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November 21, 1972
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Approved For Release 2001/11/01 :CIA-RDP73409Mrpie00020019-3 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE .4?1 PAGE IN The Washington Merry-Go-Round , THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Nov. 21, 1972 B 15 . . Soviets Protest Saigon Buildup By Jack Anderson Strictly speaking, the U.S. has not violated any under- standing. Not until the shoot- ing stops does the proposed agrbement call for a halt of military shipments (except for replacements) into South Viet- natn. In an obvious effort to strengthen President Thieu's liand before the cease-fire goes into effect, the U.S. has macy isn't exactly uncommon. swamped Saigon with sup- plies. The deliveries of war- planes and helicopters, in par- ticular, has transformed the South Vietnamese Air Force into one of the Worlds' largest, with a new total of 4850 air- craft. The Soviets -have charged this violates the spirit of the truce negotiations. They point mit that the North Vietnamese can't match the sudden U.S. buildup and, therefore, have been placed at a last-minute tested b. ' to over ta4canth Vietnam in anticipa- tieweta cease-fire. This has put the Soviets on the spot, since they gave Ha- noi a guarantee of U.S. good faith. The Soviets Also quietly pressured Hanoi to end the fighting. They went so far as to imply that Soviet military aid might be curtailed if the war drags on. disadvantage. This has caused Hanoi to question the Soviet guarantee of U.S good faith. Footnote: U.S. re onnais- sance fli hts and electronic wawa Ape deteg no gavitairatt.luararat.4.sup- tveut the north, into $6111.til-3riatzlain? ae?,s?14,j,atax.w e d sources claim PrelideAUTizon erns-e-crrge`aqt understand- fthary that We7,7x.s. NyaapallitasasuiliAL21Eu- Tiltsgilinese_are&alicr to have the UhS..inaintain a mili- raiLjazcF.ence in_Eurazpr to gLaw Ssylet,larges Amy from der. The The _President assured Cliou tIere would be lin-Amer- iarinillitarY withdrawal froln Eti h -reductions are lien*, conai ci** Our Thebrces say President's as, surance can't be deseribe,d as a secret agreement but, more accurately, a secret, informal understanding. U.S. Bribery?-It has been whispered around the White House that bribery was used to overcome President Thieu's opposition to a cease-fire. There is absolutely no indica- tion he, was paid off, himself. But our sources have official knowledge that other South Vietnamese lea der s were slipped money to helper- suede Thicu to go along with the U.S. cease-fire agreemept, in Saigon. This sort of black-bag diplo- rector, James Miller, admitted mac yisn't exactly uncommon Our sources have heard Philip Habib, for one, tell pri- vately how he bribed opposi- tion leaders when he was the top political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon in 1965-67. Now Ambassador in Seoul, Ha- bib was heard to say he used to carry "a little black bag" in Saigon. "From that little black bag," he is quoted, "we bought out any opposition." While Henry Kissinger was trying to sell the cease-fire to Thieu, Habib left his post in Seoul for a rush trip to Saigon. A spokesman denies that bribery played any part in these Sai- gon negotiations. He would say only that Habib flew to Saigon to discuss "Vietnamese matters" with Kissinger. Ha- bib couldn't be reached for di- rect comment. MUST Musn't-An impor- tant scientist in the Manned Underseas Science and Tech- nology Office, part of the Commerce Department, is also a principal officer of a com- pany which furnishes MUST with midget submarines. MUST rents submersibles for undersea research. One of the half-dozen "science coordina- tors," who participates in the decision on whether to rent a midget sub is Dr. Robert F. Dill. }Ie also happens to be a founder, director and major stockholder in General Ocean- ?graphics, a Newport Beach Calif., firm. MUST'S deputy di- to us that he was aware of Dill's relationship with Gen- eral Oceanographics but claimed Dill "exerted no un- due influence" on decisions to rent the company's subs. Dr. Dill was unavailable for com- ment. Naval Sabotage-Sabotage in the fleet has become so se- rious that Navy security engi- neers are studying ways of locking on the metal plates which cover inspection holes. Sailor saboteurs have removed the plates and thrown in dirt or metal shavings to foul gear boxes and other moving parts. The damage slows or stops the ships and costs thousands to repair. CIA Echoes-CIA agents ac- el ..1.7477--1:117.11T...743177n traffic in Southeast Asia can MirdbiiSotatroli-Trtiiinflrec- etirfirlreT16" yea r'g -WV itrthe slltiTA/11,rtrieoltraffitt of 421EV'S'elv7teLIILLbook "The OSS in Wqrk War II," antrOrrifilard-M7iitoff Wfi te s th"artISFgnts .P:arkalirgd i""-naliliirina with silv-e-Floins and, oiritiFtnrar VET ttp a- nese Kachin irregulars. "If there was any mOTII-Mttler- ZiZ-writes ITymliff,-10 ex- OS,S_tran overcome by-tfie realitrer'of war an-d-fiiiTitary opet-71-0s." C 1972, United Feature Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25X1A Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74130,934A5M210.220019-3 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE css PAGE al The Washington Merry-Go-Ronnd WASHINGTON POST Honda,., Am,. 20, 1972 B 7 Investigation Can Be a Big Weapon By Jack Anderson ears we have reported vesiraret feder ors ? en e.T9du.iiis could be arriTTS1711Y5fie wEo deals with the government or makes out a tax return. It has kgcojoo fre- ractice i con-filcts arja...and for the gov- dis- the s. e power of in- ve iga ion, which is supposed to be used for the good of the citizens, is ,often_used insteact to intimidate, coerce and istrike back at persons who challenge the rulings or op- pose the policies of govern- ment. Government files are liter- .ally crammed with the life his- tories of wholly innocent citi- zens. These files are loaded With derogatory information? true statements, deliberate lies, idle gossip?whispered into the ears of eager govern- ment gumshoes. FOIAb3b The dirt these gumshoes pick up- on people is swept into dossiers which are freely exchanged between federal of- fices. This gives an alarming number of government em- ployees access to the raw files. If the subject happens to be a prominent urson, the gossip from his files travels swiftly in titillating whispers. The Secret Service, for ex- ample, recently wanted to know more about a famous singer. A request for informa- tion brought in a deluge of raw allegations from various government agencies. The FBI had a full file on the singer, a black woman, al- though she has been accused of no crimes and isn't likely to commit any. the CIA Eihmitted a ,cerifidentia run- nits with Wiautionar note: Sex File "BezumuLtriu., na- ture of this information and 2Lir , Or glassaLiatzl fuitii?without ljagjarammonaralleinat- .ce." aving cleared its con- sc.igam t e to ?j2a*m_it unsubstantiated aft .A400.06.1.4. charges about the singer's ricco, .en al ssau,L;_agsjzsz th ee- pare memo, "advised . . . that her escapades overs as and hsr?...29.1e morals were said to beEhe sursaltakttLijat_abitaliad .lurid sex life in Paris and described her as laalP1Q111"ialaw juenua..: ? ? ." on nit ,e4t on pout her sex activities, with these addecr7"Omments: "Another informant described her as having a very nasty dis- position, a spoiled child, very crude, and having a vile tongue. The informant states subject was not well liked by most actors and actresses working with her. The inform- ant, states she is a very self- ,shallow person who erately upstages and scues actors working with her... "The informant states' that subject did not associate with very many Negroes and often bragged that she had very lit, tie Negro blood. The inform:: ant states that those vibe work with subject know from experience either to play up VS her or to keep their distance to avoid subject's treachery.' ..../L4p2.1Fesfrian stressed, and 3Le..,11411A-Carriiiiarihal, hP 141,,,,sjagant . keep -DX.> on American citizens, except for securay_filen. ,,its_own?per- wee,. Th,c informagoxabout the singer turned up in an-, This illustrates, neverthe- less, how promiscuous the traffic in unproved allegations has become inside the govern- ment: Footnote: Even the National aeMITZ"ArintVviarre=lup- ale limiLita .a.ctivities to ,71? ' iterj-J3g.,.. foreign codes, utagausuutarjaLdwut ..the laazi.e.=..wgrAlingtaLIQ.Irocts 1 cif foreign -lugagIcazia?aluzit 41?416..... 1 ,.s,;; . 972, United Feature Syndicate , . t er--`n=r7"?"7"7,,,,t.90 -- D , 2114pQS4E4_ ? a ana.thai,ad.not ite.tla7Pri qr Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25X1A Approved or Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74ADIUX00300020019-30?0 ? THE WASHINGTON POST DATE/ 141.-11- PAGE The Washington Merry-Go-Henna tRE VASITINGTON POST Tuesday, Oct. 17, 1972 C 15 Nixot,i Forces Accused of Dirty Tricks By Jack An erson en in power don't relish having their cozy relation- ships exposed, and their sotace of money bared, and their errors and embarraSs- ments publicized. is not surprising, there-,, fore that the Ncxon Mminis- tration doesn't like this col- umn. So the President's dirty trieks department tried to -play a few tricks bn us. e dirty tricks operation, Otherwise known as the "Of. fensive Security i'rogram ot tha Ninu Forces," was estab- lished chiefly to bewitch and befoul Democratic presidential candidates. It was fundedout of a secret, fluctuating Repub- lican slush fund. The Washington Post has charged that the dirty tricks included forging_phony letters to embarrass the Democrats, leaking false information to the press, tailing family mem- bers of Democratic presiden- tial candidates and throwing campaign schedules into dis- array. The Watergate, incident? hteaking into Democratic Filly headquarters, tapping party leaders' telephones and sUallrig_party documents?was part of this sor id operation. dirty tricks were piffled by Political opera- tives and government gum- shoes alike. Their objective aptarentlY was two fold (1) to discredit the column by errnining our crdibi1ity; and p' ghut o mar sources. A host of investigators par- ticipated in the project. Gov- ernment agents, watching through binoculars, from a twarpy knoll, staked ont my house. With walkie-talkies, they directed waiting govern- ment security ears to tail me wherever I went. Sources in- side the Justice Department ,provided me with the descrip- tictn.s , ancl license_ nurnhqs of the cars. So it didn't take long to locate them lurking in hiding places near my home. McCord's Report The President's campaign security chief, James W. Mc- Cord Jr., joined in the inves- tigation. In an "interim re- port" to the White House, he accused Me of "close associa- tion with the operating arm of the Democratic Party." Ironically, a Democratic Party spokesman later accused me of close association with Mc- Cord's operation after we pub- liShed an embarraising memo m party files. Sources inside the White House, meanwhile, warned us of attempts to discredit the column. Not long afterward, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs called a press conference. We were tipped off that the bureau ld challenge our story about Thailand's great opium hoax. The Thai authorities considerable whoop-de-d00 staged a million-di-311er opitlili burning to dramatize how they were cooperating with the U.S. crackdown on drugs. We re- ported, however, that they really burned cheap fodder mixed with opium. Nixon aides went to elal3O- rate lengths to knock the story down. They prepared pages of refutation for the press, set up a movie of the opium burning and produced an "expert" to testify how wrong we were. Not only narcotics officials but White House and Justice Department aides were involved in the arrangements. fa_ ram wivanee tuLay associate Le's Whitten stgazaja_aillie mess con- Lierence with a Stack of secret 4C1,45,, downents and detailed alate,s_trarti_ather cTocuments. - ? e Med evidence ri:ht from hat the Thais had burned er inffe-a-Calplu-7nrilm -infitration spokesmaa siteepishLy admitted thaLUncle Sam hnd.paid a cool $1 milli= the PAIM, Air Force Attack More recently, the Pentagon furnished the editors of Air Force Magazine with material for a blistering attack on us. They challenged our report about Air Force research on a laser beam that would ex- plode the eyeballs of enemy soldiers at a distance of more than a mile. Blinded soldiers, research noted, would be of a burden to a fight- g force than dead soldiers. We based our story on a copY Of the actual study, which speaks more than five times of the violent effects of laser beams on eyeballs. Twice, the 'study cites "massive blast" effects; in another place, it tells of a "micro-explosion" in the eyes. The water fluids in the' eyes, adds the study, would "rise to about 100 degrees Centigrade" ? the boiling point. Although we had a copy of the' study, we also contacted two Air Force researchers at Wright- Patterson Air Force Base where the research was reviewed. They would confirm only that they had been in- volved in classified research on laser weapons. Finally we located the phy.- sician-researcher. Dr. Milton. Zaret, who directed the study. for the Air Force. To make sure our story was absolutely accurate, we read it back to him word-for-word. He sugges- ted a few minor technical changes, which we made. After Air Force Magazine- called our story false, we. reached editors Claude Witze and John Frisbee. The attack on us was written by Witze who admitted he had never- seen the study he accused us of misrepresenting. He also. had never tried to reach the scientist who prepared it nor, for that matter, had he bother- ed to seek our side of the story. "My understanding was that (the Pentagon version) was the whole package," said Witze. "I rely on them fairly heavily." (c_i? 1972, United Fektuie Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 'TC??? ariLar 'TO Vtki (2-00/7.. s.e. 0 ow; 3aril iggetiggictuRoonoigummota, death and details of his ran counter to the report, the premier said, The report was entitled "United to Win Still greater Viotories,.." The Party Central Com- mittee had earlier rejected a draft that Lin Piao had had prepared for him by Chen Po-ta, a former secretary of Mr. Mao and a Politburo member who was a militant leader of the Cultural Revolution and has since disappeared amid -denunciations. A Plot Without Action Seeing his path to the succession endan- ?gent Lin Piao began plotting with "a small hari,c1bal -nr sworn conspirators" to assassinate Mr. Mao and try to seize power, according to Premier Chou. No attempt was actually made on the party chairman's life, however. "He didn't dare to put his plot into practice because Why Now? it was only the scheme of a very small handful Why did Premier Chou decide now to en- of people," Mr. Chou continued. "It was only gage in the first public discussion of the Lin after Lin Piao fled that we got hold of material Piao affair by any Chinese leader? One can concerning his conspiracy." only guess. A possible explanation is that the - -Last September Lin Piao became "afraid purge of Lin Piao's suspected followers has that his designs had been exposed" and pre- been completed, that the Chinese people have pared to flee on short notice, the premier said. been carefully informed and that they have Although Lin Piao as defense minister had the taken the news calmly. In addition, China may authority to order a plane for his own use, he now want the world to see that the plot wasn't instead had his son, Lin Li-kuo, deputy head of widespread, that it was coped with easily, that the air force's operations department, arrange China has nothing to hide and that the matter to have a British-M.ade .Trident aircraft se., should cease being a source of conjecture. That cretly sent to him at Peitaiho, a seaside resort would fit in with China's desire to project to to the east of Peking. the world an image of calmness, stability and respectability. Some foreign specialists accept the Lin Piao story, others are openly skeptical, while most suspend judgment. The skeptics question whether Lin would have plotted to kill as re- vered a national figure as Chairman Mao or would have tried to flee to the Russians, whom he had been outspoken in denouncing in the past. They suggest that Lin Piao might have been pulled from his pinnacle of power by Chairman Mao, Premier Chou and other lead- ers and, when he wouldn't go quietly, done away with. Then, they speculate, a group of his close followers might have tried to flee by air, were pursued over the Mongolian frontier and shot down. All this is pure speculation, of course. "What Puzzle?" "About this jigsaw puzzle . . . ," began one TUtn .ruye- American editor, addressing Premier Chou 1971, with a few conspirators but without even after the tale was told. the navigator or radio operator, who had be- "What puzzle?" the premier ,interrupted. come_gware of the order that no planes were to "There is no puzzle about it. I have' told you ev- take off. The plane headed for Outer Mongolia, erything. It's much clearer than your Warren where Soviet influence is strong. But "when report on the assassination of J. F. Kennedy." the plane got there, it failed to spot the runway "It's a puzzle to us," the editor replied. Later, after the premier expressed skepti- cism that Lee Harvey Oswald had been the sole assassin of President Kennedy, ?T. Edward Murray of the Detroit Free Press, president of ?Bow can, the premier be sure that Lin Piao the American Society of Newspaper Editors, was among the nine bodies? he was asked, told him: "You just have a conspiratorial ' "Our embassy people were accompanied to mind." the spot by officials from the Mongolian for- eign ministry, and they took photos there," he replied. "Although the bodies were burned, they were not completely destroyed, and it was still possible to identify them." -After the .order grounding all aircraft, an- other group of conspirators took off in a heli- copter and tried to flee abroad but never reaglied the border, the premier said. It was forced, to land by Chinese aircraft and "after the fowced ?landing.* innitto ieaseaafiliGitlattisaQ1L is round .evidence of their plot," Premier Chou ire Told You Everything,' He 'Tells I.J.S. Newsmen in China; ?But Some Experts Doubtful AiiiEd.4 Platio. t Didiotor- 0 f,7*E trA.a,'STREiT SOURNAI: ,a--,--Preniter,r dhoti divnIged details of the Chinese governments version of the downfall and death of Lin Piao, who was ,,Tse-Aing's designated successor until tember of last $'ear. ; inese, hafiald earlier.. merely that _ ,in a plane_ crash while trying to flee the country after an unsuccessful got to assassinate CommunistParty Chairman Mao ind_seize power. TheinoW-detailed tale of mystery and intrigue -rivals-adriielitiire fietioii. th_ he freShly added details there are Ore ign- -iraf ion '&1 lii`st-Tiiat te'fin Pia.O'Slo7 tree- our-ane u-minute mee mg aiojjrorn the ikiierkah ety of laewspeam o"cs--.11r_. m7ating place arreire tion room of .the' great e an lagecritit the srnall rnornin or s TNT, a ar o e saiiThr 'Tar th-Thrtan la? a air eau n ?e rat-18- ,4 -11-v filfcciattranscryt harEeen pre- andIfie-pr mire/. faff?ofiooRgelf for iteirStai g67e7nrinTiTTe'S- 15-layzre-mmrtm-ii` ' Ls. a nelVed- his cons " because e eve_ at ha could really Sucae-4 _14-t " ''`rnalt rytqltthen we criffcized witErri-Ehe pafty-t-h-e oris-flifinjilk-alid-folifiCar by Lin ieft 'couleniit ori airy lOnger:? ecorne'ffise- tiOe., The_preinTer say',_ Toreign-Spe- 4Iists aAatitstde China fieliere lh liaVe the explariatiOW:-Ille-iltt-lbbbtultural 'neVo.futina "had lef1t,ha COiLiaLL:irilsf'. Party 'arid :ci.fldli4n....governmentirriretui'eg disarray:fai- l:Owing T!.e4- Otiajd, -affaela-On. Tor elitist atfl,,f4pgs tut. mdcrthti.: ti5;1:97s-e7t6ii:c1-1 With th In0P1,;, ariVP41110"tii-i'vr4-0, yirt 'galled id 'to, reitb--r. 04i ..qPITe,e2 country rarniirlg' and _ bad assurne4 poWer China s plzilti" economic and social institutions. Pfe..4r:MICOT,i hef_gali 16 rebuild -the pat' aridThe goirtritierithilrealie'ra4; the ,undotibtecily was a Struggle over how much-au- thority over civilian. institutions would remaini in the hands of,q-, '''and 'how Much would' ? r4?t6. party _authorities. qAairnian Mao' threw his suppoit-lo 117 Pieniler and T in , Piao's future star_ - cloudy. Foi- eign of tlie-s_ChWe'gcene also believe 41.# oaffaTeT1T7'd"ecISion to seelc in. r,e ,avtei,o s The a'rly as Apiil U. s said, .1.. splibizeillapcw fcte 2+4-9- 156tt, e alronaY Tran-("tfcinires that - _ Vt'aslerg=77"."', imme Mat actually alleged conspiracy have never been published In the Chinese press. In fact, denunciations of his shortcomings have never referred to him by name, but have lumped him in with another leader who fell from grace earlier. "Liu Shao? chi and other swindlers? is the code phrase, with Lin Piao represented by the latter refer- ence. But the premier said party and government officials were told about the plot, and later or- dinary citizens were informed, presumably at meetings of their local farm, factory or neigh- borhood organizations. "Now the entire Chinese people know about this matter," he said. "All ordinary citizens, and even children, know about it." "As soon as he secretly ordered an airplane, the move was reported because it was not ir accordance with our country's normal proce- dures," the premier said. When -bffibials asked Lin Piao's wife, Yeti Chun, whether a plane had been ordered, she Met it, and this showed he Was up to some- thtrig7 But at that time we were not sure how Wthe S-C-heme was," so all airplanes in the country-were ordered grounded, the premier satctHe continued: "In these circumstances, as he had a guilty conscience, he thought his plot had been exposed, so he fled in great haste by the plane moved there secretly, fearing that he ? might be caught if he fled too late. Actually,, we dtd not at all think of arresting him, we only wished to know what he wanted that plane' for." The plane took off on the night of Sept. 12,' of_the airport and its fuel was nearly ex- hausted,. so it had to try a forced landing." It caught fire in the attempt, and all nine persons aboard were_burned to death, the premier said. 000300020019-3 25X Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDPWA0811 1540300020019-3 g le? THE WASHINGTON POST DATE c?t-1 PAGE The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Oct. 12, 1972 G19 Kissinger's Command Is a Hot Spot By Jack Anderson coded _messages flgoL inte as ion r m m snirT71'?1"31 po ? e niost urgent telegrams are funneled into Henry Kissin- ger's command post in the White House. Digests of over- light intelligence reports are lelivered each morning to 'resident Nixon. 1stam_anurge,141112.Legg41-1,0 httiiatzagceflo4_1.12,L*,are oregnr_gis: New Offensive??Privately, -rem Kissinger is optimistic ibout the prospects of a !ease-fire in Vietnam. Yet in- tercepted messages indicate that North Vietnam is prepar- ing for a renewed offensive. Our military intelligence has found no trace, however, that Russia hap replaced the tanks and artillery the North Viet- namese lost in their spring of- fensive. They were able last spring to sneak heavy hard- ware into South Vietnam vir- tually undetected. But the best available intelligence sug- gests that both Russia and China have cut back military shipments to North Vietnam. Hanoi's military preparations, therefore, may be for a lim- ited attack upon a political target, perhaps even Saigon it- self. But no one really knows whether the guns will be si- lenced or booming when the voters go to the polls on Nov. 7. Soft on Thieu?Hanoi may, be softening slightly on its arch enemy, President Thieu. In the secret truce talks, North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho has emphasized that the Saigon regime must be dismantled and replaced by a tripartite gov- ernment dominated by neither side. But he has indicated that Saigon can choose anyone it wishes to the new government, that neither side should have a veto over the other's ap- pointments. The implication is that Hanoi would not object if Saigon appointed the hated Thieu as a member of the tri- partite government. Mao's Vow?China's supreme ruler, Mao Tse-tung, told visit- ing Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka fiercely that the Chinese would resist to the death any encroachments by Russia. A.LIZ=2.64a,jk .Aggro-Tanaka talks agotes old =m7mg China would sacrifice its on ution. He citea the tate ot nis former heir apparent, Lin Piao, who died in a plane crash fleeing to Russia after attempting a pro-Soviet coup against Mao. gill 0 0_1 Onnosition?The Cr:0 ral Inch- oiTs?thift inese Premier Lfliz1ai is still ejaraintek Eng onnosition inside Peking's ruling circle. Chou's of-00- M s arelt upset over his policy of detente with the United States, Japan and the West. They contend that the detente has hurt China's cred41V with revolutionary f oree 81 around the world. Soviet Shipments?A classi- fied State Department analy- sis charges that Israel's forays across her borders against the Palestinian guerrillas have given the Soviets a pretext for strengthening their foothold in Syria and Iraq. Military shipment have been sent not only to Syria and Iraq but to the Palestinian guerrillas di- rectly. Contrary, to press re- ports of a Soviet "airlift" to Syria, however, the airlift consisted of only four transport planes, which have ceased to make regular deliv- eries. But the shipments, though no more than token military aid, have had the ef- fect of strengthening Soviet bonds with the Arab hotheads. The analysis concludes, never- theless, that Russia wouldn't likely risk war for Syria, Iraq or any other Arab country. African Wildman?The 'ef- forts to placate Uganda's wild- man, General Idi Amin, ap- pear to have backfired. He has ordered the Asians, who had become the backbone of Ugan- da's economy, out of the coun- try. He has made impossible demands upon neighboring Tanzania. He has made and broken promises to visiting mediators. He has imposed harsh martial law upon his country, charging that Tanza- nia, India and even Britain are planning to invade his small country. For the sake of black African solidarity, a host of black African leaders have Made pilgrimages to Uganda to placate General Amin. But p renozkluvgestt J11 autent,inn_ha,s_mczglyxiDoed difaujja, aiLlzysy. Castro "Uncouth" ? Intent gence reports acknowledge a rise in anti-U.S. feeling. throughout Latin America,: But apparently Cuban Dicta;; tor Fidel Castro's attempts to" exploit U.S. unpopularity for his own purposes have failed. A typical message from our defense attache in Ecuador, where Castro visited last year, describes the top Ecuadorean military brass as anti-U.S. but also anti-Castro. The message quotes them as calling Castro "uncouth" and "not the great leader that many people con- ' dider him to be." Cuba-Panama Friendship? A .peret CIA cable, reporting ?fficer o " cluotesjatp gs, saving that ''the Cobaai?goxernment_m_ierally sopperts?the_ __Manama:A General nz, atna.c...2=1121, head of Patteea..lut?w nd encourage Torrijos to ? I I ? II er o A ;1in4 ? 1- ..e44:_sjrue ci t at . ists in PanaThTia7fo'e?M?ir7ina- ma-Cuba Friendship Society, which could promote friend- ship with Cuba, put pressure on Torrijos from the left and possibly be used as the center, for certain unspecified Cuban activites." ? 1972, United Feature Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25)(11....MME NEW YORKAMBeflel For Re!easel:2AM 146415/3-14.1300415139,61Q1320020014 WAR RAINMAKING SUBJECT OF SUIT U.S. Said to Violate Patent in Indochina Project By ANTHONY RIPLEY Special to The New York Time. WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 ? In inuaicecl lawsuit fjjed hete?more_tban.....threa?seeeks aga??e. manufacturer of equipment char,ges_that the United States is making rain Jn oc in with a device he leyepted. in violationfliis natent rights. Bernard A. Power, president of the Weather En gineering Corporation of Canada Ltd. and its United States subsidiary, Weather Engineering Corpora- tion of America, estimated that 1.9-million of the devices ? ex- plosive canisters filled withsil- ver iodide crystals ? had been produced for use in Southeast Asia. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 18 that the Defense Department had not conducted any rainmak- ing activitiesover North Viet- nam. Second Denial by Laird On July 3, The New York times reported secret use of cloud-seeding over North Viet- nam and South Vietnam and Laos, quoting both civilian and military sources in the Govern- ment. Then, in a news conference July 6, Mr. Laird was again asked about any seeding opera- tions. He repeated his denial concerning military operations over North Vietnam and de- clined commenton the situa- tion elsewhere. Mr. Power said by telephone from Montreal, that the com- pany was seeking $95-million for "full recovery of profits" for the devices, which he said cost $50 each. Mr. Power said the estimate was based on the length of the monsoon seasons over Indo- china and the size of the area Involved, which he said he thought was the Ho Chi Minh trail netwcirk. The use covered the period from 1967 to present, he said. Tested in Newfoundland Mr. Power said that the three-pound explosive canister and the method of dropping it from a plane into the clouds was tested in a demonstration at Harmon Air Force Base in Newfoundland in November, 1966, with military observers from Canada and the United States on hand. The suit contends that in Dec- ember, 1966, the company of- ficers got in touch with Walt W. Rostow, who at the time was Special Assistant to Presi- dent Lyndon B. Johnson. Mr. Rostow referred them to Cot Robert N. Ginsburgh of the Air Force, who at that time was on Mr. Rostow's staff. He is now a major general in charge of Air Force public informa- tion. The suit alleges that Mr. Power and Dewitt S. Copp, Washington representative of the company met with Colonel Ginsburgh "and disclosed the details of a plan to close in- filtration trails to South Viet- nam while at the same time greatly reducing the loss of lives normally attendant with the conventional procedures of attempting to close the trails by bombing." That plan, the suit alleges, was to make the trails impass- able through excessive rainfall. At the time they described their patented devices, exhibited models and discussed both tac- tical and strategic use. e telephone in ' VAW:a MOW, if .U01 WPM Fr: f rwrrilj ,cvntract wit 'enanin of Defense but ha _ColoneLMs- e United States o t e wTthout itching on we wo hear Nothing u The iiaiNTITMl;" later-Power said. Sought Information In March, 1971, he said, he first heard that weather modi- fication was being used in Southeast Asia in an article by Jack Anderson, the columnist, and decided to see if his device was involved. Since April, 1971, the suit alleges, the company has met with the General Counsel's of- fice of the Defense Depart- ment trying to work out the matter to no avail. "To date," the suit alleges, "the Department of Defense has been either unable or un- willing to supply plaintiffs with any information on the pro- cedures or structures used in the weather modification pro- Approved geriRelease 2001/11/01 : When the matter of military rainmaking came to light again this year, Mr. Power said, he was advised to file suit seeking to examine docttments and question witnesses about the matter. Device on Paperboard Tube The device itself is a paper- board tube wrapped with ex- plosive cord that contains silver iodide. Protruding from one end is a lanyard that is attached to a delay fuse and three blasting caps. The lanyard is attached to the inside of an airplane and the device shoved by hand through a hole in the plane's body, jerking the lanyard out to start the time fuse. It falls into the cloud and explodes, releasing the silver iodide cry- sent e CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25X1A Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415Z:700020019-3 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 7-1+ -7Z, PAGE Jack Anderson Soviets, Syrians Fight Peace Bid 4,14-Tra.LICAEZTZE,_ixasaL flpim that the Soviet Union's I culuitinLatia,Saii02gui- a 41u t,...UalaAto block die East peace settlement. By expelling Soviet forces from Egypt, Sadat had ma- neuvered into position to get some concessions from Israel. Indeed, there were signals from Tel Aviv that Israel would be generous about re- turning captured territory. The Israelis made it clear, however, that they intended to keep the strategic Golan Heights which they seized from Syria. The Syrians, therefore, would have noth- ing to gain from a peace set- tlement. Egypt and Syria are part- ners, with Libya, in an Arab confederation ,j3ut the Cen,- ,tral Intelligence Agency, in secret reports from Dania's- sus has Ouoted President Assad as making deroga.tory Kgruat ithautAlle_Egyptaris. Not long after the expul- sion of the Soviets from Egypt, the Kremlin sent an urgent, hand-carried message to Assad. The message, ac- cording to the CIA, warned that Syria couldn't afford to follow Egypt's example and strip the country of Soviet protection. This would leave Syria vulnerable to an Israeli attack, the message report- edly declared. Not only did Assad heed the message and keep his So- viet advisers, but he agreed ' to bring more Soviet military equipment and technicians into the country. The intelligence reports suggest that the Kremlin seeks to block an Egyptian-Is- raeli accord?because it could only be arranged by U.S. mediation. This would increase American influence In the area and leave the So- viets out in the cold. THE SOVIET overtures to Syria, incidentally, have also has a side effect upon Syri- an-American relations. Pre- viously, the Syrians had shown signs of wishing to im- prove their relations with the United States. An intelligence report tells, for example, how the Syrians in July, 1969, communicated with U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) agents in Beirut through an Italian diplomat that they would agree to a re- sumption of cooperation with the United States on narcot- ics matters. Subsequently, according to the classified document, "two visits to Damascus by BNDD agents were conducted cor- dially and in exchange of in- formation was initiated." America t dlOotiati 'Worn Abanon Ind Jordan were ilso allowed to travel in ;yria. But suddenly, on Sept. ), Maj. Richard Barrett, an assistant U.S. military at- tache in Jordan, was arrested as he was driving through the Syrian countryside. And David McClintoch, chief of the political section at the U.S. embassy in Jor- dan, was manhandled by Syr- ian border guards when he tried to cross the border. He was turned back and had to be driven out of Syria in an Italian embassy car. Castro's Denial WE RECENTLY quoted Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro as saying that Chile's President Salvador Allende was "physically spent" and that other Chilean leaders "live too well." This has brought a roaring denial from Castro, whose private opinions of Allende weren't intended for outside Approved For Release.2171fik1k14/011ad_ P74B00415R000300020019-3 all, are supposed to be Marx- ist comrades. We COpiPri _cagt,r44_40,, marks verbatim from a se_Erpt ilAk.e.g_dettAccolint of his meeting with pro-Castro lead- "During the morning of 3 December 1971," began the cable, "Fidel Castro and Ar- mando Hart, member of the central committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, met with a very few nationals who are strong sympathiz- ers of the Cuban revolution in the residence of the Cuban ambassador in Santiago." As we reported earlier, "Castro said he is worried about Allende because the latter is physically spent. Cas- tro also observed that U.P. [Allende's popular unity government] leaders live too well and are not under suffi- cient tension to take the of- fensive." Here are some additional quotes which we didn't in- clude in our original story: "Castro commented that there is an ideological weak- ness within the U.P. coali- tion. The U.P., he said, does not have a good grasp of the problems which are involved in a revolutionary process ... "Castro stated that the Communist Party of Chile (PCCH), which he called the spinal column of the Popular Unity government, was too conservative and said that it must become more radical and move to assume the role of the vanguard of the U.P." ? 1972. United Peature Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Sept. 8,1972 D 19 Aid Sought for Crusading T enn.Editor By Jack Anderson During the early morning hours of August 23, an arson- ist set ablaze the two-story of- fices of a Tennessee newspa- per whose crusading editor, Dan Hicks Jr., had dared to print the truth about corrupt county politicians and law- breaking bootleggers. It wasn't the first violence against Hicks since he took over the weekly Democrat in the small rural town of Madi- sonville, Tenn., in 1967. He has been firebombed, shot at twice and assaulted by two hired hooligans. Equipment has been stolen out of his newspa- per office. But the soft-spoken editor hasn't been intimidated. "If I have to print this newspaper elsewhere and drop it on this town from an airplane, I'll do it," he told us, Ever since John Peter Zen- ger was thrown into a dun- geon in 1735 for publishing a critical story about the gover- nor of New York, editors like Dan Hicks have defied gun- men and government men alike to print the truth. In his small corner of East Tennessee's wild-boar country, Dan Hicks is fighting for free- dom of the press. This isn't a right that belongs just to edi- ' tors. Rather, it is the right of very American to pick up a \ pen and express his griev- ances. We believe Dan Hicks' fight, tierpfore. is every American's fight. So let us all help hi raise the $20,000 it will cost to replace his ruined equipment. Contributions can be sent to him at P.O. Box 8, Madison- ville, Tenn., 37354. The Marxist Brothers ' idel Castro has b... _ _eqn critical. in ?pri a e, I ile,:z.sAly4121. Allen . Not only has Alien e * failed to impose Marxism upon Chile with the necessary force and to keep the people in fear of the government, complained Castro, but Allende is "physi- cally spent." The leaders he has brought to power in Chile also "live too well" and "are not under sufficient tension," said Cas- tro. ?Tari.,...CALLIUL.....cauraliStacior putidedat he really thiautrpsf Aire' ricre?Tviirli?ffe taa.T.1-41-41.- Ur. Castro actually made some of his remarks to Al- lende's face but spoke more sharply behind his back. Hard-core Communist lead- ers gathered for a secret ses- sion with Castro on December 3 at the home of the Cuban ambassador in Santiago. t s el- ency, wQe..seet 0 US. "Castro said the U.P. (Al- ende's Popular Unity govern- ment) does not have a sat front to face the opposition, which he claimed is growing rapidly," declares the CIA re- port. "Castro added that the has not yet acted against the ituation in Chile is rapidly .P. because Allende his; approaching a critical stage .. . "Among the factors listed tayed within the constitution. y Castro, which could precip- "Castro added that he had tate the crisis and a confron- told the President all of this, ation with the opposition, was but that Allende did not re breakdown in public order. .spond. his, he said, could come about at any time because the opposition, especially the mid- dle class, has lost its fear of the government, Allende's Health "Castro opined that a gov- rnment must have fear if it is o control the country," the IA report continues. "An- ther factor listed by Castro as the possible deteribration f Allende's health, Castro aid he is worried about Al- lende because the latter is physically spent. "Castro also observed that U.P. leaders live too well and re not under sufficient ten- ion to take the offensive. In- ertwined into the overall situ- ation is that the U.P. has a minority complex,' which af- ects its judgment. "In relation to the Chilean armed forces, Castro said that Allende is chasing an illusion by thinking that he can count on the Chilean military to de- fend his government during a critical period. He said Al- ende is completely mistaken in this regard. "He classified the Chilear armed forces as anti-commu nist, and said that the militar: "Castro then complained u that he thought the U.P. was not really happy with the re- sults of his visit, despite the fact that he did everything the P. leaders wanted. He said he believes he helped the U.P. y his presence, but he added hat many U.P. leaders are of he opinion he stayed too long? and talked too much. "Castro said he felt that his. December farewell gather - g had been a disaster, be, ause all of his efforts in hile had been directed to- ard getting the masses be- id the U.P. However, there was no mass turnout for the arewell and some people even eft the gathering before he ad finished speaking." 1972. United Feature Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 NEW YORKAllpilMfr gd For ReleasBROpi/ kl-ile,41300415p9R10002001q-it 25X1A '65 Reports on Outlook for War By U.S. Intelligence Community Section of Pentagon papers dealing with reports on outlook for Communists' activities, April 22, 1965. . .- of t.12.6J,Inited States intelligence 1111.? ? ??? ?? in analysts' explanation, which introduces comments by Adm. William F. Raborn flr JJLfl, rperniiveitigence. If present U.S. policies continue with- out the introduction of large addi- tional forces or increased U.S. air ef- fort, the Communists are likely to hold to their existing policy of seeking vic- tory in the local military struggle in South Vietnam. They will try to intensi- 'y that struggle, supporting it with tdditional men and equipment. At the et.rne time, D.R.V. air defenses will be trengthened through Soviet and per- aps Chinese aid. If, however, the U.S. deepens its in- olvement by increasing its combat role rid intensifying its air effort, the intel- gence officers believed: . . . that the Vietcong, North Viet- = and China would initially. . . try offset the new enemy strength by epping up the insurgency, reinforcing e Vietcong with the men and equip- mt necessary. They would likely count time being on their side and try to rce the piecemeal engagement of U.S. ops under conditions which might g them down in jungle warfare, hop- to present the U.S. with a de facto -rtition of the country. The Soviet Union . . . would almost certainly ac- quiesce in a decision by Hanoi to inten- sify the struggle. This lack of any real prospect of "give" on the enemy's part was also confirmed by Admiral Raborn, shortly after he had succeeded John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence. On the day of Raborn's swearing-in (April 28), the President had given him a let- ter from McCone which McCone had handed to the President as his last official act. The President had asked Raborn to prepare his own comments on McCone's views. Raborn's comments, circulated to Secretaries Rusk and Mc- Namara on May 6, included the fol- lowing: Our limited bombing of the North and our present groundrorce build-up in the South are not likely to exert sufficient pressure on the enemy to cause him to meet our present terms in the foreseeable future. I note very recent evidence which suggests that our military pressures are becoming some- what more damaging to the eneray within South Vietnam, but I am inclined to doubt that this damage is increasing at a rate which will bring him quickly to the conference table. With particular reference to Mc- Cone's recommendation that the U. S. add much heavier air action against the North to its planned combat force deployment to the South, Raborn indi- cated his agreement, and expressed his belief that such an action would have the following consequences: The D.R.V. is, in my view, unlikely to engage in meaningful discussions at any time in coming months until U.S. air attacks have begun to damage or destroy its principal economic and mili- tary targets. I thus concur with the U.S.I.B.'s judgment of 18 February 1965, that, given such U.S. punishment, the enemy would be 'somewhat more like- ly' to decide to make some effort to secure a respite, rather than to intensify the struggle further and accept the con- sequent risks. And then he added the following advice: Insofar as possible, we should try to manage any program of expanded bombings in ways which (1) would leave the D.R.V. an opportunity to ex- plore negotiations without complete loss of face, (2) would not preclude any Soviet pressures on Hanoi to keep the war from expanding, and (3) would not suddenly produce extreme world pressures against us. In this connection, the timing and circumstances In which the bombings were extended northward could be of critical importance, partic- ularly in light of the fact that there have been some indications of differing views between Moscow, Peiping and Hanoi. For example, it would probably be advantageous to expand bombings after, not before, some major new VC move (e.g., obvious concentration for imminent attack on Da Nang or Kon- tum) and after, not before, any current possibilities of serious negotiations have been fully tested. And such bombings should not be so regular as to leave no interval for the Communists to make concessions with some grace. Indeed, we should keep in mind the possibility of a pause at some appropriate time, which could serve to test the Communist intentions and to exploit any differ- ences on their side. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 NEW YORK TIMES DATE ltit) hi -1 Secret History Affords Insights on Negotiations By NEIL SHEEHAN Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, June 27 ? settlement. Among the ma- The Pentagon papers volumes lor points are these: on the secret diplomacy of the The volumes do not indicate Johnson Administration show that Hanoi and Waashing- ton could not reach a peace settlement because they coal not compromise their basic dis- agreement over who would hold power in South Vietnam. These four volumes of the secret history of the Indo- chnia war reveal that Hanoi, despite mounting levels of ? punishment, was adamantly_ clincing to its long-term ob- Cmjzjsts would ad ere to jeotive of unifying Vietnam un- ' e der a Communist form of gov- risinE level of mill unish- emment. ? - histo shows ? . by . ? tt.A an y American power. of 11.11anoi conducted relatively ng same pnvate ? 3740&i. diplomacy sayingvirtifal- lt?hat-kATIC-in public. rf6 lack 4,14amai?isras...stlilling_to_sn- wo romise onl to the extent of emedi-ving **a ? an a ace-say- ? .. ? ... aiil iae111/ any miss Peal/lite there may have been . ? ... ell probleilmliaLriTillirMither side e ? 0 ? The was willing to compromise on the basic substance of its posi- tion. What misunderstandin did exis seems o - a ? a mo e th art of V/ash- a i ;aaarentl could some ?e un ria clin # ? ail ? # 0 . to US its am . ? ? # a ? ec sta es an ommunis 'des or shorta re ou ows een o in ive * - ? " ? a MatillnimirliM - .? Geoid-MA.17/1h r?, at.?the wa ' for reasons o su stan5e. ' lo- aatss..alachinery. When The New York Times South. published its series of articles on the Pentagon papers last June and July, it did not possess eanailte the these four four volumes of the 47- 1 ' ar ace-s ving volume Pentagon study..4p- means the term # - ? I - .? I' 0' . ? . a a . a). rom snd.....a_nDsZmung chievement of its long- II ? ? sed- the en WashiagLop zirloke ' !-1/411.1 ? SU- 4141161. 6:f=ktexe o?? ge rizi1 ilib .alataitA4.4.1asIs...i.adavssin,414 sazkzted columnist. A on mance ntion. empt to e 41Se b- neWSpaper nromari 1-4# er, for ted ta a ,nc? ? 11,gns. Rather, it seems ub- to have regarded the peace derson's movement as evidence of a n. fundamental political weakness Attitudes Clarfied in American policy that would tell against Washington in the The volumes on the negotia- end. tions begin with events in mid- Washington in turn tended 1964 and end with May of ,act m- 1968, shortly after President munist interm lanes su as Lyndon B. Johnson made pos-Wre="-"h"ff.3:arta1wo-ere = sible the opening of the Paris c e can iczwin talks by limiting the bombing V.iatuam. of North Vietnam to the area ..1Lagjunjaing_LUILe North south of the 20th Parallel and ears to have increased currently announcedhisdecision ?t mum ion to not to seek another term. =Lime_ itece of Pentagon history doesagifying_iietna-7i?n. in?fd?er its s ovineTdaShip. it it does reveal much a out !he unwillingness to coin- pie Itaitudes of both sides, the promise on basic positions was jac,..tirjr_dawmay_lid evident reports on the first vihy.....thgLama.zat.agagh....a diplomatic contact made in 1. PAGE The New York Times Secretary of State Dean Rusk, left, acrid Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union at the Soviet mission here in 1967. When they conferred in Vienna in May, 1965, Mr. Gromyko told Mr. Rusk Soviet Union "will not negotiate about Vietnam." June of 1964 through J. Blair Seaborn, the Canadian member of the International Control Commission for Vietnam, and in the first bombing pause, for five days in May of 1965, which was code-named Mayflower by the State Department. On June 18, 1964, more than six months before the first air attacks on the North, Mr. Seaborn orally conveyed a message from the Johnson Ad- ministration to Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam, ac- cording to the history. The message said, according to the Pentagon account, that the United States was determined to preserve a non-Communist South Vietnam and threatened North Vietnam with "the great- est devastation" if Hanoi did not halt the Vietcong guerrilla rebellion in the South and if the conflict intersified. The Pentagon history says that Premier Dong "laughed and said he did indeed appre- ciate the problem." He is re- ported to have replied that while North Vietnam "will not provoke the U. S.," apparently through overt-intervention, Hanoi would continue to sup- port the Vietcong and "We shall win." He is reported to have pro- posed as a "just solution" an American withdrawal from the South and the creation of a neutral regime there in accord- ance with the publicly an- nounced program of the Vietcong. Dean Rusk, who was then Secretary of State, is shown to have reflected Washington's attitude of no compromise on its essential demands in a con- versation with the Soviet Am- bassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, on May 11, 1965, at the outset of the Mayflower bombing pause. Mr. Rusk noted, in a cable- ram relating the conversation, which the Pentagon historians quote, that Mr. Dobrynin asked seems to have caused, despite the constant hope of Washing- ton that the pressure would force Hanoi to compromise its basic objective, is strikingly evident in remarks attributed to Premier Dong in conversation with two French scientists in July, 1967, when the bombing was at its height. The two scientists, Herbert Marcovich and Raymond Au- brac?Mr. Aubrac was a friend of the late President Ho Chi Minh?went to Hanoi as inter- mediaries for the Johnson Ad- ministration. Their mission was arranged and supervised by Henry A. Kissinger, then a Har- vard professor and now Presi- dent Nixon's adviser on na- tional security. U.S. Power Acknowledged if the pause meant "any change in the fundamental U S.posi- tion." "I replied that it did not and that this should be no sur- prise," Mr. Rusk is said to have written. The Soviet Union then refused to deliver to the North Vietnamese a secret message that amounted to an ultimatum to call off the Vietcong and withdraw fro mSouht Vietnam or face more American bomb- ing. The stiffening of the North Vietnamese determination that the escalation of the bombing The message they carried to Hanoi was essentially the same as the earlier ones. Premier Dong is quoted as having replied that Hanoi knew that "U.S. power is enormous and the U.S. Government wants to win the war. "President Johnson is suffer- ing from a pain and this pain is called South Vietnam," he went os. "Therefore we think that at- tacks on the North are likely to increase. We have made provi- sions for attacks on our dikes; we are ready to accept war on our soil. Our military potential is growing because of aid from the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries." "Now I shall talk to you about negotiations and solu- tions," Premier Dong is said to have continued. "We have been fighting for our independence for 4,000 years. We have de- feated the Mongols three times. The United States Army, strong as it is, is not as terrifying as Genghis Khan." He again replied to Wash- ington that the solution for the United States was to withdraw from South Vietnam and permit the establishment of a neutral regime there, according to the history. "To theextent they believed each other, the two sides were amply forewarned that a pain- ful contest lay ahead," the Pentagon historians write in Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 their opening chapter on the secret diplomacy. "Even so, they were not inclined to com- promise their way out. "They held very different estimates of the efficacy of U.S. military might. We thought its pressures could accomplish our goals. The Communists did not." 25X1A ,k,??? THE WASIWle raase 2001/11/01 : ci#ARA'rergailittEF6230002pgs.1 15 I 3 AIifl\IFilele 1 The Washington Merry.Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, June 27,1972 Bi5 The Government Secrecy Syndrome By Jack Anderson _The custodlans of govern- egt cenrats arp anashipg pit tneth agiain nvpr our Ac- cess to the still-secret ? ortis ns ""rthe s ow ow Lyndon Johnpon .latil412?bring4tessura-upan Hanoi to Se He would would withhold the bombs for awhile, hoping this would encourage the North Vi- etnamese to negotiate. Then he would let the bombs fly again when he thought they needed some prodding. Sometimes, he stepped up the bombing at crucial stages of the secret negotiations. Re- peatedly, Hanoi would halt the talks because of the military pressure. After his retirement, Presi- dent Johnson published selec- tive excerpts from the secret papers to demonstrate how right and reasonable he had been. He omitted the , por- tions that made him look wrong and unreasonable. President Nixon also re- leased sensitive information, strictly for political reasons, about Henry Kissinger's se- cret Vietnam negotiations. The President used the ?infor- mation to reply to his critics. Jae_nnEgLio.slasdLos; unatiatuawst be reengnized for at it is. It is is I ess : grrecuti ?MTrri= the government to make a see) of ,vhjteeJt c1asi& documents has been 2.1atti1P°rep 'Pimp 01- evetion. Not only does the govern- ment sweep its bungles and blunders, its errors and em- barrassments under the se- crecy labels. But our entire foreign policy and defense posture remains secret except for what the federal establish- ment thinks is in its own inter- est to make public. The tragic, bitter lessons of Vietnam have shown the fate- ful consequences of allowing any president to exercise power in spendid isolation be- hind the double walls of exec- utive privilege and official se- crecy. We will continue, therefore, to publish information that the government seeks to hide from the public by classifying. Soviet Role The unpublished Pentagon Papers, for example, shed new light on the Soviet role in the Vietnam negotiations: The Kremlin, after showing no in- terest In settling the war, sud- denlradopted a different atti- tude In 1967. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin made the new attitude known during a Lon- don visit. "The British were first star- tied, then delighted to find Kosygin eager to play an ac- tive role as intermediary be- tween the U.S. and Hanoi ?" state the papers. "There was definitely a sharp change from previous Soviet reluc- tance to play the middle- man. . . . "What produced this change in Soviet attitudes? Were they acting on DRV (North Vi- etnamese) behest? Or were they now willing to put pres- sure on Hanoi in pursuit of their own? "Only a little light is shed on these questions by the ma- terials relating to Kosygin's stay in London. He was appar- ently willing to transmit pro- posals for DRY consideration more or less uncritically. While he argued the general merits of the DRV's side of the war, he did not try to bar- gain or alter specifics of the proposals transmitted to him. . . . "What is more striking is that he did not reactlidversely to the substance of the princi- pal de-escalatory proposal under discussion?the termi- nation of all DRS, infiltration and supply into SVN in ex- change for a U.S. halt on at- tacks on the .North and in troop level augmentation. Intercepted Call "Entirely apart from the se- quence in which these steps would be taken, their long- term result for- th piste would be extremely ad- verse militarily. Yet on Feb. la, he was overheard (by tele- Phone intercept) to tell Brezh- nett (the Communist Party chief) of 'a great possibility of achieving the aim, if the Viet- namese will understand the present situation that we have passed to them; and they will have to decide...' "In a retrospective discus- sion with Thompson (then the U.S. Ambassador) in Moscow, Kosygin expressed a jaun- diced view of the rule of me- diators, saying they either complicated the problem or pretended they were doing something when in fact they were not. "He had stepped into this uncomfortable spot in London because 'the Vietnamese had for the first time stated they were ready to negotiate if the bombings were stopped uncon- ditionally; this was the first time they had done so....' "How much the Russians had hoped in fact to accom- plish during Kosygin's Lon- don trip is impossible to know. They apparently har- bored few expectations after his return. Kosygin complain- ed to Thompson about the 'ultimatum' implied in the final proposal he transmitted to Hanoi from London, saying that he knew it was hopeless the minute he read it. . . ?" This incident illustrates how little influence the Kremlin had over the North Vietnam- ese. It was the beginning, how- ever, of an increased Soviet in- terest in ending the Vietnam War. C 1972. 'United Feature Srattleats Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 THE wAsEAV69-1, 8V1VdMease 2001/11/01 : C1kARiET7e1041A1146661a0020A.1313 The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, June 26, 1972 B 11 3 Hanoi Lessons Still Unlearned By Jack Anderson The history of our secret ne- sot14tigns with /fanoi contcains some ? ainful lessons which The a omzin details a ? pear in e unpui ? ? tions of the Pentagon Pap erg, which Daniel Ellsberg Care- WV withheld from the press. Prpident Nixon, heweve7, as u, ev_er_l_mpre sensitive IMMIAZin t e su res d itftlts. e us ice preparing to use these papers in its prosecution of Ellsberg. There appears to be no legitimate reason, there- fore, for continuing the se- crecy. Zgaye a con.v_of_the nulaishest Pentagon Paner,s, which give chronological ac- ount of our ? ?lomati frus- in s ? ? ,IrTionMait ? ? ? ?V . Here are the lessons, whic seemed to us to be the most compelling; Lesson No. 1?Ex-President Lyndon Johnson orchestrated the bombing of North Vietnam in careful synchronization with the peace negotiations. He alternately suspended and escalated the bombing in an effort to influence the negotia- tions. Invariably, this seemed to produce the opposite effect in Hanoi than Mr. Johnson had intended. Yet President Nixon is now using the same strat- egy. Lesson No. 2?The North Vi- etnamese, whether on the bat- tlefield or at the peace table, never lost sight of their ulti- mate goal; control of all Viet- nam. As the unpublished pa- pers put it, "Who shall govern SVN is what the war is all about." Lesson No. 3?With a pa- tience unknown in the West, the Hanoi leaders are pre- pared to ?await and outlast all enemies. "We have been fighting for our independence for 4,000 years," Premier Pham Von Dong told interme- diaries who approached him in 1967 with a peace offer. "We have defeated the Mongols three times. The united States Army, strong as it is, is not Is terrifying as Genghis Khan." Lyndon Johnson's game of now-we-bomb-now-we-don't, ac- cording to the peace papers, repeatedly backfired. An exchange of peace mes- sages through the Poles, for example, ended abruptly with the bombing of Hanoi on Dec. 13-14, 1966. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin later re- viewed with Secretary of State Dean Rusk why the contact had been broken off. "The bombing was just before that date," Dobrynin explained Ha- noi's response, "meaning the U.S. thought it could pressure Hanoi to talk." The papers quote a Soviet diplomat as saying the North Vietnamese regarded bombing of their homeland as an effort "to get Hanoi to talk." The re- fusal to talk while the bombs were dropping, he Said, "was a direct response" to the U.S. position. Nevertheless, President Nixon has now stepped up the bombing again as a means of wringing concessions out of the Hanoi leadership. But he, too, is finding the North Viet- namese fiercely stubborn. Their attitude is expressed in a secret quotation from Pre- mier Pham Van Dong. "President Johnson is suf- fering from a pain, and this pain is called South Vietnam," the North Vietnamese Premier told peace emissaries in 1967. "We agree that the situation on the battlefield is decisive; the game is being played in South Vietnam. "From the newspapers we see that some people want to confine the war to the South. However, the White House and the Pentagon seem deter- mined to continue the war against the North. Therefore, we think that attacks on the North are likely to increase. 'We have made provisions for attacks on our dikes; we are ready to accept war on our soil. Our military potential is growing because of aid from the USSR and other Socialist countries.... "We fight only when we choose; we economize on our resources; we fight only for political purposes." The lessons outlined in the unpublished Pentagon Papers should be studied carefully by those who still are seeking peace in Vietnam. C 1972, United Feature Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020019-3 25X1A NEW YORkPPIISXA For Release MI11/01? cou-For7e30041 5 RWISRAO 2 0 0 1 9-3 U.S. Attempted to Ignite VietnamForestsin'66-67 By ROBERT REINHOLD spccial to The New York Times MISSOULA, Montana, July 16?Wellrinfnrmed civilian nd militar so st s "a i? a ?? 1 to clear awa enem -controlle for ? es made a numb. .of roncertecl ?????....?????????ii* attempts to Jiij iire %tam? jiLatt.L._iam during 1966 AILIZZLIlejapj=_Eall,ati- matel abandoned, they,..said, because the sL_ti?al The project was undertaken with the collaboration of fire- prevention experts from the United States Forest Service. They were detached from the service's Northern Forest Fire Laboratory in Missoula and, ac- cording to some reports, from the Pacific Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station in California. Area Is Defoliated In the final atteiscalIe.d , laperal?TroriPinki_ROlpe, an area: ailasaut..Xx_sigs of the cit of Pljjjacielphia was d ' and barallar.decls,nesium bombs in in Iroliti?langle region northwest of Saigon, an ,area where the Allied pacifica- tion program had never suc- ceeded in eradicating Vietcon influence. fin Pallier at empt aialeaLlt-a-auggIde.CLaglallarer s1u.--164/S-11.Ulahee-r-aLion i?leararaiad_Eaceat. The results of the two attempts was so dis- appointing that no further ef- forts were made.' "It produced a lot of smoke and not a whole heck of a loti of fire at all," said a Pentagon spokesman, who confirmed that the fire attempts took place under the Johnson Administra- tion. He called them "test projects aimed at determining the feasibility of jungle-clear- ing by burning," and added . Continued on Page 2, Column 2 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 Continued From Page 1, Col. 2 that he could not provide fur- ther details of -1,11e_p.L....-oject, akich was conducted by the Wvanced Research Projects kgeney a high-levpt research Def_ense. ..12epart- Concern Over Environment The disclosure comes at a time of mounting concern among some scientists and Gov- ernment officials that years of defoliation, bombing and burn- ing have inflicted irreversible I damage on the Vietnamese en- vironment. Only _recently was it??diaclusaLtimt the United The target of the fire storm efforts were rare and desirable mahogany trees that many for- estry experts consider a poten- tially valuable resource for the Vietnamese economy. Had the burning succeeded, according to interviews with a number of experts on tropical vegetation, the trees would probably have been destroyed, replaced possibly by less useful bamboo and other coarse vege- tation. One military officer familiar with the project defended it on strategic grounds. Saying that the areas?War Zones C and D in Tayninh and Long- khanh Provinces? were Viet- cong staging areas, he asked, "When you're fighting a war, do you want to save trees or lives?" At the same time that the American foresters were trying to set forest fires, other United States Forest Service special- sts were at work helping to mild Vietnam's primitive log- ;ing industry and to improve imber management techniques, mder contract with the Agency 'cr International Development. Sought to Try Again 4uslugl.....t4 fire_ storm urces?LiaaLsaiii- Laz4offidaks_augges.tecl_that? it a am if better methods =y' ested that for and- Ot er -311T:Voiirre?s-ur- vPveri to determine if fire ? ? 0 00 ' ? be employed as eapon. Interviews with fire experts suggest that the project was ill- fated from the outset. "No way ?too wet," remarked William R. Beaufait, a Forest Service expert in the setting of pre- scribed fires to control timber forests, in his office here. Fire storms are a fearsome and little understood phenome- non. A fire storm, unlike an ordinary conflagration, packs tremendous energy. It sucks in air from all around, creating a convection column and mighty whirlwinds. What results re- sembles a cyclone and it is cap- able of ripping out bridges and 300-foot trees like matchsticks. Its demand for oxygen is such that people in the area perish from asphyxiation: this oc- curred during the Allies' World War II bombings of Dresden and Hamburg, in which more than 200,000 died Although the methods of starting and controlling fire storms are not well understood, the foresters were asked to ad- vise the military on the best conditions ? in terms of sea- son, wind, rainfall, tempera- ture, moisture content of vege- tation and other factors. Civil- ians in Vietnam during the pe- riod from 1965 to 1967 report having seen Forest Service per- sonnel at the Advanced Proj- ects Research Agency com- pound in Saigon. White House Role Unclear It could not be learned if the project nad the approv of President Johnson, but ac cording to a former high-rank- ing military officer, "The pro cedure was to get clearanc from the White House on any- thing like this?' A forestry contingent, work- ing under contract to the r search agency, was believed t include Craig Chandler, now in Washington as director of for- est-fire research for the Forest Service, and Robert W. Mach, a scientist at the fire laboratory here who has studied the mech- anisms of fire spreading and the relationship of wildland fires to ecological systems. Mr. Chandler was formerly with the Pacific Southwest sta- tion in Berkeley, Calif., which participated in fire storm ex- periments in the early nineteen- sixties. He acknowledged that he had been to Vietnam, but referred questions about his functions there to the Pentagon. A document that is still se- cret is believed to contain the details of some of the early work by the foresters. It is titled "Forest Fire Research? Final Report, Phase I, Volume 1, U. S. Department of Agri- culture, Forest Service. ARPA Order Number 818. January, 1966." The burning was necessari- ly keyed to the dry season in South Vietnam which lasts roughly from January to April. The target was what botanists call a double-canopied tropical rain forest. Double-canopied means that there are two levels of vegetation, the upper being the tops of tall mahogany trees, called Dipterocarpus, and the lower being smaller bushes and trees. Such a cover provides effective concealment for troops, but the area is not oth- erwise inhabited. Spraying With Herbicides Although the forest is wet even in the 4:1Ty season, the foresters theorized that they could create enough fuel for burning by first killing the leaves by spraying with chem- ical herbicides. This task was carried out by Operation Ranch Hand, the 9ir Force code name for the defoliation operations. The incendiaries were dropped by other Air Force planes. The burning project was de- scribed by a former command- er of Ranch Hand, Lieut. Col. Arthur F. McConnell Jr., in an article he wrote in 1970 for the Air University Review. The article was heavily censored, but an uncut draft has been obtained by The New York Times. According to Colonel McCon- nell, the first burning, Oper- ation. Sherwood Forest, was tried early in 1965. He described it as "a massive at- tempt to burn out a defoliated section of the Boiloi Woods in the hopes of denying the enemy an extremely vital base camp area." "For the next year," Colonel McConnel contnued, "several fire storm projects similar to the BoiLoi Woods effort were made in conjunction with the Vietnamese Air Force. While the attempts to ignite the de- foliated area met with limited success, the effect of the de- foliant itself significantly im- proved visibility for observa- tion." Flew 225 Sorties In support of the final fire storm effort in April, 1967, he wrote, his squadron flew "ap- proximately 225 sorties and de- livered over a quarter-million gallons of herbicides on se- lected target areas in War Zones C and D." According to other sources, the undergrowth was ignited, but the fire did not spread to the 70-foot high upper canopy. Since this third and final at- tempt was carried out under the most favorable conditions, the project was abandoned as unfeasible. Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 THE wthRemseletrarykst9gse 2001/11/01: CIARepliariakkGairaxmAE AVisit to aJecret American Base in Thailand By Peter Smith Pacific News Service PHITSANULOK, T ha 1- land?In a U-shaped bend of a small river about 15 miles cast of this northern district capital lipq a sporat p.S4 militprx traininR base known as Camp Saritsana. Near the point where had been told to turn off the road to find the camp, a Thai waitress in a small restaurant said that there were usually about 1,000 Thai soldiers at the site, but that most had just left. She also told me that 10 or 15 Americans were station- ed there, and that planes landed on an average of five times a day. As I walked along the river away from the high- way, the whine of diesel generators guided me until I saw several concrete and wooden buildings, a 100-foot- high water tower, and a generator shed. Further up, a steel suspension bridge carried truck traffic across the river. The scene re- minded me of places where I had served in Vietnam and Thailand. At Saritsana, U.S. Army Special Forces train Thai soldiers for combat in neighboring La o s. Since the early 'Ns, CIA-financed Meo mercenary armies, led by their most powerful chieftain Vang Pao, have been fighting in Laos, and estimates of the number of Meo men killed run as high as 50 per cent Inaeplace these losses, the ,Unffid Atates..--Ims?baen?trainialg Taals_far_lb&witaLtjuze '?,eggie training and tke fact that Thai1?ff1as kma.. laglif.g.n?oo.s to Laos bave Senate Report But a U.S. Senate sub- committee on security agree- ments and commitments abroad reported last year: 'The Thai irreg1arpro- eram . 1. ? 11 along ar pgagrajn in The IA _esandiWflore jn tritArri ortritgarns a a es their salary, aubwances (m- e urairardatinsaraftts), Irrrd oiSelatioiliff-00-ats in Lads." These Northern T h i aPeak a dialect similar to Meo dialect, and they are easily integrated into \Ting Eaallorces. - At the camp, I was stopped at the main gate by three Thai guards, who called their commanding officer, a Thai special forces sergeant ma- jor, on the phone. When I told him I had once served with the U.S. Special Forces in Thailand and just wanted to talk with some Americans on the base, he said, "Sure, come on." One of the guards got on the back of my motorcycle and we drove to headquarters. The 50-acre site is divid- ed roughly in the middle by an airstrip. Heavy woods surround the base. Ten bar- racks for Thai soldiers were on the left side of the en- trance road. Elsewhere on the grounds were 41 Thai spe- cial forces headquarters, a jump tower and cable rig for Parachute training, a drying loft for the parachutes, and several maintenance build- ings. 'Air America' Sign 41-fttar..-clieckinghe Illai_sergeazt_mgam.ihe Agad_ /oa me, a,cross he runwa tp._1 huildin mark- oTj,,rter line which 1ieFOerftlniskon45. fort.l_Te , tb,rougtionLaia. My Thai escort ushered me in- to a U.S. Special Forces team room, where five men were having their morning beer. All wore civilian clothes or jungle fatigues without insignia or name tag, a frequent tip-off that people are engaged in ac- tivity which might not square with formal pro- nouncements of U.S. policy. Scattered among the usual pin-ups and memor- abilia of home were other signs. One said: "No war was ever won wish modera- tion and civility. KILL1" Another said: "Make war, not peace. War is the final answer." The men were polite, al- most painfully so. They did not mention their mission, and when I expressed in- terest they changed the subject. Finally one of the men of- fered to escort me to the gate, and I followed his truck out and waved to the Thai guards as I left. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 NEW YORK TIMES DATE rtsruz PAGE U.S. Said to Break All of Soviet's Codes By BENJAMIN WELLES Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, July 15?The United States is reported to have refined its electronics in- telligence techniques to the point where it can break Soviet codes, listen to and understand Soviet communications and coding systems and keep track of virtually every Soviet jet piano or missile-carrying sub- marine around the world. "We're able to break every code they've got," a former analyst in the National Secu- rity Agency, one of the most secret of the Government's many intelligence agencies, is quoted as saying in the August issue of Ramparts magazine, which is published by Noah's Ark, Inc., 2054 University Ave- nue, Berkeley, Calif. The former analyst, whose name was not given in the arti- cle, was an Air Force staff ser- geant who was discharged from military service in 1969 after three years of overseas duty as a communications traffic ana- lyst for the agency in Turkey, West Germany and Indochina. He uses the pseudonym of Winslow Peck in the article Some Corroboration Found Mr. Peck, who is 25 years old, was recently interviewed by a correspondent of The New York Times in California. Ex- tensrve likeleppident checking in Washington with sources in and out of the Government who were familiar ,with intelligence roboration of many of his reve- lations. But experts strongly denied that the United States had broken the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union or of other foreign powers. The national security agency headquarters is at Fort Meade, near Baltimore. It has nearly 100,000 employes ? most of them military personnel ? and spends slightly less than $1- billion a year. Unlike the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, the N.S.A.'s primary purpose is the collection of information?most, of it through advanced tech- nology ? but it rarely, if ever, tries to evaluate the importance of the information or analyze it. The Ramparts article says that matters has resulted in the cor- Continued on Page 3, Column 1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 NEW yoR.K ApmEsd For Releasapplt11/01 : CIA-R0P741300415M000020019-3 ? Continued From Page 1, Col. 7 the United States has encircled the Communist world with at least 2,000 electronic listening posts on land or on naval ves- sels or aircraft. United States electronically equipped aircraft, according to the article, are constantly pene- trating the air space of the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries to pro- voke and record their radar and signal techniques to de- velop countermeasures against them. This claim has been chal- lenged here by independent Government intelligence ex- perts, who said that there have been no authorized, as distinct from inadvertent, violation of Soviet or Chinese airspace by the United States since the U-2 flights of the early nisiteen- sixties. The experts said that satellite photography has re- placed aerial overflights, con- ceding, however, that United States electronic intelligence planes often fly along Commun- ist borders to provoke reaction and collect signals. In the California interview, which was recorded on tape, Mr. Peck described his early life in Joplin, Mo., his enlist- ment in the Air Force in 1966 when he was 20 years old, his subsequent recruitment by the security agent, his special- ized training, his promotions and his three years of duty overseas. He was discharged in California in November, 1969, and says he turned down a $10,000-a-year job offer by the Central Intelligence Agen- cy. He decided-instead, he says, to work to end the Vietnam war. Tells of TV Monitoring A highlight of Mr .Peck's dis- closures include a report that in 1967 during his duty in Turkey the agency monitored a live Soviet television contact between Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, who was in tears bid- ding an emotional farewell to the astronauts Vladimir M. Komarov. Mr. Komarov was then in orbit in the spacecraft Soyuz I, which was still two hours from re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. According to Mr. Peck's account the astronaut just been informed by Soviet ground control thatt he braking parachutes designed to bring his spacecraft safely to earth were malfunctioning and that there was no hope of saving him. Soyuz 1 crashed on Soviet territory on April 25, 1967, and Mr. Komarov was killed. He was posthumously granted a second Order of Hero of the Soviet Unoin and is buried in the Kremlin walls. Mr. Peck also said that dur- ing the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the United States electronic in- telligence ship, the Liberty, was ordered near the Israeli coast to intercept details of Israeli military intentions. The ship was attacked on June 8, 1967, by Israeli jet air- craft and torpedo boats?an incident that cost 34 United States dead and 75 wounded and which President Lyndon B. Johnson later described in his book, "The Vintage oPint," as a "heart-breaking episode." Be- fore the attack, he said, the Liberty learned that General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli De- fense Minister, intended to order his forces on to Damas- cus and Cairo. Tells of Johnson Pressure ? Mr. Peck stated that Presi- dent Johnson then brought in- tense pressure on Israel to halt further troop movement and warned Premier Kosygin on the "hot line" against what ap- peared to be an imminent So- viet airborne operation from bases in Bulgaria against Israel. Intelligence sources here said they were unable to recall these details but a veteran of 30 years service in intelligence said of Mr. Peck: "He's obviously familiar with N.S.A.?its organization, opera- tions and many of its tech- niques. But no sergeant in his early twenties would know how intelligence is handled at the White House level, what N.S.A. material is used or discarded by the President or more than just the fringes about C.I.A. operations." During his year of duty in Vietnam, from November, 1968, to October, 1969, Mr. Peck, said, he participated in airborne electronic sweeps in Thailand in support of C.I.A. operations. The C.I.A., he said, was using unmarked attack bombers flown by C.I.A. "spookies" and based at Udorn to punish Meo tribesmen who had clashed with Thai Government troops over control of their traditional areas. The United States depended on a friendly Thai Government for important air bases and other facilities useful for the Vietnam war, Mr. Peck noted, and thus was prepared to as- sign the C.I.A. surreptitiously to help the Thai Government suppress internal disorders. Neither the N.S.A. nor the C.I.A. would comment today. Senior Government intelli- gence officials who were shown transcripts of the Peck inter- view discounted parts of it but corroborated others. David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers," (published by Macmillan in 1967) and a lead- ing authority on cryptoanalysis, said in a telephone interview that the Ramparts article "rep- resents much new information that rings true to me and seems correct." However, he chal- lenged some points, specifically Mr. Peck's assertion that the agency's experts are able to "break every Soviet code with remarkable success." Top-grade Soviet Foreign Ministry code systems "have been unbreakable since the nineteen thirties" Mr. Kahn said. He added that it was "highly unlikely that they have switched to breakable codes." Mr. Peck's contention that "information gathered by N.S.A. is complete" implies a false importance, Mr. Karin said. The N.S.A. does, he said, "solve" many nations' diplomatic codes; but these are countries of the third rank and provide only "indirect clues to Communist intentions." Mr. Kahn noted that "what we are doing in this field the Russians are doing and, con- trary tot he Ramparts state- ment, they are very good." He pointed out finally that the "thrust of the article, that the N.S.A. threatens peace, is incorrect." "I believe that in the existing world of two armed camps," Mr. Kahn said, "N.S.A. can pro- vide more light, more truth? and this can lead to better evaluation of situations and so to more realistic responses. N.S.A. is not like the C.I.A., which can foment revolutions and can indeed threaten peace." The interview contains a lengthy question-and-answer passage that Mr. Peck con- ceded, in his interview with The Times, was hurriedly pre- pared at a time when he was "extremely rattled." details of hitherto suspected but obscure details of elec- tronic eavesdropping around the globe resulted, he said, from opposition to the Vietnam War and from a hope that others doing similar clandes- tine Government work would "come forward and say what they know. "He concedes that his disclosures about the agency may involve him in legal tangles. "I know the FBI knows who I am," he said recently. "I'd like to avoid publicity but I'm willing to go through trial and, if I have to, I'll go to jail. I don't like the idea of going to jail. It scares me. But I no longer feel the oath that I made when I was released from duty to never say any- thing about what I did is bind- ing on me." No Comment From Admiral Senior agency officials, in- cluding Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, the director, are reportedly highly disturbed by Mr. Peck's interview. The agency is part of the Defense Department. Admiral Gayler, who has been named commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet after three years as director of the agency, is to be succeeded in a month by Lieut. Gen. Samuel C. Phil- lips, an Air Force space spe- cialist. Direction of the agency is normally rotated among the three armed services. Neither Admiral Gayler nor Defense Department officials could be induced to comment for publication. However, other intelligence sources agreed that the Ramparts material con- tained nothing that would en- danger national ? or crypto- graphic?security. Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25X1A THE WASHINGTON POST CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 DATE ir.11.) "I Z.- PAGE 6 -7 The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, June 8,7972 G7 Nixon. Brezhnev Can Be Trusted 1 By Jack Anderson No transcript was kept of the face-to-face meetings be- twen President Nixon and So- viet party chief Leonid Brezh- nev in the Kremlin. As an act of trust, the Presi- dent didn't even bring his own interpreter into ?the confer- ence room but accepted Brezh- nev's After each session, Mr. Nixon methodically tran- scribed his recollections of the discussion. His personal notes constitute the only U.S. record of the historic Nixon-Brezhnev talks. From a source with access to these notes, here are some of the highlights: On the eve? of the Moscow meeting, the strategic arms limitation talks were still snagged in Helsinki over So- viet unwillingness to halt con- struction of missile-carrying submarines. But the President, alone with Brezhnev, leaned forward and said: "Dammit, let's settle it." Then they hammered out the important agreement to limit nuclear weapons. At one point, Mr. Nixon jokingly sug- gested that Russia could sub- stitute its mammoth SS-9 mis- siles for submarines, since the new monster missiles resem- ble submarines in both size and shape. "How do you know?" de- manded Brezhnev gruffly. For r,ussia has tried to keep its ls secret from the world. The Prpstdent renlied that Vez....Ln_ty. as well be Mk ith on7T?T6tItV7p- nn. since ild-61-50-ex- cglleat...121elligeace.. Perhaps, he said, the Soviets might wish to mount SS-9s on their submarines. "This would sink the sub- marines," snorted Brezhnev. "That is exactly what I had in mind," cracked Mr. Nixon. The President found Brezh- nev to be a hearty host but a hard negotiator. In the end, however, Mr. Nixon concluded that "the man can be trusted." Peace Code Perhaps even more impor- tant than the nuclear arms agreement, in the President's opinion, was a 12-point pact "to remove the threat of war" and "to promote reduction of tensions in the world." He felt this codified the new Soviet-American relationship and established the rules for avoiding future military con- frontations. The pact was proposed by the Russians and resisted at first by Mr. Nixon. He changed his mind, however, and decided it could be an in- strument for peace. He per- sonally drafted the 12 points between sessions in Moscow, and Brezhnev accepted most of the President's language. Mr. Nixon drove himself re- lentlessly in Moscow, averag- ing only three to five hours of sleep the first six nights, as he followed the endless hours of bargaining with meticulous notetaking and painstaking preparations for the next ses- sion. He was bouyed by his suc- cess and left Moscow ex- hausted but exhilarated. He told aides jubilantly that he felt more confident than ever of an enduring peace. The Moscow meeting, he genuinely felt, had made the world a safer place. During a subsequent visit to a Leningrad castle, the guide showed the President some trick mirrors and a spot where the acoustics made a few hand pats sound like great ap- plause. Mr. Nixon gleefully made funny faces at himself in the mirrors, then he an- nounced: "I am going to ap- plaud myself." He patted his hands and beamed happily when the magnified applause roared back. Footnote: Even Andrei Grechko, the dour Soviet de- fense minister who reportedly had opposed the Nixon visit, warmed up to the Presi- dent. While Mr. Nixon was standing at attention for the Soviet honor guard, he felt a tap on his shoulder. It was Grechko, who made a good- humored crack about the marching soldiers. WASHINGTON WHIRL Chaotic Society?President Nixon has told subordinates that he still believes in fiscal responsibility and will return to a tight budget immediately after the election. He will begin, he suggested, by cutting ex-President Lyndon John- son's Great Society programs. Mr. Nixon has already drafted " a list of 110 federal programs that he believes should be re- pealed or, at least, turned over to local governments He will charge that the programs were hastily conceived and poorly administered. He also intends to warn, in effect, that the Great Society will wind up in- stead as a Chaotic Society, with the workers taxed be- yond endurance. Headlines and Footnotes? President Nixon's fund raisers have drafted a blacklist whose campaign contributions will be turned down. The list in- cludes shady operators and former donors who demanded too much for their money... The President's foreign policy czar, Henry Kissinger, is qui- etly promoting New York's Gov. Nelson Rockefeller for Secretary of State .. . Admiral Hyman Rickover; the crusty father of the nuclear subma- rine, has never given a hang for naval starch and dress. The other day, he wore civil- ian clothes ventilated by a gaping tear in his pants. 1972, United Feature Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25X1A THE WASHIMAPOrIVAD6or Release 2001/11/01)AgA-140014ER0003fligg12919-3?;2:; The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, May 49, 1972 t23 U.S. Moves May Reunite Russia, China By Jack Anderson There Is evidence in the se- cret U.S. cable traffic that President Nixon's military moves in Vietnam may be driving the two great Commu- nist antagonists, Russia an China, back together. We have been able to trace the dismaying developments I through secret documents, which the White House has carefully withheld from both Congress and the public. These documents show that the Kremlin reacted to the Chinese-American rapproche- ment by making Its own secret overtures to Peking last Au- gust. The Soviets worked through Lin Piao, the acerbic defense minister, who has been designated by Mao Tse- tung to become his successor. Encoeraged by his Soviet contacts, Lin opposed inviting President Nixon to Peking and advocated restoring the Chinese-Russian partnership. This put Lin in direct conflict with Premier Chou En-lai, who had issued the invitation to Nixon. Lin lost the showdown and mysteriously disappeared. The crafty Chou spread the word to the party faithful that Lin had died in a plane crash after attempting to assassinate Mao. Chou's version, which was whispered around China and reached CIA ears, had it that Lin attempted to waylay Mao on the way home from South China by train last August. Knowing Mao's itinerary would take him through Shanghai and Wuhsi, Lin al- legedly arranged an assassina- tion party in Shanghai and aft- erward planned to blow up a bridge in Wuhsi to wreck Mao's train. Both plots failed, according to the story, and Lin attempted to flee to Rus- sia by jet on Sept. 13. The plane supposedly crashed in the Wenteukhan area of Mon- golia. The whispers of the plot to kill Mao, who has deity status in China, apparently was in- tended to cow Lin Piao's sup- porters. So monstrous was the thought of assassinating the great Mao, in Chinese minds, that the Lin faction was sup- posed to be intimidated into silence. But the opposition to Chou continued to simmer under the surface, and the Russians quietly pressed for better rela- tions The plenum of the So- viet Central Committee, in an unpublished action last No- vember, sought to restrain the ideological struggle against the Chinese. Still, other events inflamed Chi nese-Russian relations until the State Department re- ported in a confidential sum- mary last December: "Sino-So- viet international polemics as distinct from domestic propa- ganda have risen to the highest level since 1969 . . . Peking, however, hail so far avoided whipping up a war scare Within China, and it appears to be attempt- ing to restrict increased ten- sion with Moscow to verbal fireworks on international questions." Significantly, Chou is in charge of China's interna- tional affairs and, therefore, was responsible for the rising rhetoric. President Nixon's air attacks upon North Vietnam, however, have made it awk- ward for Chou. China and Russia have been competing for Hanoi's favor, as the two titans of commu- nism maneuver for influence In Southeast Asia. Rivalry, in Hanoi The Central Intelligence Agency, in a secret report, has declared: "Following Dr. Henry Kissinger's July visit to Peking, Chinese Premier Chou En-lei made a secret visit to Hanoi to reassure the Govern- ment of the Democratic Re- public of Vietnam (DRV) of continued Chinese support. "The Chinese emphasized their support by increasing their assistance to the DRV for the 1971-72 period. This in turn resulted in an increase in Soviet assistance to the DRV for the same period. . "The DRV expressed its ap- prehension to Chou regarding a U.S.-Chinese detente and stated that the DRV is still suspicious about President Nixon's visit to Peking." In view of the Chinese-Rus- Sian rivalry in Hanoi, Nixon undermined Chou and justi- fied Lin's position by orderiAts air strikes against North Viet- nam. This has strengthened Lin's survivors inside the Chinese policy councils. As a result, Lin's idea of re- pairing Chinese-Russian rela- tions is gaining support. At the United Nations, for exam- ple, the relations .between Chinese and Russian delegates are warming. A Soviet delegation, on tour of China, has also been re- ceived with unaccustomed cordiality. In return, there was no Soviet denunciation of the Chinese at the Lenin Day cele- bration on April 21. There are now hints of Chinese-Russian cooperation to route war supplies overland to North Vietnam. If this de- velops, the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors will cost the U.S. far more in world strategy than is likely to be gained on the Vietnam- ese fighting fronts. ej 1972, United Feature 5rndloste Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25X1A .110ppro1ve0or11eMease 1/11/01 : CIA-RDP741X1W0M020019-3 ?..1- Th, THE WASHINGTON POST DATE PAGE 11 The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, May 15, 1972 D15 Red Carpet for Nixon Slightly Pale By. Jack Anderson Secret intelligence reports declare that President Nixon's high-risk military moves in Vietnam have undermined those in both Moscow and Pe- king who want to ease ten- sions with the United States. Although there had been no visible opposition to the Presi- dent's trip to Peking and invi- tation to visit Moscow, the Central Intelligence Agency claims the detente was fierce- ly resisted inside the policy councils of both governments. To protect our sources, we cannot quote directly from the CIA documents. The CIA maintains, however, that the decision to invite Nixon was by no means unanimous in Moscow or Peking. Citing "reliable" sources, the CIA claims the Soviet mil- itary hierarchy has opposed doing business with Nixon. De- fense Minister Andrei Grechko, apparently, has be- come the principal spokesman for this faction inside the Kremlin. The Russian marshals, ac- mrding to the CIA, are eager ,o share credit in Hanoi for :he North Vietnamese sue- ceases. For the military equip- ment, which has smashed the South Vietnamese defenses, was made in Russia. The Soviets, in the bidding against the Chinese for influ- ence in Hanoi, had offered the North Vietnamese a $110 mil- lion military loan. Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the North Viet- cided to spend it for tanks, heavy artillery and anti-air- namese military genius, deci- craft missiles. The Soviet military brass would like to see a setback for U.S. Interests not only in Viet- nam but the Middle East. The CIA warns that the Russians may counter U.S. moves in Vietnam with new initiatives in the Mediterranean. The CIA offers fewer specif- ics about the opposition within the Chinese leadership to the Chinese-American detente. But bitter opposition, says the CIA, is simmering beneath the surface. Laird's Good Humor Our recent columns on the misuse of the Pentagon auto fleet has drawn a good-humor- ed reaction from Defense Secretary Mel Laird and or- ders from on high to start Obeying the regulations. But the Pentagon bigshots, as usual, are reading the regu- lations to suit their expensive tastes, not to save the taxpay- ers' money. Result: most of the staggering waste contin- ues. We told, for example, how gon cars, intended for use only on pressing official busi- ness, had become a luxury lim- ousine service for military po- tentates and their congres- sional friends. Laird, meanwhile, still has two limousines at his constant call in case one should de- velop motor trouble. His spe- caw aesistant, Carl Wahace, is also picked up each morning and delivered home each eve- ning by a military chauffeur. The men who toil in the Pentagon garage, however, were getting the word to put an end to excursions that vio- late regulations. This, presum- ably, meant stopping the prac- tice of routinely chauffeuring members of Congress around Washington. But when the motor pool tried to follow orders, it found itself in hot water with the Pentagon's congressional liai- son office, which is responsi ble for keeping the military's popularity rating high on Capitol Hill. The clash between military regulations and congressional relations was quickly resolved in favor of keeping the Con- gressmen happy. The soldiers who man the motor pool were ordered to provide whatever the congressional liaison of- fice wanted. So military vehicles con- tinue, for example, to bring in large quantities of liquor from the Pentagon's Washington supplier so there will be plenty to serve to thirsty Con- gressmen when they attend a military reception or take a military flight. The fact that such trips in- volve an apparently illegal transportation of liquor across the Virginia border from Washington doesn't bother the Pentagon brass. Apparently, the abuse of military cars is not cord med to Washington. At the U.S. naval base in Bermuda, for ex- ample, the brass ride around in full-size American sedans despite the fact that such large cars are legally forbid- den to other residents of the resort island. ? WM United Feature Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25X1A 11.6 Wdeibt-i1iNCT-201\1 .t)Ub The Washington Merry-Go-Roan& iiui . A-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 PACzi.,' THE VASHINGTON POST Wednesday:111.,ay, 10, 1972 B15 'Brainwash' Attempt by Russians? By Jack Anderson aklaaa, the Ceptral Inte1- alanaL12.stet files is an account of a possi- X4_59,at_Attgant to "brain- ersonnel erious The fantastic details are contained in a file marked "Operation Pandora," which describes how the Russians bombarded our embassy with eerie, low-radiation impulses. Their secret intent, it was sus- pected, may have been to alter the personalities of our diplo- mats. The bizarre story began in 1945 when a Russian pres- ented Averell Harriman, then our ambassador, with a hand- some carved Great Seal of the United States. Harriman proudly hung it in the em- bassy. The seal contained a tiny electronic eavesdropping de- vice, which monitored conver- sations inside the embassy until 1952, when it was de- tected. From this shocking dis- covery Came urgent orders that all embassies must be pe- riodically checked for elec- tronic signals. In the '60, U.S. security men discovered the strange micro- wave impulses, some steady, some pulsating, directed into our Moscow embassy from a neighboring building.' The CIA quickly learned that Russian medical litera- ture suggested Microwaves can cause nervous tension, ir= ritablility, even disorders. They speculated that the Rus- sians were trying to drive American diplomats stir crazy with the waves. Neither the Cia nor the State Department had the fa- cilities to ?test the effects of the silent rays on human beings. At the Pentagbn, how- ever, the super-secret Ad- vanced Research Project had worked on electronic sensors and other weird projects The agency quietly began a study, under the direction of -Richard Cesaro, into the ef- fects of microwaves on people. Cesaro gave the project the code name, "Operation Pan- dora," and called in a physi- cian, Dr. ?Herb Pollack, and two crack military scientists, Dr. Joseph Sharp of Walter Reed Army hospital, and engi- neer-microwave expert Mark Grove of the Air Force. Sharp and Grove, supplied with the microwave data moni- tored in the embassy, dupli- cated the embassy environ- ment, using monkeys for dip- lomats. The monkeys actually were trained to perform tasks and then were rewarded with food, much as embassy employees might be rewarded with a dry martini at the end of the day. The monkeys were studied night and day for months at Walter Reed, while a collat- eral experiment was con- ducted on rabbits by consult- ant Dr: Milton Zaret in his own laboratory. In the embassy in Moscow, meanwhile, no one except the highest diplomats and security men were aware of the secret microwave drama. By 1967, the scientists felt they had watcned the monkeys long enough for a tentative reading. Some felt there were signs of "aberrant behavior" caused by the microwaves, but the majority disagreed. Only the rabbits showed clear changes?in their heart rate? which Zaret attributed to heat from the rays. The disagreement on psy- chological changes were sent to.. a top secret reviewing board, which also could reach no absolute conclusion that the rays affected the monkeys' minds Nevertheless, the suspicion lingered, and the White House decided that even if the micro- waves were not "brainwash- ing" embassy people, they should be halted. It was also suspected that the wayes might be part of some radical new surveillance technique. At the June 1967 Glassboro meeting between President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, the question of the microwave rays came up. One informant Insists Johnson personally asked Kosygin to end the ray bombardment, although other sources say the request was made at a lower level. By 1968, most of Cesaro's scientists were convinced that' the microwaves were not psy- chologically harmful and the embassy experiments ended in early 1969. The brilliant work done by the team, however, has now led to important research on the effects of microwaves. So far, tests show high radiation can injure eyes, genital organs and perhaps other parts of the body. But, as yet, there is no conclusive proof that low-level radiation is harmful. Footnote: We have spoken with Cesaro, Pollack, Sharp, Zaret and Grove. All acknowl- edged they worked on "Opera- tion Pandora," but all refuse to go into details. As Sharp put it: "Pandora was classified in those days and still is." Auto Pollution The Environmental Protec- tion Agency has eased up on the car makers, all very se- cretly, so they can spew more exhaust into the atmosphere than federal law allows. The Clean Air Act requires a reduction of at least 90 per cent in poisonous exhaust emissions by 1975. But it has been left up to EPA Adminis- trator William Ruckelshaus to implement the law. Ruckelshaus's first proposal was so weak that Ralph Nader and other environmentalists raised an almighty howl. On the other side, the auto mak- ers, led by General Motors, claimed it was too tough. Publicly, EPA defended the proposal, but behind closed doors, the agency caved in to General Motors. ?1972, Publishers-Nall Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25X1A w 5e3sa,se 2001/11/01: CIA-B9faBc,4514(1.911t$102001:9At.11, D/?. The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, May 8, 1972 D15 U.S. Beats Russia in Capsule Chase By Jack Anderson With all the drama of a TV thriller, an American helicop- ter and Soviet trawler raced at top speed recently for a missile capsule that had plopped into the stormy Atlan- tic. The dramatic dash took place on March 18 off the Vir- ginia coast. In a hairbreadth finish, the copter trium- phantly retrieved the capsule from the ocean a couple of minutes before the trawler reached the spot. The missile was fired on March 17 by the National Aer- onautics and Spaee Adminis- tration from Wallops Island, Va. This was a classified mis- sion for the Atomic Energy Commission to measure how cloud moisture erodes projec- tiles, including America's nu- clear missiles. The small, cloud-probing missile soared into the atmos- phere, then jettisoned its cap- sule about 20 miles offshore into turbulent international waters. The capsule contained secret instruments and a horn- ing beacon. But recovery from the high waves was impossi- ble. Next day, the waves had calmed, but the beacon was dead. For half a day, NASA planes searched for the bob- bing object. Finally, a fixed- wing scouting plane spotted the capsule and hovered pro- tectively over it. Rushing toward the capsule, however, was a Soviet fishing boat. The Soviets have outfit- ted many of these ships with the latest electronic monitor- ing equipment. The boats fish for sea herring, mackerel and U.S. secrets along the Ameri- can coast. At the approach of the traw- ler, NASA hastily ordered a rescue helicopter into the race. The clattering copter and the straining trawler al- most converged on the prize at the same time. But the copter reached the capsule ahead of the boat and dropped down in the waves, while the American crew expertly fished the cap- sule from the seas in the nick of time. At Wallops Island, a NASA spokesman confirmed our ac- count of the sea chase. The trawler may have been moni- toring the homing device, or the Russians may have been attracted to the spot by the hovering U.S. plane. But the spokesman acknowledged "our guys were uneasy." For the Russians to have filched the capsule with its cargo of American secrets from under NASA's nose, he conceded, would have been highly embarrassing. "But," he said, "there's nothing we could have done. Those were inter- national waters." Nixon Document The mystery of billionaire Howard Hughes' $205,000 loan to President Nixon's brother, Don, still has some loose ends that need tying up. When this column exposed the loan 12 years ago, Richard Nixon stated: "I had no part or interest in my brother's business. I had no part what- ever in the negotiation of this loan." From the records of the Los Angeles County Courthouse, however, we have obtained a 16-year-old document which seems to dispute Mr. Nixon's 'statement. This is a lease of the bit of land owned by Mr. Nixon's mother, Hannah, which was used to secure the' Hughes loan. The lease was made out to Union Oil Com- pany of California and is part of the complicated loan ar- rangements. It is signed by Hannah Nixon, and the faded stamp shows it was notorized by Wil ham A. Ridgely in Washing- ton, D.C. At that time, Ridgely worked in the Senate financial " office, as he still does. Only a senator or the presi- dent of the Senate could have . approved Hannah Nixon's use of Ridgely's office for notarii- ing. As Vice President, Mr. Nixon was then president of the Senate. Ridgely told us he vaguely recalled going to Mr. Nixon's house to do notary work. 'That could have been the I time," he told us. In any case, it appears that Mr. Nixon, or someone in his office, sent Hannah Nixon to Ridgely to get a lease notar- ized on Oct. 12, 1956?at the same time Mr. Nixon said he "had no part whatsoever in the negotiation of this loan." 1972, United Feature Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25X1A THE WAS PRB ase 01 : CI6RVE741$1401456M90029411e4 The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, April 14, 1972 C39 ...R 1 Kremlin Financing Latin Revolution By Jack Anderson 4h ICremlin ha asked Cu- 12/121 dictatoF'Yfdil-CiStFo'to try tn reaain control over Lulu American revolutionai, Jziagaltat&-ai2d-las-na/13114d nay all the cost. involved." This is the secret finding of tbe Centre 1" Intemgence Agency whia has mit t. ? ? - er-the-iieasiv-eicees-trae. its alitkats...11-Euralle?auri-Staah Azarziaa. In an earlier column, we re- ported that Castro had moved his Latin American Libera- tion center from his embassy In Paris to his embassy in Santiago, Chile. IliaaMiati.2n, AgrArgin" .1,..ILAJO ?tit weverywhere saxs..the..C.1.?azille...fizajaced last-tke,cev4etar Citing information that came directly from Cuban Intelligence officer Enrique Benavides Santos in Paris, the teuads: "Renavides said that throurh Cuba. the Soviets_will suguangLarmaarsagjaama_or uth cipemerl _appropriate in situaa--aamilxies?tiasauglactut Latin Ainclica. "Aaseastiag--to?RenailitteA tite_somie' ts have told Cuba i.thay will 'ploy ftw,, evarythingl, =i;iHevcid6ierally ical peeps. "iiampAidaa...atraaglx_t,,LaRpa- rust roh.. hat pot are the best means of social; swer and what I can't," he e but still fay- 1st power in weak, backward roared. "Tell him I won't talk to them!" Footnote: "No-fault" is sched- uled for secret hearings in a few days before the Senate Commerce Committee. Ors armed revo u on e ery- Soviet-Cuban Strategy The new liberation center in Santiago, says the CIA, ',4v via in thajigaz_SguziatLuhan_atrategY fer-Latin-America. "Representatives of Latin American revolutionary groups now in Chile," the CIA adds, "are currently preparing a campaign of increased re- volutionary activity with the support of Cuba." At leact one revolutionary in ta a eirf!rtly frnm 1-he soviet lireettr?-A-saursa?imaide......t,he Ciwat.e.realao-craumunist-maaa. ? 000 ear poor tr. Hip c.:1].tp.rialan Ceerrrrarrist-Party-(.PG-T.)." From a member of the Cu- ban delegation at the United Nations, meanwhile, the CIA learned that at least some Cuban leaders "are doing some re-thinking on basic re- revolutionary tactics. "There is some theoretical opposition to the 'Che Gue- vara' theory, which favors supporting native insurrec- tionists and anarchists in poor countries." "Instead', support is growing for the Chilean formula, which maintains that tradi- tional democratic procedures countries. "It is in countries like Bra- zil," the CIA quoted the Cu- ban delegate as saying, "that stronger active measures should be taken." 'No-Fault' Ruckus When a self-styled consum- ers group in New York City tried to keep Sen. Frank Moss (D-Utah) from talking about "no-fault" insurance at their inaugural Meeting Moss angri- ly canceled the speech. The "consumers group" is made up of wives of members of the American Trial Law- yers Association.. The associ- ation is busily lobbying against "no-fault" because it will re- duce lawyers' fees by an esti- mated $1 billion. But the wives have agreed to back product safety bills which don't cut into their fur coats and their husbands' Cad- illacs. So they wanted Moss to speak. The ladies' lawyer Herman Glaser called Moss' office to make the final arrangements and said a press conference would be held at the meeting. As Moss' secretary Dolly Plumb recalls it Glaser left in- structions that if the press asked about "no-fault," Moss was to reply: "I have no com- ment to make on this point." When the senator was told about this, he exploded. "No- body tells me what I can an- Washington Whirl WHALLEY FOOTDRAG2,." John Woodcock Jr., assistant district attorney of Blair Coun- ty in Pennsylvania, has beet. stymied in his investigation of- Rep. Irving Whalley's kick- backs by the House Clerk and: the Justice Department. The clerk, Pat Jennings, has passed, the buck to the do-nothing House Ethics Committee, and the Justice Department haS dodged Woodcock's questions. Ironically, Woodcock and Whal- ley are both Republicans. ,..SELB=S?grajaive pogilifie_d_ classified infor a- ti'n which we believe 1 I But give away secret battle plariV, weapons information, fiRelli- getsea-aourzea...ar_atuer_aditi.: ra."te....s.egrer&JIRLAILY...,of- reful climbed into a taxicab the o her a s- op-oir.fs the Unksecret Per- f. la - two Nay rril_F: rive ? -r . s wen us a o W a l,ey W our ? I ailed acco nt e c e ? en on sourc I. $1- n on OU $ II $6 Iai r. . 1972, United Feature Syndleatel Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25X1A Ao,Appsqvg114FlooRglease 2001/11/01 : CIARQP7i6411145R0?0300020AM3 Walters Okayed For CIA Post Army Maj. Gen. Vernon An- thony Walters, 55, was ap- proved by the Senate yester- day Els deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a post which puts him in charge of most of the day-to-day workings of the agency. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 NEW Y8RWYTkil9S Release 2001/11/1M r.CIA-R31:144411;a7h300026iiiif I CONGRESS SETS 1111A. INQUIRY Role Another Target but Doubt Is Voiced By JUAN de ONIS Special to The New York Tlipes SANTIAGO, Chile, March 30 ?X,14 Clean Congress has de- ? - ? to investigate ?ast actri- - ? 11141U - ? . ? en- - ers7411f1M111.? dtp ? d Intern. twee e e. on d ?.7127.tmoir in - rt- . , - ? Atari (;? tcrgart, I rriViireMM taking nffie, in 1i)7 Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies called for the investigation after Hernan del Canto, Minister of the In- terior, had reported on what he said was a plot by retired military officers and a small, right-wing opposition party to overthrow Dr. Allende last week. The investigation will be conducted in the Chamber of Deputies. However, the anti- Marxist Opposition, which con- trols the Congress, questioned the evidence the Government has presented on both the C.I.A. activities and on the supposed plot. The main opposition party, the Christian Democratis, an- nounced that in protest it would organize a march open to "all democratic parties." The march, it said, would also serve to demonstrate opposition to the refusal by Dr. Allende's lett- wing Government to authorize a march by women 10 days ago and another by privale organizations Tuesday. While Congres agreed to an investigation of the C.I.A. in Chile, a court of appeals re- leased on $82 bail the president of the Fatherland and Liberty movement, Pablo Rodriguez Grez, a lawyer who was ac- cused byt he Government' prose- cutor of fomenting the plot last week. A retired general, Alberto Green Baquedano, and two re- tired junior army officers are being held in the plot, which the Government has said called for the assassination of Dr. Allende. OM The investigation of the C.I.A. and the International Telephone and Telegraph Cor- poration, which has large in- vestments here, stems from purported I.T.T. documents made public by ,Jack Anderson, the syndicated Washington columnist. The documents, which sug- gest that I.T.T. employes, some of whom were in contact with the C.I.A. in Washington, tried unsuccessfully to promote a military coup to keep Dr. Al- lende from taking office, have caused a political storm here. Ex-C.I.A. Director cited John A. McCone, a former director of the Central Intel- ligence Agency, has confirmed that executives of International Telephone & Telegraph Corpo- ratiom had discussed moves against President Salvador Al- lende Crossens of Chile, the magazine Business Week said today. cCone, nowa member = Vb - of the'.'"ard Of directors and its executive committee, w.a.a_onoted as saving he had bPP11-l and "th cnmnae a n a o the ut ited it lock the e lp Far from disavowing the au- thenticity of the memorandum published by Mr, Anderson, Mr. McCone said they were written by I.T.T. staff mem- bers, according to Business Week. I.T.T. spokesmen have denied as "without foundation in fact" allegations that the company had panned or participated in any plots against Dr. 'Allende in an effort to protect its properties in Chile against ex- propriation. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 25X1A THE wiegiRmElEag INbastepe 2001/11/01: CIA-MH1393161141)00120.02001:9AE .51 The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, March 30,1972 K11 CIA Papers Show Anti-Allende View By Jack Anderson In earlier columns, we quoted from internal memos to show how the International Telephone and Telegraph con- glomerates and the Central Intelligence Agency plotted together unsuccessfully to block President Salvador Al- lende from coming to power in Chile. Unlitive now obtained secret caajarjalUaZalaill at leastwas ermi 1-11e copmunists to turn lite. a ha an ft". afirritlip +.+inn fhrniiahout South a. Thelatest secret intelligence Leports bear out the CIA's con- !ern, These reports that Cuban lictator Fidel Castro has .urned his embassy in San- iago, Chile, into "the principal uba9 center for support of ,atin-A merle an liberation novements." This Cuban liberation center llegedly "provides financial nd logistical support and uidance to the subversive (roups operating in other r,atin American countries." The CIA also charges that, President Salvador Allende vhrougli lesser government of- icials has apparently' given his approval for Cuba to main- tain contact with these subver- sive elements in Chile." Castro has formed a special Directorate 10 r Liberation whose mission is ' to foment Communist revolutions around the world. It is staffed, accord- ing to the CIA, by hundreds of tough, trained intelligence officers under the command of Manuel Pineiro Losado, who is known by the code name "Barba Roja." The Latin American section is directed by a man known as "Ariel," whom the CIA identifies by two names he has used in the past, Juan Carretero Ibanez and Ruben Cabrera Marquez. From Ha- vana, he directed the late Che Guevara's rag-tag guerrilla operations in Bolivia in 1968. The chief of the liberation team in the Cuban embassy in Santiago, according to the CIA, is Manuel Martinez G lan, who goes by the cod name "Manolo." He is a ye eran Communist intelligence officer who is reportedly in charge of all clandestine ac- tivities in the Santiago em- bassy. "The presence in Santiago of `Manolo' and 'Arid,'" de- clares a secret CIA report, "are indicators of the import- ance attached to the continued Cuban government interests and active support of the ex- port of the revolution." Castro used his embassy in Paris as "the principal center concerned with providing vari- ous types of support to Latin American liberation move- ments" until Allende allowed him to open an embassy in Santiago. "Communications between the Cuban officers in Santiago and guerrillas operating in other countries," says the CIA, "is accomplished by radio. "On occasions an officer will be dispatched from Ha- vana to make contact with one or more of the guerrillas. Explosives in the form of plas- tics are carried in false bot- toms of suitcases by the travel- ing officers." Footnote: The Cuban em- bassy supports various sub- versive groups throughout Latin America, but the CIA identifies as "the most nota- ble" the notorious Tupamaro terrorists who operate in Uru- guay. pruce Goose Revisite Billionaire Howard Hughes' vintage plywood flying boat, the "Spruce Goose" is about to lumber into the news again. A team of General Services Administration ofifcials has secretly visited the hangared monster to try to figure out what to do with it. Although GSA owns the eight-motored giant, renting it to Hughes for about $800 a month, Hughes guards re- quired the officials to sign in, then barred, them from going inside the plane. They were kept 20 feet away on the grounds that maintenance work was in progress. Resigned to Hughes' strange ways, GSA regional head Rich- ard Laws complied. Laws sighed, "It's a beautiful thing" when he saw Itha air relic which is bigger overall than either the 747 or huge C-5 transport. GSA is considering giving the ivory-colored behemoth, which Hughes test flew one time only 25 years ago, to a federal, state or municipal museum. If none will take it, GSA may sell it for a novel restaurant, as a low-speed air transport, or ,as a tourist at- traction such as the London Bridge or the Queen Mary. Thus, the Hughes book hoax controversy is finally stirring the government to dispose of he venerable seaplane slum- ering in its huge humidity- controlled hangar in Cali- fornia. Gravel vs. Kleindienst Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) has confided to friends that he will vote firmly against elevating Richard Kleindienst to Attorney General. ' Gravel was dubious before the ITT hearings. Now, he says, he is convinced that Kleindienst is unsuitable as the nation's number one law enforcer. (..)A 1972, United Feature Syndteate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3 2 5X1 A MilliNgEIMMMI THE WAthaffervpdgorDftaase 2001/11/01 : ClibRPI4950400041S90029261 (