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December 16, 2016
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June 29, 2005
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March 1, 1972
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EAR'S Approved For Release 20119'A-RDP74B00415R000400170054-7 A Short History of CIA-1 ntervention in Sixteen Foreign Countries In July, 1947, Congress passed one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the history of America in peacetime. The National Security Act of 1947 created The National Security Council, the Department of Defcn,' , fhe Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Air Force and, not least of all, the CIA. This act provided the Agency with five principal duties: 1. To advise the National Security Council on matters concern- ing intelligence. 2. To make recommendations for the coordination of such intel- ligence matters. 3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and disseminate it to other government departments. .4. To perform "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally." 3. To perform "such other functions and duties as the NSC would direct.'." In 1949 Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency'Act, allowing the* agencyto disregard laws that required disclosure of information concerning the organization, to expend funds without regard to laws and regulations governing expenditures with.no other accounting than the Director's vouchers, and to make contracts and.purchases without advertising. With such unprecedented au- thority, with unlimited access to money,; with liberty to act with- f ut regard to scrutiny or review y either civilian or governmental rganizations, the CIA has become a self- fontained state. One observer ranks the CIA as he fourth world power, after the U.S, Russia, and hina. Partly because of the CIA's special "secret" status and partly because of the laziness of the press, the total history of CIA intervention in foreign coun- tries has never been reported. What you read instead are fragments-an attempted bribe in Mexico last July, an assassination in Africa last November. What emerges here is an atlas of intrigue but not a grand design; on the contrary, the CIA's record is as erratic and contradictory as that of any bureaucracy in the Federal stable. But you -do begin to comprehend the enormous size of the CIA and its ruthless behavior. The rules permit murder, defoliation and drug addiction for Political, ends. Look at the record: ~{:Fnr RplPace 2005/07/1.3: CIA-RD074BI Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA FIY48?M4$R(?004041 064xVe Bolivian people and STAT Mohammed Mossadegh, Iran Army took the reins of power from the National Revolu. tionary Movement and appointed Antonio Arguedas as Minister of the Interior. Within two months he was ap- proached by United States Air Force Colonel Edward Fox. Fox told Arguedas to resign his new post or economic aid to Bolivia would be suspended. Soon after his resignation Arguedas was approached by a known CIA operative and asked to co-operate with them in a secret mission, and in return the CIA, 'working behind the State Department's back, pledged to restore Arguedas as Minister of the In- terior. When Arguedas was back in office the CIA requested that he exercise authority on an American mining claim. When Arguedas claimed that he could do nothing, the CIA attempted to frame him with pro-Castro/Guevera docu- ments. Luckily Arguedas saw the ploy and related the. entire story at a press conference held in Peru several days later. BOLIVIA: 1971 A CIA "Brain trust" was formed for the specific purpose of gathering together exiled leaders of several Latin American countries. Victor Paz Estenssoro, former President of Bolivia,' was contacted by the Agency while residing in Lima, Peru. A revolt was arranged to re- turn Paz to power. But the agency's plans went unexpectedly awry when Colonel Hugo Banzer took over the office just prior to Paz's triumphant return. BRITISH GUIANA : 1962-66 CIA operations in British Guiana revealed the extent to which the Agency has pene- trated the mainstream of American life. Cheddi Jagan, the Marxist-oriented Premier of British Guiana was not trusted by the US. The CIA through operatives in AFL-CIO affil- iated unions supported lengthy strikes in this small South American country in their eventually successful effort to overthrow Jagan. Approximately $1,000,000 of American union and government money was channelled through the CIA-controlled affiliate unions. BRAZIL: 1965 Organized labor again became a tool of the CIA in its effort to break up the politically active labor unions of Brazil. Masquerading as the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers, the CIA funnelled $30,000 into various Brazilian petroleum unions, persuad- ing them to join vt ith the Interamerican Regional Organ- ization of Workers, ..i AFL-CIO affiliate. So far the CIA has been successful in its efforts. CHILE: 1970 With Marxist-leaning Salvador Allende as President, Chile is currently beyond the bounds of CIA activities. The policy of the agency is to "wait and see." The CIA hopes that Allende's socialization program will go sour with the peasants within the next year and a half, and that the country will be ripe for a takeover by Allende's pred- ecessor, Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat. CONGO: The CIA, fearing Soviet influence on the new republic, chose to support Joseph Mobutu as their champion ver Patrice Lumumba, whom the agency claimed wasepAT much influenced by the Communists. Although there is`iib direct evidence there have been many implications that the CIA was instrumental in Lumumba's murder. Many of the CIA and State Department personnel were later moved nearly en masse from the Congo to Laos under the assump- a Ave r Release 2005/0.7/, ion that similar situations required similar solutions. -RDP74B00415R000400170054-7 't I r,c~ec? STAT Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000400170054-7 move against Guzman in June of 1954 with L ` John F. Kennedy of expropriating 225,000 acres of United Fruit Company holdings. The U.S. started to COSTA RICA: 1954-56 Jose Figueres. was a moderate socialist who became President of this small democratic country in an open election in 1953. His presence was particularly bothersome to the CIA because of Figueres' government policy allowing asylum to anyone who desired it. The CIA accordingly saw this as a strain upon their in- telligence gathering and surveillance capabilities. To get rid of Figueres the CIA engineered a twofold plan; first, to create embarrassment within the Communist Party, and second to somehow link Figueres with the Communists. The first succeeded in creating confusion within the State De- partment, since the straight diplomats hadn't been informed of the plan; and the second failed entirely. The agency also managed to work at cross purposes with the US Ambassa- dor, who at the same time had been urging President Eisenhower to invite Figueres to Washington in order to lend him a measure of prestige. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 1962 Through contacts with the CIA made by the American Con>ulate, two prominent landowners and former politicians conspired with the help of the CIA to assassinate Rafael Trujillo, the arrogant dictator of this small Carribbean nation. EGYPT: 1952 Seeing no advantage in supporting the de- caying monarchy of King Farouk, the CIA played an import- ant role in support of the revolt that placed General Naguib and?Gamal Abdul Nasser at the head of the country. Nasser, though, proved to be more independent than the US govern- ment would have liked; so the State Department convinced President Eisenhower to refuse American aid in building the Aswan Dam. GUATEMALA: 1954 One of the most tragic examples of CIA intervention in foreign affairs was the Guatemalan Revolution of 1954. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, the popularly elected socialist President of the small country was a man marked by the CIA. Guzman had become too friendly with the Soviet Union, and had committed the unpardonable sin monist." Approved ForRelease 2005/01`3 CIA B00415R000406170054-7 and prepared to unload 2,000 tons of Czechoslovakian arma. ments. The Arbenz govern- ment fell in ten days and Castillo-Armas' repressive regime took over, fully sanc- tioned by the CIA. One of the first actions of the new government was to appoint "defense committees" which could meet in secret and declare anyone a "Com- patiently for the right moment-to move against the Arbenz government. That moment came when a Swedish freighter docked at Puerto Barrios trained men in Honduras and waited f? trained Guatemalan Colonel, the agency the CIA calling the shots. Supporting and Allan Dulles, U.S. INDONESIA: 1958 Washington became annoyed at Presi- STAT Cheddi Jagan, British Guiana dent Sukarno's leftist tendencies. He had'become friendly with the Soviets, began expropriating huge tracts of former Dutch properties, and welcomed a Communist coalition into his Jakarta government. With the wild riches of the In- donesian Archipelago at stake, the CIA took to the air to strike at the Sukarno government. Once again the familiar scenario emerged: the State Department denied everything while the CIA flew its B-26 bombers out of the southern Philippines, raining bombs on the small islands populated by Indonesians partial to Sukarno. When one American pilot was shot down over Ambonia in the Spring of 1958, the State Department in Washington was left to answer for the CIA. IRAN: 1953 Mohammed Mossadegh, the Shah-appointed Premier of Iran, bowed to popular sentiment and nation- alized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1953. The action spawned a boycott of Iranian oil and the economy began to falter. In the face of these conditions, the British and American governments decided that Mossadegh would be better done away with. Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt, the grandson of Teddy, illegally entered the country and began organizing CIA operatives to overthrow Mossadegh. Roosevelt did his job well. Mossadegh? was promptly ar- rested and the Shah returned from unofficial exile in Rome. The incident also worked well for American business. The British. lost their monopoly and a consortium of Gulf Oil, Standard Oil and Mobil Oil received 40 percent of the con- cession in a reorganization of the former company. Roose- velt later left the CIA officially to take a position with Gulf. IRAQ: 1958 The CIA was lesss successful in Iraq than it was in Iran in 1953. The revolution killed King Feisal but the new government. was faced with a series of revolts from various tribal factions who were angered at the murder of Feisal. This instability was encouraged by the CIA, who actively supported the tribes. Because of the oil companies, it was mandatory to maintain a friendly pro-Western government in Iraq, so the CIA'worked to offset the Arab Unity cries beaming from Radio Cairo by setting up many of their own clandestine stations. JORDAN: 1958 King Hussein's pro-Western sentiments had shackled pro-Arab factions within the country and weakened the all-Arab alliance. The CIA stayed in Jordan to protect these sentiments and successfully repulsed two separate rebellions against the crown. i LAOS: 1960-present Since the French withdrawal from Indo-China in 1954, Laos has been in turmoil. The CIA ___ __ - f s. i na e activity o e o g over the past 20 years in Laos. In December, 1959, the high-living right-wing military leader, Phoumi No- souvan, was assisted by the-CIA in overthrowing the US State Department-supported government of Phoui Sananikone. Using rigged elections inApril 1960, the CIA was able to keep Nosouvan in power. When Nosouvan himself was overthrown by a determined young paratrooper, the CIA assisted Nosouvan in set- ting up his military government further down the Me- knng in the province of Savannaket. The State De- partment sided with the paratrooper, tong Le. Approver or Releag 2005/07113: CIA-RDP74BOO415R000400170054-7 r,t ; r c Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP74B00.415R000400170054-7 with the North Vietnamese incursions onto Lagttan territory, the CIA has been actively trying to organize the hilltribe people who are scattered throughout the moun- tains of Indochina. PORTUGUESE ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. 1965 A number of planes were flown from the United States to Portugal for use against black liberation move- ments in these countries.' During a rather bizarre trial, the two men apprehended openly admitted, just as Francis Gary powers had before them, that they worked for the CIA and ,that the planes were flown across the United States and through Customs with the full knowledge of a number of government agencies. Seven planes eventually reached Africa. URUGUAY: 1969-71 Using martial law to quell the student and worker disturbances in this bankrupt country, President Jorge Pacheco Areco, with the assistance of in- country CIA operatives, is pressing- 'or an amendment to the Uruguayan constitution which ..uauld allow him to run again for President. VIETNAM: 1955-present The CIA has been involved in a myriad of activities since the CIA's predecessor-the Office of Secret Services-left the Indochinese theater soon after WW II. The Agency's influence has permeated the entire range of US policy in Vietnam. It was the CIA which at first developed the "intimate" relationship between President Diem and Madame Nhu. It was also the CIA which plotted with the Buddhists several years later to have Diem assas- sinated. The CIA was designed to collect intelligence, but as the scope of the war expanded, so did the agency. The CIA originated the "pacification effort" and agents were given carte blanche to make it work. With CIA funds they formed Revolutionary Development Cadre teams assigned to per- form "good deeds" for the villagers. But their real function was to collect intelligence and serve as militia. The Agency also set up the Vietnamese FBI and works clo el with the USAID people to co-ordinate police s y activities at the village level. They were previously involved E{ Ngo Dinh Diem, Vietnam J. Z hlands of Cen- Hi h i d g e n t s gnar with the. training of lviontatral Viet-Nam but have since turned that responsibility over to the Special Forces. The CIA organized intelligence col- lection systems which could be co-ordinated with mobile CIA troops (The Provincial Recon Unit-PRU). This short history of CIA activities defines three charac- teristics of the Agency's operations: i )~ hat tl ci4. use any means.to_achieve it goal&42).#hca s_gools are c Utra= Actory and often only self-interested43) .a.nd._.tbat rn pursrt- ,ing .the;. goals,-the - agency frequently contracts alliances c thal_ dominates thW, are, even in terms of the realpoli CIA thinking, self-defeating to the UnitecLStgtps. The game goes on, because eve allow it to. In the past, perhaps our acquiescence has been based on a feeling that it only happens over there, that CIA subversion has had no material effect at home. But in the light of recent research by Peter Scott [see pages 35 to 42 ] and others, it begins to look like the CIA is also a crucial force in the sub- version of American culture. The means? Heroin addiction. The CIA's natural ally? The National Crime Syndicate. Thegoal? Who knows? -Victor. Bedoian. Approved For Release 2005/07/1.3: CIA-RDP74B