ITT HOPE OF OUSTING ALLENDE REMOTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 28, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

25X1
THE WAl&PRQr qse 2001/11/01: CIA 4BZR11 tMO730'i020V~-dE F1)
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
ITT Hope of Ousting Allende Remote
By Jack Anderson M " exist policies, has contin- F lende's course Is working less
Any hnnp International Tel_'ued to explore the prospects well. If this trend continues, it
pphone and Telegraph may Of removing Allende from I will increase pressures on All
ave of ousting Chile's Presi-power. lende to move toward radical
~} I Ambassodor Davis, however, l solutions or In other direc-
ctent Salvador Allende, in the
1sTathaniel Davis, is unrealistic.
In a secret cable to the
State Department, Davis re-
ported that "prospects of mili-
tary intervention for the fore-
seeable future are extremely
small.
"It is held that military will
turn blind eye to virtually any
!constitutional abuse, and Al-
lende is smart enough to avoid
abuse so flagrant as to force
Before we published the in-, "Allende's decisions may, in
summarized the situation in his opposition and also of th
ment. that "there is considerable va-
Military Plotting riety in ways military might
intervene."
He reported "growing con-; Before ITT is likely to get
viction in opposition parties, its military coup, however,
private sector and others that Davis suggested that public
opposition is possible." He opposition to Allende would
cited! intelligence reports that have to become "so over-
THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, March 28, I972
--
1 1.1144 - -
_ -----? --- ---- great, that military interven-
t mention in 1970 to block Al? military services have been
substantiallj greater." . don is overwhelmingly invited.
lende's election. We have pub-
Mshed confidential memos But he concluded: "It is "It is held that military will
Among the world leaders
who have turned up in ITT's
corporate hierarchy are Paul
Henri Spaak, former Belgian
prime minister; Trygve Lie,
the late U.N. Secretary-Gen-
former chief of our own,Cen-
Twice a month, ITT's man-
agers gather alternately in
New York City and Brussels
to plan high strategy. Five of
the top managers draw higher
pay than President Nixon's
$200,000-a-year salary. And
ITT's panjandrum, Harold Ge-
neen, collects the highest sal-
ary in the world, $766,755 a
Which reveal the giant con-; not our impression that Chile wait for this public repudia-!sic _. wereI? to Pii
glomerate was prepared to is yet on brink of showdown, tion to become more clear and lis . he CTA inn an nrti plot
lve
spend millions promoting eco- In fact, there is some reason to more open than it is likelyt~ hogk llpnrlP's elnrtinn
nomic collapse in Chile to believe that new opposition ever to be." and th?s_ intprfPrp in Chile's
force a military coup. spirit could prove transitory ... roe igi' ion n s . This il-
Corporate Nation lustrtes the inees . uo r -
T1ig e_ shoe y 1 "My warn colleagues continue to' ! tinnshin that has rnwi >n be
1~' I i once Agency 1 warn me that t events move l With annual sales around t~^,en TTT and
ooperated w in p an- I slowly in Chile, or perhaps $7.5 billion and holdings in 67 the Nixonnaad
- ---I ILC~itliSlration.
countries
ITT is 'a veritable
but that other American __- great ability to rush to the
pare. The "With Russian and East Eu-
memos also blame the State ropean help ... and with some
Department for failing to take breaks, Chile just might be
a tougher ? stand against Al-; able, to rock along for some
lende. time to come."
Inside sources say that ITT, In his secret summary, how-
in order to protect Its invest- ever, the new American Am-
,
corporate nation. It has built
an empire, like Britain's, upon
which the sun never sets.
ITT directs Its own intelli-
gence operations, security sys-
tem and foreign service. It
deals with foreign govern-
ments at the highest levels-
often through former political
leaders, cabinet ministers and
Undersea Booby Trap
The Navy has awarded a $26
million study contract to de-
velop a secret, delayed-action
torpedo to be called the "Cap-
tor." It could be fired silently
into an enemy harbor where it
would remain a threat for
weeks.
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 25X1A
WA i-Ql o s? 2001/11/01 : CIA-Rp 7 20 0&0b 02 - GE '
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
By Jack Anderson
President Nixon's pledge in
Peking to pull American mili-
tary forces out of Taiwan, pre-
dictably, has raised howls from
the Republican right.
The same hardheads, who
called for President Truman
in the 1950s to "unleash" Chi-
ang Kai-shek, are now railing
against Mr. Nixon for promis-
ing to remove the American
lease. When old Chiang is at
last unleashed, they warn in
anguish, his island redoubt
will be overrun by the Red
Chinese.
Long before Mr. Nixon wa
invited to Peking, our militar
strategists fiercely debate
whether Chiang could wit
vd an amphibious assault.
iprguments are spelled out
~cret working papers in
bssession.
th~ntagon study contends
!thaAang's forces "are more
Taiwltluate" for defending
assau.Iainst an amphibious
mary dcause Chiang's "pri-
to regative . . . has been
mainlandeontrol over the
he has be study asserts,
tary force C formidable mili-
exceeds the h substantially
ments for Ta ense require-
hand, isn't rega
P
bilities "that the CPR (Chi-
nese Peoples Republic) could
not mount major offensives
on more than one front."
Soviet Threat
Since Mao Tse-tung's main
forces are tied up on the So-
viet border, where Russia has
now deployed nearly a million
men, he would have trouble
mounting "a major offensive
against Taiwan."
In any event, the Pentagon
strategists believe the U.S.
commitment to defend Taiwan
in case of attack "should be
more than adequate to deter
the CPR."
The Central Intelligence
Agency, after detailed survey
of Taiwan's defenses, identi-
ied "four major and two mi-
or beach areas suitable for
mphibious landings."
n ~~'
THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, March 4,1972,
R -r__
should be deployed. This
should not require that the
U.S. maintain additional forces
in the Pacific.
Footnote: Countering these
arguments, the U.S. mission
on Taiwan has warned that
"the CPR military capabilities
will improve over the next
decade with continued empha-
sis on the improvement of nu-
clear weapons capabilities."
As for Chiang's ability to
throw back an amphibious as-
sault, the mission contends:
"The DOD report relies on the
deployment of forces to ac-
quire favorable ratios. This
can be accomplished under
ideal conditions, but rapid lat-
eral movement is extremely
difficult due to the communi-
cations network and terrain."
Strange Reward
President Nixon has asked
the Senate to promote a high-
ranking diplomat who only 20
months ago was exposed for
trying to cover up the Mylai
massacre of Vietnamese civil-
ians.
Secretary of State William
Rogers put tall, balding James
May at the head of the De-
cember 1 promotion list sent
first to the White House, then
forwarded to the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee. It
calls for May's promotion to
the second highest level of
foreign service officer.
The suave May, who dressed
like a fashion plate even in
m gg`' Quantngai province
where he was top civilian ad-
viser, figured prominently in
a House report on the mas-
sacre.
A special Armed Services
Investigating subcommittee, in
a report released July 15,
1970, described May's role in
the cover-up this way:
"The Senior Province Ad-
visor, Mr. James May, was a
State Department for e 19 n
service officer free of any re-
sponsibility to Americal Divi-
sion or its commander.
"The testimony clearly es-
tablished that his headquarters
was apprised of atrocity alle-
gations by Vietnamese Gov-
ernment sources. It further es-
that members of his
tablished
staff had discussed the allega-
tion and its investigation with i
representatives ? of Americal
Division, and with others . .. '~
,,It further demonstrated
that he had personally been
Informed of the allegations at
several times during the in-
Despite the evi-
vestigation.
that his unit had demon-
dence
strated concern over the
admittedly unusual allegations
and its investigation, Mr. May
claimed to have no recollec-
tion i'.
of the incident."
The House Mylai subcom-
headed by the Rep. F.
mittee,
Edward Hebert (D-La.), said
failure of May's headquarters
to report the incident "raised
the question about where the
decision was made to suppress
any reporting of the allega-
tion."
` Pentagon strategists drafted
an elaborate scenario, citing
the difficulties of an amphi-
bious attack from the main-
land, and concluded: "When
the reserves are deployed, the
GRC (Government, Republic
of China) would outnumber
the CPR threat in any sector
by at least two to one. over-
all, the CRC would outnumber
the assault force by at least
five to one."
Adds the secret Pentagon
study: "If GRC control of the
air and sea were to be threat-
ened, or it appeared that a
much larger amphibious at-
tack were being launched, U.S.
Navy and Air Force u nit s
entagon as serioCd by tee
De-
fense Intelli $? The
has
concluded from an envy has
study of'Chinese 10 (%,haustive
g t'c capa-
Unleashing' Chiang Is Protested
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 THE WA ffg U -5~3! a 2001/11/01 : CIA$[R7E4 3P2003?OAGE X_
The Washington MerryGo-Ronnd
Russia Moves to Counter Nixon
President Nixon's aim in
going to China was to reduce
tensions in Asia,, but it may
Th.?RUacianc h^vF enrlrle y
wl 4a1
V'n+naTM and Nnrth KnrP r _
felhoen ~'P rPnnr}C ^,
that the Kremlin 's ncourag-
The Soviet strategy, appar-
ently, is to spoil the Chinese.
success, the intelligence cables
intended a warmer welcome
for Nixon but put a muffler on
4L_ _nw .
Not long after the President
I Hanoi. intelligence reports say
ese that China might sell them
out and offered them a friend-
ship treaty. The rulers in
China, rejected the treaty but
accepted an offer of more mil-
Not long afterward, a high-
headed by politburo member
Sh
f R
ara
ashidovdim
, mae a si.
lar pitch in Pyongyang. Rashi-
dov is reported to have en-
couraged the North Koreans
to start skirmishes along their
southern border.
tamed a cony of a-=-"^~.t
i.c}rv cayn_ t_ihP rrA. ;~}l~ a~~_
and has secured military supe- "spells death for the minds
riority over the $OK It i
s
. wait ing for the arrival of the
"Because of the defeat it ex
orth Korea s
LU.Int ROK (R- P of
Aafenses.ll
or a).
"In view of the above, it is
believed that the North will
~,e~~ Kr,~?a ,.. War?
Here are the highlights:
"1. North Korea will initiate
war at any time it deems a de-
cisive moment is at hand.
Given a choice of timing, it
will
h
- - -
c
aos
over a summer attack.
"2. It will carry out attacks
against the entire peninsula or
thereof . -~ "
"3. It will adopt a blitz-type
strategy combining both regu-
lar and irregular warfare It
. will not employ nuclear weap-
ons.
"4. The North will seek an
excuse to make all attack
against the ROK claiming it
was provoked into such an at-
tack. If It is unable to find a
suitable pretext, it *ill carry
out irregular warfare . .
"North Korea's basic obje
c-
tive is the communized unifi-
cation of Korea by forceful
means. It has almost com-
pleted its war preparations
place emphasis on winter op-
exists.--
- _CIA, giving
Sessr
THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Feb. 25, 1972 D15
idence a orth
p annin an immineKn orgnajvas
-
38th parallel, the Koreans are
armed to the teeth and pre-
pared for a resumption of
their civil war. Passions are
running high.
Washington Whirl
Anti-Jewish Handout-For
the past three years, the De-
partment of Health, lducation
and Welfare has doled out
$85,000 annually to the anti-
S e m i t i c African-American
Teachers Association. The
funds are supposed to get
ghetto drop-outs back to
school. But the Association's
magazine recently wrote that
Jewish influence on the New
York public school system
and souls of our black chil-
dren." And one of the Associa.
tion's leaders is Tyrone
Woods, best known for his
statement three years ago that
Hitler "didn't make enough
lampshades out of" Jews. The
Anti-Defamation League is
protesting the HEW grants.
G o -G o Gauzza-George
Gauzza, the Interior Depart.
ment bureaucrat who flouted
federal law to help former
Secretary . Walter Hickel re-
decorate his office at public
expense, has now`begun to dip
into the public till for his own
pleasure. Gauzza recently left
for an extended trip to Guam
and Saipan to do "property in-
ventories" in the Pacific Terri.
tories. "George was originall
going to San Francisco," a
spokesman said, "and it was
decided that while on the
coast he might as well go on
to Guam and Saipan " Guam
after all, is only 6,194 miles",
out of his way.
Baleful Bargirls--State De-
partment pacification experts
fear that if the Communists
take control of South Viet
nam, there may be repirsals.
against more than 200,000 Vi-
etnamese who have worked di-
rectly for Americans. Part of a
col!fidential State Department
study also deals with 80,000 Vi-
etnamese bar girls who have
catered to Americans. The
girls are not sure they want to
be left to the tender mercies
of the moralistic Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese.
Bell-McClure syndicate
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 25X1A
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE___________ 41.1 PAGE
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
an offshore island settlement
with the Chinese Communists.
Secret Study
_Xr_JaLerw, ork tjL.
U.S. Turns Bach on Quemoy, Matsu
By Jack Anderson,
President Nixon is prepared,
as a gesture to Peking, to
abandon U.S. support of the
offshore islands of Quemoy
and Matsu. .
Yet as Vice President, -he
4tarteL even. before.,.lxon
r~+nv .d ~tQ,_tll,e. Wh1te~F~is?.'
A secret study suggests that
"several substantial reductions
could be made in GRC naval
f o r c e s (meaning Chiang's
navy) were it to negotiate with
the CPR (Chinese Com-
munists) ' an offshore island
settlement.
THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Feb. 18, 1972 B I-'*
...R
detailed analysis of the mil-Ito: (1) patrol the coast; (2) re-
itary threat to Taiwan and
concludes that Chiang's forces
could repulse a Chinese Com-
munist Invasion.
The CIA intelligence sur-
vey o Taiwan ident es our
major and-1Wo_, inor beach
,arils s ii table r asous
land
ingg , states the susve .
It spells out in precise de-
tail the likely battle scenario
and concludes flatly: "When
was willing to risk nuclear
warfare over the same off-
shore Islands In 1958._
,let study of the 1958
g u YMatSL crlsisL Le-
nare ..W Pentagon bit
R.an C`orooration, clalriiaat
clear weapons"`I'
Inside the policy councils,.
no one was more militant over
the two tiny islands ? than
Richard Nixon who now, Ironi-
cally, considers both Quemoy
and Matsu to be expendable.
This doesn't mean he will.
hand over the two Islands to
Chou En-lai as_poker chips on
the Peking conference table.
But the United States no long-
er will help Chiang, Kai-shek
defend them.
The U.S. commitment to de-
fend Taiwan itself, it should
be emphasized, is still in. ef-
fect. But the commitment
won't.. continue to include
Quemoy and Matsu.
U.S. -military experts believe
Chiang is quite capable of de-
fending the islands without
U.S. help. But they think he
would be wiser to negotiate
the reserves are deployed, the
GRC would outnumber the
CPR threat In any sector by
at least two to one. Overall,
the GRC would outnumber
the assault force by at least
five to one.
"First the GRC amphibious
capability could be reduced by
two-thirds. The ability to land
,000 marines on the Penghus
5
(guarding the approaches to
Taiwan) as reinforcements
would be more than adequate
for the defense of that area.
Such a reduction would free
at least 2,900 men from the
Navy, saving the GRO about
$820,000 annually in manpow-
er costs, and obviating the
need for further LST re
pairs .. .
"Secondly, GRC ocean con-
trol and surveillance forces
could also be reduced, per-
haps at least one-third, be-
cause operations along the
mainland coast and In support
of offshore island resupply
would be unnecessary. This
would save the GRC at least
$530,000 annually in manpow
er costs ..."
The study also provides a
"As indicated previously,
based on U.S. World War II
and Korea experience, an. at-
tack-to-defense ratio of three
to one is normally required
to assure the success of an
amphibious attacking (assum-
ing the attacker can gain
naval and air superiority)."
On this subject, the military
experts believe Chiang has
enough naval power to deter
the Chinese Communists from
attempting an amphibious as-
sault. ?
U.S. Support
Declares' the study: "Since
we seek to avoid a direct U.S -
CPR confrontation, we have
assisted the GRC through
MAP (military aid program)
in developing a navy adequate
supply the offshore islands}
(and) Taiwan.
"The GRC navy can a:^
complish all these miss.,
.now. It will retain these ctew
-bilitles through FY73 (fiscal
year 1973) without major in-
vestments in new ships or
craft largely because the
CPR does not appear to. bo
developing naval offensive
forces."
U.S. officials have suggest-n,
ed in their secret discussions, ?y
meanwhile, that old Chiang
Kai-shek has enough cash
stashed away to pay more of
his own military bills. He I$-
holding holding the money to finance
his dream of reconquerin g
the Chinese mainland.
The U.S. mission in Taiwan'.
has reported in - a "secre.t
working paper" that "we do,
know privately that the GRC,
has considerable sums of<
money in special funds, most-.
ly marked for contingency
use in mainland recovery"
The Americans, however,
believe Chiang is so obsessed"-
with his dream of returning""'
to the mainland that he won't
spend the invasion funds for
any other purpose.
"The possibility that these
funds would be used for rou-
tine military expenditures," .'.
states the report, "is remote,
and they would be disbursed
only as a last resort."
Hell-McClure Syndicate
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP74 0020020-1
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE ffM PAGE
$ ?.1
THE WASHINGTOI\T POST Twsday, Jan. 18, 1972
The Washington Merry-Go-Round ---- -- Protesters Leak Their Own Secrets
By Jack Anderson I nation reserved for the
I kest of the CIA's secrets:
The planners in the White
House basement, who howled
in pain over our disclosure of
their India-Pakistan secrets,
have slipped fragments from
the same secret documents to
their friends in the press.
This illustrates how the
White House uses official se-
crecy to control the flow of
news to the public. Favorable
1 facts are leaked out; unfavora-
ble news is suppressed.
The official leakers are now
spreading the word that Presi-
dent Nixon's pro-Pakistan pol-
icy was not the disaster it ap-
peared but really saved West
Pakistan from dismember-
ment.
As evidence, the boys in the
'basement leaked a few selec-
tive secrets to our column-
;writing colleague, Joseph
Alsop, who has excellent con-
taGts at the highest levels of
government.
Alsop stated "on positive au-
thority" that the U.S. govern-
ment had "conclusive proof"
Alsop's 'Proof'
Alsop told us he never read
the CIA reports himself. He
had no way of knowing, there-
fore, that his sources gave him
only part of the story.
These CIA digests, true
enough, raised the possibility
of an Indian attempt to crush
West Pakistan. But the same
disgests also suggested India
would accept an early cease-
fire.
Here is a typical excerpt:
"There have been reports that
(Indian Prime Minister) Gan-
dhi would accept a cease-fire
,and international mediation as
soon as East Bengal 'had been
liberated ... On the other
hand, we have had several re-
cent reports that India now in-
Keating that India has no ter-
ritorial ambitions and wished
only to end the conflict with
the least possible bloodshed.
Dubious `Proof
It is clear from the secret
documents in our possession
that the CIA had no "conclu-
sive proof" of an Indian plan
to dismember West Pakistan.
The CIA had received a num-
ber of reports that a major In-
dian offensive might be immi-
nent on the western front. But
these were discounted by both
the State and Defense Depart-
ments.
Only Henry Kissinger, the
President's foreign policy czar,
seemed eager to believe the
worst.
Alsop's sources also told
him that President Nixon in-
tervened with the Kremlin,
threatening "an ugly show-
down," to stop Mrs. Gandhi's
army from carving up West
Pakistan.
In response, Alsop claims
that the Kremlin hurriedly
viet Union . . ," according to
the CIA. "Kuznestsov has told
Indian officials that the Soviet
Union is not prepared to rec-
ognize Bangladesh until Dacca
falls and until the Indian
army' successfully liberates
Bangladesh from Pakistani
forces."
The question of an Indian
offensive against West Paki-
stan was brought up the next
day by Soviet Ambassador Ni-
kolai Pegov. Reported the
CIA:
"Pegov pointed out that
India has achieved a marvel-
ous military victory. Pakistan
is no longer a military force,
and it is therefore unneces-
sary for India to launch an of-
fensive into West Pakistan to
crush a military machine that
no longer exists.
"If India should decide to
take Kashmir, Pegov added,
the Soviet Union would not in-
terfere, but India would have
to accomplish this objective
within the shortest possible
time." .
Joseph Alsop Is an enter-
prising and conscientious col-
umnist. He acknowledged to
us that "it is possible to be
lied to on the very highest
level." But he assured us his
source had "never lied be-
fore."
The evidence In our posses-
sion, however, suggests that
the White House Is playing
peekaboo with CIA secrets to
distort the truth.
Bell-McClure s7ndlcat
tends not only to liberate East
Bengal but also to straighten
its borders in Kashmir and to
destroy West Pakistan's air
and armored forces."'
The strongest CIA warning
was sent to the White House
on December 10. "According
to a source who has access to
information on activities in
Prime Minister Gandhi's of-
fice," declared the report, "as
soon as the situation in East
IPakistan is settled, Indian
forces will launch a major of-
fensive against West Paki-
stan."
But the CIA also took note
of repeated Indian assurances
to American Ambassador Ken
of India's intention to crush
the main body of the Pakistan
army in West Pakistan. This
positive proof., he wrote, was
"the centerpiece of every one
of the CIA's daily reports to
the White House during the
crisis period."
We have read the CIA's
daily reports to the White
House during the India-Paki-
stan war. They are stamped
"Top Secret Umbra," a desig-
dispatched Deputy Foreign
Minister Vasily Kuznestsov to
New Delhi on December 12 to
tell Mrs. Gandhi not to attack
West Pakistan.
The secret CIA report on
his mission, however, doesn't
mention any ultimatum
against attacking West Paki-
stan.
"Vastly Kuznestsov arrived
in India on 12 December to
discuss the political recogni-
tion of Bangladesh by the So-
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 THE WA& e#S1gr: gsse 2001/11/01 : CIA MI? 4BQb4A OA3 ?BO20Q2Q, E ?p II
The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Mondey, Jon. 17, 1972 Bit'
Europe First' Laird Tells NATO
By Jack Anderson
In a secret speech he
thought would never get back
to the Senate, Defense Secre-
tary Mel Laird has told his
counterparts In the North At-
lantic Alliance to pay no at-
tention to Senate resolutions
about troop cuts.
lfe has also promised them
th4t Europe will now be given
"first priority" over Southeast
Asia in building up U.S. com-
bat readiness.
+'I can Inform you," he told
NATO defense ministers. In
Brussels last month, "that our
fotces in Europe today are at
th,6 highest level of manning
and effectiveness compared
wljth any time during the past
fiy a years ... .
In our Army units is easing
b. cause of the substantial
withdrawals which , we have
made from Southeast Asia,
particularly Vietnam .....
I"First priority for combat
readiness for all of our forces
has now been assigned to Eu-
rope, and that priority will
Laird tried to reassure the connection with the defense
NATO planners that they appropriations bill should, of
need not worry about Senate course, be of no surprise to t3cfd off some secret military
Majority Leader Mike Mans- anyone in this room 4 1 pre-! dkilfs. Then he added: "We
sississin (ppirF? wimcikI GCt tr' B IC Tt ins r + .r n
field's efforts to reduce U.S. 1 dieted' that this action would
forces in Europe.
"I appreciate your concern,"
he said, -"about such develop-
ments as Senator Mansfield's
recent proposal to set a lower
ceiling on U.S. forces in Eu-
rope .. .
"I have on several occasions
pointed out (to defense minis-
ters) that we will have amend-!
ments from time to time on
... defense legislation consid
"I advised you then, and I
advise you again, that similar
amendments will be offered
by various members of the
Senate, particularly the major-
ity leader of the United States
Senate, but we-are in a posi-
tion where I am quite confi-
dent that we will be successful
in resisting this kind of unilat-
eral action."
ered by the Congress but that Laird also called for the es-
I was confident that we had tablishment of a tactical air
the votes and the support in control system for Europe and
Congress to see that these a NATO fleet in the Mediter-
amendments were not enacted
in the law.
"And I hope that there is
ranean.
"I must be blunt," he de-
clared. "We handicap our-
should not delay t}. forma-'
tion of a NATO standing naval
force in the Mediteti'anean,'
which would sail under the al-
liance, because of the interna
tional negotiations regarding!,
command boundaries ...
"We should act now to cre? :
ate a standing force that can`..
patrol the Mediterranean Sea
with the same kind of freedom
which the Soviets have."
m 1972, Bell-Mcclure syndicate
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D.C.'s Original !hafting 8@ii.t
EN.blished ISIS YMca.
not an over-reaction on the ! selves unnecessarily because
part of our friends ands all'-;;'we lack centralized command
when amendments like this and control of our (tactical
are introduced and niscussed air) resources in Europe ... .
before our Congress, because "Our own experience with
the congressional process will air operations in Southeast
work its will. But I can assure Asia made it abundantly clear
you very confidently that the that an adequate and inte-
situation is such that we do grated control system was
presently have the votes ... needed to use most effectively
Ignore Senate the air assets of our four serv-
"This most recent action of ices and our allies ... I be-
The Defense Secretary
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 '3~rn F~oi jese 2001/11/01 :CIA-RDP743TQ,41'151~
Jack Anderson
And in Other
Secret Memos ..
ALTHOUGH the precar-
ious peace in the Middle
East still hasn't been broken,
a. settlement is likely to
'prove as rocky and tortuous
as ever.
This Is Illustrated in pain-
ful detail by the classified
cable traffic between the
State, Department and our
United Nations delegation
during` last month's General
Assembly debate on the Mid-
east. The secret messages. also
provide a fascinating insight
into the UN cloakrooms.
The U.S.. worked tirelessly.
behind the scenes to find a
compromise resolution which
both the Arabs and Israelis
"Ambassa 9r i usn
sought out Fonm[n-ifid7 in
UN Indonesian Lounge to
discuss Egyptian draft res re
Middle East ... Noting that
Egyptian draft res appeared
from initial reading to be
generally satisfactory, Bush
.stated that major stumbling
block for USG (U.S. govern-
ment) was placing of lan-
guage re Jarring mission in
operative paragraph section
. Bush asked if Riad will-
ing to consider removal of
this language from operative
section to preamble.
"Rlad replied in negative
but not before he stressed
that for Egyptians inclusion
of this language In operative
section not repeat not merely
semantic exercise, on con-
trary, Egypt convinced that
Israel trying to get out of giv-
ing favorable reply to Jarring
and that only way to force Is-
..rael to td-d-6-so is by means
of explicit UN resolution."
The United States re-
sponded to the Impasse with
several proposed changes.
The reaction by Israeli For-
could accept and which
would point the way toward
further negotations.
But the Arabs stuck stub-
bornly to their position, and
the Israelis were equally in-
transigent. In the end, 'a. reso-
lution passed with the Isra-
elis opposed and the U.S. ab-
staining.
The resolution calls on Is-
rael to surrender Arab terri-
tory it had seized in the 1967
war. This, was sought last
February by UN mediator
sign Minister Abba Eban il-
Gunnar Jarring. lustrates how tightly the
The Israelis are so ads-
mantly opposed to Jarring's lines were drawn on both
i
i
ld i
th
l
h
was endless haggling in the
backrooms over the reference
in ,the resolution to Jarring's
mission.
oni
e
des. T
is
s to
e o
-
s
n
lowing exerpts from a tele-
gram marked "Eyes only-
Spee'at-Exclusive:
"Bush ... had meeting the
Here s now an _ ey
Y Formin Eban this afternoon
telegram f r o m America's Eban said Israel could
UN delegation" to the State ?
Department describes a meet not repeat not accept USG
ing between U.S. Ambassador proposal. . He noted .
George Bush and Egyptian , that Jarring has not been too
Foreign Minister Mahmoud ''helpful and characterized him
920-1
At another meeting, Eban
expressed deep concern the
resolution might contain too
favorable a mention of the
Jarring proposal for with-
drawal from occupied territo-
ries.
"He observed, however,"
said a_ secret telegram to the
State _Department, "that on
'political grounds Israel
not have any reference to
Jarring but appreciated that
parliamentary reasons may
dictate need for o m e
thing ...
"Both Eban and Tekoah (Is-
rael's UN. ambassador)
summed up that from Israel
point of. view, best course
would be to limit resolution
language to 'complimentary
.reference to Jarring' -
"Eban then reiterated that
srael ready to accept
'allback position which would
nvolve reference to Jarring
n preamble with operative
.)ara simply calling on Secy
Jen to reactivate Jarring
nission."
Despite. such patient bar-
;aining over such seemingly
ninute matters of wording,
,he U.S. effort to work out a
.ompromise resolution. ulti-
mately failed. The resolution
that passed called on Israel
to surrender the occupied
tealtory.
the United
e has promised Israel a
continued supply of F-4
fighter jets. This, it Is hoped,
:might soften the Israeli oppo-
sition to the UN resolution or
some other plan Involving
withdrawal from the lands.
But if the niggling, frus-
trating round of discussions
at the UN last month is any
indication, the bargaining is
likely to be long and bitter.
Bell-McClure syndicate
other hand, he opined that if
Jarring would make move to-
ward Israel, 'We'll see what
we can do to help him.' Sum- '
ming up, Eban expressed con-
tinued Israeli un-happiness
.with draft res even with
changes."
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 ME WA's rtQd1d&RrM$ase 2001/11/01: CIA-5R~7E4B0W1' b&200?~AE T~ Yo"
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Friday. Ian. 14, 1972 D 1q
Rep. Whalley and Public Funds
By Jack Anderson
Rep. J. Irving Whalley (R-
Pa.), a power on the House
Foreign Affairs Committee
and a former United Nations
delegate, has taken illegal
kickbacks from employees,
padded his payroll and chis-
eled House funds to pay for
his Christmas gifts.
The Windber, Pa., wheeler-
dealer has been cheating the
taxpayers this way quite me-
thodically behind a respecta-
ble front as a church elder,
bank president and legislator-
diplomat.
President Nixon named him
in 1969 to a one-year term at
the U.N., where he spoke for
the U.S. on such subjects as
Red China, Korea and the
U.N. budget. But while the
world weighed his words at
the U.N. Whalley was gouging
the taxpayers in his Pennsyl-
vania district like a back-coun-
try Bobby Baker.
We reported last September
that Whalley had demanded
kickbacks from a.former aide,
and we have been investigat-
ing his activities ever since.
We can now prove that he
has put more than a dozen edi-
tors, politicians and business-
men on the public payroll.
Many were required to give
him kickbacks in the form of
personal services; others give
kickbacks in.goods; some were
compelled to pay their own of-
fice expenses, and sometimes
even Whalley's expenses, from
their House salaries.
We can also show that Whal-
ley raided House stationery
funds, which regulations say
must be used by members
solely "for the purpose of sta-
tionery and other supplies."
He stretched the regulations
to Include book ends, scarves
and pen-and-pencil sets, which
he then gave out as Christmas
gifts. The recipients, of course,
were unaware that as taxpay-
ers they had helped pay for
their own gifts.
Fiscal Finagling
In one of the many cases we
investigated, Whalley paid for
his political literature 'with
U.S. Treasury funds. Here's
how he worked it:
One of Whalley's staunch
political allies is C. Robert
Collary, proprietor of Capitol
Press, a non-union printing
shop in Duncanville, Pa. A pil-
lar of his community, Collary
is also a powerful GOP com-
mitteeman in Blair County
and chairman of a Republican
"zone."
We discovered that Collary
has done more than $1,500 in
free printing for the congress-
man, much of it political.
Ordinarily, a congressm
would pay for the printing o
of his campaign contributions
Instead, halley used th
House Disbursing Office a,
most like it were his persona
checking account.
Checks drawn at Whalley's
order from the House show
that Whalley put Collary on
the payroll as a "staff" worker
in 1967, paying him $997 that
year. In fiscal 1971, Whalley
paid him another $5,932.
Collary has kicked back
$1,500 to $2,000 to Whalley in
the form of free, printing.
In a long talk with my asso-
ciate Les Whitten, Collary at
first said his free printing for
Whalley amounted only, to a
"little letter press work." He
later admitted it could have
amounted to as much as $2,000
but said this might include
$300 he spent on his travels
for Whalley.
Asked whether he regarded
the free printing as. a kick-
back, Collary snapped back:
"Absolutely not. Everything
was on the up and up."
Whalley told us that such
arrangements were, common
in Congress, although this
runs counter to our 'experi
ence. He explained that by hir-
ing staff members for brief pe-
riods at a time in various
parts of his district, he saves
taxpayers the cost of opening
up field offices in a variety of
towns.
We will have more reports
on the 11-year House veteran
in future columns.
1
Hanoi's Game
An amazing account of how
Hanoi is playing Russia and
China against each other i
contained in a secret CIA r
port in our possession.
Chinese Premier Chou E -
lai and Soviet President Nik -
lai Podgorny competed wit
each other, according to th
report, to offer North Vietn
more aid.
The report is based ups
the confidential remark
picked up by the CIA, of
high Foreign Ministry officil
named Hoang Muoi. Here ar
the highlights:
. "Muoi stated that Chines
Premier Chou En-lal ha,
made a secret, trip to Hand
following the July, 1971, visi
of Dr. Kissinger . to Peking
Chou assured the DRV (Norti
Vietnamese. government) d
continued. Chinese support. .
"On the subject of aid, Mud
stated that the Chinese, i;
order to convince the DRV d,
their continued . support has
agreed to give more aid in thl
1971-72 period. The Soviets
were thus forced to increasR
their aid . in order to balance
off the Chinese assistance.
"The Soviet aid agreement
which resulted from SovieC
President Podgorney's visit ii
October, was bigger than tht
1970 agreement.
"Muoi said that during th,
Podgorny visit, the Soviets
proposed a friendship treat
with the DRV. Muoi said th4
DRV refused the offer be
cause it would have, certainly
antaginized China and, in an;
event, the DRV does not nee
such a treat to get what
wants from the Soviets."
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 THE WAAPC31 Fl~qr g se 2001/11/01 : CIA$RF 7E49 N19M p020(F9 E j
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
TEE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Jan. I2, 1972 _~ 11
Secret Cables on Pakistan Quoted
By Jack Anderson
Secret di lomatic cables
gyrate graphically 110w
the United States used the
at of arge-scale military
a_ to Pak s an as a per' svcTTg-
under heavy pressure from
Pakistan for arms aid and that
he, in turn, was putting the
heat on the United States to
help furnish it.
"You should tell King Hus-
sein we fully appreciate heavy
pressure he feels himself
under by virtue of request
from Pakistan," Irwin in-
structed U.S. Ambassador L.
Dean Brown.
"We are nevertheless not
yet in a position to give him
definite response. Whole sub-
ject remains under intensive
review at very high level of
USG (U.S. Government).
"We are fully alive to your
delicate situation in not being
able to give definite answer to
King's urgent pleas. But we
ask you to bear with us and
put situation to Hussein in
best light possible."
cables also show that,
while direct U.S. arms ship-
ments to Pakistan were ruled
out from the start, the United
States came within an ace of
providing backdoor weapons
assistance through several of
Pakistan's Arab allies.
The backdoor scheme was
never adopted, but the cables
show that the United States
wanted India to continue to
think the possibility was immi-
nent, thus strengthening Paki-
stan's position.
The most tevealing of the
cables was addressed to the
American Embassies in Saudi
Arabia and New Delhi:
"In view of intelligence) re-
ports spelling out Indian mili-
tary objectives in West Paki-
stan, we do not want in any
way to ease GOI's (Govern-
ment of India's) concern re
help Pakistan might receive
from outside sources.
"Consequently, embassy
should give GOI no repeat no
assurances re third country
transfers" The secret cable
was signed by Under Secre-
tary of State John Irwin.
Another cable from Irwin to
the U.S. Embassy in Jordan
shows that King Hussein was
Undersea Wealth
The big world powers have
been greedily eying the vast
mineral wealth on the ocean
bottom. But feckless United
Nations attempts to settle the
issue of ownership have all
but collapsed.
The confusion has now led
the Defense Department into
scheming with Russia to swap
our rights to the mineral de-
posits for a shaky guarantee
of total freedom of the seas. .,
These are among the alarm-
ing secret findings of an unu-
two-man task force as
sual
,
signed to investigate the prdb-,
lem by Senate Interior Chair-
man Henry Jackson, (D-Wash.).
Senator Jackson feared that
the State Department might
surrender U.S. sea bottom
rights, so he dispatched two
trusted Senate experts to the
U.N. Seabed Committee in Ge-
neva last summer..
The two aides, Charles
Cook, a land and mineral law
specialist, and Merrill En-
glund, the conservation
minded chief aide to Sen.
Lee Metcalf, (D-Mont.) have
now readied their draft report
on the subject.
Entitled "The Law and the
Seas Crisis," the nine-page
draft agrees with the Nixon
administration that the United
States must guard its stake in
the ocean's fish, minerals, gas,
oil and other treasures.
But while the administra-
tion is challenging the claims
of Ecuador and Peru to sover-
ignty 200 miles offshore, the
Senate observers recommend
we consider adopting the 200-
mile limit ourselves. We pres-
ently claim a 12-mile limit.
The switch would cause con-
sternation at the State Depart-
ment, which is upholding the
right of American tuna boats
to fish inside Ecuador's 200-
mile limit.
Special criticism is reserved
for the unusual dealings lle-
tween the Defense Depart-
ment and the Soviet Union
over the ocean wealth. The re-
port warns that Defense, "Sup-
ported by the U.S.S.R.," is try-
ng to get a formal world
guarantee that warships can
go anywhere they want.
"We fear," states the report,
"that the Defense Department
might urge the administration
to abandon its deep-sea bed
mining objectives ... as a
trade off."
Quickie Auto Titles
Alabama, known for its
quickie divorces, has now de-
veloped a new legal racket:
quickie auto registrations.
This is a great convenience
for car thieves, reckless driv1
ers and motorists with unsafe
cars.
To test how the racket
works, a car was selected from
a nationwide stolen-car alert.
The make, year and serial
number, together with $30
were mailed to Probate Judge
Leland Enzor of Andalusia,
Ala.
Fast as you can jump-wire a
jeep, Enzor sent back a regis-
tration and Alabama tags to a
general delivery box in down-
town Manhattan.
We questioned Enzor's chief
clerk, T. Wayne Daughtry,
about the quickie tags. He said
two other Alabama judges
also service out-of-state driv-
ers. He says Enzo chages $9
a tag and handles a brisk 30 to
35 out-of-state registrations a
day.
To douse the wildfire, Rep.
Bill Ryan (D-N.Y.) has asked
the Justice Department to
help him draft a bill to end
the registration-by-mail racket.
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2A GL0
svuvr ILTICA 1'Ilrilis ~ifa a va.v. -,+ --- -
Text of Memo on Indan-Pakistan. War'
WASHINGTON, Jan. 14-
Fohowing is the text of a
memorandum on a meeting
of a National Security Coun-
cil committee on Indian-
Pakistani hostilities, made
public today by the columnist
Jack Anderson:
SECRET/SENSITIVE
THE JOINT STAFF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
8 DECEMBER 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR
RECORD
SUBJECT: Washington Spe-
cial Action Group meeting on
Indo - Pakistan hostilities; 8
December, 1971
1. The N.S.C. Washington
Special Action Group met in
the Situation Room, the White
House, at 1100, Wednesday,
8 December to consider the
Indo-Pakistan situation. The
meeting was chaired by Dr.
I Kissinger.
2. ATTENDEES
A. PRINCIPALS. Dr. Henry
Kissenger, Mr. Richard Helms,
C.I.A., Gen. John Ryan, J.C.S.,
Mr. Donald MacDonald,
j A.I.D., Mr. David Packard, De-
fense, Ambassador U. Alexis
Johnson, State.
B. OTHERS: Mr. Maurice
Williams, A.I.D., Mr. John
Waller, C.LA., Col. Richard
Kennedy, N.S.C., Mr. Samuel
Hoskanson, N.S.C., Mr. Harold
Saunders, N.S.C., Mr. Armi-
stead Selden, Defense, Mr.
James Noyes, Defense, Mr.
Christopher Van Hollen, State,
Mr. Samuel De Palma, State,
Mr. Bruce Laingen, State, Mr.
David Schneider, State, Mr.
Joseph Sisco, State, Rear Adm.
Robert Welander, O.J.C.S.,
Capt. Howard Kay, O.J.C.S.
Group 4 downgraded at 3-
year intervals; declassified
after 12 years.
3. Summary. Dr. Kissinger
suggested that India might be
attempting, through calculat-
ed.destruction of Pak armored
and air forces to render Pak-
istan impotent. He requested
that the Jordanian interest in
assisting Pakistan not be
turned off, but rather kept in
a holding pattern. He asked
that Pak capabilities in Kash-
mir be assessed.
4. Mr. Helms opened the
eeting by briefing the cur-
ent situation. In the East,
he Indians have broken the
me at Comilla. Only major
var crossings prevent them
rom investing Dacca. The
ndians are advancing rapid-
throughout
11 major PakL.O.C.'s in the
ast are now vulnerable. In
he West, the Paks are now
laiming Punth, inside the
ndian border. However, the
aks are admitting fairly
eavy casualties in the fight-
ng. Tank battles are appar-
ntly taking place in the
ind/Rajasthan area. Mrs.
andhi has indicated that be-
ore heeding a U.N. call for
ease-fire, she intends to
traighten out the southern
border of Azad Kashmir. It is
reported that prior to termi-
nating present hostilities,
Mrs. Gandhi intends to at-
empt to eliminate Pakistan's
r and air force capabil-
ties. Thus far only India and
hutan have recognized Ban-
ladesh. It is believed that
he Soviets have held off rec-
gnition primarily so as not
o rupture relations with the
Paks. Soviet action on the
matter of recognition, how-
ver, may be forthcomingin
e near future.
5. Mr. Sisco inquired how
long the Paks might be ex-
petted to hold out in East
Pakistan, to which Mr. Helms
replied 48 to 72 hours. the
time to reach the ultimate
climax is probably a func-
tion of the difficulties en-
countered In river crossings.
6. Assessing the situation
in the West; General Ryan
indicated that he did not see
the Indians pushing too. hard
at this time, rather they seem
content with a holding ac-
tion.
7. Dr. Kissinger asked
how long it would. take, to
shift Indian forces. from East
to West. General Ryan said
it might take a reasonably
long time to move all the
forces, but that the airborne
brigade could be moved
quickly, probably within a
matter of five or six days.
8. Dr. Kissinger inquired
about refugee aid. After a
discussion with Mr. Williams
it was determined that only`'
a very small number of U.S.
dollars earmarked for ref-
ugee relief was actually
entering the Indian economy.
Contrary to the sense of the
last meeting, the Indians
have actually lost foreign
exchange in the process of
caring for refugees. In any
event, the entire relief ef-
fort is currently suspended
in both. India and Pakistan.
9. pr.. Kissinger then em-
phasized that the President
has made it clear that no
further foreign exchange,
PL-480 commodities, or de-
velopment loans could be as-
signed to India without ap-
proval of the White House.
Mr. Williams stated there
was no problem of anything
sliding through.
10. Dr. Kissinger inquired
what the next turn of the
screw might be. Mr. Williams
said that the only other pos-
sible option was taking a po-
Associated Press
David Packard
sition concerning aid material
currently under contract.
This however would be a
very messy problem inas-
much as we would be dealing
with irrevocable letters of
credit. Mr. Williams further
stated that we would have to
take possession of material
that was being consigned to
the Indians by U.S. contrac-
tors and thus would be com-
pelled , to pay U.S. suppliers,
resulting in claims against
the U.S.G.
11. Mr. Packard said that
all of this could be done, but
agreed that it would be a
very laborious and difficult
problem. He further elaborat-
ed that all the items involved
would have to be located, the
United States would have to
take ownership, settle with
suppliers, locate warehousing,
etc. Nevertheless, if such was
desired it could be done. Mr.
Williams said that in a very
limited way this type of ac-
tion had been taken against
some Mid-East countries, but
that it had taken years to
settle the claims.
12. Dr. Kissinger asked
how India was handling next
year's development loan pro-
gram, to which Mr. Williams
responded that nothing was
under negotiation at 'the
present time.
13. Dr. Kissinger inquired
about next year's [A.LD.]
budget. Mr. Williams stated
that what goes into the
budget did not represent a
commitment. Dr. Kissinger
stated that current orders
are not to put anything into
the budget for A.I.D. to
India. It was not to be
leaked that A.I.D. had put
money in the budget for
India, only to have the
"wicked" White House take
it out.
14. Dr. Kissinger suggested
that the key issue if the
Indians turn on West Pakis-
tan is Azad Kashmir. If the
Indians smash the Pak air
force and the armored forces
we would have a deliberate
Indian attempt to force the
disintegration of Pakistan.
The elimination of the Pak
armored and air forces
would make the Paks de-
fenseless. It would turn West
Pakistan into a client state.
The possibility elicits a num-
ber of questions. Can we al-
low a U.S. ally to go down
completely while we partic-
ipate in a blockade?. Can we
allow the Indians to scare
us off, believing that if U.S.
supplies are needed they will
not be provided?
15. Mr. Sisco stated that
if the situation were to
evolve as Dr. Kissinger had
indicated then, of course,
there was a serious risk to
the viability of West Paki-
stan. Mr. Sisco doubted, how-
ever, that the Indians had
this as their objective. He
indicated that Foreign Min-
ister Singh told Ambassador
Keating that India had no
intention of taking any Pak
territory. Mr. Sisco said it
must also be kept in mind
that Kashmir is really dis-
puted territory.
16. Mr. Helms then stated
that earlier he had omitted
mentioning that Madame
Gandhi, when referring to
China, expressed the hope
that there would be no Chi-
nese intervention in the
West. She said that the So-
viet had cautioned her that
the Chinese might rattle the
sword in Laddakh but that
he Soviets have promised
o take appropriate counter-
ction if this should occur.
r. Helms indicated that
here was no Chinese build-
p at this time but, never-
heless, even without a build-
p they could "make mo-
ions and rattle the sword."
17. Turning then to the
question of military support
of Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger re-
ferred to an expression of in-
terest by King Hussein rela-
tive to the provision of
F-104's to Pakistan, and
asked how we could get
Jordan into q holding pattern
to allow the President time
to consider the issue. Dr.
Kissinger also asked whether
we should attempt to convey
to the Indians and the press
that.a major attack on West
Pakistan would be consid-
ered in a very serious light
by this country.
18. Mr. Packard explained
that we could not authorize
the Jordanians to do any-
thing that the U.S.G. could
not do. If hte U.S.G. could
not do. If the U.S.G. could
Stan, we could not allow.
Jordan to do so. If a third
country had material that
the U.S.G. did not have, that
was one thing, but we could
not allow Jordan to transfer
the 104's unless we make a
finding that the Paks; them-
selves, were eligible to pur-
chase them from us directly..
19. Dr. Kissinger suggested
that if we had not cut the
sale of arms to Pakistan, the
current problem would not
exist. Mr. Packard agreed.
20. Dr. Kissinger suggested
that perhaps we never really
analyzed what the real dan-
ger was when we were turning off the arms to Pakistan.
21. Mr. Packard suggested
that another consideration
in the Jordan issue is that if
Jordan delivers this equip-
ment we would be expected
to replace it.. Ambassador
Johnson stated we do not
have any more M.A.P. left.
22. Dr. Kissinger states
that what we may be wit-
nessing is a situation where-
in a country [India] equipped
and supported by the Soviets
may be turning half of Paki-
stan into an important state
and $he. other half into a
vassal. We must consider
what other countries may be
thinking of our action.
23. Mr. Helms asked
about our. ,LENTO relation.
ships with Pakistan: Am-
bassador Johnson stated we
hall no legal obligations
towards Pakistan in the .
CENTO context: Dr. Kissjn-
'ger agreed but added that
neither did we have legal ob-
ligations toward India in
1962 when we formulated
the air defense agreement.
We must consider what
would be the impact of the
current situation in the
larger complex of world af-
fairs.
24. Dr. Kissinger said that
we must look at the prob-
lem in terms of Security
Council guarantees in the
Mid-East and the impact on
other areas. We must look
at the military supply situa-
tion. One could make a. case,
he argued, that we have done
everything two weeks . too
late in the current situation.
25. Mr. Packard stated that
perhaps the only satisfactory
outcome would be for us to
stand fast, with the expecta-
tion that the West Paks
could hold their own.
26. Ambassador Johnson.
said that we must examine
the possible effects that ad-
ditional supplies for Pakistan
might have. It could be that
eight F-104's might not make
any difference once the real
war in the West starts. They
could be considered only as a
token. If, in fact, we were to
move in West Pakistan we
would be in a new ball game.
27. Ambassador Johnson
said that one possibility
would be our reply to For-
eign. Minister Singh,. In which
we could acknowledge the In-
dian pledge that they do not
haveterritorial designs. He
also stated we must also con-
sider the fact that the Paks
may themselves be trying to
take Kashmir.
28. After discussing vari-
ous possible commitments to
Terms Used in Text
A.I.D.-Agency for International
Development.
Azad Kashmir-Free Kashmir,
name of Pakistani-held parts of
Kashmir.
CENTO-Central Treaty Organi-
zation.
C.I.A.-Central Intelligence Agen-
cy..
jet aircraft.
J.S.S.-Joint Chiefs of Staff.
L.O.C.-Line(s) of communica-
tion.
M.A.P.-Military Assistance Pro-
gram.
N.S.C -National Security Coun-
cil.
O:J.C.S.-Office of Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Paks-Pakistanis.
PL-480-Public Law 480, govern-
ing surplus food sent abroad
as aid.
S.S. Buckeye State-American
vessel strafed in a Pakistani
port.
U.S.G.-United States Govern-
ment.
U.S.N.-United States Navy.
both Pakistan and India, Mr.
Packard stated that the over-
riding consideration is the
practical problem of either
doing something effective or
doing nothing. If you don't
win, don't get involved. If we
were to attempt something it
would have to be with a cer-
tainty that it would affect
the outcome. Let's not get in
if we know we are going to
lose. Find some way to stay
out.
29. Mr. Williams suggested
that we might now focus ef-
forts for a cease-fire in West
Pakistan. Ambassador John-
son stated this might, how-
ever; stop the Paks from
moving into Kashmir.
30. Dr. Kissinger asked for
an assessment of the Pak ca-
pabilities and prospects in
Kashmir. He asked C.I.A. to
prepare an assessment of the
international implications of
Mrs. Gandhi's current moves.
He indicated that we should
develop an initial stand on
the military supply question.
He reiterated that he desired
to keep Hussein in a "holding
pattern relative to the. Tat-
ter's expression of support
for Pakistan and that he
should not be turned off. The
U.S.G. sliould indicate to Hus-
sein that we do not consider
trivial his feelings in this
matter.
31. Turning to the question
of the blockade, Ambassador
Johnson said that both India
and Pakistan have taken
blockade action, even though
the Pak blockade is essen-
tially a paper blockade. Dr.
Kissinger said that we should
also protest to the Paks. Am-
bassador Johnson indicated
we do not have a legal case
to protest the blockade. The
belligerent nations have a
right to blockade when a
state of war exists. We may
think it unwise and we may
question how it is carried
out. We have, in fact, nor-
mally expressed our concern.
On the other hand we have
no problem in protesting the
incident of the S.S. Buckeye
State.
32. Dr. Kissinger said that
we are not trying to be even
handed. There can be no
doubt what the President
wants. The President does
not want to be even handed.
The President believes that
India is the attacker. We are
trying to get across the idea
that India has jeopardized re-
lations with the United
States. `Dr. Kissinger said
that we cannot afford to
ease India's state of mind.
"The Lady" is cold blooded
and tough and will not turn
into a Soviet satellite merely
because of pique: We should
not ease her mind. He in-
vited anyone who objected
to this approach to take his
case to the President. Am-
bassador Keating, he sug-
gested is offering enough re-
assurance on his own.
33. Addressing briefly the
question of communal strife
'in East Pakistan, _Dr. Kissin-
ger asked whether anyone
would` be in a position to
know that massacres were
occurring at the time when
they kook place. Mr. Helms
indicated that we. might not
know immediately, but we
certainly would know after
a massacre occurred.
34. The meeting was ad-
journed at 12:10.
/S/ H. N. KAY
H. N. KAY
Captain, U.S.N.
South Asia/M.A.P. Branch, J5
Extension 72400 !
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The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday. Feb. 2, 1972 C 2j
s Bare Deception in War
Pohc ..:
General H
b
Classified documents in our
ossession revealunhappily,
that ceptio ins still of-
_finioi nnlirv in Vietnam
The raw facts about the
Vietnam war go through a fil-
tering and flavoring process,
which can be ascribed partly
to a natural desire to make
American troops look as he-
roic tis_possible, partly to the
Pentagon's determination to
portray the war as the top
brass want the world to see it.
A classified memo to all top
U.S. officials in the Pacifica.
tion program, for example,
bluntly tells them to be mis-
leading at command briefings.
These are special briefings for
vitisinq newsmen and dignitar-
ies. The memo, therefore, is
an order to flavor the well of
truth at its source.
Small wonder that Brig.
Gen. James Herbert, a top
U.S. deputy in the pacification
program, ordered that "Over-
all security classification will
be SECRET."
Dated Sept. 8, 1971, the
memo mentions the disaster-
ridden programs for helping
war victims and for persuad.
ing the Vietcong and North Vi-
etnamese to defect. U.S. offi-
cials in charge of these pro-
grams are directed only to
"submit material which re-
flects progress" for the brief-
ings.
er
ert notes the 20x27 centimeters on the outer "The District Chief has rec
iefin
br
g program Is aimed at
creating a picture of "progress
made in the Republic of Viet-
nam."
To carry out this aim, all
pacification officials must "de-
velop 10 or 12 high impact In-
dicators that may persuasively
that much progress has been
made;. that our effort has not
been a fruitless venture; that
we have helped to establish
conditions and build systems
that at least give the Republic
of Vietnam an opportunity to
choose its future course of
events.
"Final thought should be
that a strong, broadly based
military establishment has
been created in RVN (South
Vietnam) that will be difficult
to destroy by military
action ...'
Army-Inspired Slogans
Our Vietnamese allies are
even more blatant in faking
success where none exists. A
classified U.S. translation of
an order by the late Lt. Gen.
Do Cao Tri explains all those
slogans that visitors to Viet-
nam are shown, as evidence of
pro-Saigon sentiment, in ham-
lets and along the roads.
Soldiers and civilians In his
military region were ordered
by Gen, Tri to "display na-
tional flags at every village/
hamlet office and person's
home. Paint national flags
walls of the homes." ommended that the bounds;;"',
"Draw as many of the follow- ries of these two hamlets b'
ing slogans as possible on the changed," Wilson told his sii,
blank walls: 'To coalesce with periors. "I Indicated to thla
the Communists is suicide,' District Senior Advisor that
'We are determined not to he could assure that this rec-
concede any land to the Com ommendation would be ap
munists,' 'To Chleu Hot (to de- proved, and the August HEST,
feet) is the only.way to end (hamlet survey) should reflect
the war and restore peace.' no (Viet cong-controlled) bam-
"Depending on the local lets."
situation, all ultilization of
leaflets, slogans and banners
must be exploited to the full-
est. These operations must be
completed in one week ... Re-
sults should be reported to
(Tri) and should include .. .
the number of villages and
hamlets where flags were dis-
played, and the number of slo-
gans, leaflets, and banners dis-
tributed at the localities."
Tri added menacingly that
his army units sould discipline
people who do not put out the
flags.
This attitude of fakery and
falsehood extends down to
every level. For example,
Americans have been repeat-
edly told about the increasing
number of hamlets which are
secure from Communist con-
trol.
A high U.S. Pacification offi-
cial, Wilbur Wilson, tells in a
confidential memo, dated Aug.
19,19771, how he cut two Viet-
con-controlled hamlets out of
a district simply by gerryman-
dering the district Tammany.
style.
Perhaps U.S. officials sim-
ply are sick of the truths in.
Vietnam, and would rather:
read soft, sweet lies. As a
symptom of this, we can quote
from a memo written to his
aides by Richard Funkhouser,
Pacification Head for a giant
area north of Saigon.
"I plan to visit provinces
and districts," he advised his
deputies down the line. Each
division director, he said,
should be prepared to give
him three pieces of good news
about programs that might
possibly be used to show ,ac-,
complishments,"
Intelligence Reports
Helicopter Mystery The.
British have picked up myste-
rious helicopter activity on
their side of the Hong Kong
border. The secret specula- ;
tion is that this may be a dra
matic attempt to block the es-.
cape of high-ranking Chinese
s u-McC1ur. smell.
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The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Feb. 1, 1972 B 11
U.S. Losing mar, Hanoi Said to Feel
By Jack Anderson
e latest intelligence
$Qris Indicate- Jwn
no Intention of settlin
dochina, and that the threelmigh+ p011 Obinpsp into
countries as ? a united force
re" I will openly fight the U.S. any-
the
con-
"Vanna commented, how-
ever, that ... the U.S. with-
drawal will not be easily ac-
complished. The U.S. will
_Z?..a,L?pl et that ie
latestCommunist rives in
Taos. Cambodia and- South
y'iipp n m ire ennrfir i nafe_ __ by
lion
ei
ll
uunnist cadres In all
m
ountries are spre
m
the word. accord irngtoo one se-
7a^~ f t," overnmeennt contin-
+~ use Thai troouo s "At
present, approximately 4,000
The excuse for this pleasure
safari was to educate the
members in the workings of
the European Common Mat-
Thais are fighting with the i ket and related trade pro-
Laotian Army inside Laos. I lems. In the past, the membe.L,s
~X na na cam JJhW on yeral
" e CIA
P@P&44-!~+h FTC !C.nmmunist
Jrnut ha refused Communist
Chinese proposals to 'i erate
Laos' on the grounds that
world tensions would probably
result. However, he said con-
tinued or increased infusion of
Royal Thai Army troops into
Laos could result in the. in-
troduction of Chinese Army
combat elements ...
'17it->a id that the RLG
(R.nval Lao (~.overnMPRT4 is
tired of war. and the Lao peo-
ple want a peace sett dMent, a
unift Laos an an'Mortu-
^ roun-
t~r~
"The Lao armed forces,
however, are not expected to
give up the battle easily, al-
though FAR (government)
troops are tired of fighting
and PL (Pathet Lao) forces
are nearly equal to FAR in
strength.
House Junket
The congressional junke-
teering year got off to an im-
pressive start when 14 mem-
bers of the House Ways and
Means Committee, 11 of their
wives and four staff members
flew off to Europe on a luxuri-
ous Air Force jetliner.
got sufficient education from
testimony, staff reports and
other data less expensive for
the taxpayer than a week in
Paris and Brussels.
One member, Rep. James
Corman, (D-Calif.) was so en-
thusiastic about the junketeer=
ing that he stretched his tour
to include India, Australia and
New Zealand, all on "commit-
tee business." Corman paid for
his wife's transportation.
Other Ways and Means jun-
keteers stretched the week-
long Common Market tour to
include such places as Israel,
Madrid or Budapest. They
were Reps. Richard Fulton (D-
Tenn.); Hugh Carey (D-N.Y.);
Herman Schneebeli (R-Pa.),
and Barber Conable (R-N.Y.).
Those who settled for the
standard week in Paris and
Brussels were Reps. Phil Lan-
drum (D-Ga.); Sam Gibbons (D-
FTa.); Joe Waggonner (D-La.);
Joe Karth (D-Minn.); John
Byrnes (R-Wis.); Jackson Betts
(R-Ohio); Jerry Pettis (R
Calif.) and Don Brotzman (R
Colo.).
Footnote: To the credit of
Congressman Conable, he set.
an example by paying his own
airfare and returning $117 of
his allotment funds to the U.S.'
embassy in Brussels.
? 1972, Bell-McClure Syndicate
only -a-matter of time and that
the threes ate o n o ina
are now ioinea to etner to
probably disengage aggres-
sively in order to show its
strength to the world and to
show that it has not lost the
war in Indochina.
"Vanna explained that the
U.S. will not admit defeat and
will continue its 'support' to
the South Vietnamese, RLG
(Royal Lao Government) and
y.1 Lon Nol 'puppets' (Cambodia).
whi-re In Indochina."
A typical cadre briefing was
given recently by a high-rank-
ing Pathet Lao colonel named
U.S. Elections
"If Nixon wins the 1972 U.S.
elections, the N.S. (is expected)
Vanna at a secret site in the to conduct a longer and more
Muong Phalane area of Laos. vigorous Indochina war. If the
Tile? CIA was able to et a de-
tgiled, iR-nape acco the
secretmeeting.
"Vanna sa~the U.S. is
losing the war in ouu Ti Viet-
nam an that is son
President Nixon is dis gag-
sng from Tn oc ina Tre tints
the CIA_
"Also, the U.S. Congress and
the U.S. people have openly
advocated the withdrawal of
U.S. forces from Indochina
and the reduction of aid to the
Democrats win, then the U.S.
can be expected to terminate
the war more quickly.
In any event, he explained,
the U.S. will eventually disen-
qge, and the U.S. elections
will only indicate whether it
will disengage more quickly or
more slowly.
"Vanna noted that the
North Vietnamese allies re-
main firmly committed to Ho
Chi Minh's advice to 'vanquish
the Americans and be true to
government of South Vietnam. the historic missions of North
"He added that the joining Vietnam."'
of Cambodia with Vietnam .e-?.c~ret CIA. su p '
and Loas in common battle ooak-ined an omjnp, s
against the U.S. has united In- the Pathet _14p
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THE WASHINGTON POST
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DATE7( (1ZPAGE
Cables Show Doubletalk on VC
By Jack Anderson
The secret cables from Sai-
gon show that U.S. officials
have been talking out of both
sides of their mouths about
their campaign to wipe out the
Vietcong Infrastructure.
The idea was to kill, capture
or convert the key people who
operate the Vietcong under-
ground inside South Vietnam.
This grim missionary effort is
known delicately as Operation
Phoenix, named after a mythi-
cal bird which rises from its
own ashes.
But the Phoenix program,
according to the classified
cable traffic, hasn't gotten off
the ground. Ellsworth Bunker,
the American Ambassador in
Saigon, has reported to Secre-
tary of State Bill Rogers that
the operation "has not ap-
peared to have significantly
weakened" the Vietcong in-
frastructure.
It "has reduced the power of
the VCI (Vietcong Infrastruc-
ture), he said, and "is an es-
sential part of the Govern-
ment of Vietnam's defense."
American support, he de
clared, "is fully warranted."
The VCI, he said, "operates
under considerable limits
tions" and has been reduce
in some areas "to skeleton sta
tus." As statistical evidence,
he reported that 9,331 VCI
were "neutralized during the
first five months of 1971. This
included 3,650 killed, he
said.
Secret Reports
300 people. This has 'appar- the Vietnamese but which
ently been adequate to keep
the VCI viable and enable
them to make their presence
felt."
A few weeks before Colby
bragged to Congress about the
success of the Phoenix pro-
gram, his top aide in Gia Dinh
province, David McKillop, re-
ported grimly: "We have not
scratched the surface of the
Urban VCI network of thei
Shadow Supply System."
In a confidential report
from Binh Duong province, Lt.
Col. Gerald Chikalla informed
Colby that operation Phoenix
-vas killing off the little fish
but missing the sharks.
"There has developed the
tendency to place more im-
portance on volume rather
than on quality neutraliza-
tions," reported Chikalla.
"Much of this can be attrib.
uted to U.S. guidance and in-
fluence and Quotas."
does not get the priority atten-
tion in action at any level that
it gets on paper."
Similar admissions of fail-
ure came from Lt. Col. Gerald
Bartlett in Hau Nghia prov-
ince.
Yet Colby suppressed these
unfavorable reports and gave
Congress a fabricated, favora-
ble account of the Phoenix
r rogram. He was supported by
the Pentagon's G. Warren Nut.
ter, who wrote a similarly
glowing letter about Opera
tion Phoenix to House Foreign
Affairs Chairman Thomas
Morgan (D-Pa.) on Aug. 21.
Once again, we have caught
government officials in a fla-
grant deception. They twisted
the facts, apparently, in order
to win congressional support.
Gift from Agnew
Bunker's secret Aug. 30
cable, however, tells a dismay-
ingly different story. Although
the Phoenix program "rou-
tinely exceeds its goals of neu-
tralizations (deaths and ar-
rests)," confided Bunker, it
"has not appeared to have sig-
nificantly weakened the VCI."
Giving the classified statis-
tics on VCI strength, he re-
ported: "June strength (of)
61,994 was down 341 from
May. The drop in strength for
the first half of 1971 is about
10 per cent. Even if this figure
is reliable, it is not a signifi-
cant decrease in view of the
urgent GVN (Government of
Vietnam) efforts directed
,against the VCI in 1971.
Bunker's cable is dated Aug.
30, 1971. The date is signifi-
cant. For a few days earlier,
Ambassador William Colby
and Assistant Defense Secre-
tary G. Warren Nutter made
public statements saying ex-
actly the opposite.
Colby, who headedthe paci
fication program 'in Vietna
testified on July 19 before th
House Foreign Operation "Sixty thousand members of
subcommittee. Suave and s an underground organization
emn as an undertaker, h in a population of 18 million
praised the Phoel1lx program. represents one VCI for each
Vice President Agnew is a
man often accused of a lack of
sympathy for the black and
the poor. But you'd have a
hard time convincing Ray
May, the rugged outside line-
backer of the Baltimore Colts.
May has adopted three
teen-aged black youths and
plans to convert his Kansas
ranch into a home for disad-
vantaged city boys.
Not long ago, May received
a handwritten note from the
Vice President. "Ray, congrat-
ulations," it said. "Perhaps
this will help a little." En-
closed was a crisp $100 bill.
Bell-McClure Syndicate
Another reason for Phoe-
nix's failure was the unwilling-
ness of the Vietnamese to turn
in their sons and fathers to
the Saigon government. As Lt.
Col. Jack Cantrell put it in a
classified report from Binh
Tuy province:
"The major reasons for lack
of success include: (a) The in-
herent distaste of the people
to indict (inform on) relatives,
friends or personnel with po-
litical implications. .. (Phoe-
nix) is a U.S. innovation that
has been bought officially by
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R 00f ~ 9~1 002~AGE Pr
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Jail. 11, 1972
B11
U.S. Deception on Role in Cambodia
By Jack Anderson
A secret exchange between
Washington and Phnom Penh
reveals that officials aren't
telling the truth about the
U.S. role in Cambodia.
Because of congressional
hostility, the Nixon adminis-
tration has pretended to take
no active part in raising funds
from other nations to support
the tottering regime of Cam-
bodian strongman Lon Nol.
The secret cables show, how-
ever, that the U.S. not only is
bringing political pressure on
other governments to con-
tribute to Lon Nol but has ac-
tually prepared a solicitation
letter for Lon Nol's signature.
Apparently, U.S. policymak-
ers don't trust the Cambodian
leader to write his own letters
on such a delicate matter. The
appeal was supposed to be ad-
dressed "on a personal basis"
to other heads of state who
might have a. little cash to
spare for Cambodian aid.
Congressmen have balked at
financing Lon Nol because of
I the dismaying similarity be-
tween his regime and some of
the corrupt, floundering South
Vietnamese regimes that have
cost the American taxpayers a
fortune.
In an earlier column, we
quoted from secret dispatches
that described Lon Nol as "a
sick man, both physically and
mentally" and told of wide-
spread incompetence and cor-
ruption throughout his govern-
ment.
Compulsive Womanizer
Even some of the able men
under him were characterized
respectively, as "an inveterate
gambler," "a compulsive
womanizer" and as a leader
whose "personal authority is
diluted by a tendency toward
financial corruption."
American Ambassador
Emory Swank, in one secret
report, criticized "Lon Nol's
haphazard, out-of-channel and
ill-coordinated conduct of mili-
tary operations." The result is
that Communist hit-and-run
harassing operations have de-
veloped-apparently much to
the Viet Cong's surprise -
into a serious military treat to
the Cambodian capital.
Similar reports about some
of South Vietnam's earlier po-
litical corruption and military
bungling were kept secret
from the American people. If
the truth had been known in
time, the U.S. might have been
spared some of the lives and
resources that have gone down
the drain in Vietnam.
Because of the Vietnam ex-
perience, Congress is keeping
a tight pursestring on Cambo-
dian aid. The Nixon adminis-
tration has gone behind con-
gressional backs, however, to
sneak military supplies into
Cambodia through South Viet-
nam and Indonesia.
Now the administration has
resorted to deception again to
raise exchange support funds
for Cambodia.
Cambodia "has undertaken
to do its own representations
to elicit donors for the ESF," a
State Department spokesman
told us blandly.
Secret Instructions
But secret instructions were
cabled to the American Em-
bassy in Phnom Penh, declar-
ing: "We believe political ap-
proach necessary lest finance
ministries, who are generally
opposed new aid programs, ar-
range for an evasive or nega-
tive reaction to (the Cambo-
dian) appeal.
"Department believes high-
level political appeal needed
to improve chances for suc-
cess. Letter from Lon Nol to
heads of prospective donor
governments could help nail
down (contributions)."
The suggested letter begins:
"Excellency: I am writing this
note on a p rsonal basis in
order to bring to your Excel-
lency's attention directly the l
economic problem that we are
now confronted with in the
Khmer -Eepublic ..."
It winds up- "I am asking
that your government make a 1
contribution of - to the
fund for 1972 at a meeting to
be held in Phnom Penh (on
January 14.)"
All Lon Nol had to do was
fill in the blank space with the
correct amount for each coun-
try. The sums that will be
sought are: U.S., $12.5 million;
Japan, $7.5 million; Australia,
$3 million; Britain, $500,000;
New Zealand $300,000; Indo-
nesia, $250,000; Malaysia,
$250,000; Singapore, $250,000;
Thailand, $250,000; and the
Philippines, $250,000.
Despite the State Depart.
ment's public pretense that"
Lon Nol is running his own
fund-raising drive, here's what
the secret in structions add:
"Once letters sent, we pre-
pared urge our embassies in
key countries make high-level
approaches in support of Lon
Nol request. We understand
that Japanese will then move
out and actively lobby for par-
ticipation in ESF. We can, on
selective basis, do some lobby-
ing here, especially with UK
and Australia."
These secret instructions,
like the India-Pakistan revela-.
tions, demonstrate, sadly, that
the government of, by and for
the people cannot always be
trusted to tell the people the
truth.
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE ((~J~~JJ//~rhh PAGE
The. Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan. 10, 1972 D 11
Bay of Bengal and Tonkin Gulf
By Jack Anderson
The secret White House
Papers reve ous
similarities be w n the Bay
of Bengal and the Gulf of
Tonki .
The Gulf of Tonkin incident
on Aug. 4, 1964, led to our
.deep involvement In the Viet-
nam war. The'American pub-
lic was told that North Viet-
namese torpedo boats had
staged an unprovoked attack
upon a U.S. destroyer, al-
l though. later evidence indi-
cated that the attack was ac-
tually provoked.
The risk of a similar 'naval
incident in the Bay of Bengal
caused grave apprehensions
inside the State Department
as a U.S. task force steamed
toward a Soviet task force at
,'the, height of the Indian-Pak'
staiifighting.
On Dec. 7, a top secret warn-
i g was flashed to Washington
that "three Soviet naval ships,
a seagoing minesweeper and a
begun to move
tanker have
northeastward Into the Bay of
Bengal. The units entered the
Indian Ocean from the Ma-
lacca Strait on 3 December and
were located approximately
500 nautical miles east of Cey-
lon on 7 December."
Urgent huddles in the White
House led to a decision on
Dec. 10 to assemble in ' Ma-
Iacca Strait a U.S. task force,
'spearheaded by the aircraft
carrier Enterprise, the Navy's
most powerful ship. The pri-
mary purpose was to make a
"show of force" and to divert
Indian planes and ships from
Pakistan.
As the task force moved
Into position, Admiral John
McCain, our Pacific com-
mander, inquired on Dec. 11
about "the feasibility of ...
aerial surveillance of Soviet
.task group located approxi-
mately 180 NM (nautical
miles) southwest of Ceylon."
Air Surveillance
Authorization was flashed
back the same day "in the
event Task Force 74 is directed
to transmit the Strait of Malac-
ca. At that time, appropriate
screening-surveilance
flights are authorized."
As the American warships
moved through the strait and
headed into the Bay of Bengal,
even more ominous reports
reached Washington from the
Defense Intelligence Agency.
"Recent indicators have
been received which suggest
the PRC (Peoples Republic of
China) may be planning ac-
tions regarding the Indo-Paki-
stan conflict," a top secret
message reported tersely. "Ac-
cording to a reliable clandes-
tine source, (Pakistan's) Presi-
dent Yahya Khan claimed ...
today that the Chinese Ambas.
sador in Islamabad had as-
sured him that within 72 hours
the Chinese Army will move
towards the border.
"President Yahya's claim
cannot be confirmed. How-
ever, recent Peking propa-
ganda statements have be=.
come more critical of India's`
involvement in East Pakistan."
From Katmandu In the India Nikolai M. Pegov, how- good will toward men.
Himalayas, meanwhile, came ever, promised on Dec. 13 that Bell-McClure syndicate
word that both the Soviet and
Indian military attaches had
asked Col. Melvin Holst, the
American attache, what he
knew about Chinese troop
movements and U.S. fleet
movements.
"U.S.S.R. Attache Loginov,"
said the secret dispatch,
"called upon PRC military at-
tache Chao Kuang Chih in
Katmandu advising Chao that
PRC should not get too serious
about intervention, because
U.S.S.R. would react, had
many missiles, etc."
Hoist concluded, the dis-
patch added, that "both the
U.S.S.R. and India Embassies
have a growing concern that
PRC might intervene."
i pul eously, the Central
r?t - s ed
o?t a ton secret mnort at
ing weather data for locations
than or er per.
T e continued passing of
weather data for these loca-
tions is considered unusual
and may indicate some form
of alert posture."
Soviet Threat
,mid from New De 1, the
(-!T A rPpnr'ar r lr1 nP "a
rpliah1Peland- es source,
a Prime n her Mjniste_ Gai0liF a
i as Congress ar,y
that she had some indications
nnese Intend o n-
g`,along India's northern
borg" , _, . Mrs. Gandni
the Soviets "would open a di-
versionary action" against the
Chinese and "will not allow
the Seventh Fleet to inter-
vene."
Here are the highlights of
this ominous Soviet pledge,
which the CIA claimed to
have picked up from a "relia-
ble source."
"Pegov stated that Pakistan
is trying to draw both the
United States and China into
the present conflict. The So-
viet Union, however, does not
believe that either country
will intervene.
"According to Pegov, the
movement of the U.S. Seventh
Fleet is an effort by the Unit-
ed States to bully India, to
discourage it from striking
against West Pakistan, and at
the same time to boost the
morale of the Pakistani forces.
Pegov noted that a Soviet
fleet is now in the Indian
Ocean and that the Soviet
Union will not allow the Sev-
enth Fleet to intervene.
"If China should decide to
intervene in Ladakh, said
Pegov, the Soviet Union would
open a diversionary action in
Sinkiang. Pegov also com-
mented that after Dacca is lib-
erated and the Bangladesh
government Is installed, both
the United States and China
will be unable to act and will
change their current attitude
toward the crisis."
This is how the big powers
danced precariously on the
edge of the brink just before
Christmas as people sang
about peace on earth and
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE q1QjA'V\'7-2-
__ PAGE
Jack Anderson
Telling Truth
Is Best Policy
GOVERNMENT }j11
~~~ii havp
ay~o, a rTef
011 uTil a on o he
t White ouse pa era
y
1 z _%lnin2 nne. thins-telling
ti i- "-"4h.
If presidential adviser
Henry Kissinger had not lied
to the press in his December
background briefing on the
Asia war, there would have
been no story for us to write.
The documents would simply
have confirmed what the pub-
lic had already been told.
Instead, the White House
chose to mislead the public
flagrantly. Kissinger said the
administration was not anti-
India, a misrepresentation
that must have been obvious
to both India. Pakistan and
the allies of both.
The secret papers prove
that the administration was
militantly anti-India. It was
this contradiction, not the fact
that the papers were classi-
fied, that made them news.
Indeed, it is doubtful that
the various sources who
made the papers available
would have done so if the ad-
ministration had not engaged
in such bald-faced deception.
Now, unfortunately, the ad-
ministration seems bent on
widening its credibility gap.
It is thundering off in search
of our sources instead of
making good the solemn
promise it made during the
court battle over the Penta-
gon Papers.
At that time, the govern.
ment admitted there was
"massive over-classification"
of official documents. It
promised to reform the clas-
sification system, which it
had undermined by chronic
overuse of the "secret"
stamp.
Supreme Court Justice
Potter, Stewart summarized
the state of affairs in one
sentence: "When everything
is classified," he wrote,
"nothing Is classified"
Today, documents which
might genuinely need to be
kept temporarily from public
view are lost in a classified
shuffle of miscellaneous ca-
bles, correspondence, intelli-
gence summaries and other
bric-a-brac.
Government officials al-
most daily demonstrate their
contempt for the security la-
bels by slipping newsmen se-
lected secret papers which
make them look good.
If these labels had any real
meaning, the government it-
self would be the nation's
number one security risk.
But while high officials
have debased and cheapened
the "secret" stamps, they still
find them useful for one pur-
pose: to keep their actions
and particularly, their blun-
ders hidcn from public
view.
But this passion for secrecy
is far more serious than mere
bureaucratic b u n g l i n g
'Secrecy, as the Supreme
Court has observed, is not
merely undemocratic, it is
anti-democratic.
The proper function of our
political system depends on
the ability of the public to be
informed. This is the crucial
mission of the First Amend-
ment - to promote a maxi-
mum flow of news and com-
mentary to every citizen.
There is no way this funda-
mental concept, d squared
can
democracy, ,
with a system of "security"
classification which Is, in
reality, a legalized form of
censorship.
The White House papers
on India and Pakistan con-
tain not a shred of informa-
tion that threatens the na
tion's security. Instead, they
reveal the inside policy ma-
neuverings and public decep-
tions of our top officials.
They tell the story of for-
eign policy moves that may
have pushed India-the
world's second largest nation
and its largest democracy-
into the arms of the Soviet
Union. Meanwhile, we find
ourselves locked in an em-
brace with a feeble, beaten
military dictatorship,.
Mufti 4he an"i f cf p
cnrh infnrmatinn has
-nthing fn d .vi+h~],afiru al
""LUw R^Th P~-i* h~C_ Q. do
withpolitical security.
Nassikas' Giveaway
WE EXPOSED in a series
of columns last June how
Federal Power Commission
chairman John Nassikas lied
to Congress, sold out the pub-
lic in a $4 billion rate case
and suppressed his own econ-
omist's opposition to the give-
away.
Our charges were investi-
gated by Rep. Neal Smith (D-
Iowa), who summoned Nassi-
kas and others to testify be-
fore his House Special Small
Business Subcommittee. Now
Smith has completed his for-
mal report. In many respects,
it is tougher than our col-
umns.
"It is the view of this sub-
committee," declares the re-
port, "that the public has lost
confidence in the ability of
the FPC to set just and rea
sonable producer rates for
the sale of natural gas in in-
terstate commerce ...
"The subcommittee be=
lieves that the action taken
by the FPC in creating
higher rates for gas produced
in the southern Louisiana
area was not in the public in.
terest."
We had estimated this rate
increase would cost Ameri-
ca's consumers $4 billion.
Smith's subcommittee esti-
mated the sell-out closer to
$4.5 billion.
Bell-McClure Syndicate
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ED
 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B0 5RDQQ300020020-1 (Zs
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE (.Jf_'h_l_ PAGE
The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Jan. 7, 1972 C 23
-1& T ? 4 !1 L,f `' t . _ ~ JT'k -~?
By Jack Anderson
Owlish, offish Henry Kissin-
ger, the foreign policy wizard,
is* simply over his head in pa-
perwork.
He is trying to serve Presi-
dent Nixon as a one-man State
Department. But the paper-
work is too voluminous, the
problems too overwhelming
even for the brilliant Kissin-
ger to master.
Still he tries to manage
every foreign crisis, to absorb
every new detail, to advise the
President on every develop-
ment. During the three hectic
weeks before Christmas, the
secret White l:Iouse Papers
show Kissinger had his fingers
in the following pies:
Ambassador George Bush
probed and pressed in the
backrooms of the United Na.
tions for a diplomatic solution
while Egypt and Syria de-
ployed their forces for a mili-
tary showdown. To keep a mil-
itary balance, Kissinger urged
the shipment of Phantom jets
to Israel.
continued to prepare for the
presidential pilgrimages to Pe-
king and Moscow. He not only
handled the arrangements but
plotted the big-power chess
that the President will play
with our two chief adver-
saries.
? More than anyone else,
Kissinger served as ring mas-
ter for the three-ring Paris
peace talks, Vienna SALT and
Brussels NATO conference
that were going on simultane-
ously behind closed doors. He
called the signals from the
White House.
He also kept close watch
through horn-rimmed glasses
upon such far-flung trouble
spots as Cuba, Chile and
Korea. He monitored the dip-
lomatic cables, intelligence
digests and situation reports
that poured into Washington
Calling Kissinger
? He became deeply in-
volved in preparing the new
international monetary agree-
ment. President Nixon's uni-
lateral economic moves last
August caused a diplomatic
backfire around the world. He
did not consult with America's
trading partners. He offered
no explanation to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. He ig-
nored the diplomatic niceties.
In all this, he was advised
chiefly by Treasury Secretary
John Connally. Kissinger was
called in, finally to unravel
the international disorder.
? He directed the top-level
strategy sessions on the Indi-
an-Pakistani conflict. He sub-
mitted the option papers, for
example, that persuaded Presi-
dent Nixon to dispatch a naval
task force into the Bay of Ben-
gal
? Kissinger compiled a grim
situation report showing a
dangerous intensification of
North Vietnamese /military
pressure in Laos, Cambodia
and South Vietnam. Not only
os
s i
lli
n p
e
were our Laotian a
sible peril, but the govern- where-conferring with Birit-
ment we support in Cambodialish Prime Minister Edward
.r__aL, h..oo4f~c4inp with
collapse. He recommended air
strikes against North Vietnam.
He orchestrated the deli-
4- in the Mid.
? He stage-managed the
President's blobe-trotting to
placate ruffled allied leaders.
Not only were the briefing
papers prepared under Kissin-
ger's supervision, but he trav-
French President Georges
Pompidou and, after hours,
hitting the night spots with
beautiful young ladies.
Cate U.S. stra egyl- i
dle F t iTnA?~ s IITr~CSlon,l ? All the While Kissinger
from around the globe. His in-
terpretations and recommen-
dations, largely, guided the
President In setting policy ev-
erywhere.'
Paper Clip War
Day after day, Kissinger
processed dozens of option
papers, security memoranda
and briefing papers for the
President. Kissinger . also
worked on several major na-
tional security studies on such
subjects as "Prisoners of War"
and "Laos Peace Initiatives."
Policy out of his hnsPment of- Bell-McClure syndicate
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Al
tmen
fice in the White House. The
final decisions, to be sure,
have been made by the Presi-
dent. But Kissinger has guided
the President's thinking and
directed the implementation:
of his policies.
The State Department, with
its worldwide foreign service'-
network, has been relegated
largely to a messenger service.
Kissinger accepts briefing
papers from the State Depart-
ment, and the department's
specialists participate in
White House strategy sessions.
But the final formulation of
policy is handled by Kissinger.
In preparation for the Presi-
dent's Peking visit, for exam-
ple, veteran strategists at the
State Department submitted
briefing papers but weren't in-
vited to join the advance party
now in Peking. This mission is
completely controlled by Kis-'
singer.
Yet Kissinger has been able-
to operate in almost total se-'
Crecy. Congress has sought in
vain to find out what he's
-doing, but he has, refused to,
testify as Secretary of State.
o
.
Bill Rogers is required to d
The State Department,. which
is charged with the conduct of
foreign affairs, can't even
keep up with Kissinger.
Not until. we got hold of the
White House Papers hat
public been given a glimpse..
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE___________ a h PAGE 11
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE 'WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Ian. 6,197P D 11,
U.S. Y
Sato Steering Away From the
By Jack Anderson
Japan's staunchly pro-Amer-
lean Prime Minister Eisaku
Sato, severely shaken by a se-
ries of diplomatic shocks from
the White House, is steering a
new course away from the
U.S. and closer to Communist
China.
Secret White House docu-
ments caution that, ultimately,
Japan may slip out from be-
hind the American nuclear
shield and become a nuclear
power In her own right.
In the meantime, Sato wants
to make his own deal with the
Chinese, not let President
Nixon trade off Japanese de-
fenselessness for Chinese con-
cessions at the bargaining
table in Peking next month.
The Japanese fear Mr.
Nixon may offer to keep
Japan unarmed. He may try to
persuade Chou En-lai that the
Japanese-American security
treaty deters. Japan from
"going it alone" and rebuild-
ing her military might.
"It would be a mistake,
"the Japanese have warned,
"for the President to make
such an argument. His doing
so would inevitably become
known in Japan, thus deepen-
ing Japanese distrust of U,S."
This warning is contained In
the secret papers prepared for
President,,.. Nixon's crucial
meeting. today with Prime
ente, Calif tVe have seen aconf1dant`' of top Japanese
some of these documents, leaders. Wakaizumi suggested
which also show: that a joint communique be is-
sued after the San Clemente
Losing Japan? meeting proposing a "restudy"
? The President has pulled of postwar relationships in
the pro-American rug right Asia. "Such a restudy," Wakal-
out from under Sato. First, zumi said, "would permit GOJ
Mr. Nixon made overtures to (Government of Japan) lati-
Peking behind Sato's back, tude similar to that which
then twisted his arm to get a USG is enjoying In political
textile agreement, then dealing with Peking."
slapped him in the face with ? The same message, la-
harsh economic measures. this assessment of future Japa?
? This has turned Sato away nese policy: Japan "(A) will
from the U.S. and has cost agree that (Peking) is sole le-
America the confidence of the gitimate government of China;
Japanese "establishment." Re- (B) will recognize that Taiwan
ports American Ambassador is part of China; (C) will avoid
Armin Meyer in a secret mes- any 'two China' implications;
sage from Tokyo: "Whereas and (D) will rule out concept
heretofore anti-Americanism of an 'independent Taiwan' or
was pretty mucl} special vehi- a U.N. trusteeship over Tai-
cle for opposition parties and wan."
Japan's tendentious press, de- I
velopments of past few New Attitudes
months have fostered seeds of Earlier, Kazuyukl Kasuga, a
doubt within normally Ameri- political power in Japan, paid
can-oriented community." quiet calls on top Washington
The same message, la- officials and gave them a pre-
beled "President Sato talks," view of the new Japanese atti-
says the Japanese have the tudes.
"impression that Japan Is The President has carefully
being asked to maintain cold- studied the secret minutes, for
war confrontation posture example, of Kasuga's meeting
while President's mission to with Deputy Defense Secre-
Peking gives USG (U.S. Gov- tary David Packard. Speaking
ernment) advantage of appear- for Japan's Democratic Social-
ing to be more progressive 1st Party, Kasuga suggested
and peace-minded." that the Japanese-American:
? On the eve of the Nixon- security treaty requires .some
Sato summit meeting, Meyer review."
was visited by a distinguished Packard asked Kasuga, ac-
scholar of Japanese-American cording to the secret minutes,
affairs, Kei Wakaizumi, whom "in what respects treaty
should be modified and if it
should be discontinued. Mr.
Kasuga replied that 119F& lieves U.S.-Japan security s7s-
tem would remain viable .with-
out U.S. forces or bases in
Japan ...
"Packard replied that' ,if
GOJ should come to 16 '
Japan did not need ourprofc-
tion and wished to asstlh1 e
total responsibility for Japan's
security, including defense
against the nuclear threat, we
should have no forces In
Japan. But then, Mr. Packard
asked, 'Would we negd
treaty?'
"Mr. Kasuga replied tfiat
treaty would provide effehtiwe
deterrent against (ChinaYs).po-
tential nuclear power and`that
DSP desires to maintain basic
security, system ... Confist-
ent stationing of U.S. forces in
Japan is unnecessary, said Jr.
Kasuga, and he recalled Japa?
nese proverb, 'Too much is as
bad as falling short.'
"Mr. Packard said If GOJ
decided should be no .U.$.
troops or bases in Japan,
"That's your business; we re-
spect your sovereignty.'
"Mr. Packard said U.S.
troops are in Japan for secu-
rity of Japan, not that of U.S.,
and that, if we had no forces
or bases in Japan, would be
well to look at consequences
of that fact ... A suddenpre-
cipitous change wouldhaTe.lte-
rious implications and reper-
cussions throughout Asia.,'We
must move slowly and npt
jump to new position.'
Bell-McClure Syndicate
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B0~,O(30,3Q0020020-1
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE JJ ~~''~~"'++ ~i `~''''' PAGE ED
Joseph Kraft
Undermining Kissinger
HIGH POLICY differ-
ences are widely supposed
to have prompted the leak
of secret documents on the
Indo-Pakistani crisis to Jack
Anderson. But most of the
evidence suggests that the
true cause is a vulgar bu-
reaucratic row aimed at get-
ing the President's chief as-
istant for national security
ffairs, Henry Kissinger.
The most striking evi-
dence is like the evidence of
the dog that didn't bark in
the Sherlock Holmes story.
The fact is that no enduring
policy issue of high impor-
tance is involved in the
leaks.
The fight over East Ben-
gal is largely a one-shot af-
fair. Hardly anything that
happens on the subcontinent
is central to international
politics. The United States
had already tipped toward
Pakistan - and practically
everybody knew it when
the leaks were sprung. At
the time, as some of Dr. Kis-
singer's comments make
plain, the administration
was anticipating a return to
more normal relations with
back to 90, and the deadly
you-or-me rivalry between
rid prfnidpat` agencies of
tie foielgn affairs commu-
nity 'in the Mkini'adminis-
tration. Washington veter-
ans tell me that to find a fit
; iitbr ff"tl ey have to'110'
As a thira bit of evidence
:there is the state of rela-
tions a o a for officials
fected policy. The chief con-
aeque1 a wtx9 to Impugn the
tegrity of fir. Kissinger.
A SECOND BIT of evi-
dence involves Mr. Ander-
son himself. He is not
deeply versed in foreign af-
fairs. No one who aimed to
change a line of interna-
tional policy would single
out Mr. Anderson as the
agent for deflecting that re-
sult through the leak of se-
cret information.
Mr. Anderson's specialty-
and it is an important spec-
ialty-is putting the jour-
nalistic arm on wrong-doers.
By no mere accident the
chief fruit of his disclosures
was not something that af-
his, He has a sharp tongue,
and he has been unnecessar-
ily unkind in comments
about some of the senior of-
ficials of the most pres-
tigous departments.
But most of the resentment
has been'caused by what Dr.
Kissinger does in the serv-
ice of the President. The
present administration has
expanded the job of special
assistant for national secu-
rity affairs way beyond what
it was under Walt Rostow
and McGeorge Bundy. Dr.
Kissinger has virtually elim-
inated from the decision-
making business some of the
most high-powered men and
agencies in town
The office of Secretary of
Defense Is perhaps the chief
victim. Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird is going to be
stepping down soon with
practically nothing to his
credit. Even his claim
(which has at least some
foundation) to be the author
of the policy for getting out
of Vietnam is not widely be-
lieved.
He seems hostile to the
administration's policy on
an arms control agreement,
and he was completely cut
out of plans for the Presi-
dent's visit to China. His
general reputation for trick-
iness has caused the cognos-
centi, rightly or wrongly, to
establish him as the short-
odds favorite for almost all
leaks regarding national se-
curity these days. Indeed,
some White House officials
at first believed Mr. Laird
leaked the Pentagon papers.
THE UNIFORMED MILI-
TARY comes a close second
in the odds. Many of them
do not like the way the White
House is winding down the
war in Vietnam. Almost all
are opposed to the arms con-
trol agreement which the
White House is now negoti-
ating with the Russians.
Some are hostile to the Oki-
nawa reversion agreement
which the White House has
negotiated with Japan. And
far, far more than civilians
in the government, the uni-
formed military are in the
habit of leaking classified
information to serve their
own interests.
Not that the State Depart-
ment or other civilian agen-
and Louis Johnson, who Gies can be entirely ex-
4. then ruled the roost at the empted from suspicion.
Pentagon. In any case, rela- Except as regards the Near
tions npwadays are marked East, Dr. Kissinger has
by ' paranoia, jealousy and taken over the whole realm
h c~i,efgaror AIlgAg 2?kn~pf a~4 ~$00415R000300020020-1
of the venom is Dr. Kissin- eign officials. This assump-
ger, and some of the fault is tion , of the State Depart
Dean Acheson who was then
at the State Department,
ment's traditional role is bit-
terly resented by many of
the department's leading of-
ficials. Indeed, one of them,
not long ago, voiced the sus-
picion that Dr. Kissinger
spent an extra day on his
last trip to China in order to
embarrass the State De-
partment which was han-
dling the United Nations
vote on Chinese admission.
With suspicions at that
level, there is every reason
to figure bureaucractic ri-
valry as the key element in
the background of the An-
derson papers. There is no
case for lionizing, or even
protecting the sources of the
of the leaks.
On the contrary, for once
there is a ease for a presi-
dential crackdown. Mr. Nix-
on's interest-and that of
the country-is to find the
source of the leaks and fire
them fast.
Publishers-Hall syndicate
 THE WA;"rse 2001/11/01 CIAgOOrg~*TW020(y
,Rd1E EP
Net Effect of the Anderson Leaks
IT IS' already fashionable somewhat taken aback by icy. If Kissinger's influence step in an agreed co slightly
d as a result of deed,
ey
t
to say that the secret and receiving this word from a is weakene
have set In
h
v
private papers 'leaked to 'friendly power, Madam Gan- the leak', it will be, the na- plaintive, ive, andt h representatives here in
columnist Jack Anderson dhi inquired what, in the tion's loss. ington to wondering
told us nothing we did not event of such an attack The President's assistant Wash Wash tho have done to
rouse Mr. Nixon's personal
already know. In fact, they would be the attitude of the has been a brilliant, as well remind us of .-Important' United States. Keating re- as an efficient public serv- awnat
tri hs we have insuffi- plied that he had fulfilled ant. In three years he has pique.
his instructions and was em- managed to turn the foreign Finally, the Anderson pa-
eie i~ tly lear ned .
The first of these `is that Powered to say nothing policy making of the nation pers are a reminder that
President Nixon and Dr. more. ' from obsession with ideol- public exposure of private
Kissinger are embarked Kissinger also took a hand ogy to judgment of power. conversations among gov-
upon a major change in in attempting to frighten If, in the course of this ernment officials can be al-
U#iited Stated foreign pol- the Indians. He told the In- turn-around, options have most as destructive of gov-
icy. What the American peo- dian ambassador here that if not always been made clear, ernment as the report-
ple had presumed was a po- India became Involved in the fault lies not with Kis- ing of actual life and death
lite how-do-you-do to China war with both Pakistan and singer but with Mr. Nixon's military high level
may nhig b as
derstandingturns out. to be a firm un- China, the United States determination that the cold meetings
could be of no assistance. war 'ideology still required The Anderson p a p e r s The implication that Mr.' lip service. frank frank agraainin, and level those who
meetings igh strongly suggest that part of Nixon's chief foreign policy IT MAY BE ARGUED mattend ay wonder whether they
this understanding was to aide was delivering a mes- whether the new China pol- should say what they think
The papers icy required quite the or say what their enemies in
back Pakistan against India. sage from the Chinese
seemed clear, and it has- brusqueness which the the room might approve.
have so far not
revealed two additional tened Madam Gandhi's de- United States displayed to- To choice reduce makes a men to mockery such a
a
pieces of evidence which termination to formal alli- wards its oldest friend in government. Nobody will
buttress this view. ante with Moscow. the East, but the Anderson argue against the public's
The second truth which
LAST OCTOBER 12, U.S. emerges from the Anderson seem to show Kissin- right to know the logic be-
Ambassador Kenneth Keat? papers is that somebody dy in gee as a somewhat reluctant red differenceits
lug called upon Indian Pre- the United States govern- follower of the hard line. porting the making of for-
mier Gandhi with the warn- ment-and at a high level- The President is blaming eign policy and reporting
ing that if India did not is opposed to the New China me" and "He wants to tilt private conversations is the
cease aid to dissidents in policy and is not averse to towards Pakistan" are not difference between the re-
East Pakistan, Pakistan destroying Kissinger in the the remarks of a man with porter and the spy.
would attack from the West. process of opposing the poi- sole responsibility for each Los Angeles Times
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 WASHINGTON STAR
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9
JAN' i
JAMES J. KILPATRICK
Leak of Papers to Anderson a Grave Breach
i
We are in the midst of an-
other of those great ruffled
flaps involving the press, the
government, and the ethics of
public and private conduct.
This one is serious.
The story goes back to the
first week in December, when
the Washington Special Action
Group met at the White House
to discuss the suddenly flam-
ing war launched by India
against East Pakistan. The
WSAG, in effect, is the super-
National Security Council of
this administration - a top-
level coordinating body intend
ed to serve the President with
the : best advice and intelli-
gence that can be pulled to-
gether by skilled and experi-
enced men.
The three WSAG meetings of
Dec. 3, 4 and 6 were held in
confidence, of course, behind
locked doors, but written min-
utes were prepared. These
minutes were stamped "se-
cret-sensitive," which is the
classification level just be-
low "top secret," and then
were distributed among an es-
timated 50 to 75 persons in the
Pentagon, State Department,
CIA, and the White House.
A. person or persons un-
known made copies of the
memoranda and gave them to
columnist Jack Anderson. He
excerpted them for use in his
column, and a few days later
'supplied the texts for use by
newspapers generally. In one
view-it is the view of anti-
Nixon liberals-Anderson per-
formed a great public service,
and his anonymous informant
wa- a man of noble character
who risked his job in the name
of truth and honesty in govern-
ment.
There is another view. The
importance of this disquieting
affair does not lie in the mem-
oranda themselves. The im-
portance lies in the leak.
Make no mistake: This leak
must be found, and it must be
stopped. This is a breach of
trust, and a breach of securi-
ty, of the most profound im-
plications.
The memoranda are embar-
rassing, no more. For the
most part, the minutes reflect
the discussion of men trying to
find out what is going on, and
seeking to decide what best to
do about it. The President,
they are advised, is angry at
India for its aggressive ac-
tion; he wants "a tilt toward
Pakistan." There is much
talk of the futility of the
United Nations. One detects
sympathy for the plight of the
emerging nation of Bangla-
desh; it promises to become
"an international b a s k e t
case." The conferees come to
no particular decisions. They
agree to prepare certain pa-
pers for the President. Their
discussion is candid, sponta-
neous, unreserved.
Subsequent to these private
meetings, the White House
was publicly to assert its neu-
trality in the India-Pakistan
war. Obviously the White
House was not neutral. This
was self-evident to every edi-
tor and critic in the country.
It is a fair surmise that
every government in history
has taken public positions in-
consistent with its private
wishes. Diplomats know this.
What matters, to repeat, is
the leak itself. This is not to
on,
be compared with the act
of the Washington Post last,
month in blowing Henry Kis-:
singer's cover as the source of
a recent backgrounder; that.
was no more than an ill-man
nered breach of professional,
rules. Neither is it to be com-
pared with Daniel Ellsberg's
clandestine distribution last
spring of the aging "Penta-,
gon Papers." Ellsberg was,
then out of the government.
We must infer, in this in_ .
stance, that someone still em-
ployed at the very highest lev-
els of confidence-some one
holding top secret clearance,
with access to other memoran-,
da of immense importance
has wantonly violated the,
trust reposed in him. This
goes beyond disloyalty; it sails
close to the windward edge.
of treason. What other docu-.
ments one must wonder, has
this person secretly copied?
Where will he peddle them
next? This is the alarming as-
pect. Anderson thinks it "fun-
ny," but then Anderson would.
It is not funny at all.
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 WASHINGTON POST.
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M
Joseph Kraft
The Anderson Papers
JACK ANDERSON achiev- 3 that "he (the President) suspicion that the depart
ed a journalistic coup in pub- wants to tilt in favor of Paki- ments and agencies are full
the minutes of the se- stan." of crypto-Democrats out to get
lashing On Dec. 7, in a background the administration-is only
cret White House meetings on session with reporters ?subse. going to be intensified. And
the India-Pakistan crisis. But quently released by Sen. Bar- that deep suspicion is going
how much of a hero is the ry Goldwater, Dr. Kissinger to yield two sets of adverse
reactions.
man who. leaked the informa- said: There have been some For one thing, security will
tion? comments that the ad,minis- be tightened. There is apt to
My strong impression is tration is anti-Indian. This is be an end to the kind of min-
that he accomplished very lit- totally inaccurate." utes that were taken at Dr.
tle public good, if any. On the Seen thus starkly, Dr. Kis- Kissinger's meetings. They
his actions are al- singer told a flat lie. My im- will certainly not be spread
contrary, through the bureaucracy any-
most certain to drive the Nix- pression is that, taken in the nlnre.
on administration deeper than larger context, his remarks Secondly, the limited access
ever into secret dealings on a at the secret conference were which experienced officials
restricted basis, not In such flagrant contra- now have to White House de-
f on the good side of the diction with his remarks at cision-making is going to be
ledger, the leak has now pro- the background briefing. Still, even further curbed. The
vided unmistakable informa-, he was plainly trying to ma- President and Dr. Kissinger
tion that the President delib- nipulate public opinion. are going to keep things to
erately tilted American pol-
favor of Pakistan and BUT SO WHAT? Does the themselves more than ever...
icy in . But that much new evidence do more than Important decisions which are
against India
was known to everybody in confirm a universal judg- even now made with too little
touch with the State Depart- ment? After the U-2 and the consultation.., and with too
meet and White House at the Bay of Pigs and the credibil- small an input from the out-
ity gap, is there anybody not side are going to be made by
time s. the Edmund nds. 1tluski Ed. Impossibly naive or ill-inform- an even more narrowly cir-
Sen ed who doesn't know that the cumscribed group of men.
ward Kennedy and Frank
government lies? Is one more No doubt Anderson gets
Church, among others, said bit of evidence a noble act? high marks for his acumen
so. Hundreds of us wrote it. and industry and courage as
Indeed, one reason Henry Kis Or is it just a pebble added a journalist. But his source,
singer held his background to the Alps? the man who leaked the stuff,
briefing of Dec. 7 was to take Set against these gains, is something else. Whatever
there is the way the adminis- his motives, he has done this
the edge off the charges the , country a disservice.
t to react Maybe '
ti
i
t
on
s ap
ra
White House was biased in
. favor of Pakistan. the President and Dr. Kissin
A second and more impor. ger are going to say to them-
tent gain from the revelation selves: "Golly, we sure erred
in not telling the truth and
has to do with information nothing but the truth. Jack
about the way the govern- Anderson has taught us that
ment works. The secret min- honesty is the best policy."
utes provide detailed, to-da - But much more likely, they
table evidence that day-to-day are going to feel that the min-
foreign policy is made in the utes of- the meeting were le-
.They qua lly show House as never before. gitimately classified internal
ey e qua top working papers of the govern-
il.o be tr allowed treated mere themselves lackeys ment. Probably they are going
bb Some Of to feel that the stuff was leak-
th me White House. ed not for any large purpose,
posed - heavyweights invyweights such s h the but out of opposition to the
a policy. And almost certainly-
chief of naval operations-ly
said , and apparently regularly and I say this as an opponent
of the policy-they will be
say, things silly enough to right in this surmise.
Issue from the mouth of In these circumstances, the
Bertie Wooster.
Then there is the matter of limited trust they have in the
truth-telling. According to the outside world is going to be
minutes released by Ander- even more sharply limited.
son, Henry Kissinger told a The morbid suspicion they
meeting, of officials on Dec. have, of the bureauucracy-a
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 WASHINGTQN STAR
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WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP
Things Ordinary People Call Lies:
By FRANK GETLEIN
Jack Anderson's remarkable to many-and indeed was pub-
service to the country in re- licly interpreted by many-as
vealing the White House dis- academic partisanship against
cussions that led to our forth- Rostow because of his part in
right pro-dictatorship, anti- escalating the Indochinese
democracy, pro-slaughter, an- war. The academics didn't like
ti-victim position in the India- the war, it was said, and ex-
Pakistan war extended well pressed their dislike by turn-
beyond the mere making pub- ing their backs on their form-
lic of the processes of such de- er colleague.
cisions for the advancement of There may have been some-
freedom in the world. thing in that. Academics do
* tend to be more solidly against
the war than any other wage-
His revelations clearly show- earning part of the population.
ed what ordinary people would But a stronger factor in Ros-
ordinarily think of as a policy tow's rejection almost certain-
of deliberately lying to the ly was the free and easy way
public. Selected Washington with truth he necessarily pick-
pundits have, with little trou- ed up in the White House. A
ble been able to convince vital part of the whole escala-
themselves that no deception tion was the deliberate decep-
was intended because anyone tion of the public and the Con-
who was anyone in town al- gress at every step of the way,
ready knew that we would from that early light at the
support Pakistan - "tilt in end of the tunnel to the events
favor of" seems to have been in Tonkin Gulf to the glorious
the Kissingerian formula-and victory of the Tet offensive.
oppose India. Rostow was inescapably in-
But those Americans who volved in the continuing decep-
weren't someone in Washing- tions. But the whole point, the
ton, or approximately 99.99999 basic assumption, of scholar-
percent of the people, are still ships is that the scholar
more or less inclined to be- searches for truth wherever
lieve what their government the search may lead. Truth, less call in
tells them. Lacking prior ac- for a scholar, is an end in it. they public nevertheless
Maurice
cess to the higher truth behind self and not a walnut shell to pub ic AID dM rice
the public statement, when the be manipulated on a table to Williams of the fact that
eir
contradictions are pointed out, dazzle the yokels. price attention
vegetable oil was
they are inclined to think that * weakening in the United
somhbnda lied. States. Cutting it off from ship-
ble, Dr. seems entirely de post If Kissinger indeed is not ment to India would weaken it
rile Dr. Kiespecial singer does not carried on the shoulders of his further. He therefore request-
receive b o tey hfellow academics on his retire- ed that commodity be shipped
welcome bhck t to the highest he ment from government, the in place of wheat.
levels of the academic coin- cause will be, not the positions This confusion of motive is
h
munity, the Anderson papers
should be remembered.
The same thing happened to
Lyndon Johnson's Kissinger,
Walt Rostow, who was forced
to go and teach in Texas,
where, presumably, the aca-
demic world takes a less punc-
tilious view of these things.
At the same time, it seemed
e
he took, but the double posi- the inevitable result of t
tions as revealed by Anderson, double-entry style of decision-
the things that ordinary peo- making as revealed by Ander-
ple ordinarily call lies. son. The pragmatic reason for
The process seems to be get- scholars to adhere to truth is
ting habitual and it may have that it lets them know where
elements of personal tragedy they are. The principle may
for scholars who serve their have application to govern-
governments by putting aside ment.
the normal scruples of scholar-!
ship.
It may be seen on the level
of farce in the continuing evo-
lution of the political thought
of Arthur Schlesinger Jr., an-
other academic who bounded
into government with great en-
thusiasm. A convincing advo-
cate of presidential power
when he was working for a
President, Schlesinger's schol-
arly analysis has now led him
to think that presidential pow-
er is not all that unrestrained
a blessing and must be curbed
in some way.
There are those cynical
enough to believe that Schles-
inger's views of presidential
power thus vary directly with
the likelihood of Schlesinger's
finding appropriate employ-
ment with any given president.
A relatively minor form of
similar self-deception occurs
in the Anderson papers in the
discussion on continuing eco-
nomic aid to Pakistan while
cutting it off to India.
While the game planners
were thus constructing a
heavy tilt in the attitude which
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 NEW YORK TIMES
`Leaks Follow the Course of Greatest Impact
WASHINGTON-The choicest bits
.of the White House's secret strategy
sessions On the Pakistan-India fuss had
already been published in Jack An-
derson's syndicated column-read by
an, estimated 45 million muck-hungry
Americans - when Presidential aide
Henry Kissinger; decided that the best
way tp fight ? back was to say that
his statements had suffered distortion
by being printed out of -context.
That was a. mistake. Last week Mr.
Anderson responded to Mr. Kissinger's
criticism by releasing to the press the'
full text of the White House minutes,
and these were printed by The New
York Times, The Washington Post
and other. major newspapers across
the country.
It was no -great act of largesse. Mr.
Anderson could spare a few secret
documents; he says he gets dozens of
them every week "from officials, of
integrity who believe Uncle Sam can
tell the truth and survive." A smaller
selection, he says, comes "from peo-
ple who are out to get even with
their boss or somebody, else." The of-
ficials who slipped him these White
House papers might qualify in both
categories. Mr. Kissinger, having' up-
staged the entire State Department
and some of the Defense Department,
is not without bureaucratic enemies.
Those who recall Mr. Anderson's
being caught in 1954 eavesdropping
on Bernard. Gbldfine in the Sheraton-
Carlton Hotel, or sending an assistant
to dig through J. Edgar Hoover's gar-
bage can last year, would have been
easily -persuaded that Mr. Anderson
got the documents by some light-fin-
Approved For Release 30Q111.1/gT'~ 00415PP~ 00 0-1
gered technique. But Mr. Anderson
says they came the usual way-"from
friends in sensitive government posi-
tions." The friends were "appalled by
the Administration's siding with the
akistani dictatorship" and by the
'misleading information coming out of
the White House."
Sensing an opening, Mr. Anderson
softened them up further by implant-
ing the fear-which he shared - that
the presence of the United States
fleet in the Bay of Bengal might be
pointing to another Gulf of Tonkin
incident.
If the Johnson Administration's se-
cret plans in 1$64 for covert war
against North Vietnam--and for sub-
sequent bombing of. the North-had
been known in advance of the Tonkin
episode, the escalation 'of the war
might have been prevented. Right?
And ' if the public knew what the
White House was thinking about India
and Pakistan, it might even mean pre-
venting a conflict with Russia. Right?
"Quite .frankly," says Mr. Anderson,
,,this was persuasive with my friends.
Originally they gave me about a
dozen documents. They said these
were the key ones. But I didn't feel
I. should write without seeing all the
documents of this period. I told my
sources, 'I trust you guys, and when
you say this is a representative sam-
pling I'm sure you're telling the truth.
But somebody might argue that you
had misled me by picking out just
the 'documents that prove what you
want to prove. I think I've got to
see them all.' }
"They said, 'You're crazy' I said,
'No. You've got to decide whether
you work for the country or for Kis-
singer.' So they gave me all of them."
In dealing with people so disposed,
Mr. Anderson benefits from the first
law of leak physics: Leaks tend to
follow the course of greatest impact.
Officials with a secret tale to tattle
know that through Mr. Anderson's
column . they will reach 700 newspa-
pers, which is' by far the most wide-
spread circulation of any political
column in American journalism.
Not that all 700 newspapers always
use it. Some editors don't appreciate
what Mr. Anderson does to some of
their heroes. Others are occasionally
afraid he may be leading them down
the libel path. His column aboutthe
sex problems encountered by cartoon-
ist Al Capp on college campuses, for
instance, was carried in only two
newspapers on the East Coast.
When Mr. Anderson inherited the
Merry-Go-Round column from Drew
Carson in ' 1969 there were some
oubts about his ability to handle it.
rue, he had helped produce the col-
mn since 194. and Mr. Pearson had
ontributed little during his last years
the series that ruined the career of
he late Senator Thomas Dodd, , for
example, was almost. entirely Mr. An-
derson's handiwork). Nevertheless,
during most of his career Mr. Ander-
son-an unglamorous teetotalling
Mormon family man (nine children)
-was overshadowed by his suave
boss and partner; who handled the
big-name -contacts in . Georgetown
salons.
Mr. Anderson, now 49, is not a
party goer. He, takes his religion very
seriously and teaches Sunday school.
Big physically (about six feet, 200
pounds), a onetime halfback and
brash, Mr. Anderson likes to cultivate
the reputation of a Peck's Bad Boy,
an' outsider. He has a Middle Ameri-
can background: an upbringing in
Utah, no college degree, experience
on Utah newspapers and the Stars
and Stripes before reaching Washing-.'
ton. He has never received an impor-
tant journalism prize. He likes to take
jibes at the "Establishment press,"
though his column, in the sense that
it is a key conduit to some portions
'of the Establishment, is also very
much a part of it.
If, after all this, there were any
lingering doubts about Mr. Anderson
as proprietor of the Merry-Go-Round
column, they must surely have been
dispelled by the White House papers
coup. Now, with a staff of four leg-
men (Les Whitten, Brit Hume, Joe
Spear, Ray Cole) operating out of five
rooms in Howard Hughes's old office
suite on K Street, Mr. Anderson is bit-
ing hard enough to be forgiven what
appears to be an extra layer to his
customary cockiness. He's even chal-
lenking the White House to get tough
about his latest gambit.
. "I didn't get my information out
of a Daniel Ellsberg, who belonged
to another Administration and has
been out of government two years,"
he says. "I got my information .f roil
some of Nixon's own boys."
-ROBERT SHERRILL
Mr. Sherrill is a freelance writer
based in Washington.
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP7 0p4~5RQ~00020020-1
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE J ~-_ PAGE
Stephen Klaidman
Uninformed Officials
'J' `T?3- n PTTRT.IC often f. eels
syigld heeause of a gnaw-
jug ffeaIling that the pre~s
...not providing enough infor-
_m9tinn ahnnt the deeeeni
g i rnnecs in govern-
wrewoy a Fwnnnen ly
% It j a gjAs ofit a "-' sons
tk& documents sneh as the
dAhe r
?'
ggi147y2 published Anderson
p^a l a r a, roiw ed fhrnu h
adioated nnimmnict Tack
Andarsnn 2r f
l They E'y~ a gt
;_ t_`the wav decisions ire
, ebeii..
They show presidential
adviser Henry A. Kissinger's
school-masterly control of
the high-level policymaking
body known as the Washing-
ton Special Action Group.
Tux also show fumbling
am w ortalatin-an area
:+nl,ore no 'c * y shou
been well thought out
i nn a ore.
pg a mart ist,urbiRg,
however, the documents in-
dirate that , .the top n, ,Trials
charged with setting a
C n a United ates
in-matters of war anTneace
as? nperating with lase ?han
adeate information to
make d eisions an a well-in-
formed and thoughtful
Cm eeivably. th at, infnrma-
t`inn is avail' ble at wer
1ovallL_ and has fAiled- to
reach the top because cif the
d_ensgness of the bureauc-
racv~i~ ei~1>'n
it is
.u,+ al.ravs in evidence
. +hoae w" 1, n Qs& need
It would seem, however,
that any dedicated newspa-
per reader was about as well
informed as the White
House on what was happen-
ing on the battlefields dur-
ing the recent Indo-Paki-,
stani war.
The -evicTence [s contained
In the documents on the ,yar
released by Anderson. They
consist of summaries and
quoted matter from three
meetings of the Washington
Special Action Group hied
during the fighting.
DURING these meetings,
three men reported on mili-
tary matters and the course
of the war. They were Rich-
ard M. Helms, director of
the Central Intelligence
Agency, Adm. Thomas H.
Moorer, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Gen. William C. Westmore?
land of the Joint chiefs.
Careful comparison with
newspaper accounts for the
appropriate days yields the
following grim surprise:
The government appar-
ently had no better informa-
tion about the war than the
press, which at the time con-
sidered its information
dreadfully inadequate.
The Washington Post was
not pleased when it had to
repgrt Indian claims and
Pakistani counter-claims
without being able to give
readers a clear sense of
what was really happening,
isut. nn ngn Qr 11 old
WSAGthe falklwing:_
"C ng th( reported
aetinn in th- !Argot I,-
there are eon icting r n g
from both sides 411d 1d the only
common aro
attacks on the Amritsar Pa.
thankot And Crinigar air.
ports. The Paks say the . gi-
ans are attanking_ allll Ri
their border- hot the Tndi
In a dispatch from Rawal-
pindi dated Dec. 3
Jim
,
Hoagland reported to The
Washington Post:
"Radio Pakistan an-
nounced tonight that India
had launched attacks
against Pakistani forward
positions all along the west-
er
Approved ~i- n 'er an~
ppl /r 1
s
sated with raids on four air.
fields in western. India and
Tndian_1n1r7 TZ.,.a....:..
"The airfields the Pakis-
tanis announced hitting
were given as Amritsar, Pa-
thankot, Avantiput, near the
northwest frontier and Sri-
nigar, capital of Indian
Kashmir."
In his account of military
activity at the Dec. 4 meet-
ing, Helms had caught up
with Avantipur and a sum-
mary of the meeting said:
On the political side, An-
derson quoted Wednesday
from a briefing document
prepared for the President's
current meeting in San
Clemente with Japanese
Prime Minister Sato.
Those readers who have
been following the dis-
patches of Washington Post
correspondent Selig S. Har-
rison from Tokyo were ap-
parently as well briefed as
the President on the current
Japanese attitude toward
the U.S., international mone-
tary affairs, military and
more specifically nuclear
matters and attitudes to-
ward China.
,5311 a1sYeS-
~e loa;ic 1 conclusion is
-1LXwa s wonderful,', ',-,,e W
-AfaWSd, but that the gov-
e. woe-
rfuilY111-informed.
 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B R000300020020-1
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE J IZ' PAGE
Joseph Kraft
The Anderson Papers
JACK ANDERSON achiev- comments that the adminis- which experienced officials
ed a journalistic coup in pub- tration is anti-Indian. This is now have to White House de-
lishing the minutes of the se totally inaccurate." cisionmaking is going to be
eret White House meetings on Seen thus starkly, Dr. Kis- even further curbed. The
the India-Pakistan crisis. But singer told a flat lie. My im President and Dr. Kissinger
how much of a hero is the pression is that, taken in the are going to keep things to
man who leaked the informa larger context, his remarks themselves more than ever.
tion? at the secret conference were
which are
My strong impression is not in such flagrant contra- even now Important made decisions with too little
that he accomplished very lit diction with his remarks at consultation and with too
tle public good, if any. On the the background briefing. Still, small an input from the out.
contrary, his actions are al- he was plainly trying to ma- side are going to be made by
most certain to drive the Nix- nipulate public opinion. an even more narrowly cir
on administration deeper than BUT SO WHAT? Does the cumscribed group of men.
ever into secret dealings on a new evidence do more than No doubt Anderson gets
high marks for his acumen
restricted basis. confirm a universal judg-
and industry and courage as
On the good side of the ment? After the U-2 and the
a journalist. But his source
the man who leaked the stuff
'ledger, the leak has now pro- Bay of Pigs and the credibil-
is something else. Whatever
vided unmistakable infor;na-, ity gap, is there anybody not
his motives, he has done this
tion that the President delib
impossibly naive or ill-inform-
country a disservice.
erately tilted American pol
ed who doesn't know that the
icy in favor of Pakistan and
government lies? Is one more
against India. But that much
bit of evidence a noble act?
was known to everybody in
Or is it just a pebble added
touch with the State Depart-
to the Alps?
ment and White House at the
Set against these gains,
time of the crisis.
there is the way the adminis-
Sens. Edmund Muskie, Ed
tration is apt to react. Maybe
ward Kennedy and Frank
the President and Dr. Kissin.
Church, among others, said
ger are going to say to them-
so. Hundreds of us wrote it.
selves: "Golly, we sure erred
Indeed, one, reason Henry Kis
in not telling the truth and
but the truth. Jack
singer held his background nothing
Anderson has taught us that
briefing of Dec. 7 was to take
honesty is the best policy."
the edge off the charges the
But much more likely, they
White House was biased In
are going to feel that the min-
favor of Pakistan.
utes of the meeting were le-
A second and more Impor-
gitimately classified internal
of the govern-
tant gain from the revelation working papers
ment. Probably they are going
has to do with information
to feel that the stuff was leak-
about the way the govern-
ed' not for any large purpose,
rnent works. The secret min-
but out of opposition to the
utes provide detailed, irrefu-
policy. And almost certainly-
table evidence that daY-today
and I say this as an opponent
.foreign policy is made in the
of the policy-they will be.
White House as never before.
right in this surmise.
They equally show that top
In these circumstances, the
officials allowed themselves
limited trust they have In the
to be treated as mere lackeys
outside world is going to be
by the White House. Some of
sharply limited.
there - including such sup even more
The morbid suspicion they
posed heavyweights as the
have of the bureaucracy=a
chief of naval operations-
art
said, and apparently regularly suspicion that the dep
meets and agencies are fu1T
-stay, things silly enough to
of crypto-Democrats out to get
issue from the mouth , of
the administration - is only
Bertie Wooster.
going to be intensified. And
Then there is the matter of
that deep suspicion is going
truth-telling. According to the
to yield two sets of adverse
rhinutes released by Ander-
reactions.
son, Henry Kissinger told a
meeting of officials cn Dec.
For one thing, security will
3 that "he (the President) be
e tightened. There is apt to
to tilt in favor of Paki- be
an end to the kind of min-
stan." utes that were taken at Dr.,
On, Dec. 7, in a background Kissinger's meetings. They
:es~l o ~e ft% i b 0Bb0415R000300020020-1
quen er Eefy ene. ur a
ry Goldwater, Dr. Kissinger more.
said: "There have been some Secondly, the limited access
,
,