Kilogram of Crude Opium
Purchased on the Illicit Market in the Interior of Turkey*
US $ 40 1
0'
1960 65 67 69 71
Average Price for One Kilogram
of Morphine Base Purchased in Turkey*
Average Price for One Kilogram
of Morphine Base Delivered to France *f
us $ 800
$400
$340
0
1960 65 67 69 71
*These figures represent general trends and do not reflect seasonal or other variations.
tPrices often increase by at least 50 percent when transaction involves a middleman in
Germany.
512684 12-71
Approved For Releast f3 Yf R VQPL 3BOO296ROOO3OOO7OO22-8
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
Morphine Base Seizures
Kilograms
Year
France
Turkey
West
Germany
Italy
Yugoslavia
Lebanon
Syria
Other
Total for
Year
1971 (Jan-
Aug)
(Bulgaria)
386
32
2
146
24
16
N.A.
606
C
1969
284
53
200
0
0
0
N.A.
.537
tt
Z
Ui
1968
30
215
7
0
0
19
N.A.
271
H
1967
136
138
19
10
27
10
15
(Spain)
1
(Belgium)
36
Total
1,410
679
408
163
51
45
39
348
3,143
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Releas $4i)EbMOF ,3B00296R000300070022-8
Average Price for One Kilogram of Crude Opium
Purchased on the Illicit Market in the Interior of Turkey*
US $ 40 1
0L-
1960 65 67 69 71
Average Price for One Kilogram
of Morphine Base Purchased in Turkey*
wwmft~
$500 475*."
0L.
1960
Average Price for One Kilogram
of Morphine Base Delivered to France *t
us $ 800
0
1960 65 67 69 71
*These figures represent general trends and do not reflect seasonal or other variations.
tPrices often increase by at least 50 percent when transaction involves a middleman in
Germany.
512684 12-71
Approved For ReleaspQRQPI73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release`36"WIA'FbPB00296RO00300070022-8
Figure 2. Incising the Opium Poppy
Approximately 10 hours after the incision, the now dark brown or black
latex will have lost about one-third of its weight.
16. This sticky substance, known as raw or crude opium, is then
scraped off the pod and collected. The pasty opium is formed into
irregularly shaped flat or spherical cakes and wrapped in poppy leaves.
17. The incision and collection process reportedly requires about 72
working hours for each kilogram of opium. A good poppy field in Turkey
yields about 15 kilograms of crude opium per hectare. For his work, a
Turkish farmer receives from $9 to $11 for each kilogram of opium sold
to the government. He can receive about twice that amount, however, if
he chooses to sell his opium to a trafficker.
18. The main active chemical principle of opium is the alkaloid
morphine, the sole source of the substance's analgesic, narcotic, and
addictive properties. The morphine content of Turkish opium -- about
14% - is one of the highest in the world and, therefore, Turkish opium
is preferred by French heroin traffickers. About 10 kilograms of crude
opium can be processed to yield one kilogram of morphine base. Skilled
narcotics chemists, in turn, can convert one kilogram of morphine base
into one kilogram of unadulterated heroin.
Approved For Release OQ;ff(WCIUINff N00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release(2Q (fiWF4{ 4T"~ZB00296R000300070022-8
Morphine Base Conversion
19. The conversion of crude opium into morphine base is a fairly
simple process. A conversion workshop is usually set up in a large room
in an isolated private residence. It is often staffed by a "chemist," who
in reality is often more like a good cook with chemicals, and two or three
unskilled assistants, who may be paid $5 or more for a day's work.
20. The basic equipment found in such a workshop usually consists
of such improvised utensils as large tubs, enamelled pans, buckets, jugs,
drying trays, and an oven or stove. Other materials used in the conversion
process are slaked lime, ammonium chloride, hydrochloric acid, and various
paper and cloth filters (Figure 3). The only other necessity for a morphine
base workshop is a readily available source of water.
Figure 3. Seized Morphine Base Conversion Equipment
21. The conversion process begins by steeping the opium for several
hours in a large tub over a stove until it completely disintegrates. This
process requires about two gallons of water for every three pounds of opium.
About one pound of slaked lime for every pound of opium is then added
to the mixture. This produces the basic morphine lime salt. This salt is
filtered through cloth straining sacks in order to remove the insoluble debris
and by-alkaloids (Figure 4). In order to obtain the optimum amount of
final product, the debris will normally be mixed again with water and
refiltered.
Approved For ReleasC;MR// / rVf~~F~73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release 29941'YWIIW~A600296R000300070022-8
Figure 4. Morphine Base Strainer and Chemical Solution
22. About one pound of ammonium chloride for every pound of
opium is then stirred into the solution. The solution must then stand for
several hours to enable the morphine base to precipitate completely. The
remaining solution is then discarded and the morphine base filtered and
dried.
23. The finished product is a powdery substance with a consistancy
similar to raw sugar. It has a light tan color and feels somewhat sticky
(Figure 5). Once sealed and packaged, the morphine base will retain its
potency indefinitely.
Approved For Release(?o
l r Xl3600296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Relea&t b:IV1K4&E73B00296R000300070022-8
Figure 5. Raw Opium and Morphine Base
24. Following the conversion process, the utensils are usually scrubbed
clean and stored while the disposable materials and opium residue are
discarded. The workshop is then cleaned and all traces of illicit activity
are removed. In order to protect the security of the workshop location,
the finished morphine base usually is removed from the processing site and
stored in a depot located in another area. As an added precautionary
measure, the workshop location is often changed.
The Basic Trafficking System: Turkey-France
25. The entire illicit opium and morphine base trafficking system,
from the purchase of crude opium to morphine base delivery in France,
consists of a series of interrelated but separate buyer-seller transactions.
Although no two transactions may ever be exactly the same, a general
trafficking pattern can be discerned among the larger and best-organized
trafficking groups. The pattern often can be broken down into five basic
steps centered around various key individuals in the system.
Step 1 - Interior Trafficker
26. The basic character in the illicit narcotics trafficking system is
the interior opium trafficker. This person operates in the interior of Turkey
and initiates the illicit process by buying crude opium from opium poppy
Approved For Released?Q /,q /lJ ffXL3B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release 221tM702I&1RB~~0296R000300070022-8
farmers. Most interior traffickers conduct their operations by sending
representatives to various farmers to solicit opium purchases. Some
traffickers may estimate the amount of opium they can dispose of in the
coming year and pay farmers in advance to plant a given amount of poppies
for their organization. Other traffickers simply send representatives to
various farms to offer top prices in order to meet their requirements. After
the harvest, the traffickers send their men from farm to farm to collect
the opium which will be stored in isolated and protected depots.
Step 2 - Morphine Base Conversion
27. The opium trafficker may next convert all or a part of the bulky
crude opium into its concentrated, compact, and odorless morphine base
form. Major traffickers normally have their own conversion facilities. One
such trafficker reportedly once had an entire village involved in the
operation of 40 conversion workshops. Those traffickers who do not have
their own conversion facilities can send their opium to independent
workshops where the opium will be processed for them for a fixed fee.
Smaller traffickers may simply limit their activities to buying opium for
resale to the larger interior traffickers. The interior traffickers thus serve
as the source of supply for "exterior" traffickers who specialize in selling
the narcotics to foreign customers. Some interior traffickers, however,
occasionally bypass "exterior" traffickers and sell direct to foreign
customers.
Step 3 - Commission Man
28. The so-called commission man is a middleman who receives a
commission from both the interior trafficker and the exterior trafficker
if he is successful in locating and purchasing opium or morphine base for
the latter. When dealing with a new supplier, the commission man may
have to advance a portion of the sales price in order to ensure his good
faith. If a large order is required, the commission man will contact several
interior traffickers until the total amount is accumulated.
Step 4 - Exterior Traffickers
29. The exterior trafficker is normally the pivot in Turkey between
the internal suppliers and the foreign customers. The first requirement for
a prospective exterior trafficker is a large amount of money - $50,000
to $75,000 -- with which to finance the first large transaction in opium
or morphine base. In order to obtain this money, the would-be trafficker
will often borrow funds from one or more of his legitimate businesses or
obtain a high-interest loan from an underworld loan shark. A more common
practice, however, is to find two or three partners who will put up equal
Approved For Release IJOgMA B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Releasg94"t6 IKi&P73B00296R000300070022-8
funds for an equal share of the profits. If this partnership is to continue,
much of the profits from the first transaction will be reinvested into a
second purchase of narcotics. Once firmly established in the trade, the
Turkish traffickers are able to ask for a substantial advance payment from
their French connections to cover a part or all of their operating expenses.
30. A major exterior trafficking group can consist of as few as two
members or as many as five or more. Each group usually has one leader
who oversees the entire operation, including the negotiations with the
French connections, the purchase of the narcotics, and perhaps even the
smuggling operations. On equal footing with the leader, but divorced from
the actual operations, are the silent partners. These individuals are often
high-ranking figures in the Turkish underworld who own one or more
legitimate businesses. The silent partners and their legitimate businesses
normally will not become involved in handling the narcotics. A third element
associated with a trafficking group is the commission man who may either
belong to the group or act as an independent middleman. Most groups also
have a transportation man who picks up the opium or morphine base from
the interior suppliers and transports it to the trafficker's storage depots.
This same individual may also be in charge of planning external smuggling
operations. If the group has its own morphine base conversion facilities,
a fifth member, a "chemist", will oversee the conversion operations.
Step 5 - Negotiations, Communications, and Payments
31. Initial negotiations between prospective French and Turkish
connections are normally conducted on a person-to-person basis in Turkey.
During this meeting, the discussions will most likely center around the price,
methods of payment, and means of delivery.
32. Communications between buyer and seller usually are handled
through couriers or messengers, by telegram, or through the use of mail
drops in Turkey and France. In the latter case, air mail letters are mailed
to either connection using a previously established alias. The letters are
sent in care of a private residence or business where the nominal addressee
is aware of the true identity of the connection. These drops are changed
whenever the mail appears to have been tampered with. In urgent cases,
these traffickers have also used the telephone, but always with caution.
33. Payment for narcotics deliveries to France is normally made in
cash. In many cases, anywhere from 20% to 50% or more of the order
is paid for in advance. This money may have been furnished by a silent
partner associated with the French connection. The Turkish traffickers
prefer advance payment since it establishes the good faith of the buyer,
furnishes the traffickers with funds to purchase the opium or morphine
Approved For ReleaqT~tc73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release 200cP;i:F-4- 7tM9296R000300070022-8
base, and can be used to cover at least part of the traffickers' losses if
shipments are seized prior to delivery.
34. Arrangements for the final payment and narcotics delivery are
usually made in France a few days prior to scheduled delivery. In cash
transactions, French francs are often given to a courier who either delivers
them directly to Turkey or exchanges them for Turkish lire in Beirut where
a higher exchange rate often can be obtained. French traffickers often pay
for their narcotics shipments with firearms or cigarettes. In these cases,
the contraband materials are usually smuggled into Turkey using the same
smuggling methods employed in the narcotics delivery.
35. French traffickers also make use of European banks when paying
for narcotics shipments. In this type of transaction, the buyer opens a letter
of credit at a bank in favor of the seller for an amount of money equal
to the cost of the shipment. Once the seller is notified that the funds have
been designated in his name or to his account, he will authorize the delivery
of the narcotics. Upon receiving the shipment, the French buyer will
authorize the bank to release the funds to the designated payee. Other
banking arrangements simply involve payments by check made out to the
seller's bank account in France, Germany, or Switzerland.
Variations To The Basic System
36. There are four principal variations to the direct Turkey-to-France
procedure. They can be separated into (a) narcotics transactions handled
by Syrian and Lebanese traffickers, (b) those using the services of Middle
Eastern or German middlemen residing in West Germany, (c) transactions
involving Italian middlemen, and (d) illicit operations conducted by
independent small-time operators.
37. Narcotics traffic passing through the Middle East normally
involves two associated trafficking groups operating out of Syria and
Lebanon. These transactions are handled primarily by Lebanese traffickers
who first negotiate a narcotics deal with their French connection and then
order the supplies from their Syrian associates. The Syrian traffickers in
most cases have been receiving a fairly steady flow of crude opium purchased
from Turkish opium traffickers. The morphine base conversion process in
this type of transaction normally takes place in Syria using Syrian
"chemists" who reportedly are much more skilled and turn out a better
grade of morphine base than their Turkish counterparts. When the supplies
are ready for shipment, the Lebanese traffickers will he responsible for
smuggling them to Lebanon and from there to France.
Approved For Release 27V7
pf3M00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Rele.QQ;02t(i1'I62' CIi` tbP73B00296R000300070022-8
38. This type of transaction apparently has become less common in
recent years. Lebanese traffickers now tend to pick up their morphine base
supplies in Turkey, thereby eliminating the Syrian middlemen. The Lebanese
traffickers either smuggle the narcotics directly from Turkey to France or
bring them back to Lebanon for shipment to France.
39. Narcotics trafficking through the Federal Republic of Germany
generally can be divided into two types of transactions - those that use
Germany as a temporary storage depot and those that involve a Middle
Eastern or German middleman. In the first case, narcotics are simply sent
to one or more associates of a Turkish trafficking group who reside in
Germany. The narcotics are stored there until a buyer can be found or
until final arrangements for a sale can be made with an existing French
connection.
40. The second type of transaction involves the outright sale of
narcotics to a Turkish, Middle Eastern, or German middleman residing in
Germany. The middleman thus becomes an independent trafficker who must
arrange his own illicit narcotics system and find his own connections in
France. Since two separate trafficking groups are involved in this type of
transaction, the final cost for the narcotics delivery in France may be from
50% to 300% higher than for the direct Turkish-French transaction.
41. In addition to the middlemen operating out of Germany,
middlemen operating out of Italy are sometimes involved. These Italian
traffickers may either act as agents for a French group or as independent
narcotics importers. In the first case, the Italian group uses its connections
in Italy to facilitate the transit of narcotics from Turkey to France. In
the second case, the Italian group finds its own connections in Turkey and
imports the narcotics into Italy for eventual resale to French groups.
42. Independent narcotics trafficking is too varied to be submitted
to a general description. These transactions normally involve relatively small
quantities of narcotics that are sold and smuggled to any prospective
trafficker - in Turkey or elsewhere -- by opium farmers or small-time
traffickers. The total amount of narcotics entering the illicit French market
in this manner is not believed to be significant when compared to the
quantity handled by the major Turkish traffickers.
Historical Patterns of Smuggling
43. The pattern of narcotics smuggling from Turkey to France can
be divided into three overlapping phases covering the last 15 years. During
the first phase, from the 1950s to early 1960s, crude opium was usually
shipped to France via Lebanon. As much as three-fourths of all opium
Approved For Releaeopffl4j ifjk[]LP73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release 20"tik@f-f~6W7.(b296R000300070022-8
smuggled to France during this period is believed to have transited Beirut.
In addition to smuggling opium, narcotics traffickers also handled limited
quantities of morphine base which were converted in Syria. Virtually all
of the opium not smuggled through Lebanon was shipped directly from
Turkey to France using seamen couriers.
44. By the mid- I960s, morphine base began to replace opium as the
principal raw material shipped to the French heroin traffickers. During this
period, Syria emerged as the prime morphine base conversion center for
Turkish opium. As the need for the narcotics increased and as customs
procedures tightened, narcotics smugglers began to realize the advantages
that the smuggling of morphine base offered over opium. First, it was much
easier to package and conceal. Second, it did not emit the distinct odor
that crude opium did. Even more important, however, was the fact that
one kilogram of morphine base produced the same amount of heroin as
ten kilograms of opium, and therefore the same amount of money or more
could be earned for smuggling only one-tenth the quantity of narcotics.
45. Another change brought about by increased product demand and
tighter international controls at this time was the increase in narcotics
smuggling directly from Turkey to France. Turkish traffickers began to rely
somewhat less on seamen couriers and began to smuggle narcotics over land
using specially constructed compartments in cars, trucks, and buses to hide
the illicit cargo. When seamen couriers were used, special arrangements were
made whereby the narcotics could be unloaded at various ports in Italy
if "the heat was on" in Marseille.
46. The third basic smuggling phase began in the mid or late 1960s
and has continued to the present. During this period, the use of Syria as
a morphine base conversion center declined drastically, giving Turkish
traffickers practically a monopoly over both opium and morphine base
production. Increased internal security measures in Syria following the 1967
war may have had an effect on Syria's declining role. The importance,
therefore, of Syrian and Lebanese traffickers has waned dramatically during
the last several years.
47. Available evidence indicates that overland smuggling has now
become the most common means to smuggle opium and morphine base
from Turkey into Western Europe. Although narcotics are still sent by ship,
the emphasis has apparently changed from port delivery to off-loading on
the high seas.
48. The most significant change during this period, however, has been
the emergence of West Germany as a major opium and morphine base
storage depot and staging area. A large part of all narcotics shipped overland
Approved For Release 20M I_f)n P AT0296R000300070022-8
 Approved For ReleasQH1W.N1K~,73B00296R000300070022-8
from Turkey to France is now believed to pass through Germany. The
narcotics are either sold to traffickers living in Germany or are transshipped
from there to France.
Methods of Smuggling
49. The methods a smuggler may use to transport narcotics from
Turkey to France are limited only by the scope of his imagination. An
analysis of known methods -- both past and present -- indicates that there
are certain general practices and common routes followed by many such
smugglers.
50. The most popular method of smuggling narcotics into Western
Europe apparently is through the use of specially constructed compartments
or "traps" built into passenger cars, commercial trucks, and touring buses.
The cost for having such a compartment built may range from about $150
for simple traps in a car to a few thousand dollars for large traps built
into international touring buses. Automobile traps are often constructed
behind the front headlights, in the inner base of each fender, inside door
panels, inside the upholstery, under the dashboard, under the floor, in the
gas tank, and underneath the trunk. These traps on a European car will
normally hold about 75 to 100 kilograms of narcotics.
51. A typical truck trap might consist of a false truck bed, cab wall,
or ceiling measuring one foot deep and holding about 200 kilograms of
narcotics. The trucks used to smuggle opium and morphine base out of
Turkey often belong to legitimate international trucking companies which
frequently haul legal cargos from the Middle or Near East and Turkey to
Western Europe. Although the modus operandi will vary, a typical operation
begins with the loading of a bonded consignment of legitimate cargo in
Turkey or Iran. Following a customs inspection, a metal customs bond strip
will be placed over the truck's cargo doors. The truck driver upon arriving
at the Turkish narcotics depot will pick the lock on the customs tag, load
the narcotics, and then relock the tag. These trucks, carrying a customs
seal, will then be able to travel across national frontiers with little or no
controls.* The number of such trucks traveling to Europe is so great that
systematic inspections are not possible. If no advance information is
available, these trucks will be allowed to proceed without examination as
long as the customs seal appears to be intact.
* These legitimate international truck shipments are often accompanied by a "Transport
International Routier" (TIR) carnet. The TIR carnet is a booklet that ordinarily allows
shipments under customs seal to transit a country, or move from a port of entry to
destination, without customs inspection. All major European countries adhere to the
TIR Convention of 1956.
Approved For Releatee +".tff 73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release k0O DE1N&[JAIB00296R000300070022-8
52. The overland shipment of narcotics to Western Europe requires
several preparations. The traffickers must first procure the services of a
courier and arrange for traps to be built into his car. The courier must
then be briefed on foreign customs procedures, customs connections (if
any), and suggested routes. In some cases, particularly if a new procedure
is involved, the traffickers will conduct a "dry run" to inspect road
conditions, customs enforcement, etc. The courier will also be given contact
plans and the number of someone to call in case of trouble.
53. A day or two after the courier leaves for Western Europe, the
trafficker or his representative will fly to the point of delivery and make
final arrangements for the delivery to the customer. He will then meet the
courier at a prearranged location and at that time instruct him as to where
to make the actual delivery. The trafficker will often meet the courier in
a neighboring country and follow the car carrying the narcotics across the
last frontier in order to verify that the shipment made it through. The
courier generally will receive about $80 for each kilogram of morphine base
he successfully smuggles into France from Turkey. Thus one load of 200
kilograms will earn a Turkish smuggler about $16,000 for one week's work.
54. Delivery procedures from Turkey to middlemen in West Germany
are similar to those made in France. Other shipments to Germany will only
remain in the country for temporary storage and subsequent reshipment
to France. In these cases, the narcotics are unloaded from the original
vehicles and eventually transfered to a less suspicious vehicle owned and
driven by a European national who will carry the narcotics into France.
Once in France, the European courier often will hand over his shipment
to the originating Turkish trafficker who in turn will deliver it to his French
connection.
55. The German trafficking operations are often similar to those in
Turkey. The German groups usually employ the services of a commission
man who often will be given round-trip fare to France, expense money,
and a narcotics sample and be asked to find a customer. The traffickers,
after finding a connection, will then hire a courier to transport the narcotics
from Germany to France. The most common smuggling method for this
type of shipment is the private car. One recent report states that narcotics
are now also being smuggled from Germany to France on board German
ships bound for Marseille. Turkish and Middle Eastern traffickers reportedly
are relying much more on European couriers, vehicles, and ships since
anything coming into France from another European country is much less
suspect than anything or anyone coming from Turkey. The European
courier's fee for smuggling morphine base from Germany into France
averages about $50 per kilogram.
Approved For Release 21 6fK/pqM79R00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For ReleasC'Pgikl)W. N 73B00296R000300070022-8
By Sea
56. The smuggling of opium and morphine base by sea, although
perhaps less popular than a few years ago, still accounts for a large amount
of the narcotics entering France. In a typical sea smuggling operation, one
or more seamen are hired in Turkey to oversee the shipment of narcotics
to a specified Mediterranean port. The choice of port usually depends on
customs security and the availability of a cooperating customs official. The
narcotics are delivered to a cargo ship shortly before the ship's departure
and then smuggled on board. This loading procedure often involves the
complicity of a port customs official. The seaman courier is then instructed
how and where to contact the Turkish trafficker's representative, who will
be waiting at the port of delivery. Frequent use is made of prearranged
recognition signals in order to facilitate identification.
57. There are two principal means of smuggling narcotics by sea. The
first is to unload the narcotics before entering the port. This procedure,
usually carried out off the coast of southern France, can be accomplished
by transferring the shipment to a smaller craft at a prearranged rendezvous,
or by throwing the shipment overboard at a predetermined spot. In the
latter case, the bags of narcotics are weighed down by lead weights to hide
them from surface view and then marked by a special buoy. The shipment
will be retrieved after the ship leaves the area by a smaller boat belonging
to the French traffickers. Because of the navigational planning required,
this type of operation normally involves the complicity of the ship's captain
or other. senior crew members.
58. If the delivery is to be made at the port of Marseille, the courier
will first contact the trafficker's representative to determine how strict port
security is at that time. If port security is judged to be too tight, the courier
will most likely be instructed either to deliver the shipment at another
port - usually in Italy or Spain - or deliver it to Marseille on the ship's
next call. Many Turkish ships will stop at Marseille three or four times
during their month-long voyage out of Istanbul or Izmir (Figure 6).
59. The unloading of the narcotics from the ship is generally the
responsibility of the French buyer. The process often involves the
collaboration of a port customs official who may receive up to $100 for
each kilogram of morphine base he helps to unload. When a cooperating
customs official is not available, the narcotics may be smuggled ashore in
the seaman's personal effects or in the ship's cargo, or it may be transferred
to an adjoining boat that has been moored there for that purpose. The
availability of a cooperating customs official is judged so valuable, however,
that the entire smuggling pattern and port of delivery may shift to wherever
this accomplice is stationed.
Approved For RelEM4/fJLQN f ItFLDP73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release 992/0'I/0P-Q hbAB00296R000300070022-8
Figure 6. Typical Turkish Ship Used for Narcotics Smuggling
60. The overland and sea smuggling methods are sometimes combined
whereby the narcotics are hidden in a car which is transported by ship
from Turkey or Lebanon to a West European or Mediterranean port. The
car is then taken off the ship and driven from the port to France. This
method reduces the number of customs searches undergone by the shipment.
By Air
61. The smuggling of narcotics by air appears to be the least popular
smuggling method. In one type of airline smuggling operation, a package
containing narcotics is taken to an accomplice working at a commercial
airline freight office. This accomplice takes care of the air freight labeling
process and delivers the package to a cooperating customs official. The
package, with customs clearance stamps, is then flown to France and picked
up by the French connection. Another type of airline smuggling involves
the secreting of packages containing narcotics on board an aircraft by a
member of the ground crew. The package will later be removed by a
confederate ground crew member in France.
Approved For Release kO 1F0t N $i800296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Relea `360ke4f0Y tA{A P73B00296R000300070022-8
62. The simplest type of airline smuggling involves the carrying of
narcotics in a false bottom suitcase by an airline passenger. This method
is widely used by French traffickers to smuggle heroin into the United
States. Although this method of smuggling morphine base apparently has
been used more by Lebanese traffickers than by those in Turkey, recent
reporting suggests that the latter may now be using this method more
frequently. The smuggling of narcotics into Western Europe by airline
passengers may increase in popularity in light of the lax customs procedures
at most European airports.
Approved For ,ZMP73BOO296ROO0300070022-8
 Approved For ReleaseQObl/bb}.bki3B00296R000300070022-8
Grejce
Istanbul
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
Smuggling Routes
Turkey (Figure 7)*
63. Opium and morphine base must be transported clandestinely from
the interior storage depots to the depots located closer to the various points
of embarkation in Turkey. While being transported, the unwrapped crude
opium is usually carried in large burlap bags, while the morphine base is
carried in sealed plastic bags which serve as linings for outer cloth bags.
The cloth bags are often tied at the neck and will occasionally carry a
lead seal. These bags are frequently carried inside commercial 18-liter oil
cans, which facilitate transport and storage. The bags or cans are normally
transported inside Turkey by private cars and trucks equipped with special
traps.
64. There are several key transit areas in Turkey through which the
illicit narcotics tend to pass. Shipments destined to France via Syria or
Lebanon are first moved to the Syrian border near the cities of Iskenderun,
Gaziantep, Kilis, or Antioch. From these cities, the narcotics are sent
overland into Syria or by sea to either Syrian or Lebanese ports.
65. Most narcotics earmarked for direct shipment to France or West
Germany will usually leave Turkey via the ports of Istanbul and Izmir or
* The following maps indicate known and suggested smuggling routes commonly used
by narcotics smugglers.
Approved For Release 2 0a /fiffp~~Pg~3f!00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release'IIBM3B00296R000300070022-8
overland via Istanbul to the Turkish frontier post at Edirne. Edirne is located
on the Turkish-Greek-Bulgarian frontier and has been a major exit point
for all overland shipments leaving Turkey for Western Europe over the last
15-20 years. The complicity of various customs officials from all three
countries at this key location has facilitated the movement of narcotics
into Western Europe since the 1950s.
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 9OLVIbH)d2$IR00296R000300070022-8
l-\J
TEL (AVIV-YAFO
QAMMAN
Syria and Lebanon (Figure 8)
66. Most opium smuggled into Syria usually enters through Kilis or
through the roads coming from Iskenderun and Antioch. The opium is
usually carried in cars and trucks, but may also be carried by mule train.
The border controls in these areas are few in number and generally primitive,
making narcotics smuggling a relatively easy matter (Figure 9). Most of
these shipments are taken to the city of Aleppo, traditionally the major
morphine base conversion center for Middle Eastern traffickers. Morphine
base from Aleppo is usually carried overland through Hims or Latakia into
Lebanon.
67. Some of the narcotics enter Lebanon by ship from either the
Turkish port of Iskenderun or from Syria's major port at Latakia. From
Latakia, the narcotics may either be transshipped to Lebanon or sent
directly to France. The Lebanese ports of Beirut and Tripoli serve as major
entry and exit points for illicit narcotics.
Approved For Release 0F3R O fikI TAlB00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For ReleasCoK4n/OEi ] 'IFJXFL73B00296R000300070022-8
Figure 9. Syrian Border Post
Approved For Releas~2QQ~/_Q1/A2 CJ,Q-E21~PL7 3B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release!~IV/bi`TR3B00296R000300070022-8
Bulgaria (Figure 10)
68. The role of Bulgaria in the field of international narcotics has
increased tremendously in the last several years. Most of the opium and
morphine base carried overland from Turkey to Western Europe travels
through Bulgaria. More important than its transit role, however, is the recent
trend by some Turkish traffickers to use Bulgaria as a safehaven from where
major narcotics operations are directed. Sofia has been described as the
"new center" for directing narcotics and arms trafficking between Western
Europe and the Near East. French and UK police officials have also voiced
their belief that Bulgarian government officials may be actively involved
in selling seized Turkish narcotics to French traffickers.
69. Turkish and Iranian vehicles leaving Turkey at Edirne may be
subjected to customs inspection at Kapitan Andreevo, located near
Svilengrad. However, Bulgarian trucks hired to haul Turkish cargos
reportedly are normally excluded from inspection. The general consensus
among narcotics smugglers is that this Bulgarian customs inspection is the
most dangerous search they face during their entire trip. The detailed search
for narcotics often includes the use of specially trained dogs as well as
a thorough search for traps in the undercarriage and ceiling of suspected
trucks. It is reportedly because of this careful examination that many
narcotics smugglers refuse to attempt to secrete and carry more than 200
Approved For Release F,(Myllb f F~7~3B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release( M44l(DE [FDB00296R000300070022-8
kilograms of narcotics per shipment. These detailed searches, however, are
not conducted primarily to stop the flow of narcotics to Western Europe
but to increase the revenue of the local customs officials. If a narcotics
smuggler is caught in Bulgaria, he reportedly pays a small fine for the
violation and then is given the opportunity to repurchase his seized shipment
of narcotics for a certain percentage of its estimated value. The apprehended
smuggler thus loses only a small part of his courier's fee and a few hours
of his time before he is allowed to continue with his shipment. The Bulgarian
route probably passes through Kharmanli, Plovdiv, and Sofia before leaving
Bulgaria at Kalotina.
Approved For Release, g2~011Qi lCIA.:.F3QPJ3B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release 4idi)lba d4iB00296R000300070022-8
avala V
Albania K Al ex androupoIls
Thessaloniki
Katerini.
Edirne
Turkey
Th
Piraievs,o-ATHENS
it
Greece (Figure 11)
70. Greece serves as a secondary transit area for passenger vehicles
carrying narcotics out of Turkey and as an alternative for those traffickers
wishing to avoid playing the Bulgarian customs game. The only known major
entry point for these illicit shipments is at Edirne. The apparent pattern
is for the narcotics to be driven through Alexandroupolis and Kavala to
Thessaloniki. From there the vehicles generally turn north air d' proceed
across the Yugoslav border.
71. A second means of smuggling narcotics into Greece is by ship.
In addition to the narcotics smuggled via the larger Turkish cargo ships
that regularly call at Piraievs, smaller ships reportedly also carry opium and
morphine base from various Turkish ports to numerous smaller Greek ports.
From there, the narcotics probably are taken by car to their final
destination.
Approved For Release 2M"/PqWTAM00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Releas ENifAAFE3B00296R000300070022-8
Yugoslavia (Figure 12)
72. Virtually all of the opium and morphine base smuggled overland
from Turkey to Western Europe travels through Yugoslavia. Despite reported
attempts to strengthen customs controls, the number of customs officials
has remained frozen at pre-World War II levels. Only about 20 smugglers
of all kinds of drugs are arrested each year at the various Yugoslav customs
stations. The apprehended smugglers reportedly receive only a prison term
of three or four months and a fine as punishment. In addition to the Turkish
narcotics transiting Yugoslavia, an undetermined amount of Yugoslav opium
is also smuggled from its Macedonian growing areas to traffickers in France
or West Germany.
73. There are two principal entry points for illicit narcotics.
Shipments coming from Greece normally enter Yugoslavia through the
province of Macedonia near Smokvica, while shipments from Bulgaria enter
through the Serbian city of Dimitrovgrad. Most narcotics seizures in
Yugoslavia are made at Dimitrovgrad. Whether coming from Greece or
Approved For Releas~ f3?2 Q1/Q2 CJt~Q I73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For ReleasC@PN}OIjW-E73B00296R000300070022-8
Bulgaria, the principal smuggling route passes through Nis and Paracin to
Belgrade and from there via highway to Zagreb. There, the smuggler is faced
with two alternatives. He may either continue west through Ljubljana to
the Italian border and then France, or he may turn north and travel through
Maribor on his way to West Germany.
74. In addition to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, illicit narcotics may also
be transiting other East European countries. Although the evidence is still
fragmentary, an undetermined amount of morphine base reportedly is being
shipped to Western Europe via Hungary. The specific routes, however, are
unknown.
Approved For Release 2POR4~/ ~~'P00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release I IOPfV f AL600296R000300070022-8
IONIAN
SEA
Tunisia
Italy (Figure 13)
75. Italy has been a major narcotics transit area for more than 15
years. Illicit narcotics from Turkey enter Italy in two ways - overland from
Yugoslavia through Trieste or Gorizia and by sea via Trieste, Venice, Naples,
or Genoa. Many smaller Italian ports, such as Bari and Brindisi, have also
been used as narcotics entry points. Shipments arriving by sea are usually
driven to France via Genoa or Torino or driven to West Germany apparently
via Verona, Bolzano, and Innsbruck. Narcotics shipments entering Italy from
Yugoslavia usually proceed to France via Venice, Verona, and Milan and
from there through either Torino or Genoa. Milan has also frequently been
used as a major operational and storage base by Italian morphine base and
heroin traffickers.
Approved For Relea ea~MML73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release @bIi13Mfk-hhk73B00296R000300070022-8
Switzerland
L" f~
Austria (Figure 14)
76. Most of the narcotics shipments destined for West Germany pass
through Austria. The principal route for narcotics entering Austria from
Maribor, Yugoslavia, appears to go through Graz, Bruck, and Bischofshofen
to just south of Salzburg where the Austrian road connects to the Munich
autobahn at Schwarzbach. A secondary route used for narcotics shipments
entering Austria from Italy passes through Innsbruck and probably follows
the Inn River to Raubling, Germany, before turning west toward Munich.
77. Austria is also used as a transit route for narcotics heading from
West Germany to France. The major route in this case is believed to enter
Austria northwest of Innsbruck and proceed through Landeck into
Switzerland.
Approved For Release 2,0~?1/PJLPLA5"? 00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release fo0OkWitD. 1XFMFgj?00296R000300070022-8
N
Hamburg 1
Germany
Strasbaurg
France
Mulhouse-
-Zurich
Switzerland
1
r
ti
C
r-r
r
Munich
Schwarzbach
Czechoslovakia
West Germany (Figure 15)
78. Beginning in the late 1960s, large numbers of Turkish and other
Near Eastern workers began to immigrate to West Germany. By 1970, the
need for labor had swollen their number to some 400,000. Many of these
BERLIN,J *\~
Germany
Approved For ReleaYmW? IE73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release/F'j/1N4- 3B00296R000300070022-8
Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian nationals have entered the drug smuggling and
trafficking business from their residences in West Germany. They, often
together with German partners, have established major storage and staging
areas across West Germany. The three known principal storage/staging areas
are located in or near Munich, Frankfurt, and Hamburg.
79. Most of the Turkish opium and morphine base brought into
Germany is believed to enter the country through the Schwarzbach border
crossing near Salzburg and another crossing opposite Innsbruck. The customs
control problem at these crossings was recently summarized by a Bavarian
criminal magistrate who stated: "Each year 2.5 million automobiles cross
the Schwarzbach freeway border station. After all, we cannot take every
car apart and search it for narcotics." Narcotics shipped from Germany
to France often travel via Landsberg and Tubingen into Switzerland and
through Karlsruhe and Freiburg into France.
80. Not all of the morphine base leaves Germany. According to
German newspaper estimates, there are about 15,000 drug addicts
throughout the country. Some of these addicts are consuming a narcotic
substance referred to as "Berlin tincture," a heroin-like drug produced by
processing morphine base with acetic acid and distilled water. There have
also been unconfirmed reports that some of the morphine base is being
converted into heroin in West Germany.
Approved For Release ~pQ~ F
I fK-f?A?B00296R000300070022-8
1/0
 Approved For Release JW0N1M- IDN1lIMIP00296R000300070022-8
France
Switzerland (Figure 16)
Sankt
Gallen
81. In addition to serving as a favorite banking area and meeting place
for many narcotics traffickers, Switzerland also serves as a transit area for
narcotics shipped from Germany to France. Although these shipments enter
Switzerland at various points on the Austrian and German borders, most
shipments appear to travel through Zurich before turning south through
Lucerne and Lausanne to Geneva and then France.
West Germany
,,,Konstanz
i/
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For ReleasCBbiYDIkiIA'-73B00296R000300070022-8
Spain (Figure 17)
82. French traffickers use Spain primarily in smuggling heroin from
France to the United States. There have also been some unconfirmed reports
that heroin is being produced there. Spain, however, is involved in the
smuggling of opium and morphine base into Europe. Narcotics traffickers
reportedly have increased their use of Spain, and particularly the port of
Barcelona, as an entry point for Turkish narcotics. Using this route, the
shipment is delivered by ship to Barcelona and then driven into France
via Gerona and Figueras.
Approved For Release 2(~C ,k B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release J@Qr9T11NR;?00296R000300070022-8
France (Figure 18)
83. Virtually any road, port, or airport has or can be used to bring
opium and morphine base to the heroin processing sites in France. There
are, nonetheless, certain popular routes that many traffickers have used
when delivering narcotics to the two principal known French narcotics
receiving areas - Marseille and Paris. Marseille is by far the most popular
point of entry for shipments arriving by sea. Narcotics destined for Marseille
overland from Italy tend to travel via the road leading from Torino to
Grenoble or via the road linking Monaco, Nice, and Toulon. Those shipments
destined for Paris often will proceed via Grenoble to Lyon and then over
national highway to Paris.
84. The most common French border crossing point for narcotics
transiting Switzerland is outside of Geneva. Vehicles using this route usually
will head south to Lyon and then either continue south via Avignon to
Approved For Releasa. 2- VI' CIQ-Rp~73B00296R000300070022-8 D-E
 CONFIDE'I~
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA- 0296R000300070022-8
Marseille or turn north at Lyon and travel to Paris. Border crossings near
Strasbourg and Mulhouse apparently are quite popular with smugglers
transporting narcotics from Germany to France. The only other known
smuggling route into France is the road from Barcelona to Marseille which
passes south of Perpignan and follows the coastline to its final destination.
The Outlook
85. On 30 June 1971 the Turkish government announced that it
would reduce the opium production areas from the seven authorized
provinces in 1971 to four provinces in 1972. The government also banned
the production of all opium following the 1972 harvest. The elimination
of authorized poppy cultivation and opium production in Turkey, if
successfully monitored, should eventually put an end to a close, cheap,
and plentiful source of supply for the French heroin processors.
86. Knowledge of the gradual elimination of opium production in
Turkey reportedly prompted French traffickers and their financiers to begin
planning in 1970 to buy out and stockpile as much opium and morphine
base as possible. These plans reportedly are still being carried out and will
most likely continue to be executed as long as opium remains available
in Turkey.
87. In addition to formulating stockpiling plans, however, French
traffickers undoubtedly have also been planning how and where to get their
narcotics supplies after their Turkish sources dry up. There is unfortunately
little information presently available concerning these plans. French
traffickers have previously received small amounts of opium from Yugoslavia
and even less from the Far East. So far as is known, opium from Pakistan
and Afghanistan has not yet been tapped by the French. An attempt to
maintain the pace of heroin production in France could involve any or
all of these countries.
88. The source most frequently mentioned by French traffickers as
to future potential is Yugoslavia. The largest known French importer of
opium and morphine base stated prior to his arrest earlier this year that
if the supplies from Turkey were ever reduced, he and other French
traffickers would look to Yugoslavia as a potential steady source of supply.
He, as well as other important French traffickers, has often praised the
quality of Yugoslav opium which has even a higher morphine content than
Turkish opium.
89. Virtually all of the opium produced in Yugoslavia is grown in
the region of Macedonia which covers the southern part of Yugoslavia and
crosses into northern Greece and western Bulgaria. Total opium production
Approved For Release 2 '9T/bi:iI L W IDD,00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Releas~90M1~, `.kTIk-hDP73B00296R000300070022 ,8
estimates from Yugoslav officials have varied considerably over the last five
years - from a high of 50 tons in 1966 to five tons in 1970. There are
no authoritative estimates as to how much of this or other unauthorized
opium in the Macedonian region has entered the illicit market, although
illicit opium trafficking between Yugoslavia and France has been going on
for at least ten years. In 1965, at least two major French traffickers
reportedly obtained Yugoslav opium from a source based in Trieste. The
seizure of 15 kilograms of Marseille-bound Yugoslav opium near the
Yugoslav-Italian border in October 1971 indicates that this traffic is still
continuing.
90. Narcotics traffickers in the Far East reportedly have smuggled
minor quantities of smoking opium and morphine base into France. Large
quantities of opium and morphine base are produced in Southeast Asia,
and there appear to be no insurmountable obstacles to a shift by French
traffickers to use of morphine base of Asian origin. The other major opium
producing area which may be explored by French traffickers is the Near
East. Although the quality of Pakistani and Afghan opium is not as high
as that produced in Turkey, these areas remain a significant potential opium
source. Poppy cultivation and opium smuggling are well established
occupations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Most of the illicit opium from
this area, however, is smuggled into Iran to meet the needs of Iran's large
number of narcotics addicts.
91. Of the three main alternative sources of supply of opium and
morphine base, Yugoslavia appears to be the first area to which French
traffickers will turn. This option is likely to have only a minimal impact
on the patterns and techniques of opium smuggling now existing in Europe.
If adequate supplies of opium and morphine base are not forthcoming from
Yugoslavia, however, these traffickers may turn to either Pakistani-Afghan
sources or Southeast Asian sources. This would likely cause a major
realignment of the smuggling routes now serving French traffickers and
could raise the costs associated with the French traffic.
Approved For Releae" f14"EiI C]LP73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release t"ffl 1v r1,k: 00296R000300070022-8
Publications and Related Papers
in the International Narcotic Series
BGI GR 71-4 -- The Illicit Production and Movement of Opiates in Latin
America, January 1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM.
BGI GR 71-5 -- Opium Production and Movement in Southeast Asia, January
1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
BGI GR 72-1 - Opium Production and Movement in the Near East and
South Asia, July 1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM.
Recent Trends in the Illicit Narcotics Market in Southeast
Asia, May 1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
(International Narcotics Series No. 1)
Chemical Requirements for Opium Refining in Southeast
Asia, August 1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
(International Narcotics Series No. 2)
Paraguay - Heroin Crossroads of South America, August
1971, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
(International Narcotics Series No. 3)
The Cocaine Situation in Latin America, October 1971,
CONFIDENTIAL.
(International Narcotics Series No. 4)
ER IM 71-212 - Opium Poppy Cultivation in Northern Thailand, October
1971, CONFIDENTIAL.
(International Narcotics Series No. 5)
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
Confidential
Conf idential
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300070022-8
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIM'UB002 0 03 g7(~0~
25X1A
Subject: DOD Request for Advice on Replying to Congressional Inquiries
Regarding CIA Alleged Involvement in Transport of Drugs
1. On 1 .June 1971, Col. Everett Hopson, DOD Special Assistant for
Drug Abuse Control, phoned to state that DO) had
received letters from Senator Fred Harris and Congressman Bingham
inquiring about reports that CIA.controlled aircraft had been used for
the transport of drugs in Southeast Asia. Col. Hopson said he.intended
to reply that DOD had no information on this subject, but he wished to
check with the Agency in the event the Agency preferred"some other course
25X1A of action.
2. I called Mr. , to inform him of this inquiry. He
stated that Col. Hopson's proposed response to the letters seemed.
the best under the circumstances, but he asked me to touch base also
with Mr. Maurey, Legislative Counsel, or in his absense with Mr.
or Mr. of that office.
25X1A 3. Mr. _ suggested I inform Col. Hopson that Congressman Glaser had
recently received from Mr. Ingersoll, BNDD, a reply to a similar
25X1A inquiry which GuOser intended to have printed in the Congressional
Record on 1 June, This communication served the Agency's interests well
and, it was hoped, would serve to forestall further Congressional
inquiries along the same lines. Mr. suggested that, if Col. Hopson,
could put off his replies to the letters We had received until 2 June, he
could make reference to the item in the Record. Otherwise, Col. Hopson's
intention to indicate no knowledge of CIA involvement would be appropriate.
25X1A
4. Col. Hopson was informed of the expected appearance of the Gubser
item, and he indicated he would like ~o refer to it in his replies
to Harris and Bingham.
5. The Gubser item did not appear on 1 July as expected, but it did
appear on 2 July. (Item beginning on page E5305 is attached.) On
3 July I informed Col. Hopson of this. He expressed appreciation for
this, and I thanked him for alerting the Agency to the Harris and Bingham
queries*
cc: Office of Legislative Counsel
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 :3 3BOO296R000300070022-8
s
 Appro
F &MOW-EOgE/fij ~ECIA-RDP73B00296R
TO: c
ROOM NO.
REMARKS:
eDPO6
FROM:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
00300070022-8
Appro EQ2ftleas&,RQQZl'i.Q2 : CIA-RDP73B00296,R000300070022-8
I FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.