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July 11, 1972
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OGC Has Reviewed Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 CONFIDENTIAL OLC 72-0786 11 July 1972 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Developments During Your Absence 1. Representative Rangel Request for Reports on Drug Traffic. You will recall that on 13 June I wrote Rangel saying that in view of his continued interest in obtaining copies of certain Agency reports on the illicit drug traffic, we were reexamining the possibility of declassifying at least some of these reports. On 28 June, Rangel wrote Ingersoll of BNDD requesting the same material. Ingersoll has referred the request to us. (Tab A) The whole problem has been taken up with the White House, where Walter Minick, Bud Krogh's deputy, apparently opposes declassification of any material on the illicit drug traffic. The matter is now being reviewed by David Young, Executive Secretary of the Interagency Review Committee on Classification, whose decision is expected momentarily. If Young agrees with Minick that none of the reports can be released, we should be prepared for possible legal action, and OGC has been in touch with Justice in this regard. Rangel seems determined to press for a showdown. On 10 July he issued a public statement charging that CIA's "paranoid quest for secrecy" was keeping vital information about the drug traffic from the American public, and that we were "covering up for the international merchants of death." (Tab B) 2, Representative Aspi-n's Letter on Opium Smuggling. Aspin's 27 June letter to you which appeared in the Congressional Record on that date was received by the Agency on 3 July. We immediately asked Aspin's office for the "additional information" which he said he had received from Alfred McCoy. Upon examination, this additional information DOJ review(s) completed. ???,??????? EXEMPT FROM RENERAL CETAASSiFICATIOR OF E. O. 11U.:2, CATEaRY: - ? ER(1), (D, (dr :le or.t cr more) ON Approval of DCI CONFIDENTIAL 1 (unless impassliAs, insert dute or eunt) CLASSIFIED BY Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 CRC, 2/13/2003 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 CONFISENTIAL appears to be essentially the same as that which McCoy had provided the Proxmire Subcommittee in support of his testimony there several weeks ago. (See Tab C for that portion of the material McCoy provided Aspin which deals with the Agency and Air America.) FE has requested the field to report on the detailed allegations. Attached at Tab D is a copy of Aspin's 27 June letter to you, together with an excerpt from the Congressional Record of 30 June containing Charlie Gubser's comments and a copy of your reply to Aspin. 3. Allegations of Preferential Treatment Being Given to Air America. Scoop Jackson has received a letter (Tab E) from an outfit in Vientiane called Lao Air Development which complains that Air America is overcharging U.S. agencies and which offers comparable services at substantially lower rates. Craig Jarrell, who signed the letter, claims he is in touch with Jack Anderson on the matter. We promised Jackson's office we would check on the facts, which DDS is doing. 4. Legislative Interdepartmental Group Meeting. At a 7 July LIG meeting serious concern was expressed regarding the Mansfield "end the war" amendment. Apparently the Administration is dismayed to learn that perhaps a dozen senators whose support it had assumed, such as Chuck Percy and Jim Pearson of the Foreign Relations Committee, have turned out to be "fence sitters" despite some active lobbying by Kissinger. It is planned that after Congress reconvenes, Kissinger will entertain the "fence sitters" at a breakfast and try to win them over, hoping that the Democratic disarray following the convention, coupled with expected ARVN military successes, will strengthen his appeal. 5. Armed Services Committee Investigation of LaVelle Case. Stennis has sent Jim Woolsey and Larry Garcia, of the Committee staff, to Saigon to investigate the LaVelle case. The station has been alerted to show them appropriate courtesies but avoid any discussion of the LaVelle matter. 2 CONFIDEUTIAL Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 CONFIDENTML 6. Interest in Hersh Articles on "Rainmaking." On 5 July John Goldsmith called to say he had seen Seymour Herskis New York Times story of 3 July (Tab F) alleging Agency involvement in "rainmaking" in Indochina. He said that in view of the concern the story would probably create on the Hill, he was calling it to Stennis' attention, with the suggestion that Stennis get himself briefed on the matter so he could respond to the questions that were likely to come up. In view of Hersh's second story on the same subject on 9 July (Tab G), we should be ready for queries by both friend and foe. Cr'e,-; S 7. Scheduled Congressional Appearance. rc, rk t 5u 13 ().r 1 C. 4k. 4.) tAAALAk. I- C abiel tv 14 if House Foreign Affairs has you tentatively scheduleeto appear on 27 July to discuss Soviet strategic weapons and SALT verification. Presumably the text you used before Senate Foreign Relations with little or 25X1 no modification would be responsive to their request. 25X1 Attachments: Tabs A - G 3 s). 4 I CA ef g (.7 k,t dr?oull (a_ke C...) _Legislative Counsel Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 ? Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Thc. lionorablo 1:nar.l.z.,,,s RanrYol U.. S. liouso or Ecxeccntaivos Was:thritoa, D. C. 20515 ? This 13 In 'oply to your lettor a June.2, 1072, roquostinz cortain documeats. scralina. you thwo pro4lucod by ZZIDD mad havo tho 1210...ty 07 Sort1.7',7, yolPabIrcz:.).:yrI to tilo Ccntrcti ixUigc Azzr.:_ry r tLoir roxard to floc? tiocualoats which ?Icy X:X caz. ba cd ivathor azdzZaLco. plienr42 lot rilo know. Slacorc3, Joi--.z1 E. liwzorcoll Alractor Ew,clo "TL c: vio,21d Drtla Maf.',I1071 , "Lci:ra ',r,..11.0 United, aates and Approved ForRelease2009/04/14 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 CHARLES B. RANGEL 10131CONOIWPRIOhlAt. DIRTM(T '%1111r N. ICK SWYGCRT ADMINILITRATIVIg ASsIOTANT HOOSG ()remit ClUIL.DINO WASHINGTON, D.C. 20516 TC?crtioNci 202-226-4365 Ccingrax tbt raniteb a>tates-3 31)cituSe oi 3.a.epreentritibeZ Warsbinaton, 20515 June 28, 1972 John E. Ingersoll, Director Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 1405 I Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20537 Dear Mr. Ingersoll: NUM VIRGiTIIA 13ELL OIRTRIOT ADMIt.13TPATOR 144 WELT 125TH GTRE;11T NcW 'now, NEW YORK 10021 TELIZPHONCs 666-6600 As you know, the Select Committee on Crime has been holding hearings in New York and Washington on drug use in our public schools. Each witness makes it more clear that heroin addiction among our youth cannot be wiped out as long as heroin is smuggled into this country. I know that this, too, is your feeling and that of BNDD. In order to make it harder for Congress to ignore this critical :problem, it is most imperative that we have as much information as possible on heroin trafficking and the smuggling of other dangerous drugs. "The World Opium Situation," which your office was kind .enough to provide me last year was-of great assistance in this regard. would deeply appreciate your providing me with the following reports as well dealing with international drug traffic: "Opium Production and Movement in the Near East and South Asia" "The Cocaine Situation in Latin.America" "Chemical Requirements for Opium Refining in Southeast Asia" "The Illicit Production and Movement of Opiates in Latin America" "Opium Poppy Cultivation in Northern Thailand" Opium Production and Movement in Southeast Asia" "Paraguay--Heroin Crossroads of South America" "Recent Trends in the Illicit Narcotics Market in Southeast Asia" "The French-Turkish Connection: The Movement of Opium and Morphine Base from Turkey to France." Thank you for your attention to this most important request. With best regards, I am, ,ncer /19 4 e"/?B. Rangel Member of Congress CBR:e Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 DISTRIBUTION: DDCI ExD DCl/IC DDI DDS DDP(2) DDS/T D/OCT (')NE OSR OSI (2) Ch/OpsCn PDB INDICO 25X1 CSDO(3) 1W SAVA- OSD mea f'eT wh eur Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 ..,001hEIA PRESS ITEM FOR THE DCI DATE: 10 Jul ITEM: NO,_ 12_ REF ; NO. UPI-092 (CIA) WASHINGTON--REP. CHARtSL RANGEL, D-N.Y., SAID TODAY A "PARANOID QUEST FOR SECRECY" IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) IS KEEPING INFORMATION ABOUT DRUG TRAFFIC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA FROM THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. RANGEL, A MEMBER OF THL HOUSE SELECT COMMITILk, ON GRIM., SAID THE CIA HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUSED HIS REQUESTS FOR REPORTS ON OPIUM AND HEROIN TRAFFICKING IN THE AREA, ALTHOUGH SOME ARE ALREADY PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OR ARE AVAILABLE FROM OTHER AGENCIES. "THIS BUREAUCRATIC BUNGLING AND PARANOID QUEST FOR SECRECY ON THE PART OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS PREVENTED CONGRESS FROM EFFiCTIVELY DETERMINING WHICH OF OUR SO-CALLED 'ALLIES' ARE PROFITEERING IN HEROIN," HE SAID IN A STATEMENT. "EACH CITIZEN HAS THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO KNOW WHAT IS IN THESE REPORTS -- WHICH GOVr.RNMi.NIS ALLOW DRUG PRODUCTION TO FLOURISH AT THE EXPENSI'. OF OUR CHILDREN'S LIVES." RANGL SAID NINE REPORTS HE IS SEEKING FROM THE CIA NAME THr INDIVIDUALS, TRIBES, GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND PLACES INVOLVED IN HEROIN TRAFFICKING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. BUT HE SAID THE AGENCY HAS CLASSIFIt-D THE REPORTS AND HAS REFUSED TO GIVE THEM TO HIM. "IT IS TIME FOR THE CIA TO STOP PLAYING GAMES AND TO STOP COVERING UP FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MERCHANTS OF DEATH so4,119 HE SAID. YM 7-10 Comment: 25X1 These comments represent the initica and tentative reaction of the Office of Current Intelligence to the attaohad item fram ti4 ?.,. eervices. Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 IV. CIA AND AIR AMERICA INVOLVEMENT Nelson Gross quoted the Managing Director of Air America, who called my charge that Air America aircraft have been transporting opium "utterly and absolutely false." Air America's involvement has been confirmed by Gen. Guano and by Gen. Thao Ma, former commander of the Laotian Air Force, who refused to carry opium for Gen. Guano. I spent six days in August, 1971 in the opium-growing Moo village of Long Pot, Laos. Ger Su Yang, the District officer, told me: Meo officers with three Or four stripes [captain or more] came from Long Tieng to buy our opium. They came in American helicopters, perhaps two or three men at one time. The helicopter leaves them here for a few days and they walk to villages over there, then come back here and radioed Long Tieng to send another helicopter for them. They take the opium back to Long Tieng. This account was verified by everyone I talked with. Ger Su Yang also reported that the helicopter pilots were always Americans. Flora Lewis, writing in The Washington'Fost on July 23, 1971, said: The CIA has changed its rules in an attempt to stop the use of its private airline, Air America, for transport of drugs [opium and heroin] in Laos. Although only two months. ago CIA director Richard Helms adamantly denied there had been any agency involvement in this traffic, he is now said to have told a secret Congressional hearing that there was involvement but it has stopped.. Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 LES ASPIN HIT DISTRICT, WISCONSIN HOME OFFICES: 603 MAIN STREET I3AcmE, WiscoN5IN 53403 414-632-8194 210 DODGE STREET JANESVILLE, WISCONSIN 53545 608-752-9074 C,"?14-v,. m3'.5 Ilyz, 'ErLittL, atal-zi1 Ti)citz2 of ..A.epriellittatilla alcztinc,lort, =J1).C. 20515 June 27, 1972 Mr. Richard Helms, Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Helms: At-284ED SERVICES COMMITTEE SE BCOM M ITT EE: ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE #4 WASHINGTON OFFICE: 515 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE EiOILDING 202-225-3031 I am publicly releasing today substantial new evidence that indicates that U.S. pilots flying CIA-operated helicopters have been smuggling opium inside Laos. These allegations are contained in a letter and additional information that I have received from Mr. Alfred McCoy, author of a forth- coming book on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. If these allegations are true, then the CIA is implicated in fostering the drug trdffic that ruins the lives of tens of thousands of Americans. I am writing to you today to request that you thoroughly investigate Mr. McCoy's allegations. Since Mr. McCoy obtained his information last summer, it is imperative to determine whether this kind of drug trafficking is still going on. A principal unanswered question which the CIA must resolve is: "At what level in the CIA were officials aware of this illicit drug traffic?". I hope that you will report tme in full he results of your investigation. LA:bk Thank you for your cooperat ( a Le A spin Merrfer of C' ngress Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Utik)11.4 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 CONGRiiSSION as loas of Remarks June 30, 1972 CIA DOES NOT SMUGGLE OPIUM HON. CHARLES S. CUBSER OLIN LA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 71"ii,laSday?fune 29, 1972 . GUBSER, Sneaker, once again there has been an upsurge in charges alleging direct CIA involvement, in drug traffic in Southeast Asia. These allega- tions have proven false in the past. Last year I personally looked into similar. charges and I am satisfied myself that they Were Wit:H(1/dt substance. Moreover, in April 1.971, Mr. Richard Nelms, Di- rector of Central Intelligence, made a public categorical denial of Agency in- volvement in drug traffic. before the American i`i_iciciety of Newspaper Editors.' life has personally reaffirmed tins denial to ine. What the facts actually dem- onstrated was that the CIA is cooperating closely with other Government agencies in a concerted effort to curb the world drug traffic.. The efforts of these U.S. agencies are designed to persuade conn- tries, which for centuries have accepted the growth or local consumption of illicit drugs, to take stringent steps against such practices. They are also cooperating to eliminate the flow of these drugs into the 'United States. Most recently, Mr. Alfred McCoy, a graduate student who is about to pub- lish a book on the drug traffic in South- east Asia, has made the same charges against the CIA,. in early june, he aired his charges before a Senate subcom- mittee and received considerable pub- licity. Immediately after Mr. McCoy's testimony, Mr. Nelson Gross, senior ad- viser to itie SecretaiT of State and Co- ordinator for International Narcotics Matters, .publicly and in detail refuted Mr. McCoy's charges. I regret that these allegations have been given further pub- licity in a statement by a Member of this body when he published in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD OC June 27, a let- ter he has directed to Mr. Helms, re- questing an investigation of the allega- tions made by Mr. McCoy. Mr. Speaker, Director Helms' denial of charges that CIA has been involved in the drug traffic has been confirmed by other senior "U.S. Government officials. There has been no substance to the charges that have been leveled and it is most regrettable that the CIA must be the continual target of a tactic which serves to undermine positive efforts that are being taken under difficult circum- stances to curb drug traillekung. Those few who promote false accusations to the contrary undermine the good work that is being done and the personal integrity of high officials of our Government. I can assure the Members of this body and all American citizens that our Government is committed 100 percent to solving the driliS problem. - Mr. Speaker, while it is unfortunate that tiiese old Ciiarg,TS have been ly aired. again, I believe that Mr. Helms' letter of June 28 on this subject should also be included in the RzeoRD: CENTRAL INILLLIGGNCE AGENCY, Ok'FiCE DIR.ECTOil , June 28, 1972. Hon. Lim Asvist, Ii use of Representatives, . Was& in fi ton, D.C. Dasa Ma. Asp SN: Congressional Record of June 27, 1912, wTies a letter addressed 'to inc by you announcing your release of "substantial nev., evidence that inches tea 11.5. pilots lying CIA operated helicopters have 'been smuggling opium Inside Laos." I have yet to receive your letter. Pending its receipt, however, I than begin it thorough investigation of this alleged, "new evidence" and wlii advise you in due course of the IT:- sults. In this connection. I call to your at- tention the testimony of Mr. Nelson Gross, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Slate iind Coordinator for international Narcotics Mat- ters, before the CoLgressional Inquiry He- gardIng International Narcotics 1LJIic on June 0, 1972. He there quoted the Al' Amer- ica Managing Director's statement that Mr. Alfred McCoy's allegation before the For- eign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee that Air America aircraft have been transporting opium 4). Northern Laos on a regular basis is "utterly anti absolutely false." In the interim, I wish to reiterate strongly what I have said publicly to the America Society of Newspaper Editors: "There is the arrant nonsense that the Central Intelligence Agency is SOnlenOW in- volved in the world drug traffic. We arc not. As fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as are all of you. As an Agency, in fact, We ore heavily engaged In tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics end Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution: we know we are not contributing to the problem." In addition, you will have no doubt noticed in the Congressional Record Of .7arie 2, 1971, ? that Congressman Charles Oubser cited a letter from Mr. John Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau Of MITCOtieFi and Dangerous Drugs, attesting to the fact that this Agency has taken a. great number of steps against the narcotics trade. Further, we have is- sued the strongest. instructions, and have most vigorously enforced them, to prohibit any inadvertent use of CIA facilities by nar- cotics Sinn gglero. In the light of these well-established posi- tions, we find it disappointing to be sub- .jected to the, typo of public allegation rep- resented by graduate student McCoy's Rs-. Zell;i011S of "new evidence," the innuendo in which can only dishearten CIA personnel of honor and integrity working against this nefarious trade. I have taken the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to Congressman Gubser be- cause of his interest la these matters. Sincerely, Wei-stew, Director. Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 hi I:I ? ? la 4 OL,C 72-0768 5 July 1972 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Senate Armed Services Committee Interest in Hersh Story re "Rainmaking" 1. This morning John Goldsmith, of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff, called to say that the New York Times story by Seymour Hersh of 3 July 1972 (copy attached) was attracting considerable interest and would no doubt be the subject of formal inquiry during upcoming Senate deliberations. He said the subject might be brought up in connection with discussion of the pending "end the war" amendment to the Foreign Assistance Authorization bill, and almost certainly would come up in connection with the discussion of Indochina when the Defense Procurement bill came up. 2. Goldsmith said he wanted to let us know that for the above reasons he felt he should call the matter to the attention of Chairman Stennis, and was therefore preparing a note for Stennis (now out of town) suggesting that Stennis get himself briefed on the subject and be forearmed with information necessary to respond to the questions which are likely to come up. 3. I told Goldsmith that I knew nothing about the substance of these allegations but appreciated his alerting us. Att. Distribution: Original - Subject 1- A/DCI 1 - Ex/Dir 1 - DDP 1 - C /FE 1 - SAVA \---/Legislative Counsel ? Gli00 1 Excluded trom automatic downgading and 4 declassification Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 n) Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 ? "7-'5 2. 4 4 ? .?;'" 1 dti!"4 ,r r fI USSa Cloud Seeding in Indochina Confirmed?I Chemicz21 Also Employed to Foil Radar tnt SE`i!A?IOLif IfF.2itS: I wo main monsoon seasons that , at act Laos and Vietnam. "It,-,sevell inches of rain- in two was just trying 10 add on to Humrs on one of our. Special scii.t.etiting, that you aireadY 1011' Cs camps." got," one ofiieer iid.? ilitiay sources sai [Iiiat ono DesPite the professed skepti? Roat was to increase tie ,eisni on the part of some mom- J. J?ai,;(,11 of the southwest mon. iners of the Johnson Administra- soon, which spawns high-rising Tullital?Y men aPimuelitlY cumulus clouds ? those most took the weather modification susceptible to cloud. seeding? Progi inn niuch 11101.0 seriously. ?over the panhandle areas of According to a document Loos and North Vietnam from contained in the Pentagon fIllY ii) cariyl October. The long- papers, the Defense 1.),part. ,Spec!r,1 ta New York LiLic: rainy. season thus would give nient's secret history of the war, wAsHINGTON, july 1.What,s vorso,,, or,c official t C An horCe 1110i'0 opportun- w.etti,ier modification was one, to ninsto-ins (4 seven basic r s- United Sti?ites has 'peen secretly asked, " d Of! 1)0 b its Wombs or, we, , ` ? ? e e aying 1.0 arrange ping up Lesa options fo tel) r that were pi seeding clouds over North Vi- rain?" the weather pattern to suit our tatiitt,d on request by the Joint! etnam, Laos and South Viet- All of the officials inter-! CC.,:Venienee said one foimer, 'Chiefs of Staff to 'the Witite? viewed said that: the united! Government official who hadl llouse in late February, ,1 t cletaiied knowledge of thc,?opor- Tile dOCUMChi. deSerihed the! Stiites not have the capabil-; ? ation, weather program over Laot.---1 itY to cause ileavY ditr-; According to interviews, the ?officinily known as Operati0:1 lug the summer in the northern! Central Intelligence Agency in- Pop--i lye--as an atiempt "tol parts of North Vietnam, where itimod the use of cloud-seeding "reduce traffieahnity along infil- seriouS flooding occurred last over :Thu; in tilt? nOrtheril part ltration routes." jof South Vietnam. "We first ? Authoriati zon Needed . ? , t used that stuff in about August I Officially, the White o, oi.? formerCiAIt said that Presidential and State Department declined; agent said, "when the Diem,inuthorization was "requited to comment on the use of mete- I regime was having all that ,itoPit'ntent 01)enal:1ot-1n' Plittst! of 0010 cal warfare. "This is cut.el trouble the Luddhists."St I mr modifietition process of those things where no one "They would ;list stand Previously successfully tested oing t:o say ,,?,,tarmincli during deiriOriStiltiOnS !.1.;lnd eVahlatCd S;Inle the police threw tear gas ie brief summary concluded official said.JJ them, but we noticed that by stating that "risk of corn, Most officialti,,,,.,lntervicwedliv,-ht,n the! rains came they promise is minimal," ? -tgreed that the seeding had Ilwouldn't stay on the foriner , ? A similar oinion was cited in F10011101' !,167 '5 (II donl- ACCOMpliSlli2C4 011C it,, , AI ? . T., ObjeCtiVCS ? ;nuddying rono5 yemerica Iliecchcrall and had and 1-1000ing Of communi- lit rigged up with silver iodide," cation'. /WI: there \stare cdso, he said. "There was another many military and Government! OttmonstratiOn and we seeded officials who expressed doubt l the arc". It l'a,ined." - A similar cieud?seeding was that the project had caused any; carried out by C.I.A. aircraft in dramatic results. Siogon at least once during the ? The sources, without pro,,.i.1- l summer of 1664, the former ing detaiiS, 1150 Said thiflt a I agent said. method had been developed for Expanded to Trail nan1 to increase and control the? rainfall for militaty purposes. Government sources, both ci- vilian and military, said during an extensive series of inter- views that the Air Force cloud- scaling program has been aimed most recently at hinder- ing movement of. North Viet- !maltose troops and equipment ;and suppressing enemy 01 Li missile fire. The disetosure confirmed I growing speculation in Con-i gressional and scientific circlesl about the use of weather mod- in Southeast Asia. De-1 years of experiments with imiimaking in the United States and elsewhere, scientists !are not sure they -understand its long-term effect on the ecology of a region. Sonic Opposed Vrogram Tho weather manipulation in In which was first tried in South Vietnam in 1963, is the first confirmed use of meteorological , warfare. Al- though it is not prohibited by any international conventions on warfare, artifical rainmak- ing has been strenuously op? posed by some State Depart- ment officials. ? It could. not be determined whether the operations Were being conducted in connection with the current North Viet- namese offensive or the renewed American bombing of the North. Effectiveness Douhied fleit dublisneu ill the Pentagon papers. Neithei? attracted any immediate public attention. The Laos cloud-seeding op- erations did provoke, however, a lengthy and bitter, albeit secret, dispute inside the john? son Administration in 11)67. A' teehl of State Department at- torneys and officials protested that the use of cloud-seeding was a dangerous precedent for the United States, treating clouds with a che.micalt Tile Intelligence Agency ex:-,. "I felt that the military and that ?cv-entually produced an; panded 115 cloud-sceding .activi- agency hadn't analyzed it to acidic rainf;in capable of foul-, ties to the Ho Cid Minh supply determine if it was in our tug the ?Niltdion of N?Ilth Viet7!trah in Laos sometime in the interest," one official who was namese radar equipment uset. middle nineteen-sixties, a num- involved in the dispute saki. for directing surface-io-air lins-lber of Government sources Fe also was concerned over sites. . said. by 1967, the Air Force the rigid secrecy of the project, In addition to lhamPertng,h&a become involved although, he said, "although it might SAM missiles 'and dtellig as ono former Government of- have been all right to keep it North Vietnamese infiltration, said, "the at,,,eney was secret 'if you did it once a?ci (11(10 1: want the precedent to become known." The general feeling was sum- marized by one !former State Department official- who said he was concerned that the rainmaking "might violate what WC considered the general ruie of the thumb for an illegal weapon of war?something I3egthrlillg in 1967, s"le ? 4.:Altcring or tailoring the; The state of the art had not that would Cause unusual suf- State Departnient officials pro- rain ptitterns cver No yiet-k'et advanced to thc point where feting or dispropriate ttainage." ,tested that the United Stales, nam and Laos to aid United :it. was possible to predict the .There also was concern. het , leliberately altering the nal- Sta?t.,,er: hothhin r 0.s t a of a seeding Operation I added, becau th se of e unklIOW11 LIVerting Not .1, , ltrral raitlfall in parts o. ludo- ;men and nititortai from rrinit,Ary lecological sks china WaS taking enviromnen- operations to keep muddied; 'Yon aministrallon of- ltal risks of unknown proPor- !roads and other lines of cons- i.i,t.otind arid J"We USCC1 to go out flying j???;"\,;.m.11 ,?, richt, he 0C ,S . first uso ol weather modui- ing for cer- Itions. But. many advocrites of imunication in operation, ltain cloud formation," the ()fit- , cation over North Vietna:n the operation have found little. iieyed 'Io .0045000 ? ? lc :Z.,' 110 "And we made a lot of tonk late, I.;Gp, wi-ong with using weather mod- Tho (10,1,1.[,00,Thif! w)eration l Mistakes. Once we (lumped ? ? or,,. . . . Z1:?1:L=:1 Approved For Release 2009/04/14 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 the Vail;11;dkirig p:Ocyarr, lied Cflul 11. . . " the f011OWing purposes: "I" always assumed the rigor, c;Pi?oviding 1-a11? and 0:111d Cy had is mandate from the COVer for nI11 rat ion of r.;nuth .m.jto iiouso to do it,'' he Victnamese command and in- added. - telligence teams into North. A number of former CIA, and? Vietnam. ,high-ranking Johnson Adminis- Servint.t. as a tOl'ltration officials depicted the ,North Virmaracse att:tcks andopC'r,lI 05 along the trail as raids in South Vh:tnam. Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 the istration had been hoti in the i..aotiatt border. dark. Ovcr the next two years, , to tho last year, there havt.: s official added, "it seemed !been repeated in and get more important?the re- 'publicly posed questions by were coming moro fre- itientibers of Ccmgress a bo?tht: quently." !weather moditicotion programs It could not be learned how iii Southeast Ass, hut. no ac- many specific: mission5. were icurate iriforrocit.on has been cal ;tied out 10 any year. iprovided to th,n by the Dc- Due well-informed source said 'nal-in:0M of Dei'erise ? that Navy scientist ViCre re- "This hint: of thing was a spor,sibio foi? devolop;ng a new ;bomb, and ileniv restricted in- kinit Of chemical cigent effee- !formation about it to those who live in the warm stratus clouds 111!ad to know," said one well- that often shielded many key P;acted Government official, re- antiaircraft sites in northern ferring to Lenny A. 1;issinger, parts of North Vietnam. the President's adviser on na- Trio chemical, he said, "pro- tional security. duce(' a rain that had ,an acidic Nonethiess, the official said, quality to it and it would foul "I under.stood it to he a spoil- up mechanical equipment?like ing action?tin-it, this was dc- radars, trucks and tanks." scriptive ofv,diat was going on ? "'rids wasn't originally in our north of the 1):4Z with the planning," the official added, roads and the SAM sites." "It was a iat.i.incinent." Another source said that Apd.arcutiy, nalny Air Force most of the weather inoditdett- elouchseeding missions were lion activities eventually Were conducted over North Vietnam conducted vt?ith tlie aid and sup- and Law> simply to confuse or port of the tiottth Vietnamese. "at termate"---a word used by "1 think we were trying to many military men?the radar teach the Soul I., Vietnamese how equipment that controls anti-; to fly the eiouctsceding aircraft ini.ssiles. The planes sions," the source said. used for such Operations, C:-1 It was impoasible tn learn toast fly at relatively' where the staffing, and reseal oh slow speeds and at altitudes nil l for the secret Weather opera-, greater than 22,000 fce to dis- tion were carried out. Sourccs: I'' 'so the rainmaking chemicals it the Air Force Cambridge; .'clively. Research Laboratories at Iians-, nurribez- of officials con_ comb Field in 1:ed.-Ord, Mass.,! cd I het, cloud seeding had and at the Air Weather Service; ocent widely used in South Vict- headquarters, while cieknowl-!! . nail, particularly in the north odtitijog that they had heard of along the Laos border. "We the secret operation, said they tried to use it in connection ha ditto information about its with air and ground opera- research oeflIcfc, was. a military officer ex. One Government source did planed, say that a group was ''nowi evaluating the program to see, One Government official ex- r how much additional rain was; plained more explicitly that "ii " you were expecting a raid fm lie would not elabo-I ['morn caused. their side, you would try to rate. control the weather to make it more difficult." 'Ibis official1 estimated that more than half Of the actual cloud-seeding operations in 1069 and 1970 took place in South Vietnam. Much of the basic research was provided by Navy scien- tists, and the seeding operations were flown by the Air Weather Service of the Air Force. iJy 1937, or possibly earlier, the Air Force flights were orig- inating from a special opera- tions group at lIdorrf air base in Thailand. No more thark four Ci 30's, and usually only two, were assigned in the highly restricted section of the base. Each plane was capable of car- rying Out more than one mis- kion on one flight. One former high-ranking of- .ratial said in an interview that by the end of 1071 the pro- gram, which had been given at least three different code names since the middle nineteen-six, ties, was under the direct con- trol of the White ilouse., . Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3 NEW YORK TIMES Pentagon: wea ar-IN \yea, Of War e IAN ? WASHINGTON?Dr. Gordon J. F. ,.MacDonald, a prominent geophysicist who had just completed a tour as vice president of the Defense Department's , :institute of Defense Analysis, pub- lished in 1968 a little-noted but chilling study on the military potential of tneterological warfare. He listed a num- ? .ber of options available to those who would choose to tamper with nature. Among them: '44 Altering the world's temperature rocketing materials into the earth's upper atmosphere to either absorb light '(thereby cooling the surface below) or ,absorb outgoing heat (thereby heating the surface below). This technique ,_?.. .could be targeted at a specific area. Triggering tidal waves by set. ?trig off a series 'of underground ex- plosions along the edge of the Conti- mental Shelf, or by producing a natural .earthquake. A guided tidal wave could .be, achieved by correctly shaping the energy-release sources. rt 9 Changing the physical makeup of the atmosphere by creating, with ? ?a rocket or similar weapon, a "hole" in the important ozone layer between -40 and 30 miles up that is responsible ? for absorbing much of the ultra-violet light cast from the sun. Without the -protective layer of ozone, a molecular form of oxygen, the radiation would .he fatal to all human, plant and animal life that could not take shelter in the affected area below. it Dr. MacDonald (who is now a !member of the White House Council on elinvironmental Quality) made it clear ? that his essay was based only on spec- ulation. Last week, however, it became ? ? known that at least part of his maca- :e weather arsenal had been secretly use by the United States since the ? a1960's. .0, Air Force planes, supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, have been ; waging a systematic war of rain on the infiltration trails of Laos, Cam- bodia, North Vietnam and South Viet- nam. The intent: suppress enemy anti- missile fire, provide cover for South Vietnamese commando teams pene- trating the North and hinder the movement of men and materiel from North Vietnam into the South. The first experimental rain-making mission was flown by the C.I.A. in South Vietnam in 1963, but it was not until 1965 that a group of Air Force scientists officially was ordered to start thinking of ways to turn nature into a military tool. "We all sat down in a big brain- storming session," said one of the scientists who participated at the Air Force Cambridge Research Labora- tories at Ilanscomb Field near Bedford, Mass. "The idea was to increase the rain and reduce the trafficabiiity in all of Southeast Asia." Within a year, the Air Force and C.I.A. began a highly secret rain-mak- ing project over the Ho Chi Minh Trail ? in Laos, known as "Operation Pop- Eye." There were heated protests from , the State Department, and eventually a directive from the Secretary of De- fense Robert S. McNamara 'ordering a halt to the project. Instead, well- qualified sources said last week, "it went underground?into the dark." . From 1969 through at least early this year, weather warfare was a covert operation being directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with White House , acquiescence. The fact that the program existed at all came to light only last week in ? The New York Times. But, despite an extensive investigation, it could not be learned how successful the program had been, how many missions were ? conducted or whether it was still being used in connection with the heavy bombing of North Vietnam that fol- lowed the enemy offensive last April. Making rain has long been techni- cally feasible. Scientists have learned that rain fall can be increased by as much as 40 per cent after seed- ing clouds by aircraft with silver-io- dide particles. Other chemicals, includ- ing dry ice, also have been used with success, both in the United States and in Southeast Asia. Military and Government specialists 'acknowledge that there is little precise scientific knowledge of the short-range impact of cloud seeding and practi- cally none of the long-range ecological effect of changing the amount of natural rainfall. Some scientists have A , published data suggesting that weather 'modification, in combination with ?other ecological stresses such as air 'pollution and pesticides, may have a t; synergistic effect?that is, result in t- collective changes far greater than either abuse would have caused , by ? itself. In Indochina, where heavy bombing already has robbed much of the land- scape of its natural water-holding ca- pability by destroying foliage and trees, artifically induced rains may result in far greater flooding than expected. -??along with heavier soil erosion. ? ? Technically,. - there are no interna- tional agreements outlawing such war- fare. But Government officials made clear last week that the weather-mak- ing activity of the Air Force was shielded from public view because of , White House sensitivity to what could be regarded as the impropriety of the action. The issue, one well-informed official said, was .one in which Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national- security adviser, took a personal hand. ? "This kind of thing was a bomb," the ' official said, "and Henry restricted information about it to those who had to ?knows". '?svaitoua 14. vize.s.a. Approved For Release 2009/04/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000500090001-3