STATEMENT BY SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT CONCERNING THE ARREST OF TRAN NGOC CHAU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000500080004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 27, 1970
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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#35
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FEBRUARY 27, 1970
UNITED STATES SENATE
CO TTEE ON FOREIGN REL&TIONS
Statement by Senator J. W. Fuibright
Concerning the Arrest of
Tran Epp Chau
Yesterday we leap ned of the latest chapter in the case of
the Vietnamese legislator, Tran Ngoc Chau. On Monday Chau
was sentenced by a military tribunal to 20 years at hard labor,
ostensibly because of contacts with his brothers a North
Vietnamese intelligence agent, which he did not report to the
South Vietnamese authorities. On Thursday Chau was taken by
the police from the National Assembly building in Saigon to
jail.
The charges against Chau are regarded by many as a
transparent pretext for silencing one of the most outspoken
critics of the Thieu regime. The manner in which Chau's
immunity was lifted and his trial conducted raises serious
questions regarding President Thieu?s attitude toward the
Vietnamese constitution and the justification for continued
American respect or support for the Thieu government.
For the benefit of those who may not have followed the
most recent developments in the Chau case may I point out that
the petition used to justify the lifting of Chau?s parliamentary
immunity is apparently of dubious constitutionality. Two appeals
on this point are pending before the Vietnamese Supreme Court.
These appeals apparently should have entitled Chau to freedom
pending decision. Furthermore, the authenticity of some
signatures on the petition has been challenged. At least one
Vietnamese Deputy is reported to have declared before the trial
that his signature had been forged and another has apparently
asked that his name be withdrawn from the petition. Even if
the constitutionality of the petition procedure is upheld,
since the petition requires the signatures of a majority of
the members of the Assembly to be effective, the elimination
of these two names would mean that the petition would not
suffice to lift Chau?s immsnity. I should add that it has been
widely reported that several of the other signatures on the
petition were obtained by threats and bribery.
Mr. Chau was apparently tried and sentenced without benefit
of counsel. According to a story by Mr. Robert G. Kaiser in
Wednesday?s Washington Post the tribunal was unexpectedly
convened an h o u r earle an its normal starting time with the
result that Mr. Chau?s attorney had no opportunity to present
MORI/CDF
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,is case. Mr. Kaiser reported that the court accepted, without
question, the prosecution's Suggestions for punishment
As I explained on an earlier occasion, the circumstances
t'f the Chan case seem to show that President Thieues charges
ainst Chau are politically motivated. Furthermore, it appears
that the American Embassy bears a measure of responsibility in
Whir matter. Despite warnings of Riau?s intention to disclose
his past relationships with Americans, and I know that there
Igave been such relationships, and despite recommendations
from some American officials that the Embassy assist Mr. than,
ssion officers have been ordered to keep "hands off" the
than case. The apparent reason for this decision is our
unwillingness to do anything which might displease President
3si.eu
The real reasons for President Thieu"s campaign against
than and our "hands off" policy seem to have little to do with
?,haue s contacts with his brother. Such contacts among members
of Vietnamese families, divided by the war, are not at all
uusua. ermore. Mau 19 contacts were known to high
American authorities in Vietnam at the time they occurred.
Mire recently, some of the best informed and most experienced
American officials in Vietnam have said that they know of no
grounds for believing that than is a communist. It is interesting
to note that although t'hau"s contacts with his brother had been known
to the Thieu government at least since April 1969, and that than
had openly acknowledged them in July, Thieu did not begin to press
his charges against than until November, 1969.
President ieu"s campaign against than must be considered
against the .background of than's open advocacy of a negotiated
political settlement to the war. Because of the strength of
Vietnamese sentiment for an end to the war than's espousal of
talks with the NL? apparently made him a potentially dangerous
political rival and threatened to undermine Vietnamese support
for continuing the war.
As I have stated before, than"s credentials as a Vietnamese
nationalist and opponent of Communism are not questioned by
those who are familiar with his record and his views. Given
that fact., Chan'a belief that peace can come only as the result
of direct talks between : aigon, North Vietnam and the NLF takes
on added significance. Mau wrote on this point in January, 1969:
"We have the right to call the National Liberation
Front by a hundred terms which are bad, vile and most
servile, but we must admi tthat this organization exists
in realty, and that there could never be any peace talks
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giAcTe could bring an end to the war if we did
agree to make acme aorn essione to this
, vilzatt earn and thu;r.~ to satisfy, some of its
> ~ . t`iem a"r .
have done this befe re with regard to
e: armed ounoeit1.on ctr guns . Why can- I t we do it
i! with regard to the National Liberation Front?
it beceuse thisont is Coiiet or dependent
the ium ists't
iA- tae tretth..
'Dt at present. both we and the U.S. have
."ems', ized that our army and the army, teen ical
t'bility and resources of the most advanced modern
p.wer in the world caret exterminate them and
v :: ause of that. we are forved to talk with them at
",has eanfer ce t bl,e.
'hshethe we like it or not. we are com o fled
se rose the a e r- m ? e e %f' e!din.r the war in order
e~st~re ne~.e~e.e
ureiilinr ess of the VrAted States to intercede on
au^ s behalf is pears: all the m