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October 2, 2001
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March 28, 1972
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25X1 THE WAl&PRQr qse 2001/11/01: CIA 4BZR11 tMO730'i020V~-dE F1) The Washington Merry-Go-Round ITT Hope of Ousting Allende Remote By Jack Anderson M " exist policies, has contin- F lende's course Is working less Any hnnp International Tel_'ued to explore the prospects well. If this trend continues, it pphone and Telegraph may Of removing Allende from I will increase pressures on All ave of ousting Chile's Presi-power. lende to move toward radical ~} I Ambassodor Davis, however, l solutions or In other direc- ctent Salvador Allende, in the 1sTathaniel Davis, is unrealistic. In a secret cable to the State Department, Davis re- ported that "prospects of mili- tary intervention for the fore- seeable future are extremely small. "It is held that military will turn blind eye to virtually any !constitutional abuse, and Al- lende is smart enough to avoid abuse so flagrant as to force Before we published the in-, "Allende's decisions may, in summarized the situation in his opposition and also of th ment. that "there is considerable va- Military Plotting riety in ways military might intervene." He reported "growing con-; Before ITT is likely to get viction in opposition parties, its military coup, however, private sector and others that Davis suggested that public opposition is possible." He opposition to Allende would cited! intelligence reports that have to become "so over- THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, March 28, I972 -- 1 1.1144 - - _ -----? --- ---- great, that military interven- t mention in 1970 to block Al? military services have been substantiallj greater." . don is overwhelmingly invited. lende's election. We have pub- Mshed confidential memos But he concluded: "It is "It is held that military will Among the world leaders who have turned up in ITT's corporate hierarchy are Paul Henri Spaak, former Belgian prime minister; Trygve Lie, the late U.N. Secretary-Gen- former chief of our own,Cen- Twice a month, ITT's man- agers gather alternately in New York City and Brussels to plan high strategy. Five of the top managers draw higher pay than President Nixon's $200,000-a-year salary. And ITT's panjandrum, Harold Ge- neen, collects the highest sal- ary in the world, $766,755 a Which reveal the giant con-; not our impression that Chile wait for this public repudia-!sic _. wereI? to Pii glomerate was prepared to is yet on brink of showdown, tion to become more clear and lis . he CTA inn an nrti plot lve spend millions promoting eco- In fact, there is some reason to more open than it is likelyt~ hogk llpnrlP's elnrtinn nomic collapse in Chile to believe that new opposition ever to be." and th?s_ intprfPrp in Chile's force a military coup. spirit could prove transitory ... roe igi' ion n s . This il- Corporate Nation lustrtes the inees . uo r - T1ig e_ shoe y 1 "My warn colleagues continue to' ! tinnshin that has rnwi >n be 1~' I i once Agency 1 warn me that t events move l With annual sales around t~^,en TTT and ooperated w in p an- I slowly in Chile, or perhaps $7.5 billion and holdings in 67 the Nixonnaad - ---I ILC~itliSlration. countries ITT is 'a veritable but that other American __- great ability to rush to the pare. The "With Russian and East Eu- memos also blame the State ropean help ... and with some Department for failing to take breaks, Chile just might be a tougher ? stand against Al-; able, to rock along for some lende. time to come." Inside sources say that ITT, In his secret summary, how- in order to protect Its invest- ever, the new American Am- , corporate nation. It has built an empire, like Britain's, upon which the sun never sets. ITT directs Its own intelli- gence operations, security sys- tem and foreign service. It deals with foreign govern- ments at the highest levels- often through former political leaders, cabinet ministers and Undersea Booby Trap The Navy has awarded a $26 million study contract to de- velop a secret, delayed-action torpedo to be called the "Cap- tor." It could be fired silently into an enemy harbor where it would remain a threat for weeks. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 25X1A WA i-Ql o s? 2001/11/01 : CIA-Rp 7 20 0&0b 02 - GE ' The Washington Merry-Go-Round By Jack Anderson President Nixon's pledge in Peking to pull American mili- tary forces out of Taiwan, pre- dictably, has raised howls from the Republican right. The same hardheads, who called for President Truman in the 1950s to "unleash" Chi- ang Kai-shek, are now railing against Mr. Nixon for promis- ing to remove the American lease. When old Chiang is at last unleashed, they warn in anguish, his island redoubt will be overrun by the Red Chinese. Long before Mr. Nixon wa invited to Peking, our militar strategists fiercely debate whether Chiang could wit vd an amphibious assault. iprguments are spelled out ~cret working papers in bssession. th~ntagon study contends !thaAang's forces "are more Taiwltluate" for defending assau.Iainst an amphibious mary dcause Chiang's "pri- to regative . . . has been mainlandeontrol over the he has be study asserts, tary force C formidable mili- exceeds the h substantially ments for Ta ense require- hand, isn't rega P bilities "that the CPR (Chi- nese Peoples Republic) could not mount major offensives on more than one front." Soviet Threat Since Mao Tse-tung's main forces are tied up on the So- viet border, where Russia has now deployed nearly a million men, he would have trouble mounting "a major offensive against Taiwan." In any event, the Pentagon strategists believe the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan in case of attack "should be more than adequate to deter the CPR." The Central Intelligence Agency, after detailed survey of Taiwan's defenses, identi- ied "four major and two mi- or beach areas suitable for mphibious landings." n ~~' THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, March 4,1972, R -r__ should be deployed. This should not require that the U.S. maintain additional forces in the Pacific. Footnote: Countering these arguments, the U.S. mission on Taiwan has warned that "the CPR military capabilities will improve over the next decade with continued empha- sis on the improvement of nu- clear weapons capabilities." As for Chiang's ability to throw back an amphibious as- sault, the mission contends: "The DOD report relies on the deployment of forces to ac- quire favorable ratios. This can be accomplished under ideal conditions, but rapid lat- eral movement is extremely difficult due to the communi- cations network and terrain." Strange Reward President Nixon has asked the Senate to promote a high- ranking diplomat who only 20 months ago was exposed for trying to cover up the Mylai massacre of Vietnamese civil- ians. Secretary of State William Rogers put tall, balding James May at the head of the De- cember 1 promotion list sent first to the White House, then forwarded to the Senate For- eign Relations Committee. It calls for May's promotion to the second highest level of foreign service officer. The suave May, who dressed like a fashion plate even in m gg`' Quantngai province where he was top civilian ad- viser, figured prominently in a House report on the mas- sacre. A special Armed Services Investigating subcommittee, in a report released July 15, 1970, described May's role in the cover-up this way: "The Senior Province Ad- visor, Mr. James May, was a State Department for e 19 n service officer free of any re- sponsibility to Americal Divi- sion or its commander. "The testimony clearly es- tablished that his headquarters was apprised of atrocity alle- gations by Vietnamese Gov- ernment sources. It further es- that members of his tablished staff had discussed the allega- tion and its investigation with i representatives ? of Americal Division, and with others . .. '~ ,,It further demonstrated that he had personally been Informed of the allegations at several times during the in- Despite the evi- vestigation. that his unit had demon- dence strated concern over the admittedly unusual allegations and its investigation, Mr. May claimed to have no recollec- tion i'. of the incident." The House Mylai subcom- headed by the Rep. F. mittee, Edward Hebert (D-La.), said failure of May's headquarters to report the incident "raised the question about where the decision was made to suppress any reporting of the allega- tion." ` Pentagon strategists drafted an elaborate scenario, citing the difficulties of an amphi- bious attack from the main- land, and concluded: "When the reserves are deployed, the GRC (Government, Republic of China) would outnumber the CPR threat in any sector by at least two to one. over- all, the CRC would outnumber the assault force by at least five to one." Adds the secret Pentagon study: "If GRC control of the air and sea were to be threat- ened, or it appeared that a much larger amphibious at- tack were being launched, U.S. Navy and Air Force u nit s entagon as serioCd by tee De- fense Intelli $? The has concluded from an envy has study of'Chinese 10 (%,haustive g t'c capa- Unleashing' Chiang Is Protested Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 THE WA ffg U -5~3! a 2001/11/01 : CIA$[R7E4 3P2003?OAGE X_ The Washington MerryGo-Ronnd Russia Moves to Counter Nixon President Nixon's aim in going to China was to reduce tensions in Asia,, but it may Th.?RUacianc h^vF enrlrle y wl 4a1 V'n+naTM and Nnrth KnrP r _ felhoen ~'P rPnnr}C ^, that the Kremlin 's ncourag- The Soviet strategy, appar- ently, is to spoil the Chinese. success, the intelligence cables intended a warmer welcome for Nixon but put a muffler on 4L_ _nw . Not long after the President I Hanoi. intelligence reports say ese that China might sell them out and offered them a friend- ship treaty. The rulers in China, rejected the treaty but accepted an offer of more mil- Not long afterward, a high- headed by politburo member Sh f R ara ashidovdim , mae a si. lar pitch in Pyongyang. Rashi- dov is reported to have en- couraged the North Koreans to start skirmishes along their southern border. tamed a cony of a-=-"^~.t i.c}rv cayn_ t_ihP rrA. ;~}l~ a~~_ and has secured military supe- "spells death for the minds riority over the $OK It i s . wait ing for the arrival of the "Because of the defeat it ex orth Korea s LU.Int ROK (R- P of Aafenses.ll or a). "In view of the above, it is believed that the North will ~,e~~ Kr,~?a ,.. War? Here are the highlights: "1. North Korea will initiate war at any time it deems a de- cisive moment is at hand. Given a choice of timing, it will h - - - c aos over a summer attack. "2. It will carry out attacks against the entire peninsula or thereof . -~ " "3. It will adopt a blitz-type strategy combining both regu- lar and irregular warfare It . will not employ nuclear weap- ons. "4. The North will seek an excuse to make all attack against the ROK claiming it was provoked into such an at- tack. If It is unable to find a suitable pretext, it *ill carry out irregular warfare . . "North Korea's basic obje c- tive is the communized unifi- cation of Korea by forceful means. It has almost com- pleted its war preparations place emphasis on winter op- exists.-- - _CIA, giving Sessr THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Feb. 25, 1972 D15 idence a orth p annin an immineKn orgnajvas - 38th parallel, the Koreans are armed to the teeth and pre- pared for a resumption of their civil war. Passions are running high. Washington Whirl Anti-Jewish Handout-For the past three years, the De- partment of Health, lducation and Welfare has doled out $85,000 annually to the anti- S e m i t i c African-American Teachers Association. The funds are supposed to get ghetto drop-outs back to school. But the Association's magazine recently wrote that Jewish influence on the New York public school system and souls of our black chil- dren." And one of the Associa. tion's leaders is Tyrone Woods, best known for his statement three years ago that Hitler "didn't make enough lampshades out of" Jews. The Anti-Defamation League is protesting the HEW grants. G o -G o Gauzza-George Gauzza, the Interior Depart. ment bureaucrat who flouted federal law to help former Secretary . Walter Hickel re- decorate his office at public expense, has now`begun to dip into the public till for his own pleasure. Gauzza recently left for an extended trip to Guam and Saipan to do "property in- ventories" in the Pacific Terri. tories. "George was originall going to San Francisco," a spokesman said, "and it was decided that while on the coast he might as well go on to Guam and Saipan " Guam after all, is only 6,194 miles", out of his way. Baleful Bargirls--State De- partment pacification experts fear that if the Communists take control of South Viet nam, there may be repirsals. against more than 200,000 Vi- etnamese who have worked di- rectly for Americans. Part of a col!fidential State Department study also deals with 80,000 Vi- etnamese bar girls who have catered to Americans. The girls are not sure they want to be left to the tender mercies of the moralistic Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. Bell-McClure syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 25X1A Approved or Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP74 D~g300020020-1 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE___________ 41.1 PAGE The Washington Merry-Go-Round an offshore island settlement with the Chinese Communists. Secret Study _Xr_JaLerw, ork tjL. U.S. Turns Bach on Quemoy, Matsu By Jack Anderson, President Nixon is prepared, as a gesture to Peking, to abandon U.S. support of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. . Yet as Vice President, -he 4tarteL even. before.,.lxon r~+nv .d ~tQ,_tll,e. Wh1te~F~is?.' A secret study suggests that "several substantial reductions could be made in GRC naval f o r c e s (meaning Chiang's navy) were it to negotiate with the CPR (Chinese Com- munists) ' an offshore island settlement. THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Feb. 18, 1972 B I-'* ...R detailed analysis of the mil-Ito: (1) patrol the coast; (2) re- itary threat to Taiwan and concludes that Chiang's forces could repulse a Chinese Com- munist Invasion. The CIA intelligence sur- vey o Taiwan ident es our major and-1Wo_, inor beach ,arils s ii table r asous land ingg , states the susve . It spells out in precise de- tail the likely battle scenario and concludes flatly: "When was willing to risk nuclear warfare over the same off- shore Islands In 1958._ ,let study of the 1958 g u YMatSL crlsisL Le- nare ..W Pentagon bit C`orooration, clalriiaat clear weapons"`I' Inside the policy councils,. no one was more militant over the two tiny islands ? than Richard Nixon who now, Ironi- cally, considers both Quemoy and Matsu to be expendable. This doesn't mean he will. hand over the two Islands to Chou En-lai as_poker chips on the Peking conference table. But the United States no long- er will help Chiang, Kai-shek defend them. The U.S. commitment to de- fend Taiwan itself, it should be emphasized, is still in. ef- fect. But the commitment won't.. continue to include Quemoy and Matsu. U.S. -military experts believe Chiang is quite capable of de- fending the islands without U.S. help. But they think he would be wiser to negotiate the reserves are deployed, the GRC would outnumber the CPR threat In any sector by at least two to one. Overall, the GRC would outnumber the assault force by at least five to one. "First the GRC amphibious capability could be reduced by two-thirds. The ability to land ,000 marines on the Penghus 5 (guarding the approaches to Taiwan) as reinforcements would be more than adequate for the defense of that area. Such a reduction would free at least 2,900 men from the Navy, saving the GRO about $820,000 annually in manpow- er costs, and obviating the need for further LST re pairs .. . "Secondly, GRC ocean con- trol and surveillance forces could also be reduced, per- haps at least one-third, be- cause operations along the mainland coast and In support of offshore island resupply would be unnecessary. This would save the GRC at least $530,000 annually in manpow er costs ..." The study also provides a "As indicated previously, based on U.S. World War II and Korea experience, an. at- tack-to-defense ratio of three to one is normally required to assure the success of an amphibious attacking (assum- ing the attacker can gain naval and air superiority)." On this subject, the military experts believe Chiang has enough naval power to deter the Chinese Communists from attempting an amphibious as- sault. ? U.S. Support Declares' the study: "Since we seek to avoid a direct U.S - CPR confrontation, we have assisted the GRC through MAP (military aid program) in developing a navy adequate supply the offshore islands} (and) Taiwan. "The GRC navy can a:^ complish all these miss., .now. It will retain these ctew -bilitles through FY73 (fiscal year 1973) without major in- vestments in new ships or craft largely because the CPR does not appear to. bo developing naval offensive forces." U.S. officials have suggest-n, ed in their secret discussions, ?y meanwhile, that old Chiang Kai-shek has enough cash stashed away to pay more of his own military bills. He I$- holding holding the money to finance his dream of reconquerin g the Chinese mainland. The U.S. mission in Taiwan'. has reported in - a "secre.t working paper" that "we do, know privately that the GRC, has considerable sums of< money in special funds, most-. ly marked for contingency use in mainland recovery" The Americans, however, believe Chiang is so obsessed"- with his dream of returning""' to the mainland that he won't spend the invasion funds for any other purpose. "The possibility that these funds would be used for rou- tine military expenditures," .'. states the report, "is remote, and they would be disbursed only as a last resort." Hell-McClure Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP74 0020020-1 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE ffM PAGE $ ?.1 THE WASHINGTOI\T POST Twsday, Jan. 18, 1972 The Washington Merry-Go-Round ---- -- Protesters Leak Their Own Secrets By Jack Anderson I nation reserved for the I kest of the CIA's secrets: The planners in the White House basement, who howled in pain over our disclosure of their India-Pakistan secrets, have slipped fragments from the same secret documents to their friends in the press. This illustrates how the White House uses official se- crecy to control the flow of news to the public. Favorable 1 facts are leaked out; unfavora- ble news is suppressed. The official leakers are now spreading the word that Presi- dent Nixon's pro-Pakistan pol- icy was not the disaster it ap- peared but really saved West Pakistan from dismember- ment. As evidence, the boys in the 'basement leaked a few selec- tive secrets to our column- ;writing colleague, Joseph Alsop, who has excellent con- taGts at the highest levels of government. Alsop stated "on positive au- thority" that the U.S. govern- ment had "conclusive proof" Alsop's 'Proof' Alsop told us he never read the CIA reports himself. He had no way of knowing, there- fore, that his sources gave him only part of the story. These CIA digests, true enough, raised the possibility of an Indian attempt to crush West Pakistan. But the same disgests also suggested India would accept an early cease- fire. Here is a typical excerpt: "There have been reports that (Indian Prime Minister) Gan- dhi would accept a cease-fire ,and international mediation as soon as East Bengal 'had been liberated ... On the other hand, we have had several re- cent reports that India now in- Keating that India has no ter- ritorial ambitions and wished only to end the conflict with the least possible bloodshed. Dubious `Proof It is clear from the secret documents in our possession that the CIA had no "conclu- sive proof" of an Indian plan to dismember West Pakistan. The CIA had received a num- ber of reports that a major In- dian offensive might be immi- nent on the western front. But these were discounted by both the State and Defense Depart- ments. Only Henry Kissinger, the President's foreign policy czar, seemed eager to believe the worst. Alsop's sources also told him that President Nixon in- tervened with the Kremlin, threatening "an ugly show- down," to stop Mrs. Gandhi's army from carving up West Pakistan. In response, Alsop claims that the Kremlin hurriedly viet Union . . ," according to the CIA. "Kuznestsov has told Indian officials that the Soviet Union is not prepared to rec- ognize Bangladesh until Dacca falls and until the Indian army' successfully liberates Bangladesh from Pakistani forces." The question of an Indian offensive against West Paki- stan was brought up the next day by Soviet Ambassador Ni- kolai Pegov. Reported the CIA: "Pegov pointed out that India has achieved a marvel- ous military victory. Pakistan is no longer a military force, and it is therefore unneces- sary for India to launch an of- fensive into West Pakistan to crush a military machine that no longer exists. "If India should decide to take Kashmir, Pegov added, the Soviet Union would not in- terfere, but India would have to accomplish this objective within the shortest possible time." . Joseph Alsop Is an enter- prising and conscientious col- umnist. He acknowledged to us that "it is possible to be lied to on the very highest level." But he assured us his source had "never lied be- fore." The evidence In our posses- sion, however, suggests that the White House Is playing peekaboo with CIA secrets to distort the truth. Bell-McClure s7ndlcat tends not only to liberate East Bengal but also to straighten its borders in Kashmir and to destroy West Pakistan's air and armored forces."' The strongest CIA warning was sent to the White House on December 10. "According to a source who has access to information on activities in Prime Minister Gandhi's of- fice," declared the report, "as soon as the situation in East IPakistan is settled, Indian forces will launch a major of- fensive against West Paki- stan." But the CIA also took note of repeated Indian assurances to American Ambassador Ken of India's intention to crush the main body of the Pakistan army in West Pakistan. This positive proof., he wrote, was "the centerpiece of every one of the CIA's daily reports to the White House during the crisis period." We have read the CIA's daily reports to the White House during the India-Paki- stan war. They are stamped "Top Secret Umbra," a desig- dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznestsov to New Delhi on December 12 to tell Mrs. Gandhi not to attack West Pakistan. The secret CIA report on his mission, however, doesn't mention any ultimatum against attacking West Paki- stan. "Vastly Kuznestsov arrived in India on 12 December to discuss the political recogni- tion of Bangladesh by the So- Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 THE WA& e#S1gr: gsse 2001/11/01 : CIA MI? 4BQb4A OA3 ?BO20Q2Q, E ?p II The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Mondey, Jon. 17, 1972 Bit' Europe First' Laird Tells NATO By Jack Anderson In a secret speech he thought would never get back to the Senate, Defense Secre- tary Mel Laird has told his counterparts In the North At- lantic Alliance to pay no at- tention to Senate resolutions about troop cuts. lfe has also promised them th4t Europe will now be given "first priority" over Southeast Asia in building up U.S. com- bat readiness. +'I can Inform you," he told NATO defense ministers. In Brussels last month, "that our fotces in Europe today are at th,6 highest level of manning and effectiveness compared wljth any time during the past fiy a years ... . In our Army units is easing b. cause of the substantial withdrawals which , we have made from Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam ..... I"First priority for combat readiness for all of our forces has now been assigned to Eu- rope, and that priority will Laird tried to reassure the connection with the defense NATO planners that they appropriations bill should, of need not worry about Senate course, be of no surprise to t3cfd off some secret military Majority Leader Mike Mans- anyone in this room 4 1 pre-! dkilfs. Then he added: "We sississin (ppirF? wimcikI GCt tr' B IC Tt ins r + .r n field's efforts to reduce U.S. 1 dieted' that this action would forces in Europe. "I appreciate your concern," he said, -"about such develop- ments as Senator Mansfield's recent proposal to set a lower ceiling on U.S. forces in Eu- rope .. . "I have on several occasions pointed out (to defense minis- ters) that we will have amend-! ments from time to time on ... defense legislation consid "I advised you then, and I advise you again, that similar amendments will be offered by various members of the Senate, particularly the major- ity leader of the United States Senate, but we-are in a posi- tion where I am quite confi- dent that we will be successful in resisting this kind of unilat- eral action." ered by the Congress but that Laird also called for the es- I was confident that we had tablishment of a tactical air the votes and the support in control system for Europe and Congress to see that these a NATO fleet in the Mediter- amendments were not enacted in the law. "And I hope that there is ranean. "I must be blunt," he de- clared. "We handicap our- should not delay t}. forma-' tion of a NATO standing naval force in the Mediteti'anean,' which would sail under the al- liance, because of the interna tional negotiations regarding!, command boundaries ... "We should act now to cre? : ate a standing force that can`.. patrol the Mediterranean Sea with the same kind of freedom which the Soviets have." m 1972, Bell-Mcclure syndicate TRAIN for a fine position with a good starting salary IN A FEW MONTHS --INDIVIDUAL INSTRUCTION- DAY or EVENING Phone 920.8866 For Free Catalog - Start Now: Dorf Spsnafized UnlI -Al Sro dwa-(E- Lwn Typal-Atw Commercial An Tedrniool Riu.iroeon . Ardutct eat Tubr- leg... T*dology course.. Register now for An Conditioning. Solid SAN' Radio & TV. TecMkian and otrr reiotod coweea. To login week of Jan. 31st COLUMBIA TECHNICAL INSTITUTE School of Technology IusW"nN.*Arof.a,Y. Free Parking D.C.'s Original !hafting 8@ii.t EN.blished ISIS YMca. not an over-reaction on the ! selves unnecessarily because part of our friends ands all'-;;'we lack centralized command when amendments like this and control of our (tactical are introduced and niscussed air) resources in Europe ... . before our Congress, because "Our own experience with the congressional process will air operations in Southeast work its will. But I can assure Asia made it abundantly clear you very confidently that the that an adequate and inte- situation is such that we do grated control system was presently have the votes ... needed to use most effectively Ignore Senate the air assets of our four serv- "This most recent action of ices and our allies ... I be- The Defense Secretary Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 '3~rn F~oi jese 2001/11/01 :CIA-RDP743TQ,41'151~ Jack Anderson And in Other Secret Memos .. ALTHOUGH the precar- ious peace in the Middle East still hasn't been broken, a. settlement is likely to 'prove as rocky and tortuous as ever. This Is Illustrated in pain- ful detail by the classified cable traffic between the State, Department and our United Nations delegation during` last month's General Assembly debate on the Mid- east. The secret messages. also provide a fascinating insight into the UN cloakrooms. The U.S.. worked tirelessly. behind the scenes to find a compromise resolution which both the Arabs and Israelis "Ambassa 9r i usn sought out Fonm[n-ifid7 in UN Indonesian Lounge to discuss Egyptian draft res re Middle East ... Noting that Egyptian draft res appeared from initial reading to be generally satisfactory, Bush .stated that major stumbling block for USG (U.S. govern- ment) was placing of lan- guage re Jarring mission in operative paragraph section . Bush asked if Riad will- ing to consider removal of this language from operative section to preamble. "Rlad replied in negative but not before he stressed that for Egyptians inclusion of this language In operative section not repeat not merely semantic exercise, on con- trary, Egypt convinced that Israel trying to get out of giv- ing favorable reply to Jarring and that only way to force Is- ..rael to td-d-6-so is by means of explicit UN resolution." The United States re- sponded to the Impasse with several proposed changes. The reaction by Israeli For- could accept and which would point the way toward further negotations. But the Arabs stuck stub- bornly to their position, and the Israelis were equally in- transigent. In the end, 'a. reso- lution passed with the Isra- elis opposed and the U.S. ab- staining. The resolution calls on Is- rael to surrender Arab terri- tory it had seized in the 1967 war. This, was sought last February by UN mediator sign Minister Abba Eban il- Gunnar Jarring. lustrates how tightly the The Israelis are so ads- mantly opposed to Jarring's lines were drawn on both i i ld i th l h was endless haggling in the backrooms over the reference in ,the resolution to Jarring's mission. oni e des. T is s to e o - s n lowing exerpts from a tele- gram marked "Eyes only- Spee'at-Exclusive: "Bush ... had meeting the Here s now an _ ey Y Formin Eban this afternoon telegram f r o m America's Eban said Israel could UN delegation" to the State ? Department describes a meet not repeat not accept USG ing between U.S. Ambassador proposal. . He noted . George Bush and Egyptian , that Jarring has not been too Foreign Minister Mahmoud ''helpful and characterized him 920-1 At another meeting, Eban expressed deep concern the resolution might contain too favorable a mention of the Jarring proposal for with- drawal from occupied territo- ries. "He observed, however," said a_ secret telegram to the State _Department, "that on 'political grounds Israel not have any reference to Jarring but appreciated that parliamentary reasons may dictate need for o m e thing ... "Both Eban and Tekoah (Is- rael's UN. ambassador) summed up that from Israel point of. view, best course would be to limit resolution language to 'complimentary .reference to Jarring' - "Eban then reiterated that srael ready to accept 'allback position which would nvolve reference to Jarring n preamble with operative .)ara simply calling on Secy Jen to reactivate Jarring nission." Despite. such patient bar- ;aining over such seemingly ninute matters of wording, ,he U.S. effort to work out a .ompromise resolution. ulti- mately failed. The resolution that passed called on Israel to surrender the occupied tealtory. the United e has promised Israel a continued supply of F-4 fighter jets. This, it Is hoped, :might soften the Israeli oppo- sition to the UN resolution or some other plan Involving withdrawal from the lands. But if the niggling, frus- trating round of discussions at the UN last month is any indication, the bargaining is likely to be long and bitter. Bell-McClure syndicate other hand, he opined that if Jarring would make move to- ward Israel, 'We'll see what we can do to help him.' Sum- ' ming up, Eban expressed con- tinued Israeli un-happiness .with draft res even with changes." 'Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 2A G ME WA's rtQd1d&RrM$ase 2001/11/01: CIA-5R~7E4B0W1' b&200?~AE T~ Yo" The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Friday. Ian. 14, 1972 D 1q Rep. Whalley and Public Funds By Jack Anderson Rep. J. Irving Whalley (R- Pa.), a power on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and a former United Nations delegate, has taken illegal kickbacks from employees, padded his payroll and chis- eled House funds to pay for his Christmas gifts. The Windber, Pa., wheeler- dealer has been cheating the taxpayers this way quite me- thodically behind a respecta- ble front as a church elder, bank president and legislator- diplomat. President Nixon named him in 1969 to a one-year term at the U.N., where he spoke for the U.S. on such subjects as Red China, Korea and the U.N. budget. But while the world weighed his words at the U.N. Whalley was gouging the taxpayers in his Pennsyl- vania district like a back-coun- try Bobby Baker. We reported last September that Whalley had demanded kickbacks from a.former aide, and we have been investigat- ing his activities ever since. We can now prove that he has put more than a dozen edi- tors, politicians and business- men on the public payroll. Many were required to give him kickbacks in the form of personal services; others give kickbacks in.goods; some were compelled to pay their own of- fice expenses, and sometimes even Whalley's expenses, from their House salaries. We can also show that Whal- ley raided House stationery funds, which regulations say must be used by members solely "for the purpose of sta- tionery and other supplies." He stretched the regulations to Include book ends, scarves and pen-and-pencil sets, which he then gave out as Christmas gifts. The recipients, of course, were unaware that as taxpay- ers they had helped pay for their own gifts. Fiscal Finagling In one of the many cases we investigated, Whalley paid for his political literature 'with U.S. Treasury funds. Here's how he worked it: One of Whalley's staunch political allies is C. Robert Collary, proprietor of Capitol Press, a non-union printing shop in Duncanville, Pa. A pil- lar of his community, Collary is also a powerful GOP com- mitteeman in Blair County and chairman of a Republican "zone." We discovered that Collary has done more than $1,500 in free printing for the congress- man, much of it political. Ordinarily, a congressm would pay for the printing o of his campaign contributions Instead, halley used th House Disbursing Office a, most like it were his persona checking account. Checks drawn at Whalley's order from the House show that Whalley put Collary on the payroll as a "staff" worker in 1967, paying him $997 that year. In fiscal 1971, Whalley paid him another $5,932. Collary has kicked back $1,500 to $2,000 to Whalley in the form of free, printing. In a long talk with my asso- ciate Les Whitten, Collary at first said his free printing for Whalley amounted only, to a "little letter press work." He later admitted it could have amounted to as much as $2,000 but said this might include $300 he spent on his travels for Whalley. Asked whether he regarded the free printing as. a kick- back, Collary snapped back: "Absolutely not. Everything was on the up and up." Whalley told us that such arrangements were, common in Congress, although this runs counter to our 'experi ence. He explained that by hir- ing staff members for brief pe- riods at a time in various parts of his district, he saves taxpayers the cost of opening up field offices in a variety of towns. We will have more reports on the 11-year House veteran in future columns. 1 Hanoi's Game An amazing account of how Hanoi is playing Russia and China against each other i contained in a secret CIA r port in our possession. Chinese Premier Chou E - lai and Soviet President Nik - lai Podgorny competed wit each other, according to th report, to offer North Vietn more aid. The report is based ups the confidential remark picked up by the CIA, of high Foreign Ministry officil named Hoang Muoi. Here ar the highlights: . "Muoi stated that Chines Premier Chou En-lal ha, made a secret, trip to Hand following the July, 1971, visi of Dr. Kissinger . to Peking Chou assured the DRV (Norti Vietnamese. government) d continued. Chinese support. . "On the subject of aid, Mud stated that the Chinese, i; order to convince the DRV d, their continued . support has agreed to give more aid in thl 1971-72 period. The Soviets were thus forced to increasR their aid . in order to balance off the Chinese assistance. "The Soviet aid agreement which resulted from SovieC President Podgorney's visit ii October, was bigger than tht 1970 agreement. "Muoi said that during th, Podgorny visit, the Soviets proposed a friendship treat with the DRV. Muoi said th4 DRV refused the offer be cause it would have, certainly antaginized China and, in an; event, the DRV does not nee such a treat to get what wants from the Soviets." Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 THE WAAPC31 Fl~qr g se 2001/11/01 : CIA$RF 7E49 N19M p020(F9 E j The Washington Merry-Go-Round TEE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Jan. I2, 1972 _~ 11 Secret Cables on Pakistan Quoted By Jack Anderson Secret di lomatic cables gyrate graphically 110w the United States used the at of arge-scale military a_ to Pak s an as a per' svcTTg- under heavy pressure from Pakistan for arms aid and that he, in turn, was putting the heat on the United States to help furnish it. "You should tell King Hus- sein we fully appreciate heavy pressure he feels himself under by virtue of request from Pakistan," Irwin in- structed U.S. Ambassador L. Dean Brown. "We are nevertheless not yet in a position to give him definite response. Whole sub- ject remains under intensive review at very high level of USG (U.S. Government). "We are fully alive to your delicate situation in not being able to give definite answer to King's urgent pleas. But we ask you to bear with us and put situation to Hussein in best light possible." cables also show that, while direct U.S. arms ship- ments to Pakistan were ruled out from the start, the United States came within an ace of providing backdoor weapons assistance through several of Pakistan's Arab allies. The backdoor scheme was never adopted, but the cables show that the United States wanted India to continue to think the possibility was immi- nent, thus strengthening Paki- stan's position. The most tevealing of the cables was addressed to the American Embassies in Saudi Arabia and New Delhi: "In view of intelligence) re- ports spelling out Indian mili- tary objectives in West Paki- stan, we do not want in any way to ease GOI's (Govern- ment of India's) concern re help Pakistan might receive from outside sources. "Consequently, embassy should give GOI no repeat no assurances re third country transfers" The secret cable was signed by Under Secre- tary of State John Irwin. Another cable from Irwin to the U.S. Embassy in Jordan shows that King Hussein was Undersea Wealth The big world powers have been greedily eying the vast mineral wealth on the ocean bottom. But feckless United Nations attempts to settle the issue of ownership have all but collapsed. The confusion has now led the Defense Department into scheming with Russia to swap our rights to the mineral de- posits for a shaky guarantee of total freedom of the seas. ., These are among the alarm- ing secret findings of an unu- two-man task force as sual , signed to investigate the prdb-, lem by Senate Interior Chair- man Henry Jackson, (D-Wash.). Senator Jackson feared that the State Department might surrender U.S. sea bottom rights, so he dispatched two trusted Senate experts to the U.N. Seabed Committee in Ge- neva last summer.. The two aides, Charles Cook, a land and mineral law specialist, and Merrill En- glund, the conservation minded chief aide to Sen. Lee Metcalf, (D-Mont.) have now readied their draft report on the subject. Entitled "The Law and the Seas Crisis," the nine-page draft agrees with the Nixon administration that the United States must guard its stake in the ocean's fish, minerals, gas, oil and other treasures. But while the administra- tion is challenging the claims of Ecuador and Peru to sover- ignty 200 miles offshore, the Senate observers recommend we consider adopting the 200- mile limit ourselves. We pres- ently claim a 12-mile limit. The switch would cause con- sternation at the State Depart- ment, which is upholding the right of American tuna boats to fish inside Ecuador's 200- mile limit. Special criticism is reserved for the unusual dealings lle- tween the Defense Depart- ment and the Soviet Union over the ocean wealth. The re- port warns that Defense, "Sup- ported by the U.S.S.R.," is try- ng to get a formal world guarantee that warships can go anywhere they want. "We fear," states the report, "that the Defense Department might urge the administration to abandon its deep-sea bed mining objectives ... as a trade off." Quickie Auto Titles Alabama, known for its quickie divorces, has now de- veloped a new legal racket: quickie auto registrations. This is a great convenience for car thieves, reckless driv1 ers and motorists with unsafe cars. To test how the racket works, a car was selected from a nationwide stolen-car alert. The make, year and serial number, together with $30 were mailed to Probate Judge Leland Enzor of Andalusia, Ala. Fast as you can jump-wire a jeep, Enzor sent back a regis- tration and Alabama tags to a general delivery box in down- town Manhattan. We questioned Enzor's chief clerk, T. Wayne Daughtry, about the quickie tags. He said two other Alabama judges also service out-of-state driv- ers. He says Enzo chages $9 a tag and handles a brisk 30 to 35 out-of-state registrations a day. To douse the wildfire, Rep. Bill Ryan (D-N.Y.) has asked the Justice Department to help him draft a bill to end the registration-by-mail racket. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 p~-o ~vn {F2,ely~ 001/11/01 :CIA-RDP74BC~Q 1,200 2A GL0 svuvr ILTICA 1'Ilrilis ~ifa a va.v. -,+ --- - Text of Memo on Indan-Pakistan. War' WASHINGTON, Jan. 14- Fohowing is the text of a memorandum on a meeting of a National Security Coun- cil committee on Indian- Pakistani hostilities, made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson: SECRET/SENSITIVE THE JOINT STAFF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 8 DECEMBER 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Washington Spe- cial Action Group meeting on Indo - Pakistan hostilities; 8 December, 1971 1. The N.S.C. Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, the White House, at 1100, Wednesday, 8 December to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. I Kissinger. 2. ATTENDEES A. PRINCIPALS. Dr. Henry Kissenger, Mr. Richard Helms, C.I.A., Gen. John Ryan, J.C.S., Mr. Donald MacDonald, j A.I.D., Mr. David Packard, De- fense, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, State. B. OTHERS: Mr. Maurice Williams, A.I.D., Mr. John Waller, C.LA., Col. Richard Kennedy, N.S.C., Mr. Samuel Hoskanson, N.S.C., Mr. Harold Saunders, N.S.C., Mr. Armi- stead Selden, Defense, Mr. James Noyes, Defense, Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State, Mr. Samuel De Palma, State, Mr. Bruce Laingen, State, Mr. David Schneider, State, Mr. Joseph Sisco, State, Rear Adm. Robert Welander, O.J.C.S., Capt. Howard Kay, O.J.C.S. Group 4 downgraded at 3- year intervals; declassified after 12 years. 3. Summary. Dr. Kissinger suggested that India might be attempting, through calculat- ed.destruction of Pak armored and air forces to render Pak- istan impotent. He requested that the Jordanian interest in assisting Pakistan not be turned off, but rather kept in a holding pattern. He asked that Pak capabilities in Kash- mir be assessed. 4. Mr. Helms opened the eeting by briefing the cur- ent situation. In the East, he Indians have broken the me at Comilla. Only major var crossings prevent them rom investing Dacca. The ndians are advancing rapid- throughout 11 major PakL.O.C.'s in the ast are now vulnerable. In he West, the Paks are now laiming Punth, inside the ndian border. However, the aks are admitting fairly eavy casualties in the fight- ng. Tank battles are appar- ntly taking place in the ind/Rajasthan area. Mrs. andhi has indicated that be- ore heeding a U.N. call for ease-fire, she intends to traighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir. It is reported that prior to termi- nating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi intends to at- empt to eliminate Pakistan's r and air force capabil- ties. Thus far only India and hutan have recognized Ban- ladesh. It is believed that he Soviets have held off rec- gnition primarily so as not o rupture relations with the Paks. Soviet action on the matter of recognition, how- ver, may be forthcomingin e near future. 5. Mr. Sisco inquired how long the Paks might be ex- petted to hold out in East Pakistan, to which Mr. Helms replied 48 to 72 hours. the time to reach the ultimate climax is probably a func- tion of the difficulties en- countered In river crossings. 6. Assessing the situation in the West; General Ryan indicated that he did not see the Indians pushing too. hard at this time, rather they seem content with a holding ac- tion. 7. Dr. Kissinger asked how long it would. take, to shift Indian forces. from East to West. General Ryan said it might take a reasonably long time to move all the forces, but that the airborne brigade could be moved quickly, probably within a matter of five or six days. 8. Dr. Kissinger inquired about refugee aid. After a discussion with Mr. Williams it was determined that only`' a very small number of U.S. dollars earmarked for ref- ugee relief was actually entering the Indian economy. Contrary to the sense of the last meeting, the Indians have actually lost foreign exchange in the process of caring for refugees. In any event, the entire relief ef- fort is currently suspended in both. India and Pakistan. 9. pr.. Kissinger then em- phasized that the President has made it clear that no further foreign exchange, PL-480 commodities, or de- velopment loans could be as- signed to India without ap- proval of the White House. Mr. Williams stated there was no problem of anything sliding through. 10. Dr. Kissinger inquired what the next turn of the screw might be. Mr. Williams said that the only other pos- sible option was taking a po- Associated Press David Packard sition concerning aid material currently under contract. This however would be a very messy problem inas- much as we would be dealing with irrevocable letters of credit. Mr. Williams further stated that we would have to take possession of material that was being consigned to the Indians by U.S. contrac- tors and thus would be com- pelled , to pay U.S. suppliers, resulting in claims against the U.S.G. 11. Mr. Packard said that all of this could be done, but agreed that it would be a very laborious and difficult problem. He further elaborat- ed that all the items involved would have to be located, the United States would have to take ownership, settle with suppliers, locate warehousing, etc. Nevertheless, if such was desired it could be done. Mr. Williams said that in a very limited way this type of ac- tion had been taken against some Mid-East countries, but that it had taken years to settle the claims. 12. Dr. Kissinger asked how India was handling next year's development loan pro- gram, to which Mr. Williams responded that nothing was under negotiation at 'the present time. 13. Dr. Kissinger inquired about next year's [A.LD.] budget. Mr. Williams stated that what goes into the budget did not represent a commitment. Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything into the budget for A.I.D. to India. It was not to be leaked that A.I.D. had put money in the budget for India, only to have the "wicked" White House take it out. 14. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the key issue if the Indians turn on West Pakis- tan is Azad Kashmir. If the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks de- fenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. The possibility elicits a num- ber of questions. Can we al- low a U.S. ally to go down completely while we partic- ipate in a blockade?. Can we allow the Indians to scare us off, believing that if U.S. supplies are needed they will not be provided? 15. Mr. Sisco stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West Paki- stan. Mr. Sisco doubted, how- ever, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that Foreign Min- ister Singh told Ambassador Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory. Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really dis- puted territory. 16. Mr. Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mentioning that Madame Gandhi, when referring to China, expressed the hope that there would be no Chi- nese intervention in the West. She said that the So- viet had cautioned her that the Chinese might rattle the sword in Laddakh but that he Soviets have promised o take appropriate counter- ction if this should occur. r. Helms indicated that here was no Chinese build- p at this time but, never- heless, even without a build- p they could "make mo- ions and rattle the sword." 17. Turning then to the question of military support of Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger re- ferred to an expression of in- terest by King Hussein rela- tive to the provision of F-104's to Pakistan, and asked how we could get Jordan into q holding pattern to allow the President time to consider the issue. Dr. Kissinger also asked whether we should attempt to convey to the Indians and the press that.a major attack on West Pakistan would be consid- ered in a very serious light by this country. 18. Mr. Packard explained that we could not authorize the Jordanians to do any- thing that the U.S.G. could not do. If hte U.S.G. could not do. If the U.S.G. could Stan, we could not allow. Jordan to do so. If a third country had material that the U.S.G. did not have, that was one thing, but we could not allow Jordan to transfer the 104's unless we make a finding that the Paks; them- selves, were eligible to pur- chase them from us directly.. 19. Dr. Kissinger suggested that if we had not cut the sale of arms to Pakistan, the current problem would not exist. Mr. Packard agreed. 20. Dr. Kissinger suggested that perhaps we never really analyzed what the real dan- ger was when we were turning off the arms to Pakistan. 21. Mr. Packard suggested that another consideration in the Jordan issue is that if Jordan delivers this equip- ment we would be expected to replace it.. Ambassador Johnson stated we do not have any more M.A.P. left. 22. Dr. Kissinger states that what we may be wit- nessing is a situation where- in a country [India] equipped and supported by the Soviets may be turning half of Paki- stan into an important state and $he. other half into a vassal. We must consider what other countries may be thinking of our action. 23. Mr. Helms asked about our. ,LENTO relation. ships with Pakistan: Am- bassador Johnson stated we hall no legal obligations towards Pakistan in the . CENTO context: Dr. Kissjn- 'ger agreed but added that neither did we have legal ob- ligations toward India in 1962 when we formulated the air defense agreement. We must consider what would be the impact of the current situation in the larger complex of world af- fairs. 24. Dr. Kissinger said that we must look at the prob- lem in terms of Security Council guarantees in the Mid-East and the impact on other areas. We must look at the military supply situa- tion. One could make a. case, he argued, that we have done everything two weeks . too late in the current situation. 25. Mr. Packard stated that perhaps the only satisfactory outcome would be for us to stand fast, with the expecta- tion that the West Paks could hold their own. 26. Ambassador Johnson. said that we must examine the possible effects that ad- ditional supplies for Pakistan might have. It could be that eight F-104's might not make any difference once the real war in the West starts. They could be considered only as a token. If, in fact, we were to move in West Pakistan we would be in a new ball game. 27. Ambassador Johnson said that one possibility would be our reply to For- eign. Minister Singh,. In which we could acknowledge the In- dian pledge that they do not haveterritorial designs. He also stated we must also con- sider the fact that the Paks may themselves be trying to take Kashmir. 28. After discussing vari- ous possible commitments to Terms Used in Text A.I.D.-Agency for International Development. Azad Kashmir-Free Kashmir, name of Pakistani-held parts of Kashmir. CENTO-Central Treaty Organi- zation. C.I.A.-Central Intelligence Agen- cy.. jet aircraft. J.S.S.-Joint Chiefs of Staff. L.O.C.-Line(s) of communica- tion. M.A.P.-Military Assistance Pro- gram. N.S.C -National Security Coun- cil. O:J.C.S.-Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff. Paks-Pakistanis. PL-480-Public Law 480, govern- ing surplus food sent abroad as aid. S.S. Buckeye State-American vessel strafed in a Pakistani port. U.S.G.-United States Govern- ment. U.S.N.-United States Navy. both Pakistan and India, Mr. Packard stated that the over- riding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or doing nothing. If you don't win, don't get involved. If we were to attempt something it would have to be with a cer- tainty that it would affect the outcome. Let's not get in if we know we are going to lose. Find some way to stay out. 29. Mr. Williams suggested that we might now focus ef- forts for a cease-fire in West Pakistan. Ambassador John- son stated this might, how- ever; stop the Paks from moving into Kashmir. 30. Dr. Kissinger asked for an assessment of the Pak ca- pabilities and prospects in Kashmir. He asked C.I.A. to prepare an assessment of the international implications of Mrs. Gandhi's current moves. He indicated that we should develop an initial stand on the military supply question. He reiterated that he desired to keep Hussein in a "holding pattern relative to the. Tat- ter's expression of support for Pakistan and that he should not be turned off. The U.S.G. sliould indicate to Hus- sein that we do not consider trivial his feelings in this matter. 31. Turning to the question of the blockade, Ambassador Johnson said that both India and Pakistan have taken blockade action, even though the Pak blockade is essen- tially a paper blockade. Dr. Kissinger said that we should also protest to the Paks. Am- bassador Johnson indicated we do not have a legal case to protest the blockade. The belligerent nations have a right to blockade when a state of war exists. We may think it unwise and we may question how it is carried out. We have, in fact, nor- mally expressed our concern. On the other hand we have no problem in protesting the incident of the S.S. Buckeye State. 32. Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even handed. There can be no doubt what the President wants. The President does not want to be even handed. The President believes that India is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized re- lations with the United States. `Dr. Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. "The Lady" is cold blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique: We should not ease her mind. He in- vited anyone who objected to this approach to take his case to the President. Am- bassador Keating, he sug- gested is offering enough re- assurance on his own. 33. Addressing briefly the question of communal strife 'in East Pakistan, _Dr. Kissin- ger asked whether anyone would` be in a position to know that massacres were occurring at the time when they kook place. Mr. Helms indicated that we. might not know immediately, but we certainly would know after a massacre occurred. 34. The meeting was ad- journed at 12:10. /S/ H. N. KAY H. N. KAY Captain, U.S.N. South Asia/M.A.P. Branch, J5 Extension 72400 ! Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 25X1A THEW rR1 (5Rr PtVpe 2001/11/01 : CIAO[ P17.AB 4 3QM200 0AbE (29 The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday. Feb. 2, 1972 C 2j s Bare Deception in War Pohc ..: General H b Classified documents in our ossession revealunhappily, that ceptio ins still of- _finioi nnlirv in Vietnam The raw facts about the Vietnam war go through a fil- tering and flavoring process, which can be ascribed partly to a natural desire to make American troops look as he- roic tis_possible, partly to the Pentagon's determination to portray the war as the top brass want the world to see it. A classified memo to all top U.S. officials in the Pacifica. tion program, for example, bluntly tells them to be mis- leading at command briefings. These are special briefings for vitisinq newsmen and dignitar- ies. The memo, therefore, is an order to flavor the well of truth at its source. Small wonder that Brig. Gen. James Herbert, a top U.S. deputy in the pacification program, ordered that "Over- all security classification will be SECRET." Dated Sept. 8, 1971, the memo mentions the disaster- ridden programs for helping war victims and for persuad. ing the Vietcong and North Vi- etnamese to defect. U.S. offi- cials in charge of these pro- grams are directed only to "submit material which re- flects progress" for the brief- ings. er ert notes the 20x27 centimeters on the outer "The District Chief has rec iefin br g program Is aimed at creating a picture of "progress made in the Republic of Viet- nam." To carry out this aim, all pacification officials must "de- velop 10 or 12 high impact In- dicators that may persuasively that much progress has been made;. that our effort has not been a fruitless venture; that we have helped to establish conditions and build systems that at least give the Republic of Vietnam an opportunity to choose its future course of events. "Final thought should be that a strong, broadly based military establishment has been created in RVN (South Vietnam) that will be difficult to destroy by military action ...' Army-Inspired Slogans Our Vietnamese allies are even more blatant in faking success where none exists. A classified U.S. translation of an order by the late Lt. Gen. Do Cao Tri explains all those slogans that visitors to Viet- nam are shown, as evidence of pro-Saigon sentiment, in ham- lets and along the roads. Soldiers and civilians In his military region were ordered by Gen, Tri to "display na- tional flags at every village/ hamlet office and person's home. Paint national flags walls of the homes." ommended that the bounds;;"', "Draw as many of the follow- ries of these two hamlets b' ing slogans as possible on the changed," Wilson told his sii, blank walls: 'To coalesce with periors. "I Indicated to thla the Communists is suicide,' District Senior Advisor that 'We are determined not to he could assure that this rec- concede any land to the Com ommendation would be ap munists,' 'To Chleu Hot (to de- proved, and the August HEST, feet) is the only.way to end (hamlet survey) should reflect the war and restore peace.' no (Viet cong-controlled) bam- "Depending on the local lets." situation, all ultilization of leaflets, slogans and banners must be exploited to the full- est. These operations must be completed in one week ... Re- sults should be reported to (Tri) and should include .. . the number of villages and hamlets where flags were dis- played, and the number of slo- gans, leaflets, and banners dis- tributed at the localities." Tri added menacingly that his army units sould discipline people who do not put out the flags. This attitude of fakery and falsehood extends down to every level. For example, Americans have been repeat- edly told about the increasing number of hamlets which are secure from Communist con- trol. A high U.S. Pacification offi- cial, Wilbur Wilson, tells in a confidential memo, dated Aug. 19,19771, how he cut two Viet- con-controlled hamlets out of a district simply by gerryman- dering the district Tammany. style. Perhaps U.S. officials sim- ply are sick of the truths in. Vietnam, and would rather: read soft, sweet lies. As a symptom of this, we can quote from a memo written to his aides by Richard Funkhouser, Pacification Head for a giant area north of Saigon. "I plan to visit provinces and districts," he advised his deputies down the line. Each division director, he said, should be prepared to give him three pieces of good news about programs that might possibly be used to show ,ac-, complishments," Intelligence Reports Helicopter Mystery The. British have picked up myste- rious helicopter activity on their side of the Hong Kong border. The secret specula- ; tion is that this may be a dra matic attempt to block the es-. cape of high-ranking Chinese s u-McC1ur. smell. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 25X1A THE WAftp qt ~r se 2001/11/01: CIA p ,4Bd0 Ob 0020 ~~E The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Feb. 1, 1972 B 11 U.S. Losing mar, Hanoi Said to Feel By Jack Anderson e latest intelligence $Qris Indicate- Jwn no Intention of settlin dochina, and that the threelmigh+ p011 Obinpsp into countries as ? a united force re" I will openly fight the U.S. any- the con- "Vanna commented, how- ever, that ... the U.S. with- drawal will not be easily ac- complished. The U.S. will _Z?..a,L?pl et that ie latestCommunist rives in Taos. Cambodia and- South y'iipp n m ire ennrfir i nafe_ __ by lion ei ll uunnist cadres In all m ountries are spre m the word. accord irngtoo one se- 7a^~ f t," overnmeennt contin- +~ use Thai troouo s "At present, approximately 4,000 The excuse for this pleasure safari was to educate the members in the workings of the European Common Mat- Thais are fighting with the i ket and related trade pro- Laotian Army inside Laos. I lems. In the past, the membe.L,s ~X na na cam JJhW on yeral " e CIA P@P&44-!~+h FTC !C.nmmunist Jrnut ha refused Communist Chinese proposals to 'i erate Laos' on the grounds that world tensions would probably result. However, he said con- tinued or increased infusion of Royal Thai Army troops into Laos could result in the. in- troduction of Chinese Army combat elements ... '17it->a id that the RLG (R.nval Lao (~.overnMPRT4 is tired of war. and the Lao peo- ple want a peace sett dMent, a unift Laos an an'Mortu- ^ roun- t~r~ "The Lao armed forces, however, are not expected to give up the battle easily, al- though FAR (government) troops are tired of fighting and PL (Pathet Lao) forces are nearly equal to FAR in strength. House Junket The congressional junke- teering year got off to an im- pressive start when 14 mem- bers of the House Ways and Means Committee, 11 of their wives and four staff members flew off to Europe on a luxuri- ous Air Force jetliner. got sufficient education from testimony, staff reports and other data less expensive for the taxpayer than a week in Paris and Brussels. One member, Rep. James Corman, (D-Calif.) was so en- thusiastic about the junketeer= ing that he stretched his tour to include India, Australia and New Zealand, all on "commit- tee business." Corman paid for his wife's transportation. Other Ways and Means jun- keteers stretched the week- long Common Market tour to include such places as Israel, Madrid or Budapest. They were Reps. Richard Fulton (D- Tenn.); Hugh Carey (D-N.Y.); Herman Schneebeli (R-Pa.), and Barber Conable (R-N.Y.). Those who settled for the standard week in Paris and Brussels were Reps. Phil Lan- drum (D-Ga.); Sam Gibbons (D- FTa.); Joe Waggonner (D-La.); Joe Karth (D-Minn.); John Byrnes (R-Wis.); Jackson Betts (R-Ohio); Jerry Pettis (R Calif.) and Don Brotzman (R Colo.). Footnote: To the credit of Congressman Conable, he set. an example by paying his own airfare and returning $117 of his allotment funds to the U.S.' embassy in Brussels. ? 1972, Bell-McClure Syndicate only -a-matter of time and that the threes ate o n o ina are now ioinea to etner to probably disengage aggres- sively in order to show its strength to the world and to show that it has not lost the war in Indochina. "Vanna explained that the U.S. will not admit defeat and will continue its 'support' to the South Vietnamese, RLG (Royal Lao Government) and y.1 Lon Nol 'puppets' (Cambodia). whi-re In Indochina." A typical cadre briefing was given recently by a high-rank- ing Pathet Lao colonel named U.S. Elections "If Nixon wins the 1972 U.S. elections, the N.S. (is expected) Vanna at a secret site in the to conduct a longer and more Muong Phalane area of Laos. vigorous Indochina war. If the Tile? CIA was able to et a de- tgiled, iR-nape acco the secretmeeting. "Vanna sa~the U.S. is losing the war in ouu Ti Viet- nam an that is son President Nixon is dis gag- sng from Tn oc ina Tre tints the CIA_ "Also, the U.S. Congress and the U.S. people have openly advocated the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina and the reduction of aid to the Democrats win, then the U.S. can be expected to terminate the war more quickly. In any event, he explained, the U.S. will eventually disen- qge, and the U.S. elections will only indicate whether it will disengage more quickly or more slowly. "Vanna noted that the North Vietnamese allies re- main firmly committed to Ho Chi Minh's advice to 'vanquish the Americans and be true to government of South Vietnam. the historic missions of North "He added that the joining Vietnam."' of Cambodia with Vietnam .e-?.c~ret CIA. su p ' and Loas in common battle ooak-ined an omjnp, s against the U.S. has united In- the Pathet _14p Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 25X THE WASHINGTON POST /01 : CIA-RDP741300 15R000300020020-1 DATE7( (1ZPAGE Cables Show Doubletalk on VC By Jack Anderson The secret cables from Sai- gon show that U.S. officials have been talking out of both sides of their mouths about their campaign to wipe out the Vietcong Infrastructure. The idea was to kill, capture or convert the key people who operate the Vietcong under- ground inside South Vietnam. This grim missionary effort is known delicately as Operation Phoenix, named after a mythi- cal bird which rises from its own ashes. But the Phoenix program, according to the classified cable traffic, hasn't gotten off the ground. Ellsworth Bunker, the American Ambassador in Saigon, has reported to Secre- tary of State Bill Rogers that the operation "has not ap- peared to have significantly weakened" the Vietcong in- frastructure. It "has reduced the power of the VCI (Vietcong Infrastruc- ture), he said, and "is an es- sential part of the Govern- ment of Vietnam's defense." American support, he de clared, "is fully warranted." The VCI, he said, "operates under considerable limits tions" and has been reduce in some areas "to skeleton sta tus." As statistical evidence, he reported that 9,331 VCI were "neutralized during the first five months of 1971. This included 3,650 killed, he said. Secret Reports 300 people. This has 'appar- the Vietnamese but which ently been adequate to keep the VCI viable and enable them to make their presence felt." A few weeks before Colby bragged to Congress about the success of the Phoenix pro- gram, his top aide in Gia Dinh province, David McKillop, re- ported grimly: "We have not scratched the surface of the Urban VCI network of thei Shadow Supply System." In a confidential report from Binh Duong province, Lt. Col. Gerald Chikalla informed Colby that operation Phoenix -vas killing off the little fish but missing the sharks. "There has developed the tendency to place more im- portance on volume rather than on quality neutraliza- tions," reported Chikalla. "Much of this can be attrib. uted to U.S. guidance and in- fluence and Quotas." does not get the priority atten- tion in action at any level that it gets on paper." Similar admissions of fail- ure came from Lt. Col. Gerald Bartlett in Hau Nghia prov- ince. Yet Colby suppressed these unfavorable reports and gave Congress a fabricated, favora- ble account of the Phoenix r rogram. He was supported by the Pentagon's G. Warren Nut. ter, who wrote a similarly glowing letter about Opera tion Phoenix to House Foreign Affairs Chairman Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) on Aug. 21. Once again, we have caught government officials in a fla- grant deception. They twisted the facts, apparently, in order to win congressional support. Gift from Agnew Bunker's secret Aug. 30 cable, however, tells a dismay- ingly different story. Although the Phoenix program "rou- tinely exceeds its goals of neu- tralizations (deaths and ar- rests)," confided Bunker, it "has not appeared to have sig- nificantly weakened the VCI." Giving the classified statis- tics on VCI strength, he re- ported: "June strength (of) 61,994 was down 341 from May. The drop in strength for the first half of 1971 is about 10 per cent. Even if this figure is reliable, it is not a signifi- cant decrease in view of the urgent GVN (Government of Vietnam) efforts directed ,against the VCI in 1971. Bunker's cable is dated Aug. 30, 1971. The date is signifi- cant. For a few days earlier, Ambassador William Colby and Assistant Defense Secre- tary G. Warren Nutter made public statements saying ex- actly the opposite. Colby, who headedthe paci fication program 'in Vietna testified on July 19 before th House Foreign Operation "Sixty thousand members of subcommittee. Suave and s an underground organization emn as an undertaker, h in a population of 18 million praised the Phoel1lx program. represents one VCI for each Vice President Agnew is a man often accused of a lack of sympathy for the black and the poor. But you'd have a hard time convincing Ray May, the rugged outside line- backer of the Baltimore Colts. May has adopted three teen-aged black youths and plans to convert his Kansas ranch into a home for disad- vantaged city boys. Not long ago, May received a handwritten note from the Vice President. "Ray, congrat- ulations," it said. "Perhaps this will help a little." En- closed was a crisp $100 bill. Bell-McClure Syndicate Another reason for Phoe- nix's failure was the unwilling- ness of the Vietnamese to turn in their sons and fathers to the Saigon government. As Lt. Col. Jack Cantrell put it in a classified report from Binh Tuy province: "The major reasons for lack of success include: (a) The in- herent distaste of the people to indict (inform on) relatives, friends or personnel with po- litical implications. .. (Phoe- nix) is a U.S. innovation that has been bought officially by Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 i'1 E W1 1 'iv 11 91rv ~ ~e 2001/11/01 :CIA-PbO R 00f ~ 9~1 002~AGE Pr The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Jail. 11, 1972 B11 U.S. Deception on Role in Cambodia By Jack Anderson A secret exchange between Washington and Phnom Penh reveals that officials aren't telling the truth about the U.S. role in Cambodia. Because of congressional hostility, the Nixon adminis- tration has pretended to take no active part in raising funds from other nations to support the tottering regime of Cam- bodian strongman Lon Nol. The secret cables show, how- ever, that the U.S. not only is bringing political pressure on other governments to con- tribute to Lon Nol but has ac- tually prepared a solicitation letter for Lon Nol's signature. Apparently, U.S. policymak- ers don't trust the Cambodian leader to write his own letters on such a delicate matter. The appeal was supposed to be ad- dressed "on a personal basis" to other heads of state who might have a. little cash to spare for Cambodian aid. Congressmen have balked at financing Lon Nol because of I the dismaying similarity be- tween his regime and some of the corrupt, floundering South Vietnamese regimes that have cost the American taxpayers a fortune. In an earlier column, we quoted from secret dispatches that described Lon Nol as "a sick man, both physically and mentally" and told of wide- spread incompetence and cor- ruption throughout his govern- ment. Compulsive Womanizer Even some of the able men under him were characterized respectively, as "an inveterate gambler," "a compulsive womanizer" and as a leader whose "personal authority is diluted by a tendency toward financial corruption." American Ambassador Emory Swank, in one secret report, criticized "Lon Nol's haphazard, out-of-channel and ill-coordinated conduct of mili- tary operations." The result is that Communist hit-and-run harassing operations have de- veloped-apparently much to the Viet Cong's surprise - into a serious military treat to the Cambodian capital. Similar reports about some of South Vietnam's earlier po- litical corruption and military bungling were kept secret from the American people. If the truth had been known in time, the U.S. might have been spared some of the lives and resources that have gone down the drain in Vietnam. Because of the Vietnam ex- perience, Congress is keeping a tight pursestring on Cambo- dian aid. The Nixon adminis- tration has gone behind con- gressional backs, however, to sneak military supplies into Cambodia through South Viet- nam and Indonesia. Now the administration has resorted to deception again to raise exchange support funds for Cambodia. Cambodia "has undertaken to do its own representations to elicit donors for the ESF," a State Department spokesman told us blandly. Secret Instructions But secret instructions were cabled to the American Em- bassy in Phnom Penh, declar- ing: "We believe political ap- proach necessary lest finance ministries, who are generally opposed new aid programs, ar- range for an evasive or nega- tive reaction to (the Cambo- dian) appeal. "Department believes high- level political appeal needed to improve chances for suc- cess. Letter from Lon Nol to heads of prospective donor governments could help nail down (contributions)." The suggested letter begins: "Excellency: I am writing this note on a p rsonal basis in order to bring to your Excel- lency's attention directly the l economic problem that we are now confronted with in the Khmer -Eepublic ..." It winds up- "I am asking that your government make a 1 contribution of - to the fund for 1972 at a meeting to be held in Phnom Penh (on January 14.)" All Lon Nol had to do was fill in the blank space with the correct amount for each coun- try. The sums that will be sought are: U.S., $12.5 million; Japan, $7.5 million; Australia, $3 million; Britain, $500,000; New Zealand $300,000; Indo- nesia, $250,000; Malaysia, $250,000; Singapore, $250,000; Thailand, $250,000; and the Philippines, $250,000. Despite the State Depart. ment's public pretense that" Lon Nol is running his own fund-raising drive, here's what the secret in structions add: "Once letters sent, we pre- pared urge our embassies in key countries make high-level approaches in support of Lon Nol request. We understand that Japanese will then move out and actively lobby for par- ticipation in ESF. We can, on selective basis, do some lobby- ing here, especially with UK and Australia." These secret instructions, like the India-Pakistan revela-. tions, demonstrate, sadly, that the government of, by and for the people cannot always be trusted to tell the people the truth. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP7 E ,Q 15RO1O0300020020-1 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE ((~J~~JJ//~rhh PAGE The. Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan. 10, 1972 D 11 Bay of Bengal and Tonkin Gulf By Jack Anderson The secret White House Papers reve ous similarities be w n the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Tonki . The Gulf of Tonkin incident on Aug. 4, 1964, led to our .deep involvement In the Viet- nam war. The'American pub- lic was told that North Viet- namese torpedo boats had staged an unprovoked attack upon a U.S. destroyer, al- l though. later evidence indi- cated that the attack was ac- tually provoked. The risk of a similar 'naval incident in the Bay of Bengal caused grave apprehensions inside the State Department as a U.S. task force steamed toward a Soviet task force at ,'the, height of the Indian-Pak' staiifighting. On Dec. 7, a top secret warn- i g was flashed to Washington that "three Soviet naval ships, a seagoing minesweeper and a begun to move tanker have northeastward Into the Bay of Bengal. The units entered the Indian Ocean from the Ma- lacca Strait on 3 December and were located approximately 500 nautical miles east of Cey- lon on 7 December." Urgent huddles in the White House led to a decision on Dec. 10 to assemble in ' Ma- Iacca Strait a U.S. task force, 'spearheaded by the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the Navy's most powerful ship. The pri- mary purpose was to make a "show of force" and to divert Indian planes and ships from Pakistan. As the task force moved Into position, Admiral John McCain, our Pacific com- mander, inquired on Dec. 11 about "the feasibility of ... aerial surveillance of Soviet .task group located approxi- mately 180 NM (nautical miles) southwest of Ceylon." Air Surveillance Authorization was flashed back the same day "in the event Task Force 74 is directed to transmit the Strait of Malac- ca. At that time, appropriate screening-surveilance flights are authorized." As the American warships moved through the strait and headed into the Bay of Bengal, even more ominous reports reached Washington from the Defense Intelligence Agency. "Recent indicators have been received which suggest the PRC (Peoples Republic of China) may be planning ac- tions regarding the Indo-Paki- stan conflict," a top secret message reported tersely. "Ac- cording to a reliable clandes- tine source, (Pakistan's) Presi- dent Yahya Khan claimed ... today that the Chinese Ambas. sador in Islamabad had as- sured him that within 72 hours the Chinese Army will move towards the border. "President Yahya's claim cannot be confirmed. How- ever, recent Peking propa- ganda statements have be=. come more critical of India's` involvement in East Pakistan." From Katmandu In the India Nikolai M. Pegov, how- good will toward men. Himalayas, meanwhile, came ever, promised on Dec. 13 that Bell-McClure syndicate word that both the Soviet and Indian military attaches had asked Col. Melvin Holst, the American attache, what he knew about Chinese troop movements and U.S. fleet movements. "U.S.S.R. Attache Loginov," said the secret dispatch, "called upon PRC military at- tache Chao Kuang Chih in Katmandu advising Chao that PRC should not get too serious about intervention, because U.S.S.R. would react, had many missiles, etc." Hoist concluded, the dis- patch added, that "both the U.S.S.R. and India Embassies have a growing concern that PRC might intervene." i pul eously, the Central r?t - s ed o?t a ton secret mnort at ing weather data for locations than or er per. T e continued passing of weather data for these loca- tions is considered unusual and may indicate some form of alert posture." Soviet Threat ,mid from New De 1, the (-!T A rPpnr'ar r lr1 nP "a rpliah1Peland- es source, a Prime n her Mjniste_ Gai0liF a i as Congress ar,y that she had some indications nnese Intend o n- g`,along India's northern borg" , _, . Mrs. Gandni the Soviets "would open a di- versionary action" against the Chinese and "will not allow the Seventh Fleet to inter- vene." Here are the highlights of this ominous Soviet pledge, which the CIA claimed to have picked up from a "relia- ble source." "Pegov stated that Pakistan is trying to draw both the United States and China into the present conflict. The So- viet Union, however, does not believe that either country will intervene. "According to Pegov, the movement of the U.S. Seventh Fleet is an effort by the Unit- ed States to bully India, to discourage it from striking against West Pakistan, and at the same time to boost the morale of the Pakistani forces. Pegov noted that a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and that the Soviet Union will not allow the Sev- enth Fleet to intervene. "If China should decide to intervene in Ladakh, said Pegov, the Soviet Union would open a diversionary action in Sinkiang. Pegov also com- mented that after Dacca is lib- erated and the Bangladesh government Is installed, both the United States and China will be unable to act and will change their current attitude toward the crisis." This is how the big powers danced precariously on the edge of the brink just before Christmas as people sang about peace on earth and Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74 0 R000300020020-1 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE q1QjA'V\'7-2- __ PAGE Jack Anderson Telling Truth Is Best Policy GOVERNMENT }j11 ~~~ii havp ay~o, a rTef 011 uTil a on o he t White ouse pa era y 1 z _%lnin2 nne. thins-telling ti i- "-"4h. If presidential adviser Henry Kissinger had not lied to the press in his December background briefing on the Asia war, there would have been no story for us to write. The documents would simply have confirmed what the pub- lic had already been told. Instead, the White House chose to mislead the public flagrantly. Kissinger said the administration was not anti- India, a misrepresentation that must have been obvious to both India. Pakistan and the allies of both. The secret papers prove that the administration was militantly anti-India. It was this contradiction, not the fact that the papers were classi- fied, that made them news. Indeed, it is doubtful that the various sources who made the papers available would have done so if the ad- ministration had not engaged in such bald-faced deception. Now, unfortunately, the ad- ministration seems bent on widening its credibility gap. It is thundering off in search of our sources instead of making good the solemn promise it made during the court battle over the Penta- gon Papers. At that time, the govern. ment admitted there was "massive over-classification" of official documents. It promised to reform the clas- sification system, which it had undermined by chronic overuse of the "secret" stamp. Supreme Court Justice Potter, Stewart summarized the state of affairs in one sentence: "When everything is classified," he wrote, "nothing Is classified" Today, documents which might genuinely need to be kept temporarily from public view are lost in a classified shuffle of miscellaneous ca- bles, correspondence, intelli- gence summaries and other bric-a-brac. Government officials al- most daily demonstrate their contempt for the security la- bels by slipping newsmen se- lected secret papers which make them look good. If these labels had any real meaning, the government it- self would be the nation's number one security risk. But while high officials have debased and cheapened the "secret" stamps, they still find them useful for one pur- pose: to keep their actions and particularly, their blun- ders hidcn from public view. But this passion for secrecy is far more serious than mere bureaucratic b u n g l i n g 'Secrecy, as the Supreme Court has observed, is not merely undemocratic, it is anti-democratic. The proper function of our political system depends on the ability of the public to be informed. This is the crucial mission of the First Amend- ment - to promote a maxi- mum flow of news and com- mentary to every citizen. There is no way this funda- mental concept, d squared can democracy, , with a system of "security" classification which Is, in reality, a legalized form of censorship. The White House papers on India and Pakistan con- tain not a shred of informa- tion that threatens the na tion's security. Instead, they reveal the inside policy ma- neuverings and public decep- tions of our top officials. They tell the story of for- eign policy moves that may have pushed India-the world's second largest nation and its largest democracy- into the arms of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, we find ourselves locked in an em- brace with a feeble, beaten military dictatorship,. Mufti 4he an"i f cf p cnrh infnrmatinn has -nthing fn d .vi+h~],afiru al ""LUw R^Th P~-i* h~C_ Q. do withpolitical security. Nassikas' Giveaway WE EXPOSED in a series of columns last June how Federal Power Commission chairman John Nassikas lied to Congress, sold out the pub- lic in a $4 billion rate case and suppressed his own econ- omist's opposition to the give- away. Our charges were investi- gated by Rep. Neal Smith (D- Iowa), who summoned Nassi- kas and others to testify be- fore his House Special Small Business Subcommittee. Now Smith has completed his for- mal report. In many respects, it is tougher than our col- umns. "It is the view of this sub- committee," declares the re- port, "that the public has lost confidence in the ability of the FPC to set just and rea sonable producer rates for the sale of natural gas in in- terstate commerce ... "The subcommittee be= lieves that the action taken by the FPC in creating higher rates for gas produced in the southern Louisiana area was not in the public in. terest." We had estimated this rate increase would cost Ameri- ca's consumers $4 billion. Smith's subcommittee esti- mated the sell-out closer to $4.5 billion. Bell-McClure Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 ED Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B0 5RDQQ300020020-1 (Zs THE WASHINGTON POST DATE (.Jf_'h_l_ PAGE The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Jan. 7, 1972 C 23 -1& T ? 4 !1 L,f `' t . _ ~ JT'k -~? By Jack Anderson Owlish, offish Henry Kissin- ger, the foreign policy wizard, is* simply over his head in pa- perwork. He is trying to serve Presi- dent Nixon as a one-man State Department. But the paper- work is too voluminous, the problems too overwhelming even for the brilliant Kissin- ger to master. Still he tries to manage every foreign crisis, to absorb every new detail, to advise the President on every develop- ment. During the three hectic weeks before Christmas, the secret White l:Iouse Papers show Kissinger had his fingers in the following pies: Ambassador George Bush probed and pressed in the backrooms of the United Na. tions for a diplomatic solution while Egypt and Syria de- ployed their forces for a mili- tary showdown. To keep a mil- itary balance, Kissinger urged the shipment of Phantom jets to Israel. continued to prepare for the presidential pilgrimages to Pe- king and Moscow. He not only handled the arrangements but plotted the big-power chess that the President will play with our two chief adver- saries. ? More than anyone else, Kissinger served as ring mas- ter for the three-ring Paris peace talks, Vienna SALT and Brussels NATO conference that were going on simultane- ously behind closed doors. He called the signals from the White House. He also kept close watch through horn-rimmed glasses upon such far-flung trouble spots as Cuba, Chile and Korea. He monitored the dip- lomatic cables, intelligence digests and situation reports that poured into Washington Calling Kissinger ? He became deeply in- volved in preparing the new international monetary agree- ment. President Nixon's uni- lateral economic moves last August caused a diplomatic backfire around the world. He did not consult with America's trading partners. He offered no explanation to the Interna- tional Monetary Fund. He ig- nored the diplomatic niceties. In all this, he was advised chiefly by Treasury Secretary John Connally. Kissinger was called in, finally to unravel the international disorder. ? He directed the top-level strategy sessions on the Indi- an-Pakistani conflict. He sub- mitted the option papers, for example, that persuaded Presi- dent Nixon to dispatch a naval task force into the Bay of Ben- gal ? Kissinger compiled a grim situation report showing a dangerous intensification of North Vietnamese /military pressure in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Not only os s i lli n p e were our Laotian a sible peril, but the govern- where-conferring with Birit- ment we support in Cambodialish Prime Minister Edward .r__aL, h..oo4f~c4inp with collapse. He recommended air strikes against North Vietnam. He orchestrated the deli- 4- in the Mid. ? He stage-managed the President's blobe-trotting to placate ruffled allied leaders. Not only were the briefing papers prepared under Kissin- ger's supervision, but he trav- French President Georges Pompidou and, after hours, hitting the night spots with beautiful young ladies. Cate U.S. stra egyl- i dle F t iTnA?~ s IITr~CSlon,l ? All the While Kissinger from around the globe. His in- terpretations and recommen- dations, largely, guided the President In setting policy ev- erywhere.' Paper Clip War Day after day, Kissinger processed dozens of option papers, security memoranda and briefing papers for the President. Kissinger . also worked on several major na- tional security studies on such subjects as "Prisoners of War" and "Laos Peace Initiatives." Policy out of his hnsPment of- Bell-McClure syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 Al tmen fice in the White House. The final decisions, to be sure, have been made by the Presi- dent. But Kissinger has guided the President's thinking and directed the implementation: of his policies. The State Department, with its worldwide foreign service'- network, has been relegated largely to a messenger service. Kissinger accepts briefing papers from the State Depart- ment, and the department's specialists participate in White House strategy sessions. But the final formulation of policy is handled by Kissinger. In preparation for the Presi- dent's Peking visit, for exam- ple, veteran strategists at the State Department submitted briefing papers but weren't in- vited to join the advance party now in Peking. This mission is completely controlled by Kis-' singer. Yet Kissinger has been able- to operate in almost total se-' Crecy. Congress has sought in vain to find out what he's -doing, but he has, refused to, testify as Secretary of State. o . Bill Rogers is required to d The State Department,. which is charged with the conduct of foreign affairs, can't even keep up with Kissinger. Not until. we got hold of the White House Papers hat public been given a glimpse.. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74 15R00 020020-1 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE___________ a h PAGE 11 The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE 'WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Ian. 6,197P D 11, U.S. Y Sato Steering Away From the By Jack Anderson Japan's staunchly pro-Amer- lean Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, severely shaken by a se- ries of diplomatic shocks from the White House, is steering a new course away from the U.S. and closer to Communist China. Secret White House docu- ments caution that, ultimately, Japan may slip out from be- hind the American nuclear shield and become a nuclear power In her own right. In the meantime, Sato wants to make his own deal with the Chinese, not let President Nixon trade off Japanese de- fenselessness for Chinese con- cessions at the bargaining table in Peking next month. The Japanese fear Mr. Nixon may offer to keep Japan unarmed. He may try to persuade Chou En-lai that the Japanese-American security treaty deters. Japan from "going it alone" and rebuild- ing her military might. "It would be a mistake, "the Japanese have warned, "for the President to make such an argument. His doing so would inevitably become known in Japan, thus deepen- ing Japanese distrust of U,S." This warning is contained In the secret papers prepared for President,,.. Nixon's crucial meeting. today with Prime ente, Calif tVe have seen aconf1dant`' of top Japanese some of these documents, leaders. Wakaizumi suggested which also show: that a joint communique be is- sued after the San Clemente Losing Japan? meeting proposing a "restudy" ? The President has pulled of postwar relationships in the pro-American rug right Asia. "Such a restudy," Wakal- out from under Sato. First, zumi said, "would permit GOJ Mr. Nixon made overtures to (Government of Japan) lati- Peking behind Sato's back, tude similar to that which then twisted his arm to get a USG is enjoying In political textile agreement, then dealing with Peking." slapped him in the face with ? The same message, la- harsh economic measures. this assessment of future Japa? ? This has turned Sato away nese policy: Japan "(A) will from the U.S. and has cost agree that (Peking) is sole le- America the confidence of the gitimate government of China; Japanese "establishment." Re- (B) will recognize that Taiwan ports American Ambassador is part of China; (C) will avoid Armin Meyer in a secret mes- any 'two China' implications; sage from Tokyo: "Whereas and (D) will rule out concept heretofore anti-Americanism of an 'independent Taiwan' or was pretty mucl} special vehi- a U.N. trusteeship over Tai- cle for opposition parties and wan." Japan's tendentious press, de- I velopments of past few New Attitudes months have fostered seeds of Earlier, Kazuyukl Kasuga, a doubt within normally Ameri- political power in Japan, paid can-oriented community." quiet calls on top Washington The same message, la- officials and gave them a pre- beled "President Sato talks," view of the new Japanese atti- says the Japanese have the tudes. "impression that Japan Is The President has carefully being asked to maintain cold- studied the secret minutes, for war confrontation posture example, of Kasuga's meeting while President's mission to with Deputy Defense Secre- Peking gives USG (U.S. Gov- tary David Packard. Speaking ernment) advantage of appear- for Japan's Democratic Social- ing to be more progressive 1st Party, Kasuga suggested and peace-minded." that the Japanese-American: ? On the eve of the Nixon- security treaty requires .some Sato summit meeting, Meyer review." was visited by a distinguished Packard asked Kasuga, ac- scholar of Japanese-American cording to the secret minutes, affairs, Kei Wakaizumi, whom "in what respects treaty should be modified and if it should be discontinued. Mr. Kasuga replied that 119F& lieves U.S.-Japan security s7s- tem would remain viable .with- out U.S. forces or bases in Japan ... "Packard replied that' ,if GOJ should come to 16 ' Japan did not need ourprofc- tion and wished to asstlh1 e total responsibility for Japan's security, including defense against the nuclear threat, we should have no forces In Japan. But then, Mr. Packard asked, 'Would we negd treaty?' "Mr. Kasuga replied tfiat treaty would provide effehtiwe deterrent against (ChinaYs).po- tential nuclear power and`that DSP desires to maintain basic security, system ... Confist- ent stationing of U.S. forces in Japan is unnecessary, said Jr. Kasuga, and he recalled Japa? nese proverb, 'Too much is as bad as falling short.' "Mr. Packard said If GOJ decided should be no .U.$. troops or bases in Japan, "That's your business; we re- spect your sovereignty.' "Mr. Packard said U.S. troops are in Japan for secu- rity of Japan, not that of U.S., and that, if we had no forces or bases in Japan, would be well to look at consequences of that fact ... A suddenpre- cipitous change wouldhaTe.lte- rious implications and reper- cussions throughout Asia.,'We must move slowly and npt jump to new position.' Bell-McClure Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B0~,O(30,3Q0020020-1 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE JJ ~~''~~"'++ ~i `~''''' PAGE ED Joseph Kraft Undermining Kissinger HIGH POLICY differ- ences are widely supposed to have prompted the leak of secret documents on the Indo-Pakistani crisis to Jack Anderson. But most of the evidence suggests that the true cause is a vulgar bu- reaucratic row aimed at get- ing the President's chief as- istant for national security ffairs, Henry Kissinger. The most striking evi- dence is like the evidence of the dog that didn't bark in the Sherlock Holmes story. The fact is that no enduring policy issue of high impor- tance is involved in the leaks. The fight over East Ben- gal is largely a one-shot af- fair. Hardly anything that happens on the subcontinent is central to international politics. The United States had already tipped toward Pakistan - and practically everybody knew it when the leaks were sprung. At the time, as some of Dr. Kis- singer's comments make plain, the administration was anticipating a return to more normal relations with back to 90, and the deadly you-or-me rivalry between rid prfnidpat` agencies of tie foielgn affairs commu- nity 'in the Mkini'adminis- tration. Washington veter- ans tell me that to find a fit ; iitbr ff"tl ey have to'110' As a thira bit of evidence :there is the state of rela- tions a o a for officials fected policy. The chief con- aeque1 a wtx9 to Impugn the tegrity of fir. Kissinger. A SECOND BIT of evi- dence involves Mr. Ander- son himself. He is not deeply versed in foreign af- fairs. No one who aimed to change a line of interna- tional policy would single out Mr. Anderson as the agent for deflecting that re- sult through the leak of se- cret information. Mr. Anderson's specialty- and it is an important spec- ialty-is putting the jour- nalistic arm on wrong-doers. By no mere accident the chief fruit of his disclosures was not something that af- his, He has a sharp tongue, and he has been unnecessar- ily unkind in comments about some of the senior of- ficials of the most pres- tigous departments. But most of the resentment has been'caused by what Dr. Kissinger does in the serv- ice of the President. The present administration has expanded the job of special assistant for national secu- rity affairs way beyond what it was under Walt Rostow and McGeorge Bundy. Dr. Kissinger has virtually elim- inated from the decision- making business some of the most high-powered men and agencies in town The office of Secretary of Defense Is perhaps the chief victim. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is going to be stepping down soon with practically nothing to his credit. Even his claim (which has at least some foundation) to be the author of the policy for getting out of Vietnam is not widely be- lieved. He seems hostile to the administration's policy on an arms control agreement, and he was completely cut out of plans for the Presi- dent's visit to China. His general reputation for trick- iness has caused the cognos- centi, rightly or wrongly, to establish him as the short- odds favorite for almost all leaks regarding national se- curity these days. Indeed, some White House officials at first believed Mr. Laird leaked the Pentagon papers. THE UNIFORMED MILI- TARY comes a close second in the odds. Many of them do not like the way the White House is winding down the war in Vietnam. Almost all are opposed to the arms con- trol agreement which the White House is now negoti- ating with the Russians. Some are hostile to the Oki- nawa reversion agreement which the White House has negotiated with Japan. And far, far more than civilians in the government, the uni- formed military are in the habit of leaking classified information to serve their own interests. Not that the State Depart- ment or other civilian agen- and Louis Johnson, who Gies can be entirely ex- 4. then ruled the roost at the empted from suspicion. Pentagon. In any case, rela- Except as regards the Near tions npwadays are marked East, Dr. Kissinger has by ' paranoia, jealousy and taken over the whole realm h c~i,efgaror AIlgAg 2?kn~pf a~4 ~$00415R000300020020-1 of the venom is Dr. Kissin- eign officials. This assump- ger, and some of the fault is tion , of the State Depart Dean Acheson who was then at the State Department, ment's traditional role is bit- terly resented by many of the department's leading of- ficials. Indeed, one of them, not long ago, voiced the sus- picion that Dr. Kissinger spent an extra day on his last trip to China in order to embarrass the State De- partment which was han- dling the United Nations vote on Chinese admission. With suspicions at that level, there is every reason to figure bureaucractic ri- valry as the key element in the background of the An- derson papers. There is no case for lionizing, or even protecting the sources of the of the leaks. On the contrary, for once there is a ease for a presi- dential crackdown. Mr. Nix- on's interest-and that of the country-is to find the source of the leaks and fire them fast. Publishers-Hall syndicate THE WA;"rse 2001/11/01 CIAgOOrg~*TW020(y ,Rd1E EP Net Effect of the Anderson Leaks IT IS' already fashionable somewhat taken aback by icy. If Kissinger's influence step in an agreed co slightly d as a result of deed, ey t to say that the secret and receiving this word from a is weakene have set In h v private papers 'leaked to 'friendly power, Madam Gan- the leak', it will be, the na- plaintive, ive, andt h representatives here in columnist Jack Anderson dhi inquired what, in the tion's loss. ington to wondering told us nothing we did not event of such an attack The President's assistant Wash Wash tho have done to rouse Mr. Nixon's personal already know. In fact, they would be the attitude of the has been a brilliant, as well remind us of .-Important' United States. Keating re- as an efficient public serv- awnat tri hs we have insuffi- plied that he had fulfilled ant. In three years he has pique. his instructions and was em- managed to turn the foreign Finally, the Anderson pa- eie i~ tly lear ned . The first of these `is that Powered to say nothing policy making of the nation pers are a reminder that President Nixon and Dr. more. ' from obsession with ideol- public exposure of private Kissinger are embarked Kissinger also took a hand ogy to judgment of power. conversations among gov- upon a major change in in attempting to frighten If, in the course of this ernment officials can be al- U#iited Stated foreign pol- the Indians. He told the In- turn-around, options have most as destructive of gov- icy. What the American peo- dian ambassador here that if not always been made clear, ernment as the report- ple had presumed was a po- India became Involved in the fault lies not with Kis- ing of actual life and death lite how-do-you-do to China war with both Pakistan and singer but with Mr. Nixon's military high level may nhig b as derstandingturns out. to be a firm un- China, the United States determination that the cold meetings could be of no assistance. war 'ideology still required The Anderson p a p e r s The implication that Mr.' lip service. frank frank agraainin, and level those who meetings igh strongly suggest that part of Nixon's chief foreign policy IT MAY BE ARGUED mattend ay wonder whether they this understanding was to aide was delivering a mes- whether the new China pol- should say what they think The papers icy required quite the or say what their enemies in back Pakistan against India. sage from the Chinese seemed clear, and it has- brusqueness which the the room might approve. have so far not revealed two additional tened Madam Gandhi's de- United States displayed to- To choice reduce makes a men to mockery such a a pieces of evidence which termination to formal alli- wards its oldest friend in government. Nobody will buttress this view. ante with Moscow. the East, but the Anderson argue against the public's The second truth which LAST OCTOBER 12, U.S. emerges from the Anderson seem to show Kissin- right to know the logic be- Ambassador Kenneth Keat? papers is that somebody dy in gee as a somewhat reluctant red differenceits lug called upon Indian Pre- the United States govern- follower of the hard line. porting the making of for- mier Gandhi with the warn- ment-and at a high level- The President is blaming eign policy and reporting ing that if India did not is opposed to the New China me" and "He wants to tilt private conversations is the cease aid to dissidents in policy and is not averse to towards Pakistan" are not difference between the re- East Pakistan, Pakistan destroying Kissinger in the the remarks of a man with porter and the spy. would attack from the West. process of opposing the poi- sole responsibility for each Los Angeles Times Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 WASHINGTON STAR Approved For Release 2001/11/01 -RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 9 JAN' i JAMES J. KILPATRICK Leak of Papers to Anderson a Grave Breach i We are in the midst of an- other of those great ruffled flaps involving the press, the government, and the ethics of public and private conduct. This one is serious. The story goes back to the first week in December, when the Washington Special Action Group met at the White House to discuss the suddenly flam- ing war launched by India against East Pakistan. The WSAG, in effect, is the super- National Security Council of this administration - a top- level coordinating body intend ed to serve the President with the : best advice and intelli- gence that can be pulled to- gether by skilled and experi- enced men. The three WSAG meetings of Dec. 3, 4 and 6 were held in confidence, of course, behind locked doors, but written min- utes were prepared. These minutes were stamped "se- cret-sensitive," which is the classification level just be- low "top secret," and then were distributed among an es- timated 50 to 75 persons in the Pentagon, State Department, CIA, and the White House. A. person or persons un- known made copies of the memoranda and gave them to columnist Jack Anderson. He excerpted them for use in his column, and a few days later 'supplied the texts for use by newspapers generally. In one view-it is the view of anti- Nixon liberals-Anderson per- formed a great public service, and his anonymous informant wa- a man of noble character who risked his job in the name of truth and honesty in govern- ment. There is another view. The importance of this disquieting affair does not lie in the mem- oranda themselves. The im- portance lies in the leak. Make no mistake: This leak must be found, and it must be stopped. This is a breach of trust, and a breach of securi- ty, of the most profound im- plications. The memoranda are embar- rassing, no more. For the most part, the minutes reflect the discussion of men trying to find out what is going on, and seeking to decide what best to do about it. The President, they are advised, is angry at India for its aggressive ac- tion; he wants "a tilt toward Pakistan." There is much talk of the futility of the United Nations. One detects sympathy for the plight of the emerging nation of Bangla- desh; it promises to become "an international b a s k e t case." The conferees come to no particular decisions. They agree to prepare certain pa- pers for the President. Their discussion is candid, sponta- neous, unreserved. Subsequent to these private meetings, the White House was publicly to assert its neu- trality in the India-Pakistan war. Obviously the White House was not neutral. This was self-evident to every edi- tor and critic in the country. It is a fair surmise that every government in history has taken public positions in- consistent with its private wishes. Diplomats know this. What matters, to repeat, is the leak itself. This is not to on, be compared with the act of the Washington Post last, month in blowing Henry Kis-: singer's cover as the source of a recent backgrounder; that. was no more than an ill-man nered breach of professional, rules. Neither is it to be com- pared with Daniel Ellsberg's clandestine distribution last spring of the aging "Penta-, gon Papers." Ellsberg was, then out of the government. We must infer, in this in_ . stance, that someone still em- ployed at the very highest lev- els of confidence-some one holding top secret clearance, with access to other memoran-, da of immense importance has wantonly violated the, trust reposed in him. This goes beyond disloyalty; it sails close to the windward edge. of treason. What other docu-. ments one must wonder, has this person secretly copied? Where will he peddle them next? This is the alarming as- pect. Anderson thinks it "fun- ny," but then Anderson would. It is not funny at all. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 WASHINGTON POST. Approved For Re ea 0,01/l1 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 M Joseph Kraft The Anderson Papers JACK ANDERSON achiev- 3 that "he (the President) suspicion that the depart ed a journalistic coup in pub- wants to tilt in favor of Paki- ments and agencies are full the minutes of the se- stan." of crypto-Democrats out to get lashing On Dec. 7, in a background the administration-is only cret White House meetings on session with reporters ?subse. going to be intensified. And the India-Pakistan crisis. But quently released by Sen. Bar- that deep suspicion is going how much of a hero is the ry Goldwater, Dr. Kissinger to yield two sets of adverse reactions. man who. leaked the informa- said: There have been some For one thing, security will tion? comments that the ad,minis- be tightened. There is apt to My strong impression is tration is anti-Indian. This is be an end to the kind of min- that he accomplished very lit- totally inaccurate." utes that were taken at Dr. tle public good, if any. On the Seen thus starkly, Dr. Kis- Kissinger's meetings. They his actions are al- singer told a flat lie. My im- will certainly not be spread contrary, through the bureaucracy any- most certain to drive the Nix- pression is that, taken in the nlnre. on administration deeper than larger context, his remarks Secondly, the limited access ever into secret dealings on a at the secret conference were which experienced officials restricted basis, not In such flagrant contra- now have to White House de- f on the good side of the diction with his remarks at cision-making is going to be ledger, the leak has now pro- the background briefing. Still, even further curbed. The vided unmistakable informa-, he was plainly trying to ma- President and Dr. Kissinger tion that the President delib- nipulate public opinion. are going to keep things to erately tilted American pol- favor of Pakistan and BUT SO WHAT? Does the themselves more than ever... icy in . But that much new evidence do more than Important decisions which are against India was known to everybody in confirm a universal judg- even now made with too little touch with the State Depart- ment? After the U-2 and the consultation.., and with too meet and White House at the Bay of Pigs and the credibil- small an input from the out- ity gap, is there anybody not side are going to be made by time s. the Edmund nds. 1tluski Ed. Impossibly naive or ill-inform- an even more narrowly cir- Sen ed who doesn't know that the cumscribed group of men. ward Kennedy and Frank government lies? Is one more No doubt Anderson gets Church, among others, said bit of evidence a noble act? high marks for his acumen so. Hundreds of us wrote it. and industry and courage as Indeed, one reason Henry Kis Or is it just a pebble added a journalist. But his source, singer held his background to the Alps? the man who leaked the stuff, briefing of Dec. 7 was to take Set against these gains, is something else. Whatever there is the way the adminis- his motives, he has done this the edge off the charges the , country a disservice. t to react Maybe ' ti i t on s ap ra White House was biased in . favor of Pakistan. the President and Dr. Kissin A second and more impor. ger are going to say to them- tent gain from the revelation selves: "Golly, we sure erred in not telling the truth and has to do with information nothing but the truth. Jack about the way the govern- Anderson has taught us that ment works. The secret min- honesty is the best policy." utes provide detailed, to-da - But much more likely, they table evidence that day-to-day are going to feel that the min- foreign policy is made in the utes of- the meeting were le- .They qua lly show House as never before. gitimately classified internal ey e qua top working papers of the govern- il.o be tr allowed treated mere themselves lackeys ment. Probably they are going bb Some Of to feel that the stuff was leak- th me White House. ed not for any large purpose, posed - heavyweights invyweights such s h the but out of opposition to the a policy. And almost certainly- chief of naval operations-ly said , and apparently regularly and I say this as an opponent of the policy-they will be say, things silly enough to right in this surmise. Issue from the mouth of In these circumstances, the Bertie Wooster. Then there is the matter of limited trust they have in the truth-telling. According to the outside world is going to be minutes released by Ander- even more sharply limited. son, Henry Kissinger told a The morbid suspicion they meeting, of officials on Dec. have, of the bureauucracy-a Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 WASHINGTQN STAR Approved For Release 200Jt1/3AN RDP74BOO415R000300020020-1 WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP Things Ordinary People Call Lies: By FRANK GETLEIN Jack Anderson's remarkable to many-and indeed was pub- service to the country in re- licly interpreted by many-as vealing the White House dis- academic partisanship against cussions that led to our forth- Rostow because of his part in right pro-dictatorship, anti- escalating the Indochinese democracy, pro-slaughter, an- war. The academics didn't like ti-victim position in the India- the war, it was said, and ex- Pakistan war extended well pressed their dislike by turn- beyond the mere making pub- ing their backs on their form- lic of the processes of such de- er colleague. cisions for the advancement of There may have been some- freedom in the world. thing in that. Academics do * tend to be more solidly against the war than any other wage- His revelations clearly show- earning part of the population. ed what ordinary people would But a stronger factor in Ros- ordinarily think of as a policy tow's rejection almost certain- of deliberately lying to the ly was the free and easy way public. Selected Washington with truth he necessarily pick- pundits have, with little trou- ed up in the White House. A ble been able to convince vital part of the whole escala- themselves that no deception tion was the deliberate decep- was intended because anyone tion of the public and the Con- who was anyone in town al- gress at every step of the way, ready knew that we would from that early light at the support Pakistan - "tilt in end of the tunnel to the events favor of" seems to have been in Tonkin Gulf to the glorious the Kissingerian formula-and victory of the Tet offensive. oppose India. Rostow was inescapably in- But those Americans who volved in the continuing decep- weren't someone in Washing- tions. But the whole point, the ton, or approximately 99.99999 basic assumption, of scholar- percent of the people, are still ships is that the scholar more or less inclined to be- searches for truth wherever lieve what their government the search may lead. Truth, less call in tells them. Lacking prior ac- for a scholar, is an end in it. they public nevertheless Maurice cess to the higher truth behind self and not a walnut shell to pub ic AID dM rice the public statement, when the be manipulated on a table to Williams of the fact that eir contradictions are pointed out, dazzle the yokels. price attention vegetable oil was they are inclined to think that * weakening in the United somhbnda lied. States. Cutting it off from ship- ble, Dr. seems entirely de post If Kissinger indeed is not ment to India would weaken it rile Dr. Kiespecial singer does not carried on the shoulders of his further. He therefore request- receive b o tey hfellow academics on his retire- ed that commodity be shipped welcome bhck t to the highest he ment from government, the in place of wheat. levels of the academic coin- cause will be, not the positions This confusion of motive is h munity, the Anderson papers should be remembered. The same thing happened to Lyndon Johnson's Kissinger, Walt Rostow, who was forced to go and teach in Texas, where, presumably, the aca- demic world takes a less punc- tilious view of these things. At the same time, it seemed e he took, but the double posi- the inevitable result of t tions as revealed by Anderson, double-entry style of decision- the things that ordinary peo- making as revealed by Ander- ple ordinarily call lies. son. The pragmatic reason for The process seems to be get- scholars to adhere to truth is ting habitual and it may have that it lets them know where elements of personal tragedy they are. The principle may for scholars who serve their have application to govern- governments by putting aside ment. the normal scruples of scholar-! ship. It may be seen on the level of farce in the continuing evo- lution of the political thought of Arthur Schlesinger Jr., an- other academic who bounded into government with great en- thusiasm. A convincing advo- cate of presidential power when he was working for a President, Schlesinger's schol- arly analysis has now led him to think that presidential pow- er is not all that unrestrained a blessing and must be curbed in some way. There are those cynical enough to believe that Schles- inger's views of presidential power thus vary directly with the likelihood of Schlesinger's finding appropriate employ- ment with any given president. A relatively minor form of similar self-deception occurs in the Anderson papers in the discussion on continuing eco- nomic aid to Pakistan while cutting it off to India. While the game planners were thus constructing a heavy tilt in the attitude which Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 NEW YORK TIMES `Leaks Follow the Course of Greatest Impact WASHINGTON-The choicest bits .of the White House's secret strategy sessions On the Pakistan-India fuss had already been published in Jack An- derson's syndicated column-read by an, estimated 45 million muck-hungry Americans - when Presidential aide Henry Kissinger; decided that the best way tp fight ? back was to say that his statements had suffered distortion by being printed out of -context. That was a. mistake. Last week Mr. Anderson responded to Mr. Kissinger's criticism by releasing to the press the' full text of the White House minutes, and these were printed by The New York Times, The Washington Post and other. major newspapers across the country. It was no -great act of largesse. Mr. Anderson could spare a few secret documents; he says he gets dozens of them every week "from officials, of integrity who believe Uncle Sam can tell the truth and survive." A smaller selection, he says, comes "from peo- ple who are out to get even with their boss or somebody, else." The of- ficials who slipped him these White House papers might qualify in both categories. Mr. Kissinger, having' up- staged the entire State Department and some of the Defense Department, is not without bureaucratic enemies. Those who recall Mr. Anderson's being caught in 1954 eavesdropping on Bernard. Gbldfine in the Sheraton- Carlton Hotel, or sending an assistant to dig through J. Edgar Hoover's gar- bage can last year, would have been easily -persuaded that Mr. Anderson got the documents by some light-fin- Approved For Release 30Q111.1/gT'~ 00415PP~ 00 0-1 gered technique. But Mr. Anderson says they came the usual way-"from friends in sensitive government posi- tions." The friends were "appalled by the Administration's siding with the akistani dictatorship" and by the 'misleading information coming out of the White House." Sensing an opening, Mr. Anderson softened them up further by implant- ing the fear-which he shared - that the presence of the United States fleet in the Bay of Bengal might be pointing to another Gulf of Tonkin incident. If the Johnson Administration's se- cret plans in 1$64 for covert war against North Vietnam--and for sub- sequent bombing of. the North-had been known in advance of the Tonkin episode, the escalation 'of the war might have been prevented. Right? And ' if the public knew what the White House was thinking about India and Pakistan, it might even mean pre- venting a conflict with Russia. Right? "Quite .frankly," says Mr. Anderson, ,,this was persuasive with my friends. Originally they gave me about a dozen documents. They said these were the key ones. But I didn't feel I. should write without seeing all the documents of this period. I told my sources, 'I trust you guys, and when you say this is a representative sam- pling I'm sure you're telling the truth. But somebody might argue that you had misled me by picking out just the 'documents that prove what you want to prove. I think I've got to see them all.' } "They said, 'You're crazy' I said, 'No. You've got to decide whether you work for the country or for Kis- singer.' So they gave me all of them." In dealing with people so disposed, Mr. Anderson benefits from the first law of leak physics: Leaks tend to follow the course of greatest impact. Officials with a secret tale to tattle know that through Mr. Anderson's column . they will reach 700 newspa- pers, which is' by far the most wide- spread circulation of any political column in American journalism. Not that all 700 newspapers always use it. Some editors don't appreciate what Mr. Anderson does to some of their heroes. Others are occasionally afraid he may be leading them down the libel path. His column aboutthe sex problems encountered by cartoon- ist Al Capp on college campuses, for instance, was carried in only two newspapers on the East Coast. When Mr. Anderson inherited the Merry-Go-Round column from Drew Carson in ' 1969 there were some oubts about his ability to handle it. rue, he had helped produce the col- mn since 194. and Mr. Pearson had ontributed little during his last years the series that ruined the career of he late Senator Thomas Dodd, , for example, was almost. entirely Mr. An- derson's handiwork). Nevertheless, during most of his career Mr. Ander- son-an unglamorous teetotalling Mormon family man (nine children) -was overshadowed by his suave boss and partner; who handled the big-name -contacts in . Georgetown salons. Mr. Anderson, now 49, is not a party goer. He, takes his religion very seriously and teaches Sunday school. Big physically (about six feet, 200 pounds), a onetime halfback and brash, Mr. Anderson likes to cultivate the reputation of a Peck's Bad Boy, an' outsider. He has a Middle Ameri- can background: an upbringing in Utah, no college degree, experience on Utah newspapers and the Stars and Stripes before reaching Washing-.' ton. He has never received an impor- tant journalism prize. He likes to take jibes at the "Establishment press," though his column, in the sense that it is a key conduit to some portions 'of the Establishment, is also very much a part of it. If, after all this, there were any lingering doubts about Mr. Anderson as proprietor of the Merry-Go-Round column, they must surely have been dispelled by the White House papers coup. Now, with a staff of four leg- men (Les Whitten, Brit Hume, Joe Spear, Ray Cole) operating out of five rooms in Howard Hughes's old office suite on K Street, Mr. Anderson is bit- ing hard enough to be forgiven what appears to be an extra layer to his customary cockiness. He's even chal- lenking the White House to get tough about his latest gambit. . "I didn't get my information out of a Daniel Ellsberg, who belonged to another Administration and has been out of government two years," he says. "I got my information .f roil some of Nixon's own boys." -ROBERT SHERRILL Mr. Sherrill is a freelance writer based in Washington. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020020-1 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP7 0p4~5RQ~00020020-1 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE J ~-_ PAGE Stephen Klaidman Uninformed Officials 'J' `T?3- n PTTRT.IC often f. eels syigld heeause of a gnaw- jug ffeaIling that the pre~s ...not providing enough infor- _m9tinn ahnnt the deeeeni g i rnnecs in govern- wrewoy a Fwnnnen ly % It j a gjAs ofit a "-' sons tk& documents sneh as the dAhe r ?' ggi147y2 published Anderson p^a l a r a, roiw ed fhrnu h adioated nnimmnict Tack Andarsnn 2r f l They E'y~ a gt ;_ t_`the wav decisions ire , ebeii.. They show presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger's school-masterly control of the high-level policymaking body known as the Washing- ton Special Action Group. Tux also show fumbling am w ortalatin-an area :+nl,ore no 'c * y shou been well thought out i nn a ore. pg a mart ist,urbiRg, however, the documents in- dirate that , .the top n, ,Trials charged with setting a C n a United ates in-matters of war anTneace as? nperating with lase ?han adeate information to make d eisions an a well-in- formed and thoughtful Cm eeivably. th at, infnrma- t`inn is avail' ble at wer 1ovallL_ and has fAiled- to reach the top because cif the d_ensgness of the bureauc- racv~i~ ei~1>'n it is .u,+ al.ravs in evidence . +hoae w" 1, n Qs& need It would seem, however, that any dedicated newspa- per reader was about as well informed as the White House on what was happen- ing on the battlefields dur- ing the recent Indo-Paki-, stani war. The -evicTence [s contained In the documents on the ,yar released by Anderson. They consist of summaries and quoted matter from three meetings of the Washington Special Action Group hied during the fighting. DURING these meetings, three men reported on mili- tary matters and the course of the war. They were Rich- ard M. Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Gen. William C. Westmore? land of the Joint chiefs. Careful comparison with newspaper accounts for the appropriate days yields the following grim surprise: The government appar- ently had no better informa- tion about the war than the press, which at the time con- sidered its information dreadfully inadequate. The Washington Post was not pleased when it had to repgrt Indian claims and Pakistani counter-claims without being able to give readers a clear sense of what was really happening, isut. nn ngn Qr 11 old WSAGthe falklwing:_ "C ng th( reported aetinn in th- !Argot I,- there are eon icting r n g from both sides 411d 1d the only common aro attacks on the Amritsar Pa. thankot And Crinigar air. ports. The Paks say the . gi- ans are attanking_ allll Ri their border- hot the Tndi In a dispatch from Rawal- pindi dated Dec. 3 Jim , Hoagland reported to The Washington Post: "Radio Pakistan an- nounced tonight that India had launched attacks against Pakistani forward positions all along the west- er Approved ~i- n 'er an~ ppl /r 1 s sated with raids on four air. fields in western. India and Tndian_1n1r7 TZ.,.a....:.. "The airfields the Pakis- tanis announced hitting were given as Amritsar, Pa- thankot, Avantiput, near the northwest frontier and Sri- nigar, capital of Indian Kashmir." In his account of military activity at the Dec. 4 meet- ing, Helms had caught up with Avantipur and a sum- mary of the meeting said: On the political side, An- derson quoted Wednesday from a briefing document prepared for the President's current meeting in San Clemente with Japanese Prime Minister Sato. Those readers who have been following the dis- patches of Washington Post correspondent Selig S. Har- rison from Tokyo were ap- parently as well briefed as the President on the current Japanese attitude toward the U.S., international mone- tary affairs, military and more specifically nuclear matters and attitudes to- ward China. ,5311 a1sYeS- ~e loa;ic 1 conclusion is -1LXwa s wonderful,', ',-,,e W -AfaWSd, but that the gov- e. woe- rfuilY111-informed. Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B R000300020020-1 THE WASHINGTON POST DATE J IZ' PAGE Joseph Kraft The Anderson Papers JACK ANDERSON achiev- comments that the adminis- which experienced officials ed a journalistic coup in pub- tration is anti-Indian. This is now have to White House de- lishing the minutes of the se totally inaccurate." cisionmaking is going to be eret White House meetings on Seen thus starkly, Dr. Kis- even further curbed. The the India-Pakistan crisis. But singer told a flat lie. My im President and Dr. Kissinger how much of a hero is the pression is that, taken in the are going to keep things to man who leaked the informa larger context, his remarks themselves more than ever. tion? at the secret conference were which are My strong impression is not in such flagrant contra- even now Important made decisions with too little that he accomplished very lit diction with his remarks at consultation and with too tle public good, if any. On the the background briefing. Still, small an input from the out. contrary, his actions are al- he was plainly trying to ma- side are going to be made by most certain to drive the Nix- nipulate public opinion. an even more narrowly cir on administration deeper than BUT SO WHAT? Does the cumscribed group of men. ever into secret dealings on a new evidence do more than No doubt Anderson gets high marks for his acumen restricted basis. confirm a universal judg- and industry and courage as On the good side of the ment? After the U-2 and the a journalist. But his source the man who leaked the stuff 'ledger, the leak has now pro- Bay of Pigs and the credibil- is something else. Whatever vided unmistakable infor;na-, ity gap, is there anybody not his motives, he has done this tion that the President delib impossibly naive or ill-inform- country a disservice. erately tilted American pol ed who doesn't know that the icy in favor of Pakistan and government lies? Is one more against India. But that much bit of evidence a noble act? was known to everybody in Or is it just a pebble added touch with the State Depart- to the Alps? ment and White House at the Set against these gains, time of the crisis. there is the way the adminis- Sens. Edmund Muskie, Ed tration is apt to react. Maybe ward Kennedy and Frank the President and Dr. Kissin. Church, among others, said ger are going to say to them- so. Hundreds of us wrote it. selves: "Golly, we sure erred Indeed, one, reason Henry Kis in not telling the truth and but the truth. Jack singer held his background nothing Anderson has taught us that briefing of Dec. 7 was to take honesty is the best policy." the edge off the charges the But much more likely, they White House was biased In are going to feel that the min- favor of Pakistan. utes of the meeting were le- A second and more Impor- gitimately classified internal of the govern- tant gain from the revelation working papers ment. Probably they are going has to do with information to feel that the stuff was leak- about the way the govern- ed' not for any large purpose, rnent works. The secret min- but out of opposition to the utes provide detailed, irrefu- policy. And almost certainly- table evidence that daY-today and I say this as an opponent .foreign policy is made in the of the policy-they will be. White House as never before. right in this surmise. They equally show that top In these circumstances, the officials allowed themselves limited trust they have In the to be treated as mere lackeys outside world is going to be by the White House. Some of sharply limited. there - including such sup even more The morbid suspicion they posed heavyweights as the have of the bureaucracy=a chief of naval operations- art said, and apparently regularly suspicion that the dep meets and agencies are fu1T -stay, things silly enough to of crypto-Democrats out to get issue from the mouth , of the administration - is only Bertie Wooster. going to be intensified. And Then there is the matter of that deep suspicion is going truth-telling. According to the to yield two sets of adverse rhinutes released by Ander- reactions. son, Henry Kissinger told a meeting of officials cn Dec. For one thing, security will 3 that "he (the President) be e tightened. There is apt to to tilt in favor of Paki- be an end to the kind of min- stan." utes that were taken at Dr., On, Dec. 7, in a background Kissinger's meetings. They :es~l o ~e ft% i b 0Bb0415R000300020020-1 quen er Eefy ene. ur a ry Goldwater, Dr. Kissinger more. said: "There have been some Secondly, the limited access , ,