SOVIET'S MISSILE BASES

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030037-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 8, 2013
Sequence Number: 
37
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 25, 1959
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030037-0.pdf89.81 KB
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S TAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/11/08: CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030037-0 1 VS/ NEW Wilk r . Soviet's Missile Bases Washington Finds No Proof Moscow Has Capability of Launching ICBM's By HANSON W. BALDWIN Despite the repeated alarms In Washington,. lard evidence of Soviet capability ,of launch-fit Jonglp-hge rniisffes is still ab- verifieltron has reached is country Of numerous re- ports. published here and abroad of the identification of ballistic missile launching pads. Several such reports have been investi- gated and were found to be erro- neous, Launching Mg- for both in- termediate range and intercontinen- ,tal ballistic missiles could, of course, be hidden in deep for- ests, or placed underground or deep in mountainous valleys, or they might be mobile. But extensive underground construction would probably be detected, at least in the case of some sites, after a lapse of time. And intermediate range ballistic missiles?the Soviet types of these have ranges of 700 and 1,100 miles?would have to be emplaced, if they were to reach Allied targets, somewhere near the periphery of the Communist heartland. The satellite areas have never been as thoroughly sealed off as Russia itself, so that sooner or later any extensive missile emplacements in Eastern Eu- rope probably would be de- tected. News Analysis 41.any. .observers believe tha Russia expects to- utilize mobile launching sites for at least her intermediate range ballistic mis- siles: at sea, sub arines, and on land, specially esigned, rail- road flat cars. again there is no conclusi *Vidence, as yet, of any such unching sys- tems. If Russia had hundreds of 700 or 1,100-mil-ballistic mis- siles mounted on tatcars, some of them almost certainly would have been seen by now. One or more of the Soviet Z-class sub- marines, the large submarines yet built in Rusilapparently have been modified to launch what some experts believe may be short-range ballistic missiles. But so far this is the only hard evidence of Soy,h4?. missile- launching sites anAdiere. This purely negative evidence cannot be construed to mean, of course, that the Russians have no operational ballistic missiles. In fact, other hard evidence suggests that they have a sig- nificant number, probably in the hundreds, of 700-mile mis- siles in the hands of troops. It is probable that these mis- . siles can be fired from mobile launchers, from hard-surfaced roads or quickly improvised launching sites. In any case, no ,fixed per,manen, t installations have been discOVered, - Available Witknee suggests that thsi?Riissians have few, if any, 1,100,mile xockets in oper- ation. ? Originally, it was be- II liecled that the _700 and 1,100- mile rockets were 'part of the same ."farail,y." but it is now believed the two are distinct types. The importance of the 1,100- mile missile is that its addi- tional, range would enable it to reach a few bases and missile sites that are, beyond the range of the 700-mile rocket. Because of it increased , range its launching sites could be moved well back behind the Commu- nist frontiers. In the interconkinental bal- listic missile field, we have de- tected the -.firing. of only one Soviet missile this year at a range of more than 3,000 miles. This brings the total recorded firings of Soviet long-range missiles (beyond 3,000 miles) to seven. It is possible, though this llogsibility is not rated too highly, that the Russians have established an ? . Arctic test range, beyond the reach 9.f. 111,11' two long-range surveillance radars in Turkey and the Aleu-, tians. \ ? n? any case, best estimates are that the U. S. S. R. nov. has, or soon will have, a few( ICBM's in operation (though( not too reliable) . If' present I estimates of Soviet. capabilities are correct, and if the Russians utilize those capabilities to the maximum, the Russians may te roughly 100 ICBM's some 1 time in 1960 and perhaps 5001 by late 1961, More probably. some time in 1962. *Contrary to popular impres- sion, the Russians are still pro-, ducing piloted bombers, though, at a slow rate. They now have about 150 heavy bombers, and are believed to be producing , one Bison a month. The Bison is Russia's stand- ard heavy bomber, with four! jet engines. Apparently none of the turbo-prop Bear bomber, has been produced for the last, two years. Small production of the i Badger two-jet medium bomber, roughly comparable to our, B-47, is continuing. The U., S. , S. R. may have built up its, total number of mediums to. Ai more than 1,000 by some time this spring. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/11/08: CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030037-0