WHITE HOUSE TOOK STEPS TO STOP LEAKS MONTHS BEFORE ANDERSON DISCLOSURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020017-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 9, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

? Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-WP741300415R000300020017-5
NEW YORK TIMES DATE `1 7:14-s?N-7 PAGE it
hite House Took Steps to Stop Leaks
Months Before Anderson Disclosures
By ROBERT M. SMITH
specter to TM w York Times
ASHINGTON. Jp. 8?Th
nist Jack An erson has
Na-
meet-
rpr.eritly despite White
months ago to
s hhd
ii
" I i ?
mon mg to reliable sources,
White House quietly ordered
id R. Young of Henry A.
'nger's national security
and Egil Krogh Jr. of
D. Ehrlichman's domestic
sory staff to investigate the
and to stop them.0?-
accor-dilfg
ew ?
j-yea
i, ? I 31j itation
44MM:I ?
n ite 'ouse.
is not known? specifically
w t Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young
done in the five months
e the security assignment
added to their duties. They
reported to have reviewed
procedures used by the
cil and to have inquired
the methods used by coun-
embers, such as Secretary
tate William P. Rogers, to
are for meetings and to
e the council's papers.
F.B.I. Called In
esumably, Mr. Krogh and
Young have had their task
more difficult by the dis-
res by Mr. Anderson. The
ce Department has con-
ed that the Administration
called on the Federal
au of Investigation to in-
gate the leaks.
According to one source, Mr.
Krogh and Mr. Young are
authorized to call on the F.B.I.
ut hold the principal re-
sponsibility because "it is a
White House problem" and be-
cause "it would be inappro-
priate to send some F.B.I. man
around to talk with people like
the Secretary of State." It is not
known whether Mr. Rogers
'himself was interviewed.
rom ted
The
a
Imes,
actiC14
a
corres
eoortea mat rune. p...an
or had 'roue - ? to
n-
men
WOU
rgnstcpatinrvint %pm iana-oased
es and missile submarines.
et=dier also reiroRMitat
? 300 e en we
tt: as
zajzLes in
tte S'OnetlIpil _to
arzeeteggnsive
The artzerrilTr-that the
American proposals had been
made orally at negotiations in
Helsinki but that specific draft
agreements were still being
written in Washington.
According to one Govern-
ment official, the disclosure
came "during a very critical
stage of the negotiations" and
the proposals involved "were
not even in any written memo."
He said the Administration's
feeling was that the informa-
tion had to come from someone
present at the discussions of
the National Security Council.
Officials at council meetings
include representatives of th
Defense and State Departments,
the intelligence community and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The F.B.I. has conducted an
extensive investigation ov
more than four months in
effort to uncover Mr. Beecher's
sources. The inquiry has been
conducted here, elsewhere in
the United States and abroad,
and was still going on last
week.
1
:
'
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Lt) AS i4 9e3s1-
44.E.w_ateitive.44gred For Release 2001/11/naA-RDP711:2K111;003000pRy
Secret Paper
Says Press
'Slanted' War
By Laurence Stern
and Sanford J., thigar
wiwunstgp oi Wpfers
During the' secret: delibera-
tions of the top Nixon admin.
Istration policy makers on the
Indo-Pakistani cri $ is last
month, an assistant secretary
of defense accused the press
of "slanting" its war coverage
against Pakistan.
Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for International Secur-
ity Affairs G. Warren Nutter
made the charge in an ex-
change with President Nixon's
national security adviser,
Henry A. Kissinger, during
the White House session on
December 4.
"It goes without saying,"
Nutter commented, "that the
entire press is slanting this
war to place the entire blame
on the Pakistanis and to show
that they attacked India."
Kissinger then said, "This
has been a well-done pqlitical
campaign for which we will
ray.,,
The exchange was recorded
in a "memorandum for record"
pi eared by James H. Noyes,
a deputy to Nutter.
The memorandum, which
purportedly quotes the partici-
pants directly, is one of sev-
eral documents that have been
in the posSeSsion of The Wash-
ington Post, which obtained
them from columnist Jack
Anderson.
It covers the same meeting
as another memorandum pub-
lished in Wednesday's editions
of The Washington Post. The
other memorandum, drafted by
Navy Capt. Howard N. Kay
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
reported the secret session in
paraphrase form.
See DOCUMENTS, Al, Col. I
:The Noyes Memorandum also
recorded Kissinger's assertion
that President Nixon was
angry With the version of
events that was being put out
in State Department press back-
grounders.
This issue came up during
discussion of American stra-
tegy in the United Nations de-
bate over the war.
"Both Yahya (West Pakistan
President Yahya Khan) and
Mrs. Gandhi are making belli-
cose Statements. If we refer
to Mrs. Gandhi's in our state-
ment, do we not also have to
refer to Yalta's?" asked Assis-
tant Secretary of State Sam-
uel dePalma.
Kissinger is reported as re-
plying:
s5 ,ger so recorded as
having said: "We have told the
Pelts we would make our state-
ment. Let's go ahead and put
in our own stateltient anyway
regardless of vvhat other coun-
tries want to do.
"We need now te make our
stand clear even though it has
taken us two weeks of fiddling.
We need our resolution tabled.
We want to insist on a cease-
fire and withdrawal of forces
before the details of a political'
settlement are considered."
India opposed the pull-back
resolution on grounds that its
troops would have to with-
draw to bases more than 400
miles from the border while
the Pakistani bases were only
a few miles from the front.
tional Seturit Council's Was -
, I $ I - ? girelrOanilLegi
? UI I it Il?
up,
1
"The President says either
the bureaucracy should put out
the right statement on this, or
the White House will do it.,
Can the UN object to Yahya's
statements about defending
his country?"
DePalma answered: "We
will have difficulty in the UN
because most Of the countries
who might go with us do not
want to tilt toward Pakistanl
to the extent we do."
"Whoever is doing the back-
grounding at State," Kissinger,
is then quoted as saying, "is
invoking the President's wrath.
Please try to follow the Presi-
dent's wishes."
At another point, Kissinger
is quoted as expressing, in bit-
ter terms, his pessimism about
the eventual outcome of the
U.N. Security Council meeting.
"Nothing will happen at the
Security Council because ot
Soviet vetoes. The whole thing
is a farce."
As events developed, the
Soviet Union did veto the res-
olution sponsored by the
United States and other coun-
tries calling for a mutual pull-
ing back of troops and an im-
raediate cease fire.
/?1 sic ijiroetataie., watt opeqd
;XiatralintelljtgAnce Ageney
Director RI hard M. Berms.
Helms to Soviet-MP-
12211-tiziglilia-14--,thet-eragr-giV g
vimflirt In_ an aside
C011eouPs the CIA directer ad-
vised
"You should all read our
An erson's disclosures of
secret U.S. policy discussions
about the Indo-Pakistani crisis
brought an announcement yes-
terday from a second congres-
sional committee that hearings
will be held on the govern-
ment's security classification
system.
asitteg_rellergign_Quegations
end Government InforraUn
44,11.4Lexh_mitammilearjags
tti?Mageb.
They will cover the first
five years of operations of the
Freedom of Information Act,
as well as "the whole prob-
lem of classification," includ-
ing the Anderson documents.
Moorhead conceded there
may be "overlap" with an in-
vestigation announced
Wednesday by the House
Armed Services Committee.
An rin investigation into
Anderson's sources for the
Indo-Pakistani documents con-
tinued yesterday. Justice De-
partment sources said, how-
ever: that it was not of the
scale of an ea'rlfer probe con-
certing disclosures of the
Pentagon Pitii-eri on the War
In Vietnam.
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N,EYV YORK TIMES
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11,S, ENVOY IN INDIA
, DISPUTED POLICIES
"
BACKING PAKISTAN
Keating Said Explanation of
Nixon's Stand Was Hurting
,::Americans' Credibility
rACTS ALSO QUESTIONED
Ambassador's Cable Bared
by Columnist, Who Also
Replies to Kissinger
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Jan. 5?Ken-
neth B. Keating, United States
Ambassador to India, com-
plained in a secret cablegram to
The documentr provide an Pakistan. Ambassador 'Keating'
unusual look into the thinking
and actions of Mr. Nixon and
his advisers on national se-
curity affairs at the start of
the crisis, which eventually led
to the Indian capture of East
Pakistan and the establishment
of a breakaway state there
under the name Bangladesh.
Because the White House Se-
curity Action Group, known
here as WSAG, did not have a
formal structure, the language
of Mr. Kissinger and the other
participants was often looser,
more piquant and franker than
that in public statements by
Mr. Kissinger and other Admin-
istration spokesmen at the
time.
On Dec. 3, the day that full-
scale fighting broke out, Mr.
Kissinger told the White House
strategy session, according to
one document:
"I am getting hell every half-
hour from the President that
we are not being tough enough
on India. He has just called me
again. He does not believe we
are carrying out his wishes. He
is also understood to have
argued since March, when the
repression began, for a state
ment against Pakistan.
Mr. Keating's cable, dated
Dec. 8, was in response to the
United States Information
Agency's account of a briefing
given by Mr. Kissinger at the
White House on Dec. 7, setting
forth the Administration's justi-
fication for its policy.
That briefing also became a
source of contention between
Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Ander-
son. In it Mr. Kissinger said that
the United States was not
"anti-Indian" but was opposed
to India's recent actions. Mr.
Anderson, seizing on the denial,
sought to prove that the Ad-
ministration was "anti-Indian,"
and therefore lying.
Dispute Over Relief
In his briefing Mr. Kissinger
said, among other things, that
the United States had allocated
$155-million to avert famine in
East Pakistan at India's "spe-
cific request."
Mr. Keating said that his
recollection from a conversa-
tion withtion with Foreign Min-
ister Swaran Singh was that
India "was reluctant to see a
cated that intelligence informa-
tion on the situation in South
Asia was quite thin, at least
in the early stages.
Mr. Helms and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?while agreeing
that India would win in East
Pakistan ? disagreed on the
time it would take. Adm. Elmo
R. Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval
Operations, came close by say-
ing it would take one to two
weeks, but there is no sign yet
that he was correct in predict-
ing that the Russians would
push for permanent use of a
base at Visag, on India's east
coast.
Often Mr. Helms simply read
rival claims by Pakistan and
India, without making any
judgment on their accuracy?
indicating that the United
States had no independent in-
formation.
Fears for West Pakistan
By Dec. 6, when it was clear
that the Indians would win in
East Pakistan, Mr. Sisco said
that "from a political point of
view our efforts would have to
be directed at keeping the In-
dians from extinguishing West
Pakistan."
After the war was over Mr.
relief program started in East Nixon said in an interview in
Washington during the Indian-
wants to tilt in favor of Paki- Pakistan prior to a political Time magazine that the Amen-
settlement on grounds such an can intelligence community
stan. He feels everything
Administration's justification for we do effort might serve to bail out" had reason to believe that
"
its pro-Pakistari.policy detracted comes out otherwise. Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya there were forces in India
The group included John N.IKhan, then President of Paki-
from American credibility and pushing for total victory but
Irwin, under secretary of state; stan, who was displaced after that under pressure from the
was inconsistent with his knowl-
Richard Helms, Director of the loss of East Pakistan. , United States the Soviet Union
edge of events. I The Ambassador noted that convinced India to order a
Central Intelligence
. The secret message to the
aomas - ' and Adm. the briefing said that the Indian cease-fire once East Pakistan
.
H. Moores, airman
Ambassador in Washington, L.
State ' Department was made
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. K. Jha, was informed on Nov.
available to: The New York The next day, Dec. 4, the 19 that the United Sttates and
Times at its request by the syn- United States called for a meet. Pakistan were prepared to dis-
dicated columnist Jack Ander- ing of the United Nations Se- cuss a precise schedule for po- plans to invade West Pakistan.
son: who says he has received curitY Council to discuss the:litical autonomy in East Paki- But in the period covered by
from:unidentified United States war and to press India for asstan but that India had sabo- the documents made public by
Government informants "scores? withdrawal. Joseph J. Sisco, As-:taged the efforts by starting the Mr. Anderson there seemed
of highly classified documents sistant Secretary of State for war. considerable confusion in the
Near Eastern and South Asian "The only message I have on Administration. At one point
relating to the conflict last Affairs, told newsmen that the record of this conversation ?Mr. Kissinger said that Mr.
month. United States believed that makes no reference to this crit- I Nixon might want to honor
- Today Mr. Anderson?assert- India bore "the major respon- ical fact," Mr. Keating said. any requests from Pakistan for
sibility" for the fighting. Mr. Kissinger said at the American arms ? despite an
The decision by the Adminis- briefing, that when Prime Min- i American embargo on arms to
tration to attach blame to India ister Indira Ghandi was in 1
!India or Pakistan.
surrendered.
This version of events has
been officially denied by New
Delhi, w.hich said it had no
ing-that he was irked by a com-
ment from Henry A. Kissinger,
President Nixon's adviser on came as something of a surprise Washington in early November, , It was decided at the Dec. 6
national security disputing thelie Washington since most dip-"we had no reason to believe session to look into the possi-
accuracy of some of his re .Clom ex_ that military action was that ats and officials had bility of shipping arms quietly
to Pakistan. But the State De-
partment said today that no
action was taken.
Carrier Sent to Rejoin
pslumns?released the Defense pected a more neutral stance.
,Department's record .of three! Disagreed With 'Tilt'.
-op-level White House strategy Critics of the Administration
,tessions held at the start of such as Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, Democrat of Massa-
chusetts, and Senator Frank and Islamabad, and my own
.Secret Sensitive' Reports Church, Democrat of Idaho, had decisions in Washington, I do
The reports of the meetings been complaining about Mr. not understand statement that
Nixon's failure to criticize Paki- 'Washington was not given the
of Dec. 3, 4 and 6, were classi- stan for her bloody represseion slightest inkling that any mill-
fled "secret sensitive." A low-
of the East Pakistani autonomy tary operation was in any way
imminent and that we did not
have time to begin to work on
a peaceful resolution."
"With vast and voluminous
efforts of intelligence commu-
nity, reporting from both Delhi
key investigation is underway movement and the arrest of its
to ascertain who leaked the leader, Sheik Mujibur Rhaman.
documents to Mr. Anderson. He Mr. Anderson has indicated
said today that he was ready, that the documents in his pos-
session were leaked by offi-
if necessary, for a battle with cials who disagreed With the
the' Government. [Details on Administration's "tilt" toward
Page, j7.] - I
imminent,'" Mr. Keating re-
sponded. He said that on Nov.
12 he sent a cable "stating
specifically that war Is quite
imminent.
The record of the White
House strategy.. sessions indi-
"It is quite obvious that the
President is not inclined to let
the Paks be defeated," Mr.
Kissinger said, apparently re-
ferring to the possibility of the
loss of West Pakistan.
Later on in the crisis the
United States sent the nuclear-
powered aircaft carrier Enter-
prise into the Indian Ocean, ap-
parently as a show of force to,
deter any attack on West Pak-
istan, sources said at the time..
. .
coatinued
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- Mr: Kissinger asked at- the
Dec. 3 meeting for clarification
of a "secret special interpre-
tation" of a March, 1959, United
States-Pakistani accord by whic
the United States would come
to Pakistan's aid in case of at-
tack. Later, Administration offi-
cials said that the United States
was bound only to come to
Pakistan's aid in case of attack
bya Communist country.
Much of the discussion -re-
volved around tactics in the
United Nations. Mr. Kissinger
indicated some frustration with
the pwerlessness of the world
body to take action because of-
the Soviet veto.
"If the United Nations can't
operate in this kind of situa-
tion effectively, its utility has
come to an end and it is use-
less to think of United Na-
tions guarantees in the Middle
East,", he said on Dec. 3. To-
day the State Department,
asked about that gloomy pre-
diction, sought to diminish its
importance by saying that the
United Nations could be effec-
tive in specific situations.
Many ideas were raised only
to be dropped. Despite strong
talk about cutting off aid to In-
dia, she only lost military aid
and development loans; food
products and so-called "irrevoc-
able loans" were not stopped.
Mr. Kissinger, reflecting the.
President's anger, said that
"henceforth we show a certain
coolness to the Indians; the In-
dian Ambassador is not to be
'treated at too high a level." An
Indian spokesman said to-
day that Mr. Jha had not sought
or been invited to an inter-
view with a high official since
thd crisis.
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EW YORK TIMES
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Officialdom in Action
Anderson's Revelations Provide Glimpse
Of How Leaders React Under Stress
By MAX FRANKEL
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Jan. 5?The
country has now caught The papers also suggest a
up
with the movies and received
remarkable degree of frustra-
some real-life Anderson tapes, tion and anger by the President
a
or at least minutes, and they and is principal security ad-
viser, Henry A. Kissinger, over
offer a fascinating glimpse of
t
government?a faithful account the presumed unwillingness of
of how high-ranking officials the bureaucracy to follow their
talk to one another
under instructions and adopt their
?
stress. But to be read fairly
view of the war. And they dem-
a n d profitably, onstrate some of the methods
?
these revelations ? from htreats to jokes ?
News also need more
htat Mr. Kissinger uses to en-
Analysis explanation and force the Presidential will.
Information, only The leak of these papers to
some of which is Jack Anderson, particularly so
soon after the Pentagon papers,
obviously troubles tht White
House and many other high
Government officials. The hunt
for the culprit is less energetic
than might be imagined, ap-
parently because the conse-
quences are thought to he
more of an embarrassment
than a compromise of diplo-
matic or military secrets.
But a breach of confidence
about discussions at such a
high level may result in serious
side effects. It could encourage
an already secretive President
to cut off even more officials
from policy deliberations, thus
denying them both influence
and understanding. It could
available so far.
These are not the equivalent
of the massive Pentagon papers
on Vietnam. In one sense, they
are even more vivid: they
record the crisis managers in
action, barely one month after
the -fact, in the early days of
the India-Pakistan war. In
every other sense, however,
they are only fragmentary:
they deal with tactical discus-
sions during a few days, with-
out relation to the larger cal-
culations of American interests,
in South Asia and elsewhere.
The Andreson minutes do not
.offer conclusive proof of any
major deception. The Nixon Ad-
ministration's sympathy for
Pakistan and anger over what also further inhibit thQ candor
it called Indian "aggression" of official discussions and
were obvious at the time. But record-keeping.
they do reveal that the White It is widely believed here,
House secretly toyed with the even by mony reporters who
idea of giving more positive delight in printing secrets, that
military help to Pakistan than orderly administration and fair
it acknowledged, dealings with the public as well
Interpretation Questioned as with other nations require
a certain amount of confidenti-
And the further disclosure May in Government offices.
today of Ambassador Kenneth This view reflects the convic-
B. Keating's complaint about tion that sound decisions de-
the Administration's public pend upon energetic and free
statements suggests that the debate and often upon brutal
judgments of the White House judgments about the motives,
may have rested on a debatable strengths and weaknesses of
reading of prewar diplomatic individuals, groups and govern-
events. ments.
Indeed, the new disclosures ? But secrecy is also widely
once again point up the failure employed here to mislead the
of the Administration to reveal Public, to hide errors of judg-
all the reasons for the Presi. ment or calculations of personal
dent's anger at the Indians, for
or political profit. It has there-
his willingness at every turn
fore become customary for re-
to give the Pakistanis the bene-
porters to try to penetrate of-
fit of every doubt and for his ficial confidences and to receive
readiness to side conspicuously and print as much information
with Pakistan and China, thus as they can get, from sources
enhancing the Soviet Union's both sympathetic and disgrun-
position in India and the Indian tied.
Ocean. Often the reporters do not
learn enough to explain events
fully. Sometimes they learn
more than the Government
deems to be in the national in-
terest. The Government's most
effective defense against leaks
from inside is an information
policy of candor that satisfies
public curiosity about an event
and leaves officials immune to
charges of duplicity or decep-
tion.
Unusually Large Audience
The audience for Mr. Ander-
son's disclosures was unusually
large here today, clearly be-
cause the Nixon Administra-
tion's policies and conduct in
South Asia over the last 10
months are not yet widely un-
derstood.
The White House minutes
confirm there was a general
fear that India might seek to
dismember West Pakistan after
she severed East Pakistan from
the West. The basis for that
fear has not been publicly dem-
onstrated, and it was not dis-
cussed at the compromised
meetings..
The minutes portray an un-
seen President driving his assis-
tants into words and deeds that
would punish India. But they
reveal nothing about Mr.
Nixon's apparent personal affi-
nity for the Pakistani leaders
and dislike of high Indian offi-
cials. Nor do they shed any
light on the intensity of the
effort the White House says it
made to find a peaceful soluti
-
One of Mr. Anderson's recent
columns about the war?but
not the documents he has re-
leased?portrayed the President
as confident that the Indians
would not allow themselves to
become wholly dependent on
the Russians and that the risks
of offending them were there-
fore less than critics believed.
But there has been no official
explanation to this effect, nor
any accounting of why the
United States was willing to
diminish its own influence in
India and in the new state pro-
claimed by the Bengali seces-
sionists because of its pro-Pa-
kistani exertions and assertions
that could not alter the course
of the war.
If these issues were debated
among high officials, the record
remains secret. The tone of the
meetings now divulged sug-
gests that Mr. Kissinger, as so
often before, may simply have
been enunciating policy as pri-
vately determined by the Presk,
dent, with no back-talk wanted,1
and hardly any offered.
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6 N 1972
Kissinger Parley Excerpts
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, kn. 5 ?
Following are excerpts from a
background briefing for news
correspondents given on Dec.
7 by Henry A. Kissenger,
President Nixon's adviser on
national security. Senator
Barry Goldwater of Arizona
obtained the transcript from
the White House and inserted
It in The Congressional Rec-
ord on Dec. 9. It constitutes
a Nixon Administration sum-
mary of American policy at
the time of the meetings dis-
cussed in the documents
made public today by the
columnist Jack Anderson.
OPENING STATEMENT
There have been some com-
ments that the Administra-
tion is anti-Indian. This is
totally inaccurate. India is a
great country. It is the most
populous free country. It is
? governed by democratic pro-
cedures.
Americans through all ad-
ministrations in the postwar
period have felt a commit-
ment to the progress and de-
velopment of India, and the
American people have con-
tributed to this to the extent
of $10-billion.
Therefore, when we have
differed with India, as we
have in recent weeks,?we do
so with great sadness and
with great disappointment.
Now let me describe the-
situation as we saw it, going
back to March 25. March 25
is, of course, the day when
the central Government of
Pakistan decided to establish
military rule in East Bengal
and started the process
which has led to the present
situation.
The United States has
never supported the particu-
lar action that led to this
tragic series of events, and
the United States has always
recognized that this action
had consequences? which had
a considerable impact on In-
dia. We have always recog-
nized that the influx of refu-
gees into India produced the
danger of communal strife in
a country always precarious-
ly poised on the edge of
communal strife. We have
known that it is a strain on
the already scarce economic
resources of a country in the
process of development.
The United States position
has been to attempt two ef-
forts simultaneously: one, to
ease the human suffering and
to bring about the return of
the refugees; and secondly,
we have attempted to bring
about a political resolution of
the conflict which generated
the refugees in the first
place.
Now the United States did
not condone what happened
in March, 1971; on the con-
trary, the United States has
made no new development
loans to Pakistan since
March, 1971.
Secondly, there has been a
great deal of talk about mili-
tary supplies to Pakistan. The
fact of the matter is that im-
mediately after the actions in
East Pakistan at the end of
March of this past year, the
United States suspended any
neW licenses. It stopped the
shipment of all military sup-
plies out of American depots
or that were under Ameri-
can Governmental control.
The only arms that were con-
tinued to be shipped to Pak-
istan were arms on old li-
censes in commercial chan-
nels, and these were spare
parts. There were no lethal
and end-items involved.
To give you a sense of the
magnitude, the United States
cut off $35-million worth of
arms at the end of March
of this year, or early April
of this year, immediately
after the actions in East Ben-
gal, and continued to ship
something less than $5-mil-
lion worth; whereupon, all
the remainder of the pipeline
was cut off.
It is true the United States
did not make any public dec-
larations on its views of the
evolution, because the United
States wanted to use its in-
fluence with both Delhi and
Islamabad to bring about a
political settlement that
would enable the refugees to
return. ,
We attempted to promote
a political settlement, and if
I can sum up the difference
that may have existed be-
tween us and the Government
of India, it was this:
We told the Government
of India on many occasions
? the Secretary of State saw
the Indian Ambassador 18
times; I saw him seven times
since the end of August on
behalf of the President. We
all said that political auton-
omy for East Bengal was the
inevitable outcome of political
evolution and that we fa-
vored it. The difference may
have been that the Govern-
ment of India wanted things
so rapidly. that it was ? no
longer talking about political
evolution, but about political you are now giving? The per-
collapse. ception of the world is that
We told the Indian Prime the United States regards In-
Minister when she was here ?dia as an aggressor; that it
of the Pakistan offer to with- is anti-India, and you make
draw their troops unilaterally a fairly persuasive case here
from the border. There was that that is not the case. So
no response, why this late date?
We told the Indian Prime Mr. Kissinger. We were re-
Minister when she was here luctant to believe for a long
that we would try to arrange time that the matter had
negotiations between the Pak- come down to a naked re-
istanis and members of the course to force, and we were
Awami League, specifically attempting for the first two
approved by Mujibur, who is weeks of the military opera-
in prison. We told the Indian tions to see what could be
Ambassador shortly before done to quiet it through per-
sonal diplomacy conducted
his return to mum that we
were prepared even to dis-
cuss with them a political
timetable, a precise timetable
for the establishment of po-
litical autonomy in East Ben-
gal. '
When we say that there
was no need for military ac-
tion, we do not say that India
did not suffer. We do not
say that we are unsympa-
thetic to India's problems or
that we do not value India.
This country, which in
many respects has had a love
affair with India, can only,
with enormous pain, accept
the fact that military action
was taken in our view with-
out adequate cause, and if
we express this opinion in the
United Nations, we do not
do so because we want to
support one particular point
of view on the subcontinent,
or because we want to forego
our friendship with what will
always be one of the great that it was necessary to en-
countries in the world; but gage in military action. We
because we believe that if, believe that what started as
as some of the phrases go, a tragedy in East Bengal is
the right of military attack now becoming an attempt to
is determined by arithmetic, dismember a sovereign state
if political wisdom consists and a member of the United
of saying the attacker has Nations.
500 million and the defender So the view that was ex-
has 100 million, and, there- pressed on Saturday is not
fore, the United States must inconsistent with the view
always be on the side. of the that is expressed today. What
,
numerically stronger, then we was done today is an explana
are creating a situation tion of the background that
where, in the foreseeable we led to the statement on
will have international an_ Saturday, and it might have
archy, and where the period been better if we had put
of peace, which is the great- ,the whole case forward.
est desire for the President to
establish, will be jeopardized;
not at first for Americans,
necessarily, but for peoples
all over the world.
Questions and Answers
Q. Why was the first semi-
public explanation of the
American position one of
condemning India, and why
this belated explanation that
by the Department of State.
We made two appeals to
the Indian Prime Minister.
We appealed also to the Paki-
stan President, and we ap-
pealed also to the Soviet
Union.
Now, then, on Friday the
situation burst into full-blown
war and it was decided to
put the facts before the pub-
lic. Now, I cannot, of course,
accept the characterization
that you made of the way
these facts were put forward:
that they were put forward
as anti-Indian.
Q. I satd the perception of
the world public was that
the United States was anti-
Indian because of the nature
of that first background
briefing at the State Depart-
ment on Friday.
A. We are opposed to the
use of military force in this
crisis, and we do not believe
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDF'74600415R000300020017-5
NEW YoRUQYElikt% Release 2001/11/01 : CIA&M.41n07049020017-4DAGE c
Texts of Secret Documents
Specie to The New Yolk Times
WASHINGTON, Jan. 5--Pollowing are the ,texts of three secret
documents made public today by the columnist7ack Anderson describ-
ing meetings of the National Security ConncTri Washington Special
Action Group on the crisis between India and 'Pakistan:
eino on Dec Meeting
Secret Sensitive
ASSIST'ANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
Offer' to: .1.-i0643
International Security Affairs
Memorandum for Record
SUBJECT
wsAri meeting on India/Pakistan
participWras.
Assistant to the President for national
security affairs?Henry A. KisSinger
Under Secretary of State ?John N
Irwin
Deputy Secretary of Defense ? David
Packard
`bireFtor, Central Intelligence Agency?
Richard M. Helms
Deputy Administrator (A.I.D.)?Maurice
3. 'Williams
Chairipan, Joint Chiefs of Staff? Adm.
- Thomas H. Moorer
AssiStant Secretary of State (N.E.E.A,R.)
---Joseph J. Sisco
AssfStant Secretary of Defense (LS.A..)
Warren Nutter
fent, Secretary of State (I.0.)?
' I De Palma
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
(I.S.A.)?Armistead I. Selden
Assistant Administrator (A.I.D/N.E.SA.)
-*Donald G. MacDonald
TIME AND pLACE
3 December 1971, 1100 hours, Situa-
tion Room, White House.
HELMS: Concerning the reported ac-
tion in the west wing, there are con-
flicting reports from both sides and the
only common ground is the Pak attacks
on tbe Amritsar, Pathankot and Srina-
gar airports. the Palo say the Indians
are attacking all along the border; but
the Indian officials say this is a lie.
In the east wing the action is becoming
larger and the Paks claim there are
now seven separate fronts involved.
KISSINGER: Are the Indians seizing
territory?
HELMS: yes; small bits of territory,
definitely.
SISCO: It would help if you, could
provide a map with a shading of the
areas occupied by India. What is hap-
pening in the West?is a full-scale at-
tack likely?
.MOGRER: The present pattern is puz-
zling in that the Paks have only struck
at three small airfields which do, not
house significant numbers of Indian
combat aircraft.
HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's speech at 1:30
May well announce recognition of
Bangladesh.
MOORER: The Pak attack is not
credible. It has been made during late
afternoon, which doesn't make seise.
We do not seem to have sufficient facts
on this yet.
KISSINGER: Is it possible that the
Indians attacked first and the Paks sim-
ply did what they could before dark
SUMMARY julitonse?
Reviewed conflicting reports about
major actions in the west wing. C.I.A.
agreed to produce map showing areas
of East Pakistan occupied by India.
The President orders hold on issuance
of additional irrevocable letters of ,
credit involving $99-million, and a hold
on further action implementing the $7-
million P.L. 480 credit. Convening of
Security Council meeting planned con-
tingent on dischssion with Pak Ambas-
sador this afternoon plus further clari-
fication of actual situation in West
Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarifica-
ton of secret special interpretation of
March, 1959, bilateral U. S. agreement
with Pakistan.
KISSINGER: I am getting hell every
half-hour from the President that we
are not being tough enough on India.
He has just called me again. He does
not believe we are carrying out his
wishes. He wants to APpraVed Ebr
Pakistan. He feels everything we do
Comes out otherwise.
SISCO: We WE have a recommenda-
tion for you this afternoon, after the
meeting with the Ambassador. In order
to give the Ambassador time to wire
home, we could tentatively plan to con-
vene the Security Council tomorrow.
KISSINGER: We have to take action.
The President is blaming me, but you
people are in the clear.
SISCO: That's ideal!
KISSINGER: The earlier draft for
Bush is too even-handed.
SISCO: To recapitulate, after we have
seen the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary
will report to you. We will update the
draft speech for Bush,
KISSINGER: We can say we favor
political accommodation but the real job
of the Security Council is to prevent
military action.
SISCO: We have never had a reply
either from Kosygin or Mrs. Gandhi.
WILLIAMS: Are we to take economic
steps with Pakistan also?
KISSINGER: Wait until I talk with
the President.- He hasn't addressed this
problem in connection with Pakistan
yet.
SISCO: If we act on the Indian side,
we can say we are keeping the Pakistan
situation "under review."
KISSINGER: It's hard to tilt toward
Pakistan if we have to match every
Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you
wait until Monday, I can get a Presiden-
tial decision.
? PACKARD: It should be easy for us
to inform the banks involved to defer
action inasmuch as we are so near
the weekend.
KISSINGER: We need a WSAG in the
morning. 'We need to think about our
treaty obligatipns. I remember a letter
-11F?ITitofttn- iniftreting our existing
treaty with a special India tilt. When I
visited Palostaittn Janua?p, 1962, I was
briefed on a secret document or oral
itrr- n
This is certainly ossible
t , = ? understanding about contingetete
KISSINGER: The President wants no ing in other than the SEATO context
more irrevocable letters of credit issued Perhaps it was a Presidential letter.
under the $99-million credit. He wants This was a special interpretation of the
?he $721nillion P.L. 480 credit also held. March, 1959, bilateral agreement.
WILLIAMS: Word will soon get
around when we do this. Does the
President understand that?
KISSINGER: That is his order, but I
will check with the President again. If
asked, we can say we are reviewing
our whole economic program and that
the graining of fresh aid is being stls-
pended in view of conditions on the
subcontinent. The next issue is the U.N.
IRWIN: The Secretary is calling in the
Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the
Secretary leans toward making a U.S.
move in the U.N. soon.
KISSINGER: The President is in favor
of this as soon as we have some con-
firmation of this large-scale new action.
licr-211-1. Wight% 74B00415R000300020017-5
to an end and it is useless to think of
U.N. guarantees in the Middle East.
Prepared by:
/S/ initials
JAMES M. NOYES
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern, African and South Asian Af-
fairs
Approved:
(illegible signature)
For G. Warren Nutter Assistant Sec-
retary of Denfense for International
Security Affairs
Distribution: Secdef, Depsecdef, CJCS,
ASD(ISA), PDASD(ISA), DASD: NEASA
& PPNSCA, Dep Dir: NSCC & PPNSCA,
CSD files, R&C files, NESA.
I If
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020017-5
NEW YORK TIMES DATE 67 PAGE/6
Account of Dec. 4 Meeting
Covering Memorandum
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
Secret-Sensitive
Memorandum for: Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army
Chief of Staff, U.S. Ail-- Force
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant of the Marine Corps
SUBJECT
Washington Special Action Group
meeting on Indo/Pakistan hostilities; 4
December 1971
1. Attached for your information is
a Memorandum for record concerning
subject meeting.
2. In view of the sensitivity of infor-
; mation in the N.S.C. system and the
detailed nature of this memortndum,
it is requested that access to it be
limited to a strict need-to-know basis.
For the chairman, J.C.S.:
A. K. KNOIZEN
Captain, U.S. Navy
Executive assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff
Report on the Meeting
Secret Sensitive
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
5 DECEMBER 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT
Washington Special Action Group
meeting on Indo-Pakistan hostilities; 4
December 1971.
1. The N.S.0 Washington Special Ac-
tion Group met in the Situation Room,
the White House, at 1100, Saturday,
4 December, to consider the Indo-
Pakistan situation. The meeting was
chaired by Dr. Kissinger.
2. Attendees
A. Principals:
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Dr. John Hannah, A.I.D.
Mr. Richard Helms, C.I.A.
Dr. G. Warren Nutter, Defense
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, J.C.S.
Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State
B. Others:
Mr. James Noyes, Defense
Mr. Armistead Selden, Defense
Rear Adm. Robert Welander, 0.J.C.S.
Capt. Howard Kay, 0.J.C.S.
Mr. Harold Saunders, N.S.C.
Col. Richard Kennedy, N.S.C.
Mr. Samuel Hoskanson, N,S.C.
Mr. Donald MacDonald, A.I.D.
Mr. Maurice Wiliams, A.I.D.
Mr. John Waller, C.I.A.
Mr. Samuel De Palma, State
Mr. Bruce Laingen, State
Mr. David Schneider, State
3. Summary. It was decided that the
U.S. would request an immediate meet-
ing of the Security Council. The U. S.
resolution would be introduced in a
speech by Ambassador Bush as soon
as possible. The U.S.G.-U.N. approach
would be tilted toward the Paks. Eco-
nomic aid for Pakistan currently in ef-
fect will not be terminated, No require-
ments were levied on the J. C. S.
4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by
indicating that the Indians were cur-
rently engaged in a no holds barred
attack of East Pakistan and that they
had crossed the border 011 all sides this
morning. While India had attacked
eight Pak airfields there were still no
indications of any ground attacks in
the West. Although not decreeing a for-
mal declaration of war, President Yahya
has stated that "the final war with
India is upon us," to which Mrs. Gandhi
had responded that the Pak announce-
ment of war constituted the ultimate
folly. The Indians, however, had made
it a point not to declare war. The In-
dian attacks have hit a major P.O.L.
area in Karachi resulting in a major
fire which will likely be blazing for a
considerable length of time, thus pro-
viding a fine target for the India air
force. Mr. Helms indicated that the
Soviet assessment is that there is not
much chance of a great power confron-
tation in the current crisis.
5. Dr. Kissinger remarked that if the
Indians have announced a full scale
invasion, this fact must be reflected in
our U.N. statement.
6. Mr. Helms indicated that we do
not know who started the current ac-
tion, nor do we know why the Paks hit
the four small airfields yesterday.
7. Dr. Kissinger requested that by
Monday the C.I.A. prepare an account
of who did what to whom and when.
8. Mr. De Palma suggested that if we
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0415R000300020017-5
Msoctled
pros,
JA-PA.KIpAN PAPERS, which Jack Anderson, the columnist,
,utetl n Washington yesterday. They are classified Secret-Sensitive.
refer to the India declaration in our
discussion in the U.K, -that we almost I
certainly will have to refer to remarks
by Yahya.
Dr. Kissinger replied that he was
under specific instructions from the
President, and either someone in the
bureaucracy would have to prepare this
statement along the lines indicated or
that it would be done in the White
House.
10. Mr. Helms referred to the "no
holds barred" remark in the official
India statement and similar remarks
that were being made' from the Pak side.
11. Dr. Kissinger asked whether the
Indians have stated anything to the
effect that they were in an all-out war.
12. Mr. Helms said that the termi-
nology was "no holds barred."
13, Dr. Kissinger asked what the Paks
have said. Mr. Helms said the termi-
nology was "final war with India."
Dr. Kissinger suggested this was not an.
objectionable term. It did not seem
outrageous to say that they (the Paks)
were trying to defend themselves.
14. Dr. Kissinger then asked what
was happening in the U.N., to which
Mr. De Palma responded that the U.K.,
? Belgium, Japan and possibly - France
were joining for a call for a Security
Council meeting. The Japanese had
detected some slight tilt in our letter
requesting the meeting. The Japanese
preferred a blander formulation. We
have not, however, reacted to the
Japanese.
15. Dr. Kissinger asked to see the
letter and requested that it be promul-
gated in announcing our move in the
U.N., to which Mr. De Palma -responded
affirmatively.
16. Dr. Kissinger stated that while he
had no strong view on the letter, our
position must be clearly stated in the
announcement.
1.74' Dr. Kissinger stated he did not
care how third parties might read: -?o
long as Ambassador Bush understands
what he should say.
18. Dr. Kissinger said that_whay_er
was putting out background infrraffOli
relative to the current situation is pro-
voking Presidential wrath. The Pres-
ident is under the "illusion" that he is
giving instructions; not that he is mere-
ly being kept apprised of affairs as they
progress.Di"cM.ii`iYtitClaFlatt Ratetnixe 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R
be kept in mind,
. 19. Mr. De Palrna indicated that he
. did not yet know whether the Security
cptmcil would be conyertedin the after-
noon or evening (this date). However,
the first statements at the meeting
would likely be those by the Indians
and Paks. He suggested that Ambassa-
dor Bush should be one of the first
speakers immediately following the
presentation by the two contesting
nations. He fet that the impact of our
statement would be clearer if it were
made early. Dr. Kissinger voiced no
objections.
20. Mr. De Palma asked whether we
wanted to get others lined up with our
resolution before we introduced it. This,
however, would take time. Dr. Kissinger
suggested rather than follow this
course, we had better submit the reso-
lution as quickly as possible, alone if
necessary. According to Dr. Kissinger
the only move left for us at the present
time is to make clear our position rela-
tive to our greater strategy. Everyone
knows how all this will come out and
everyone knows that India will ulti-
mately occupy East Pakistan. We must,
thereore, make clear our position, table
our resolution. We want a resolution
which will be introduced with a speech
by Ambassador Bush. If others desire
to come along with us, fine; but in any
event we will table the resolution with
a speech by Ambassador Bush.
21. Dr. Kissinger continued that it
was important that we register our
position. The exercise in the U.N. is
likely to be an exercise in futility, in-
asmuch as the Soviets can be expected
to veto. The U.N., itself, will in all
probability do little to terminate the
war. He summarized the foregoing by
saying that he assumed that our reso-
lution in the U.N. will be introduced
by a speech and there will be no delay.
Wp will go along in general terms with
reference to political accommodation in
East Pakistan but we will certainly not
imply or suggest any specifics, such as
the release of Mujib.
22. Dr. Kissinger asked how long the
Indians could delay action in the Coun-
cil. Mr. De Palma said they could make
long speeches or question our purpose.
Mr. Van Holten said that they would
draw out as long as possible which
would allow them to concentrate on
the situation in East Pakistan. Mr. De
Palma said that they could shilly-shally
for three or four days which, Mr. Helms
stated would be long enough for them
to occupy East Pakistan. Mr. De Palma
stated that we could always try to force
a vote. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that
there was no chance in getting any-
thing useful in the U.N.
23. Mr. De Palma suggested' that in
all likelihood one side or the other will
veto.
24. Concerning the matter of eco-
nomic aid, Dr. Kissinger stated that the
President had directed that cutoff was
to be directed at India only. He indi-
cated, however, that he wanted to read
the announcement to the President so
that the latter would know exactly what
he might be getting into. At this point
Mr. Williams asked whether some men-
tion should be made in the statement
explaining why aid for Pakistan is not
being cut off. Dr. Kissinger said that
information would be kept for back-
ground only.
25. Mr. Williams said that the De-
partment of Agriculture indicated that
the price of vegetable oil was weaken-
ing in the United States; thus cutting
off this P.L.-480 commodity to India
could have repercussions on the domes-
tic market. He asked, therefore, whether
oil could be shipped in place of wheat.
Dr. Kissinger said that he will have
the answer to that by the opening ot
business Monday.
26. Dr. Kissinger then asked for a
brief rundown on the military situation.
Admiral Zumwalt responded that he
thought the Paks could hold the line in
East Pakistan for approximately one
or two weeks before the logistics prob-
lems became overriding. He expected
the Soviets to cement their position in
India and to push for permanent usage n
of the naval base at Visag. He antici-
pated that the Soviet's immediate short
range objective would be to gain mili-
tary advantages through their current
relationship with India.
27. Dr. Kissinger indicated that the
next meeting will convene Monday
morning (Dec. 6).
/S/ H. N. Kay
H. N. KAY
tail'', U.S.N.
SOCttll'Asia/M.A.P. Branch,J5
Extension 72400
000300020
NEW iipsffwepli.Wgelease 2001/11/01 : CIA-FOR
IVIemo on Dec. 6 Meeting
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
6 December 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT
Washington Special Action Group.
meeting on Indo-Pakistan hostilities; e
December 1971.
I. The N. S. C. Washington Special
Action Group met in the Situation
Ream, the White House, at 1100, Mon-
day, 6 December, to consider the Indo-
Pakistan situation. The meeting was
chaired by Dr. Kissinger.
2. Attendees
A. Principals:
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Mr. I:tavid Packard, Defense
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, State
Gen. "William Westmoreland, J.C.S.
Mr. Richard Helms, C.I.A. '
Mr. DOnald MacDonald, A.I.D.
3. others:
Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State
Mr, Samuel De Palma, State
Mr. Bruce Lanigen, State
Mr. Joseph Sisco, State
Kr.. Armistead Selden, Defense
Mr. James Noyes, Defense
Mr. John Waller, C.I.A.
'Mr. Samuel Hoskanson, N.S.C.
Col. Richard Kennedy, N.S.C.
Mr. Harold Saunders, N.S.C.
Rear Adm. Robert Welander, 0.S.C.S.
Capt. Howard Kay, 0.J.C.S.
Mr. Maurict Williams, A.I.D.
3, Summary. Discussion was devoted
to the massive problems facing Bangla-
desh as a nation. Dr. Kissinger indicat-
ed that the problem should be studied
now. The subject of possible military
Terms Used in Texts
A.I.D.?Agency for International De-
velopment
A.S.!) (1.S.A.)?Assistant Secretary of De-
fense, International Security Affairs.
C.I.A.?Central Intelligence AganCY
C..1.C.5.?Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
D.A.S.D.: N.E.A.S.A. & P P.N.S.C.A.?DePutY
Assistant Secretary of Defense, near
Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs;
Deputy Assistent Secretary of Defense,
Policy Plans and National Security Coun-
cil Affairs.
Den Dir: N.S.C.C. & P. P.N .S.C.A.?Deputy
Director, Policy P ens and National Secu-
rity Council Affairs.
I.S.A.?International Security Affairs
of Offense Department
4.C.5.?Joint Chiefs of Staff
Pa017-5 PAGE
aid to Pakistan is also to be examined,
but on a very close hold basis. The
matter of Indian redeployment from
East to West was considered as was
the legality of the current sea "block-
ade" by India.
4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by
briefing the current situation. He stated
that the Indians had recognized Bangla-
desh and the Paks had broken diplo-
matic ties with India. Major fighting
continued in the East but India is en-
gaged in a holding action in the West.
Mr. Helms felt that the Indians will
attempt to force a decision in the East
within the next 10 days. The Indians
have almost total air superiority now
in the East where they can employ ap-
proximately a hundred of their aircraft
against Pak ground forces and logistic
areas. The Indians, however, have not
yet broken through on the ground in
East Pakistan. Major thrust of the Indian
effort in East Pakistan is in the north-
west corner of the province. The air-
field at Dacca is all but closed. The
Indians are registering only minor gains
in the Jessore area, but they claim to
have taken Kamalpur. In the West,
Indian activity is essentialty limited to
air attacks. The Paks appear to be on
the offensive on the ground and have
launched air strikes in Punjab. Overall,
the Paks claim 61 Indian aircraft
destroyed; the Indians claim 47 Pak
planes. In naval action one Pak destroy-
er has been sunk by the Indians and
another claimed sunked [sic]. The In-
dians also claim the sinking of one Pak
submarine in eastern waters. Moscow
is increasingly vocal in its support of
LOC.?Llne(s) of communication
N.E.A.?Near Eastern Affairs, Section
of State Department
N.E.S.A.?Near Eastern and South
Asian.
N.S.C.?National Security Council
0.J.C.S.?Office of Joint Chiefs of
O.S.D. Files?Office of Secretary of Defense
Files.
Pegs?Pakistanis
P.D.A.S.D. ( I S A.)?Principe I Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of Defense, international
Security Affairs.
P.O.L.?petroleum, oil and lubricants
& C Files?Records and Control Files.
P.L.?public law
Side?Secretary of Defense.
U.S.G.?United States Government
W.S.A.G.?WashInnton Special Action
Group, erns of National Security
Staff
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020017-5
India and is not supporting any U:N.',''' 4 44. Mr. Sisco opined that the Indians
moves to halt the fighting. The Chinese would pull out most of their troops
once the Pak forces are disarmed, inas-
ApproffFekeiikiteT20041/110011 : ?CIA-FREIP 74 Bilt043115R0 MOO NOON -5
n la t is morning.
5. Dr. Kissinger then asked for a willi_a_ very friendly population; thus,
military assessment, queitioning how Vill turn the military efforts over
fmtbe ,Mukti Bahini as quickly as pos-
'long the Paks might be able to hold
out in the East. General Westmoreland Oar, klq, felt that the extent and timing
.44f, Indian withdrawal from East Pakis-
responded that it might be as much as
tiiOuld depend to a large degree on
three weeks. developments in the West.
? 6. Dr. Kissinger asked what is to be
15. In response to a question, Gen-
done with Bangladesh. Mr. Helms stated era! Westmoreland stated that Indian
that for all practical purposes it is transportation capabilities were limited
an independent country, reco,g- from West to East, and that it would
d by India. probably take at least a week to move
7. Ambassador Johnson suggested one infantry division. It might take as
that the Pak armed forces now in East much as a month to move all or most
Pakistan could be held hostage. General of the Indian forces from the East to
Westmoreland re-enforted this by not- the West.
ing there was no means of evacuating 16. Mr. Sisco said that the long term
West Pak forces from the east wing, presence of Indian forces in Bangladesh
particularly in view of Indian naval would have to be addressed. Mr. Van
Superiority. , Hollen remarked that should the Indian
?B. Dr. Kissinger stated that the next Army remain more than two or three
state of play will involve determining weeks after the situation in East Pakis-
otIr attitude toward the state of tan is wrapped up they would, in fact,
Bangladesh.' become a Hindu army of occupation in
9. Mr. Williams referred to the one the eyes of the Bengalis.
and a half million urdu speaking (Bi- ,17.. Mr. Van Hollen raised the prob-
heti) people in East Pakistan who could lem of the return of the refugees from
also be held hostage. India. Inasmuch as Bangladesh is pre-
10. Dr. Kissinger asked if there had dominantly Moslem, the return of 10
already been some massacre of ,these ' million refugees, most of whom are
'people. Mr. Williams said that he cer- Hindu, would present another critidal
tainly thinks there will be. Dr. KiSsinger problem
asked if we could do anything, to which 18. General Westmoreland suggested
Mr. Williams stated that perhaps an that the Indian position in the West
International humanitarian effort could was not unadvantageous. He briefly dis-
be launched on their behalf. Dr. Kis- cussed the order of battle in West Paki-
singer asked whether we should be sten and suggested that the Indians
calling attention to the plight of these were in relatively good shape. He said
people now. Mr. Williams said that that he expected the major Pak effort -
most of these people were, in fact, cen- to be toward Kashmir and the Punjab.
otered around the rail centers; that they The Indians, he felt, will be striking
are Luton dwellers and that some ef- toward Hyderabad so as to cut the
forts on their behalf might well be main L.O.C. to Karachi. He did not
started through the U.N. Dr. Kissinger think that the Indians necessarily plan
SuggeSted that this be done quickly in to drive all the way to Karachi. He also
(liter to prevent a bloodbath. Mr. in suggested that the current Indian move
stated that while the U.N. cannqt do in that direction could very well be di-
anything on the ground at this time, versionary in order to force the Paks to
public attention could be focused on pull reserves back from the Kashmir
this situation through the General As-
area.
sembly.
19. Mr. Packard asked about the
11. Mr. Williams referred to the P.O.L. supply situation for Pakistan.
300,000 Bengalis in West Pakistan, and Mr. Helms said that at the present time
that they too were in some jeopardy. it looked very bad. The overland
Mr. Sisco said that this humanitarian L.O.C.'s from Iran, for example, were
issue could be a very attractive one for very tenuous.
the General Assembly and that we 20. Mr. Williams suggested that the
would begin to focus on Assembly reason fort he Indian thrust to the
action. Mr. MacDonald cited as a pos- south was essentially political. Inas-
sible precedent the mass movement of much as the Indians do not want to
population from North Vietnam in 1954 fight on the border they will have to
12. Returning to the military picture, give ground in Kashmir. In order to
Mr. Williams stated that he felt that the ward off parliamentary criticism, Mrs.
primary thrust of the Indian Army Gandhi may be going for some Pak real
would be to interdict Chittagong and estate in the south. ,
ctit ,off any supply capability still exist- 21. Dr. Kissinger then asked about
Leg for the Paks in the East. He said U.N. initiatives. Mr. Sisco said that we
that he felt that the major thrust of the are now reviewing the situation with
Indian Army in the East would be to Ambassador Bush. Two Security Coun-
destroy the Pak regular forces. He felt cil resolutions have been vetoed by the
that a major job would be to restore Soviets. However, there is a grouna-
order within the East inasmuch as it will swell building in New York for an
be laced with a massacre as great as emergency session by the General As-
any we have faced in the 20th century. sembly to be convened under the pro-
13. General Westmoreland suggested visions of the "threat to peace" mech-
that the Indians would probably need anism. The crisis could be moved into
three or four diVisions to continue to the Assembly through a simple ma-
Ap p rrir4sIvFqr lipiled4!okr.mittyor.CIAATOMINimighoppqmp.37,15
ain er cou e pu e out to assist
the Indian forces in the West. that any resolution introduced into the
general Assembly must retain two key
alompni-c? ("PACO fir e> and withdrawat nf
military forces. Dr. Kissinger agreed
that pur U.N. delegation has handled
the? _s Wituation exlreligilil to clate
1V101.,
^1;KP tkP ra Sie 20,,q0}/1 1/01
likely that the crisis will be introduced
in the General Assembly, we must re-
member that there are 136 Countries
represented therein and we can expect
all sorts of pressure to be generated.
Mr. De Palma suggested that when the
resolution is introduced in the Assem-
bly there will be a new twist, i.e.: the
Indians will be no longer terribly in-
terested in political accommodation. By
that time that issue will have ceased to
be a problem.
23. Mr. De Palma said that a Council
meeting was scheduled for 3:30 today
and at that time we could try to get
the Council to let go of the issue in
'order to transfer it to the Assembly,
it being quite obvious that we are not
going to get a cease-fire through the
Security Council.
24. Dr. Kissinger asked if we could
expect the General Assembly to get the
issue by the end of the day, to which
'Mr. De Palma replied that hopefully
this will be the case.
25. Dr. Kissinger said that we will
go with essentially the same speech
in the General Assembly as was made
in the Security Council, but he would
like something put in about refugees
and the text of our resolution.
26. Dr. Kissinger also directed that
henceforth we show a certain coolness
to the Indians; the Indian Ambassaddr
is not to be treated at too high a level.
J27:Dr. Kissinger then asked about
' a legal position concerning the current
Indian naval "blockade." Mr. Siko
Stated that we have protested both in-
idents in which American ships have
? been involved. However, no formai
prnclamation apparently has been made
ln terms of a declaration of a war, that
It is essentially still an undeclared war,
with the Indians claiming power to ex-
ercise their rights of beligerency. State
would however, prepare a paper on the
legal aspects of .the issue. Ambassador
Johnson said that so far as he was
cpncerned the Indians had no legal
position to assert a blockade.
28. Dr. Kissinger asked that a draft
protest be drawn up. If we considered
it illegal, we will make a formal dip-
lomatic protest, Mr,. .Sisco said that he
would prepare. such a protest.
29. Dr. Kissinger then asked whether
we have the right to authorize Jordan'
or Saudi Arabia to transfer military
equipment to Pakistan. Mr. Van Hollen
stated the United States cannot permit
a third country to transfer arms which
we have provided them when we, our-
selves, do not authorize sale direct to
the ultimate recipient, such as Pakistan.
As of last January we made a legisla-
tive decision not to sell to Pakistan.
Sisco said that the Jordanians
would be weakening their own position
by such a transfer and would probably
be grateful if we could get them off
the hook. Mr. Sisco went on to say
that as the Paks increasingly feel the
heat we will be getting emergency re-
quests from them.
id 3 161/914,0e(ste
ROWIVO 1 1 /0 1
quests. The matter has not been brought
to Presidential attention but it is quite
dined to let the Paks be defeated. Mr.
Packard then said that we _should look
Ah10105sW Ogiethiet#V0?1 7-5
Kfr. Kissinger indicated he would like
paper by tomorrow (7 Dec.).
ir2,1,?Mr. Sisco suggested that what
we a.re really interested in are what
supplies and equipment could be made
available, and the modes of delivery
of this equipment. He stated that from
a political point of view our efforts
would have to be directed at keeping
the Indians from "extinguishing" West
Pakistan.
32. Dr. Kissinger turned to the matter
of aid and requested that henceforth
letters of credit not be made irrevok-
able. Mr. Williams stated that we have
suspended general economic aid, not
formally committed, to India which
reduces the level to $10-million. He sug-
gested that what we have done for
Pakistan in the same category does not
become contentious inasmuch as the
Indians are now mobilizing all develop-
ment aid for use In the war effort,
whereas remaining aid for East Pakis-
tan is essentially earmarked for fertil-
izer and humanitarian relief. A case can
be made technically, politically and
legally that there is a difference be-
tween the aid given India and that given
to Pakistan.
33. Dr. Kissinger said to make sure
that when talking about cutoff of aid
for India to emphasize what is cut off
and not on what is being continued.
34. Dr. Kissinger then asked about
evacuation. Mr. Sisco said that the
Dacca evacuation had been aborted.
35. Dr. Kissinger inquired about a
possible famine in East Pakistan. Mr.
Williams said that we will not have a
massive problem at this time, but by
next spring this will quite likely be the
case. Dr. Kissinger asked whether we
will be appealed to bail out Bangladesh.
Mr. Williams said that the problem
would not be terribly great if we could
continue to funnel 140 tons of food a
month through Chittagong, but at this
time nothing is moving. He further
suggested that Bangladesh will need all
kinds of help in the future, to which
Ambassador Johnson added that Bangla-
desh will be an "international basket
case." Dr. Kissinger said, however, it
will not necessarily be our basket case."
Mr. Williams said there is going to be
need of massive assistance and reset-
tling of refugees, transfers of popula-
tion and feeding the population. Dr.
Kissinger suggested that we ought to
start ,studying this problem right now.
36. Mr. Williams suggested that the
Indians had consistently ,requested ref-
ugee aid in cash. The Indians in turn
will provide the food and support for
the Tefugees. This has provided India
with a reservoir of foreign currency.
Dr. Kissinger also asked that this prob-
lem be looked at by tomorrow to deter-
mine whether we could provide com-
modities in lieu of cash. We do not want
to cut off humanitarian aid. We would
like to provide material rather than
cash.
37. The meeting was then adjourned.
IS/ H. N. KAY
: CIA-RDMINI1j.?.13p0030002001 7-5
South Asia/M.A.P. Branch, J5
Extension 72400.
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP743001415R0014409920017-5
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 0,L PAGE (
House
ill Probe
ocuments
By Sanford J. Ungar
Washiriwton Post .taff Writer
Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-
A repoit t7lieultiled yester-
among high-level adminis-
La.), chai day airman of the House tration sources that the inves-
Armed Services Committee, tigation had already pin-
yesterday announced "a major officesr()noinatsedtheprobable psource of
in the Pentag-
.. - ... .
inquiry into the problem of l
*
proper classification and -. da describing meet-
&an .,. he National Security
dling of government interim- _!..7.M.,is41Engliiri IEPeoi,a1
tion involving the nada-al-Se:" Alta-KM, oup.
curity."
He said it was "a ,to ces stressed that
tile_ memoranda, prepared for
dence" that the invesqa ,wor
would come on the heel's oi' the- .Laiut Chiefs of Staff and
the release by syndicated cot-111...o.! G. Warren Nutter, assist-
umnist Jack Anderson of se, wit, searetary of defense for
cret government doeument;, international security affairs,
concerning American policy ir had been circulated only
.,
the Indo-Pakistani war. withiu the Pentagon.
Nonetheless, the disclos-(iro ''-TheY said they were espe-
of the top-secret Penfazoi 1 'Y surprised by the leak of
papers on the history of Viet' tile memoranda, because it
nam war last summer, am
now Anderson's release
rent documents, documents, appeared.
have focused new c
throughout the govern
over the troubled sect).
Would be relatively easy to
'trace their limited distribu-
.
-f5thet government officials,
Meyer, pointed their fingers
eigectetreft,
classification system. ,:hite House official
Zebert assigned the ,:j2th susUcted that the
probe, which will hegin St?e iepartrnent was the
o1TrtI after ? - SOIfftt dt the security breach.
to a spbc.mm that place leaks
IPA -REM '-?? p like _a _Ave," lie said, especial-
ritic u the lv ,Mstarides that might
a- make _ Henry A. Kissinger,
Pfegerbfit Nixon's national se-
a elephone interview "adviser, look bad.
-Mat, Nedzi said haT A e Pentagon, on the
is not thy intent to investigate hand, attention was di-
th leak" of documents to Au-i veite Oi the National Secur-
.
so gour&il.
intlY. The Justice Department con"-
MET -Jtoblerns ofj tinned to decline comment on
alfir?fecurtty, the continuing FBI investiga-
. tion.
how much is required and how
it iS handled and what kind of
new legislation may be neces-
sary," Nedzi said.
He acknowledged, however,
dei-so documents.
eared in
Wasjton Post
4 *b?1d Tmost nee-
.
ily" come op during tlie
?
?43.
'Affeanw soyerninen't in-
vitstigators pressed- their ef-
s to Locate Die source of
arson's documents.
Anderson continues his bat-
tle against government secrecy
today, switching from the
Indo-Pakistani war to secret
White House documents used
by President Nixon in prep-
aration for meetings At San
Clemente with Japanese Prime
Minister Eisaku Sato.
In a column distributed to
700 newspapers, including The
Washington l'oSt, Anderson
discloses the contents of brief-
ing papers prepared for the
President.
Those papers, Anderson
says, indicate that Sato has
been dsmayed with American
policy iti?The:Tra-r tut and is
considering an indep end ent
Japanese arittaOh te China.
Anderson quptee a cable
from Armin Meyer, U. S.
Ambassador to Japan, which
said that "whereas heretofore
anti-Americanism was pretty
much special vehicle for op-
position parties and Japan's
tendentious press, develop-
ments of past few months have
fostered seeds of doubt within
normally American-oriented
community."
Meyer also told Washington
Approved PAtmagigagab
being asked to maintain cold-
war confrontation ' posture
while dent's niission to
Peking gives (the U.S. govern-
ment) advantage of appearing
to be more progressive and
peace-minded."
In San Clemente, one
Japanese diplomat in the
Sato party told Washington
Post reporter Stanley Karnow
that it was "alarming" to
learn the content of the secret
American papers.
"I must pay my compliments
to the White House," he added,
however. "They understand
Japanese attitudes very well."
The diplomat said he was
especially concerned by refer-
ences in today's Anderson
column to growing interest
in Japan in a revision of the
American-Japanese secur ity
treaty.
Assistant White House press
secretary Gerald Warren con-
tinued to refuse comment un
any of the disclosures in the
Anderson columns, and Kis-
singer, who is in San Clemente
with the President, refused to
discuss them.
. In response to a question
about Kissinger's earlier com-
ment to reporters that Ander-
son had taken comments about
India and Pakistan "out of con-
text," Warren said, "I am sure
Dr. Kissinger stands by what
he said. . . . The President is
aware of the matter."
Anderson said Tuesday that
he was releasing the full texts
or the three documents to re-
fute Kissinger's claim.
There was a run on Ander-
son's Washington office yes-
terday for copies of the secret
documents which had ap-
peared in The Washington
Post.
By day's end, a member of
his staff said, 18 news organi-
zations had picked up copies
of the 4.1aree memoranda and
another nine had asked that
toey be sent in the mail.
The New York Post, The
Chicago Sun-Times, The San
Francisco Chronicle and The
Boston Globe all published the
texts of the memoranda in
yesterday's editions after, they
received them from the
Los Angeles Times-Washing-
ton Post News Service.
The widespread appearance
of the documents in news-
papers throughout the coun-
try appeared to obviate the
possibility of any action in
court by the Justice Depart-
ment, as in the case of the
Pentagon papers.
The New York Times said
it would publish the docu-
ments in today's editions.
Responding to Anderson's
suggestion Tuesday that the
secret documents and others
in his possession could be
made available to Congress as
tikatbROFV4B60446R0008
of American policy toward
India and Pakistan, a'high-
ranking aide or the nate
Foreign Relations Committee
said, "I think that's fine."
Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-
Ark.), chairman of the com-
mittee, was in the Caribbean
on vacation and could not be
reached for comment.
Fulbright staff aides direct-
ed attention, however, to a
report issued by the Foreign
Relations Committee on Dec.
16, which said, "The problem
for Congress in the foreign .
affairs field . . . goes beyond
reducing unnecessary classi-
fication."
The report added, "It in-
volves finding a way for Con-1
gress to make certain that it
receives the full information,
necessary for exercising its
war and foreign policy pow-
ers, including information
which most people would
agree should be kept secret
from potential enemies.
"It may also Involve finding
a way for Congress to share
In determining what informa-
tion is classified and thus
kept secret from the Ameri-
can people."
That appeared to be the
focus of the upcoming inves-
tigation by the House Armed
Services Subcommittee. Nedzil
said that it might not be
"appropriate" to look into Kis-
singer's activities, but said ,
the probe would focus on the 1
way information is handled
within the government.
"I don't know how any offi-
cial has the right to deceive
the public," Nedzi said. "He
has the privilege to say 'no
comment,' or that the subject'
is classified, but to misrepre-1
sent is wrong."
Hebert, announcing the in-
vestigation in New Orleans,
said it appeared to be "open
season" on all classified infor-
mation in government
He acknowledged that there
is substantial overclassifica-
ton, but expressed anger over
what he called the "callous dis-
regard" of security regulations
by those with access to sensi-
tive material.
Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska);
who released much of the con-
tent of the Pentagon papers
during a midnight, one-man
subcommittee hearing June 29,
praised Anderson for his col-
umns on the Indo-Pakistani
war.
"Again American citizens
have been dependent on secret
documents for knowledge of
the true plans and actions of
their government," Gravel
said.
Sen. George S. McGovern
(D-S.D.), a candidate for the
Democratic presidential nomi-
nation, said the Anderson
documents "set forth a record
of seeking by whatever subter-
fuge American economic and
Ittc169 Pakistan, while
blandly assuring the public of
our neutrality."
MIAMI HERALD
Approved For Release 2os1m11pt-RDP74B00415R000300020017-5
Accurate intelligence
rtored In Pakistan
otes
By SAUL FRIEDMAN
Herald Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON ? As in
the Vietnam war, American
Intelligence information, be-
fore and during the India-
Pakistan conflict generally
was accurate, but apparently
Was ignored by White House
policymakers.
This became evident in in-
terviews with American offi-
cials, on the scene in India
and Bangladesh, who refer-
red to their secret messages
to Washington.
The conclusion is support-
ed by the minutes of secret
strategy sessions here, which
have been released in full by
columnist Jack Anderson.
FURTHERMORE, Michi-
gan Congressman Lucien
Nedzi, Democratic chairman
of an armed services subcom-
mittee on intelligence, said:
"My. reviews so far suggest
to me the biggest problem is
the use, or the lack of use,
the executive makes of intel-
ligence."
In the Indo-Pakistan war,
as on other occasions, Nedzi
said, "One gets the impres-
sion that policy is made in
the President's bedroom."
Nedzi explained that he
meant that President Nixon
is engaging in "one-man"
policy-making, which does
not take into account the
opinions of the intelligence
community and the state de-
partment.
American officials here
and in India complained that
during the Indo-Pakistan
war, intelligence experts and
experienced State Depart-
ment personnel were re-
moved from policy making.
Among those excluded were
consuls and even Kenneth
Keating, the .ambassador to
India, they said.
AS A RESULT of the gap
eveal
between intelligence informa-
tion and policy-making, the
White House insisted on an
anti-India, pro-Pakistan poli-
cy and ended up on the los-
ing side, U.S. officials in
Washington and overseas
said.
The Pentagon study of the
Vietnam war disclosed that
the Central Intelligence
Agency and other intelli-
gence gatherers correctly as-
sessed the strength of the
Communists, the relative in- ?
effectiveness of American
bombing, and the weaknesses
in the "domino theory" ?
the belief that if South Viet-
nam fell to' the Communists,
the rest of Southeast Asia
would follow.
Similarly, American offi-
cials stationed as political
observers and intelligence
gatherers in India and East
Pakistan are bitter that their
information was ignored by
the White House.
Consequently, they say,
the White House underesti-
mated:
0 The efects of the Paki-
stani reign of terror in East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh)
that resulted in a guerrilla
war for independence and
the Indian invasion.
0 The determination of
Indian prime Minister Indira
Gandhi to aid Bangladesh
and return to the new coun-
try the 10 million refugees
who fled to India from the
Pakistani terror.
0 The improvement of the
Indian armed forces since
1965, when they suffered de-
feat at the hands of Ameri-
can-equipped Pakistanis.
The officials maintain that
the White House, paying
closer attention to reports of
the ambassador to Pakistan,
misundersood the role of the
East Pakistan Awami
League. They say the White
House failed to realize that
the league, which bore the
brunt of the terror campaign
(its leader, Sheik Mujibur
Rahman, was jailed) repre-
sented the moderate left, in
opposition to Maoist Comma-
fists.
India, criticized by main-
land China, primarily went to
the aid of the Awami League,
which meant that the U.S. in-
advertently supported the
more radical leftists in Ban-
gladesh.
THE MINUTES of the Spe-
cial Action Group meetings
that were obtained by Ander-
son show that even in the
early days of the 14-day war,
the CIA and the Pentagon
correctly predicted that the
Indians would capture East
Pakistan and recognize the
Bangladesh government, but
fight only a holding action on
the borders of West Paki-
stan.
Nevertheless, national se-
curity adviser Henry Kissing-
er indicated that the Presi-
dent personally was making
policy. The policy was appar-
ently at odds with the intelli-
gence.
State Department sources,
apparently at the President's
behest, continually voiced
concern to reporters that
India was bent on carrying
the war into West Pakistan,
when the intelligence offi-
cials were saying that front
was "a holding action."
Kissinger told one meeting
of the group:
"I am getting hell every
half-hour from the President
that we are not being tough
enough on India. He has just
called me again. He does not
believe we are carrying out
his wishes. He wants to tilt
in.favor of Pakistan. He feels
everything we do comes out
otherwise."
eports
ar, Secret
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