HUNT FOR REDS IN U.S. EMPLOY: TOO TOUGH OR TOO SOFT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00297R000601240006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 25, 1956
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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4.
HUNT FOR REDS IN U.S. EMPLOY:
/TOO TOUGH OR TOO SOFT?
Is the U. S. Government going too far in its
search for security risks? Or not far enough?
Are civil rights being violated?
A federal commission now is to study such
questions. Some problems it will meet are
revealed in a recent survey by Mr. and Mrs.
Richard Harkness. Mr. Harkness is a Washing-
ton correspondent of the National Broadcast-
ing Company. The two writers examined
scores of controversial security cases, talked
with many U. S. officials and employes.
Results of their study are reprinted here by
permission of The Reader's Digest, which holds
the copyright.
by Richard and Gladys Harkness
STRANCE ARE THE EVENTS that followed, some years later,
publication in the Washington Post in 1950 of a letter
signed "Joseph S. Petersen, Jr." The letter read:
"Under the guise of 'security,' numerous sins are being
committed. The welfare of the nation is of supreme impor-
tance, but the right of an individual to 'life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness' is one of supreme importance, too.. . ."
Such criticism of the Administration's crackdown on "secu-
rity risks" among Government employes is still not uncommon.
"Suppose they are unconventional in their personal lives?
That's no affair of the Government's; they still have a right
to their jobs."
Oddly enough, the 1954 security case of Joseph S. Petersen,
Jr.?who wrote that letter in 1950?is convincing answer to
these criticisms. The details of the story, until now locked in
s9cret files, are here published for the first time.
Petersen, cleared for loyalty under Truman, was inherited
y the Eisenhower Administration as an employe in an enter-
rise even more,. hush7hush than the Central Intelligence
Agency. Ile was on fric Star of theNtatidomall'etigif,
w'hIeli is responsible for deciphering secret codes used by
foreign powers. Even in Washington, few were aware of the
agency's existence, since the name of the National Security
Agency was kept out of print. When, after Eisenhower's elec-
tion, the National Security Agency received allegations that
Petersen might be a "security risk," he was rechecked im-
mediately.
When it was discovered that highly classified material had
disappeared from National Security Agency files, the matter
was turned over to the FBI.
The investigation of Petersen was painstaking. He lived
quietly in a modest apartment in Arlington, Va. His job rat-
ing was "satisfactory." It would have been "outstanding" ex-
cept for a trait of instability?a tendency to disappear from
his desk without explanation .for weeks at a time. That
one word?instability?was a clue. For Petersen had become a
potential security risk through allegations concerning aberrant
habits.
On the afternoon of Sept. 28, 1954, FBI agents called on
Petersen and, while exchanging pleasantries, sized up the tall,
gaunt, bespectacled code expert.
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now. You'll feel better in your own mind if you tell us
about it."
The agents detected a fleeting look of surprise on Petersen's
face. One investigator went on, "Look, Pete. Why don't you
go home and sleep on it? You can call us in the morning."
Next morning Petersen phoned the Washington FBI Field
Office. "I want to see you," be said. "I have something for
you."
The FBI men had no idea what to expect as they drove to
Virginia. If Petersen had been a trained observer, he would
have seen the surprise in their eves as he produced a docu-
ment from which the cover had been removed. The remain-
ing sheets contained a jumble of apparently meaningless
ciphers.
"That's fine, Pete," one of the agents said evenly. "Fine as
far as it goes. But there's more. We'll be back this afternoon."
Officials of the National Security Agency identified the
code as one of four missing documents. NSA. had taken every
possible step to safeguard its secrets. Double wire fences sur-
rounded its two gray headquarters buildings. Security police
patrolled the premises day and night. All classified material
was kept locked in safes with three tumblers.
Yet here was an NSA staff man in possession of a basic
counterespionage document! The document was not only
"top secret" but carried a code word that cannot be made
public even now. It was a classification applied only to ma-
terial "the disclosure of which could result in exceptionally
grave danger to the nation."
The next day, Petersen came clean. He allowed the FBI
men to search his apartment. There, on the shelf in a closet,
were the other missing NSA documents. We had broken the
North Korean Political Security code used by the Reds in the
Korean 'War, and Petersen had a copy. Another document
consisted of notes, in his own handwriting, of material which
the Government still refuses to identify because of potential
repercussions on Capitol Hill and in capitals around the world.
Meanwhile, the FBI had been back-checking Petersen's
activities. It uncovered evidence that he had relayed the
purloined information to two employes of a foreign govern-
ment.
Petersen decided to plead guilty to a charge that he
"knowingly used classified information concerning the
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Federal employment "is not a right but a privilege"
foreign governments." Judge Albert V. Bryan, visibly shaken
by the Government's description of the Petersen documents,
called the defendant to come up to the bench for sentencing.
There stood a Government employe uncovered through the
recheck of federal workers ordered by President Eisenhower.
A single clue had developed proof that Petersen was a "security
risk." Judge Bryan sentenced Petersen to serve seven years in
a federal penitentiary.
This is but one of numerous cases that have developed
since the President's executive order, in 1953, establishing
the following criteria for investigating a federal employe's
trustworthiness:
"Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral or notori-
ously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to
excess, drug addiction or sexual perversion. Any facts which
furnish reason to believe that the individual may be sub-
jected to coercion, influence or pressure which may cause
him to act contrary to the best interests of the national
security."
Under those standards a Defense Department employe may
be loyal. But if he cannot resist that third, tongue-loosening
Martini at a cocktail party, he may be discharged as a se-
curity risk. A Government secretary in the Atomic Energy
Commission may be loyal, sober and efficient. But if she is
inclined to gossip about confidential letters dictated by her
employer, she is subject to discharge. Certainly in testing
liability to "coercion, influence or pressure" by foreign agents,
any immoral and perverted sex practices by people on the
Government payroll are highly pertinent.
The underlying principle is that a place on the federal
payroll is not a right but a privilege, with the safety of the
United States entitled to the benefit of any doubt.
Blackmail: a Red Weapon
The sordid combination of immorality or homosexuality and
blackmail has been a tool of espionage through the ages. Soviet
agents are known to delve into the personal lives of figures in
American Government for signs of weakness. In 1952, when
General Eisenhower was being boomed for the Republican
nomination, MVD headquarters in Moscow instructed its op-
eratives to concentrate on the General to procure "any in-
formation of a current nature which might be used for bargain-
ing purposes" in the event of his election.
Communists and pro-Communists were directed to deliver
to Moscow "complete data on J. Edgar Hoover," including in-
formation on his character, hours he spent alone, his associates,
advance travel plans on Government business or recreation,
hotels and specific rooms assigned to him. A similar order
through the Soviet Embassy in Washington called for close
scrutiny of the wife of a high-ranking Army officer, now retired.
A married federal official met an attractive girl at a social
function in Washington. He later saw her frequently. She be-
came pregnant, and suggested that she be attended by a
certain doctor in New York. The physician who delivered her
child was on the monthly payroll of a Soviet-front establish-
ment. The father was discharged from his Government position
before the next step in the Red scheme?a demand for classified
information as the price of silence.
Convinced that research knew no barriers of geography or
ideology, a scientist had passed largely harmless information
to a Communist cell leader before Pearl Harbor. With the
war, he was transferred to a secret defense project engaged
veloping a new explosive second only to the atomic bomb
in de tive force.
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In 1943 he was approached by the same Communist, w
went straight to the point: He wanted the formula for the
new weapon. The scientist refused, but the Communist agent
was blunt: The man hid furnished information to the Soviet
previously. He would do so now, or pay the price of exposure.
Had the Government employe taken his story to the FBI,
he would have been protected. Probably he would have been
supplied with a bogus formula to pass to the spy. But the
scientist yielded to the Communist threat. He is now serving
a sentence for espionage in a federal penitentiary.
The explosive he betrayed was used by the Chinese Reds
against American troops in Korea.
The FBI discovered that an attache of a Red satellite em-
bassy in Washington, known to be an espionage agent, had be-
come acquainted with two Government employes in sensitive
positions (how, the FBI never learned). A check revealed that
both federal workers were homosexuals?obvious grounds for
exploitation by the Communist spy. The two were quietly
discharged as security risks; the Red agent was suddenly "re-
called" by his home government.
The Communists prey mainly on homosexuals. A Soviet in-
telligence official, newly defected, furnished American authori-
ties with detailed information on these tactics. A favorite pro-
cedure is to lure unstable Americans employed along the Iron
Curtain in Germany into homosexual acts, and photograph them
with hidden cameras. Often the pressure on the victim is not
applied at once. They may be unmolested for years?and then
face a demand for cooperation with Red spy rings under threat
of exposure.
Homosexuality figured at least in part in the defection to the
Communists of Dr. Otto John, whose duties as counterintelli-
gence chief in Berlin made him the West German counterpart
of J. Edgar Hoover. John's companion the night he crossed the
border into East Berlin was a known Red sympathizer for
whom John had developed an unnatural affinity. FBI files docu-
ment many such cases.
in
Since the advent of the Eisenhower loyalty-security program,
the Government has discharged 788 homosexuals, or permitted
them to resign upon presentation of allegations. The statistics
' include 469 from sensitive Government agencies dealing direct-
ly with national defense or security. When thesurrent loyalty-
;tsecurity..screening procedure had .iyect only seven
Oionths, the-Centeanntelligence Agency had,ejected 31 individ-
oals-for sexual perversion. CIA officials'finallyawakened to the
fact that it was informing the enemy that, we.,-laafil,Asewarlty ?risks--
in o,rsUioLgjijdefense. PnblishgL1..reper.ts-mq,Go.
enina ent loyalty:sgmity,n o wager itreltderfi MerfiritlifitTia CIA
'To understand the origin of these procedures. we must go
back to Jan. 23, 1953. That day Attorney General Herbert
Brownell, Jr., took his oath as the nation's new chief law-en-
forcement officer. On his desk was the secret report he had
requested from J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI.
Brownell felt cold sweat of alarm in his palms as he read and
reread the document. The head of the FBI was officially warn-
ing the incoming Administration of a "clear and present danger"
to the country's security.
That warning may now be revealed to the public for the first
time. It presented a startling picture of underground Commu-
nist penetration of the Government and named individuals who
should be seized immediately in the event of war with Soviet
Russia?just as the FBI seized Nazi and Fascist agents with
Pearl Harbor.
Hoover submitted to his new chief for reconsideration the
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? ? . Subversives: "a problem no I
names 8 Government officials and employes, each cleared
und e Truman loyalty program, but who were considered
ost critical" cases of Communist infiltration or subversion.
Another 165, eligible for federal positions under the old loyalty
standards, and on whom the new Administration wished to
check, were employes known by the FBI through "evidence or
their own admissions" to have present or past Communist affili-
ations. Beyond that, 17,816 more federal workers, the subjects
of previous loyalty investigations on whom there was "derog-
atory information" in FBI files, had either been cleared under
the previous Administration or the FBI had not been notified of
the disposition of their cases. These allegations should be
proved or disproved, especially where these employes occupied
sensitive jobs.
.7:1111\
Cases from FBI Files
Hoover cited specific examples from his confidential files. To
protect the national interest and disguise FBI counterespionage
techniques, these cases must be paraphrased even now. The
following are typical:
? A State Department Foreign Service officer: Responsible
for employment of known Communist spy with direct Soviet
Embassy contacts in sensitive position in Justice Department. . . .
? An Interior Department engineer: Employed federal
project supplying hydroelectric power to key atomic installa-
tion . . . worked early 1940s for Soviet purchasing agency . . .
currently contacted by Soviet functionaries, including espionage
agents known to be operating among federal workers. . . .
? A Defense Department guard: Signed Communist Party
nominating petition in 1946. . . made speeches idolizing Lenin
and Stalin . . . still employed in position passing on admittance
of military and civilian personnel to vaults containing "top
secret" military film. . . .
? A U. N. Economic and Social Council economist: Member
of United Public Workers of America, expelled by CIO for
Communist domination . . . arranged blind date for U. N.
official with girl connected with Rosenberg atomic-bomb spy
ring . . . passenger on Polish ship, S.S. Batory, when Commu-
nist agent Gerhart Eisler fled to East Germany . . . charged to
U. S. quota of U. N. employes. . . .
? A clerk in investigative branch of federal personnel
agency: Father and brother Communist Party members . . .
father former employe of Rustian Embassy and Amtorg . . .
active member prior to 1942 in two Communist-front organi-
zations . . . recommended for dismissal as early as 1942 . . .
recommendation overruled on appeal by Truman Loyalty Re-
view Board . . . still had access to confidential files on Govern-
ment workers. . . able to supply information to be used as pres-
sure or blackmail to induce Government workers to serve as
espionage contacts. . . .
? A U. S. Information officer: Close association with Com-
munists and Party-liners while attached to American Embassy
in Latin America . . . brother-in-law active Communist and
Party member since 1933 . . . allegedly used official position
to "obstruct, hamper or nullify" American policies designed to
embarrass the U.S.S.R. and her satellites.
gilh, . . .
Brownell closed the file and went straightway to the White
House. President Eisenhower shared his concern. He felt that
the Hoover report, as summarized by the Attorney General,
presented the new Administration with a problem no less urgent
than ending the war in Korea. And he ordered immediate de-
velopment of the loyalty-security program which has ever since
been under attack by some critics who consider it a threat to
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ess urgent than ending th war//
Among the questions such critics ask are th- ese:
Is it fair to recheck federal workers previously clearealz.
isn't that double jeopardy?
The previously mentioned case of Joseph S. Petersen, Jr.?
easily cleared under the Truman program but convicted and
imprisoned after a second screening?is sufficient answer to
that.
May Government employes be suspended without pay on
the basis of confidential information, given a hearing, and then
discharged with no right to confront their accusers?
The answer is "Yes." And this occasions the most plausible
strictures against the loyalty-security program. An employe is
dismissed as a result of anonymous charges and is not even
allowed to face or question his accuser.
But consider the reason for the policy, and its results.
The Justice Department in 1954 brought charges against
five Communist Party members, who conducted Communist
training schools and directed infiltration into aircraft and
electronic-defense plants in the St. Louis area during the war.
At the trial the defendants were stunned by the parade of
Government witnesses. There was Mrs. Anna Hanners, air-
craft-plant secretary, who joined the Communist Party in
1942 at the request of the FBI. There was Thomas A. Young-
love, a St. Louis cement contractor and an FBI "plant" in
the Party since 1945. Then came a Negro minister, the Rev.
Obadiah Jones, an undercover agent for the FBI since 1946.
They all testified on a wealth of inside information.
New Surprise for Reds
If the five Reds were surprised by the revelations from with-
in their own ranks, they were caught completely off guard by
the next witness. William Walter Cortor testified that he
joined an "electrical fraction" of the Communist Party in
1937, and volunteered his services to the FBI in 1950. Mrs.
Mary Kaufman, attorney for two of the Communists, rose
from her seat at the counsel table. Normally she was cool and
calculating, but now her face twitched in agitation as she
asked the judge to send the jury from the room.
Mrs. Kaufman revealed that, even after the trial was undei
way, Cortor had sat in on a defense-strategy huddle to plan
the cross-examination of Mr. Jones. Mrs. Kaufman asserted
that the FBI had "interfered with and entered into the defense
of this case," and demanded a mistrial. Cortor testified he did
not discuss the case with Government lawyers, so the motion
was overruled. Finally the jury found the five Communists
guilty on the first ballot.
The St. Louis case remains a classic in FBI files. The
Bureau had infiltrated so many informants into the inner
councils of the party that its agents informed on one
another. Only as each individual took the stand to testify
did the Government's informers learn the true identity of
one another.
The victory was important, but the price paid was heavy.
It cost the Government the four agents in the Communist
Party whose "covers were blown" when they "surfaced" to
testify. Younglove, for instance, had reported some 500 party
members and 3000 fellow travelers to the FBI. His lists in-
cluded defense-plant workers. In security proceedings result-
ing from his information he had never been identified. Had
he appeared at any hearing for confrontation and cross-ex-
amination, he would have been expelled from the party long
ago. The Government would have been deprived of his de-
cisive testimony in the St. Louis case.
The FBI also gathers information, especially in security
OnCPC frnm rinotnre 1.7,7ers, ministers, bankers, as well?as
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e Communist Party is today in a state of near-panic"
fr. s, neighbors and fellow employes. Obviously many such
individuals will talk only if guaranteed their names will not
be used.
The point is that the "confrontation" demanded by critics
of the program would rapidly dissipate and in the end destroy
the entire network of Government informants. And let's
remember that by information thus obtained and other-
wise unobtainable the Communist conspiracy to destroy
the very civil liberties we are concerned with here has
been weakened.
For the Communist Party is today in a state of near-panic.
Eighty-eight of its top leaders have been convicted of the
134 who were indicted, and others are awaiting trial. Thanks
to the FBI and the Administration's loyalty-security program,
Communist leaders have had to contrive their own system of
loyalty-security checks.
Each of the party's estimated 21,000 members must answer
a questionnaire more intimate and prying more deeply into
individual affairs and thoughts than any questions put to fed-
eral employes. The Communists' interrogatory, obtained from
confidential Washington sources, includes 34 questions such
as these:
Have you had extra-marital relations since you have been
married? If so, with whom and how often? If you owe any
debts, either to individuals, banks, loan agencies, or as a
result of obligations due on purchase of autos, furniture,
etc., list the amount owed, and to whom, and for what
.purpose.
The party's methods in grilling John Lautner, a party mem-
ber for 21 years whom they suspected of informing, are illumi-
nating. They subjected him to a kangaroo-court procedure
reflecting the twisted minds of terrorists. Hungarian-born,
bushy-haired, bespectacled John Lautner was lured to Cleve-
land. Still unsuspecting, he joined a group in the basement
of a house. There, in the garish light of a single unshaded
light bulb, Lautner was forced to strip and sit on a stool.
A loaded pistol was held at his head. A Communist goon
beat the cellar wall with a rubber hose. Lautner's wrists were
taped to what he was told was a "lie detector." To escape,
Lautner scrawled a dictated "confession." Despite his in-
nocence, he pleaded guilty to being a "Fascist enemy traitor
to the working class" and stated that he had received a "fair
and impartial" trial.
Lautner's revulsion against such heavy-handed torture
brought him to the side of our Government. He was a federal
witness in the Smith Act trial which resulted in the conviction
of 13 Communist officials for advocating "the overthrow of
the Government by force."
Where to Draw the Line?
Administration officials are the first to admit that any
screening of American citizens for loyalty and security poses
serious questions. Even Congress, casting aside partisan poli-
tics in this politically loaded program, has established a non-
partisan commission of 12 to make a six-months' study of
the knotty problem: Where is the line to be drawn between
the Government's undeniable need of self-protection and an
individual's civil liberties?
We should not attempt to answer that question without
considering thoughtfully the facts stated in this article. And
we should remember that the Eisenhower loyalty-security
program must be credited with setting back the Communist
conspiracy within the United States and making it increas-
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AGOVERNMENT EMPLOYE with a long record of service is
suddenly summoned to the office of his departmental se-
curity officer, where he is handed a formal letter. He blanches
as he reads the key sen'tence: "Certain information has been
received indicating that your continued employment may not
be clearly consistent with national security."
The letter outlines the charges against him. They add up to
reports" that he and his wife are "intimate friends" of an-
other couple who "were close associates of persons described
as having Communist tendencies"; that his sister and her hus-
band had been connected with two organizations listed as
Communist fronts by the Attorney General; that guests at a
birthday party in his honor included "friends and acquain-
tances of questionable political orientation."
Suspension Is Automatic
With the presentation of these charges the employe's sus-
pension?without pay?is automatic. He is not even allowed to
return to his desk to pick up personal belongings. These are
handed to him as he leaves.
What recourse has an employe so charged? Under regular
loyalty-security procedures he has 30 days to file an answer to
the charges. If the agency head then refuses to reinstate him he
has another 10 days to ask for a hearing before a loyalty-secur-
ity board, with the?limited?right of counsel. His only alterna-
tive is to resign under a cloud of unresolved charges.
This man's experience is typical of thousands, as the Gov-
ernment proceeds with its stupendous task of removing from
sensitive positions not only disloyal persons but those consid-
ered security risks because of personal habits or associations.
* *
"I tried to figure out, driving home, how to tell my wife,"
one suspended worker told us. "We were married after I'd
been in Government for four years?that was 14 years ago?and
we have two children. Now, after 18 years, I'd been dropped
for being disloyal or a security risk: the letter didn't say which.
"We told our neighbors I was taking leave. But things get
around. I knew, from the way people looked at me, that they
wondered if I was a spy."
Why didn't he answer the charges and ask for a hearing?
"Lawyers cost money," he explained, "and we dipped into
our savings with the first missed check. My wife and I talked
it over. We were told that the chances were my lawyers
couldn't cross-examine Government witnesses and I couldn't
confront my accusers. Under those conditions we couldn't see
how a man went about proving that his continued employment
was consistent with national security.
"Even if I were cleared and got my back pay, we'd still be
in the hole financially because of the lawyer's fees. Clearing
my name seemed a luxury I couldn't afford. Anyway, I'd al-
ways be 'that fellow who was hauled up for security.' So I
took advantage of the alternative?I resigned."
One hears many such stories these days. Obviously Gov-
ernment workers or private employes of Government con-
tractors who are discharged or resign on definite proof of
guilt do not spread their stories. Nor do they find champions
to publicize them?outside of Communist and fellow-traveling
circles. It is the weak, badly administered or bungled cases?
the striking examples of injustice and blunder?which become
public. The worst of these become the objects of loud cru-
sades for rehabilitation and reinstatement.
* *
The widespread concern over this issue is the result, in
large part, of the gigantic scale of our loyalty-security operii-
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. . "Five million employes have been checked and rechecked"
tions. Few Americans realize that the federal government
has looked into the personal affairs of one out of every five
employed adults. Under six different screening programs, 14
million of the nation's 64 million working population are sub-
jects of confidential files. The heads of 70-odd agencies pre-
scribe their own screening regulations under a broad presi-
dential directive.
Records of all persons whose employment calls for access
to defense information are held in special dossiers compiled
from secret reports by friends, neighbors, schoolmates and
fellow workers. Into the record go judgments on their patriot-
ism, personal character, competence and discretion. For work-
ers in less sensitive jobs the Government has records contain-
ing, at least, their names, fingerprints and answers to personnel
questionnaires.
To date, five million present and past federal employes have
been checked and rechecked. Another five million are officers
and enlisted personnel of the armed forces; these have been
screened by the Defense Department's own security system.
More than three million business executives and employes in
private plants with defense contracts have been processed.
before being permitted to work in electronic, aviation, guided-
missile and other classified projects.
Half a million individuals, ranging from professors and
scientists to carpenters and bricklayers, have had to be
checked and cleared for work on Atomic Energy Commission
enterprises. Another half million are seamen and port workers
investigated under a special maritime-security act of Congress.
Even private citizens donating their talents for a one-day
Government conference encounter the security officer. For ex-
ample, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare re-
cently produced ink pads to fingerprint public-health experts
and pharmaceutical executives called to consult on Salk anti-
polio vaccine. Each individual was required to fill out a fed-
eral form which features a loyalty oath and warns against
drunkenness, sexual perversion and associating with spies.
Defense Jobs Infiltrated
The Defense Department is convinced that a "hard core"
of Reds is in critical spots on private payrolls. Already some
18,000 manufacturing plants in industries directly or indirectly
related to defense are covered by the security program, and
the Department has asked Congress to extend the screening
to additional industries. These include transportation, com-
munications, utilities, mining and smelting, petroleum, steel
mills and heavy industry generally.
Critics of the gigantic undertaking point out that of the
three million defense workers checked only about 1000 were
found to be possible risks; they insist that a blunderbuss of
indiscriminate inquiry is being used when the need is to
pin-point spies and saboteurs.
Those disquieted by the scale of the program and the num-
ber of innocents caught in the toils of investigation often use
alarmist language. They talk of a menace to personal liberty,
star-chamber proceedings, a trend toward totalitarian methods.
Among the most outspoken critics is Harry P. Cain, former
Republican Senator from Washington, now a member of the
Subversive Activities Control Board, which determines
whether organizations should be placed on the Attorney
General's list of Communist fronts.
"Let us never forget," he says, "that in an effort to keep
our nation secure at home we have constructed an apparatus
that will destroy us if we don't watch out. A whole clique
of spies could hardly do as much damage to us as could
-oiiHiilure as a Government to have confidence in our people."
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Dr. Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution
in Washington and a distinguished scientist, has been espe-
cially emphatic in opposing what he considers overzealous
screening in the scientific fields. "The great question as we
try to envisage the future," he said recently, "is whether
this madness of ours is a passing phase, or whether it will
grow until the free world transforms itself into a replica of
the captive world it opposes."
What Is a Security Risk?
A prominent attorney who has defended both Government-
and industrial-security suspects summed up his disapproval
of screening policies thus:
"My experience has convinced me of the unbelievable
impact of the security program on the life of the individual
and his family. The procedures are in many particulars
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and make it
almost impossible in a complex case for the accused to ex-
onerate himself.
"There is no objective standard of what is or is not a
loyalty or security risk. As a practical matter, a security
risk is a person whom a security officer doesn't trust. Most
security officers are not of superior intelligence and cur-
rently they are motivated by fear that they will make a
mistake."
In the light of such criticism, we asked questions of Ad-
ministration officials, and received these answers:
Q Hasn't the Government gone beyond the rule of reason
in checking almost every federal agency?
A Yes, in a measure. Of 2,300,000 federal jobs, more than
500,000 have been classified as actually or potentially "sensi-
tive." Even such nondefense groups as the American Battle
Monuments Commission and the National Gallery of Art
now file semiannual loyalty-security reports. Yet many Com-
munist agents have found positions in nonsensitive agencies,
then followed a zigzag but well-plotted course through other
boards and agencies until they reached sensitive spots where
they could influence economic, foreign and defense policies.
It is difficult to imagine why Communists would want to
infiltrate the Post Office Department. Yet years ago Reds in
the postal service are known to have intercepted mail passing
between Leon Trotsky in Mexico and his followers in the
United States. Communist assassins used this mail thievery in
plotting Trotsky's murder. Also, atomic-energy plants maintain
special post-office boxes. A security-cleared plant-protection
officer handles all such incoming and outgoing mail. One can
see opportunities for a disloyal Postal worker.
The Fish and Wildlife Service of the Interior Department
also seems a farfetched target for subversion. But with its cre-
dentials an enemy agent could obtain access to public lands
containing uranium or federal hydroelectric projects supplying
power to atomic installations.
Q Isn't it going too far to apply loyalty-security tests to
such humble workers as clerks, charwomen and janitors?
A No. Consider a sensitive position like that of the Defense
Secretary. In security terms we cannot ignore the girl who
takes his dictation, the messenger who distributes his confiden-
tial memos, the clerk who posts his dispatches to commanders
overseas, the charwoman who empties his wastebasket.
The job of janitor is traditionally coveted by any espionage
agency. Before the war the FBI managed to plant a loyal
German-born American citizen in Hitler's consulate in New
(Continued on page 84)
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ai4att, ,
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? 1 200 miles away, pilot automatically gets
Tacan indication of distance and direction,
follows indications accordingly.
2 Course accurate within 2/10ths
of mile, pilot easily finds
blacked-out carrier, sets new
heading for landing approach.
NEW DEVICE GIVES
PILOT HIS POSITION
Tacan Shows Distance and
? The ocean is a big place. And it's
especially big if you're a jet fighter pilot
trying to find your carrier base in pitch
darkness. With no other place to land,
you'd like the shortest route to the car-
Direction
accurately. TACAN (the new Tactical Air
Navigation system) provides such a
beacon to guide you home.
? Developed for the Navy by IT&T'S
Federal Telecommunication Laborato-
ries and manufactured by Federal Tele-
phone & Radio Company, Tacan owes
muCh of its power, range and dependa-
rier's deck. If von had a radio beacon on bility to the Model SAL-39 Klystron
3 Knowing direction and distance to
the moving flat-top at all times,
fuel has been conserved, danger
of "missing" carrier eliminated.
...010514":
signals . . . which have been generated
within the system . . . to the power
required for Tacan's operation. Requir-
ing little or no attention during its long
life, the SAL-39 helps assure that the
beacons will always be "on the air" as
dependable navigation aids.
? With the addition of the new Klystron
developed for Tacan, Sperry now pro-
duces more tharf 85 types of tubes to
power other microwave systems?ranging
in power from a few thousandths of a
watt to many millions of watts and in
frequencies covering the microwave
radio spectrum. To meet industrial as
well as military demands, a complete
new plant is now devoted to their design
and manufacture in Gainesville, Florida.
07108COPE COMPANY
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gP0:111Y
Great Neck, New York
CIA-RDP74-00297R000601240006-6 of tube, located in the land or ship-based
, 011
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U. S. News & World Report
? ? ? "The controversy revolves around methods, not goals"
York. It paid off. Among other things, he succeeded in secretly
installing a new firebox under the furnace grates?with a false
bottom. Daily, after office hours, this janitor went through the
motions of burning all discarded papers, under the watchful
eye of the consulate security officer. As, soon as the Nazi left,
the janitor tripped a switch that dropped the charred papers
through the false bottom into an asbestos-lined box. Each
night he delivered the box to another FBI agent in a different
location. Piecing together charred scraps, the FBI learned a
lot?including the presence of a German spy in a rooming
house near the Brooklyn Navy Yard.
Q A few highly publicized security cases have involved
people with foreign names. Is it true that the program is
weighted against the foreign-born?
A Place of? birth cannot be ignored in meeting this prob-
lem. In 1948 the FBI reviewed the origins of leading members
of the Communist Party. J. Edgar Hoover reported the results:
"Of 4984 reviewed, a total of 4555 or 91.4 per cent were
either of foreign birth, married to persons of foreign birth, or
born of foreign parents, while 56.5 per cent of the 4984 traced
their origins either from Russia or her satellite countries."
This may help to explain why, in screening workers in
defense plants especially, those of alien background almost
automatically rate a full field investigation.
Q Does the Government ever knowingly employ loyalty
or security risks because they are essential to some project?
A Yes, but rarely. Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, director of
the atomic project in World War II, authorized the employ-
ment of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer although security officers
could not give him clearance. Nor was Oppenheimer the
only one. After the war General Groves informed the AEC
that he had "considered it in the best interests of the United
States to clear certain individuals for work on the Manhattan
Project despite evidence indicating considerable doubt as to
their character, associations and absolute loyalty."
Q Is it possible to achieve 100 per cent loyalty and se-
curity by investigating every federal employe?
A No. Even if every official and worker were checked
today, there would be no guarantee against their becoming
disloyal or security risks tomorrow. One of the tricky intan-
gibles a loyalty-security hearing must decide is: "Is this the
kind of person who may decide one day to take the law
into his own hands, as Alger Hiss and others did?"
Even forthright critics of the screening program acknowl-
edge that there are security risks, that the country cannot
overlook their aggregate menace and that Government as
well as industry must have the right to fire, or to refuse to hire,
persons whose discretion or loyalty is in doubt. Individual
miscarriages of justice are reprehensible, but they do not
cancel out the need for some kind of screening. The con-
troversy revolves around methods, not goals.
Red Spies Since 1933
Communist infiltration and subversion are facts too well
established to be ignored. As far back as 1933, Red agents,
sympathizers and actual spies began to penetrate the Gov-
ernment. In the war years secret Communists reached high
positions, and the Democratic Administration found it neces-
sary to discharge loyalty risks from top-rung posts in the
r---"'''%' bite House, the State Department, Treasury Department,
.1-7,,i,t4
, 'onal Labor Relations Board, War Production Board and
othei't branches.
President Eisenhower's order expanding and stiffening the
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threat. His program has worked well and fairly in the over-
whelming majority of cases, but it cannot be denied that
some avoidable injustice has been done. The lumping to-
gether of loyalty and security risks has frequently proved
to be a mistake. In the public view, the man or woman who
resigns or is discharged these days may be unjustly suspected
of the two most widely discussed charges?disloyalty and
sexual abnormality. A clearer and more merciful yardstick
for employment, critics suggest, would be "suitability" and
,`unsuitability."
There is substantial ground also for the charge that security
officers have been too quick to act on unproved and uneval-
uated allegations. Such shotgun suspensions have subjected
many people to undeserved trouble, expense and public stigma.
How Many Are Cleared?
Official statistics show that since October 1953 two out of
every five workers who chose to fight charges before hearing
boards have been cleared. More recently, Washington law-
yers who formed a legal-aid committee to represent employes
have won every one of their cases. But it should be remem-
bered that hearings are given only when requested, and that
those conscious of their guilt or of the weight of the evidence
against them prefer to resign quietly.
In view of the likelihood that the struggle against Com-
munism may last for decades, the loyalty-security problem
will remain to plague us. With rechecking of federal employes
almost completed, investigations are now largely limited to
new applicants, to jobholders transferred to more sensitive
posts and to individuals about whom new information is re-
ceived. A crash program no longer seems indicated. Many
students of the issue believe that a uniform and fair code
should be developed, with authority and responsibility vested
in one carefully chosen official with the rank of Presidential
Assistant.
Few deny or minimize the difficulty of the problem. It is,
basically, the problem of maintaining a balance between our
need for protection against Communist tactics and the liberties
guaranteed us in the Constitution. It is, specifically, the ques-
tion of weighing the civil rights of individuals against the pos-
sibility that one of those individuals may betray the trust and
imperil the lives of millions.
This is the task facing the 12-man bipartisan loyalty-
security survey panel established by Congress, with the ap-
proval of the White House. . . . Changes in procedure to
give the suspect more protection seem inevitable. The spirit
of the inquiry is reflected in this statement by the Presi-
dent:
"All the measures have two purposes. Their first purpose is
to make certain that this nation's security is not jeopardized
by false servants. Their second purpose is to clear the at-
mosphere of that unreasonable suspicion that accepts rumor
and gossip as substitutes for evidence.
"In the long run you may be certain of this: America be-
lieves in and practices fair play and decency and justice. In this
country public opinion is the most powerful of all forces,
and it will straighten this matter out wherever and whenever
there is real violence done to our free rights."
Foregoing are extracts from a series of two articles, en-
titled "How About Those Security Cases?" by Richard and
Gladys Harkness, appearing in the September and November
issues of "The Reader's Digest." The extracts are reprinted
by permission of "The Reader's Digest," which holds the
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