MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00297R000301040021-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: October 13, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

STAT
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STAT
13 October 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:
1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. Several references to CIA appear in Marquis Childs '?ecently
-published. book, "Eisenhower: Captive Hero; A Critical Study of the General
and the President" (1958, Harcourt Brace), as follows:
a. Brief reference to Ferdinand Eberstadt's reorganization plans
of 1945 which led to what later included the MSC, "served by the Central
Intelligence Agency" (p. 95);
b. CIA's alleged intelligence reporting, November 1956, on Soviet
missile capability against U.K. (p. 240); see exCerpt, attached;
c. CIA's alleged intelligence reporting 1957 on Soviet missile
testa (p. 258); see excerpt, attached.
cc: DDCI
'STAMM J. GROGAN C/
Assistant to the Director
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Marquis Childs, "Eisenhower: Captive Hero; A Critical Study of the General
and the President" (1958, Harcourt Brace, New 'York); Chapter 5, ',Return
of the Hero," 14 95.
, for "consolidaticg
"The Army's plan/called for a strict chain of command: a single, into
Department of Defense under a single secretary, a chief of staff and
General Staff for the Armed Forces, and three coequal components, air, ground,
and sea, each with a commander. The core of the Navy's plan was a continua..
tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system inaugurated during the war, to be re-
inforced by other wartime co-ordinating mechanisms such as the Joint Research
and Development Board and the Army-Navy Munitions Board. Co-ordination on
basic policy was to be provided by the Joint Chiefs and by an over-all
secretary of defense who would not, however, have administrative control over
the services. The service departments, including, if the Army insisted, a
separate Air Force, were to be autonomous and of cabinet rank. The Navy's
views were presented in a report prepared in 1945 by Ferdinand Eherstadt at the
direction of the then Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal. The report
envisioned on the highest level co-ordination of military, diplomatic, and
economic policy through what were to emerge as the National Security Council,
served by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources
Board.
"From the first, the Navy had an advantage in the effectiveness of its
presentation and, in addition, because its plan was far less radical than the
sweeping reorganization advocated by the Army. The Army proposed, or so the
Navy alleged through the secret propaganda bureau directed by Admirals
Radford and Burke, to abolish some of the most cherished military institutions
embodying the proudest American traditions. The existence of the Marine Corps
in particular was believed to be threatened.
It
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?
Excerpt from Marquis Childs, "Eisenhower: Captive Hero" (1958); Chapter 11,
"A State of Health," p. 240:
"On Election Day, November 6 ff95g7, events cams to a wild climax.
Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has told how he
was en route to his voting residence on Long Island to cast his ballot. when
a courier hastily dispatched from Washington overtook him. The word the
courier brought was of Marshal .Bulganinis notes of the day before to Britain
and France which seemed to imply that the Soviet Union would use rocket
weapons against them unless the invasion of Egypt was stopped immediately.
Dulles turned around and flew back to Washington to spend what he has said
was perhaps the most agitated and frantic twentMour hours in his entire
career. On the basis of thorough and intensive work by the C.I.A., Dulles
had every reason to believe that the Soviet Union had launching bases in
place capable of sending missiles with nuclear warheads in the direction of
the European capitals up to a range of. 1,500 miles. His agency had been
plotting the trajectories of missiles since late in. 1954. So the Bulganin
threat was not an empty one. In high government offices in London and Paris,
where there was also a, relatively realistic appraisal of. Soviet
something like panic prevailed."
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Excerpt from Marquis Childs, "Eisenhower: Captive Hero" (1958); Chapter 12,
The Image Fades," p.
"Looking back, the marvel is how totally unprepared we were for what
was to happen next. Before October 4 295171 our complacency, our comfortable
conviction of inevitable superiority, was a suit of armor that nothing could
penetrate. A warning of sorts had come earlier in the summer when reports
were printed that American intelligence sources had verified the successful
testing of a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of up to
5,000 miles. Not long afterward, the Soviets announced that they had per-
fected an operational ICBM. The fact was that the Central Intelligence Agency
had known of these successful testa for many months. The information had
been kept back, so it was said, to see when and how Moscow, in its own good
time, would make known this great advance. Important as it was, signifying
that Russia was at least two to three years ahead of the United States, the
news created only a mild stir. One reason, of course, was that administration
spokesmen in the Defense Department and elsewhere began to cast doubt on the
report. This VAS in all probability no more than a test prototype of a
long-range missile. From these first tests it would be a long was to an
operational weapon. These were the comfortable words that came out of
Washington, and so deeply ingrained was the assurance of superiority that
it was easy to shrug off this latest claim by the boastful Russians."
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