THE U.S. HEROIN PROBLEM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT OF A STAFF SURVEY TEAM OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000100100002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

STATINTL
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THE U.S, HEROIN PROBLEM AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA
REPORT;
OF A
STAFF SURVEY TEAM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
DECEMBER -, 1972'
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
u:i GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFF
WASHINGTON : 1972 -., .
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN, December -, 1973.
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C.
There is transmitted herewith a report -of a staff survey which was
conducted per your instructions between August 16, 1972, and Sep.
tember 3, 1972.
The purpose of the survey was to gather information pertainin
to the production and smuggling of heroin in Southeast Asia and
to ascertain the steps that the governments of Southeast Asia are talc
ing to help control illegal international narcotics trafficking.
During the course of the study; the survey team met in Washington
with U.S. Government officials involved in the international aspects.
of the narcotics control problem, including; representatives of the De-
partment of State, the Department of Justice, including the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Department of the Treasury, the
White House, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
In the field, which included visits to Japan, -long Kong, South Vet-
nam, Laos, Burma, and Thailand, the survey team met with U.S. diplo-
matic, intelligence, and narcotics control officials, foreign law enforce-
ment and other government officials responsible for iiarcoties control
efforts in those countries, and representatives of the United Nations
Special Drug Abuse Fund, former military leaders, and private
citizens.
The survey team would like to express its thanks and appreciation
for the, assistance, advice, cooperation, and hospitality extended during
the course of its deliberations.
ROBERT' K..Bo r.
JOHN J. BRADY.
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APPENDIXES
A. Translation of a letter prepared by National Assembly Deputy and
former Lao Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Ouan Rathi-
koun on April 10,1972________________________________________
B. The Result of the Feasibility Study on the Opium Suppression In the
Royal Laos, by Gen. Ouan Rathikoun__________________
C. Text of United States-Thai Memorandum of Understanding (Sept. 28,
1971) -------------------------------------------------------
D. Recent SNO operations in Northern Thailand ---------------------
E. Decree law No. 008/TT/SLU on the eradication of toxic, narcotic
and dangerous substances (promulgated by President Thieu on
August 12, 1972)---------------------------------------------
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The use of heroin in the United States has reached crisis propor.
,tions. It is now estimated that there are between 500,000 and 600,000
heroin users in the United States, a substantial increase over the
mid-1971 estimate of 315,000 addicted.-
Precise statistics on heroin abuse are difficult to collect. It is, there-
fore, likely that there are more addicts than current assessments indi-
cate. For example, the White House Special Action Office for Drug
Abuse Prevention has stated "that all available data seems to indi-
cate that drug abuse in the United States is rising."
In New York City, drug abuse is the largest single cause of death
for persons between the ages of 15 and 35. Last year, there was 1,259
,confirmed drug-related deaths in that city.
Heroin is not only a scourge to those who use it-it is also a cancer
to the society upon which it feeds.
Reliable estimates indicate that the average addict spends about
$30 per day on heroin. Some spend as much as $100 per day.
Roughly, this means that if there are 500,000 addicts spending $30
per day on heroin, the cost per day is $15 million, or approximately
$5,475. million per year. If there are 600,000 heroin addicts, the daily
cost would be approximately $18 million while the yearly cost would
exceed $6,570 million. A large majority must turn to crime to support
their habits.
HEROIN ADDICTION AND CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
In May 1971 Congressman Morgan F. Murphy and Robert Steele
in a report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs stated that:
Reliable authorities estimate that the addict would have to steal goods
worth at 'least four or five times the cost of his habit per year to support that
habit.
If 75 percent of those addicted resorted to crime * * ? the cost in crime com-
mitted to sustain the habit would be in excess of $8 billion per year at a minimum.
Based upon this formula, 500,000 to 600,000 heroin addicts would
commit crimes involving property, cash, and other tangibles worth
between $16 and $20 billion per year.
HEROIN CONSUMED IN THE UNITED STATES
It is estimated that the heroin addict population in the United
States requires from 10 to 12 tons of heroin per year. Since it requires
10 tons of opium to produce 1 ton of heroin, it would. only take between
100 and 120 tons of opium to satisfy these needs.
1 The increase in the number estimated is due in part to refined teehntques of Identifica-
tion and detection. It, therefore, should not be construed that the number of addicts doubled
during the past year.
BACKGROUND
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INTRODUCTION
Until mid-1971, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(BNDD) estimated that 80 percent of the heroin entering the United
States originated in the poppy fields of Turkey.
On June 30, 1971, the Government of Turkey announced that it
would stop growing poppies after 1972. In return, the United States
agreed to furnish $35 million in financial assistance to help alleviate
economic difficulties resulting from the ban on opium production.
As a result of the decision by Turkey to stop growing poppies there is
concern in the United States that the countries of Southeast Asia will
replace Turkey as the major source of supply for heroin in the United
States. For if the decision by the Government of Turkey to discontinue
opium production eliminates that country as a source of opium, the
International and domestic U.S. drug peddlers will turn to other areas
of the world for heroin, particularly Southeast Asia.
There are those who argue that much more heroin already enters the
United States each year from Southeast Asia than the 5 to 10 percent
estimated by Nelson Gross, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for Narcotics Matters. For example, a recent report by the Strategic
Intelligence Office of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
stated, "More of the heroin reaching the United States Is from thib
area than conventional knowledge has recognized."
A senior official of the Bureau said "Southeast Asia is playing a more
important role and more heroin is coming from that part of the world.
The exact amount cannot be ascertained because the chemists are unable
to determine beyond a reasonable doubt where heroin originates.
Therefore, it is not possible to determine how much Southeast Asian
heroin is entering the United States."
While the percentage of Southeast Asian heroin entering the United
States cannot be determined with any accuracy or certainty, there is no
doubt that that area can and does produce more_than ._enough opium to
replace Turkey as the major supplier to the illegal market in the United
States.
It is estimated that three countries, Burma, Laos, and Thaiir itd,
produce about 700 tons of opium per year. This amount of opium will
yield 70 tons of heroin which is many times the estimated 10 to 12 tons
required to sustain the heroin population,of the United States. `
Before 1970 the bulk of Southeast Asia's opium was'consnmed by
Asians. mostly in the form of opium or as No. 3 purple smoking heroin.
A small amount, less than 10 tons of opium equivalent, was sold 'to
non-Asians in the form of high quality injectable heroin (No. 4
heroin).
This pattern began to change in 1970 when 90 to 98 percent pure
No. 4 white heroin began to appear in South Vietnam. By spring of
1971 the widespread use of No. 4 heroin by U.S. troops in Vietnam
had reached alarming proportions. It was in great supply, it was
readily available and the market, was profitable.
.(b)
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U.B. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
ORGANIZATION
CABINET COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
On September 7, 1971 the President established the Cabinet Com-
mittee for International Narcotics Control to coordinate anti-narcotics
activities.
The Cabinet Committee is responsible for the "formulation and co-
ordination of all policies of the Federal Government relating to the
goal of curtailing and eventually eliminating the flow of illegal nar-
cotics and dangerous drugs into the United States."
Because the cooperation of foreign governments is absolutely essen-
tial if these objectives are to be achieved the Secretary of State was
designated Chairman of the Cabinet Committee. Its members include
the Attorney General, the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, Agricul-
ture, the Permanent United States Representative of the United
Nations, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and such
others as may be deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
The Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee is a Speciftl
Assistant to the President.
The Committee is supported by it Working Group composed of
personnel from each of the Departments and Agencies represented on
the Cabinet Committee, the National Security Council, and the Special
Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. The Chairman of the Work-
ing Group is also the Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee.
The Working Group has seven functional subcommittees-Law En-
forcement, Intelligence, Public Information, Diplomacy and Foreign
Aid, Congressional Relations, Rehabilitation and Treatment, and
Research and Development.
Under the Working Group is a Coordinating Subcommittee which
is a staff level group responsible for coordinating interagency narcotics
control actions within five geographic regions. This group which de-
velops policy recommendations and monitors implementation is also
chaired by a White House Official who is responsible to the Chairman
of the Working Group. The following chart shows the organizational
structure of the Cabinet Committee.
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12,
As important as bilateral programs are to the solution of the prob-
lems in the final analysis the suppression of narcotics in SoutheastAsia
will require regional cooperation. To attack it, therefore, requires coor-
dination between narcotics law enforcement officials of all countries in
the area.
The United States is attempting to encourage regional cooperation
in Southeast Asia through the Regional BNDD Office which is lo-
cated in Bangkok. While there hasbbeen little success in these efforts
and the results are not yet satisfactory, several countries are developing
an awareness of the need to coordinate activities and to exchange
information.
BNDD agents in Southeast Asia also work closely with U.S. Customs
officials stationed in the area.
U.S. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
Briefly stated, the role of the U.S. Bureau of Customs is to prevent
tho illegal entry of narcotics into the United States.
It is the contention of U.S. Customs that the best place to interdict
the flow of narcotics is at the U.S. border. As several Customs officials
explained, "the bottleneck in narcotics smuggling is at the U.S. border
and this is the best place to attack the problem. This has not proved
to be completely effective, however, for in spite of intensified inspection
and examination procedures an unknown quantity of heroin slips by
Customs and enters the United States each year. As part of its pro-
gram to impede the illegal flow of narcotics the United States has
offered Customs assistance to foreign countries (1) to impri in-
spection and screening of traffic at lawful points of entry and exit;
and (2) to prevent smuggling at border and coastal points and interior
air strips.
U.S. Customs agents are stationed in several countries around the
world, including Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam. These agents
advise and assist local customs officials and in Laos conduct inspections
and examinations of aircraft personnel and baggage entering or leav-
ing the country. In addition, U.S. Customs agents participate in border,
patrol operations along the Mekong River in the Golden Triangle. And
in March 1972 Customs began recruiting 25 agents with intelligence
experience o collect, data on smuggling., operations abroad. Thesis,
agents are being. assigned to, principal opium source countries or at
key points along the smuggling routes to the United States. (At the
time the Survey Team was in Southeast Asia Customs intelligence
personnel were in Laos and South Vietnam but not in Thailand.)
According to several Customs officials in Southeast Asia and in
Washington, the raison d'etre for establishing an intelligence collection
capability was that "BNDD did not share all of the intelligence that
it collected." One particularly outspoken official on this subject said,
"BNDD is not likely to work on behalf of Customs. As a result it was
decided to send our own intelligence agents overseas." Unfortunately,
like many BNDD agents overseas all of those Customs intelligence
officials do not speak the language of the_ country in which they are
stationed.
On the other hand, BNDD officials complained that Customs is "not
entirely forthcoming with a lot of the information that they get.
BNDD does not receive a regular flow of intelligence from Customs."
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It is deplorable that this situation exists. The ultimate objective is
to stop heroin from reaching the addicts and it will require the whole-
hearted participation and cooperation of all parties and agencies in-
volved. The dimensions of the problem are such that the United States
cannot afford the luxury of interagency friction.
In war, intelligence on the activities of the enemy is vital. This is
especially true of the war on narcotics where the entire process is
clandestine. Poppies are grown illegally. Opium is purchased from
the grower covertly, processed in illicit laboratories and smuggled
across national borders in violation of international law.
Prior to the establishment of the Cabinet Committee, narcotics in-
telligence was the responsibility of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs. This was an unsatisfactory arrangement. The view of
several U.S. officials was that they [BNDD] were not trained to handle
the collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intel-
ligence and as a result a lot of good intelligence went largely unused.
To remedy this situation and to improve the quality of intelligence,
the President directed the Central Intelligence Agency to give nar-
cotics intelligence collection a major priority. The Agency has done
this.
It is the consensus among most officials with whom the Survey, Team
met, in and out of the intelligence community, that the inclusion of
CIA in the narcotics intelligence collection effort was necessary. The
Agency has the expertise, the resources, and the contacts that BNDD'
and Customs do not have. These same officials are concerned, however,
that the requirement to participate in the narcotics intelligence effort'
will interfere with the Agency's capability in other areas. This con-
cern is valid. While CIA was given the responsibility, the Agency was'
not authorized additional personnel, and overall funding was reduced.
In Southeast Asia, the CIA has been given the responsibility for'
coordinating the narcotics intelligence collection activities in the vari-
ous U.S. Missions.
To prevent any of the agencies engaged in collecting intelligence on
narcotics from using the same informers, the CIA provides coordi-
nated intelligence support. This enables them to monitor the program
and insure maximum effectiveness with a minimum amount of con-
fusion and duplication.
Domestically, a Central Intelligence Agency official serves as Chair-
man of the Cabinet Committee's Working Group Subcommittee on
Foreign Intelligence. The purpose of this subcommittee is to coordi-
nate the foreign intelligence collection effort at the Washington level
and to develop collection guidelines for the field. The subcommittee
conducts its activities on an informal rather than organizational basis.
As a result, a working relationship has developed among the individ-
ual representatives of its more important components; i.e., CIA,
BNDD, and Customs.
In the. past, the Agency has produced a number of Intelligence
Memoranda on various aspects of the international narcotics problems,
for the use of the Department of State, BNDD, Customs, and other
agencies. While there are no such documents being produced at the_
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bers of the Working Group represented independent, autonomous
agencies and bureaus, each with a different frame of reference and
each with a different approach to the problem, the meetings resulted in
arguments, and that no decisions are reached. As a result, the anti-
narcotics effort is conducted on a personal relationship basis. This
system cannot work, however, unless there are dedicated full-time
individuals with full authority to represent the agencies and the
White House.
This pretty well sums up the shortcomings in the U.S. organiza-
tion to combat drugs on an international level. Petty bureaucratic
jealousies over jurisdiction have inhibited the.activities of the Cabinet
Committee. This in turn has hampered efforts to mobilize the full,
resources and to coordinate the agencies of the Federal Government
involved in the anti-narcotics struggle. Fortunately this situation does
not appear to be as severe in Southeast Asia as it is in Washington.
While minor personnel and bureaucratic tensions do arise from time
to time, for the most part the representatives of the different agencies,
departments, and bureaus work closely with each other and the prob-
lems that are present in Washington do not seem to have been,
exported.
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THE? SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Oriim PRODUCTION IN TIII7 GOLDRN TIUTANOLL
The remote Golden Triangle area of Northern Thailand, Eastern
Burma, and Western Laos produces almost half (700 tons) of the
world's illicit opium (990=1,210 tons). (See map No. 1.)
Efforts to control the production of opium in the Golden Triangle
have been unsuccessful. There are several reasons for this.
First, opium represents the only cash crop for the tribes producing it..
In many cases, the cash that opium brings, or the opium itself, is
used to purchase, or barter for, the arms, ammunition, and supplies
needed to support the insurgent groups that operate throughout the
area.
Second, most poppy growers are simple hill tribesmen who are
unaware of the dimensions of the world heroin problem. The tribes
have accepted the use of opium and its derivatives for centuries, and
the respective governments have been unable to educate them to
the fact that the opium they produce contributes to a serious cultural
and sociological problem in the United States and around the world.
The most important factor hindering effective control of opium
production, however, must be attributed to the fact that the area
has not been under the control of any government and as a matter of
fact has been dominated by the several insurgent groups that operate
in the Golden Triangle.
The governments involved have been plagued by civil wars and
insurgencies for over two decades. Given the inability of, the Govern-
ments of Burma, Laos, and Thailand to assert effective administrative
and political control over this area, it is unlikely that the production of
opium can be stopped, at least in the foreseeable future.
Unfortunately, once the opium or heroin gets into the international
smuggling network, at least part of it will reach the addict in the
United States. For when the illegal product fans out from the Golden
Triangle, it becomes increasingly difficult to intercept. The following
diagram shows the probable smuggling routes from the Golden
Triangle.'
i There have been recent reports indicating movement of opium westward from the Shan
State and the Chin IIllls of Burma toward India and Bangladesh.
(17)
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BM MA
Of the three countries with territories in the Golden Triangle,
Burma presents the most perplexing problem for the United
States. An estimated 400 metric tons, or more than one-half of the
entire illicit opium output in the Golden Triangle is produced within
Burma. Yet, unlike Laos and Thailand, United States presence and
influence in Burma is negligible.
To appreciate the complexity of the problem of.eradicatinpr the
production of and traffic in opium in Burma, it Is necessary to recog-
nize the various elements which contribute to that problem.
Burma has been beset with insurgency for over 25 years. In 1*49-50;
the Government of the Union of Burma. came very close to 'being
overthrown by the combined attacks of Communist and Karen forces
(estimated in excess of 20,000), but it succeeded in defending Rangoon
and ultimately in expelling the insurgents from the more populated
areas. Subsequent factionalization along ideological, ethnic, or political
lines has prevented the insurgents from uniting into a serious threat
to the central government. However, more than .10 percent of the
country is estimated to be effectively denied to the government b
insurgent forces whose numbers probably still exceed 15,000 although
accurate estimates of their numbers are difficult. As indicated, p-
surgent forces -occupy and control the. Burmese area located in t
Golden Triangle.
The following! 4hmmary lists the major insurgent groups, their
location and political. orientation :
Burma Co9nmuni8t Party-1 bite Flag (RCP--WF)
'Estimated to number between .4,000 and 6,000, the BCP-WP ie
located throughout the delta area and in lower Burma as well as in
the northern Shan State along the. Sino-Burmese border where its
major forces are found.
The White Flags are essentially two'-sepa'ate. groups-the original
Burman insurgents in lower Burma hind 'a primarily ethnic insurgency
created and supported by the Peoples Republic. of,C'hina, (-PRC) along
the border. The former group has been racked,by internal purges and
severe Government of Burma military pressure and in recent years has
been limited to sporadic acts of terrorism and sabotage. In comparison,
the White Flag insurgents aionr the Chinese border are very effective
with large, well-armed forces. They have been increasingly aggressive
during the past year and control large areas of the northern Shan
state between the Salween River and the border. A clandestine radio
station, the "Voice of the People of Burma" contributes propaganda
support.
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That arrest along with increased enforcement activity along the
Thai and Laotian sides of the tri-border area has brought about both,.
a buildup of opium stocks and a drop in price on the Burmese side,
according to U.S. intelligence estimates. In addition, the withdrawal
of U.S. troops stationed in South Vietnam has caused a backlog of
opium and heroin stocks particularly in the Tachilek area and in
South Vietnam.
Although-no one has determined how much opium and its various
derivatives are stored in Tachilek and other refinery locations, it is
estimated that over 300 tons of opium has been convoyed to Tachilek
since January 1972. The following list shows the status of the current
market in Tachilek compared with last year's prices ;
Raw opitim ----_---------
--
Heroln ------------------- -------------- ...... -?..........
Morphine e base. ---------- --------- ------- --- ----
1971 1972
(April-July) (Aus at)
(per kilo) (per kilo)
1,41895 po
4495 3~ 232
The market is also. reported as being depressed in the Shan State
areas of cultivation. There, the farmer, whose crop is financed by
Chinese ethnic entrepreneurs, is absorbing the loss. Whether the back-
log of opiates and the depressed prices can be translated into a short-
age on the consumer end is not evident. Insofar as local consumption
is concerned, there is no evidence of a shortage in Bangkok, Saigon,
or Hong Kong.
Furthermore, there are indications that growers and traffickers
are positive that the current depression in the market is only tem-
porary. Growers are reportedly buying fertilizer for next year's poppy
crop and major traffickers such as La Iising-han are attempting. to
modernize their operations. This is an indication that the major
traffickers do not view the current depression as being permanent.
There are, however, developments which demonstrate that recent
enforcement efforts in the tri-border area have caused the traffickers
to experiment with different routes. One such route which U.S. intel-
ligence sources have identified involves the capital city, Rangoon.
Originating in the town of Pinlaung in the southern Shan State, the
new route bears straight south to Toungoo, Pegu and reache Rangoon
where the opiates are transshipped either by rail or wat@r to Moulmein.
From the latter location, the shipments are transported down through
Tavoy, and Mergui to Victoria Point in the Malaysian peninsula.. It
has not yet been determined whether the shipments then go to Bangkok
or whether other routes are used.
While in Rangoon, the Survey Team was told by Burmese officials
that trafficking through Rangoon was impossible due to stringent
government controls. However, in view of the development cited above,
one must assume that the Burmese Government has as little control in
"administered" areas as it has in the so-called "unadministered" ter-
ritories. If the Government of Burma does - exercise control in the
.Rangoon area, there must be some acquiescence to the traffickers as is
the case in Tachilek.
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More ominous than the development of a Rangoon route is the
increased activity reported in the Chin Hills in western Burma. Al-
though opium poppies have been cultivated traditionally in the Chin
Hills, the region's production has always been small compared to the
output in the Shan State. Recent reports, however, show that Chin
Hills production has doubled and the Chin Hill farmer is receiving
double the price his Shan State counterpart is collecting.
The Chin Hills product is moved westward into the newly named
state of Bangladesh. This, for the United States, is a disturbing
development. Because there is ample opium production in the Indian
subcontinent, it is unlikely that the local consumer would require an
external source. Moreover, the lack of purchasing power on the part
of a prospective consumer in Bangladesh would appear to make a
Chin Hills-to-Bangladesh operation unprofitable. The other option-
i.e., a Chin Hills-Bangladesh connection to the international traffic
routes-seems more credible. Given the existing chaos in Bangladesh,
the use of a port area such as Chittagong should pose little problem
for a trafficker.
Arms smuggling and the opium trade
Inherent in the Burmese opium trade is the illicit traffic in armaments
in Southeast Asia. From, the inception of U.S. military sales and mili-
tary assistance programs in that region, substantial amounts of arms,
ammunition, and equipment have fallen into the hands of indigenous
insurgent groups in the various countries of the area.
Officials in the Burmese Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the Survey
Team that one of their primary concerns was the traffic of contraband
arms of U.S. origin into Burma. According to these officials, the
abundant availability of modern U.S. arms makes those insurgent
forces who obtain them better equipped than the Burmese military
forces. As a result, it becomes even more difficult for Rangoon to com-
bat the insurgents and the opium traffic flourishes for it provides a
principal source of revenue with which to buy these arms.
Although most cases of arms smuggling in the area involve only
small lots, there is at least one instance of a large scale operation.
According to U.S.. sources, Gen. Ouan Rathikoun (former Chief of
Staff, Royal Lao Army) had "plane loads" of U.S. arms flown into
Laos. These arms subsequently fell into the possession of insurgent
forces in Burma during the period 1966-70. These weapons were Re-
quired by General Ouan in Taiwan. While the Survey Team has not
determined whether these arms came to Taiwan under the U.S. mili-
tary assistance program, it should be noted that, under MAP condi-
tions, recipient countries agree not to transfer MAP-supplied
equipment to third countries.
Further, in this vein, the Survey Team learned that the Thai Gov-
ernment also furnished arms to CIF insurgents- on both sides of the
Thai-Burmese border with arms procured in Taiwan. Again the Sur-
vey Team was unable to determine whether these arms came to Taiwan
under the U.S. military assistance program.
The special circumstances surrounding former Burmese President
U Nu also contribute to area arms smuggling. Now residing in northern
Thailand, he directs the insurgent activities.of his followers on both
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Heroin Zaboratorles inLaos
For several years there have been rumors that heroin was being
manufactured in laboratories located along the Mekong River par-
ticularly in the area of Ban Houei Sai in northwest Laos in the heart of
the Golden Triangle, in Vientiane, Luang Prabang, and Long Cheng,
Until recently, efforts to locate such laboratories have been largely
fruitless. On August 2, 1971, however, a laboratory was seized at
Houei Phee Lark just north of Ban Houei Sai and destroyed by Lao
irregular forces. In addition, an opium" producing laboratory at
Ban Houei Tap was found abandoned. Lao officials believe that the
closing of these two laboratories has ended narcotics production in
the Ban Houei Sai area.
This optimism'may be unwarranted. Laboratories could be operating
without the knowledge of the authorities.
One factor supporting the government's assessment, however, is the
fact that the enforcement effort in Laos has been stepped up, thus in-
creasing the risks of operating such laboratories. This may have re-
sulted in some producers moving out of Laos and into the Tachilek
area of Burma where there are at least 16 morphine and heroin
laboratories in existence. There is no enforcement effort in that part
of Burma and operations can be conducted without governmental
interference.
There have been unsubstantiated reports that heroin laboratories are
also located in Luang Prabang, Pakse, Vientiane, and Long Cheng.
Long Cheng is the headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao, leader of the
Meo irregular forces which are supported almost entirely by the
United States in their struggle against the Pathet Lao and the North
Vietnamese.
According to W. E. Colby, Executive Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, there is "no evidence indicating that Gen. Vang Pao is
involved in the Lao drug trade. Because his forces are the principal
Lao deterrent to North Vietnamese aggression, many U.S. Government
personnel have been in constant contact with Gen. Nang Pao for a
number of years. No evidence has come to light connecting him with
narcotics trafficking`-10
In an effort to stop the illegal production of and trafficking in
gpiafes the Lao Government has promulgated a law prohibiting the
cultivation of poppies, except under certain controlled conditions. This
law became effective on November 15, t971.
GroupeSpecialed'Investigation (GA I)
On January 2,1971, the Groupe Speciale diInvestikation was estab-
lished to direct and coordinate implementation of the narcotics law.
GSI is currently staffed by 60 trained military and civilian agents.
The unit is headed by the Lao Chief of Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Kham-
hou Boussarath, who reports directly to the Prime Minister. His juris-
diction includes both civilian and military investigations.
The Narcotics Attache of the TJ.S. Embassy, a BNDD officer, is
the principal American adviser to the Director of GSI.
According to -Lao officials, if the .struggle to control narcotics in
Laos is to be successful it will be neeessry (1) to control the growing
of pap ies, (2) to discover and close heroin producing laboratories,
and (3) to interdict the movement of narcotics into and out of Laos.
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Narcotics and arms are smuggled into Laos along the Mekong by
many of the dissidents and other groups operating in the Go3den
Triangle. They have been and probably still are being smuggled
out of Laos on Royal Lao Air Force aircraft, on Lao and other
commercial aircraft, by trucks, automobiles and by foot and caravan.
An example of some of the problems faced by the GSI in Laos is
the case of Maj. Chao La, a Yao irregular force leader who is located in
Houa Khong Province.
Chao La has written that he has 3,000 kilos of opium that he is
willing to sell to the Lao Government. The Lao Government does not
want to purchase the opium and has approached the United States,
Japan, France, and the United Kingdom asking if they would buy
the opium. Simultaneously the Prime Minister ordered Chao La to turn
the opium over to the Provincial Governor, Chao Khoueng. Chao
La, who does not trust the Provincial Governor, refused to turn
over the opium as ordered and the Lao Government has issued instruc-
tions that the opium is not to be seized. The plan is to wait until it has
been decided which government will make the preemptive buy of the
opium. All governments concerned are reluctant to encourage such a
practice. They are fearful that once preemptive buying starts, it will
encourage farmers to produce more opium for sales to those govern-
ments at constantly increasing prices. Paying premium prices for a
product which is as valuable on the illegal market as is opium can
only encourage those who deal in opium to cater to both the licit and
the illicit markets.
For example, according to U.S. authorities in Ban Houei Sai, Chao
La needs money. He owes the Chinese irregulars' cash for services
rendered (probably for convoying opium from Burma into Laos)
which he does not have. Opium is not moving on the illicit market and
stocks are piling up in warehouses in Tachilek as well as in Chao
La's village.
Chao La wants to sell 3000 kilos of opium (which will yield 660
pounds of heroin). The Lao Government does not 'believe that the
Yao could have produced more than 1;000 kilos of opium and that the
remaining 2,000 kilos have been obtained in Burma.
If the latter estimate is true, a governmental buy of the opium would
have the effect of "bailing out" those in Burma who are having trouble
moving the opium into and through Laos and Thailand.
If the precedent established in Thailand where the United States
purchased 26 tons of opium for $1 million is followed in Laos the
results could be disastrous. Opium is not in short supply and produc-
tion in Burma alone is estimated to be about 400 tons per year.
The Government of Laos and Thailand have both established nar-
cotics control organizations and there have been some initial successes.
Lo using-han and others are having trouble moving their opiates
and as a result can be expected to seek other smuggling routes.
Already there is evidence to suggest that some opiates are being moved
westward through Burma into Bangladesh where conditions are
chaotic and governmental control in many parts of the country almost
nonexistent.
What could be -a better way to 'finance these operations than to sell
opium to governments that are concerned with the problems created by
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operators were able to get small shipments out of Laos-but not
much."
What is not clear is by what authority Ouan continued to regulate
opium transactions in Laos after the Prime Minister had rescinded
the order banning opium transactions in 1964.
Whatever the circumstances there is no doubt that by 1967 Ounn
Rathikoun knew more about the narcotics business in Laos than prob-
ably any other Government official.
For Ouan's own assessment of the opium situation in Laos, see ap?
pendix A and appendix B.
During this same period, Royal Lao Air Force aircraft were used
to transport opium throughout Laos, with the approval of General
Ouan. Ouan has written that in 1966-
After being told by some of the Air Force officers about their poor living con.
ditions, I decided to allow them to transport goods on the condition that the
transportation must be organized and made under only one chief's orders ; there
must be no transportation of private goods for any officer of the Air Force ; the
transportation must occur in the Kingdom of Laos only ; there must be no trans.
portation of goods outside the Kingdom of Laos ; and it must be the duty of the
merchants themselves to transport goods outside of Laos.
Seventy percent of the income from this activity went to the Air Force, 15 per-
cent to the pilots, 10 percent to those who worked on the ground, and 5 percent
to the mechanics.
At the same time, I contacted the U.S. Government asking it to aid the Air
Force. I told the U.S. Government that if the Air Force was given aid, it would
stop completely the transportation of opium. LItalics added.] My request was
considered by the U.S. Government. Later, In 1069-70, the U.S. Government sent
its administrative experts to investigate. After their three-month investigation,
no change was made. Later, in 1971, the U.S. Government began to pay sufficient
per diem to pilots. At the present time, the U.S. Government still pays them, per
diem.
According to the Department of State, the United States does not
pay per diem to Lao pilots. Combat pilots do receive a small pay-
ment per combat mission. A representative from the Department of
State indicated that the United States makes no direct payments in
Laos. U.S. aid is placed in the Lao Defense budget and is disbursed
by the Lao Government.
Ouan claims that the Royal Lao Air I`+ orce stopped' transporting
opium in 1971. The Survey Team-was told that, Lao Air Force
pilots are still involved in the smuggling of opiates throughout South-
east Asia..
U.S. officials'state t1iat there is no evidence of this, They, do not dis-
count the possibility, however. Accordingg to one U.S. official in Vien-
tiane "there are a number of Air Force officers suspected of smuggling
narcotics at the present time."
Ouan is not the only high ranking Lao official thought to be in-
volved in the smuggling activities, particularly opium, arms, and
ammunition. There have been rumors that the other government offi-
cials are also implicated. Again there is "no hard evidence."
In addition to the smuggling of narcotics, it is likely that Lao mili-
tary personnel are also involved in the arms traffic. As noted else-
where in this report opium is used to obtain arms, cash, and other
necessities by the dissidents and other groups that operate in Burma,
Laos, and Thailand. One U.S. official observed that some high. ranking
military officials in Laos may be trafficking in munitions. The United
States has no proof of this although one U.S. narcotics control official
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33
in Vientiane is of the opinion that Nao is involved : "He is a brigand
and be is probably involved in the munitions trade. We have not been
able to catch him."
While there is no proof that high ranking Lao officials have been
or are involved in smuggling activities, the fact that opium has been
produced in Laos and smuggled into the country from Burma on
Lao aircraft with the support of at least one high ranking official
would tend to bear out the allegations that there was official in-
volvement before the law banning opium transactions was passed in
1971. U.S. officials in Laos indicated that there is no evidence to prove
that Gen. Ouan Rathikoun and others are implicated at the present
time.
The questions that remain unanswered are the nature of the role
of Ouan and others in supplying heroin to United States military
forces in South Vietnam and, if they were implicated, with whom
were they working in South Vietnam?
The answer to these questions may never be known.
United States-Laos cooperation
In spite of the possibility that several members of the Laotian
National Assembly, and other military and governmental officials, may
be implicated in narcotics smuggling, it is the opinion of U.S. officials
in Laos that the'Government is serious in its efforts to detect and prose-
cute violation of the anti-narcotic law.
To support this conclusion, U.S. officials cite a number of exam-
ples. The establishment of the Groupe Speciale d'Investigation (GSI),
passage of the first comprehensive anti-narcotics law in the history of
Laos, the prohibition which has been placed on the importation of
acetic anhydride (an essential chemical in the production of heroin.),
and the demonstrated willingness of the Lao Government to allow
U.S. narcotics agents, Customs personnel, and other U.S. officials to
operate in Laos are the most prominent.
BNDD agents work closely with GSI, and the Lao Government has
requested U.S. assistance in improving their Customs Service.
In addition to the close working relationship that has been estab-
lished between BNDD agents in Laos and the Group Speciale d'In-
vestigation, other American advisers from the Agency for 'Interna-
tional Development (AID) and the Bureau of the Customs work
closely with their counterparts in the National and Military Police
and with the Lao Customs Service.
Successful interdiction of narcotics also depends upon effective
customs inspection procedures. The U.S. Bureau of Customs has under-
taken a program in conjunction with Lao Customs which is hoped will
result in increased seizures, especially along the Mekong River in the
Golden Triangle area. As a part of this program, U.S. Customs has
implemented a "customs to customs" exchange to help Laos develop
an effective customs force capable of enforcing customs law and anti-
narcotics laws. As a result of U.S. proposals, the Lao Government has
agreed to admit 9 U.S. Customs advisers into Laos to assist Lao Cus-
toms in upgrading its enforcement capabilities.
While the United -States has agreed to furnish equipment and train-
ing for Lao Customs and to assist that organization in expanding its
operations much remains for that Government to do. It could begin
by making the Laos Customs Service an enforcement agency.
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among some police officials throughout Thailand, including the Border
Patrol Police, there is undoubtedly a quantity of opiates driven across
the bridge in official Government vehicles.
Narcotics are also smuggled into Thailand by air. There is an un-
known number of privately owned short takeoff and landing (STOL)
aircraft which can take off and land from unprepared strips anywhere
in the country. Until an effective aircraft monitoring system is devel-
oped, opium and heroin will move into the country and will gat into
the international narcotics network.
It is not known how much opium is moved into Thailand by this
method. It could be considerable.
There is no effort to interdict the illicit traffic by transportation of
narcotics in commercial aircraft in Thailand. There are numerous
scheduled internal flights between cities in the north and Bangkok and
other points in Thailand. There is no inspection system in-country and
it is pos?ible to carry quantities of opium or heroin aboard aircraft
without,being detected. As one BNDD agent put it, "Nobody is
searched. Why go by truck if you can go free by air?"
The opium and its derivatives are transshipped through Thailand-
usually through Bangkok-by trawlers and commercial aircraft to
Hong Kong, Singapore, and other points.
Until recently, it was thought that the trawlers dropped their illegal
cargo near the Lima Islands in Communist Chinese waters. According
to the U.S. BNDD and Customs officials, this is not the case. The
trawlers actually drop the opiates in international waters where it is
fished out of the water and taken to Hong Kong by the many junks and
other vessels that operate in the waters around Hong Kong.
This trawler activity is of special concern to United States and Thai
authorities.
Much opium also enters Thailand by' mule caravans escorted by
remnants of the 3d and 5th I 'uomingtang (1'KMT) Armies which
were driven out of China in 1940. Now referred to as Chinese Irregular
Forces (CIF), these forces under the command of Generals Li an
Tuan have operated in southern Burma and northern Thailand for
over two decades.
Efforts to resettle the Chinese Irregular Forces
In its efforts to control nareotic? traffic the Thai' Government l,s
initiated a resettlement program for the Chinese Irregular Forces.
In return for land to settle oii And potential Thai citizenship the.'
CIF's agreed to turn over all of their opium stocks.
This agreement was made between the Government of Thailand
and Generals Li and Tuan, commanders of the respective Chinese
forces with the concurrence and support of the United States.
BNDD agreed to help finance the Thai Government resettlement
project by turning over 20.8 million baht (almost $1 million) to the
Thais who in turn contributed 17 million baht (about $850,000) in
Thai Government funds. In connection with this, the Agency for
International Development transferred $1 million to BNDD.
Subsequently 26 tons of opium was turned over to-the Thai Govern-
ment by Generals Li and Tuan. On March 7, 1972, Thai officials burned
the 26 tons of opium.
This burning was witnessed by two BNDD officials, the Regional
Director for Southeast Asia and a forensic chemist,
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According to BNDD the opium was wrapped in balls weighing
between 185 and '191 pounds. The balls were wrapped in leaves, paper,
and plastic and sealed in 319 burlap bans.
The BNDD representatives sampled each of the bags by randomly
cutting into each with a knife and withdrawing a small amount of
the contents with a wooden applicator stick. Each stick was placed in
a test tube and later examined under a. microscope.
BNDD officials are insistent that the bags contained opium and that
the opium was completely destroyed.
After burning it was alleged that only 5 of the 26 tons was in fact
opium.?
BNDD called, a press conference on August 1, 1972,. and denied the
allegations. Included in the press conference was a 20-minute film
which showed both Thai and U.S. officials inspecting the opium prior
to burning.
Another U.S. official present in Chiang Mai corroborated the fact
that the opium had been checked prior to burning by both Thai and
BNDD officials and that he was also certain that the bags had all con-
tained opium. According to this official, Thai customs inspected the
opium in the mountains of Thailand first and BNDD then inspected
it after it had been brought down to Chiang Mai.
A high ranking Thai official also contends that the Chinese turned
over 26 tons and that it was all opium.. According to this official, the
Chinese actually brought 27 tons of opium to the turn-in point, but
Thai and U.S. authorities refused to accept the additional ton of
'opium. Instead the CIF were ordered to get the extra ton of opium out
of Thailand. It is unfortunate that there is no official explanation
available which would indicate what actually did happen to the 27th
ton of opium. It could have been returned to Burma or it could have
been smuggled to Bangkok, Hong Kong, or elsewhere.
When questioned as to why 1 ton of opium was refused both Thai
and U.S. officials told the Survey Team that there was no additional
money authorized to pay for the extra ton and that they did not wish
to negotiate further with Li and Tuan lest the whole deal fall through.
For this reason, 1 ton of opium was returned to the Chinese.
This is disturbing. Initially, the objectives which prompted the
agreement with the CIF were twofold : one was to get the Chinese
out of the opium business by resettling them in Thailand with a prom-
ise of eventual Thai citizenship if they adhered to the agreement.
The other was to destroy a large quantity of opium thus precluding
it from being refined into heroin.
Another aspect of this case which should be given critical attention
is the precedent that has been established. Regardless of explanations
about resettlement the transaction involved paying $1 million for
opium. To many this constitutes a preemptive buy which could en-
courage more opium production, not less. Under some circumstances
such buys may be necessary,. As a general rule, however, it is a danger-
ous practice and should be avoided.
The success of the agreement depends upon whether the Chinese
will abide by their part of the bargain and stay out of the opium
706 percent Opium and 30 percent that an tpossible to refute or sub6 antiate ithe
accuracy of this statement although all of the Thai and U.S. officials contacted by the
Survey ream substantiated the details as set forth above.
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independently, that the suppression effort was ineffective. As a result
of this meeting it was decided to set up a system of unified control
and on December 23, 1963, the Thai Government organized the Cen-
tral Bureau of Narcotics under the Director General of the Police
Department.
The duties of this committee are to :
(1) Suppress all illicit traffic in narcotics;
(2) Take measures to control drug addicts;
(3) Coordinate the activities of, the various government agen-
cies in narcotics matters
(4) Coonerate with International Criminal Police Organiza-
tion (INTERPOL) for the direct exchange of information on
international narcotics matters; and
(5) Coordinate Thailand's activities with those of the United
Nations Commission on Narcotics Drugs.
Also in 1961 the Government of Thailand authorized the death
penalty for narcotics offenses. The decree stated that manufacturers
and traffickers in dangerous drugs will be suppressed mercilessly by
the authorities. "In addition to being inflicted with punishment, they
will be regarded as traitors against the national security too."
Importation of all chemicals used in the production of opiates
refining such as acetic anhydride have been placed under government
regulation.
In spite of this ban, smuggling of acetic anhvdride is still a problem
It is manufactured in Janan in large quantities and sold without
registration or export controls. Tt is easy to disguise in various sizes
and shanes of containers and detection is difficult.
The Thai Government has also established a Special Narcotics Or-
ganization (SNO) to deal with the trafficking of narcotics into and
through Thailand.
Special Narcotics Organization (SNO)
The movement of illicit narcotics to and through northern Thai-
land from the various sectors of the Burma-Laos-Thailand Golden
Triangle was virtually unimpeded before 1971. Thai enforcement
activities were basically centered in Bangkok with only one officer and
three NCO's on station in the north at Chiang Mai. In the summer of
1971 the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok and the, Royal Thai Government
examined iointly the existinm Thai enforcement capability with the
specific objective of enhancing operational effectiveness. This aim
was underscored in the September 28, 1971, "Memorandum of TTnder-
standi.n!g" in which the two governments agreed to cooperate in a set
of urograms designed to meet all four facets of the narcotics problean-
enforcement. crop substitution, education, and rehabilitation and
training, with priority given to the enforcement effort. (The Thai-
United Sta,tes memorandum. of understanding is reproduced in appen-
dix C.) The basic outline of the requirements for an increased enforce-
ment effort evolved out of a series of meetings. It was agreed that, in
addition to upgrading the metronolitan police capability, initial em-
phasis should be given to developing a new unit, well equipped, mobile
and fully backed logistically to operate throughout northern Thailapti
as a Special Narcotics Organization (SNO). In late 1971 and early
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1972 the necessary support arrangements were made, quarters located,
and the Thai enforcement officers assigned.
The primary mission of SNO is to provide for the greatest possible
interdiction of narcotic substances and chemicals used in the produc-
tion of 'opiates along the major surface routes of the north where the
possibility of such interdiction is the greatest and to close down
collection and storage points located along these routes. SNO has also
targeted for destruction any narcotics conversion facilities which may
be discovered in the area of its jurisdiction. As a necessary corollary,
SNO has the responsibility for developing and utilizing tactical
intelligence from clandestine sources. Further, it is prepared to move
against narcotic couriers when information concerning their clandes-
tine movement is developed.
As of August 15, 1972, including the commanding officer, SNO had
a total of 37 officers and NCO's on active duty, positioned as follows :
Chiang Mai Headquarters ,13; I.ampang, 6; Chiang Rai, 6; Fang, 6;
and Mae Sai, 6. It is estimated that operating expenses at these loca-
tions will be between $4,000 and $5000 per month which will be paid
by BNDD.
In its first few months of operation SNO has seized a total of 4,720
kilograms of opiates, the equivalent of some 17,050 pounds of raw
opium. A synopsis of these major operations may be found in appen-
dix D. (See p. -.)
Technically an element of the 7th Sub-Division (narcotics enforce-
ment) of the Crime Suppression Unit, Thai National Police Depart-
ment, in practice SNO operates as asemi-independent strike force and
its mandate provides for personnel input not only from the police but
also from Customs, I+ Excise, Border Patrol Police and the military.
Other police elements in the north have been ordered by the Director
General of the Thailand National Police Department (TNPD) not
only to cooperate fully with SNO, but to deal directly in enforcement
matters with its commander, a variation from the traditional Thai
police system for diffusion of information and supply of intradepart-
mental support between police units. In practice this means that the
SNO commander can utilize, for example, the Police Aviation Divi-
sion for logistical support and the Border Patrol Police for manpower
augmentation for a given operation without previous specific approval
of the TNPD Headquarters in Bangkok. Unfortunately, this has not
worked ns well in practice as it should and SNO has had difficulty in
obtaining aircraft or helicopter support to the extent required to con-
duct effective aerial surveillance operations. The commander of SNO
and U.S. officials in Chiang Mai are of the opinion that the United
States should furnish aircraft to SNO as part of the U.S. assistance
program. Some officials in the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment disagree. They contend that the United States has already pro-
vided the Thai Government with an adequate number of aircraft and
helicopters and that with proper coordination that Government could
provide aerial support to SNO.
The Survey Team discussed this matter with officials at the U.S.
Embassy in Thailand and in Washington, D.C., and was told that
consideration was being given to this matter. Some officials in Washing-
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of that Government and Burmese leaders tcannot be expected to con?
done Thai support for U Nu.
Thai policy is to maintain a buffer zone between China and northern
Thailand and the dissident Burmese groups who are fighting the Com-
munists in eastern Burma fill this role very well. The dissidents need
arms and ammunition, however, and most of these arms are purchased
with money earned from the opium trade.
So on the one hand the Thais are working to control opium smug-
gling while on the other they permit activities to take place which
contribute to the problem.
The United States has been encouraging the Government of Thai-
land to develop better relations with Burma but without success.
There are reports that the Thai Government is now considering
withdrawing its support from U Nu. It is unlikely that this will hap-
pen in the near future. As long as the Burmese Government is unable:
to control the Communist insurgency in eastern Burma, the Thais will
think twice before taking action which would deny them the buffer
zone they desire. To the Thai Government, U Nu is an ally in their
struggle against the Communists and the Thai Government will help
him as long as it believes that he can be of assistance.
Corruption in Thailand
United States officials in Thailand acknowledge that there. is corrup-
tion throughout the Thai Government. There are indications that
middle level police, customs officials and Border Patrol. police are
involved. U.S. narcotics authorities indicated, however, that in spite
of widespread rumors of high level complicity in the narcotics trade,
no evidence exists to substantiate those rumors.
There is a considerable difference between rumor and hard evidence
upon which criminal prosecution, or other action, can be initiated. For
example, officials at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok insisted that they
are devoting a great deal of time and resources to the collection offevi-
dence of high level corruption in narcotics but without success. The con-
sensus among U.S. officials was that if anybody had information of
such corruption "they wish that they would let the Embassy know" so
they could follow up on the allegations.
Yet on October 11, 1972, the Deputy Commander of the Crime Sup-
pression Division of they National Police, Col. Pramuan Vanigblandi
was relieved because of involvement in illegal narcotics dealings.
Prior to that, on Sept. 30, 1971, General Prasert, Director General
of the National Police was retired ostensibly due to his age. According
to U.S. officials, Prasert was involved in many corrupt practices but not
narcotics.
In a followup interview in Washington a reliable U.S. official told
the Survey Team that Prasert had been involved in narcotics and that
this was the reason for his retirement.
Other U.S. officials contend that this is not so and that there is still
no evidence to implicate Prasert in narcotics. These same officials,
however, surmising that Prasert was possibly protecting Pramuan,
speculate that Thai authorities knew about Pramuan's involvement
but "could not touch him" as long as Prasert remained Director
General of the police.
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45
This raises several questions: Were U.S. authorities in Thailand
aware of Pramuan's involvement? Was Prasert protecting Pramuan
and was this information available to U.S. officials? If the answer
to these questions is affirmative, why did U.S. officials in Thailand tell
the Survey Team that there was no evidence of high level involvement
in narcotics among officials of the Thai Government?
Background
American concern over narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia did not
arise until early 1971 when reports of serious heroin addiction among
GI's stationed in South Vietnam began to surface. In May 1971 a
Foreign Affairs Committee study mission composed of Representatives
Morgan F. Murphy and Robert H. Steele, reported that 10 to 15
percent of all U.S. troops then stationed in South Vietnam were
addicted to heroin in one form or another, and, in some units, the
addiction rate was estimated as high as 25 percent. Those GI's on
heroin smoked it, sniffed, or "snorted" it, and an estimated 5 to 10
percent of users injected it.
There are several underlying factors which contributed to this
epidemic use of heroin. Among them were the ready availability of
heroin, boredom, and the fact that youthful GI's merely reflected the
burgeoning drug culture in American society as a whole. While some
of those on heroin in South Vietnam were found to have been users
in the States, most encountered the drug for the first time in South
Vietnam.
Prior to the extensive use of heroin by U.S. troops, marijuana
was the popular drug among GI's. However, in a program instituted
by the United States Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV)
in November 1966, an all-out effort to eradicate marijuana smoking
was initiated. U.S. and Vietnam officials set about to defoliate and
destroy the abundant marijuana fields located throughout the coun-
try. Those convicted of using marijuana were strictly disciplined.
The rise in the incidence of heroin abuse coincides with the U.S.
military's crackdown on marijuana. Because heroin can be consumed
more discreetly than marijuana its use became more widespread as
the restrictions on "pot" increased. In addition, GI's fell under the
dangerous illusion that heroin consumed by means other than injection
is not addictive. Unfortunately, for the naive users, nothing could be
further from the truth. Thus, in Vietnam, it is possible that the ab-
sence of marijuana, not its use, led to a GI addiction rate of epidemic
proportions.
United States-Vietnamese actions against drug trafficking and abuse
in Vietnam--1,971-19713
Although MACV launched its first Drug Abuse Suppression Pro-
gram in December 1.970, and the United States conveyed its concern
to President Thieu in January 1971, it was not until the May 1971
that measurable action was taken either to combat trafficking or to
detect and treat heroin addicts.
On May 3, 1971, the U.S. Ambassador and MA;CV Commander
presented a memorandum to President Thicu setting forth recom-
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48
The most ambitious of these relationships is that existing between
U.S. AID public safety personnel and the GVN's National Police.
While BNDD and Customs agents concentrate on day-to-day opera-
tional and intelligence aspects, the Public Safety sector of U.S. AID
programs incountry emphasizes institution building in the field of
narcotics suppression.
Under the current program, 11 Public Safety Advisers (one full-
time) are assigned. specifically to narcotics training, intelligence
gathering and suppression. Commodities and equipment and partici-
pant training are. supplied through the normal AID police assistance
program.. Public Safety funding for narcotics suppression in South
Vietnam for fiscal year 1973 is around $500,000 out of a total budget
of $6,179,000.
During the period 1969-71, a total of 1,623 police investigators were
trained in -narcotics and 486 are now performing specialized work
in the Vietnamese Narcotics Bureau' and in covert teams assigned-
to key drug abuse areas. Narcotic identification has been introduced,
into the curricula, of all National Police Training schools and the
police are. engaged in a public education program. Included in the
training of police personnel in narcotics, is a program for 67 to be .
trained in the U.S.
As of July 10, the GVN had carried 1,353 investigations in 1972,
made 2,324 narcotics arrests in 1972 and seized 13, kilos of heroin.
Further, in the field of legal activity, President Thicu promul-
gated, on August,12?1972, a new tougher law on the eradication of
toxic, narcotic, and dangerous, substances. A comprehensive measure,
Thieu's decree provides for life imprisonment of those involved-iii im-
portation, exportation, speculation, production, or transportation of
opium, morphine, heroin, and cocaine. Moreover, if the offender be-
longs to a "well-organized group", he will be subject to the death.
penalty. (For the text of the law, see appendix E)
U?iited States-GVN Customs programs
Wliereas the U.S. Array-run Joint. Customs Group, established i'n
December 1970, has been effective viii preventing GI's from smuggling
drugs out of Vietnam, Vietnariiese customs officials have been lax in
the past. At the height of the GI heroin' addiction epidemic in South
Vietnam, U.S. Customs advisers conducted a computer study of
imports at Tan Son Nhut Airport which reve'aled' numerous viola-
tions and irregularities.
Based on those findings, the U.S. Ambassador directed U.S. Cus-
toms advisers to insist on 'a crackdown on lax customs practices at
Tan Son Nhut. Following that directive, the U.S. Commissioner of
Customs visited Vietnam to discuss upgrading GVN customs with
that Government's Director General of Customs. As a result of those
discussions, a "Narcotics.. Squad" was created within the framework
of Vietnamese Customs and a joint decree issued by the Ministries of
Economics and Finance ordered the flow of unlicensed imports of air
cargo through Tan Son Nhut stopped.
Despite those actions, by January 1971 open smuggling through the
Tan Son Nhut passenger terminal increased and threats of violence
were made against U.S. Customs advisers. On February .127, 1q71, these
irregularities in Tan Son Nhut Customs were officially reported to
the Director General of Customs who, the following month, requested
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additional U.S. Customs advisers to help solve the problem at the air-
port. Nevertheless, threats against U.S. advisers increased.
On April 15, 19-71, additional U.S. Customs advisers arrived at Tan
San Nhut.
After a series of inter-governmental high level meetings during
which U.S. officials urged their Vietnamese counterparts to set a high
priority on the narcotics enforcement, President Thieu ordered the fol-
lowing steps taken to tighten Vietnamese customs :
(1) The Director General of Customs was replaced and other
high GVN Customs officials, including a brother of the Prime
Minister, were transferred to less sensitive positions;
(2) Customs checks and security measures at Tan Son Nhut
Airport were tightened;
(3) All police, customs, and military security service person-
nel at the airport were replaced;
(4) The airport customs area was rearranged to facilitate
better control and deny access to unauthorized persons.
U.S. Officials claim that, as a result of these measures, narcotics
smugglers in Laos, Thailand, and elsewhere have been forced to find
other points of entry into Vietnam.
In May 1971 the GVN took steps to seal off airports and harbors,
particularly Danang, Vung Tau, and Saigon harbors, through which
most narcotics and other contraband appeared to be entering at that
time. And, in July 1971, with the approval of the GVN's new Director
General, U.S. Customs advisers .were dispatched to Danang, Nha
Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Chu Lai on the sea coast, and
to Tan Chau, Chan Doc, Go Sau Ha, and Ma Tien on the Cambodian
border.
When the Survey Team met in August 1972 with U.S. Customs
agents assigned to Vietnam, the latter pointed out that, like U.S. AID
public safety experts and the National Police, U.S. customs relation-
shipp with the local customs organization is one of institution building.
U.S. agents do not work with their counterparts on. an operational
basis . for the Vietnamese fear that the presence of Americans would
draw fire.
'In the view of the U.S. Customs agents interviewed by the 'Survey
Team, the situation has improved considerably over the past 11/2
years. They regard the new Director General of Customs, Colonel
Cao Van Khanh, who is the former head of the GVN's equivalent to
the CIA, as a capable and aggressive official. His predecessor, on the
other hand, was termed ineffective and possibly corrupt.
Extent of official involvement in drug traffic in South Vietnam
Since attention was initially focused on Southeast Asia as a poten-
tial source of supply of heroin for the U.S. market, a wide range of
charges and allegations involving high ranking officials of the area's
governments have been. made. In the case of South Vietnam, those
charges have implicated high officials in the GVN including Presi-
dent Thieu, Vice President Ky, and Prime Minister Khiem as well
as several high ranking military officers.
During the course of its investigation executive branch officials
representing the White House, State Department, Customs, BNDD
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In a section on Hong Kong, the Survey stated that the Crown Colony
was not only a major consumer of illicit opiates (150,000 users, est:),
but also a major transit point. Playing down the Survey, Commis-
sioner Rolph denied that Hong Kong was a major transit point for
drug traffickers, although he admitted that the port is used "to a cer-
tain extent." Another Hong Kong Government drug expert, Dr. L. K.
Ding, also disputed the Survey's estimate of local drug users by con-
tending that the figure should be between 80,000 and 100,000 and no
more. Clearly, there is a stark difference of opinion between the two
governments as to the importance of Hong Kong in the international
framework.
To coordinate the United States antidrug effort in Hong Kong, the
United States Consulate has established three groups designed to deal
with all aspects of the problem. At the top is an overall mission com-
mittee on which everyone tasked with a narcotics assignment is rep-
resented. The second group acts as a liaison to the Hong Kong Com-
munity with the local chamber of commerce acting as the focal point.
The U.S. Consul General, started the program when it became evident
that young people in the American community were becoming heavily
involved in drugs. The third group is the intelligence committee, which
included representatives from the enforcement and intelligence
agencies of the Consulate. This committee will soon be expanded to
include represci#atives from the immigration section, the Defense
Liaison, and Customs.
While the Survey Team was told the antidrug effort was one of the
Consulate's highest priorities, one official complained that, aside from
those associated with enforcement agencies, the other members of the
mission do not give the problem proper attention nor are they moti-
vated to do so.
Apart from the dissatisfaction on the part of some Hon bong
based United States officials \idth 'the United States Consulate s anti-
drug'effort, Hong Kong's position in the regional framework was also
criticized. Although it is a major consumer, conduit, and financier of
narcotics trafficking, originating in Southeast'Asr, Hong Kong oper-
ates under I3NDD's Far.. East region which includes ll!~'a.nila, "P. I.
(the regional headquarters), Tokyo, Seoul, Japan. and .Okinawa. I ep-
resentatives ,,of the United, States= Narcotics Control Committee told
the Survey Team,that if Hong Kong were placed in the Southeast
Asia region that the overall narcotics suppression effort in that area
would be more effective.
.In terms of intelligence collection, the United States Mission in
Hong Kong admittedly has gotten a late start. As a result, the esti-
mates citing local consumption; prides, and local narcotics operatives
are dated and misleading. Indicative of the shortcomings of narcotics
intelligence in Hong Kong is the fact that no concrete information is
available on the heroin "chemists" who originate in the Colony.- It is
widely assumed that Hong Kong is a major source of these technicians
.who are vital, to the heroin trade. Yet, without a solid fix, on their
iCxiavements, tb y will continue to operate with impunity.
10 These "chemists" are not university-trained but could best be termed "brew-masters"
who have learned their trade through apprenticeship.
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While the United States Consulate recognizes the problems inherent
in I-Iong Kong,,there has been only a nominal effort to alleviate those
conditions through, United States assistance. For example, in Novem-
ber 1971, the cons`ate's overall narcotics action committee drafted a
request for $190,000 to send local law enforcement officials to the United
States for narcotics training. However, there has been no follow-up on
this request. Given the fact that Hong Kong only has one man per
mile of coastline in enforcement work and given the staggering amount
of traffic through the Colony, a major effort to upgrade local enforce-
ment capabilities is needed.'
TAB PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Actually, little is known about opium~.production in mainland China.
That country is not a signatory of the Single Convention on Narcotics
and does not report production figures or control procedures to the
United Nations. It is known that the Government of the Peoples
Republic of China does control the production and use of opiates in
China.
According to several U.S. officials in Southeast Asia, it is possible
that some of the opium which is produced in the part of Yunnan
Province which borders the Golden Triangle is transported into
Burma. It is the opinion of these officials, however, that if
any opium does enter the world markets, it does so in spite of the
government of the Peoples Republic of China and not with official
approval.
There have been reports that such controls do not extend outside of
China and that the Peoples Republic is involved in the production
and illegal export of narcotics.
For example, the Washington Post reported on October 8,1972, that
"The Soviet Union is currently accusing China of involvement in the
production and illegal export of narcotics." In addition, on May 17,
1972, a Miss Yuan Moun-Ru, a political refugee from mainland China,
told the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs that she saw the Chinese Communists
Liberation Army growing opium. She further stated that "it is illegal
to sell opium or other narcotics in Communist China, although a
black market in opium exists. The government controls all the opium
for exports, especially for the United States."
U.S. narcotics officials on the other hand cannot verify these reports.
The official U.S. Government position has been outlined by the Cabinet
Committee on International Narcotics Control in the World Opium
Survey, 1572. In that document, the Cabinet Committee stated:
There is no reliable evidence that China has either engaged in or sanctioned
the illicit export of opium and its derivatives nor are there any Indications of
government participation In the opium trade of Southeast Asia and adjacent
markets. British authorities in Hong Kong believe that most of the opium and
related narcotics seized in Hong Kong in recent years comes into the Colony by
sea from Southeast Asia.
This was also the consensus among those U.S. officials in Southeast
Asia.
117,700 ships load and unload yearly and twice that nutnber pass through with more
than 1 million passengers. In addition, ferries carry 1% million passengers between Hong
Bong and Macao.
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U.S. NARCOTICS CONTROL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Prior to fiscal year 1972, the United States did not provide assist-
ance specifically for international narcotics control activities in Burma,
Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. In some instances
prior to fiscal year 1972, AID Public Safety Advisers with narcotics
control experience did assist the local governments as a part of the
overall Public Safety Program. On June 17,1971, in a special message'
to Congress, the President announced a major worldwide expansion in
existing programs to control the illicit international traffic of narcotics
and dangerous drugs. In that message, the President requested an
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which would permit assist=
ante to any country willing to cooperate in antidrug efforts. The Con
gross incorporated the President's request in section 481 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1971. Section 481 also included a provision which re-
quires the President to cut off economic and military aid to any coui}+-
try which he determines to be uncooperative in the narcotics control
effort. This latter provision has never been invoked.
Since the beginning of fiscal year 1972, the United States has pro-
vided a total of $2,627,000 in narcotics control assistance to Laos, Thai-
land, and South Vietnam. For fiscal year 1973, the executive: branch
has programed $2,193,000 for narcotics control assistance in Southeast
Asia.
In Laos, a total of $1,100,000 was obligated for narcotics control
activities in fiscal year 1972. This amount includes equipment 'and
training for Lao narcotics control personnel and support for a pilot
methadone maintenance program which was initiated after Laos out-
lawed the use of opium in November 1971. In addition to direct assist-
ance to the Lao Government, the United States funds staff support in
Laos provided by BNDD and Customs personnel and a program of
reward payments to informants. The fiscal year 1973 proposed pro-
gram for Laos is $1,532,000.
In Thailand, a total of $1,028,000 has been obligated for fiscal year
1972. Of that sum, $28,000 was allocated for research on drug addic-
tion and training. The larger portion, $1 million, has gone to
support the purchase of 26 tons of illicit opium. The details of the
transaction are discussed elsewhere in this report. The United States
intends to furnish $1,184,000 in fiscal year 1973.
Narcotics control programs in South Vietnam in fiscal year 1972
totaled approximately $500,000, principally for advisory salaries and
the cost of training programs administered by Customs, Public Safety,
and BNDD personnel. The fiscal year 1973 program in South Vietnam
is expected to remain at about $706,000.
In the case of Burma, no funds have been expended nor are any pro-
grams planned in the immediate future. While there is a strong desire
on the part of the United States to assist Burma in its antinarcotics
activities, Burma is not willing to accept external aid. A detailed
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THE U.N. FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL
The United Nations established a Fund for Drug Abuse Control
on April 1, 1971. At the outset, the Secretary 'General indicated that
member nations were expected to voluntarily" contribute $5 million
annually for the first few years and about $2a million thereafter.
The objective of the Fund is to furnish assistance to governments,
international organizations, and specialized' agencies in their efforts
to: (1) Limit the supply of drugs to legitimate requirements by
putting an end to their illegal or uncontrolled production, process-
ing and manufacture, making use of crop substitution or other
methods, as appropriate;
(2) Improve the administrative and technical capabilities of
existing bodies concerned with the elimination of the illicit traffic
in drugs;
(3) Develop measures to prevent drug abuse through programs
of education and special ,campaigns, including the use of mass
media; and
(4) Provide facilities and develop methods for treatment, re-
habilitation, and social reintegration of drug dependent persons.
The Fund intends to support- the expansion of research and infor-
mation facilities of United Nations drug control;bodies; the planning
and implementation of programs,of technical assistance in pilot proj-
ect for crop substitution purposes; the establishment and improvement
of additional drug control administration and enforcement machinery,
the training of personnel and the setting up or expanding of research
and training centers which could serve national or-regional needs; the
enlargement of the capabilities and the-extension of the operation of
United Nations drug control bodies; the promotion of facilities for
the treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration of drug addicts;
and the development of educational material and programs suitable
for use on high-risk populations.
The first major country program to be financed under the U.N. Fund
is in Thailand. A U.N.-Thai agreement approved in December, 1971,
includes projects to replace opunm poppy cultivation by substitute
crops. The U.N. will also assist Thailand in the treatment and rehabil-
itation of drug addicts, in the suppression of, illicit drug traffic, and in
creating drug education and information programs. The cost of the
program to the U.N. Fund will be about $2 million. The U.N. Division
of Narcotic Drugs is the executing organization, with technical assist-
ance from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the
World Health Organization (WHO).
The Fund is exploring in cooperating with the U.N.. Specialized
Agencies comprehensive drug abuse control programs with other
governments in critical areas, and is stationing representatives in
major regions to provide advice and assistance to governments..
[(61).
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CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control
is not as active as it should be. It is comprised of autonomous
departments, bureaus, and agencies of the Federal Government,
each jealous of its authority. As a result, coordination of the
anti-narcotics effort is conducted on a person-to-person basis
rather than institutionally.
(2) U.S. anti-narcotics programs are often formulated on an
ad hoc basis rather than upon well conceived, well thought out,
well coordinated processes.
(a) Bureaucratically and logically the Office of National
Narcotics Intelligence would have been more responsive to the
requirements of the Cabinet Committee had it been placed in
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
(b) The preemptive purchase of opium from the Chinese
Irregular Forces in northern Thailand set a bad precedent which
could encourage increased production of opium in the Golden
Triangle. .:.;
(c) The decision to send 25 Customs agents overseas to collect
narcotics intelligence will result in duplication of effort. The
Central Intelligence Agency, BNDD, the Department of State,
and other U.S. Government bureaus and agencies are already
collecting such intelligence. The problem in the past was not a
lack of intelligence but an inability to exploit it properly.
(d) BNDD and Customs Intelligence collection efforts abroad
would be more effective if all of the BNDD and Customs agents
spoke the language of the country in which they are operating.
(3) The production and trafficking of opium and its deriva-
tives, morphine and heroin, is regional in scope. Efforts to solve
this problem will require regional programs, regional cooperation,
and a complete and frank exchange of intelligence on producers,
financiers, traffickers, routes, and users. Intergovernmental coop-
eration in the Southeast Asia region which has been disappoint-
ing to date, must be vigorously pushed by the United States.
(4) The willing and wholehearted cooperation of foreign gov-
ernments is essential if U.S. objectives to bring international
narcotics under control are to be achieved. All U.S. mission com-
ponents in Southeast Asia have been fully mobilized in the fight
to suppress the narcotics traffic, and coordination both within
the missions and with the host governments has ' resulted in a
significant decline in trafficking operations. There was no evi-
dence that any U.S. Government agency was implicated in the
narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia.
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State should bring this matter to the attention of Her Majesty's
Government in London.
(10) The Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Con-
trol should be strengthened.
(I1), A full-time White House official with authority to formu-
late and coordinate narcotics control policy and programs should
be ..appointed.
(32) The Office of National Narcotics Intelligence be -trans-
ferred to BNDD and integrated with that Bureau's Offlice.of-,
Strategic Intelligence. - ,
(13) Only personnel who speak the layiguage=of the ceuntry in.
which they operate be assigned to intelligence collection duties
abroad.
(14) Narcotics assistance funds be allocated iii such~a=way as to.
enable the United States to furnish assistance on a grant basis
regardless of whether it originates with.BNDI) or.AID and-steps
tgken to preclude interagencycompptition for funds.
(15) Congress authorize and appropriate international nar-
cotics control assistance funds on a line item basis to insure that
'funding requests do not become excessive.
(16) Congress require periodic reports from the executive
-branch showing the amount of assistance furnished to each coun-
try including the type, quantity, and value of equipment fur-
nished. This report should also contain data giving amounts spent
by all agencies, of the Federal Government on- international nar-
--cotics cotrol programs including personnel salaries, allowances,
and U.S. overhead costs.
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JOURNAL
SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS, INTERVIEWS, AND DISCUSSIONS
TOKYO, JAPAN-AUGUST 10-18
Mr. John F. Lindsay, Special Agent, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(BNDD)
Mr. Larry Delaney, Special Agent, Bureau of Customs
Mr. Carl V. Oldham, Commander, District 46, Office of Special Investigations
(OSI), U.S. Air Force
Dr. Samuel E. Andrew, Commandant, USAF Hospital, T~chikawa Air Base
Mrs. Maryada Frank "Becky" Buell, Political Oilicor,;.V.S. Embassy
Mr. Kuniji Oshiki; C'Mef of Tokyo Metropolitan Police Vice Squad
Mr. Yukio Saito, Chief of Intelligence Unit, Narcotic Section, Pharmaceutical and
Supply'Bureau, Ministry of Health an(] Welfare
Mr. Tokuo Yoshida, Technical Official of the Narcotic Section
Mr. David Brown, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy
HONG KoNG-AUGUST 18
Mr. Robert Furey, Special Agent BNDD
Mr. Vincent Durant, Special Agent, Bureau of Customs
SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM--AUGUST 18-20
Mr. Charles Hill, Executive Secretary, United States Dmbassy
Colonel B. H. Russel, Jr., Provost Marshall, U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam
Mr. Charles Whitehouse, Deputy U.S. Ambassador
Lt. Gen. William J. McCaffrey, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army,
Vietnam.
Mr. Michael McCann, Public Safety Director, U.S. AID
Mr. Fred Dick, Regional Director, BNDD
Mr. William Burgess, narcotics specialist, U.S. AID
Col. Nguyen Khac Binh, Commander South Vietnamese National Pollee ,L
Mr. Pham Kim Qui, Judge, Judicial Division, South Vietnamese National Police
Capt. Ly Ky Hoang, Director, Narcotics Section, National Police
Mr. George Mallory, Political Officer, U.S.. Embassy
Mr. Walter Sampson, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy
AUGUST 20, 1972
Mr. Stephen Greene, Special Agent, BNDD
Mr. Allard Dheur, Special Agent, Bureau of Customs
Mr. Peter T'omaino, Special Agent, Bureau of Customs
Mr. Charles Easley, Special Agent, Bureau of Customs
Mr. Larry Thompson, Special Agent, Bureau of Customs
UDORN, THAILAND-AUGUST 20-21
Mr. David Reuther, U.S. Consulate
Mr. Michael Cook, Acting U.S. Consul
Maj. Kenneth J. Kwiatkowski, Chief Security Police, USAF, Udorn
Maj. Robert E. Lusk, Judge Advocate
VIENTIANE, LAOS-AUGUST 21-23
Mr. G. MacMurtrle Godley, U.S. Ambassador
Mr. Hugh Tovar, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy
Mr. Gordon Ramsey, U.S. AID Program Director
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70
Mr. Harry 1A. Alliwran, Assistant Director, Customs Assistance Division
Mr. Anthony J. Morelli, Narcotic Attache and Director, Vientiane District Office,
BNDD
Mr. Blaine W. Jensen, Area Coordinator, U.S. AID
Mr. Ger Su Yang, Moo Village Chief
Mr. John Greenough, Area Coordinator, U.S. AID
Mr. Raymond Landgren, Chief, Public Safety Division, U.S. AID
Mr. Gordon Young, Public Safety Advisor for Narcotics
Mr. Frank Craig, Public Safety Advisor for Narcotics
Mr, Jack Huxetabl.e, U.S. AID Area Coordinator
Mr. Delbert Spiers, Chief, Public Safety Adviser
Lt. Gen. Khamhou Boussaiath, Commander, Groupe Speciale d' Investigation
(GSI)
Gen. Ouan Rathilroun, former Chief of Staff, Royal Laotian Army and current
Member of Laotian Parliament representing Luang Prabang Province
Mr. Richard C. Howland, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission
Mr. William Le Clerk, Chief U.S. Customs Division, U.S. Mission in Laos,
Mr. Edgar "Pop" Buell, U.S. AID
Mr. Tames B. Chandler, Deputy Director, U.S. AID Laos
Mr. Walter F. Stettner, Economic Advisor, U.S. AID Laos
BANGKOK, THAILAND-AUGUST 23
Mr. Leonard Unger, U.S. Ambassador
Mr. Edward E. Masters, Deputy Chief of Mission
Mr. Laurence Pickering, Political Counselor
Mr. Harlan Y. M. Lee, Political Officer
RANGOON, BURMA-AUGUST .24
Mr. Edwin W. Martin, U.S. Ambassador
Mr. William M. Owen, Chief, Political/Economic Section, U.S. Embassy
Mr. Clyde It. McAvoy, Political Officer
Col. Archie W. Summers, Defense Attache
Mr. U Pyi See, Director, United Nations and Economic Department, Burmese.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. U Pe mien Tin, United Nations Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
M. IT Olin Maung, Additional Officer, Excise Office
Mr. U Ohn Maung, Additional Officer
Mr. Daw Than Ilan, Chief Europe and American Division, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Mr. A. K. Surani, Acting Resident Representative, United Nations Development
Program
Dr. J. J. Latigue, Acting Representative to Burma, World Health Organization
BANGKOK, THAILAND-AUGUST 25-27
Mr. Edward Masters, DOM
Mr. Laurence Pickering, Political Counselor
Mr. Fred Dick, BNDD Regional Director
Mr. Paul Riley, USOM Public Safety Director
Mr. W. E. Burmester, Public Safety Adviser
Mr. Joseph B. Jenkins, Special Agent, United States Customs
Mr. Joseph N. McBride, USOM, Assistant Program Director, Narcotics
Mr. Carl It. Fritz, USOM, Assistant Director for Programs
Mr. Daniel It. Niesciur, Political Officer
Mr. Edward B. Rosenthal, Special Assistant to BNDD Regional Director
Mr. Richard Harkness, Public Affairs Director, Cabinet Committee on Narcotics
Mr. Lewis Lapham, Special Assistant to the Ambassador
Mr. Kamchorn Sathrakul, Director of Tariff, Royal Thai Government
Mr. Paul Samaduroff, Special Agent, Bureau of Customs
OWANG MAI, THAILAND-AUGUST 28--29
Mr. James Montgomery, U.S. Consul
NIr. James Bullington, U.S. Vice Consul
Mr. David G. Smith, USIA Officer
Mr. James Pettet, Special Agent in Charge, BNDD
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(Other Consulate Officials)
Colonel Shukiat, Commander, Special Narcotics Organization (SNO)
BANGKOK, T'IIAILANB-AUGUST 30-31
Lt. Col. Gene D. Hunter, Commander, District 51, USAF Office of Special.Investi-
gation
Maj. Richard Troyer, Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, District 51
Gen. Nitya Bhanumas, Secretary-General of the Thai Central Bureau of Nar-
cotics
Mr. Paul Brown, Special Agent, BNDD
Gen. Kriangsak C'homanan, Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Command, Royal
Thai Armed Forces
Mr. John Everingham, Australian photographer/reporter for Dispatch News
Service
Lt. Col. Matteo Salemi, Commander of the U.S. Air Force Postal and Courier
Service, Thailand
Mr. William N. Stokes, Counselor for Development and Security Affairs (DSA)
Lt. Gen. Thao Ma, former commander of the Royal Laotian Air Force, now in
exile in Thailand
Col. Billy J. Cole, DSA
Mr. Charles R. Penney, DSA
Police Special Colonel Pow Sarasin, Chief of Foreign Assistance
Police Colonel Chawalit Yodmanee, Deputy Chief of Foreign Assistance
Mr. I. M. G. Williams, Representative of the United Nations Fund. for Drug
Abuse Control
Mr. Kun Chit Posayanonda, Representative of the United Nations Fund for
HONG KONG-SEPTEMBER 1-2
Mr. David Dean, Consulate International Relations Officer
Mr. Donald Barton, China Mainland Specialist
Mr. Robert J. Furey, Special Agent, BNDD -
Mr. Vincent E, Durant, Special Agent, United States Customs
Mr. Bruce Walker, China Mainland Specialist, U.S. Consulate
Mr. Dwight E. Scarborough, Chief, Hong Kong Macao Section
Mr. Richard C. Raines, Defense Liaison Officer
Mr. Robert H. Leeper, United States Information Service
Barbara Bodine, Consular Section
Lee Hickcox, Consulate Officer
Prior to departure and upon returning, the Survey Team met with the follow.
ing government officials and individuals :
WHITE HOUSE -
Mr. Egil Krogh, Executive Director, Cabinet Committee on International Nar-
cotics Control
Mr. Walter Minnick, Chairman, Coordinating Subcommittee of the Cabinet
Committee's Working Group.
Mr. Nelson G. Gross, Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for
International Narcotics Matters
Mr. Harvey Wellman, Special Assistant to Secretary for Narcotics Matters.
Mr. Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs -
Mr. William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs
Mr. John B. Dexter, Director of the Thailand/Burma Desk
Mr. Terrance Grant, Desk Officer, Laos
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (BUREAU OF CusTOMs)
Mr. Walter Shanley, Chief, Foreign Operations -
Mr. Robert Teela, Operations Officer, Division of Inspection Control and Enforce-
ment
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. George M. Belk, Program Manager for International Affairs, Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Mr. William Sullivan, Director, Office of. National Narcotics Intelligence
Mr. Lucien Conein, Strategic Intelligence Office, Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs
Others : various officials of the Central Intelligence Agency involved in narcotics
intelligence and Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, U.S. Army, retired
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APPENDIX A
'TRANSLATION OF A LETTER PREPARED BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
DEPUTY AND FORMER LAO ARMED FORCES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
GENERAL OUAN RATIIIKOUN ON APRIL 10, 1972
The following is a "translation of a letter prepared by National Assembly
Deputy and former Lao Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Ouan Rathi-
koun" and sent by him to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma "on April 10, 1972."
The letter was subsequently sent to all members of the National Assembly under
a covering letter signed by the President of the National Assembly Phoul
Sananikone.
"The Sixth National Assembly passed the government bill banning the culti-
vation of the opium poppy and the trafficking of opium in the Kingdom.
"The law was passed quickly and the cultivators of the opium poppy, the opium
addicts and the opium traders were not given advance warning.
"On June 1, 1970, I wrote a report on opium growing areas in Laos and sent
it to you. My report was later published in the Xat Lao newspaper and in book-
lets. It is a report on facts about the living conditions of the people in six northern
provinces-lloua Khong, Phongsaly, Sayaboury, Sam Neur, Xieng Kouang and
Luang Prabang, the opium growing areas in Laos.
"Some foreigners and Laotians have assumed that I, General Ouan Rathikoun,
was involved in trading and trafficking of illicit opium in Laos. Though I am
blamed, I am still proud of the service I have performed for helping my com-
patriots. Born in this nation, I am very proud of the part I have played In lib-
erating our country, on many occasions at the risk of my life.
"I am writing to you in all sincerity and telling you the truth. I wish to ask
that you yourself try to better the living conditions of the people who live in the
mountains.
"I have never been interested in opium because, born in Luang Prabang, I used
to see the cultivation of the opium poppy and the private and official trading in
opium each year. I saw that the Government permitted some merchants to pur-
chase opium from hilltribesmen and sell it to the Government. From 1945 to 1954,.
when I was involved in guerrilla work in northern Laos, I saw opium poppy
plantations in every village of the Mco, the Eko, the Kouy, the Muser and the Lay
tene (Lantene) peoples. Therefore, I have been able to write about the facts in my
booklet.
"In 1955 when I was the Commander of Military Region I, I officially reported
to the Government that a plane of Thai merchants frequently landed at a tobacco
plantation at Ban Ton Pheung (possibly PC 1545), Houa Khong Province. After
receiving my report, the-Government ordered us to try to arrest the Thai mer-
chants. In its order, the Government said that it would award us if we could
arrest them. After receiving the order, we planned to arrest the Thai merchants
who carried opium. In arresting them, there was a firefight and. two of our soldiers
were killed. One of those who carried opium was killed, two of them were
wounded, and three of them, who were Thais, were arrested. We captured 950
kilograms of opium hidden inside empty bomb casings.
"By order of the Government, all prisoners were sent to Luang Prabang where
they were sentenced to imprisonment by the Court. The captured opium was sent
to Vientiane as ordered.
"The military officers and men who carried out their duty of suppressing the
opium merchants fully expected to receive awards. However, after long waiting,
they have not yet received them.
"In Vientiane, the captured opium was delivered to the Central Warehouse of
the Customs Department where it hardened to such a degree that it could no
longer be refined. In 1960, the year of the Kong Le coup, when the captured opium
was inspected, it had hardened completely.
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"In 1963, General Phoumi Nosavan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance, issued an order permitting me to control opium and the opium traders.
The order is herewith attached :
`AUTHORIZATION
'A. Mr. Saveng, Manager of the SACDA Company In Vientiane is authorized to
proceed with the purchase and sale of opium within the Kingdom of Laos.
'B. The circulation of the products belonging to said company within the ter-
ritory of Laos will be free and assured by the Ministry of National Security of
which General Ouan Ratbikoun is! the permanent representative.
'C. The sale of this opium to the smokers of Laos is absolutely prohibited, except
with the special authorization of the Ministry of National Security.
'I). As the representative of the Ministry, General Ouan Ratldkoun is em-
powered to deliver all authorization in view of facilitating the functioning of the
company.
'E. The details of application will be made in a new contract between General
Ouan Rithikoun, representative of the Ministry, and Mr. Saveng, representative
'Vientiane, 7 October 1963
Vice President of the Council
of Ministers
Signed and Sealed
Division General
Phoumi Nosavan'
"After being ordered to do so in 1963, I learned about those who traded in
opium and about the quantity of opium produced in Laos and sent from Burma.
I also learned of the number of opium addicts in Vientiane.
"After having controlled opium for five months, I saw that It was not good
to continue to control it because such control was criticized by foreigners. I then
sent my report to General Phoumi, informing him that it was not good to
control opium because all merchants were transacting their sales and purchases
outside the established channels, since they were losing money by remaining In
channels.
"General Phoumi then issued an official order for stopping the control of opium
on 2 May 1964.
"At that time, after the Government had issued its order for stopping the con-
trol of opium, General (Than) Ma was Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Lao
Air Force. Instead of commanding all 1,250 men of the Air Force, General
Thao Ma controlled only 40 pilots of the T-28 planes. Ile did not control the
transportation personnel and the personnel of other section of the Air Force.
That caused a lack of discipline among officers of the Air Force. These officers
were hired to transport things and they did so because they needed money. There
was no discipline in the Air Force and the men of the Air Force played the
game of nepotism until General Thao Ma flew to another country after he bombed
a military camp in Vientiane.
"In 1966, after General Time Ma had fled, General Sourith was appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Lao Air Force, a position which he still
holds,
"I called a meeting of the Air Force officers from throughout the country at
the Wattay Air Force Camp.
"I asked them to maintain discipline in the Air Force and prohibited them
from being hired to transport illicit goods. After being told by some of the Air
Force officers about their poor living conditions, I decided to allow them to trans-
port goods on the ?condition that the transportation must be organized and made
under only one chief's orders ; there must be no transportation of private goods
for any officer of the Air Force ; the transportation must occur in the Kingdom
of Laos only; here must be no transportation of goods outside the Kingdom of
Laos ; and it must be the duty of the merchants themselves to transport goods
outside of Laos.
"Seventy percent of the income from this activity went to the Air Force, 15 per-
cent to the pilots, 10 percent to those who worked on the ground, and five percent
to the mechanics.
"At the same time, I contacted the U.S. Government asking it to aid the Air
Force. I told the U.S. Government that if the Air Force was given aid, it would
stop completely the transportation of opium. My request was considered by the
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U.S. Government. Later, in 1960-70, the U.S. Government sent its administrative
experts to investigate. After their three-month investigation, no change was
made. Later, in 1971, the ITS. Government began to pay sufficient per diem to
pilots. At the present time, the U.S. Government still pays them per diem.
"Reports on Opium-.-Since the year 1963, I have known that there are three
kinds of opium transported by the merchants.
"A. Raw opium for sale in the Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong markets.
"B. 100 percent manufactured opium that can be smoked immediately, for
sale only in Saigon, South Vietnam.
"C. Morphine for sale in Hong Kong and other unkown places.
"Later in 1971., no raw opium and morphine were known to be transported
through Laos. Only 100 percent manufactured opium was seen. Heroin, another
kind of narcotics, has also been seen. It`has been transported to the Saigon
market.
"The new kind of narcotics (heroin) can be carried by the merchants them-
selves in small cases. Therefore, they stopped hiring the Air Force to transport
opium in late 1971. The Air Force also'was no longer interested in the trans-
portation of narcotics because its men were being paid sufficient per diem.
"At the same time, in late 1.971, the Government also had enacted the Narcotics
Law.
"To produce heroin, there must be a special chemist, good equipment, and
many kinds of chemical ingredients so the Lao people do not know how to
produce it.
"Opium factory.--In the year 1903, a factory for manufacturing opium was
set up in Luang Prabang. Later, when. the merchants were ordered to stop
manufacturing opium, they moved their factory to a place North of Ban Houel
He (PC-3597) bordering Burma, where they secretly manufactured it. They also
manufactured it at a Yao village in the area North of Ban Nam Kheung (PC-
3657 or PC-3054).
"In fact, the merchants secretly manufactured opiuM at various places on the
Burma border.
"In 1971, the Ho came to Laos from Burma and Chiang Mai. They established
two factories for producing heroin in the area of Nam Kheung, North of Houei
Sal. They hired technicians from Bong Kong. At the beginning of their work,
none knew that they were producing heroin. All understood that they were
producing ordinary opium. After six months of production, some knew that they
were producing heroin. After being informed that they were producing heroin,
I ordered the Hone! Sal Provincial Commander to order them to stop their
production immediately. I told the commander to let the merchants know that
if they refused to stop their work we would arrest them immediately. After
receiving the order, the merchants stopped their work. In October 1971, they
moved their equipment back to Burma. Only low grade equipment was left in the
area North of Houei Sal.
"I believe that there is now no heroin production factory in Laos. The illegal
factories were operating for only six months.
"Proposal for Banning the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy, the Trafficking
of Opium, and the Trading of Opium-I irst of all, the merchants must be pro-
hibited from trading in opium and they must be told to run other businesses which
are better and honest.
"Next, the people must be prohibited from cultivating the opium poppy.
"I understand that the U.S. Government has allocated considerably large
amounts of money for the narcotics suppression program. News reports said that
the United States has given $20 million to the Turkish Government for the
suppression of opium, which will be used in its development program under
which its people will grow other craps instead of the opium poppy.
"Early this month, the U.S. Government also gave $2 million to the Thai author-
ities, which will be used in their attempts to suppress opium. In addition, the
news reports said that the Thai authorities and the International Police pur-
chased opium from the hill tribesmen living along the Burmese border areas and
sent it, to be kept in Chiang Mai. Most peoples possessing opium in areas border-
ing Burma are of the Kuornintang group, the General Li group, and the General
Tuan group. These authorities bought about 30 tons of opium from the groups
for almost $2.6 million.
"In Burma, the Burmese Government refused to allow the United Nations
officials concerned with narcotics to get involved in its affairs. The Burmese
Government itself will suppress opium. I understand that it is very difficult to
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suppress opium In that country because there is much opium in the Shan State.
There is also much opium in the areas that cannot be controlled by the Burmese
Government, particularly in the areas on the path leading to Lipa. There is also
much opium in areas bordering China that cannot be controlled by the Burmese
Government.
"In order to suppress the trafficking of opium from Burma to Laos and the,
trafficking of it in Laos, T propose that the Government ask the U.S. Government
for money. I do not think that we need for TT,S. $1 million for suppressing the
opium trade.
"In fact, opium traders have together invested their funds and established
their companies and hired managers to run their bu,si.nesses. If the Government
suppresses the companies, the traders will break up their partnerships and run
other businesses and the opium trafficking will no longer exist. I want the
Government to loirelmse the opium that the traders have on hand to he destroyed
or used for medicinal purposes. These purchases would be on condition that the
traders did not continue to trade in opium. T understand that the traders will
be glad to stop trading in opium because they will be safe.
"Many people who cultivated the opium poppy in the six northern provinces
had moved to live in areas controlled by the Coverntnemt. Only those who live
in the Neo Lao Ilak Sat (NLIIS)-controlled areas in Phongsaly, Muong Sal,
Nam Tha and Muong Houn continue to cultivate the opium poppy. The Govern-
ment should take this opportunity to ask the United States Government; to pro-
vide it with equipment for clearing the lands and divide the land among those
hill tribesmen as suggested by my booklet attached herewith."
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APPENDIX B
TI3E RESULT OF THE FEASIBILITY STUDY ON TIIE OPIUM SUPPRESSION
IN THE ROYAL LAOS
`(By Gen. Ouan Rathikoun)
Opium is considered one of the narcotics, destroying health and properties of
the world. I have been following up the "opium" story since 1962 which was the
time of Finance Minister General Phoumy Norsavane, who ordered me to control
opium and opium addicts. I have launched a heavy campaign on opium growing,
opium trading, opium trafficking and opium marketing. I can give you the figure
number of opium and tell you the necessity of opium growing to the best of my
knowledge.
I therefore studied hard in an effort to tackle down the opium problem, espe-
cially opium growing, and can give you the details as follows :
WHY DO WE GROW OPIUM? No one knows where the opium originally came
from. But some Chinese people said the Europeans had brought the opium in
Asia for growing and smoking. The substantial evidence on this allegation could
not be proved, it's just rumor.
The opium can grow in the hilly and mountainous area with cool climate.
Consequently, the opium is stretchingly grown up along the Himalayas Range
up to the Gulf of Tonkin. The countries in which the opium is available or grown
are Turkey, India, Burma, Thailand, Laos, China and North Vietnam. Most of
the opium is abundant in India, Burma, Cliina and Turkey. In Laos, the opium
grows in some Khouengs Such as Pbong Saly, IIoun Khong, I4opang Prabang,
Samneua, Xieng Khouang, X.ayabouri and a certain area east "of Khoiieng Kham-
mouane. The 20--30 tons of opium product are Harvested in Laos yearly. But its
quantity is depended on the seasons. Most of the opium in foreign markets is
exported from Burina, India, Cliina and Turkey. The, opium in Laos is mostly
consumed locally though sonic 'is sent to Saigon, South Vietnam, for sale. Mor-
phine and heroin are processed in Burma and Thailand ; the Royal Laos of
Kingdom does not know how to process them nor use them.
Some countries do not prohibit the people to smoke opium. So the hilltribemen
can smoke. But sonic countries such as Thailand did not allow the people to
smoke opium, Morphine and heroin are therefore processed from opium. I dare
say that morphine and heroin which have been sent out for sale in Europe and
the U.S. must not be from Laos because the Laotian people do not produce them
for sale and do not know what drug is called heroin. Heroin should be processed
from the countries which can grow a great deal of opium, such as Burma, India,
Turkey, Thailand and Mainland China. There is a possibility that Red Chinese
are conducting a retaliatory campaign through drugs against European and
American people who firstly Introduced opium In China in the olden days. We
can jump into the conclusion that wherever Chinese are living, there is opium
trade more or less.
NECESSITY OF GROWING OPIUM IN 'TIIE ROYAL LAOS of KINGDOM
Geographically speaking, Laos has had opium since the ancient time because
opium is one of the Laotians' trade. I'm speaking what I have known and seen
when I spent over ten years with the hilltribemen conducting our guerrilla units
in the mountainous area. Laos is situated along the Mekhong River, bordering
Vietnam to the east. Most of the terrain in Laos are hilly and mountainous,
only sonic parts in the central Laos are plain while northern and eastern Laos
are densed jungles. The population in Laos is totally 3 million. There are 46
tribes, included big and small ones. Almost half of the population is living in
the mountainous areas, in which they mainly grow rice as their staple food. Rice
in the high land has never grown up by flood water but by rain. It is necessary
for me to talk about how the tribesmen are living because they have to face
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economic problems in their daily life every year. The cultivation of rice on the
hill spends 10 months in a year. The tribesmen have to clear the forest in
January or February for their next coming crops, leaving the cut-down trees
dried in the sun until they are burnt in April or May. If it rains before April
or May earlier, the trees will not be burnt, and that means no rice growing In
that year. After the trees are burnt and the land is ready for plough but If
there Is no rain in June, sowing of rice seeds cannot be made. Sometimes, In
June and July there is heavy rain, making the land too good for the rice seeds
to grow but the grasses growing rapidly. If the grass is not destroyed, the rice
cannot be grown and given its yield. Speaking in a short cut, the rice grows very
well and can give the yield but many various natural damages such as fire,
insects, beast animals, etc. destroy their crops. Concluded that there is no cer-
tainty for the tribesmen to receive the product which they spend almost a year to
cultivate unless the grains of rice are kept in the barn. Some families do not
have grains enough to consume all year around. Every year the tribesmen have
to exchange their rice for what they need such as salt, clothings, medicines and
others, excluding education for their children.
Each family can receive at most 500 muns of rice paddy or 30 sacks of milled
rice a year. If the rice is sold, it can bring in not over 180,000 kip. Judging from
the above reason, the tribesmen must grow other crops so that they can survive
themselves in the jungle. Opium is one of the crops which the tribesmen grow be-
side their rice field. Also opium will grow well If the weather in that year is pretty
cool ; If not the opium will die. Many other factors hamper the growing of opium,
such ,is fertilized land, fog, etc. Supposed that the opium grows well In the fine
circumstances, each family will get the product not over 0 Pong or 21/2-3 kilo-
grammes which cost about 70,000 kip. The opium which the tribesmen grow will
be able to support their families when the hard-time comes, the rice In the field
cannot produce good product, the opium will be sold or exchanged for their neces-
sities. The annual products are conclusively brought in about 250,000 kip in the
good year for each family.
HOW THE OPIUM IN LAOS IS EXCHANGED
The opium Is regarded a media of exchange between the tribesmen and the mer-
chants in Laos. The methods of exchange can be made as following :-
Many big companies in Vientiane which import some commodities to sell in the
country have to be taxed, and some of them are in debt. The commodities which
the tribesmen or the population in the mountainous areas need are clothings,
household utensils, medicines, etc. The merchants from such remote Khouengs as
Namtha, Phong Saly, Xieng Khouang, Sam Neua, bluong, Xay, Nam Bak, etc.
come into Vientiane to place an order of those goods from the big companies have
to pay the companies in cash or in credit sometimes. The merchants In those
Khouengs mostly sell the goods to the tribesmen, who come down from the moun-
tains and do not have cash to pay. They normally use the opium they bring along
with to exchange for what they need. What can the merchant (to when they do
not have cash to buy the goods in Vientiane? They, of course, have to wait until
some men go up and buy the opium they receive from the tribesmen. The com-
panies in Vientiane by no means do receive opium when the merchants do not have
money to pay. What can the merchants do if no opium trader goes to buy the opium
from them? The merchants will not come to buy goods from Vientiane and the
tribesmen will not be able to exchange their opium for the goods, and everything
will be halted, even the companies in Vientiane or the nation's economic as a
whole. Year after year if the event repeats itself, how can the country of Laos
remain? The government must inevitably face the economic crisis. The worst
situation will come up In the hard year when the opium product cannot be in mar-
keting. That means the year of death for all people of Laos.
Turning to the opium merchants who buy the oplums from the remote
Khouengs, they send the opium to foreign lands for sale In various forms.
They know that South Vietnamese in South Vietnam prefer "cooked" opium,
they cook for them ; they know Singapore and Malaysia, prefer "raw" opium.,
they do as the markets want. lit fact, the opium merchants have brought foreign
exchanges into the country as well as various commodities. Ironically speaking,
most of the opium merchants in Laos run their business in Saigon, South
Vietnam, only, because the Saigon market needs the cooked opium at 1,200
kilogrammes or 2,400 kilogrammes of raw opium. Some years, the opium grown
in Laos was not sufficient to meet the demand of the Saigon market, particularly
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when the weather in that year was bad. This indicated that only 20-30 tons of
opium can be yearly produced in Laos. The opium markets in Singapore, Malaysia,
Indonesia and Hongkong receive the opium from Burma which channel through
Thailand-the most convenient country, but most of the opium sent from ]3urma
is the raw one.
Judging from various circumstances, opium grown in Southeast Asia should be
consumed in Southeast Asian countries only. But the opium sent to'Europe and
America is mostly from Indian and Turkey, which are nearer and have better
communication lines. The masterminds of processed heroin must be by all means
in Thailand and Burma on the grounds that heroin was produced after the ban
of smoking opium by using the pipe and the fire-lamp in the reign of late Field
Marshal Sarith Thanarath.
HOW CAN WE SUPPRESS AND SOLVE TUE PROBLEM OF GROWING OPIUM?
As I studied from the methods of the World Organization, the suppression
campaign has to be launched against its trafficking and its trading. It means
that we have to crack down the opium merchants not to suppress the opium
growing. This will lead to decreasing number of opium year after year to the
nonexistence. There are two different methods to eradicate the opium business.
They are :
1. To stop its trading and delivering to foreign countries.
2. To ban any opium growing and destroy all its seeds.
The world Narcotics Suppression Organization has been so far launching a
drastic campaign of arresting merchants and halting opium traffic only. No other
better methods that the Organization can work out now.
In order to suppress the merchants dealing in opium and delivering it abroad,
the Organization should have a fund for buying all opium from the remote
Khouengs. The opium which the Organization buys can be used in medical treat-
ment, and if some of it is left, the Organization should throw it away into the
ocean. The Organization can do like this every year. But doing this, there will
be no end, and the countries which finance the destruction operations will not
be tolerate. As for the banning of growing opium, I think that it is a better way
but the Organization has to provide a great amount of fund. The budget allocated
to the Organization for suppressing the narcotics dealers should be given to the
tribesmen as follows :
(1) To provide the tribesmen with enough food.
(2) To provide them with clothings.
(3) To provide them with medicines, hospital and doctors.
(4) To provide them with houses.
(5) To provide them with schools, teachers and teaching materials.
(6) To provide them with self-defense.
As I already mentioned, over one million population in Laos is living in the
mountainous areas. They all have to work hard for their sole product in a year.
The opium crop sometimes cannot bring their families good living. Now, I'm
going to tell you about the six existing problems that I call upon the Organization
to provide aids to.
1. Food : This is the prolonged problem that has not been thrashed out since
the ancient time, because the gross production in each family when the rain is in
season does not cost over 250,000 kip.
2. Clothing : The tribesmen do not have time to make cloth as they have to
engage themselves in growing rice and opium. They have never grown cotton
before. Rice and opium are regarded significant products of these people for
exchanging.
3. Shelters : Most of the tribesmen's houses are temporarily built ; they have
to move to other places whenever their farmland cannot bring them good prod-
ucts-that's about 2 years their thatched houses with 3-stepped ladder will be
moved. They normally are not fond oftheir houses because of no beauty at all.
4. Public Health: The public health for these people is considered very bad.
Most of the new babies-70 per cent got neumornia. and some died ; they do not
have clothes, just get warm from sitting near fire. The government cannot set up
a hospital for them on the grounds that there are not many houses and each
house is located dispersely. The sick people have never got used to medicines but
spiritual things. Sometimes the villagers have to abandon their houses when some
of them die of unknown diseases. They believe in ghost or bad spirits. The major
problem which causes the people to believe in superstition is that the government
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cannot send out the administration authorities to give them the right instruction
for good health.
5. Very few tribesmen living in the hilly areas will receive education because
of no good communication. A school cannot be set up as the children do not live
together in a village. There are many problems about giving education for those
children ; the government is now facing an acute shortage of teachers. The num-
ber of teachers in Laos is totally 3,000-4,000 while the number of villages all over
Laos is 11,000. Supposely, a school is set up in a remote area and some teachers
are sent there, there may not be children to attend the school, because most of
the parents badly need their children to help earn living, and then it's pretty
sure that the school will be abandoned.
0. Security: Owing to not many people in each village, self-defense with arms
cannot be provided. If the government provides the villages with arms, the enemy
can easily take them away. Besides, the people are easily fallen to prey to the
enemy by the reason that they are uneducated, the government officials cannot
reach them and the enemy can launch an instigation. It is obvious that any area
the enemy can control the FAR cannot retake but on the contrary, the area where
the government officials can reach and give the citizen some education, the enemy.
cannot capture it because the citizen will fight to the end.
I used to study and see a method of President Magsaysay in Philippines in
1956 in connection with the evacuation of all tribesmen living on the mountains
down to the plain, providing plots of land and various facilities. This method can
prevent the people from being instigated by the opponent but it must take time.
When late President Magsaysay launched his campaign of tribesmen evacuation,
he had to face many problems-enemy propaganda against the government, fierce
fighting, etc. until he won the hearts of the people.
After my study of the Laotian population from: 1960 up to present, I know
that some of the population were living on the hills in north and east Laos,
bordering China and Vietnam. Some of those have already moved their families
to settle down in the plain along the Mekong River and various Se rivers but
some still lived in big groups on the mountains. Up to one-third of the total
population of Laos or 600,000 (must be one-fifth as the total population is
3 imil.lion/Asawa) are willing to move down from the hilly areas. I have an
idea that the government can take this opportunity to tell those people if the
government will provide some plots of land for them to settle down. They will
by all means agree with the government whenever they make sure that their new
place is better than the one they are living in now. This will lead to the
solution to the said six problems. For instance, economically speaking, if the
tribesmen move down to cultivate the plain land, at least 500 muss of rice
grains in five months each family will bring in. And they can spend the other 7
months in a year to grow other crops, raise 4 pigs each family and others.
Judging from the rough estimation, living in the plain can make their life.
better than that on the mountain. Talking about the clothing problem when
they move down, they can live more comfortably because the weather down the
hills is warmer. They will have much more time to work. Some women can
grow cotton and weave for their own clothings. Besides, buying clothings down
the hills is cheaper and better.
On the shelter problem, the tribesmen can live together in a village of more
than 50 houses can be built permanently and lastly for their next generations.
When they live in, a better circumstances and good environment, they will have
to love and cherish what they have. Many countries in the world have tried to
organize the house-hold project. I see that the "Irsraeleee" project is a
better one which we should adopt and adapt to the Laotian custom.
On public health question, when they live in a community, the government
can provide them a hospital or health station or good instruction on health.
Comparable to living on the hill, when they are sick all of the faintly members
have to watch them with no medical treatment-resulting in loss of valuable
time.
Concerning education problem, the government or the Ministry of Education
can set tip a school for them and send teachers to teach the children in all levels.
This will make those children at least literate people of. Laos. As for smart
children, they can further their studies up to university level. In addition
to the children given education in school, .the able-bodied young men will be
able to serve the country as soldiers. They will learn how to be good com-
patriots and they will have many friends from various villages which they can
help each other. These men eventually will have good knowledge and bravery
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to fight the enemy. After the tribesmen move down to the settlement, the sub-
sequent development will follow, There will be roads linking with each com-
munity and town, and not so long the settlement will be civilized once society
is set up.
I have realized that the new community will create good understanding and
relationship between the Laotian people because marriage life in the new
world of those tribes can bring about unity, leading to no split of the nation.
I'm pretty sure what I have said above will solve many problems and get
rid of various conflicts, such as:
-self-selfish, family-selfish, city-selfish, but bring about worldwide knowledge,
sacrifices and donation.
Turning to security and peace, this is the most significant problem of the
country, because the enemy have created bad attitudes and no self-confidence
to the people -of Laos, The enemy have instigated the people to fight against the
government for the :purpose of overthrowing the Royal throne. If the tribesmen
can move down, there have to be a massive training among them as follows :
To educate them to realise the importance of peace and happiness.
To arrange them iasgroup for any possible action.
To train them to assemble arms and provide them with weapons.
To impose rules and regulations.
When the children are brought up in good way, they will realise that they
have to fight for, country. This programme takes time because we have to prepare
everything ready to cope with the present situation. Now the FAR needs man-
power to serve the nation so that peace .will come. Various disputes or conflicts
between compatriots cause no peace, and only peace can bring about happiness
to the people from all walks of life.
RESERVATION OF FOREST AND WATER
As !:.have studied about reserving forest and water, we should not cut down
the-trees. We can cut the trees down but we have to grow young trees in their
places. Many students who studied abroad, France, Canada and India, and
come back to serve the country but cannot solve this problem. If you. can, fly in
a plane to upriorth, you will see many points of the mountains and hills being
dried, compared to the plain at the foot of the hills or mountains, many parts
of the fertile land are abundant of trees. A great deal number of our relatives
abandoned their home villages from the abordering areas closed to China and
Vietnam to settle down their life in the new area, leaving some families on the
mountain. Anyhow, up to 600,000 people of various tribes have been in an odus
since 1960. They were afraid earlier that they would be killed if they oved
down because the weather down the hill was very hot for them to be a1i4 e Now,
Meo and N?hao tribesmen are cultivating their land in the plain, and some th is
on the mountain are willing to move down too. This is a golden opportunity for
the government to take. Some uncleared parts of land in the plain should be
prepared for our relatives who will abandon their opium farmland to join us.
If most of the tribesmen or all of them come down, many problems will be
thrashed out. In order to maintain peace in the refugees' communities, the gov-
ernment should send out some educated officials to live with them, training
them in various aspects, particular politics.
Whenever they all move down, the national budget or the national gross will
come up to 50 times. Besides their self-reliance, they will bring in national
income to Laos. Laos can solve the problem of opium whenever all of the tribesmen
move to live in the plain settlements, because they will not be able to grow opium
in the warm climate.
Vientiane, June 1, 1970,
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APPENDIX C
TEXT OF UNITED STATEB-TIIAI MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
The Royal Thai Government and the Government of the United States, being
parties to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, and other inter-
national agreements on the control of illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs
whether vegetal or chemical derivative, recognizing that drug addiction and
drug abuse present a threat to their respective societies and to the peoples of
other nations, accepting the cessation of opium production and the ending of
the cultivation of the poppy as international goals, and having issued on August
25, 1971, a joint statement expressing their deep concern over the growth in drug
abuse and drug addiction in many parts of the world, reaffirm their desire and
intention to cooperation with each other in actions to be taken against the
supply of illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs for the purposes of abuse,
and against international traffic which serves as a channel connecting produc-
tion with use, and to discourage the demand for such narcotics and drugs for
such purposes, and agree as follows :
(1) Disruption and elimination of narcotics trafficking, processing and stor-
age both within the two countries and across their borders through stringent law
enforcement efforts and other means, is the most promising means of achieving
significant early reduction of narcotics supplies and, as a matter of first priority,
maximum effort will be made to cooperate in this respect. The principal problem
facing Thailand is recognized by the two parties to be the illegal transit through
That territory of certain types of dangerous drugs and narcotics. The Royal
Thai Government agrees to make additional police and other -officials and other
resources and facilities available for its programs to interdict the narcotics
traffic. The United States 'Government, in its part, and wherever it has jurisdiction
rand authority, agrees to reinforce surveillance and control of drug traffic and
drug use. It will also lend its unstinted cooperation in such fields as training,
equipment, advisory assistance and other mutually agreed support to make pro-
grams of the Royal Thai Government more effective.
(2) The two governments agree to exert their efforts to work with the
countries concerned to achieve elimination of illicit agricultural production
of poppies. As regards Thailand where effective measures have for many years
been taken by the Royal That Government to prevent certain hill tribe ele-
ments from indulging in such production, further efforts are needed to support
the Royal That Government's endeavors to bring about the transformation
of regions where some poppies are still grown illegally into viable economies
based on other types of agriculture and other sources of livelihood. It is fur-
ther agreed that programs already launched by the Royal Thai Government
will be enlarged and that additional programs will be designed so that the
desired economic and social change may be realized and that work on such
programs will proceed expeditiously. The two governments see the need for
each to contribute, as available, area and social expertise, technical and agri-
cultural knowledge, personnel and required equipment. Attainment of this goal
will involve, inter alia, more effective research into and application of existing
knowledge concerning possible crop substitution, other alternative economic
production activities and marketing aspects.
(3) Medical and social rehabilitation of narcotics and drug users and ad-
dicts must be a key component of an integrated attack on the narcotic problem.
In this connection the two governments agree that the efforts will be made to in-
crease and improve the effectiveness and availability of rehabilitation services.
The United States Government will make available, in support of Thai efforts,
medical and related social counseling facilities, personnel and equipment and
other resources, as needed and available, to implement programs designed to al-
leviate the dependence on narcotics and drugs of users and addicts an to as-
sist their re-entry into society.
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83
(4) A comprehensive education and public information program Is an im-
portant aspect of narcotics and drug control and this can be achieved through
programs designed to publicize widely the medical and social and economic
dangers of narcotics and drugs and to insure the public awareness an under-
standing of the programs that will be necessary to their full acceptance, The
two parties agree to cooperate with each other and to employ existing assets, to
the maximum extent feasible, in this effort.
(5) It is important to the combating of international narcotics and drug
production and trafficking that the coordinated cooperation of many countries
be obtained. Thus, the two governments agree to the desirability of encouraging
and cooperating with United Nations and other multilateral programs to combat
drug abuse and control traffic in narcotics.
(6) The Joint Planning Groups already established by the two governments
will serve as a primary means of policy liaison in furtherance of the programs
which are to be undertaken in implementation of this agreement.
(7) In order to carry out the purposes of this Memorandum of Under-
standing, they will promptly proceed with. the preparation and implementation
of specific projects and programs within the field of narcotic and drug control.
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RECENT SNO SEIZURES AND ARRESTS IN NORTHERN TIIAILAND
Quantity
Name, place, and case number Data seize (kilos) Defendants
Raw opium:
Lamphun WB-72-0004 ................ June 9,1972 16 00 4 persons.
Chiang Mai, 3 villages, WB-72-0005, July 8,1972 $95 1 police sergeant major and 4 suspects.
0006, 0007, and 0008.
Mae Sai:
WB-72-0009 ...................... July 23 1972 63 None Identified.
WB-72-9010 ...................... July 24,1972 2,190 6 defendants (bogus military clothing).
Total (raw opium)_________________ 4,148
Morphine base: WB-72-0010______________ ...... 212 Do.
Smoking opium: WB-72-0010 .................... do....... 353 Do.
No. 4 heroin: WB-72-0010 ...................... do_...... 7 Do.
Total seizures (15 dependants) .................... 14, 720
In addition :
Vehicles :
1 Jeep
1 Landrover
1 Tank Truck with special compartment
Weapons :
11 M-1 US Carbines
9 US .30 calibre rifles
1 US M-79 grenade launcher
1 Chinese autoimatic hand gun
6 hand weapons, not further identified
1 US grenade
Ammunition :
For.30 calibre rifles, M-16 Rifles and the M-60 machinegun.
Lab equipment :
47 drums of chloroform and other chemicals and apparatus used in the making
of morphine base and #4 heroin were seized as result of leads developed from
the raid on the Tank Truck at Lamphun, June 9f 1972
(84)
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APPENDIX E
DECREE LAW No. 008,/TT/SLU ON TIIE ERADICATION OF Toxic,
NARCOTIC AND DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES
(Promulgated by President Thieu on August 12, 1972)
Considering the Republic of Vietnam Constitution dated April 1,_ 1967.
Considering Ordinance No. 60 dated Sept. 27, 1955 on opium and modifying
Decree dated July 16, 1919 which was amended by Decree No. 49/1011 dated
July 2% 1949 on toxic, narcotic, and dangerous substances ;
Considering law No. 005/72 dated June 28, 1972 delegating to the RVN Presi-
dent the power to promulgate by Decree Laws necessary measures in the domains
of Security, Defense, Economy and Finance within a six-months period.
After the Ministerial Council's discussions.
Decree Law
Article 1: Ordinance No. 60 dated Sept. 27, 1955 on opium is abolished and a
Decree dated July 16, 1919 amended by Decree No. 49/1011 dated July 26, 1949
on toxic, narcotic and dangerous substances is modified.
Article 2: Three came-lists of toxic drugs (A) narcotics (B) and dangerous
substances (C) established along with this Decree-Law are to replace three lists
A, B, C attached to Decree dated July 16, 1919 amended by Decree No. 49/1011
dated July 26, 1949.
Chapter I
Violations and punitive measures.
Article 3: Penal servitude for life penalty will be given to those who use
narcotics not for medical and teaching purpose or violate the regulations in force
on narcotics, Violations include import, export, speculation, cultivation, distilla.
Lion, transportation concession of the following kinds of narcotics : opium, mor-
phine and heroin, cocaine, pethidine. The offender, if belonging to a well-organized
group will be subject to death penalty.
Solitary confinement penalty will also be handed down to those who use sub-
stances in list B not for medical or instruction purpose, or violate the regula-
tions in force on narcotics. Act regarded as violations are import, export, cultiva-
tion, distillation, transportation, speculation and concession of narcotics of list B
including marijuana, (root, branches, leaves, browse resine of Cannabis). The
limited hard labor penalty is envisaged for violators who are members of an
organization.
Article If: Speculation of narcotics listed in Article 3 at shops or private resi-
dences for in-place consumers is prohibited throughout the RVN territory.
The speculator will be given confinement penalty. Offenders who are the specu-
lators or admit minor youths will receive limited hard labor penalty.
Consumers of narcotics including marijuana, and Cannabis plants not for
medical purpose under whatever form will be subject to one year to five years of
imprisonment and fined from VN$ 5,000 to VN$ 100,000.
Article 5: As for toxic substances likely to cause addiction :
-Amphetamine group such as Maxiton, substances of similar character or effect
such as Dexanphetamine, Methamphetamine, Phenmetrazine group such as
Obesitol ; Methylphenidate group and Pipradol group.
-Sleeping drugs : Barbiturates such as Binoctal, Immeroetal and substances of
the same category.
Punitive measures are fixed as follows :
a-Those who, not for medical or instruction purpose and not in accordance
with the regulations in-force on narcotics, toxic and dangerous substances, hoard,
transport, produce, distill, import, export, keep in warehouse or concede the
above-mentioned hard drugs will be sentenced to from one year to five years of
imprisonment and fined from VN$ 5,000 to VN$ 100,000. The confinement penalty
is reserved for those violators who are members of organization.
(85)
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b-Consuniers of toxic and medical therapeutic method will binsubject s to l three months tocthreer the
years of
imprisomnent and must: pay it fine from VN$ 1,000 to VN$ 50,000.
Article 6: As for substances which help create illusion in List A Including LSC,
Mescaline, Psiloycybine, DMT, STT or DOM, and substances of the same distilla-
tion and category, punitive measures will be limited labor penalty for those who
hoard, transport, produce, distill, export, import, concede and use these-substances
not for medical purpose, or in accordance with the regulations-in-force on nar-
cotics. The violators, if belonging to an organization, will be sentenced to hard
labor for life.
Consumers of these toxic substances under any forms not for therapeutic pur-
pose as acknowledged in physicians prescriptions will be sentenced to. one year to
five years of imprisonment and fined VN$ 5,000 to VN$ 100,000.
Article 7: Physicians, pharmacists, dentists, veterinarians who intentionally
provide means for violators prescribed in Articles 3,.4 and. 5 cause a and Article 6
of this Decree-Law will be subject to the same penalty given to the offenders.
Any misuses in the issuance of prescription authorizing the use and distribu-
tion of toxic, narcotic and dangerous substances contrary to the regulations in
force will be also subject to punitive measures stipulated in Article 5 clause b of
this Decree-Law.
In addition to the penalties, the Court may order the closure of the related con-
sultation office or pharmacy for a period from six months to two years. Besides
the Health Minister will ask the Physicians' Union Council, the Pharmacists'
Union or the Dentists' Union to, adopt disciplinary measures against the
offenders.
In case of repetition of the offense, besides the penalties said above, the Court
may order the definite closure of the medical consultation office or pharmacy.
Chapter II
De-intoxication
Article 8.-De-intoxication is enforced in separate agencies to be set up by an
Order of the Prime Minister or in national hospitals and private consultation
office legally recognized in accordance with the demands.
Subject to compulsory treatment at the above-mentioned agencies are addicts
of toxic, narcotic and dangerous substances said in this Decree-Law, who are
either arrested or voluntarily report for the treatment.
Those who try to escape from the hospitals will be sentenced to imprisonment
terms from three months to three years and fined from VN$1,000 to VN$50,0OQ.
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General provisions
Article 9.-In parallel with the penalties said in the foregoing Articles, the
Court will order the seizure of :
-Narcotics, marijuana, toxic and dangerous substances along with transporta-
tion means and materials used to conceal the offense.
-Substances used for the distillation and materials used for the cultivation,
distillation or the containers of the seized substances.
-Necessary materials and equipments for the use of narcotics, toxic and
dangerous substances under all forms.
Article 10.The offenders will not be entitled to suspended execution of sen-
tence given to cases of offenses envisaged in this Decree-Law.
However, over 55-year=old or sick opium smokers may be entitled to suspended
execution of sentence in accordance with the laws in force.
Article 11.-The Prime Minister will fix by an order the detailed application
of this Decree-Law whenever necessary.
The Prime Minister may change, by virtue of a Decree signed upon the pro-
posal of the Health Minister, the narcotics toxic and dangerous substances men-
tioned in Articles 3, 5 and 6 as well as in the A, B, C lists supplemented to this
Decree-Law.
Article 12.-During the whole period in which the state of war or martial law
is proclaimed, the trial of violators of Article 3 of this Decree-Law belongs to the
competence of the Military Field Court.
However, the Ordinary Court can still continue to handle the case if military
authorities do not claim for the right to prosecute the violators before the Mili-
tary Field Court. -
Article 13.-All articles contrary to this Decree-Law are abolished.
Article 11.-This Decree-Law is promulgated under the emergency procedures
and printed ii` the official journal of the Republic of Vietnam. (PA/26)
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