MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030017-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: December 15, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

STAT
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v
15 December 1961 \J )44(0
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
1. Hanson Baldwin, NEW YORK TIMES, had lunch with the Director in the
South Building at 1:00 PM and I was present. Baldwin asked Mr. &Cone what
his plans were regarding the Agency. Mk. &Cone replied that he had not settled
yet on his plans because of the sad incident which occurred when he lost his
wife, Rosemary. Baldwin, after expressing his regret then stated that he
believed Adlai Stevenson seems to have strong influence with the Pr?dent,
which Baldwin thinks, is most unfortunate, and that Stevenson lives in a world
of morality quite distinct from the world as it is. Baldwin said he wished Mr.
Stevenson would take a more realistic look at the worldland later he told me he
wished the President would take a more realistic look at Mr. Stevenson.
2. Baldwin asked Mr. McCone where the centers of authority exist in
Washington. Mir. MCCone said he had not been back here long enough to determine
where the centers lie but he thought that from the early days of the new Admin-
istration they seem now to be settling down to using some of the established
methods and means, such as the Planning Staff of the National Security Council.
3. Baldwin said he had been to the Pentagon and talked to people there,
including Roswell Gilpatric, for whom he has great respect and whom he thinks
is a balance wheel to McNamara. Baldwin believes McNamara has a wonderful mind
but makes decisions too quickly and then won't change. He said the press was
so delighted yesterday with Gilpatric when he said that maybe he bad madc:a
mistake in going along with the recall of the Reserves and National Guardsmen
in the Berlin crisis. Baldwin said that actually the mistake had been made by
McNamara and that he, Baldwin, had advised McNamara against doing this sometime
ago. Baldwin said MeNamara's 120 questions to the military during a period of
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crisis had everybody working overtime and it dertainly did not create: goodwill.
4. He said he, Baldwin, ran in the NEW YORK TIMES Gen. Earl Partridge's
report that there be a single chief of staff, which would mean a single commander
for all the military forces. He had stated in his article that this was from a
document labeled SECRET. Baldwin maintained it should not have been classified
at all. Mt. McCone said that that is one of the things that he will watch in
CIA because it is so easy to over-classify a document. Baldwin said his point
that
was/some of these things were classified merely because they do not want the press
to get them.
5. Baldwin asked the Director if the Russians in recent tests tested an
anti-missile missile. Mr. McCone said there is no hard evidence to indicate
that such a test was made. Baldwin asked if we think the Russians have an anti-
missile missile. The Director said no.
6. Baldwin asked why the U.S. during the moratorium did not prepare for
tests. Mr. McCone said that he thought Baldwin had a good question. He remarked
that President Eisenhower appeared to have the opinion that the Russians would
cheat during the moratorium and that there had been a quantum gain in the past
three years on the part of the Russians which would be a very serious thing if
three years from now they again had a quantum gain while the U.S. failed to resume
testing. Baldwin stated that Adlai Stevenson and Mr. Wiesner both opposed resuming
atmospheric testing. Mr. McCone doubted that Wiesner had made such a statement,
but Baldwin said be had made the statement to John Finney, of the NEW YORK TIMES.
7. There was a brief mention of the Cuban invasion attempt. Mr. McCone
in answering a question said that not only CIA, which had some blame, but other
parts of the Government were involved in the Cuban incident.
8. There followed some discussion as to whether valuable results might be
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obtained if there were an evaluation board to estimate the probability of
success of invasions like the Cuban one, just as there is now a board to
evaluate intelligence estimates. Mr. &Cone said business does such estimating
and that he thought there might be some merit in such an undertaking. Baldwin
weld be doubted this, but they both agreed it was an interesting idea.
9. Baldwin said he was mystified.by the U.S. policy toward the Congo
and he blamed Adlai Stevenson for our position. He asked if the DCI considered
the situation serious. The DCI said it was very serious and could develop into
a dangerous situation for the United States.
10.
At about 2:15 PM I drove Baldwin to the airfield.
STAT
'SMILEY J. GROGAV
cc: DDCI
Assistant to the DCI
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