HOW TO ANALYZE THAT PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00005R000100020011-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 1, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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How to Analyze That Problem
By PERRIN STRYKER
PERRIN STRYKER was for many years an editor of
Fortune. He is now a consultant on special corporate
and management problems.
REPRINTED FROM
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
JULY-AUGUST 1965
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W Harvard
Business
Review
Edward C. Bursk : EDITOR
JOHN F. CHAPMAN, Executive Editor
VIRGINIA B. PALES, Managing Editor
DAVID W. EWING, Associate Editor
a. scoTT HUTCHISON, Associate Editor
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T. K. WORTHINGTON, General Manager
ERNEST D. FRAWLEY, Controller
RAY RING, Art Director
Editorial, Business, Circulation Offices
Soldiers Field, Boston, Massachusetts 02163
Annual index is published in the November-
December issue. Contents are indexed in
the Business Periodicals Index and Bulletin
of the Public Affairs Information Service.
BUSINESS REVIEW BOARD
GEORGE P. BAKER, DEAN, Ex Officio
ROBERT W. AUSTIN, Chairman
RAYMOND A. BAUER
EDWARD C. BURSK
PAUL W. CHERINGTON
GORDON DONALDSON
BERTRAND FOX
RALPH W. HIDY
WINFIELD G. KNOPF
E. ROBERT LIVERNASH
HOWARD RAIFFA
PHILIP THURSTON
FRANK L. TUCKER
ARTHUR N. TURNER
RICHARD F. VANCIL
CLARK L. WILSON
July-August 1965, Vol. 43, No. 4
Published bimonthly by the Graduate School
of Business Administration, Harvard Uni-
versity. Printed in U.S.A.
Second-class postage paid at Boston, Mass.,
and at additional mailing offices.
? 1965 by the President and Fellows of Har-
vard College.
JULY/AUGUST 1965
VOL. 43, NO. 4
6
MANAGEMENT OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
Simon Ramo
14
ARE WOMEN EXECUTIVES PEOPLE?
G. W. Bowman, N. B. Worthy, and S. A. Greyser
45
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
Robert W. Austin
53
ART AND SCIENCE OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING
Franz Edelman
67
MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE FOR SMALL BUSINESS
L. T. White
75
THE STRATEGY OF PRICE DEALS
Charles L. Hinkle
86
ORGANIZATIONAL PARADOX
Lyman K. Randall
88
CHARTER OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EXECUTIVES
Phil N. Scheid
99
HOW TO ANALYZE THAT PROBLEM
Perrin Stryker
111
ADVERTISING AGENCY SERVICES: MAKE OR BUY?
Derek A. Newton
119
REPURCHASE STOCK TO REVITALIZE EQUITY
Charles D. Ellis
129
RETAIL REORGANIZATION
Wheelock H. Bingham and David L. Yunich
148
HUMAN RELATIONS OR HUMAN RESOURCES?
Raymond E. Miles
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How to Analyze
That Problem
Part II
of a management exercise
By Perrin Stryker
Part I of this two-installment article on prob-
lem analysis, published in the May-June issue
of HBR, invited readers to test their reasoning
powers against the problems presented in a case
history based directly on an actual situation.
This case was reported to Kepner-Tregoe and
Associates, whose systematic approach to prob-
lem analysis, as described in this installment,
made possible the correct solution of a very
puzzling situation.
Before resuming the action, I will first give a
brief synopsis of what has transpired in the first
installment and then introduce the characters
who appear in this concluding part (all but one
of whom appeared in Part I).
The Situation
In a plant making quarter panels and other
parts for one of the Big Three auto companies,
the Plant Manager and three of his key subordi-
nates are trying to find out why burrs and rough
spots are suddenly appearing on so many panels,
causing them to be rejected. They strongly sus-
pect deliberate sabotage by the men on the pro-
duction lines, who are reported to be angry over
the suspension of worker Joe Valenti by a hot-
headed supervisor, who accused him of drinking
on the job. The shop steward threatens to call
a strike if the supervisor is not reprimanded for
his arbitrary action and also if Valenti is not
reinstated.
The Plant Manager collects as many facts as
he can in a meeting with his key subordinates,
and then adjourns the meeting until the next
morning. In the meanwhile, he hopes he can
decide what to do. He sees two alternatives:
back up the supervisor and risk a strike that
might be stopped by injunction; or avoid a strike
by undercutting the supervisor, reinstating Va-
lenti, and asking the men on the line to co-
operate in eliminating the excessive rejects. The
Plant Manager hopes that he can find another,
better alternative, however, before the second
meeting with his managers.
The Principals
The following short descriptions of the char-
acters who appear in this second part of the
article (the names are disguised) may be useful:
? Oscar Burger, Plant Manager - a tough man-
ager in his late fifties; known for his willing-
ness to listen to others; considered antiunion
by the employees.
? Robert Polk, Production Chief - a hard-
nosed driver, very able technically, but quick-
tongued and inclined to favor certain subordi-
nates; also considered antiunion by the em-
ployees,
? Ben Peters, Quality Control Manager - re-
served, quiet, and cautious when dealing with
others; extremely confident in his figures.
? Ralph Coggin, Industrial Relations Manager
- a fairly typical personnel manager; sympa-
thetic to employees; relies on human relations
techniques in dealing with the union.
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100 HBR July-August 1965
? Tom Luane, Scheduling Supervisor - per-
sistent, analytical, and systematic; has had
some training in problem analysis procedure,
but lacks experience.
Problem Analysis
The situation for Part II of this case opens
at 9:3o a.m. on Thursday in the office of Plant
Manager Burger (the next-morning meeting).
BURGER: Before we begin this morning, you
notice I've asked Tom Luane, our Scheduling
Supervisor, to sit in with us. He's just returned
from taking a five-day course in problem solv-
ing and decision making, and I thought this
would be a good chance to see if he's really
learned anything. Now then, Ben, let's hear
about those reject rates on the panels. How do
they look this morning?
PETERS: They're still way over our 2% toler-
ance on lines #1, #2, and #4. If anything,
they're a bit higher than yesterday.
BURGER: Hasn't Line #3 begun to foul up a
lot of panels yet?
PETERS: No signs of it, Oscar.
BURGER: Bob, did Engineering check out the
stamping press on Line #3? You know we
wanted to track down that rumor about the
stamping job on the Cheetah panels being eas-
ier than on the Panther panels.
POLK: Engineering says it's strictly rumor -
there's absolutely no difference in the stamping
time required on any of the four lines.
BURGER: Damn . . . I thought that we might
have traced this reject trouble to the presses
somehow.
COGGIN : You still can't say that the men on
lines # I, #2, and #4 don't feel that the work
on Dawson's Line # 3 is easier; and if they
think Dawson's men have been favored by get-
ting the Cheetah panels, there could be some-
thing in it.
BURGER: But Engineering says no, Ralph. We
can't psychoanalyze the men to find out why
they believe this, if they really do. More to the
point, what did you find out about that wash-
up time deal the local union agent plans to ask
us for?
COGGIN: Shop Steward Patella says he'll be
glad if the men get this extra time, but he still
demands that Valenti be reinstated and that
Supervisor Farrell be reprimanded. I don't think
Patella would back down even if his local agent
told him not to threaten a strike. And the men
really seem sore enough to walk out on us.
BURGER: All right, then, that settles it. I've
made up my mind. Since we've got to avoid
a strike at all costs, with Detroit hounding us
for all the panels we can ship, we're going to
reinstate Valenti, reprimand Farrell, and also
jack up the other supervisors so they'll catch
any man trying to produce rejects deliberately.
Then we'll ask the men to cooperate in keeping
the reject rates within our tolerance. You,
Ralph, will tell Patella that if we catch him
inciting the men to sabotage the production
lines by burring a lot of panels - just in the
hope of getting a hot issue for the new contract
negotiations - then we'll charge him and his
union with this before the NLRB. If they
threaten us with a strike, we'll get an injunction
to carry us at least over the next two months of
maximum output.
POLL: I'm real glad to hear you take a strong
line on this, Oscar. We've been too soft with
that union for a long time, in my opinion. But
I don't think you ought to reprimand Farrell
and reinstate Valenti. That could hurt all our
supervisors.
BURGER: Sorry, but that's it, Bob. Farrell was
too rash in suspending Valenti without any evi-
dence. We've got to calm the men down and
stop this damned burring trouble, or we'll have
Detroit on our necks, and hard!
COGGIN : I think you're doing just right, and
I'm sure the men on the lines will cooperate
in licking this reject problem.
BURGER: I hope so. Anyway, I can't see a better
decision at this time. (He turns to Luane.) Now,
Tom, how did we do? What do you think of
our problem solving and decision making?
LUANE: I can't really say, Mr. Burger, because
I'm not at all sure just what the problem is.
BURGER: Well, it started out as a reject problem
and then developed into a touchy union situa-
tion we've had to handle.
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Analyze That Problem 101
POLK: The basic problem, Tom, is discipline in
the shop. We've been too lax with the men and
too soft with the union.
COGGIN: I'd say the real problem is our need
to train the supervisors in their responsibilities.
Also, we've got a communications problem if
a supervisor like Farrell fails to get the mes-
sage that he must notify me before taking disci-
plinary action.
LUANE: Let's see . . . that makes six problems
you have mentioned - rejects, union antago-
nism, shop discipline, lack of supervisory train-
ing, low morale, and poor communications.
BURGER: Yes, but you could say they're really
all part of one whole problem, as I see it.
LUANE: One whole problem? What's that?
From what I heard, it sounds like you've got a
mess of problems here.
BURGER: What I mean by the whole problem
is managing this entire plant so everything runs
on schedule and putting out what Detroit wants.
Did they teach you how to solve that kind of
problem in your training course?
LUANE: Not exactly. But I did learn the dif-
ference between a problem and a decision, and
I think some of you have been mixing these
two things up, from what I have heard.
Defining the Problem
Let us pause here for a moment and see what
these managers have been doing. First, Plant
Manager Burger checked on the points of in-
formation he'd asked for at the previous meet-
ing, and these satisfied him that he was right in
assuming sabotage to be the cause of the high
reject rates on the panels. He then made several
decisions which he judged capable of taking
care of both the reject problem and the labor
difficulties.
Some of Burger's decisions, seem right to Pro-
duction Chief Polk, who only disputes Burger's
handling of Farrell and Valenti; and all seem
right to Industrial Relations Manager Coggin,
who accepts Burger's reasoning completely.
Then Scheduling Supervisor Tom Luane be-
gins to ask some pertinent questions and finds
that each manager is using the word "problem"
in a different sense, without realizing it. And
they have been repeatedly committing the major
error in problem solving - namely, jumping to
conclusions about the cause of a problem. For
example, Polk says the "basic problem" is lack
of discipline in the shop, and he assumes that
this problem is the cause of the excessive rejects.
On the other hand, Coggin sees one problem as
the need for training, which he says is the cause
for low morale, and he sees another problem
as lack of communications, which he assumes
caused Farrell's blunder; while Burger views
all these failings and assumed causes as part
of one big "problem of managing this entire
plant."
These confusions in meaning are apparent to
Luane because he has learned to distinguish
problems from decisions. He sees any problem
as a deviation from some standard or norm of
desired performance. And to him a decision is
now always a choice among various ways of
getting a particular thing done or accomplished.
Thus he recognizes that Coggin is really talking
about a decision when he says that "our real
problem is the need to train supervisors." Sim-
ilarly, Luane realizes that Burger's "whole prob-
lem" is not a mere collection of failures and
causes, but a statement describing his responsi-
bility for making decisions as head of the plant.
So Luane tries to clarify some of this confusion.
LUANE: I suggest we agree on what we mean
by a problem so we can concentrate on that,
and not worry right now about any decisions
or any causes. The simplest way to solve a prob-
lem is to think of it as something that's wrong,
that's out of kilter, something we want to fix.
If we identify that for sure, then we can begin
to look for what caused it; and when we've
found the cause, then we can get into decision
making, which is choosing the best way to cor-
rect the cause.
BURGER: But it isn't that simple, is it? We
want to correct a lot of things around here, and
they're usually mixed up together.
LUANE: Yes, but you can't work on them all
at once, and you can't solve a lot of problems
by correcting just one of them.
BURGER: OK, let's go along with Tom on this,
but I personally think there are times when you
can solve a lot of problems by solving one key
problem.
LUANE: I think you'll find that the key prob-
lem is almost always at the end of a chain
of other problems and causes. That is, the
cause of one problem is itself a problem, and its
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102 HBR July-August 1965
cause is another problem, and the cause of that
other problem is still another problem to be
solved, and so on. It's kind of a stair-stepping
sequence. Usually, if you correct the cause of
the basic problem in such a sequence, the other
problems and their causes will automatically
disappear.
POLK: I'll buy that. If we correct the lax disci-
pline in the shop, we'll correct the reject prob-
lem and those labor troubles, too.
LUANE: Not necessarily. You've got to be cer-
tain they're connected in a problem-cause se-
quence. It's safer to assume that they're not
connected, and then pick the problem that's
most important and start analyzing from there.
BURGER: All right, let's pick our most important
problem and get on with this. Obviously the
high reject rate on those panels is our biggest
problem now. If we don't get it solved fast,
at the present rate of rejects we'll be fouling up
more than 2,500 panels every shift, and we
can't stand for that.
POLK: That's for sure, Oscar, but after we jack
up the supervisors and the press operators, and
get the reject rates back in line, let's not forget
to keep pushing for more discipline.
LUANE: Aren't you talking now about a deci-
sion, Bob - what should be done to keep things
going as you think they should?
POLK: I guess so, by your definition, but it's
damned important.
LUANE: I'm not doubting it, but we still haven't
decided that the reject problem is our number
one problem.
COGGIN : If you mean the biggest immediate
problem, then I'll admit it's the rejects, but
they're only symptoms of bigger, more funda-
mental problems, in my opinion.
BURGER: If we flop in delivering our quota of
panels in this busy season, we can cost the
company such a pile of money it makes me
shudder.
LUANE : What if those reject rates on the panels
keep rising?
POLK: Say, haven't we got it bad enough? You
know that any rejects above 5% are very serious
business. We've got to hold them below 2% -
no "if"s or "but"s or we can shut up shop.
LUANE: OK, fair enough. I was just trying to
make sure we had identified not only the most
serious and urgent problem, but the one that
could grow into real critical financial trouble.
COGGIN : I'm still convinced that our most im-
portant problem has to do with people, es-
pecially our headaches in training and helping
them communicate.
BURGER: Be realistic, Ralph. If we don't cor-
rect this reject problem and produce what's re-
quired by Detroit, we may not be around to
worry about any problems.
LUANE: Let's call this reject problem our num-
ber one problem. We can list the others, too,
but give them less priority right now. Next,
we've got to describe this reject problem pre-
cisely, and I mean precisely.
POLK: Oh, so they taught you to "define the
problem first"? Sounds very familiar. Next
you'll be telling us to "get all the facts." I've
seen a lot of these step-by-step gimmicks, but
I don't believe they really work.
LUANE: Matter of fact, getting all the informa-
tion would just be a big waste of time. Only
some of the facts would be useful to us. That's
one reason I want to describe this problem pre-
cisely. Another reason is that we're going to
use this specification to test any possible causes
we find.
Outlining the Specification
Again let us see what these managers have
been accomplishing. Luane has stated three
basic concepts: a problem is a deviation from
some standard of desired performance; a deci-
sion is a choice of the best way to correct the
cause of a problem; and every problem has only
one cause. He also has pointed out the stair-
stepping process of going from one problem to
its cause, which, in turn, may be a problem to be
solved.
But the managers don't pay much attention
to these ideas, and Polk clearly misunderstands
stair-stepping, for he clings to the conclusion he
earlier jumped to - that lax discipline is the
cause of several problems. Industrial Relations
Manager Coggin thinks "people problems" are
fundamentally more important, but he accepts
the priority his superiors give to the reject prob-
lem. At this point, Luane has tried to get the
managers to think in terms of the urgency, seri-
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ousness, and growth trend of the problem. Hav-
ing settled on the reject rate as the most impor-
tant problem, they now are ready to start ana-
lyzing it.
LUANE: How would you describe this reject
problem, Bob?
POLK: Why, I'd say the problem is that the re-
ject rates are way out of line.
LUANE: How about you, Mr. Burger?
BURGER: Let's see. I'd say it was too many
burred panels.
LUANE: And you, Ben? Haven't heard a peep
out of you for some time now.
PETERS: I guess I'd go along with Bob on the
reject rates being beyond tolerance.
LUANE: We'll have to get more specific. We're
trying to describe this exactly. As an overall
description, how about "Excessive rejects from
burring on quarter panels"? Anyway, let's write
that down for a starter. (He goes to an easel
blackboard and writes these words out.) Now
we have to dissect this problem in detail, getting
specific facts about it in four different dimen-
sions - What, Where, When, and Extent. (He
writes these four words down on the left side of
the blackboard.) What's more, we want to get
two sets of facts opposite each of these dimen-
sions - those that describe precisely what the
problem Is and those that describe precisely
what the problem Is NOT. (He writes Is and
Is NOT at the top of two columns of blank
space.)
POLK: What's all this for, anyway? Are we
drawing a chart or something?
LUANE: Sort of a map. This is the specification
worksheet, and the point is to fill the Is column
with only those things directly affected by the
problem. In the Is NOT column we will put
the things that are closely related to the prob-
lem but not affected by it. You'll see why we
do this in a few minutes.
BURGER: OK, but I hope this doesn't take too
long. Sounds kind of detailed to me.
LUANE: It's pretty simple, actually. Under
What, we can first put down "burrs" as the devi-
ation in this Is column, and "any other com-
plaint" in the Is NOT column, since, as I under-
stand it, there are no other complaints reported
Analyze That Problem 103
on these panels. But we can be more specific
here, too. For instance, what did this deviation,
"burrs," appear on? Were they on all kinds of
panels?
POLK: No, Tom., just on the Panther panels,
not the Cheetah panels.
LUANE: So we can put down, under What, the
words "Panther panels" in the Is column, and
"Cheetah panels" in the Is NOT column. Got
the idea?
POLK: I guess so, but it sounds a little too sim-
ple to me. Why bother?
LUANE: The point here is we're trying to sepa-
rate what the problem Is from everything that
Is NOT the problem. We're aiming to draw a
tight line around the problem, to describe it
precisely, and later you'll see how this gives us
the clues to the cause of the problem.
POLK: I hope so.
LUANE : Now we do the same thing for this
Where section of the specification. Where was
the deviation seen on the objects affected? Ob-
viously, the burrs appeared on the Panther pan-
els, so we put this down under Is. Also, where
in the plant were the burrs observed?
BURGER: So far, only on lines # I, #2, and #4,
but with Line # 3 expected to go bad any minute.
LUANE: So under Is of this Where section we
can put "lines # i, #2, and #4," and under Is
NOT, we can put "Line #3." Also, we have
to fill in the Is NOT opposite the words "Panther
panels." Where! didn't the burrs appear?
POLK: Nowhere else. We all know that.
LUANE : I know, but we've got to make this
specification as accurate as possible. We can
put down "other parts" under Is NOT, since we
know no other parts were affected.
POLK: I can't see where we're going with all
this business.
BURGER: Neither can I, Bob, but let's let him
finish.
LUANE: Now we come to the When part of this
specification. Here we ought to be extra careful
and get exact times, if possible. Ben, what times
did those reject rates start going up yesterday
morning?
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PETERS: You mean exactly? (He consults his
papers.) On Line #2, the first excessive rejects
showed up at 9:33 a.m.; on Line #i, they ap-
peared at io:i8; and on Line #4, at 1I:23
a.m. From those times on, each of these lines
turned out rejects that were far above our toler-
ance of 2%.
LUANE: That's nice and precise. Can't tell, it
may be important, so we'll put the exact times
down. Now, how about the Is NOT here?
There were no burrs at all on lines #1, #2,
and #4 before these times, and none at all on
Line #3 at any time.
BURGER: I think I begin to see why you use
those Is and Is NOT columns. It's to put off to
one side all the facts you aren't going to think
about in solving this problem.
LUANE: No, that's not exactly why, but it will
be clear as soon as we finish this specification.
This last section, called Extent, covers the size
of the problem - how big or serious it is, how
many items are involved. We can put down
"bad burring" and list the percentage of rejects
on each line. Now what were those percent-
ages, Ben?
PETERS (consulting his papers again) : On Line
#z, II% rejects. On Line #i, 17.5%, and
on Line #4, 15%. That's according to final
counts last night.
LUANE: That leaves us only the Is NOT column
to fill in here, and this would cover the rejects
on Line #3. We can say "Line #3 rejects"
here, since they have stayed within the z% tol-
erance. Now we've got the specification all
filled in.
BURGER: Still looks like a simple collection of
facts. Is that all there is to this system?
LUANE: No, Mr. Burger. Now we've got to be-
gin analyzing this specification to dig out the
cause of this problem.
POLK: You mean now
start solving it?
we're finally going to
Spotting the Distinction
Here we can briefly review what Luane has
done in drawing up this specification. He fol-
lowed a systematic outline to describe precisely
both the problem and what lies outside the prob-
lem but is closely related to it. (See EXHIBIT I
for Luane's specification worksheet.) The con-
trast between the Is and the Is NOT not only
draws a boundary around the problem, but
strictly limits the amount of information needed
for its solution. There is no need to "get all the
facts" - only the relevant facts.
Note that Burger, Polk, and Peters all had
different ways of describing the reject problem
at first. Also, Burger thinks the specification
looks too "detailed," while to Polk it sounds "too
simple" at one point. The separation of the Is
and the Is NOT sounds strange to these man-
agers because, like everyone else, they have
learned to think in terms of similarities, not dif-
ferences. This habit will bother them again a
little further on in this problem analysis. Both
Burger and Polk are impatient with this speci-
fication stage because they haven't yet seen the
reasoning behind it.
A precise specification makes possible two
logical steps toward finding possible causes of
the problem, and after that, as Luane pointed
out, it serves as a testing sheet to identify the
most likely cause. Luane now turns to the speci-
fication on the board and introduces the man-
agers to the most demanding part of this ana-
lytical process.
LUANE: We're ready now to use those contrasts
between the Is and the Is NOT of this specifica-
tion. Whatever caused this problem produced
only those effects we have described on the Is
side; so if one thing is affected and another re-
lated thing is not, then there must be something
distinctive or unique about the thing affected
to set it apart from the other. If we know what
is distinctive... .
BURGER (interrupting): I don't see any contrast
between "burrs" and "any other complaint" in
this specification, but 1 do see one between
"Panther panels" and "Cheetah panels." I begin
to get what you're driving at. The Panther
panels are affected by the cause; the Cheetah
ones aren't. We want to find out what sets
the Panther panels apart from the Cheetahs,
isn't that it?
LUANE: Yes, you look first for a sharp contrast
between the Is and the Is NOT, like the one
you've spotted. Then we know there must
be something distinctive about those Panther
panels.
BURGER: Both panels are made from the same
steel sheets, so the only way you could distin-
guish one from the other would be by its shape.
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Analyze That Problem
EXHIBIT I. SPECIFICATION WORKSHEET
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The Panther panels are a deeper draw than the
Cheetah panels.
LUANE: That's a distinction all right. We'll
put down "deep draw" as a distinction in this
What section of the specification. (He writes
the distinction off to one side of the blackboard.)
Now can you see any distinction in the Where
section?
BURGER: I don't see any distinction there, like
in the first case. Nothing distinctive of "Pan-
ther panels" as opposed to "other parts" that I
can think of. Then you've got lines # I, #2,
and #4 on the Is side and Line #3 on the Is
NOT side, and these lines are damned similar,
except that Line #4 is a slow, old-time press.
But that would only distinguish Line #4 from
lines # I and # 2, which isn't what you're ask-
ing for.
LUANE: No, we don't want a distinction like
that, between things that are together on the Is
side. We're looking for what sets the Is apart
from the Is NOT.
POLK: How about saying that Panther panels
are distinctive of those three lines on the Is side?
Line # 3 makes only Cheetah panels, as we said
a moment ago.
LUANE: We can put it down if we want to, but
it's really a contrast we already have in our
specification, and not a distinction. It's the same
contrast we have here in the What section be-
tween Is and Is NOT. What we want is some-
thing that really sets lines #1, #2, and #4
apart from Line #3.
POLK: Then the only distinction you have there
is that same "deep draw," as we said before.
LUANE: I agree. We'll put it down again in
this Where section. Let's go and see what dis-
tinction we can find in the When section, where
we put down the different times that the burrs
showed up on lines #I, # 2, and # 4.
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106 HBR July-August 1965
POLK: How about saying those times are all
distinctly in the morning, not the afternoon?
LUANE: But how does that make them distinct
from Line # 3, where there are no times given
at all? We're looking for something distinctive
associated with those times.
PETERS; Wait a minute! I've got a hunch those
times have something to do with the stacks of
blanks delivered to the presses. I remember
Adams on Line # I told me late yesterday that
the bad burrs began on his line just after us-
ing up the four stacks of blanks his area had
been loaded with in the morning. And another
thing - maybe those high-speed presses are just
right for the shallow-draw panel that Dawson's
line is stamping, but not quite right for the deep-
draw Panther panels.
POLK: Come on, Ben, slow down! You know
Henschel's Line #4 has an old, slow press, and
he's getting a lot of burrs, so the speed can't be
causing the rejects.
PETERS: Not just the speed, Bob, but the speed
in combination with the deep-draw panels.
LUANE: Let's stick to this specification job and
not jump to conclusions. I'm not knocking your
hunches, Ben, for I've found they can often be
useful, providing you hold them aside until you
start looking for possible causes. We can make
a note of them so we won't forget them later.
(He writes off to one side of the specification,
"Burring times connected with using up the
stacks of blanks," and "Press speed and deep
draw combine to make burrs.")
POLK: I don't think Ben's hunch on press speeds
and draws is any good, in any case. Engineer-
ing told me a while ago that they spent a lot of
time examining the presses at various speeds and
never found any stamping defects traceable
either to press speeds or to the depth of draw.
PETERS: But how about the combination of
speeds and different draws? Bob, I think you've
got too much confidence in Engineering.
LUANE: Can we get back to this specification?
Does anyone see any distinction in this When
section?
BURGER: I think Ben has a point there about the
stacks of blanks on Line # I being used up just
before the bad burring started. How about the
other lines?
PETERS: I don't know, but we can find out.
LUANE: Will it take long?
PETERS: No, just a phone call. (He reaches for
the phone, gets his assistant on the line, and asks
him to check the times when lines #2 and #4
used up the stacks of blanks they started out
with the morning before.)
LUANE : While we're waiting, let's look for dis-
tinctions in this last section of Extent.
POLK: Don't see any, unless it's that "deep-
draw" distinction again.
LUANE: As I see it, the distinction would have
to be in those rates of burring we put down
here, not in the panels or the presses.
BURGER: Well, you could say that the rates of
burring on lines #I, #2, and #4 don't cor-
respond very well with the ways those lines were
involved with that Farrell-Valenti quarrel. I
mean, Farrell's Line #2 ought to show the most
burrs, and actually it shows less than the other
two lines.
COGGIN : Maybe the reason is that the men on
lines # I and #4 are really sorer than the men
on Farrell's line. Maybe Valenti has more
friends on the other two lines. You can't dis-
tribute and measure feelings with percentage
points, like you can with those reject figures.
LUANE : Sorry to have to remind you again,
Ralph, but that's jumping to a conclusion about
the cause. We'd better not do this until we've
finished with this specification.
COGGIN : Well, I can't just sit here and let the
rest of you ignore the human side of this prob-
lem. When are we going to get to that, anyway?
LUANE: We'll take it up if this analysis leads
us in that direction. It hasn't yet. So let's put
down that distinction connected with the differ-
ent rates of rejects and the different degrees of
involvement with the Valenti affair. We can
call this distinction, "Reject rates not propor-
tional to involvement in Valenti conflict."
PETERS (reading a note his assistant has just
brought in to him) : Here are those times we
asked for. Line #2 used up its stacks of Tues-
day blanks at 9:3o a.m. yesterday, and Line #4
at r I : 20 a.m. That checks out, as I thought.
The bad burrs started on all these lines just
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after they started using stacks of blanks delivered
to the floor Wednesday morning.
LUANE: Looks like that gives us a distinction
for the When section. We can call it, "Stacks
of Tuesday's blanks used up at these times."
POLK: But how about Line #3? Ben, did your
man get the time that Dawson's line finished
using its supply of Tuesday's blanks?
PETERS: Yes. At 8:30 yesterday morning.
POLK: And no bad burring started on Line #3,
so what's the importance of this distinction?
LUANE: We can't tell yet, Bob, but we'll just
put it down for now. That seems to complete
our distinctions, unless anyone sees any more
in this specification. If not, we can proceed to
look for the possible causes of this problem.
Seeking the Cause
At this point these managers have presum-
ably collected all the relevant information that
describes their problem precisely and have dug
out those distinctive things in the Is facts that
are characteristic marks of the problem. But
they had trouble spotting the distinctions, as
Luane expected. Also, one of them, Peters, in-
troduced a couple of hunches into the discus-
sion, exhibiting a tendency to "feel" that things
are connected somehow or are important.
Note that Luane does not completely discour-
age such hunches, only recommends .they be set
aside until later. But note, too, that Peters' rea-
soning about his first hunch is faulty, as Polk
quickly points out, while his second hunch is
simply another example of jumping to a conclu-
sion about the cause, as Luane points out. It is
Burger who seems to be the sharpest here in
spotting. a distinction, after stumbling at first.
By this time apparently only Industrial Rela-
tions Manager Coggin is still interested in the
"human side of the problem," as he puts it, but
his job is, of course, most directly concerned
with this angle.
Luane, by keeping the discussion on the speci-
fication, prevents a time-wasting digression. He
also warns Polk against prematurely judging
the last distinction (about using up Tuesday's
blanks) as useless just because it doesn't seem
to fit in with another fact in the specification -
that is, the absence of serious burrs on Line #3.
Now Luane introduces the managers to a con-
cept that lies at the heart of problem analysis,
Analyze That Problem 107
the concept that the cause of every problem is
a change of one kind or another.
LUANE : The distinctions we've gotten out of
the specification give us the areas where we can
look for possible causes of these burred panels.
Let's look for any changes we can find in any
of the distinctions. What's new or different
in these distinctions? We probably won't find
many. Maybe only one.
BURGER: Do you mean any kind of change?
LUANE: No, only those changes which have oc-
curred within one of these areas of distinction,
or have had an effect on one of them. We can
start with that distinction of "deep draw."
POLK: I can't believe that a change is always
the cause of a problem. It can be any little
thing, or some goof-off, or bonehead action.
LUANE: Maybe those things go along with the
cause, but I think we'll find here that these
burred panels are being caused by some change.
Also, Mr. Burger, I meant to point out that we
don't want to go looking for everything that's
changed, or we'll be here all day. There are
things changing all over the plant all the time.
But what we want to find is any change that's
in one of these areas of distinction.
POLK: I'm not convinced, and what's more I
don't see anything changed in that "deep draw"
distinction. The deep draw is standardized on
all three presses making it, and has been for
months.
LUANE: OK, so there's no change there. But
what about that distinction we were going to
check out in the When section? What's changed
about those "stacks of Tuesday's blanks used up
at these times"? Anything new or different
about these stacks?
PETERS: Well, the shift from Tuesday's blanks
to Wednesday morning's blanks would be a
change.
LUANE: That sounds like a real change to me.
Wednesday's stacks are the new blanks the lines
started to work on just before the burring started.
BURGER: If that's the cause of these rejects, how
do you figure it? I can see that if Wednesday's
blanks were different in some way from Tues-
day's, that might make them the cause of the
rejects.
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108 HBR July-August 1965
LUANE: Let's hold off on possible causes until
we're sure there aren't some more changes in
these distinctions.
POLK: I can't see any more changes. I say let's
get on with it and start looking for possible
causes.
LUANE: OK, if you want to, but are we sure
there's not some change connected with that
other distinction in the Extent section, which
we put down as "rates not proportional to in-
volvement in Valenti conflict"?
BURGER: I don't see anything new or different
there, unless it's the differences between those
rates themselves.
LUANE: I can't either, so let's go ahead and
check that possible cause you suggested a mo-
ment ago, when you said yesterday's blanks
might be the cause of the excessive burrs. But
we should test this possible cause, not just
rationalize ourselves into accepting it. If this
possible cause fails to explain all the facts in
this specification - that is, both the facts
on the Is side and those on the Is NOT side -
then we can be sure it's not the actual cause.
Because the actual cause would have produced
exactly all those things that we put down as Is
in the specification, and also would explain
those things we put down as Is NOT.
BURGER: I assume this is what you meant when
you said earlier that the specification would be
used in testing the possible causes?
LUANE: That's right. We can start testing
against the What of the specification by asking,
"Does the use of yesterday's blanks explain the
fact that the excessive burrs -appear on the Pan-
ther panels and not on the Cheetah panels?"
POLI{ : No, of course it doesn't. Line #3 start-
ed using Wednesday's blanks even before the
other lines did, and it still hasn't produced ex-
cessive burrs on the Cheetah panels.
LUANE: Well then, there goes your possible
cause. It doesn't fit the first facts in our specifi-
cation's Is and Is NOT. We'll have to toss it out.
BURGER: You mean we've got to find a possible
cause that accounts for every fact in this speci-
fication?
POLK: That's what the man said, Oscar. But
now where does this leave us? We've run out
of the only change we could find.
LUANE: What this means is that our specifica-
tion isn't really complete. We must have missed
something somewhere. We'll have to go back
and sharpen up our facts if we can.
Respecifying the Problem
We can pause briefly here to point out that
Luane himself was responsible for the unsatis-
factory results of this first search for the cause
of the problem. When he accepted the change
that Burger suggested - that is, the change to
Wednesday's blanks just before the bad burring
started - Luane didn't think to ask about the
difference between Tuesday's and Wednesday's
blanks. A shift from one day's blanks to an-
other's is not a change if the blanks are identical.
Polk saw this at once, of course, and torpedoed
this possible cause, as he should have. But this
error of Luane's might not have occurred if
he had been more careful earlier, as we shall
now see.
LUANE: We can go back and look over our Is
and Is NOT facts in the specification, but these
look pretty accurate and precise to me. I think
we probably missed a distinction or change.
PETERS: What about those hunches of mine?
You said we might come back to them.
LUANE: That's an idea. What was it you said?
We wrote them down over here somewhere.
Here's one, "Press speed and deep draw combine
to make burrs."
POLK: That's no good, as I said before. Engi-
neering checked that thoroughly.
LUANE: Well, here's Ben's other hunch, "Burr-
ing times connected with using up the stacks of
blanks."
BURGER: We just tested that one out and got
nowhere.
PETERS: Hold everything! I think we skipped
a point. We talked about yesterday's blanks,
but those aren't just yesterday's blanks - they're
also blanks from a new supplier, Zenith. I
missed this point because we'd made some parts
with the Zenith metal before we ever put it in
production, and it worked fine. Besides, Ze-
nith's metal met all our specifications. We
checked the blanks again when the excessive
burring first occurred yesterday, and they looked
perfect going through the blanker. So we
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Analyze That Problem 109
dropped this as a possibility, especially when COGGIN : No, it couldn't, because the Cheetah
the labor trouble looked so hot. panels aren't having trouble with excessive burrs.
LUANE: Then that means we should change
that distinction in the When section of our
specification to "Stacks of Zenith's blanks began
to be used at these times."
POLK: How will that help? Dawson's Line #3
is also using Zenith blanks, and there's no burr-
ing there.
LUANE: That's jumping to a conclusion about
the cause. Let's look for a change in this re-
vised distinction. Is there anything new or dif-
ferent about Zenith's sheet steel? How long
have we been using it?
POLK: We signed the contract a month ago.
PETERS: Yes, but we didn't get delivery right
off. The first shipment didn't actually get here
until two days ago. .
COGGIN : Matter of fact, Ben, we didn't get those
Zenith sheets until late Tuesday. I know, be-
cause one of the men got hurt unloading them
that evening. He wasn't familiar with the way
Zenith blocks the sheets for shipment.
LUANE: Let's concentrate on what's new or dif-
ferent in Zenith's sheets.
PETERS: I think they're just the same as we got
from our other sheet-steel suppliers.
LUANE: Are you sure?
PETERS: Pretty sure. We specified a slightly
different alloy for Zenith's sheets, but not
enough different to matter.
LUANE: Well, anyway, the new alloy is a change
in an area of distinction. What is distinctive
about those burring times is that stacks of new
metal began being used then, and the change
here is that a slightly different metal is going into
the presses. We can state the possible cause this
way - "A new alloy in Zenith's sheet steel is
causing the excessive burring in the presses."
BURGER: Ben just said he thinks the alloy
change wasn't enough to matter.
LUANE: I know he did, but it was a change in
an area of distinction, so it's a possible cause.
We can test it against the facts in the specifi-
cation. Could this change - the slightly differ-
ent alloy - explain the appearance of excessive
burrs in the Panther panels, but not in the
Cheetah panels?
POLK: Hold it a moment! Maybe the alloy could
explain it. It just dawned on me that Engineer-
ing did say something about those Cheetah pan-
els a couple of months back. Something about
how their shallow draw would make it easier to
use a tougher alloy in the blanks. That could
mean the Panther panels are fouling up on these
Zenith blanks with the new alloy! Let's check
it! (He picks up the phone and calls Engineer-
ing, which immediately confirms his hypothesis.)
Engineering says the new alloy in the Zenith
sheets makes the Panther panels much more
likely to burr than the Cheetah panels.
LUANE: Looks :like you've found it, Bob. We
could go on and. test this out against the rest of
the specification, but I'd say you've probably
discovered the most likely cause of the exces-
sive burrs. I suggest you have Engineering ver-
ify this.
POLK: That's easy. We can do it before lunch
right on the lines.
BURGER: What if we find this "most likely cause"
isn't the answer?
LUANE: Then 'we'll have to respecify all over
again, sharpen up the facts even more, and look
for other distinctions and changes. But it looks
like we've really spotted the change that's caus-
ing the trouble. In this case, the new alloy is
the change, the metal supplied by Zenith is the
distinction, and the deep draw on lines # I, #2,
and #4 is another, added distinction. In other
words, the most likely cause turned out to be a
change in a distinction plus a distinction.
COGGIN: You mean, Tom, we've got to go through
this whole business every time in order to solve
every problem?
LUANE: If you don't know the cause of the prob-
lem for sure, I'd say yes. There may be some
times when you can spot a change in some facts
about a problem right off and hit the cause at
once. Sometimes you can just go through the
process mentally, for it tells you the relevant
questions to ask about every problem. But you'd
better check any possible cause out carefully,
and you really can't check completely unless
you have a complete specification of the prob-
lem in front of you. If you don't check a pos-
sible cause this way, you may be taking action
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110 HBR July-August 1965
on something that's not the cause at all, and a crack at it and then let me know what you
waste more time than if you had specified come up with? Meanwhile, Bob, you'd better
and analyzed the problem in the first place. make some arrangements to start reclaiming
BURGER: Sounds logical enough. But what if those rejects as fast as possible. We'll need them
you can't find a distinction or change? all if Detroit asks us for what I think they will.
LUANE: If you can't find any distinction or
change in your specification, then you have to
dig that much harder. And at least you know
where to probe. A distinction has to be there
if the problem exists, because whatever went
wrong affected some things in a certain way,
and did not affect other closely related things.
There's got to be at least one distinction between
these two kinds of things - the Is and the Is
NOT - and there's got to be a change that
works through this area of distinction to cause
the problem.
BURGER: I see what you mean. Anyway, if En-
gineering can verify this alloy change in Ze-
nith's sheets as the cause of those excessive re-
jects, I'll be damned glad. My face would sure
have been red if we went ahead with those deci-
sions I came in here with this morning, all based
on the assumption that the men were to blame
for the high reject rates! And it all seemed so
reasonable! Now, if this alloy change is actu-
ally the cause, all we'll have to do is shift back
to sheets with the old alloy formula.
COGGIN: But there's still that labor problem we
haven't touched yet. When do we get around
to analyzing that Farrell-Valenti trouble for a
solution? And we've still got to calm Patella
down somehow.
POLK: I think those problems don't need to be
analyzed. We know what touched off the Far-
rell-Valenti trouble; we know why Patella is
giving us trouble. What's got to be done now
is to make some decisions. All that's needed is
some straight talk. Tell the men the facts and
to get on with the job, and tell Patella to pipe
down or you'll report him for attempted sabo-
tage.
BURGER: Wait a minute, Bob. Maybe we'd bet-
ter first try to analyze that Farrell-Valenti
trouble a little more systematically. There could
be something else to it. Tom, why not take
The meeting ends with Burger and Polk leav-
ing together, the others following them out.
Conclusion
In these concluding exchanges we see that
the analysis has clearly uncovered a cause which
none of the managers were thinking of when
they began, and which was actually verified as
the cause. Note that the clue to the change that
caused the trouble did not appear until Luane
went back to the specification and sharpened
up one of the distinctions. It was the point
about Zenith's steel sheets that finally jogged
Polk into recalling the possible effects of a deep
draw on blanks made of the new alloy. Had
Luane been more expert in the Kepner-Tregoe
analysis procedure, the respecification might not
have been necessary.
As it was, this solution turned out to be one
of the more difficult kinds for it involved, as
Luane pointed out, a change in a distinction
plus a second distinction. This second distinc-
tion was an essential condition (the deep draw)
that had to occur before the particular change
(the new alloy) could take effect and burr the
panels.
Without a precise specification and careful
analysis, only time-wasting guesswork and luck
could have arrived at the most likely explana-
tion of this problem. More important, this anal-
ysis prevented the Plant Manager from taking
action that could have produced a more serious
problem than the one he was trying to solve.
Also, it should be noted that the managers did
not automatically become expert problem-ana-
lyzers in going through this experience. They
are still likely to jump to conclusions, as Polk
did toward the end when he quickly prescribed
actions to be taken on Coggin's labor problems
without knowing their causes. It takes time to
change a manager's thinking habits into a sys-
tematic approach to problem analysis.
Sherlock Holmes : "It's quite a three-pipe problem."
- Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
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