MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00297R000900070007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 13, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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13 December December 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:
1. This memorandum is for information only:
2. There are 26 clippings in our files (newspaper and broadcasts) covering
references to CIA by Fulton Lewis, Jr., during the period, January, 1950, to
December 1957. Fourteen of them contain derogatory remarks about CIA. In con-
trast there are 114 attacks against RFE in two months.of 1957.
3. Of the eight United States intelligence agencies represented on the IAC
only two of them, the CIA and the State Department, have been subjected to der-
ogatory remarks by Lewis in these clippings. CIA has been attacked 14 times and
the State Department L times.
Ii.. There has been no direct "name" criticism of the others; in one case,
(17 December 1951) Lewis said all intelligence agencies "except the FBI" (under-
lining furnished) "are cluttered with incompetents and others more closely aligned
to Communist idee.ology". It can only be inferred whether he intended to include
in this indictment, the Air Force, the Army, the Nary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the AECIs intelligence units.
5. In the period of almost eight years covered by these 26 clippings there
has been no single overt criticism of the FBI. Whether he did such criticism of
the FBI in other of his columns or broadcasts is not of record in this office.
Four of Lewis' columns could be referred to as inplying. criticism of the FBI:
(1) His attack on Samuel Klaus (18 January 1952) suggests that the NU could be
penetrated by Communists; (2) Two criticisms of the escape of the Russian sailors
at Idlewild Airport (April, 1956) does not mention FBI but could be interpreted
to contain a reflection on the competency of that agency charged with responsi-
bility of domestic intelligence and domestic security. (3) A "friendly' comment
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on the FBI (January, 1956) which could be taken as damaging to the FBI. Lewis
in criticism of CIA states there is "no real way" for Congress or other higher
authority to investigate CIA, and he, Lewis, recommends FBI absorb CIA. It
would seem to be more difficult for the Government to investigate the FBI than
for it to investigate CIA. In recent years there has been no record of an in-
vestigation of the FBI; in contrast, from 1948 to 1956 the CIA has been investi-
gated at least five times: (1) Dulles-Jackson-Correa survey, 19148-149; (2)
Hoover Commission Eberstadt Task Force, 19148-149; (3) Hoover Commission Clark
Task Force, 195/4-55; (4) the Doolittle survey committee, 195/4-55; and (5) the
President's Board, 1956 to date.
6. While 114 of the 26 Lewis statements contain derogatory remarks about CIA,
three of the 114 might be interpreted as "friendly" comments on CIA, even though
they probably contain an animus of tone against CIA. For example, he seems to
praise the adequacy of CIA's intelligence reporting when he relies on CIA to
"prove" that: (1) there are 32 foreign espionage agents in the UN, Soviet and
otherwise (Jan. 18, 1950); (2) the Cuban rebels are "tainted with Communism";
(3) that certain "Latin American Bigwigs" convening in Ciudad Trujillo were
criticizing the U. S. for giving haven to a certain Venezuelan in Puerto Rico
(October 1957)? Actually in these 3 cases he seems to be using CIA incidentally
to attack the U. S. Government.
7. Most of the 114 derogatory statements about CIA contain criticisms not of
CIA's intelligence reporting but of its alleged clandestine operations: (1)
CIA's "commercial operations" in the Far East (April 1956); (2) CIAts "CAT"
interest, broadcast, November, 1957; (3) its tie-up with ME operations (14,
columns or broadcasts); and (4) CIA's alleged counter-espionage operations against
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the Russian sailors at Idlewild (2 columns, April 1956).
8. While CIA is the principal target, among the U. S. intelligence agencies
attacked by Lewis (to the extent of 14 columns and broadcasts out of 26 clipped)
the RYE seems to be even more the principal target of Lewis (with or without a
CIA tie-up), expecially--and principally?since early October 1957.
9. RIB is, indeed, attacked no less than lit times in 2 months (exactly as many:.
as the 14 times that CIA was attacked in 8 years--since way back in January 1950).
The RYE, thrthermore, is identified with CIA only times out of the 14 attacks.
In at least one other case RFE is tied up, instead, with the State Department-a.
on Oct. 4, 1957, which was the beginning of his recent campaign against RYE.
10. It appears that, when it is convenient for Lewis to cite CIA's intelligence
reporting to his momentary advantage, he does so, while at other times he simply
attacks the U. S. or the State Department for this or that use of Communists
abroad, without mentioning CIA. His attacks might ultimately be addressed, not
to CIA or State or RYE alone, but at the policy of using Communists abroad in the
cold war with the .oviet Union.
11. These evaluations on Lewis's "line" are partially speculative, because they
are based only on a small fraction of his known public writings--that is, on only
about 26 statements covering almost eight years. In contrast, during these eight
years Lewis has made no less than 3,000 nightly broadcasts on Mutual Broadcasting
System, and he has, in addition, published an extensive number of miscellaneous
writings in a variety of magazines, including "little known" periodicals, "right-
wing" leaflets and handouts.
12. In Lewis's commentary taken as a whole, there are four possible motives:
a. Zeal to attack Communist influence and governmental inefficiency.
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b. A desire to destroy CIA in its present form.
c. A desire to replace CIA with another means of carrying out its
present functions.
d. A political motive associated with Mr. Lewists right-wing views.
13. They are not mutually exclusive and might be accepted in any combination.
14. Lewisls motives might be "pure" as respecting CIA and RFE. The RFE attacks
In particular might be interpreted as stemming simply from Lewists distress at
finding Communists and Communist influence in this organization. Lewis finds
that Cimmunist influence in RFE is compounded by inefficiency on the part of
"Rover Boys". This is a sort of thing that any columnist would be likely to
deplore if he believed that it existed. There are also accusations of Communist
influence and of "Rover Boy* inefficiency in CIA-- refugefor children of good
families seeking thrills.
15. Lewis's attacks are primarily destructive--almost never constructive.
He constantly refers to corruption within the Agency but claims he cannot
specify what it is because of the security blanket surrounding CIA, which pre-
vents him from finding out. He would have Congress remove this blanket and
bring everything about CIA out into the open. Lewis is not ignorant or naive.
He knows perfectly well that if his recommendations were carried out in toto,
CIA, as such, would be severely damaged or ddstroyed. Likewise, his obvious
attempts to stop contributions of "Truth Dollars," plus his objections to the
use of taxes (through CIA) to support the Crusade for Freedom, suggest that he
would like to see the whole RYE complex put out of business.
16. As to a replacement for CIA, there would seem to me to be two possibilities.
Although Lewis claims that a Congressional "watchdog" committee (of which is en-
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thusiastically in favor) would in no way interfere with CIA's activities, this
would be hard to reconcile either with his insistence on bringing CIA's activities
into the open or with his complaints about the way in which CIA has been run. It
is conceivable, if improbable, that Lewis might have contemplated placing CIA,
in effect, under Congress, where "reliable" senators like Welker, McCarthy, et
al., would have been enabled to see that it was properly handled. Or it might
be that Lewis's preference for Congressional supervision had to do more with the
general idea of preventing the Executive from retaining exclusive jurisdiction
over what might become a powerful instrument of state (Gestapo, NKVD, etc.).
17. The other possibility is the FBI. It is true that Lewis refers directly
to this possibility only twice, and then with a certain indirection (which might,
however, be purposeful). What Lewis's suggestions regarding FBI control of CIA
come down to would seem to be something like the following: CIA is bad and
Communist-ridden, while the FBI is good and is free from such influences. The
FBI operates only at home but has proved that it can operate successfully abroad.
(Oddly enough, Lewis does not directly mention this latter point, but he must
know what the FBI did during the war and that it continues to conduct some foreign
operations.) Meanwhile, Lewis says that he cannot, see why the U. S. has to have
two "intelligencenageneies. If the U. S. were going to have only one of these two,
it is abundantly obvious which one Lewis would choose. Whether there is any rela-
tionship between Mr. Lewis and Mr. Hoover, I should have no way of knowing, but
the facts of CIA history show pretty clearly that Hoover was not happy when CIG- "
CIA was formed and was unwilling to have FBI foreign operations abolished in
favor of Central Intelligence. Hoover's attitude since the formation of CIA
may have given less than whole-hearted cooperation or a desire to see the new `--
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enterprise succeed.
18. Lewis is only one of several who share his general point of view who have
shown no friendliness toward CIA. Some examples: Senator McCarthy, Westbrook
Pegler, The American Mercury, The National Review. There is no evidence the groups
represented have any sort of cohesiveness, including an agreed plan of attack.
19. Since Lewis has criticized CIA fourteen times in almost eight years and has
criticized Radio Free Europe fourteen times in two months it seems reasonable to
believe that his principal target is RFE and that CIA is a secondary target at
this time.
STAT
/STANIS/Y J GRO
Assistant to the ector
cc: DDCI
IG
I0
CI
Dir/Sec
DDP
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