MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972-- AMENDMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000500040013-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 15, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

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June 15, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE
U.B. prisoners with the final withdrawl of
all U.B. forces by a specific date In the near
future.
An agreement on this basis, It seems to me,
could act to close out this ill-fated Involve-
ment. It would also bring about, I believe,
the end of an era In the nation's Interna-
tional relations. Mistakes have been made
during the past quarter of a century in the were to stand to the side for a time and let
conduct of these relations. Do not think for , the lead pass to the smaller European states
a moment. however, that it has all been a
mistake. Much that has been done had to be
done, In the enduring interests of this na-
tion. Much that is being done now needs still
to be done.
A vast web of trade and cultural relation-
ships, for example, has been woven with the
rest of the world. It serves for the mutual
enrichment and contentment of hundreds
of millions of people. By the same token, a
sudden rupture of the web could bring up-
heavals and conflicts of a most disastrous
kind. We have also begin to perceive in these
twenty-five years, I believe, the dimensions
of the problem of maintaining permanent
peace. We have come, too, to a greater aware-
ness of the significance of human interde-
pendency and mutual concern if the world
is ever to know stabillity. Moreover, rudi-
mentary machinery which can give expres-
sion to that awareness is now in existence.
It would compound the tragedy if, In the
bitter aftermath of Viet Nam, we were to
turn our backs on this advance. It would be
a step backward if we were to veer from what
has been an excess of international involve-
ment to an extreme of disinvolvernent.
I hope it will be recognized, therefore, that
It is possible to withdraw from Viet Nam
without seceding from the world. If we make
that distinction-and I believe the people of
this nation will make it-then It should be
possible to withdraw militarily not only from
Indochina but from the Southeast Asian
peninsula without abandoning our vital na-
tional Interest In what transpires on the
periphery & I emphasize the word "periph-
ery"=of the Asian mainland.
Similarly, we should be able to reduce
sharply the United States deployment of over
half a million armed forces and dependents
In Western Europe a quarter of a century
after World War II without forsaking the
essential mutual pledges of the North
Atlantic Treaty Alliance. We should be able,
too, to exercise a firfie and discriminating
control over the enormous expenditures
which are made In the name of national de-
fense and, at the same time, still' provide
adequately for the defense of the nation. We
should find it feasible to curb the corruption
and carelessness which have filtered into the
Armed Forces without demeaning and dis-
couraging the millions of dedicated men and
women who wear the uniform. We should
be capable of shutting dawn obsolescent and
over-extended aid programs without losing
a human compassion for the other people
with whom we share the earth.
Those adjustments Involve, in the words
11 of President Nixon, "lowering the profile" of
the nation abroad. If they are to be made
effectively, it seems to me that they must be
accompanied by a new and vigorous. effort
of American diplomacy. That effort should
be aimed at securing agreements with other
nations which make international stability
more dependent on mutual understandings
and undertakings and less on the unilateral
commitment of the military power of this or
any other nation. Such agreements in the
Far Pacific, for example, would have to In-
volve not only the United States and Japan,
but also the People's Republic of China, the
Soviet Union, the Philippines and other na-
tions.
In Europe, a new and updated apprnaeh
would presuppose, a substantial shift of the
burden of NATO from this nat4on to Western
Europe-a step which,: Incidentslly. le long -
overdue and will be pressed, and pressed hard
and continuously, In the Senate until it is
taken.
It will also call for agreements embracing
both East and West Europe and the anoma-
lous situation at Berlin, Indeed, in a now ap-
proach to the security of Europe it might be
helpful if the Soviet Union and this nation
on both sides of the divide. The efforts of the
two super-powers might well be concen-
trated, Instead, on ending the game of musi-
cal chairs with regard to disarmament, mu-
tual reductions of their forces in Europe, and
the control of nuclear weapons which has
been pursued for so many years. In this con-
nection, some risks for peace are clearly
indicated if we are to reduce the ever-pres-
ent and immediate risk of the oollapso of hu-
man civilization that Is inherent in interna-
tional nuclear anarchy. In matters of aid and
assistance we will accept our share of re-
sponsibility for the well-being of the world
but it will be a proportionately lower share
than in the past and it will be discharged
In cooperation with others.
In short, In the era ahead, we will get away
from the excess of unilateral international-
ism which has characterized our policies for
the past two decades and try to recast our
relations with others to the end that they
are multilateral in substance as well as in
name, to the end that the common burdens
of the world are more equitably shared.
This transition will derive from Presiden-
tial leadership but not Executive flat. It will
depend, rather, on a concerted effort in which
the President is joined by the Senate and
the Congress, with each respectful of the
Constitutional sensibilities and responsibili-
ties of the other. Most of all, it will depend
on a government which can be trusted by an
informed people because it Is credible in what
it says and does and because it is alert and
responsive to their needs.
You who graduate, today, and your coun-
terparts throughout the nation, loom large
In what may be anticipated during the dec-
ades ahead. You have the vote, thanks to
the determined effort of the distinguished
senior Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Ken-
nedy and his amendment and, therefore, are
in a position to make your weight felt in
the conduct of the government. That is a
highly important aspect of your role in shap-
ing the nation's future. Beyond it, however,
there is the part which young people will
have played in ending the tragedy of the
involvement in Indochina.
That tragedy will be terminated; I would
hope that it will be terminated very soon,
The responsibility for bringing It to an end
rests heavily on those of us who are the "old
hands" of another generation. To move be-
yond Viet Nam into a future of pence will
devolve just as heavily on you. To open a
new era of constructive cooperation with the
rest of the human race, to act with compas-
sion and with high purpose, that Is your
opportunity, you who are the "new hands"
of tomorrow. It is your life which lies ahead,
It is your nation. It is your world. May you
make the most of them all.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, r congratu-
late the distinguished doctor majority
leader on one additional honor. As we
know, he has many prescriptions for the
health of the Nation, and I hope he will
continue to offer more prescriptions,
whether we swallow them or not.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may
I express my deep personal thanks to the
distinguished minority leader and to ex-
press the hope that not only will both of
us together be able to find prescriptions
for the His which confront the Nation,
but, hopefully, some cures as well.
89025
FORTHCOMING MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT ON DRUG ADDIC-
TION
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the Presi-
dent will, on Thursday, send to Con-
gress a message on drug addiction which
will include the establishment of a White
House office to coordinate all activities
`concerning treatment, research, educa-
tion, law enforcement, and attempts to
cut off the source of dangerous drugs
from Americans, whether in civilian or
military life. This will be a very impor-
tant and innovative proposal, which I
sincerely believe meets with the approval
of the vast majority, if not all, of the
Members of Congress. I, therefore, ex-
press my personal satisfaction in the fact
that such an important message Is short-
ly to be sent to us.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT
UNTIL 9 A.M. TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on
behalf of the distinguished minority
leader and myself, we ask unanimous con-
sent that when the Senate completes
its business today, it stand in adjourn-
ment until the hour of 9 o'clock tomor-
row morning.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
10 A.M. THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1971,
AND 10 A.M. FRIDAY, JUNE 18, 1971
Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous
consent that when the Senate completes
its business on Wednesday and Thurs-
day it stand in adjournment until the
hour of 10 o'clock on Thursday and Fri-
day of this week.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered,
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield back
my time.
- ORDER OF BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Under the previous order, the Chair
recognizes the Senator from Missouri
(Mr. SYMINCTON) for not to exceed 15
MM'LI'ARY PROCURE
tend tof[ 1311this morning on..a
subject entitled "Thailand and Laos-
The Secret War." Prior to reading the
text of my remarks, I would note the de-
gree of general lack of knowledge of just
what has actually been going on in Laos
over recent years is further illustrated
in an article by Neil Sheehan in the New
York Times last Monday, June 14, in
connection with the publication of docu-
Ipents drawn from a study of the Viet-
nam War, i ask unanimous consent that
a part of this story having to do with
covert air operations in Laos as long ago
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 9026 Approved For R~1N?g# AL (ndUIE 03S 0500040013-9June ,15, 1971
1964 be inserted at this point in the to clandestine raids by the T-28's in Laos and tive American limit the sc eat the cost
as RECORD. the United States Navy and Air Force jets- the commit In .
There being no objection, the article code-named Yankee Team-operating over During the past 2 years, despite all
was ordered to be printed in the, RECORD, Laos. Accord was also reached that South these promises to end the war and despite
Vietnamese troops, possibly accompanied by the growing demand of the American
as follows: American advisers, would also make ground at this [From the New York Times, June 14, 19711 forays into Laos up to a depth of 20 kilo- people th executive bra ling be accompli the has ed
THAILAND AND LAOS-THE SECRET WAR meters, or 12 miles.
The covert step-up in the air operations "The mission representatives agreed that, new burden of supporting the Cambodian
in Laos ordered by the President did not once the [air and ground] operations began, Government and has assumed ever
take place until mid-October. The Pentagon they should not be acknowledged publicly," greater expenses on behalf of the Gov-
account says that one reason for the delay the analyst writes. "In effect, then, they ernment of Laos.
was the Administration's need to "await the would supplement the other covert pros- Both of these governments today are
uncertain outcome" of negotiations then surer being exerted against North Vietnam. totally dependent upon the United
taking place in Paris between the right- Moreover, while the Lao Government would States.
wing, neutralist and pro-Communist factions of course know about the operations of their, in Laos. The objective of the talks was to fir- T-28's, Souvanna was not to be informed The actual cost to the United States of
range a cease-fire that might lead to a new of the OVN/U.S. [ground] operations. The the wars in Cambodia and Laos, exclusive
14-nation Geneva conference to end the unacknowledged nature of these operations of the cost of bombing in the Ho Chi
Laotian civil war. would thus be easier to maintain." Minh, trail area, would now appear to
"However, a Laotian cease-fire was not JOINT DEPARTMENTAL MESSAGE exceed $1 billion a year. Military and
compatible with current perceptions of U.S. On Oct. 6, a joint State and Defense economic assistance programs in Cam-
interest," the analyst writes. Department message authorized Ambassador bodia alone will amount to over $300
The Administration feared that during an Unger In Laos to obtain Premier Souvanna million in the coming year, a figure which
ensuing Geneva conference on Laos, Inter- . Phouma's approval for the T-28 strikes "as does not include any of the cost of con-
national pressures, particularly from the soon as possible." tinuous American combat air support
Communist countries, might force the dis- But as the analyst points out, the message per Cambodian forces, or for SViet-
Cam onto the subject of Vietnam. No.. showed that the -President had decided to namese air and ground forces South gotiations In the present circumstances were postpone the accompanying strikes by
considered certain to unravel the shaky anti- Yankee Team jets, the "U.S. armed aerial bodia.
Communist regime in Saigon. ' reconnaissance" mentioned in Mr. Johnson's In the case of Laos one is unable to
The Administration also believed that even National Security Action Memorandum 314. Cite a figure for the total cost of this
the convening of a conference on Laos might Five of the targets in the Laotian pan- war to the United States. First, because in - create an goingsion seek a thte W with- handle, well-defended bridges, had been what the United States is doing, and
ington al was going to seek a negotiated with- specifically marked for the American jets, and the cost of what we are doing, continues off a politic from South Vietnam and set en a fire by the Yankee Team planes would also to be cloaked with official secrecy by the
political collapse there and the hmergc be required against antiaircraft batteries
of a neutralist coalition regime that would defending the Mugia Pass. The message from executive branch. Second, one cannot
unt notess that In his Washington excluded these targets from cite a figure for the total cost to us of
ask the United
notes that In his Aug. high, the list of 22. the war In Laos because, it must be said
The account memorandum Southeast
level policy Bundy had "characterized Asia, are further authorized to Inform Lao in all frankness, neither you, nor I. nor
William strategy" Sundt' the Parts with the the that Yankee Team suppressive-fire strikes any other Member of Congress is in posi-
statement talks wish to slow against certain difficult targets in panhandle, tion to know what those costs actually
statement that toward "we the that s t should ou conference interspersing with further T-28 strikes, are are.
down any progress t a and part of the over-all concept and are to be Two years ago the Senate placed an
to hold Souvanna to the firmest possible anticipated later, but that such U.S. strikes
position." Mr, Bundy had referred to a tug- not authorized at this time," overall ceiling on Defense Department
gestion by Ambassador Leonard Unger that are not repeat the cable said. [See text, cable on Laos expenditures in support of Vietnamese
Prince adm n s Phonr a insist la three- and free world forces in Vietnam and in
faction
Jarres factioas "a minis useful tration of delaying the P gambit." Ambassadors bice des S d.Unger 1]nger and Taylor both warned Support of local forces in Laos and "Significantly," the analyst says, "this pro- that the Laotian Government, without some Thailand. Last year, we sought to tighten
posal was advanced at Paris by Souvanna participation by the American jets, would that provision by making it unlawful-
Phouma on 1 September-illustrating the not persevere in attacking targets on the we thought-for the United States to
fact that Souvanna was carefully advised by Communist infiltration routes. Accordingly, hire troops of other nations to defend
U.S. diplomats both prior to and during the the day before the T-28 strikes began on the governments of Laos or Cambodia.
Paris meetings. Other features of Souvanna's Oct. 14 with Premier Souvanna Phouma's Many of us honestly believed that these
negotiating posture which apparently were approval, Washington authorized the Yankee restrictions would make it impossible for
encouraged as likely to have the effect of Team jets to fly combat air patrol over the the United Stoles to become more deeply
drawing out the discussions were Insistence T-28's to raise morale and protect them from
on Communist acceptance of (1) Souvanna's any interference by North Vietnamese MIG's. involved in Laos and Cambodia.
political status as Premier and (2) unham- "MINOR EXTENSION" ONLY That was the clear intent of these re-
pered operations by the I.C.C. [International Ambassador Taylor said in his cable that strictions.
Control Commission]." the combat air patrol missions could be Nothing, however, demonstrates with
"Insistence on Souvanna's position is an- achieved by "a relatively minor extension" more clarity the difficulty of devising
other point on which he should insist, and of the current rules of engagement for Amer-
there adequate legislative Controls of the Clari-
would also be play in the hand on the ican aircraft in Indochina. destine military undrrokings of the
question of free I.C.C. operations," Mr. Bundy The President also postponed for the sbranch, or the executive's ute
wrote in his Aug. 11 memorandum. present the planned ground forays into executive branch,
disregard branch, the wi ex cut le Ut-
BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS Laos by the South Vietnamese. Ambassador
"It will be recalled that the latter point Taylor pointed out in a cable on Oct. 9 that tive branch, than the presence today of
was the issue on which progress toward a these would not be possible "in forseeable U.S. financed Thai troops in Laos.
cease-fire became stalled," the analyst re- future" in any case because the South Viet- If there should be any lingering doubt
marks The negotiations broke down In Paris namese Army was so tied down fighting the on either of these points one need only
late in September. guerrillas in its own country. the dubious rationale recently
American mission representatives from Several eight-man South Vietnamese re- consider er the rho State rationale
Department in
pay-
Bangkok and Vientiane met in Saigon on connaissance teams were parachuted Into p frwar to justify the legality ant in
Sept. 11 under Ambassador Taylor's auspices, Laos in an operation called Leaping Lona, but
however, and decided that the South Viet- the Nov. 7 report to William Bundy on covert ing for the Thai troops in Laos. In a
namese Air Force should not participate in operations would note that "all of those statement issued on the day of the secret
the stopped-up air action in Laos authorized teams were located by the enemy and only session in which the Senate was told the
by the President In his directive of Sept. 10. four survivors returned. . .. facts regarding the Thai -troops in Laos,
A list of 22 targets In the Laotian pan- Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, in the State Iepartment acknowledged for
handle had been drawn up during the sum- recent days the Senate has learned far the first time that the United States Was
mar for the possibility of such raids, includ" about the precise details of the ex- providing 'T'hai "volunteers" with finan-
pass, more ..___t
ts of TT R activities in eial and illaterlal support.
Mugla
ina one on a control nalut at the
..
th
b
ond
os
e
and
Premier Souvanna Phounia by complicating I/LLLI Wwu uy 4116 ~..~...-?.~ ~- -?---?
his political position, the meeting doter- What we have learned demonstrates ment of That soldiers to light in Laos
mined, so the air attacks would be confined the apparent futility of previous legisla- Will bo all too evident to any Member of
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 June 15, 1971 Approved For , ?Q 1A 1 h~ ~73 X000500040013-9 S 9027
the senate who reads the report on U.S. of the No Chi Minh Trail complex in no funds authorized or ai)pr'',i)y,atcd by
activities in Laos that was prepared by ? southern Laos. S. 939 or any other act "may be obligated
the staff of the Subcommittee on United Based on the above facts, we are or expended in any amount in excess of
states Security Agreements and Commit- introducing an amendment to the De- $200 million for the purpose of carrying
ments Abroad: and it Is with such fense Administration bill which imposes out directly or indirectly any economic
thoughts in mind that we earnestly hope a ceiling of $200 million in the fiscal year or military assistance, or any operation,
this report will be promptly declassified 1972 "for the purpose of carrying out project, or program of any kind, or for
so the Information now presented to the directly or indirectly any economic or providing any goods, supplies, materials,
Senate will also be made available to the military assistance, or any operation, services, personnel or advisors in, to, for,
public. The distinguished minority leader project, or program of any kind, or for or on behalf of Laos during the fiscal
has joined me in urging this be done at providing any goods, supplies, materials, year ending June 30, 1972."
1 -- advisers in to for Mr. President I yield back the re-
nve
At the same state Department brief-
ing preceding the closed Senate session,
the Department's spokesman maintained
that the payment of Thai troops was
legal because it antedated the enactment
of the amendments which had been de-
signed to prohibit it.
Now let us examine this question of
legality.
If the hiring of Thai troops to fight
in Laos is legal, why has the executive
branch gone to such lengths to keep it a
secret from the Congress?
If the hiring of Thai troops to fight in
Laos is legal, why did the State Depart-
ment feel the need to point out that this
practice had begun prior to the passage
of laws designed to prohibit it?
If the hiring of That troops to fight in
Laos is legal, why has it been necessary
for administration supporters to argue
that this practice is within the law, on
the grounds that the law In question
applied only to funds expended by the
armed services, while the Thais are
being paid from other than Defense De-
partment funds?
If the hiring of That troops to fight in
Laos is legal, because they are volun-
teers, or because the arrangements ante-
dated the congressional prohibitions,
what difference would it make what
funds they were paid from?
To us such tortured and contradictory
augmentation can mean only one thing:
The executive branch clearly understood
the Intent of Congress in passing the laws
In question but was determined to find a
way to circumvent the will of the Con-
gress; and under the cover of secrecy,
they succeeded.
The result is precisely that which the
Senate sought to avoid: The United
States is involved more deeply than ever
in the defense of the Government of
Laos; and the United States has as-
sumed the responsibility for, as well as
the costs of, Thailand's military involve-
ment in Laos-an involvement which
the Government of Thailand itself re-
fuses to acknowledge.
The executive branch has been mis-
leading the American people in order to
spare the Thai Government the necessity
of acknowledging to its own citizens, and
to its neighbors, the direct participation
of that government in the furnishing of
Thai troops to fight in Laos.
, , .
services, persa
or on behalf of Laos." mainder of my time. Before doing so,
This amount is a good deal more than however, I also ask unanimous consent
the executive branch has requested for that said amendment be printed In the
the fiscal year 1972, through the normal RECORD at this point.
appropriations process, for economic and There being no objection, the amend-
military assistance to that country. ment (No. 160) was ordered to be printed
This amendment also provides that if in the RECORD, as follows :
for some reason the executive branch AMENDMENT NO. 1e0
does not consider $200 million to be suf- At the end of the bill add a new section
wishes to undertake in Laos, the execu-
tive branch should thereupon come be-
fore the Congress and request the addi-
tional money on the basis of a specified
description of, with the justification for,
the uses to which such additional funds
will be put.
In order to give the Congress an added
degree of assurance that this amend-
ment and previous restrictive provisions
of the law will be complied with, my
amendment also includes a provision re-
quiring the executive branch to report
to the Congress every 90 days, in an ap-
propriate manner, the purposes for
which it is spending public funds In Laos.
My amendment will further provide
that such detailed justifications would
henceforth also have to be made each
year at the time when funds for the next
fiscal year are requested from Congress.
We propose this amendment in the
belief that it constitutes the most effec-
tive means for the Congress to achieve
meaningful knowledge about where, how,
and when the funds it has appropriated
have been used; and also to insure that
the executive branch take account of the
advice of the Congress with respect to
U.S. activities in Laos.
The purpose of this amendment Is to
present the position ' of the Congress;
namely, that the administration cannot
continue to prosecute the war in?Laos as
though cost were no object, cannot con-
tinue to prosecute this war with the
premise that the will of the Congress
counts for nothing, cannot continue as
if any commitment can be assumed, or
risk taken, regardless of the Congress.
Mr. President, I send to the desk, there-
fore, an amendment to S. 939, a bill to
authorize appropriations during the
fiscal year 1972 for procurement of air-
craft, missiles, torpedoes, and other
weapons, and research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Armed
Forces, and to prescribe the authorized
personnel strength for each active duty
Having reviewed previous efforts on
the part of the Congress to put an end component and of the Selected Reserve
of each Reserve component of the Armed
to such practices, we have concluded
Forces and
that there is but one solution to this for other purposes.
. problem; and that is to place in the law I ask that the amendment be printed.
a ceiling on the amount of money that The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
can be spent by any and all departments pore. The amendment will be received
and agencies for any purpose in Laos, and printed, and appropriately referred.
with a single exception limited to the use Mr. SYMINGTON. As explained above,
of U.S. combat air operations in the area this amendment is designed, to insure that
i~'?~l s i:ki'? 1 r i,rJ ,t.r. ,yl' i ? r'.ic.' H
provision of law, no funds authorized to be
appropriated by this or any other Act may
be obligated or expended in any amount in
excess of $200 million for the purpose of
carrying out directly or indirectly any eco-
nomic or military assitsance, or any opera-
tion, project, or program of any kind, or for
providing any goods, supplies, materials, serv-
ices, personnel, or advisors in, to, for, or on
behalf of Laos during the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1972.
(b) No funds may be obligated or expended
for any of the purposes described in subsec-
tion (a) of this section in, to, for, or on
behalf of Laos in any fiscal year beginning
after June 30. 1972, unless such funds have
been specifically authorized by law enacted
after the date of enactment of this Act. In
no case shall funds in any amount in excess
of the amount specifically authorized by law
for any fiscal year be obligated or expended
for any such purpose during such fiscal year.
(c) The provisions of subsections (a) and
(b) of this section shall not apply with re-
spect to the expenditure of funds to carry
out combat air operations over the so-called
Ho Chi Minh trails In southern Laos, and
over areas immediately adjacent to such
trails, by U.B. military forces.
(d) After the date of enactment of this
Act, whenever any request is made to the
Congress for the appropriation of funds for
use in, for, or on behalf of Laos for any
fiscal year, the President shall furnish a
written report to the Congress explaining
the purpose for which such funds are to
be expended in such fiscal year.
(e) The President shall submit to the Con-
gress within 30 days after the end of each
quarter of each fiscal year, beginning with
the fiscal year which begins July 1, 1971,
a written report showing the total amount
of funds expended in, for, or on behalf of
Laos during the preceding quarter by the
U.S. Government, and shall include in such
report a general breakdown of the total
amount expended, describing the different
purposes for which such funds were ex-
pended and the total amount' expended for
each such purpose.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Under a previous order, the Sen-
ator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD) Is recog-
nized for nit to exceed 15 minutes.
THE PEN'IrAGON'6 VIETNAM STUDY
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, for the past 3 days .the New York
Times has been publishing a series of
articles from a secret study, made in the
Pentagon, of American participation in
the Vietnam war.
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