STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NUTTER, WARREN G. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000300220016-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 7, 1972
• Content Type: SPEECH

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE G. WARREN NUTTER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
7 MARCH 1972
Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Committee:
It is a privilege to appear today before this Committee to explain
the request for some $2.1 billion dollars in the Defense Budget to support
our allies in Southeast Asia.
Since my last appearance before this Committee, many changes have
taken place in Southeast Asia, and considerable progress has been made
toward achievement of our objectives. Those objectives must be viewed
in the broader context of our overall policy in-Asia. Secretary Laird,
in his report on National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence,
has summed up our role in Asia as follows:
"The United States is a Pacific power, and as such must recognize
and accept its responsibilities in the area. We seek to do so as
a partner, as one of a group of concerned nations acting in concert.
It is our objective to support our allies and fulfill our treaty
commitments in the context of the Nixon Doctrine."
It is to implement that objective -- to support our allies and fulfill
our commitments -- that these requested funds are needed.
We intend to use these funds to translate the principles of the
Nixon Doctrine into concrete form as that Doctrine relates to Southeast
Asia. These principles require.that the US keep its treaty commitments,
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that the country threatened be primarily responsible for its own defense,
and that the US provide assistance when its interests are involved. If
the principles are to be implemented, our allies must have the military
hardware, the training, and the organization needed for a realistic
deterrent.
That we are moving in the right direction is clearly shown by the
reduction in our military presence in East Asia. Secretary Laird
points this out in his report:
"Last year I noted that we do not plan for the long term to maintain
separate large US ground combat forces specifically oriented to the
Asian theater alone, but we do intend to maintain strong air, naval
and support capabilities. To serve as a deterrent and to support
our allies, we continue, of course, to maintain balanced, forward
deployed ground, air and naval forces in the Asian theater. However,
we expect to continue to emphasize the strengthening of the military
capabilities of our friends and allies, as we move toward Nixon
Doctrine peacetime deterrent forces."
There were approximately 825,000 US military personnel in East Asia on
30 June 1969. There are now less than half that many. In Vietnam the
present US strength is under 120,000 as opposed to 538,700 in mid-1969.
In Thailand, US forces have dropped from 47,500 to 32,000. In the
Philippines the reduction has been approximately 9,000 and in Korea
about 20,000. Yet we continue, in cooperation with our allies, to contain
Communist expansion and subversion and to demonstrate that we are in fact
a Pacific power dedicated to creating the conditions necessary for a
generation of peace.
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Progress is also evidenced by successful implementation of our
Vietnamization program, and by continued existence of a viable govern-
ment in the sorely pressed country of Laos. We have simultaneously
achieved a reduction in overall requirements for funds to support our
effort.
In 1969, President Nixon launched the process of progressively turn-
ing over defense responsibilities to the South Vietnamese and thereby
reducing US involvement. Vietnam became the test case and the first
crucial step in implementing the Nixon Doctrine. The viability and,
effectiveness of the Nixon Doctrine, as applied in Vietnam, have been
demonstrated by the record of our Vietnamization policy. Now, in 1972,
we can examine with considerable pride the accomplishmepts of the past
three years. As the President recently outlined in his report to the
Congress:
-- There has been a steady decline in American forces over the past
three years, with over 400,000 of our troops withdrawn. The
authorized American troop level on February 1, 1972 was 139,000.
The further withdrawal announced on January 13 will bring our
forces down to 69,000 by May 1, 1972. That authorized force
level will represent an 87 percent reduction from the level
inherited by this Administration.
-- American combat deaths averaged 278 per week in 1968. They were
down to 26 in all of 1971 and to 11 in the last half. Close to
60 percent of all US casualties during this Administration
occurred in 1969, including 40 percent during the first six
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months -- before our programs had a chance to take hold. Despite
its vastly greater role in the war, South Vietnam has also exper-
ienced a decline in its casualties from the 1968 level.
In 1971 Americans flew a monthly average of 11,000 attack sorties
in Indochina, including only 1,500 in South Vietnam, representing
declines of about 70 percent and 90 percent respectively from
the 1968 levels.
Average monthly US draft calls declined to 7,500 in 1971, one-
fourth the 1968 figure.
During 1971 the South Vietnamese army, up to 1.1 million from
the 1968 level of 800,000, conducted twenty major combat engage-
ments for every one involving US forces. By year's end, US
forces had shifted essentially to a defensive and base security
role.
In the country side, at the close of 1971 approximately 73 percent
of the rural population was under South Vietnamese government
control, with 24 percent contested and 3 percent still in enemy
hands. Including the now secure urban population of 6 million,
over 80 percent of the total South Vietnamese population was
under GVN control.
South Vietnamese economic reforms have reduced inflation to 15
percent annually, turned over more than 800,000 acres of land to
tenant farmers, and laid the grounds for long range economic
development.
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-- The additional costs of the war have steadily dropped and total
$7 billion in the current fiscal year, down by almost 65 percent
from the costs three years ago.
These accomplishments are reflected in the Vietnamization program,
which was planned in three phases:
Phase I: Assumption by South Vietnam of the ground combat role
against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. Phase I was
completed last year.
Phase II: Development by South Vietnam of those support capa-
bilities -- air, naval, artillery, logistics, and other --
necessary to maintain effective security. Major,progress was
made last year in these areas, notably including the South Viet-
namese assumption of in-country naval operations and a very sub-
stantial portion of the in-country air combat responsibilities.
Phase III: Reduction of American presence to a military advisory
mission, with whatever small security forces are needed to pro-
tect this mission, and then further reductions as South Vietnam
becomes capable of handling the threat with no US military
presence required.
Our activity in Indochina has been and will continue to be in conso-
nance with the goals we established at the beginning of Vietnamization.
We seek to:
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6.
-- Maintain our obligations and interests in Asia as we move toward
a generation of peace;
-- Reduce American casualties:
-- Secure the release of our prisoners of war and an accounting
for our missing in action;
-- Continue to withdraw US forces; and
-- Transfer military responsibility to the Republic of Vietnam in.
a way that provides the South Vietnamese with a realistic capa-
bility to defend itself against aggression.
In sum, the major part of our Vietnamization program has been accom-
plished and we are ahead of schedule on the tasks that remain. The
philosophy that predominated as we assumed office in 1969 of a US
"takeover" of military activities in South Vietnam has been superseded
by the reality now of a US "turnover" of responsibility for continued
combat operations, as every statistical indicator confirms. Vietnamese
forces have demonstrated professional skill, valor, and combined-arms
effectiveness in their operations to date. Particularly noteworthy has
been the ability of the Vietnamese to operate away from their permanent
bases in areas the enemy has occupied for years. While we cannot expect
the South Vietnamese to win every battle, their effectiveness should
increase even more as they gain more-confidence and strength.
The funds requested under the Military Assistance Service Funded
(MASF) program are necessary if we are to sustain the success of Viet-
namization. These funds will provide the materiel and equipment that
can enable South Vietnam to provide for its security and meet the enemy
threat with even less reliance on US support.
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Our MASF programs are carefully developed and based on the force
structure we have assisted the South Vietnamese to organize, train, and
deploy. This force has been designed at General Abrams' headquarters
in consultation with the South Vietnamese, reviewed by CINCPAC and the JCS,
and approved by the Secretary of Defense. The Consolidated Republic of
Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) pro-
vides for continuous review of the force structure so that it can be
modified as the situation requires.
By helping the GVN to maintain a strong armed force, we are reducing
their reliance on US support and permitting large reductions in the number
of US military personnel required in Vietnam. As I have noted, our in-
country troop strength has declined by over 400,000 men, since 1969 and
will be reduced still further in the months ahead.
~So far, I have described the military implications of MASF, for it
is military requirements that justify MASF requests. There is also
another aspect that bears mention, namely, that MASF support relieves
the Government of Vietnam of some of the tremendous financial burden of
maintaining the type of force necessary to counter its persistent enemy.
This relief permits South Vietnam to assume more responsive control over
its budget and thereby contributes to economic stability. Further, MASF
support provides to South Vietnam the "breathing room" it needs to respond
to the economic guidance we have been offering for development of a self-
reliant economy. In effect then, beyond the military aspects, our MASF
program is also setting the stage for assumption by South Vietnam of a
greater share of the economic burden of the war so that there may be
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further reductions in our MASF requests in the future. The estimated
MASF program to South Vietnam totals $1.6 billion for FY 1973.
An important element of free world support to the South Vietnamese
in their struggle against incursions from the north has been the presence
in South Vietnam of a sizeable force of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Our
aid to the ROK has enabled it to send two army divisions, a Marine brigade,
and certain other support elements to South Vietnam in response to requests
for assistance from the Vietnamese. The Koreans recall the assistance
given to their nation when it was threatened in a similar manner. They
have suffered a loss of 4,030 killed and another 7,656 wounded in Viet-
nam as of February this year.
The ROK forces protect an important geographical segment of South
Vietnam and help provide time for Vietnamization to take place. As the
US forces in South Vietnam have been reduced, the ROK, after consultation
with the South Vietnamese, has also reduced its forces. The Marine brigade
and certain support units, amounting to approximately 10,000 men, have been
or are in the process of being returned home. Negotiations are underway
now between the ROK and GVN regarding the future deployment of the two
divisions remaining in South Vietnam.
The $134 million requested for the support of ROK forces in South
Vietnam is, therefore, our best estimate of what is required to support
the continued presence of two divisions of ROK troops in South Vietnam
in FY 1973. Major categories of support include subsistence, attrition
equipment, and ammunition.
T
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Our military assistance to Laos, which is also funded within the
MASF, is undertaken to sustain the legitimate government of Laos in its
efforts to oppose the aggression of the North Vietnamese Army. North
Vietnam has, ever since the ink was scarcely dry on the 1962 Geneva
Agreements, without regard either for the Agreements or for Laotian
sovereignty, used infiltration corridors in Southern Laos and attacked
Royal Laotian forces elsewhere in Laos.
Certain decisions regarding budgeting and logistic support for Laos
have been made over the past year. In sum, all military assistance to
Laos will be budgeted and furnished by the Defense Department. Whereas
in the past some of these costs were contained in the CIA budget, in
FY 1973 they will be in the DOD budget. While arrangements for control
of the US effort within the country team in Laos are not changed, the
DOD will procure and deliver the materiel resources. This change, plus
a modest response to the increased level of North Vietnamese aggression,
account for the increased MASF funds for Laos from $240.3 million in
FY 1972 to $360 million in FY 1973.
The specific requirements for military assistance are carefully
examined. The program is developed by Deputy Chief, Joint US Military
Assistance Group, Thailand -- DepChief -- and submitted to CINCPAC.
DepChief has recently been located at Udorn Royal Thai Air Base,
in recognition of the requirements of the Geneva Agreements, but his
mission is to provide military assistance to Laos. He is treated as a
member oFthe country team and develops the military assistance require-
ments in collaboration with other elements of the country team that are
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more directly involved in the conduct of hostilities. Thus both DepChief
and CINCPAC validate the contents of the military assistance program,
and DOD approves it. I believe that unless the North Vietnamese greatly
reduce their aggression in Laos, the requested figure is the minimum
essential to accomplish our objectives in Laos.
The budget request of $2,055 million for the entire MASF program
represents a reduction from the request last year and in FY 1971. In
both FY 1971 and FY 1972 approximately $2,300 million was required. The
cost of supporting the South Vietnamese and the Laotians in their efforts
to preserve their national integrity is indeed large. However, if we are
able to achieve a generation of peace, then these allies must be able to
demonstrate to those threatening them that the best solytion to the
problems of the area lies not in battlefield confrontation but in co-
operation at the conference table. Our past efforts have involved con-
siderable sacrifice, both in men and money, but are now showing results.
The request for funds in FY 1973 has been developed with much thought
and consultation based on our past experience and with the full con-
sciousness at all echelons of the necessity for austerity while getting
the job done. I solicit your favorable consideration of this request.
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