NEWSPAPER ARTICLES RE: VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000300200015-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 11, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

ppfr~vec~1~- Release 2001/08/28}2,IA-RDF~f1.5f~g0300200015-7
PACTr,
'U. S. Inteigence Was Surprisea
By Enemy's Drive, Aides Assert
By l IJAMI1 WELLES
sveeial'to i. New York Tfines
WASHINGTON, M*.: 10-
Evidence has er e
llgre that United States inte r-'
rec ion, timing and
j!j~gstve in Sou Vietnam.
. The National Security Coun-
cil's Intelligence Committee,
headed by Henry A. Kissinger;
President Nixon's national secu-
rity' adviser, reportedly con-
cluded that the main enemy
thrust would come from west
to east against Kontum in the
Central Highlands and not, as
happened, from north to south
across the demilitarized zone
to Quangtri.
ems `,_ iai~iere
Continued From Page 1, Col. 8
when or where he'd strike.
What our policy-makers or the
South Vietnamese did with our
reports is out of our hands."
Nonetheless, there are other
veteran United States intelli-
gence officials who concede
that the North Vietnamese
gained a major tactical surprise
-and four or five days of vir-
tually unimpeded advance,
which led to the seizure of
Quantri-by hitting where and
sources here say.
"We know when something's
going along the trail," said one,
source, "but we don't always'
know whether it's a truck-or
a tank."
The appearance of about 30
North Vietnamese tanks-half
of them 40-ton T-54's and the
rest 15-ton amphibious PT-76's
around Tayninh and Anloc sur-
prised both the United States
and South Vietnamese.
Whether they were disassem-
bled and brought south by
when it was least expected. truck or river boat, or whether
"The intelligence people did they were driven at night and
notanticit .te that the Northlcamouflaged by day to avoid
Vietiaipese would - a_R ttie United tSates air attacks, is
short rr -te" -'one such source still unclear. But each trip must
said. "The surprise was that for have taken two to three
the first time in 18 years the months, in the view of spe-
Communists stopped the pre- cialists here.
tense oI 'irifiltration-' and went The steady reduction in Unit-',
down the coastal Highway I. ed States ground combat in re-'
Frankly we were surprised that cent months and the_ cutback
eau ~.+?vv ..--. -
rMS-neen ny 4 ~-_
ure" durin the five-wee of- v' was d addition, T.
In addition, e , intelligence
ens_e in Vietnam. el a d sources here acknowledge that
enemy build - d !they have been surprised by the
at th
e
t
1 e n o serve an m ttsly vast quantities of bulky and
re orted since It begat early often complex weapons moved
as much as 600 to 700 miles
i"c year. south by trucks, river boats and
"We've kept the policy-mak- even on bicycles pushed or rid-
ers fully informed" said one iden over jungle trails.
source,I who asked not to be Z!- knew an offensive was
" said one intelligence
of much American aerial sur-
veillance are cited as reasons
why the North managed to
achieve these surprises.
"We've cut way back on our
SLAR," an informant said, re-
ferring to Sideways-Looking
Airborne Radar flights. "Even
radar isn't much help when
you're trying to peer through
two or three canopies of jungle
or through camouflage strung
for miles over trails."
ou
though we c
especially the amount of theirf
(Continued on Page 19, Column`4 ammunition. They dropped more
.L-- a ,no .?rr;nnr~r rromds into
identified. "There's been no dis- analyt' "but we didn't know
agreement about the "01117 the quantity, and the types of
capability. We saw the build-up their supplies, the distribution
ldn't tell just into future battle areas, and
that the United States, despite
)
its array of electronic technol-
ogy, infrared photography,
their radio communications for
The United States aerial's
flights that used Infrared de-1
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 THE Ev!/Nlrgl Vaflelease 2001/08/28: CIA- DATEO~' 001 PAGE
Q%I5 TO NIXON
CIA I To
Doubtful on Port Mining,
By MORTON KONDRAC
and THOMAS B. ROSS
In the i969 study, Kissinger
taked: - 'What are current
di2t .tT proportion of war-
essential imports that could.
come into NVN (North Viet-
nam) over the rail or-road
lines from China, even 2.aJl
Imports by sea were denied
and strong effort even made
to interdict ground trans-
port?"
The CIA replied: "All the
war-essential imports could be
brought into North Vietnam
over rail lines or roads from
China in the event that imports
by sea were successfully de-
nied. .
"On the other hand, one im-
portant point should be kept in
mind. The North Vietnamese
surprised many observers,
lad confounded many predici-
tions, by llofdingtogether and
simultaneously sending ever-
increasing amounts of supplies
and personnel into the South
during 3% years of bombing
"With this experience in
mind, there is little reason to
believe that new bombing will
c
accomplish what previous
bombing failed to do, unless it
is conducted with much great-
er intensity and readiness to
defy criticism and risk of es-
calation."
The Defense Department de-
clared: "An interdiction cam-
paign . . . when employed in
conjunction with denial of sea
imports, would, in large part,
,isolate Hanoi and Haiphong
from each other and from the
rest of the country."
Chicago Sun-Times Service I
President Nixon was advised
by the Central Intelligence
Agency in 1969 that the type of
action he now has ordered to
cut off supplies.to North Viet-
nam would not worts.
"Within two or three
months," the CIA declared in
a secret memo, "North Viet-
nam and its allies would be.
able to..implement alternative
procedures for maintaining
the flow of essential economic
and military imports."
The State Department and
the Defense Department were
less pessimistic. But both con-
ceded that the effort to pre-
vent resupply through alterna-
tive land routes from China
would involve much heavier
bombing and a much, higher
risk of civilian,.casualtie's.
The eAtimates of?the three
agencies, are contained in Na-
tional Security Memorandum 1
`(NSSM-1), a secret study of
the war compiled by the Pre'si-
dentis national security advis-
er He try A. Kissinger.
Gravel Reads Memo
This section of the memo
was read into the Congression-
al Record on the .senate floor
yesterday by Sen. iike Grav-
el, D -Alaska, altho ii two
weeks ago he hia been
blocked by Republicans from
doing so. Copies bf the memo
'also have been mid
their contents rep by
some newspapers recently:
Asked about the CIA's
(gloomy forecast at a press
conference yesterday, Kissin-
ger said it had been "carefully
considered" but that Nixon j
also had before him recent
and "much more detailed
studies," which he implied
were more optimistic.
Pessimistic View
"Almost four years of air
war in North Vietnam have
shown - as did the Korean
war - that, although air
strikes will destroy transport
facilities, equipment and sup-
plies, they cannot successfully
interdict the flow of supplies
because much of the damage
can frequently be repaired
within hours .. .
"An intensive and sustained
air interdiction program could
have a good chance of reduc-
ing the northern rail capacity
by at least half. However,
roads are less vulnerable to
interdiction, and waterways
even less so .. .
"In +.addition to the overland
capacity, an airlift from
chinese airfields could poten-
tially provide a means for im-
porting a large volume of
-high-priority goods. Moreover,
-total interdiction of seaborne
imports would be difficult be-
cause shallow-draft lighters
could be used to unload cargo
"(ram oceangoing ships anc-
hored in waters outside the
-mined major harbor areas."
The State Department com-
mented: "we do not believe
that the capacity of the DRV-
PRC (North Vietnam-China)
road and rail network is great
.enough to permit an adequate
flow of supplies in the face of
an intense day and night
bombing campaign .. .
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 U 4M4-11- "-0-1
THE W'.A WbTOW(Dor Rye 2001/08/28: CIA-Bp $B14l' dg6b2000 2E
The Was b gton Merry.Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday May 31, 1972
M-Nog Said to Bolster Hanoi El fa
xhe.~'e's.,no -dot
, kbt that the.
nd crippled production.-But-
the intelligence reports say
that the North Vietnamese
economy was already breaking
clown. NQw Hanoi can blame it
4L.. Q th bombing and exhort
the people to put up with
hardships in the name of pa-
triotism.
Even before President
Dixon renewed the. bombing,
the intelligence reports claim,
North Vietnam was badly fal-
tering. The, economy had been
strained by war and .battered
by floods.
This had ,caused, ~ virtual
breakdown of the- distribution
system. Farmers were hoard
ing their harvests instead of
delivering them to the market.
Only the black market was
bustling. Smugglers and spec-
ulators were doing a brisk
business behind the. backs of
the commissars.
Last year's floplls were said
to. be the worst in, 25 years.
ce. re
bab y at-I'e s
"Livestock losses were par-
B_LD
ticularly serious, primarily be- .knowledge cannot be cut off'They should go for Humphrey
cause of the loss of draft ani- by bombing
h
.
coals ... Hanoi had been Because of the bombing,
saved only because .the dikes Hanoi has also brought pres-
had been purposely breached sure upon Moscow and Peking
to channel the flood waters to increase their shipments.
into the districts north of the There's a
d
goo
possibility, de-
city." spite the bombing, that the
O
n top of war losses, this
was more than the harassed
North Vietnamese economy
could stand. One intelligence
estimate suggests that Hanoi
launched the recent offensive,
in part, to divert the people's
attention from their economic
woes. In a sense, the U.S.
naval and air bombardment
was almost welcome as an ex-
cuse to explain the staggering
shortages and to overcome in-
ternal discontent.
There's no doubt, too, that
the mining; of Haiphong har.
bor and the bombing of the
rail lines has disrupted the
flow of military supplies. But
this has also. forced the two
Communist rivals, Russia and
China, to work together for
the first time in 10,years to
help their North Vietnamese
ally.
Intelligence reports claim
that the Chinese have agreed
to permit a massive increase
in Soviet rail shipments across
China. The first shipments,
which would have been loaded
onto ships at Vladivostok,
have already been diverted
overland.
China and North Vietnam
are linked by a network of rail
lines, roads and trails which
our own militaryy, experts ac- tries that would be restricted.,
North Vietnamese will wind
up with all the military sup-
plies they'll need.
Greek's Predictions
Our own private pollster,
Las Vegas oddsmaker Jimmy
the Greek Snyder, predicts
next Tuesday's crucial Califor-
nia primary race will end in a
"dead heat" between Demo-
crats George McGovern and
Hubert Humphrey.
Every other major canvass.
er has picked McGovern to
win by a comfortable margin.
The Greek, however, thinks
Humphrey will be saved by
what is known as "Proposition
9" on the California ballot.
This is an environmental
proposal which, among other
things, would shut down cor-
porate polluters, restrict off-
shore oil drilling, initiate z,
five-year moratorium on con-
struction of nuclear power
plants, and restrict pesticides.
Jimmy believes California's
huge block of undecided vot-
ers will be lured to the polls
by their opposition to "Prop.
9." His surveys show most of
these voters will pull the lever
over the Humphrey column.
A large number of the silent
"undecideds," Jimmy reckons,
are people who work in indus-
t
e labor-backed candidate.
But a lot can happen be-
tween now and the June 6 pri-
mary day, the Greek warned
us. The three-part Humphrey.
McGovern debates, in particu.
lar, could affect the outcome.
McGovern has the most
money and a better organiza-
tion, Jimmy conceded. But on
the negative side, McGovern
hurt himself with California's
huge defense industry when
he voted against a federal loan
for Lockheed Aircraft.
Humphrey, possibly looking
to the California race, quietly
cast the deciding vote in favor
of Lockheed.
It all. adds up, says the na-
tion's premier oddsmaker, to a
neck-and-neck race.
Note: The Greek called two
other primaries for us right on
the nose, picking Wallace to
take the Democratic prize in
Florida and Humphrey to edge
McGovern in the close Ohio
primary.
p 1972, United Feature Syndicate
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE PAGE I.J 1)
i
1 The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Aug. 18,1977 D 17
Hanoi Signals Viewed Not Serious
By Jack Anderson
e hav_ e_hatLa,Fc ss ko~las-
g documents wh1 tf
new""Tig on e controversy
?n~ he V nam 3y4pl - ..
out several signals after the
1968 election that they were
willing to make peace with the
new Nixon , administration.
These ranged from guarded
messages . to military pull-
'backs.
The messages, some more
vague than others, reached
Washington through a variety
of channels. But more impres-
sive.was the withdrawal of 22
of 25 regiments from the two
northernmost provinces of
South Vietnam.
The key to the' controversy
lies in the interpretation of
these moves. The new Presi-
dent chose not to regard the
messages as serious peace
overtures. He also interpreted
the withdrawal of the 22 regi-
ments as a military redeploy.
ment rather than a political
signal.
The minutes of a secret
White House meeting on Oct.
28, 1969, summarize the Nixon
attitude. Speaking for the
President, Henry Kissinger de-
clared;
"We have mentioned 'cease-
fire'' (to Hanoi) in various con-
notations. If they want a rea-
sonable compromise we will
meet them half-w,ay. of they in-
sist on American humiliation,
we will resist."
He held out hope the North
Vietnamese, despite louder
growlings from Hanoi, would
come to terms. "The Hanoi
tactics are the use of unbri-
dled ferocity," Kissinger said,
"until just before they are
ready to settle."
He outlined a two-track
strategy for peace. "The rapid
road would be negotiation," he
said, "the slow road Vietnami-
zation."
nations. But the document
stressed:
"While s o m e Southeast
Asian leaders would probably
entertain doubts about the
will of the U.S. to play a secu-
rity role in the area, we do not
believe that they would be
panicked into precipitate
changes in policy or posture."
Instead, the document pre-
dicted these leaders would
take a wait-and-see stance.
The estimate also offered a
virtual point-by-point rebuttal
of the so-called "domino
theory" which the Johnson ad-
ministration had so often used
as its rationalization for. con-
tinuing the war.
The document declared, for
example, that Hanoi no doubt
hopes to extend its control
over Laos and Cambodia but
would probably bide its time.
"They might fear some risk
of a new U.S. military re-
sponse," it was suggested.
"Moreover, Hanoi would be
preoccupied for a time at least
with the formidable task of
consolidating Communist rule
in South Vietnam."
The estimate gave this fore-
cast about relations between
Hanoi and Peking in the event
of a Communist triumph in
the south:
"It is possible ... that the
two countries would draw
ploser together ... It seems
more likely, however, that
Hanoi would wish to take the
opportunity to establish quite
clearly its independence of the
C=hinese, relying on continued
Soviet and available Free
World" assistance.
The. document said Peking
could be expected to beat the
propaganda drums over the
expansion of Communist con-
trol. But it added signifi-
cantly: "Current Chinese
strategy does not appear to
call for overt aggression, and
we do not foresee a change in
this strategy."
As for Moscow, the docu-
ment predicted: "The Soviet
Union is not likely to become
a major supporter of Commu-
nist subversion in Southeast
Asia after Vietnam."
mh_ P,[, .TA',,a,Off ce of N Anal I
F L i teswould eoneurre in 1969
t11 o h
Vi m onsume pelf
1 Laos ntlti etnam.
& w u""8 i111tely
fcila i7itci....1 .e . oil unast '
orb~r'
.Thi.s..would., leave,. Southeast
,Asia,,.._thg _ CIA's opinion,
';j= as it is at least"' 16-ran.
eration ~'? ' ?.LL
Whatever the intelligence
assessment, however, Presi-
dent Nixon's political assess-
ment was that he couldn't af-
ford to lose South Vietnam to
the Communists before the
1972 election.
Perhaps he is right that the
"rapid road" to peace, via ne-
gotiation, was illusory. But the
"slow road," which he elected
to take, has cost more than
15,000 American lives since he
took office.
01972, United Feature Syndicate
Slow Road
resident Nixon has trav-
miaA t a a nw rna___ a into
Lom nis & -MIN n Smith
, _ 000:, His
Vygtnamization policy, tiere
ncta. pj jug it.
The President was deter-
mined to hold off the day the
Communists took power in
Saigon, we must conclude, for
his own political reasons. He
simply didn't want the Com-
munists in control of the south
while he was running for re-
election in 1972.
He had reason to regard
Communist control more as a
political problem for himself
than a serious menace to the
U.S. ,.it. the ti; =of hiS.~11-
ion the National Intel
licence 'stiimate was -
s o a ommi;,iL?-
There would be damage, ac-
cording to the estimate to
U.S. prestige and credibhith
among other Southeast A~Sa
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 N" W' t~h "L l c. A(`'~7 k
vpprovect elease 2001/08/288` I'A_ r j 9~0 3002000 * t
`The Human Cost- of Communism'
`If the North takes over the South,
what will the bloodbath be?'
By ROBERT THOMPSON
. LONDON-The present invasion of
South Vietnam and the intense fighting
of the last few weeks draw attention
once again to the human suffering
caused, on an almost unprecedented
scale, to the Vietnamese people by the
continuing war. I am not here consid-
ering the battle casualties which,
although on each side they have prob-
ably reached 500,000, can at least be
regarded as "legitimate" in war.
'Nor am I considering the refugees
who, although their plight may be
tragic, are at least still alive.
What should most concern us is the
number of civilians who have been
killed in both halves of Vietnam, and
those who may yet die in the future, as
part of the human cost of Communism.
The Western conscience is imme-
diately pricked : by an American-
committed atrocity, such as Mylai, and
by the civilian casualties caused by
the bombipg of the North (although
such casualties are now likely to be
far less than during 1965-68 because
of the development of the extremely
accurate "smart" bomb).
Little or no attention, however, and
certainly no' equivalent reporting, has
been given to similar Vietcong or
North Vietnamese atrocities which
have occurred on a scale that' makes
Mylai almost insignificant. These have
not occurred because of some aberra
tion, accident or inaccuracy of bomb-
ing. They have occurred, both selec-
tively and indiscriminately, as a matter
of deliberate policy.
At the time Hanoi complained of six
civilian casualties, as a result of the
first American raid on the North after
the invasion began, she was firing
122-mm. rockets indiscriminately into
Saigon and Pnompenh, killing more
than ten times that number.
Her Russian 130-mm. guns have
pounded Anloc and Quangtri to rubble.
They will do the same to Kontum and
Hue if they get within range without
any consideration whatsoever for the
civilian population.
Everyone has heard of Mylai, but
who has heard of Caibe where the
Vietcong, after its capture, lingered
only to murder the wives and children
of all the local militia? Or of the
Montagnard village of Dakson, where
they moved from hut to hut with
flame-throwers incinerating more than
250 villagers, two-thirds of them women
and children?
Most people have heard of the
massacres at Hue in 1968 where the
Vietcong and North Vietnamese, after
its capture, executed 5,700 people (as
assessed from the mass graves found
afterwards) but who knows that in
captured documents they gloated over
these figures and only complained that
they had not killed enough? These were
not aberrations, nor savagery for sav-
agery's sak nor, the work of undis-
ciplined soYthers atmg in violation of
instructions, but part of a ruthless
deliberate policy designed to break a
people who would not otherwise bend
to their will.
The world cannot plead ignorance
because it has all been well docu-
mented. The evidence has been author-
itatively put together in a compendium
prepared, surprisingly, for the United
States Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary (the meat was obviously too red
for Senator Fulbright and the Foreign
Affairs Committee).
There are distressing implications for
the future. If the invasion succeeds
and the North takes over the South,
what will the bloodbath be? Four years
ago I estimated that it would be several
hundred thousands.
I' now wish to amend that figure
to well over one million (out of
eighteen million people).
The critics of the war may claim
that the forecasts are exaggerated. But
Colonel Tran Van Dac, a North Viet-
namese officer who defected after
twenty-four years in the Communist
party, stated that the Communists, if
they win, would slaughter up to three
million South Vienamese, and another
colonel, Le Xuan Chuyen, who defected
after twenty-one years, stated that five
million people in South Vietnam were
on the Communist "blood debt" list
and that 10-15 per cent of these would
pay with their lives. When asked in
an interview if the possibility of
a bloodbath had been exaggerated he
replied: "It could not be exaggerated.
It will happen."
Sir Robert Thompson is the British
expert on guerrilla warfare who has
undertaken secret missions for Presi-
dent Nixon to report on events in
Vietnam.
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE PAGE
Coieth orisputes
u D
Vietnamese Blood bat
By George C. Wilson
'WS.shington Post Staff Writer
charge by President
d
o eir own
ppo lei when they-- too over
count in the "is a
to accorain to a stua
.,.yes er.. ay , Y
The charges are dispatched
1}~~ a 59-page essa.y by b.'Garelth
Porter, a 30-year-old research
associate at Cornell's inter-
national relations of East Asia
project. Cornell's project of-
fice, in `sendifig out the re-
port, said It deserves "imme-
diate, widespread public at-
tention" because of Mr. Nix
on's frequent references to
the alleged bloodbath in
North Vietnam.
"This bloodbath myth is the
result of a deliberate propa-
ganda campaign by the South
Vietnamese and LJ.S.govern.
ments to discredit" North
Vietnam, Porter says in ' sum
marizing the paper he re-
searched In South Vietnam
and at .oril I. Porter has
been a ct`itic f the Vietnam
war.
The prime source for Presi-
dent Nixon, author Bernard
Fail d ohers ,in describing
the aiege massacre during
the North Vietnamese land re-
form ' from 1953 to 1956 is a
book guilty o! "gross misquo-
tation" and "fraudulent docu-
'ient.atign," Porter alleges.
iip-en
In
enev. ae~oY2Cina to Porter.
ran-
s
He charges Chi also m
now W"WTAffi course arman hichwas plainly not histori-
w
slated Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap's
cal accuracy but propaganda
in Soutlieasi Asia orientation
speech of Oct. 29, 1956, on
at the State Department's a ainsf" o't'h Vietnam, says according
land reform. Giap,
ers President. of
Washington Training Center, Port
Ithe Chi's translation, said the
ed State himself has
, lectur-
was at Ft. Bragg, I.C. the U nit
party "executed too many hon-
to tie t-, -Am iis2f le that
-
ing and could not be reached
est people" and came to re
ai6` tar# a mt'tlton' 11 people
for comment yesterday.
gard torture as normal prac-
tiiinateti. D.
The National Security Coun tice.
cil cited Chi's book as one of
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to
an
sident Nixon's sources for.
laring on April 16, 1971, "I
thjf a half a million, by
eon es rvat>_ve esimletl~?, In
North VietnamwFio wdrre'
dered or otherwise extermi-
nated by the North Vietnam
eseafter they took over from
the South ..."
The President added at that
same news conference that "if
the United States were to fail
in Vietnam, if the Communists
" vvc t''"1d take over, the blood-
bath that would follow would
I be a blot on this nation's his-
tory from which we would
find it very difficult to return
In contrast to CIA's descrip-
tion of Chi as a "former Viet-
minh cadre" who could thus
be expected to have firsthand
knowledge of the land reform
program, Porter asserts that
Chi was never a party member
before leaving the North for
south Vietnam in 1955.
"Mr. Chi was himself a rela-
tively w e a I the landowner,"
Porter clalms on the basis of
an interview with. Chi. Thus,
he argues, Chi could not be
expected to give an unbiased
account of the land reform
Asked by Porter to docu- program.
mdht the President's "half a Western authors like Fall,1
mtllioii" Tigure,' the National says Porter, suffered a "criti-
Security Council quoted Chi cal" shortcoming because they
as writing the following: "The could not read Vietnamese
guilt complex which haunted and thus could not research
the peasants' minds after the the original documents the I
massacre of about 5 per cent North Vietnamese used to
of the total population . . ' communicate with their own
The National Security Council cadre. Fall and others, there-
added on its own that "5 per fore, had to rely on Saigon
cent of the total population ofi and U.S. government summa-
North Vietnam at that time ries of the North Vietnamese !
would be about 700,000." I material or on authors like
"Mr. Chi offers no justifica- Chi. (Porter reads Vietnamese
tion for this allegation" that 5 and said in an interview that j
per cent of the North Viet-' this enabled him to study doc-
I
that went to North VI.
t
s
s mur umen
namese population wa dered, asserts Porter, "but he, etnamese cadre from party
lations (which Porter said
other scholars and Vietnamese
corroborated), Porter alleges
that '`Mr. Chi's translation is
one of his most flagrant
!abuses of documentary evi-
dence."
Donald Brewster is the Na-
tional Security Council staffer
(on loan there from AID) who
discussed the source of Mr.
Nixon's bloodbath figures with
Porter. Brewster told The
Washington Post yesterday
that real and literal meanings
of communist statements are
sometimes two different
things.
Brewster added that the
sources he cited for Porter
"are not the totality" of the
material the White House re-
lied upon. Also, said Brewster,
it is the trend that is most im-
portant, not specific figures.
In that sense, he said, the
trend of Communist actions,
such as North Vietnamese as-
sassinations in Hue, shows
fears of a bloodbath in South
Vietnam are indeed well
founded, just as President
Nixon has stated.
Porter himself said in an in-
terview that he has filed for
conscientious objector status
and would decline to serve in
the military in the Vietnam
war. He is on a year-long fel-
lowship, $5,000 for the aca-
demic year, in pursuit of his
doctorate at Cornell's E.
Asia research center:
In an attempt to show the
danger relying on summaries
and other secondary sources,
Porter charges Chi distorted a
North Vietnamese party (Lao-
dong Party) slogan by saying
it included the phrase, "liqui-
date the landlords." There was
no such phrase, Porter asserts.
Instead, he alleges, the slogan
said: "Abolish the feudal re-
gime of land ownership in a
manner that is discriminating,
methodical and under sound
leadership."
i
t
most of the deaths were those
of children who starved 'owing
to the isolation policy.'
Charges Porter: "This is yet
another of the many wholly
unsubstantiated charges put
forth by Mr. Chi, for there
was no such policy of isolating
families, even of those land-
lords sentenced for serious
c,~rimes during the land
reform .
".YEt ~.it is mainly on the
basis. of Mr. Chirs-totally unre-
liable account, the intention of
GARETH PORTER
Now Vietnam study