GIGANTIC U.S. INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS IN QUESTION AFTER LAOS, OTHER FIASCOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00297R001600010069-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2014
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: May 1, 1962
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/04/08: CIA-RDP74-00297R001600010069-2
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High Margin of Error,
Secret Policy-Making
By CIA Cited ? Book
Details Some Cases.
By MkRQUIS W. CHILDS
Chief V'ethington C.orreiriondent
of the PoAt?Dispatch.
C- 1943 St. Louls Pest.DIspettek
WASHINGTON, May 19.
IT WAS just two years ago that
President Eisenhower re turned
from Paris after being subjected
by Premier Khrushchev to the vio-
lent and humiliating attack that
blew up the long awaited summit
meeting.
That was the efterrezth rf the shootlej
down of the 11:2 e,p.onage plane 1300 milts
inside the Soviet Union. And the disaster
to the U-2 '.vith the capture of tit( pilot,
Francis (,ar P,r ers, set in motion a
chain of consequences only dimly under-
stood in the two years thet Myr passed.
Ever since World eit. II r myeterioae
X called "intelligence" has fieured ie
Americaa policy decisione. A hsee intel-
ligence apperatue has come mil beim-.
While part of tbia .1.japaratae is exposed tt
ptehlic view. as in the big headquarters
that the Central Intefig.ence Agency hi:
built on the Potomac 1-14rr near Wa.shine-
ton, the mysterious reports of the CIA aid
military intelligence are always shrouded
In secrecy.
DESPITE efforts in cut it back end co-
oidinate it on the milarry side, there is a
strong suspicion that the intellieence tad
has more often then not wagged the. pr.lcy.
dog. A look- backward et intelhgenceevelu-
aticeis on which presumably major deci-
sions have been based, raises subetantel
doubt as to whether this overbalancing in-
fhience?formed on ink-Inaction always de-
nied to the public end certain Instances
even to officials of the government ? is
w lett.
? The margin of error seems always to
have been on the eptimistie side. This
noes from the estimate of when the So-
viet Union would obtein the atomic bomb,
ii misjudement of anywhere from four to
ri years, depending on the Intelligence
Source, to the Cuban fiasco and the in-
?formed conclusion that the landing of
1233 Cuban patriots at the Bay of Pigs
would touch aft a euccessfel cprians
against Fidel Castro. _
It covers the recent event: in gouda-
cast Asia. Lereely through the machina-
tions of the CIA a "strong man." Phountl
Nosavan, was put In power in Loa. He
has proved to be strong die% ii pre-
Ing ever larger demands en *1st United
Statea. As recently e-5 a year esti le lees,
military intellleence was teet'tg the
loyaI Laotian Army as en effetive mIlI
tary force. While disillesion 'etas to
have sei. in, there is reason te teteder
whether anyone was prepared lo? the
flight from Nam The led by
Laotian generels.
1 he ansv..- the CIA is that tie.t rue-
testes must necesaarily be kept .tavet
while thrir failures are advertired VI the
Porld. But if the successes canno- be
known. surely something can be leet,c'd
from the dirasters. A book just publi 'Usti
"The 11-2 Affair," by David Wire tit
'Thomas B. Ross. breaks thrcurh ii
secrecy end the teraeiringt of r if et:
covertp to show how little the t rardent
or anyone else in high author.:. moony
7,.tit.rolled the operation and how direstroce
-sere the consevences growing ere cf the
hurvIed which tie e1e-
onc'.7 1'11 pane Wrc s ? ,
The anevier ?'??
riia
photographs (.4 the Sr.,.ietU 'a *nee '1
the four o- !ram - it ! A
thevned more than re a..? to di,:
final trte,edy But rev i ant lion
may have had on PO: 'IN ? .--tetlattable.
The authors ?if "The U: e.i ? s sy that
pol:cy-makers t LC t" le
(Miff? thr- ree ' . 'Le of
lin and zenlei?
P.m ;71t1:1.11'eln
to get "jut ore .4.
cherge They reach tr. ,cfire er.
cone' el. lea
"There I's no substantiated evidence of
any sort of conspiracy to scuttle the
summit. But it is clear that many Impar-
? tent persons in the Intellleence field were
more concerned With the U-2 ea a valu-
able Instrumett of eeplonage than with
. Its possible effect on the. summit. In other
words, they were worried not se much
that the U-2 might endanger the summit
as that the summit might endanger the
U-2. By May of Ir.3, intelligence had
come to dominate policy in the U-2 pro-
gram. Instead of carving cc a beats for
policy-mekIng, intelligence-sethering had
become an end in itself."
The CTA hes virtually completed the
move from WathIngton to the new building
that rises like A big white cliff on the Po.
ti-macHaw many employes are housed
there s, ef course, secret. But it can be
Mated thrt the building has one million
ecniaer tact of floor space, making it a little
iCt>.3 trsn a thud Jac iiike of the Pentagon.
Despie- ?-upe. the CIA is retaining its
headquaeres building in Werhington. Thus
the intelligertre tett judging trom the few
external el! i?tp:en that are permitted, ap-
peace to be growing larger rcther .than
einriler. Wheter it will wag the policy
dog in appraising the perilous end uncer-
tain power balance in Southeatt Asia
bo-
ei China and RU33111 in a profoundly
e
I CIA
i,xperteed to its present size and
.t op'eretion under Allen Dulles,
-c vdre de;asty director beginning in
at an director starting in 1033.
_ ? a sera: a eyntbedc figure, He
Cot
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/04/08 : CIA-RDP74-00297R00160oo1omq_9 -