Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 17, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 19, 1972
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3.pdf19.79 MB
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972 HEARINGS COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS S. 3390 TO AMEND !THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 78-080 WASHINGTON : 1972 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C., 20402 - Price $1 Stock Number 6270-1471 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana FRANK CHURCH, Idaho STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island GALE W. MCGEE, Wyoming EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., Virginia GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky JACOB K. JAVITS, New York HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 CONTENTS Statements by: Page Alpern, Robert, SANE, A Citizens' Organization for a Sane World-- 207 Butz, Timothy, Vietnam Veterans Against the War---------------- 238 Cash, Dr. Richard, The Bangladesh Information Center ------------ 219 Clark, Hon. Joseph S., chairman, Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy_____________ 173 Laird, Hon. Melvin R., Secretary of Defense, accompanied by Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lt. Gen. George M. Seignious II, U.S. Army, Deputy As- sistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for Security Assistance and Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency; Rady A. Johnson, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; Donald S. Floyd, Special Assistant for Congressional Relations, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Col. Robert M. Lucy, U.S. Marine Corps, Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Christian A. Chapman, Director, Office of Military Assistance Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State-------------------------------- ------------ 92 Lowenstein, Allard K., national chairman, Americans for Democratic Action----------------------------------------------------- 227 Ravenal, Earl C., Federation of American Scientists --------------- 197 Rogers, lion. William P., Secretary of State, accompanied by Dr. John A. Hannah, Administrator, Agency for International Devel- opment; George S. Newman, Acting Coordinator of Security As- sistance; and Thomas R. Pickering, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State------------------- 4 Smith, Rev. John Coventry, General Assembly of the United Pres- byterian Church in the United States__________ ______________ 247 Yarrow, Clarence Friends Committee on National Legislation------ 181 Insertions for the record : Text of S. 3390 --------------------------------------------------- 1 Prepared statement of William P. Rogers, Secretary of State -------- 5 Prepared statement of John A. Hannah, Administrator, Agency for International Development --------------------------------------- 8 "Soviet Arms Aid to Hanoi Is Down," article in the New York Times, April 14, 1972-------------------------------------------------- 44 "We Have Always Survived," article by Robert Shaplen, the New Yorker, April 15, 1972------------------------------------------ 53 Prepared statement of Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense -------- 98 Prepared statement of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff------------------------------------------------- 102 Manner in which DMZ has been respected since 1968---------------- 111 IIanoi's violations of Geneva Convention-------------------------- 129 Costs of Vietnam war---------------------- ------------------------------------------- 139 U.S. military assistance to the South Vietnamese Air Force -------- th Vi t A f S 148 148 nam---------------------------------- e -1 program or ou "Saigon Making Moves To Curb Bad-News Coverage of the War," arti- cle in the New York Times, April 16, 1972------------------------ 151 "U.S. To End Disclosure of Air Strikes in North," article in the New York Times, April 13, 1972------------------------------------- 154 "50 GI's in Vietnam Refuse Patrol Duty, Then Agree To Go," article in the New York Times, April 13, 1972-------------------------- 156 Military assistance program plans--------------------------------- 160 Estimated gross national product of Greece----------------------- 171 Prepared statement of Joseph S. Clark, chairman, Coalition on Na- tional Priorities and Military Policy----------------------------- 173 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74BOO415ROO0600080001-3 Insertions for the record-Continued page Prepared stoatement of Clarence 11. Yarrow, on behalf of Friends Committee on National Relations-------------------------------- 181 Letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright from Edward F. Snyder, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Washington, D.C., April 19, 1972 ----------------------------------------------------------- 185 "The Prisoners of Burn: Held Without Trial or Hope of Trial, 10,000 Men Wait on an Island in the Moluccas," article by Dom Moraes, the Asia magazine, March 5, 1972 ------------------------------- 186 Prepared statement of Earl C. Ravenal, Federation of American Scientists ----------------------------------------------------- 202 "U.S. Cuts Dacca Relief as No Longer Needed," article from the Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1972------------------------ 212 U.N. "Aid Officials Fear Bangladesh Food Crisis," article from the Los Angeles Times, March 1.7, 1972---------------------------------- 213 "Kennedy Critical on Aid to Bengalis," article by Benjamin Welles, the New York Times, March 12, 1972---------------------------- 213 South Asia relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruetion assistance______ 216 1 U.S. Government commitments for relief and rehabilitation in Bangla- desh ----------------------------------------------------------- 217 Prepared statement of Dr. Richard Cash, Bangladesh Information Center ---------------------------------------------------------- 219 "The Strategy of Failure," editorial in the New York Times, April 19, 1972 ---------------------------.----------------------------- 230 "An Ad hoc Committee To Keep Tabs on the Military," commentary by Nicholas von Hoffman, the Washington Post, April 19, 1972-_-- 231 Prepared statement of Rev.:John Coventry Smith on behalf of the Gen- eral Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A_--_ 248 Appendix: Statement by Congressman Don Edwards, Democrat, of California, on behalf of the ITS. Committee for Democracy in Greece---------- 253 A court marl:ial in Athens, excerpts from the interrogation of Joseph A'alyrakis and Ioannis Kyriazis---------------- ,------------------ 255 "The Case of the Missing Paragraph," brticle by Maurice J. Gold- bloom, the Washington Post, December 5, 1971 --------------------- 257 "Ruling Greek Junta Implicated in Italian Terrorist Activity," article by Claire Sterling, Washington Post, April 5, 1972-------------- 259 "I low Much Russian Aid for Hanoi?" article by Henry Keys, South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, May 5, 1972-------------------- 261 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74BOO415ROO0600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972 MONDAY, APRIL 17, 1972 UNrrm STATrs SENATE, Coi'iM ITEE ON FORETON RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman), presiding. Present : Senators Fulbright, Church, Symington, Spong, Aiken, Case, Cooper, Javits, and Percy. The CIlAIRNIAN. The committee will come to order. This meeting is called this morning to receive testimony on the ad- ministration's foreign aid proposal for fiscal year 1973. Mr. Secretary, the announced and scheduled purpose of this hearing was to receive testimony on the executive branch request for something over $2 bil- lion for military supplies, guns, tanks, et cetera, and economic assist- ance particularly for Vietnam and the other allies and dependencies in Asia and elsewhere for fiscal year 1973. .I am sure you would agree, however, that it would be an evasion of this committee's responsibility were today's hearings to ignore the events that have occurred over the weekend. Furthermore, we shouldbe quite clear in our own minds that the bill before us today is a bill to authorize a continuation of the war by providing arms to our Asian dependencies and economic aid in particular for South Vietnam. (The text of S. 3390 follows:) [S. 3390,92d Cong., second seas.] A BILL To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United, States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Foreign Assistance Act of 1972." SEC. 2. Chapter 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to international narcotics control, is amended by striking out section 481 and in- serting in lieu thereof the following new sections : "SEC. 481. IN'TLILNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL.-It is the sense of the Congress that effective international cooperation is necessary to put an end to the illicit production, smuggling, trafficking in, and abuse of dangerous drugs. In order to promote such cooperation, the President is authorized to conclude agreements with other countries to facilitate control of the production, processing, trans- portation, and distribution of narcotic analgesics, including opium and its deriva- tives other narcotic drugs and psychotropics, and other controlled substances as defined in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-513). Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to furnish assistance to any country or international or- ganization, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for the control Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 or the production of, processing of, smuggling of, and traffic in, narcotic and t sychotropic drrgs. The President shall suspend economic and military assist- ance furnished under this or any other Act, and shall suspend sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act and under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop- ment and Assistance Act of 1954, with respect to any country when the Presi- dent determines that the government of such conutry has failed to take ade- gnate steps to prevent narcotic drugs and other controlled substances (as de- fined by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970) produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country, or transported through such country, from being sold illegally within the jurisdiction of such country to United States Government personnel or their dependents, or from entering the tinited States unlawfully. Such suspension shall continue until the Presi- dent determines that the government of such country has taken adequate steps to carry out the purposes of this chapter. " Sr:c. 482. Au'rlORIZArioN.-To carry out the purposes of section 481, there is authorized to be appropriated to the President $42,500,000 for the fiscal year 11173, which amount is authorized to rennin available until expended." Srsc. 3. Section 491 of chapter 9 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1901, relating to refugee relief assistance, is amended by striking out. "1972" and inserting in lieu thereof "1973" and striking out the figure "$250,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$100,000.000". Sxc, 4. Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. relating to military assistance, is amended as follows: (a) In section 504(a), relating to authorization, strike out "$500,000,000 for the fiscal year 1972" and inserting in lieu thereof "$780,000,000 for the fiscal year 1973 (h) In section 306 (a), relating to special authority, strike out "1972" each place it appears and insert in lieu thereof "1973". (c) Section 514 is hereby repealed. 8m '. 5. Section 532 of chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to authorization for security supporting assistance, is amended by striking out "for fiscal year 1972 not to exceed .$618,000,000, of which not less Oran $50,000,000 shall be available solely for Israel" and inserting in lieu thereof "for the fiscal year 1973 not to exceed $844,000,000". Sr:r. 0. The Foreign Military Sales Act. is amended as follows : (a ) In section 2", of chapter 2, relating to credit sales, strike out "ten" and insert in lieu thereof "twenty". (b) In section 31 (a) of chapter 3, relating to authorization, strike out "$400,- 000,000 for the fiscal year 1972" and insert in lieu thereof "$527,000,000 for the fiscal year 1973". (e) In section 31(b) of chapter 3, relating to aggregate ceiling on foreign mili- tary sales credits. strike out "$550,000,000 for the fiscal year 1972, of which amount not less than $300,000,000 shall be made available to Israel only" and inserting in lieu thereof "$629,000,000 for the fiscal year 1973". (d) In section 33(a) of chapter 3, relating to aggregate regional ceilings, strike out "$100,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$150,000,000.". (e) Section 33(c) of chapter 3, relating to aggregate regional ceilings, is aIaemled to read as follows: "(r) The President may waive the limitations of this section if he finds that overriding requirements of the national security of the United States justify snelr a waiver and promptly reports such finding to the Congress in writing, to- cether with his reasons for such findings. In any case in which the limitations or this section are waived under the preceding sentence, the report required under such sentence shall set forth, in detail, the amounts of assistance, sales, credits, p~narantoes, and ship loans proposed to be made In excess of the geo- graphical limitation applicable under this section.". SEC. 7. Section 8(b) of the Act of January 12, 1971, entitled "An Aet to amend the foreign Military Sales Act, and for other purposes" (84 Stat. 20-53), is amended by striking out "$1&5,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$245,000,000". Oiily a little more than 6 years ago, in hearings on a similar le?is?? lative proposal-the authorization of a supplementary request for supporting assistance, most of it for South Vietnam-we began public discussion of the war in Vietnam with your predecessor, Secretary Rusk. Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/;16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 It is ironic and tragic that today-6 years later-after hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost; after much of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have been ravaged and destroyed ; after the economic and social fabric of our own Nation has been seriously undermined-we are still discussing the war in Vietnam with the mem- bers of the Cabinet even though we have a President who came into office in January of 1969 promising to end the war either through negotiations or through Vietnamization. Instead, 3 years after that President took office, we find the largest force of combat aircraft and naval vessels the United States has ever assembled in Southeast Asia, massive bombing of North Vietnam resumed, and the port of Hai- phong and the capitol of Hanoi under attack at the risk of grave inter- national complications, at a time when at last there seemed to be some promise of a long overdue fundamental restructuring of our relations with the Soviet Union and, I might add, a movement in our relations with China. MC GEORGE BUNDY'S MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT JO] INSON, MAY 1 967 Just to refresh your memory, Mr. Secretary, I want to read a very brief excerpt from two memorandas of the past. This one is from McGeorge Bimdy's memorandum to President Johnson in May of 1.967. I think it refreshed our memory how long we have been on this. This is from the Pentagon papers that have recently been published (New York Times edition, p. 570) : On the ineffectiveness of the bombing as a means to the end of the war, I think the evidence is plain-though I would defer to expert estimators. IIo Chi Minh and his colleagues simply are not going to change their policy on the basis of losses from the air in North Vietnam. No intelligence estimate that I have seen in the last 2 years has ever. claimed that the bombing would have this effect. The President never claimed that it would. The notion that this was its purpose has been limited to one school of thought and has never been the official govern- ment position, whatever critics may assert. * * * Moreover, I think those against extension of the bombings are more passionate on balance than those who favor it. Finally, there is certainly a point at which such bombing does increase the risk of conflict with China or the Soviet Union, and I am sure there is no majority for that. In particular, I think it clear that the ease against going after Haiphong Harbor is so strong that a majority would back the Government in rejecting that course. So I think that with careful explanation there would be more approval than disapproval of an announced policy restricting the bombing closely to activities that support the war in the South. SECRETARY M'NAMARA'S COMMENTS ON BOMBING Then in the same papers, on page 580, this is then Secretary McNa- mara, in which he was commenting upon the same subject which has just been renewed this weekend. It says * * * The answer is that the cost and risk of the actions must be considered. The primary costs of course, this is of the bombing, are U.S. lives: The air campaign against heavily defended areas costs us one pilot in every 40 sorties. In addition, an important but hard to measure cost is domestic and world opinion : There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants it week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA4RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States-especially if the damage to North Vietnam is complete enough to be "successful." QUESTIONS CONCERNING RECENT MILITARY MEASURES 't'here is much more, of course, in those papers relating to this subject. The only new thing that I could add with regard to that is that on Saturday as I watched on television the table tennis contests in Michigan TTniversity, after which the Chinese and the American players all paraded out holding their hands high and flames in their other hands, this is another change from the time when we had those reports. I, for one, Mr. 'Secretary, cannot understand what possible national interest has dictated these military measures. Surely, considerations of prestige would not warrant such drastic steps. Surely, we are no longer under the illusion that a military victory can be achieved by bombing or that a renewal of bombing will improve the chances of negotiating a settlement or recovering our prisoners of war. I hope that will enlighten us this morning on the reasons for these recent actions. And I would begin by asking these five questions : (1) What is the purpose you seek to achieve by the intensified bombing of North Vietnam? (2) Why was the decision made to bomb Haiphong at this particular time? (3) Why was the Congress and especially this committee not consulted in any fashion whatsoever in advance? (4) Does the policy of Vietnamization include the assumption that the TTnited States will continue indefinitely to provide unlimited air and naval support whenever South Vietnamese ground forces are under military pressure? Finally, what do you suppose would happen to the ITnited States if we just let them fight it out, win or lose, with no further American interference? I hope, Mr. Secretary, you will address yourself to these questions. But before we proceed, the details of the bill before its which are quite well known to this committee, having gone over them year after year. I would like to say, of course, that Secretary of State Rogers is accompanied by Dr. John Hannah, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. Mr. Secretary, would you please proceed? STATEMENT OF WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE, AC- COMPANIED BY JOHN A. HANNAH, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; GEORGE S. NEWMAN, ACTING COORDINATOR OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE; AND THOMAS R. PICKERING, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF POLITICO- MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I have a statement here that I would like to read The CHAIRMMAN. Would you mind Secretary RO GERS. Dealing with the subject matter that I was asked to testify on this morning. Then I would be happy to answer any questions. The CIIATRMAN. I much prefer if you would address yourself to the Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/1116 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 questions. We are familiar with the program and I have seen your statement. But the questions that are uppermost in our minds cer- tainly relate to the justification for the program submitted in your statement. Do you object to addressing your answers to these quesions? Secretary ROGERS. No, I don't Mr. Chairman. I would like as I said a moment ago, and I won't insist on it if the Chair feels I shouldn't- I would like to read the statement that I had prepared for this meeting. The CHAIRMAN. Would you read it at the end of the hearing instead of now? I am very serious about it. Those are typical statements. We have heard them often. We know what is in them. But the substance of it is the questions we have raised, I believe. Then you can read the statement. Secretary ROGERS. Well The CIIAIRDrAN. We will certainly put it in the record. Senator PERCY. May I ask how long the statement is? Secretary ROGERS. About 10 minutes. The CHAIRMAN. Would you proceed to address the questions, please. Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, may I put the statement in the record then? The CHAIRMAN. Okay. (The prepared statements of Secretary Rogers and Dr. Hannah follow:) STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. ROOERS, SECRETARY OF STATE Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee : I am here today to seek this Committee's support for the President's fiscal 1973 funding requests for security assistance, the international narcotics control program, and South Asian relief. Mr. Chairman, for Fiscal 1973, 1 am asking your support for the authorization of $780 million for grant military assistance, $527 million in foreign military sales credits, and $844 million for security supporting assistance. This requirement was developed within the Executive Branch and approved by the President prior to final Congressional action on the Administration's fiscal 1972 request. Our fiscal 1973 request does not compensate for the reduced sums authorized and appropriated by the Congress for the current fiscal year. As the President has stated, the funds appropriated for security assistance were inadequate for the purposes which we are seeking to achieve. Many important country programs have had to be cut back drastically. These reductions have impaired the effectiveness of the Nixon Doctrine. Assistant Secretary Marshall Green, during his recent trip to East Asia found that the leaders of many coun- tries now question, not the President's desire to provide adequate assistance in support of their legitimate self-defense needs, but whether his assistance will in fact be forthcoming. The funds we seek will help to build local defense capabilities. In placing greater reliance on local forces, this approach will mean a correspondingly less potential need for direct U.S. military involvement. And it will bring the time closer when even our security assistance can be reduced. The progress of the Vietnamization program, despite the renewal of North Vietnamese aggression, has permitted us to withdraw virtually all of our ground combat troops. Our assistance to Cambodia has helped the Khmer Government develop and support a light infantry force which has resisted the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong invasion, and has diverted and complicated North Vietnamese efforts against South Vietnam. We have 20,000 fewer troops in Korea than we had two years ago, and the Koreans themselves have assumed primary responsibility for the defense of the entire demilitarized zone. Our security assistance has helped to maintain the delicate military balance in the Middle East. And although the arms balance may not be a guarantee of peace, it is a deterrent to war. Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIAGRDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Our assistance to Greece and Turkey has been an important ingredient in our close cooperation with both countries in the security field and has enhanced their ability to perform their assigned roles in NATO's military defense planning. While many of the nations we seek to assist still require our material support, the nature of our relationship is changing. Our friends and allies now are deter- mining their own security requirements, are doing more of their own military planning, are assigning priorities in terms of economic and military resources, and are developing plans for their own defense self-sufficiency. They know and we have told them that our basic objective, consistent with our security interests and obligations, is to get out of the grant military assistance business as soon as we can. Lot inc turn to our specific fiscal 1973 request. For Vietnam, we are requesting $585 million in security supporting assistance earmarked mainly for economic stabilization and war relief activities and for ex- panded economic development. A significant part of this request is for require- ments that previously were met by expenditures from the DOD budget. .I] r. Chairman, as the Committee knows, South Vietnamese forces are now en- gaged in the courageous battle to defend their country. The North Vietnamese, while cynically calling for meetings at the conference table, prepared and launched a massive invasion of South Viet-Nam. All but one of their thirteen com- bat divisions is currently operating outside of North Vietnamese territory, and nearly all of these are engaged in attacks against South Vietnam. In Military Region I, in the north of the country, the North Vietnamese have invaded directly across the Demilitarized Zone, using heavy tanks, artillery, and massed antiaircraft weapons of the most sophisticated types. In Military Region IT, in the Central Highlands, two more division, of North Vietnamese troops, attacking from Laotian territory, are pressing hard against the defenders of two provincial capitals. In :Military Region TIT, not far from Saigon, the North Vietnamese, again us- ing heavy and sophisticated offensive equipment, have invaded from Cambodian soil. These attacks have dropped the pretense that this war is in any sense a "popular uprising" and have exposed it as a naked aggression of the most flagrant type. The South Vietnamese have risen to the challenge; they have demonstrated their determination to resist aggression. They deserve, now more than ever, our steadfast help and encouragement. Our proposed $50 million program for Laos will he primarily for economic stabilization and refugee relief a.nd resettlement operations. The bulk of the $225 million requested for military assistance for Cambodia will continue to finance required ammunition, light combat equipment, and much- needed training. Another $75 million in supporting assistance will help meet the needs of a war--disrupted economy and help to replace some of the resources denied the Cambodian people by NVA/VC military operations. The largest single grant military assistance request, $235 million, is to continue to support the Republic of Korea's five-year modernization program. Given adequate funds we expect the program to be completed in 1.975. We then expect Korea to meet the hulk of its defense needs through the Foreign Military Sales program. In the Middle East, in the absence of a peace settlement, we must continue to provide assistance to Israel and friendly Arab coiuntries. This assistance con- tributes to the military stability which is an essential condition for progress toward an Arab-Israeli peace. The armed forces of Greece and Turkey need further modernization to en- hance the effectiveness of their contributions to NATO's strength. Neither country is yet able to dispense with our assistance. However, Greece's rapid economic strides have made it possible for us increasingly to substitute credit for grants. With Turkey's economy considerably strengthened, we believe it possible that Turkey will be able over a period of time to make a transition from grant military assistance credits. We are proposing two amendments directly aimed at accelerating the transi- tion of countries from grant; military assistance to sales. The first amendment which we are proposing extends the repayment period for Foreign Military Sales credits from 10 years to 20. This will allow the sale of military equipment on a more favorable basis and thereby relieve the balance- of-payments pressures which recipients experience. lint more importantly, longer repayment periods will allow us to accelerate our program for moving countries from grant Military Assistance programs to Sales programs. The Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 transfer of a country from grant assistance to sales on military equipment en- courages the recipient countries to review priorities and make the hard deci- sions between military and other requirements within their own budgets. Second, we are requesting that the Congress increase the ceiling on military grant material and sales programs to Latin America from $100 million to $150 million. Latin American nations, with World War IT and Korean War vintage equipment, wish to modernize their inventories. If U.S. equipment is not avail.- able, Latin American countries will go elsewliere--in recent years they have spent some $800 million for European arms. Recent Latin American military expenditures average only about two percent of gross national product. We want to be responsive to reasonable requests for force modernization, and we believe that important political and economic advantages will result from an increase In the regional ceiling. Finally, we are proposing the repeal of Section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act. This section imposes a requirement that is contrary to the basic purpose of grant MAP programs, cuts across our desire to encourage recipients to as- sume a greater share of their defense responsibilities and inhibits their move- ment from grant programs to credit programs. With the help of Congress, we have taken an important step to improve the management of our security assistance programs. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 authorized a new position, an "Under Secretary of State for Coordinat- ing Security Assistance Programs." The President has just nominated Curtis W. Tarr for this important position. Under his guidance I am confident that we can improve the integration of our security assistance. Mr. Chairman, I now turn to the international aspects of the drug abuse prob- lem, which has caused an inordinate amount of human suffering and social dislocation in the United States. To combat it, the President has organized an all-out effort, of which the International Narcotics Control Program, for which we are requesting $42.5 million for fiscal 1973, is an essential element. This pro- gram is supervised by the President's Cabinet Committee on International. Nar- cotics Control of which I am Chairman. It complements the domestic programs undertaken by Dr. Jaffe's Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and by Myles Ambrose's Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement. Nothing less than a comprehensive and coordinated attack on all fronts will be sufficient to over- come this critical problem. We knew at the outset of our planning that many nations did not regard the drug abuse problem as seriously as we did. The first part of our program in- voled intense diplomatic efforts to persuade other governments of the need for cooperative action and to mobilize their support. Our top narcotics officials and the President himself have joined with the Department of State in this effort. Our diplomatic posts in over 50 nations which are important producing areas, refining sites, or transiting routes have prepared Narcotics Control Ac- tion Plans. These plans will be the basis for bilateral negotiations with each country; our goal is to begin implementing all the plans within six months. In nations where bilateral joint efforts are already underway-for example, France, Laos, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey-we have received excellent cooperation. We will need your support to expand our effort. I should also like to call your attention to the increasing role of the United Nations in the international drug control effort. With broadened financial sup- port the United States Fund for Drug Abuse Control is becoming increasingly active in organizing control programs in critical areas. The recent Conference to amend the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was a singular example of inter- national cooperation on the narcotics issue, adopting by a vote of 71-0 (with 12 abstentions) a reinforcing protocol already signed subject to ratification by 41 nations. Moreover, more than 20 nations are at various stages of ratifying, and three countries have ratified, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances now under consideration by your Committee. I know that the Congress fully shares our interest in controlling the flow of illicit narcotics and I deeply appreciate your constructive efforts to support and improve the program. Our preliminary indications ,are that the international and domestic efforts are beginning to have an impact and with your help we expect by the end of the year to have registered even more significant progress. Mr. Chairman, our final -authorization request is for $100 million as the con- tribution to the international effort in South Asia. The government of Bangladesh is facing enormous problems of relief and reconstruction. For fiscal 1972, the Congress appropriated $200 million for South Asian relief. We have already committed over $71 million of that amount for priority non-food items and we Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 8 have also made available nearly $73 million under PL 480 to meet immediate requirements. We are urgently considering additional assistance to Bangladesh as part of the coordinated effort directed by the United Nations. The World Bank is completing an assessment of requirements in the area. Hence, it is still too early to determine accurately overall needs, and our $100 million request reflects only a preliminary assessment of future requirements. Mr. Chairman. the proposals for which I am asking your support are premised upon a view of the world as it is today-not upon what it was in the past. Our role has changed dramatically, but it is still significant and we must continue to discharge our responsibilities. I urge your Committee's support for these authori- zation requests. STATSMgNT OF IION. JOHN A. HANNAIr, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNA- TIONAL DEVICLOPMENT Ali-. Chairman and members of the committee, I am here today to support our request for fiscal year 1973 authorizations totalling $986.5 for three activities ad- ministered 'by A.I.P.-Security Supporting Assistance, South Asia Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance, and International Narcotics Control Assistance. The other programs carried out by A.T.D. have already been authorized by fiscal year 1973 in the foreign aid authorization bill enacted this past February. First, I would like to mention some of the changes we have made in the Agency for International Development. All Supporting Assistance programs now are managed by a single bureau. In setting up this new bureau, We sought clearer management responsibilities within A.I.D. and improved coordination with other agencies. A new bureau for population and humanitarian programs has been established within A.I.D. to give strengthened direction to these priority programs. This bureau inclndes an improved capability for administering emergency relief programs and coordinating U.S. relief assistance with the UN and other organizations. In addition to these major organizational changes, central program adminis- tration is being strengthened and we are redirecting programs to focus more directly on basic human needs, to expand the role of private organizations en- gaged in overseas assistance programs and to rely more on the developing coun- tries themselves to manage their development programs. Now, let us consider the authorizations we are requesting for fiscal year 1973. RI:'I?RITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE ($844 MTTTTON) Security Supporting Assistance is an important part of U.S. foreign policy to strengthen the economies and defense capabilities of friendly countries. This economic assistance helps countries to promote and preserve political stability and to achieve greater self-reliance. When provided in conjunction with U.S. mili- tary aid, as in Southeast Asia, Supporting Assistance strengthens the recipient country's capacity to meet its own defense requirements, permitting reduction or termination of dependence on U.S. military forces-a central aim of the Nixon doctrine. The countries we are helping with Supporting Assistance are demonstrating increasing capability to shoulder a, large share of the burden of their defense, but their material resources are often inadequate. They no longer expect Amer- ican military forces. but they do look to us for the tools-equipment, supplies, and financial resources-to help them do the job. Supporting Assistance often contributes to the economic development goals of the recipient country, but the fundamental U.S. aim in providing these funds is to strengthen the economic base and help to stabilize the country's economy in the context of a specific security situation. In many cases it helps a country avoid a. major and damaging deterioration of the national economy as it seeks to deal with a threat to its national survival. The hulk of the proposed FY 1973 Supporting Assistance program is for the countries of Southeast Asia which share an immediate common threat to their national security. Eighty-five percent of the FY 1973 Supporting Assistance pro- gram-.$743.8 million of the $874.5 million total-is proposed for Vietnam, Cam- bodia, Laos, Thailand and East Asia regional programs. This assistance will continue in FY 1973 to help maintain national economics capable of carrying the burden of their security requirements. Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Another $90 million is proposed for security-related purposes in the Middle East. Of this, $50 million will assist Israel with its heavy fiscal burden arising from the absence of a peace settlement in the Middle East and the flow of immigrants to Israel. The other $40 million will help Jordan meet the costs of maintaining its security. The remaining $40.7 million is requested for security-related purposes in other parts of .the world. For example, $9.5 million represents the U.S. contribution to- ward the new NATO Alliance agreement with Malta., $4.8 million is proposed for support of UN peacekeeping forces in Cyprus, and $3 million is requested to fund the educat ional/cultural component of the 1970 U.S.-Spanish defense agreement. . The objectives of the economic program in Vietnam remain essentially the same as last year, except for a shift in emphasis to longer term economic development efforts so that U.S. economic assistance can eventually be phased out. In addi- tion. our economic support will continue to make it possible for the Government of Vietnam to take over the military burden of the war ; will be used to main- toin, our economic support will continue to make it possible for the Government refugees and war victims ; and will provide support for the pacification program. Progress to date Much economic progress was made last year in spite of the assumption by the Vietnamese of an increasing share of the military burden of the war. Outstanding accomplishments included. reform of the foreign exchange system, dampening import demand, and increasing domestic savings through a series of economic policy measures which have now set the stage for both economic de- velopment and the gradual phasing down of U.S. assistance. These economic measures were achieved while holding price increases to 14 percent, far lower than the 32 percent average of the previous several years. The Government of Vietnam deserves great credit for its progress with economic reforms. Significant progress was also made in implementing the land reform pro- gram. Over one million acres were transferred to 325,000 new tenant owners during the past year. In agriculture there was an increase in rice production plus the successful introduction of two new high-yield strains. Pork and poultry production have risen to the point where imports for the civilian economy are no longer necessary. Agricultural credit was more widely available with establishment of 16, new rural banks. In the field of health Vietnamese Government hospitals were expanded suffi- ciently to accommodate 23,000 additional patients, and,the number of Vietnamese doctors and nurses graduating from A.I.D.-assisted medical institutions reached an all-time high of 226 and 717 respectively. A.I.D. also helped approximately 127,000 refugees who received resettlement benefits during the year. A new voluntary resettlement program was als~o? under- taken to provide permanent homes to families which have been living in refugee status for many years. We are continuing to reduce the number of A.I.D.-financed American em- ployees stationed in Vietnam. Since FY 1971, the personnel ceiling has been reduced from 1,830 to a planned 1,1;33 during FY 1972, and will drop further to 822 in FY 1973. Significantly, assistance to South Vietnam from other countries increased substantially during 1.971. Total non-U.S. financial aid to Vietnam was $78 mil- lion compared to $35 million in 1970. This increased assistance for both humani- tarian and development projects also bodes well for greater sharing of the aid burden in the future. Program request for fiscal year 1973 The FY 1973 request for Vietnam includes funds to continue support for economic stabilization through the Commercial Import Program ($375 million) and an Economic Support Fund ($50 million). These funds provide a flow of commodities required by Vietnam's economy, which indirectly replaces produc- tive resources diverted to the war effort. They also serve to keep inflation in check, which could otherwise threaten both the political and economic stability of the country. The request also includes $70 million for the Project Program for a variety of projects in such fields as agriculture, education, industrial devel- opment, public works, rural development, customs control, public safety, public health and refugees. The amount requested is below the FY 1972 level as war- related projects are turned over to the Vietnamese. Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 10 The request also initiates a shift in mnphasis to development activities by inehiiling a $7:5 million request for an "Economic Development Fund." The fund will provide financing for private and public investnieut-,with $54 million of this amount to he used to make loans available to Vietnamese private enter- prises for the expansion of plants and equipment so that Vietnam can produce a larger share of the goods which it needs, and $25 million for projects such as electric power, bridges, and water systems. In the past, the A.I.D. program in Vietnam has provided technical assistance for agriculture, industry, and roads, as well gas the financing of capital investment equipment within the Commercial Import Program. However, the new Economic Development Fund will further direct resources toward development, which in turn will. hasten the process of 1 iotnamesp e'ommnie. self-sufficiency. Our request includes $15 million as ou final contribution to the Land Reform Program. At the time the program started in 19'68. we estimated that approxi- mately $40 nlillioai woulli he required. We contributed $10 million in FY 1969 o midi $15 million in FY 1971. The final $15 million completes our support. for this highly successful program, which will ultimately involve over 2.5 million acres and provide ownership to nearly three-quarters of a million former tenants, In summary, in WY 1973 we are requesting $585 million for Vietnam, an in- crease of $30 million over the FY 1972 request. This increase is caused by a continuing decline of our military presence in Vietnam, and the consequent reduction in the Department of Defense expenditures there. We expect that future finxppcirting Assistance levels can be gradually reduced ,I i'ter FY 1973. The economic policies which the Government of Vietnam has stet in motion during the past year have laid a. sound basis for future progress. The future reduction in U.S. assistance will be hastened if assistance from other donors continues to increase, as it did last year. Cambodia Major eeomvnlie dislocations have accompanied Cambodia%. decision to resist North Vietnamese and Viet Cong a.ggression. Budget expenditures have been greatly increased in order to expand the army. At the same time, revenues have declined sharply because of decreased domestic and export production and lower dome"lii' tax col?eetions. The increaso in money supply resulting from these budget deficits has caused a major price inflation over the Thant, two years. 'f`lu, $75 million we are proposing for FY 1973 will provide further foreign c? financing for imports to help offset declines in Cambodia's domestic lmrodimction and exhort earnings. In addition, we will join Japan. Australia, United Kingdom, Thailand, New Zealand and Malaysia in contributing to a fill] itil:iternlly-Nuanced Exchange Sulsp_ort Fund designed to finance other essen- tie l ft n'ei rn exchanie transactions. The Cambodia program is being implemented with a minimum of direct U.S. involvement, relying heavily on existing Cambodian institutions and encouraging Cambodia to seek advice and assistance from others to the maximum extent possible. Laos [i.S. economic assistance to Laos has been concentrated primarily on control- ling inORtionarv pressures, which threaten the country's economic and political Lability, and helping the Lao Government to provide essential services and faciiii ies in rural areas. The proposed F'y 1973 Supporting Assistance program for Laos totals $49.8 millionmillion in support of the multilateral economic stabilization nro- grarn and 531 million for project activities, The United States has joined with Australia., France, Japan and the United Kingdom to support the Lao Porcign, E.,rcham,ie Opcretiom? Fund, which buys I,no currency on the open market to reduce the money supply. The Lao Govern- ment, in turn, has m4ade strong efforts to increase taxesy improve tax collection and. exercise strinzont budget controls. Asa result, relative price stability has boon maincained despite mounting militcry and war-related costs. The project grocvam will continue in FY 1.973 to help the Lao Government provide basic services and facilities for which its own financial. resources and supply of skilled personnel remain inadequate. The principal thrust of project assistance is to provide relief to an average of almost 300,000 refugees at any given time. The United States furnishes refugees with food, clothing, medical care and supplies; provides air services for emergency relocation of refugees and for delivering supplies to them ; and helps refugees resettle and become self- Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/1 1J16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 sufficient. The United States also helps train junior Lao Government officials to perform refugee work at both the national and provincial levels. The provi- sion of refugee assistance is carried out not only through a smecial refugee relief and resettlement project, but also as an important part of other projects such as air support, public health and rural development. The remainder of our aid to Laos is designed to strengthen, the Lao Govern- ment's ability to provide essential services and facilities ina~ia rural areas. These roads, include schools and teachers, medical care, public safety, development activities, particularly in agriculture. Thailand Our past economic assistance programs have helped to relieve the potentially adverse effect of large military programs on Thailand's economic development. The economic growth rate Thailand enjoyed in the mid-60's has decelerated in recent years. The uncertainty of the military situations in both Laos and Cam- bodia has led the Thai to reduce the rate of increase in budgetary outlays for development while, at the same time, maintaining defense expenditures at a relatively high level. The FY 1973 Supporting Assistance request of $25.6 million is important to Thailand so that the Thai need not divert additional funds needed for economic development to security purposes. The United States will continue the basic security-oriented program of pre- vious years, but will also direct increased attention to the building of institutions which will permit the Thai Government to deal on its own with its economic development problems over the long term. Assistance will be provided to help the Thai Government continue to carry out a broad program of rural security and development. The FY 1973 program will increase efforts to support or improve basic Thai institutions which have leading roles in development, including local government finance, national economic policy and agricultural planning. East Asia regional programs U.S.-assisted regional programs in East Asia help to improve the prospects for long-range peace and stability in the area. The train project focus is on the exploitation of the Mekong River's hydropower and irrigation potential. Other projects deal with flood control, transportation and communications, fisheries, resettlement, and schistosoiniasis control. For FY 1973 we are requesting $8.4 million of Supporting Assistance funds for East Asia regional programs. Israel There is an urgent need to find a way to achieve a lasting Arab-Israeli settle- ment. In the meantime, the ceasefire between Israel and her neighbors, which began in August 1970 and which has endured for the past eighteen months, must be maintained, so that a climate conducive to continued negotiations may be preserved. Ilowever, until a peace settlement is achieved, it is essential that we preserve the arms balance in the area. Despite the very considerable efforts which Israeli authorities have made in managing the Israeli economy, Israel has experienced increasing difficulties in meeting the mounting military and economic claims from available resources. To assist Israel in financing its heavy fiscal burden, we plan to provide $50 million of Supporting Assistance in FY 1972 and propose another $50 million in F Y 1973. Jordan As a moderate Arab state, Jordan is a stabilizing influence in an area where important U.S. interests are threatened by radical forces. Despite internal dif- ficulties and pressures from Arab neighbors, Jordan remains interested in a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Jordan still finds itself in serious economic difficulties. These difficulties stem essentially from Jordan's loss of the West Bank, with its relatively good farmland and its world-renowned tourist attractions. The cost of rehabilitating the areas damaged in the September 1970 crisis added another burden to the Jordanian budget. The United States is providing Supporting Assistance to Jordan to enable it to carry out essential government activities, as well as to continue modest development activities. In the course of FY 1972, we have pro- vided Jordan with $30 million in Supporting Assistance and $15 million from the Contingency Fund. A $40 million Supporting Assistance program is proposed for FY 1973. Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : Cl1 IZDP741300415R000600080001-3 Other Programs The remaining $40.7 million is proposed for a number of other security-related programs. In fiscal year 1973, we propose to contribute $9.5 of Supporting Assistance funds as the U.S. share toward the recently concluded NATO Alliance defense agreement with Malta. The U.S. contribution toward this agreement for FY 1972-also $9.5 million-is being provided from the Contingency Fund. Seenrily assistance to Spain is covered by a five-year treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in 1970, which provides grant military aid in exchange for extension of U.S. military base rights. We propose $3 million of Supporting Assistance in FY 1973 to fund the educational/cultural component of this U.S.- Spanish defense agrement. The Spanish Government attaches importance to the non-military portion of the defense agreement and views it as a significant item in U.S. relations with Spain. Accordingly, Spain looks forward to its continua- tion as part of our agreement on the use of Spanish bases. Other Supporting Assistance funds being requested for FY 1973 are $4.S million for the UN Force in Cyprus and a portion of the costs of A.I.D.'s centrally-admin- istered activities. SOUTH ASIA RELIT' AND RETTARJTSPATION ($100 MILLION) The people and government of Bangladesh face extraordinary difficulties. Large-scale relief is needed to avert human suffering arising from chronic, and now increased, food shortage and from wide-spread destruction of shelter. Related to this is the requirement for help to rehabilitate the economy-rebuild- ing basic facilities such as roads and bridges, port facilities and schools, and providing commodities such as fertilizer and raw materials to help meet basic production needs. Bangladesh authorities estimate it will cost $3 billion-including at least $1 billion of food and non-food imports-to get the country to where it was prior to 1971. The United Nations is to be applauded for assuming a lead role, working with Bangladesh, in assessing needs and priorities, and in calling for and coordinating the world response. The United Nations has already assessed the immediate human relief needs and is now engaged, with the World Bank, in examining urgent reconstruction priorities. Initially, the TJN has focussed on the more immediate relief requirements-par- ticularly food, but also road and river transport and interim logistic support, shelter, fuel, fertilizer and other essential agricultural inputs. The UN prelimi- nary assessments total over $600 million needed during the balance of this year. As our initial response to the UN Secretary General's appeal for contributions on February 15, 1972, the U.S. Government donated 450,000 metric tons of wheat and rice valued at approximately $51 million, including shipping costs, under Title II of PL 450. Fifty thousand metric tons of edible oil valued at approxi- ma.tely $21 million including shipping was authorized as a further grant to the I IN. In response to a subsequent UN appeal for funds to help meet the priority relief and rehabilitation needs in Bangladesh, we have made an additional grant to the TIN of $35 million. These funds will be used to meet urgent needs for addi- tional vessel and aircraft charters, repair and reconstruction of port facilities, and purchase of relief import requirements such as vehicles, power tillers. irriga- tion pumps, fuel, fertilizer, roofing and other construction materials. A small portion will also ire used to pay administrative costs of the UN operation. We have also provided $6.7 million in grants to support voluntary agency relief programs. Our initial grant of $650,000 is to enable CARE to carry out a 62- village housing project and continue its research on cyclone-resistant shelters. A $3 million grant has been made to the Catholic Relief Service for housing mate- rials for 200,000 returned refugee and displaced families. To help college students made destitute by the war continue their education, the United States has provided $1.2 million to the International Rescue Committee education program. These funds will enable 9,000 college students to continue their education for at least one year. In the field of health we have made a grant of $450,000 to the international Rescue Committee for emergency funding of the Cholera Research Laboratory, which operates two hospitals. Also in the field of health, a grant of $1.5 million was made to the American National Red Cross, for use by the Inter- Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/J? : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 national Committee of the Red Cross in carrying out a program of nutritional and medical assistance for an estimated two million persons, including minori- ties, who have special needs. A $1.5 million grant is pending to the Foundation for Airborne Relief to airlift food and supplies within Bangladesh. As a result of these obligations of $43.57 million in non-food post-war assist- ance provided to the UN and voluntary agencies for Bangladesh, plus a total of $27.7 million incurred before December of last year for refugees in India as well as needs in Bangladesh, less than $130 million of the $200 million fiscal year 1972 appropriation for South Asia relief and rehabilitation remains avail- able to meet additional requirements over the next few months. In making our contributions, we are guided by the Congressional recommenda- tion that the U.S. share should not exceed 40 percent of the total from all sources, if reasonably possible. In view of the significant contributions already made by many nations, including India and Great Britain, we expect that U.S. participa- tion in the amount already provided by the Congress will be within this concept of "fair share." The $100 million requested for fiscal year 1973 will enable us to continue to provide our fair share of this vital effort of expanding dimensions, which we expect to continue through the middle of next year. By late this month, when we expect to receive the report of a UN/World Bank survey of needs in Bangladesh, the type and magnitude of rehabilitation require- ments will be clearer. After we have examined that report Mr. Chairman, we would be pleased to provide the Committee with a fuller, more detailed account of the requirements these funds will help cover than we, or anyone, can do today. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL ASSISTANCE ($42.5 MILLION) We are requesting a line-item authorization and appropriation of $42.5 million for fiscal year 1973 to carry out the international narcotics control program for which special authority is now provided in the Foreign Assistance Act. The President has made the control of drug abuse a high priority. In support of this policy the U.S. Government has launched a major international drive for improved narcotics control. Initial efforts are being directed toward opium and its derivatives, since these drugs are recognized to be the most destructive, both to the individual and to society as a whole. Largely through U.S. efforts, a conference was held last month in Geneva which approved amendments to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This Convention will require tighter controls on the production of such drugs and will, for this purpose, give greater powers to the International Narcotics Control Board. These amendments will come into force following ratification by 40 nations. Our efforts have also led to the creation a year ago of the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control, to which the United States plans to contribute $2 million this fiscal year and $5 million in fiscal year 1973. We have identified more than 50 countries with which cooperative efforts could result in the diminution of the worldwide problem of drug abuse. Discus- sions are already under way with many of these countries, particularly those in which the more serious problems of opium production and trafficking exist. As the President has indicated, we stand prepared to assist any nation seeking to fight drug abuse. The most important development to date has been Turkish Prime Minister Nihat Erim's announcement that all opium production in Turkey will be banned after the 1972 crop. France and Mexico are also making significant contributions to the effort. We hope the Turkish decision and other efforts which have been undertaken will serve as an example for other countries to move forcefully also. The funds we are requesting will underwrite our contribution to the effort for the next fiscal year. The program is new and expanding rapidly. Hence, it is not possible at this time to provide detailed proposals for the entire amount of the request. However, discussions are under way with a number of governments which we expect will result in an increasing number of concrete programs in the coining months. It is essential for the United States to be in a position to move quickly into the implementation stage as each proposal is made and evaluated. Particular emphasis will be placed in the first instance on improving enforce- ment capabilities and increasing cooperation between national and international enforcement agencies in the exchange of intelligence on drug trafficking. We believe this will make the most immediate impact on the problem, in terms of 78-OSO-72-2 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 1.4 preventing both the illicit production and processing of narcotic drugs and their movement throughout the world. Programs addressing the agricultural and health aspects of drug abuse will also play important roles in the U.S. effort. However, crop substitution programs, by their very nature, must be considered long-term solutions. Drug abuse is a relatively new problem in many countries around the world. Those which are not now experiencing serious drug abuse are becoming increas- ingly alarmed that this could become a problem for them in the future. The control of narcotics will require the cooperation of the entire community of nations. We are gratified with the growing awareness of this fact and the increasingly helpful responses we are receiving. We must he prepared with the financial resources needed to take full advantage of the interest of other coun- tries and international bodies in cooperating with the United States in attacking the narcotics problem. -Air. Chairman, each of the three authorization requests A.I.D. is making this year is for an assistance program of great importance. I urge the Committee to provide the full amount we are requesting. Secretary Rocuns. If the chairman insists that when I come to testify on legislation that I am not permitted to read a statement, I, of course, will follow your instructions. Tho CurAIRMAN. You may be permitted to road it. It is the timing of it. In. order to evaluate the program you are submitting, I think the questions f asked are fundamental. Secretary RoGF:RS. Could I have the questions? I will take them one at a time. The Cir. 1PM.vN. What is the purpose you seek to achieve by intensi- fied bombing of North Vietnam? Secretary Rocuals. We have three purposes in mind. Mr. Chairman. First, we are doing it to protect American troops that are in South Vietnam, protecct the lives of those troops while the President's with- drawal program continues. We are doing it to make certain that the withdrawal program that the President has announced can continue, and we are doing it to give the South Vietnamese a chance to defend themselves against the massive invasions by the North Vietnamese. Now, the references that the chairman made in his opening state- ment about conditions that existed many years ago are quite different today. The fact is that the United States has withdrawn 450,000 .irrieric. ans. We have no Americans in ground combat action today and the President has said on every occasion that lie had a chance to, that as the withdrawals continued, that if the enemy attempted to take advantage of those withdrawals, to put American lives in jeopardy, he would take the necessary actions to prevent it. Ile has taken this action and he intends to continue to take whatever action is necessary to achieve those purposes. ?7'iIREAT To U.S. TROOPS QUESTIONED The C11AIr.3rAN. You have properly said that our troops are largely withdrawn. I wasn't under the impression and have seen nothing to indicate that our troops, such as are left, have been under any great threat. Secretary RooEns. If the Communists took over the country com- pletely, we have 55,000 men still there. The CHAIRMAN. And they could be withdrawn very easily; could they not? Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/1 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Secretary Rowuis. Well, as you said yourself, Mr. Chairman, on "Issues and Answers," you would not favor any such proposal. The ChiAIRDIAN. I said Secretary RoGERs. You said it would be ridiculous to do that. As you know, Mr. Chairman, for a long time the North Vietnamese have been able to peddle, to sell a cruel hoax to a segment of the Ameri- can people that somehow the war in Vietnam was a, civil uprising. Now it is quite clear, and I don't believe anyone can deny it, that this is a major invasion of and offensive action by the North Vietnamese into South Vietnam. It comes at a time when its purpose is to disrupt the withdrawal program and to endanger American lives, the lives of Americans who are still in South Vietnam. The enemy has committed outside of North Vietnam 12 of its 13 combat divisions. So we think it is essential to conduct the attacks that the President has ordered, to con- duct against military targets wherever lie decided to make these at- tacks to protect American lives, to permit the withdrawals to continue, and to give South Vietnamese forces a chance to defend themselves. It is quite clear, Mr. Chairman, that the South Vietnamese forces have been acting courageously in the defense of their own country. The attacks are occurring in military region I, II, and III and to some extent in military region IV. The CIIIRMAN. I said we ought to settle it by negotiated settlement. Nobody over turns tail and rims out. Secretary RoGERS. You said it would be ridiculous to have an imme- diate withdrawal. The CHAIRMAN. It would. I don't think that is in the cards at all. WHAT IS U.S. INTEREST? I am trying to understand, in view of all that we have suffered from this war, and the conditions that we know we contend with, is what is the U.S. interest. Talking about Mr. Thieu's interest or the South Vietnamese Govern- ment, that is another matter. Whether or not it is a civil war-it certainly was at one time, but our coming into it made it an international. war. That is true; it is changed in character. But with our withdrawal it was again approaching a civil. war between two sections of the same country, which is Vietnam. T am unable to understand what the U.S. interest is. How does this serve our interest in view of the developments with Russia and China? I think every member of this committee has applauded the President for. making moves in China and Russia and I am unable to see how this action promotes those. They are moves in which the interests of the United States are very clear to any of us. I have a great interest, all of my constituents do, in the moves to normalize relations with China and Russia, but I can't see what interest of the United States is served by this continuation of this war. I don't see from what you have said, except the lives of our soldiers. I don't believe that is any longer a sig- nificant threat. It is significant that we save them, of course, just as it is the prisoners. But we were in negotiations and according to the press we broke off negotiations. Would you say is it possible that these bombing raids are intended to force a return to negotiations? You didn't mention that, but is that part of it? Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 16 PRESIDENT'S ICECORD IN DECISIONMARING Secret, M ry Rcr;xs. r. Chairman, I would like to if I may, to address the first part of your question, then I will come to the last part next. Your comment that you don't understand -ki by we have t Then. this action in view of the recent decisions that the President made vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. WVcll, as you know, his record is good. I can recall testifying before this committee in the case of decisions he made in Cambodia and the decisions he made in Laos, and we were under severe, criticism because it was felt by sortie members of the committee that that would make it difficult for us to have better relations with the Soviet Union, and it was felt it would make it difficult also for us to have better relations with the People's Republic of China. As you see, the President's decision was right.. We had a very success- ful visit with the People's Republic of China. We are continuing to plan for the visit to the Soviet Union and I think the President's judg- ment has been sound. Now, F think the decisions that we have made recently to bomb mili- tary targets in North Vietnam make it clear to the other side that the United States is going to take whatever military action is necessary to achieve the purposes I mentioned. HOW IINITFI) STATES WILL CONTINI'E SSUPPORTIN(,, SOUTH VIETNAM I can remember some of the members Of this committee in the past criticizing the policy of the United States for not making attacks on military targets in North Vietnam. We are doing everything we can to prevent civilian casualties, but the North Vietnamese have mounted a major invasion of the south, and it is clear for everyone to see now, and it is clear they have been lying through their teeth when they were sav- ing there were no North Vietnam forces in South Vietnam' You have a major military invasion of South Vietnam, and we are going to con- tinue to support the people of South Vietnam and their right to deter- mine their own future and we have no intentions of permitting the Communists to to 6:e over South Vietnam by force. We are going to do it with South Vietnamese troops. We are going to do it with the use of American air power. We are not going to reintroduce any American ground combat troops in South Vietnam, but we are going to see this major offensive-attack on South Vietnam: does not succeed. The C1rAIRMAN. Let me move on to the other questions. You have had 3t/2 years to withdraw our troops. It is a very long time. If it is as important as you say, they could have been withdrawn. REASON CONCRESS NOT CONSULTED IN ADVANCE OF REESCALATION Why was the Congress not consulted in any fashion, and I don't think it was, in advance of this major reescalation of the war? Secretary RocERs. I think the reason was, of course, Mr. Chairman, that the secrecy of this type of thing is very important. Now the Con- gress knew, and the President has told the Congress from time to tinge, that if the enemy persisted in attempting to take advantage of the withdrawals, if they made attacks against its at the time we were withdrawing, mounted a major offensive, he would take whatever Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/1f : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 retaliatory action he thou9?h was necessary, and that is what he has done. To that extent the Congress has been informed. The Congress was not informed precisely of the military actions involved. TIMING OF DECISION TO BOMB IIAIPHONG The CHAIRMAN. Why was the decision to bomb Haiphong made at this particular time.? What about the timing? That was significant. Secretary ROGERS. Because of the major invasion that has occurred and because of the military targets in Haiphong. I might say that the harbor itself was not bombed. Some of the military targets in the area, of course, were near the harbor, but the harbor itself was not bombed. But it was decided to make these attacks to slow down this major offensive underway in South Vietnam. The attack included petroleum storage dumps, places where heavy equipment is stored, warehouses and other such places of that kind which contribute, of course, to the offensive in the south. U.S. CONTINUATION OF AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT The CHAIRMAN. You may have already answered this one. That is, the question of the policy of Vietnamization, including the assumption that the United States will continue indefinitely to provide a limited air and naval support whenever South Vietnam forces are under pressure. Secretary ROGERS. No, it does not. I think in that connection it should be pointed out, I am not sure there has been enough attention given to it, that the South Vietnamese are supplying a good many of the tactical missions in South Vietnam and they are doing quite well. We have every reason to think they will be able to continue the building up of their air power. WHAT IF U.S. REMOVED ITS FORCES? The CHAIRMAN. What is your answer to this question? It interests me very much. What do you think would happen if the United States had removed its forces, as we have been in the process of doing, and let the Vietnamese settle these matters themselves? What is the posi tion of the Administration? Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think as you said yourself, on the "Issues and Answers" program, Mr. Chairman, that any immediate with- drawal of American forces would be ridiculous. It probably would result in a blood bath. There are 17 million people in south Vietnam. If the United States did an about-face after all of these years of supporting South Vietnam, if that occurred I think there would be a major blood bath in South Vietnam. What its form and composition and so forth would be I, of course, can't be sure. But there is no doubt in my mind that there would be a terrible massacre. Secondly, I think it would destabilize the whole area. There are other nations in the area with which we have treaty commitments that have been negotiated and ratified over a period of a great number of years. It is not a partisan matter in any sense of the word. These treaties have received bipartisan support. If we suddenly with- draw not only would we have a major blood bath in South Vietnam Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CI,-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 but I think it would be destabilizing in areas like Korea and Japan and the Philippines and other countries in that area. So I think it wou Id be a major disaster. It would be a mistake of major proportions. WITHDRAWAL ORDER INDEYINT'I'M The CHAIRZMAN. You keep saying suddenly withdraw. Vietnam- ization was begun in 1969. There is nothing sudden about it. The order is indefinite. It could go on for 10 years if you only withdraw 2 or,", thousand a month. Secretary IioCRRs. T. think, Mr. Chairman, you overlooked the fact we have withdrawn four hundred and fifty thousand and the Presi- dent is going to make another announcement about more withdrawals, or at least he is going to make an amiuoncement about what he is going to do. We are going to continue the present withdrawals, the withdrawals that have been announced, and he has another announce- rnent he will make before May 1. Now, it is difficult for me, to understand how you can say we have.n't withdrawn troops. The American people know we have with- drawn all of the combat troops. We have only about 85,000 troops left and we are going to be down to 69,000 by May 1_ I'ON NIiLTATION WITH CONGRESS OR CO:VLVIITTEE The CICAIRAIAN. I am familiar with that. Do I understand then that in the future anytime you feel. that secrecy is called for you will not consult the Congress or this committee? Secretary Rorr;as. Well, I think that has been true throughout our history. In terms of military battles Congress has not been advised in advance about a particular battle. That has been true in most wars. It was true beginning in George Washington's time. In fact this, was one of the major controversies he, had with the Congress at that time. The CTTAiRM::1N. Senator Church. U.S. POLICY ON CONTIN1ING ROMPING Senator Cm-neir. Mr. Secretary, last week the press reported See- retarv Laird saying that the bombing of North Vietnam would con- tinue until the North Vietnamese had withdrawn above the DMZ. Is that the policy? Secretary RocT e4. Senator, the policy is that we are not going to engan?e in useless talks with the North Vietnamese. We think that the talks that we have had over the last. several years have provided them with a propaganda forum that has not been useful at all. Negotiations are quite different from talks, as you know. Negotiations require serious purposes on both sides to try to resolve differences. I can say quite frankly that we haven't detected any serious purposes at all on the part of North Vietnam. We believe that their purpose is to use the negotiating forum for propaganda purposes. In answer to your question. specifically, we are not going to engage in negotiating while this major invasion is underway. As you know, there are offenses now occurring in many parts of South Vietnam. The North. Vietnamese are committing almost all of their combat troops to this invasion. Therefore, we are not going to do Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/1 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 that. What we would do in the future, depending on the end of the invasion, of course, the President will have to decide. Senator Clrurcu. My question was the War Secretary has said that the bombing would continue until the North Vietnamese had with- drawn above the DMZ. I was wondering if that is American policy? Secretary RocE1 s. As I have just said, we are not going to enter into negotiations unless, first, we think the other side has a serious purpose and, secondly, unless this invasion is repelled or they with- draw. W7 [Y WILL BOMBING SUCCEED NOW ? Senator CIIURCII. Why do you' think the resumption of full-scale bombing in the North will now succeed when it failed before'? Secretary ROGERS. Senator, before, we had a lot of American ground troops in South Vietnam. The myth persisted at that time that this was a civil war and any attack on the North somehow was unfair. Now, that is wrong, we think. The North is being used to supply the troops in South Vietnam and as long as it is being used for that purpose we think that we will have the right to and will continue to attack to prevent the invasion of South Vietnam from succeeding? Senator CIIUrcnI. During the Johnson years, there was very exten- sive bombing of North Vietnam. It was directed toward military targets; it went on for years. I will repeat my question again. Why do you think a resumption of bombing of military targets which you have now undertaken will succeed now when it failed then? Secretary ROGERs. Well, because the facts are entirely different. Senator CIIURCrr. What facts ? The bombing of military targets went on for a long time, but it did not result in the North Vietnamese calling off the war or stopping the pressure on the South. Why do you assume that the resumption of bombing now will have that effect when it didn't have that effect before. Secretary ROGERS. Well as I repeat, the facts are different, and I will tell you what the facts are that I base my answer on. First, we do not have 535,000 Americans in South Vietnam. Sec- ondly, we have trained and equipped the South Vietnamese to defend their own country, so that a lot of them are well trained and equipped. Three, the enemy has never committed all of its forces outside of its country before. Before, we were fighting a sort of guerrilla war and there were infiltrations and sapper attacks and so forth. Now it is a totally different concept militarily. There is a major invasion and they have committed all of their divisions except one outside of North Vietnam. That is quite a different military situation, Senator. Senator CIIUrch. I say to you most respectfully you are not answer- ing my question. Secretary ROGERS. I think I am. I think the military situation is quite different. Senator Cnnurcli. I am not contending that the situation is the same as it was as far as the number of divisions in the South are concerned or as far as the number of American troops in the South are, concerned. My question relates to the effectiveness of the bombing. The bombing in the past, when it was very extensively applied against targets in the North, had not the effect of reducing pressures on the South. I want to know why you think that the resumption of the Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : Ci -RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 bombing will succeed now when it didn't succeed then? That has nothing to do with the military situation. Secretary RonRs. Of course it did. Senator Cl uucTI. Mr. Secretary, can you name a war when bomb- ing has ever resulted in the calling off of the fighting, whenever an enemy has been bombed into submission through the use of air power alone,? Secretary Row ns. Well, Senator, now you are asking another ques- tion. Senator CIIITRCri. That is the same question. Secretary ROf,'F,Rs. Let me answer first the question you asked. You asked why because the facts are different do we expect the result to be different? Isn't that the question you asked? WHY WILL REST ATIMON OF BOMBING SUCCEED? Senator CIII-WIT. No, it is not the question I asked. The question I asked was this. For years under the Johnson administration, we bombed the North in an effort to make them, as Rusk used to say, stop interfering with their neighbor's affairs. It never succeeded. North Vietnam kept up the pressure despite the bombing. The pressure only increased ; it never diminished. The South is again under great pressure. We are resuming the bombing of the North. My question is: Why do you think the bombing is going to succeed in inducing the North to call off the attacks on the South when in the past bombing never had that effect? Secretary RoG=i Rs. Well, OK. In the past, the period that you refer to, the war was being fought on a totally different basis. Now, if you !rave a different kind of a war you have to naturally consider that when you decide what to do. In this ease the enemy has committed 12 of its divisions, combat divisions, outside. of its country and it needs support for those divi- sions, which is quite different than in the past. We think and I think that history will ;how the wisdom of attacking the military targets in the, North, which are required for their invasion of the South; they need these places for logistical purposes; they need the petroleum. Now before they didn't have the need for petroleum. Now they have very sophisticated military equipment. They have tanks, armored vehicles. They have some sophisticated guns, mobile artillery guns, all of which require petroleum and oil products. They need a lot of oil supplies from the North. They need a lot of equipment coming from the North. They have massive military supply depots north of the DMZ in other nreas. Now it is quite a different war we are fighting-that is the differ- ence-and we think that these attacks will slow down that invasion and we think it evil l result in a. failure of these offenses. N ('F.S~~FIIL HISTORICAL PRECEDENT REQOJSSTED Senator Crrrn,c-r, Mr. Secretary, when you say you think history wil1. show this. can you point to another war where the, use of airpower alone has produced that effect against an enemy? As far as striking the North is concerned, you are not going to use American ground forces Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/1Ah : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 to invade the North, are you? You say you are just bombing. I want to know where in history just bombing has produced the effect you are looking for? Secretary ROGERs. As I say, this isn't just bombing. You have ground fighting going on in South Vietnam. But unless my memory fails me- I was there-airpower was quite effective in World War II. Senator Cirurcii. Airpower didn't reduce Germany into submission until allied armies conquered Germany and there was nothing left in Berlin but large ash-burning ruins. Secretary ROGERS. I was talking about the other part of the war I took part in. Senator CHURCH. Even there, bombing didn't produce that effect until atomic bombs were dropped. We were right at the point of in- vading, and the Japanese knew we had every intention of invading. SOUTH VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF WITHOUT U.S. AIRPOWER Secretary RoGERS. Let me say we have reason to think and I be- lieve that if these offensives on the part of North Vietnam are unsuccessful-and it looks as though they are going to be now. Every indication we have is to that effect. The South Vietnamese have been fighting very well, and you know from the morning papers it looks as if An Loc is going to hold. If these offensives are. unsuccessful, I believe the Vietnamization program will work well and I think South Vietnam will be able to defend itself successfully. Senator CHURCH. If to defend against the present offensive it is necessary to mass such tremendous American airpower, airpower that the South Vietnamese alone will never possess themselves, then how can you conclude that in the future the South Vietnamese will to defend themselves without the interposition of American airpower ? If the kind of aerial armada we have now assembled is necessary, how can you say that Vietna+mization is going to succeed and the South Vietnamese will become self-sufficient? Secretary ROGERS. If these offensives are unsuccessful and these com. bat divisions, 12 of the 13 that are outside, of North Vietnam are de- feated, then the effect of renewed massive invasion by the North Vietnamese in the future is going to be greatly diminished. We think in the meantime the South Vietnamese will build up their airpower. Now, we have said from the beginning-every time I have testified here I have said as we withdraw our troops from South Vietnam we are going to continue to use airpower, we are going to continue to use the airpower necessary to prevent a takeover by the Communists in South Vietnam. I believe that can be done. We are not going to make any announcements about what we are not going to do. We think that there has been altogether too much of that in this war. The only two announcements I will make about what we are not going to do are these. We are not going to reintroduce American ground combat troops in South Vietnam and we are, not going to use nuclear weapons in South Vietnam or North Vietnam. But short of that we are not going to make any announcements of what we are going to do or not going to do. Senator CHUROII. I hope, Mr. Secretary, that the Vietnamese do hold out against this offensive. My disagreement is based upon a 30- Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CL~-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 year record that, the North will continue to press this war. By now either the South is able to defend itself or it looks to be very dubious they will ever be able to defend themselves. If it takes this kind of American airpower now, I can't see any time in the near future when it won't take that kind of American aarpower again and I don't see Vietnamization ending our involvement if that is the way the, policy of V ietnanaization is defined. W 13Y NORTH VIETNAM MASSED MAJOR OP'r`F:NSIVF Secretary RooT;RS. If there had been any intention on the part of the other side to negotiate a settlement, why did they mass this major offensive at this time, at a time when we are withdrawing and the whole world knows it and we are trying, as the chairman said, to im- ln?ove our ream ions with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union ? Why (lid they think it was necessary to invade South Vietnam and in a major way so the, whole world could see it? Now there is no dispute about it. Everybody finally admits the forces in the south are North Vietnam forces. Senator CTTT-nCn. They do it because they are determined and have been from the beginning to accomplish two objectives: to drive the foreigner out of the land and to reunite Vietnam under the revolu- tionary rovernment in Hanoi. That has been their objectives all along. You are unable to negotiate a settlement with these people because yon can't agree. to their terms and they can't agree to ours. That, is plain. And they a re, not going to stop fighting . Now either Viet.Tamization means that the South Vietnamese be- come self-sufficient, we provide them the tools to defend themselves while we extradite ourselves from further involvement in the war or, as you seem to define it, it means a continuous involvement for the indefinite future because the north isn't going to call this war off. Secretary Ronmums. Well, let me. follow that by saying QITESTTON OF CIVIL WAR Senator CIruRcu. I want to add one thing further. I disagree with you when you say it is now clear to all of the world this isn't a civil war as though these two countries were distinct and separate countries. For generations, they haven't been. It is Tench like our civil war no longer being a civil war when the northern government invaded the South. It is a civil war and has been from the beginning, and the North Viet- namese are not oing to call it off. If Vietnamization means anything; a.nd if it is to be successful policy, it means and should mean by 11 new that they have acquired the capacity to defend themselves. If they haven't, if it takes this kind of massive American involvement in the air and from contiguous waters, then when will the end come to our participation ? Secretary 114-w ins. Let me answer both your comments. First, on the question of civil war. What I had reference to, Senator, is tlrat until recent Iv the North Vietnamese have never admitted they had any troops in South Vietnam. Senator CITTr,r,r,. I don't want to embarrass you by quoting your own figures to you. Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/1146, : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Secretary LAIRD. I have no problem at all with it, but I do think you. !should use the reservation which I outlined before the Appro- priations Committee at the time I gave them those figures. Senator PELL. Then using. your figures, the figure order is eight. to ten times greater. I think we should recognize that there must be something wrong when we keep talking about the Soviet assistance. We exceeded it in the order of 1,000 percent or so and then we do not still seem to be able to bring this war to a conclusion. Secretary LAIRD. That figure is incorrect. That figure is incorrect as far as the military assistance program is concerned. I think what you are doing there, you are putting in figures that had to do when the program was completely an Americanized pro- grain and the operation in Vietnam was an American operation. We have transferred certain equipment over to the forces of the Sbuth Vietnamese that was there as American equipment, and you have placed the figures in there, the original cost figures of the equipment to the United States. Now the situation is such that that particular application of the equipment priced at that fi.g titre, I do not believe is a fair appraisal because the Soviet Union, in the figures that they are using and that are used in this study, was putting in. some equipment that has been moving out of their inventory, and their pricing figure is somewhat different than ours, and that is why you have a little difficulty on that, and that is one of the. reasons that in my testimony; when I first used those figures, I outlined all of these reservations very clearly and precisely, and the, chart which was used had those reservations with it. COMPARATIVE SOVIET AND CHINESE AND U.S. AID TO VIETNAM Senator PELL. I think we disagree on this, but I think perhaps for the record on an unclassified basis maybe you could furnish us your best estimate possible on Soviet and Chinese military assistance to North Vietnam compared to U.S. military assistance to South Viet- nam during the past fiscal year. (The information referred to follows:) Secretary LAIRD. Senator Pell, what I have tried to do-1 will be glad to do that for the record at all times is to make the point that it is the restraint and the provisions of the program that are so vital. I believe that people supplying military equipment to these various nations should do it with. a certain amount of restraint and also provide that it be used in a defensive capability rather than an aggressive or offensive capability outside the country to which the equipment is provided. Senator PELL. And this is why, for instance, we are flying the B-52's over North Vietnam, and the North Vietnamese Secretary LAIRD. We have not given the South Vietnamese a cap a, bility to carry out extensive. air operations over North Vietnam. r Senator PELL. Incidentally, in connection with giving aid to another country, there have been exceptions. I think in the Pakistani war there were press reports, I don't. think denied by the Defense Depart- ment, to the effect that Jordan did send some planes in there. Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : C117 -DP74B00415R000600080001-3 Secretary LAIRD. I can assure you that any action. such as that would be immediately acted upon by our director of security assistance. In the case of Pakistan and, of course, of India, an embargo was placed on the military assistance. NEUTRAL COUNTRIES' VIEW Or MILITARY ASIOSTANCE PROGRAMS Senator PELr.. On a somewhat lighter note, yon talk about military assistance programs and what they mean. I remember sitting next to the sovereign of a little country in the underdeveloped part of the world, and at the end of the meal a request was made to us. Please make sure, Mr. Senator, we do not got an aid program. I think those who are truly neutral have this view. I have asked the Defense Department previously what we have: been doing, if anything, in the way of weather modification. I have. intro- duced a draft treaty in that regard, saying that weather modification should not be used for military reasons. 't'here have been allegations and press reports that we have engaged in those activities in Southeast Asia. Are you able to comment in any way on this subject? Secretary LAIRD. Yes, I would be pleased to comment. First, on the question of the techniques used in weather, we have used certain techniques in Asia. We have used them. in Texas. I can particularly refer to the use of it in the Philippines. This was done at the request of the Philippine Government.. We have also done some weather work on last year's drought in the Texas area. This is a program which we believe that the Congress is fully aware of. We~have used some rainmaking devices in the Caribbean area. I am not sure that this necessarily works. We have not perfected it to the extent that some of our friends in Texas would like. Senator T sr.r,. Excuse me, I know my colleagues are waiting to ques- tion you, too. Have we engaged in these activities for military reasons in Southeast Asia? Secretary LAIRD. I can't discuss the operating authority that we go forward with in Southeast Asia specifically, but I would he glad to discuss with you the techniques that haveV been used outside of the battle zone. But I cannot discuss any of the operating authorities with in the battle area. POW RELEASE PRIOR TO SETTLEMENT OF WAR QUESTIONED Senator PELT.. Finally, the subject of the prisoners of war, as you know, has interested me. I spoke on it at the United Nations, and I have made a couple of private trips to the North Vietnamese in Paris on it. Why do we believe there is any possibility of prisoners of war being rel eased prior to settlement of the war?, I asked the Library of Congress to run a check on this, and there hasn't, been a war in history where POW's have been released before there has been a, settlement of the basic questions. Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/111/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Why do we continue to delude, the American people, the poor wives and mothers, to the effect there is a chance of their men coming back prior to settlement of the war? What is the rationale here? Secretary LAIRD. Senator Poll, I have been doing as much as I can to call this problem to the attention of the world, and this has had the full support of our commander in chief and the President pf the United States. I think I have special responsibilities in this field, too, because they are military men, and I am in constant touch with their wives and their families. I have emphasized the humanitarian problems that are involved in the failure of the Communists to abide by the 1949 Geneva Conven- tion, and I will continue to emphasize this inhumane treatment of our prisoners of war. I have placed the emphasis on the Geneva Conven- tion, and in my defense report I have outlined 9 violations that are currently going on. I would like to put them in the record at this point. (The information referred to follows:) HANOI'S VIOLATIONS OF GENEVA CONVENTION The Geneva Convention requires that prisoners be humanely treated and pro- tected. This provision has been consistently violated. The Geneva Convention requires that neutral inspection of prisoner camps be permitted, including interviews of the prisoners without witnesses in attendance. The enemy has never permitted such inspection or such interviews. The Geneva Convention requires that the names of all prisoners be released promptly. Such names as the enemy has released have not been released promptly nor through regular channels. The Geneva Convention requires notification of deaths in captivity and full information on the circumstances and place of burial. The enemy has not fur- nished any information about circumstances of death and place of burial. The Geneva Convention requires that prisoner of war camps be marked clearly and their location be made public. The enemy has not marked its camps nor divulged their location. The Geneva Convention requiresthat the seriously sick and wounded be repa- triated or interned in a neutral country. The enemy has refused to comply with this provision. The Geneva Convention requires that prisoners be permitted to send at least two letters and four cards a month. The average has been two or three letters a year and none at all from some prisoners. The Geneva Convention requires that sufficient food must be given to prisoners. Yet, all of the released prisoners have been found to be underweight and suffering from malnutrition. The Geneva Convention requires that prisoners not be held in close confine- ment. Yet, the enemy has held some men in solitary confinement for years. Secretary LAIRD. I believe that any nation that is involved and wants to be involved in the international community must show through its actions that it is willing to abide by its agreements, the conventions, and the treaties to which it is a party. I think the first thing that Uanoi- must do is to abide by these con- ventions to which they were a party, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and that is where I have placed the emphasis in my discussion with the families-with the wives, with the mothers, and the fathers and the children of these men. I am just as concerned about these families who suffer. I am con- cerned about the men who are serving in Vietnam at the present time, but I am also concerned about these POW's and those missing in action. Senator PELT,. I completely agree with you on the importance of putting the emphasis on the humaine treatment. But is it not a correct Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 130 statement to say there is no real possibility of these unfortunate Amer- icans being returned to us, prior to a settlement of the war? Secretary LAIRD. I cannot read the intentions of the Communist enemy. I know that we and the South Vietnamese are willing to release prisoners of war. We have received assurances from the South Vietna- mese, who are holding North Vietnamese prisoners of war that they will release them. They are abiding by the Geneva Conventions, but they have announced that they will release prisoners from the North to return to their homes. I can only talk for our side. I cannot talk for the Communists. Senator Pm,r,. But from the viewpoint of the families, and I have some in my State, and not getting up their hopes, should we not con- centrate, as you say you have done, and you, personally, I am sure. have, on the POW's treatment? But our people must realize the men cannot be returned until the war is settled. On the basis of history Secretary LAIRD. I think it is very difficult for us to anticipate the intentions of the enemy. But particularly when they refuse, even as of today, to live by the Geneva Convention. So making an estimate of their intentions, when they even todayare not abiding by the Geneva Convention, is, I think, most difficult. The, CHAIR;,I!,N. I wonder if we could move on. Senator Cooper. Senator Cooi?RR. Thank you. I am not going to be very long. I would like to direct my questions to this present situation in Viet- nam and some of the political and military issues that I think arise from it. OBJECTIVES OF BOMBING The chairman, in his opening statement, said correctly that yester- day the Secretary of State gave three reasons for the bombing. One, to protect American lives; two, to permit the withdrawal to proceed as scheduled ; and, three, to assist the South Vietnamese in de- fending themselves. I certainly agree with the first two objectives as proper goals. I wanted to ask how many North Vietnamese troops are in South Vietnam. Secretary LAirn. At the present time there are on the borders--- Senator Coorrir. How many divisions and total number of forces? Secretary L.vIRf. The North Vietnamese have over 100,000 troops in Soarth Vietnam. Senator COOPER. How many divisions? Secretary LAnu). They have 12 of the 13 main force divisions oper- ating outside of North Vietnam at the present time. Senator Coor'ER. Now, leaving aside the South Vietnamese. forces for the moment, there are approximately 90,000 Americans there in our Armed Forces. Secretary LAIRD. As of today we have 85,000. Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11YI6 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Senator COOPER. How many combat troops? Secretary LAIRD. We had 11 divisions. We have none now. We have about seven battalions there with the security responsibility. U.S. FORCE REDUCTION AS ONE REASON FOR INVASION Senator COOPER. And in your discussions about the reasons for this invasion, did you consider that one of the reasons is that our forces have been reduced to this low point? Secretary LAIRD. Senator Cooper, it is difficult for me to really explain why the North Vietnamese attacked across the DMZ. That is, it is difficult for me to read what their reasons were for going across the DMZ to initiate the attack. But I do think that they felt because of the massive withdrawals of Americans, that they would be able to attack the South Vietnamese and that they underestimated the strength of the South Vietnamese. They thought they could harass the U.S. Forces as we continued our withdrawal program. Senator COOPER. That was as a practical. matter, it seems, common- sense, that they certainly would have a better chance of success for their operations against these smaller forces then they would have had 2 or 3 years ago. Secretary LAIRD. I think they underestimated the situation, Senator Cooper. DANGER TO U.S. FORCES FROM SUCCESSFUL BREAKTHROUGH Senator COOPER. Now, did you and your military advisers, General Abrams and others, consider that if the breakthrough should be successful that it would endanger the lives and security of our forces who are left there? Secretary LAIRD. That is correct, particularly in military region 1 where a large portion of our forces are around Da Nang. The safety and security of the American forces, I felt, was threatened, and so did General Abrams. Senator CooPR. I agree wholly with that. On the basis of the infor- mation I have been given, I think that is right. Secretary LAIRD. We did not want to take a chance with those Americans as we continue standing down forces and withdrawing them from South Vietnam. AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT WITH BOMBING PROPOSITIONS Senator CooPER. I think you have acted properly in that respect. We in the Senate have asked for the withdrawal of all these forces. We certainly have to protect them as they withdraw. So I agree with the second proposition, too, to permit withdrawals to proceed as scheduled. I disagree with the third, however, and most of us do, to bomb or take military actions to assist the South Vietnamese in defending themselves. As Senator Javits said yesterday, it comes to a point where we either make a decision to protect them forever or for other reasons we withdraw our forces. Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 132 1 want to address myself to the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi. As I have said, it seems to me that you have to weioh other factors. I am not now sitting as a military roan, though I Now a little bit about it, but it is hard for me to believe that it was absolutely necessary for the protection of the forces to bomb Haiphong and Hanoi. What do you say about that? Secretary LAIRD. I think it was absolutely essential for protecting American forces and to show the determination of the United States to protect these forces as they withdraw, and the massive violation of the 1968 understandings was one which could not be dealt with lightly by our Government. WEIG}TTNG OTHER DANGERS OF BOMBING RECOMMENDED Senator CooPER. I would assume you do not make, the final political judgments. I assume, however, that you have something to say about them. I would hope that you would weigh the other dangers in the bombing. There has been a great deal of talk about the Soviet Union here today. We are facing negotiations with them. The SALT talks could be more important than other negotiations we have ever been involved in. I would hope that you would urge that we would not endanger those talks, that we would not continue this bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi or any other place in the north, except where it is unquestionably necessary to protect our forces. I support, every- thing you do to protect our forces, but I think we are running a risk, a grave risk, a dangerous one, in this deep north bombing of the, north. That is my own opinion. ADMISSION TITAT NORTII VIETNAM FORCES ARE OPERATING IN SOUTIr Has Hanoi ever admitted the presence of these forces in South Vietnam? Secretary L.r,Tnm They have recently indicated that the North Viet- namese are operating in South Vietnam, but this was not the case for many years. But at the present time they are living up to something that has been a factor in the war for many years, and they are now admitting that the North Vietnamese are operating in the south. Senator CooryR. Do you have any information as to whether or not there are any Soviet military personnel or technical advisers in South Vietnam ? Usually when sophisticated equipment is furnished, as we have seen in Egypt, it is followed by either military or civilian technical per- sonnel to assist in training. And in Egypt, it has been said, and I think it is correct, that the Soviets are operating some of this equipment. Are there any facts? Secretary LAIRD. Yes, there is evidence of that. Just a week or 10 days before the invasion across the DMZ by the North Vietnamese, a very sophisticated team of Soviet air experts was in Hanoi. They Were seen by representatives of other nations that have representation Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 133 there. There are advisers from time to time helping the North Viet- namese with the military assistance program. Senator COOPER. I accept your evaluation of the difference between our motives of providing defensive training and the provision of equip- ment for the South Vietnamese. But again, if this introduction of Soviet personnel should continue and grow, it could be that you would raise more and more difficult questions, and you might move into a sit- uation like you have in Egypt. I think these things have to be taken into consideration, unless we become engaged in a much more difficult and much more dangerous position. Secretary LAIRD. Senator Cooper, the level of conflict is being estab- lished by the invading forces and the level of conflict can be changed by the invaders. Senator CoorER. It seems to me even this invasion describes a pat- tern which could continue to escalate : The North Vietnamese invade, the South Vietnamese with the assistance of our -air power repels the invasion, and the North Vietnamese will retire, regroup, reequip and attack again, and the United States will have to use its air power to protect our forces, and, as you say, protect the South Vietnamese. It could be interminable, just like getting your hands in flypaper. I be- lieve that it is the duty of the United States to protect our forces with the power we have as we withdraw, but I hope that the administration will make its determination at some point, and not too far away, that we will withdraw totally. Secretary LAIRD. With the Vietnamization programs, the deter- inination has been made, Senator Cooper, to terminate American in- volvement, but we do have the one reservation that the President has made on the prisoners of war and those missing in action. Senator Coorrr. Well, I want to say that I do see a vast difference between the policy of this administration and the one before. This administration is withdrawing its troops, it can't be denied. The policy of the last administration was to escalate, to continue the buildup. With the exception of building up those forces, I consider the cause of the war in every respect has been North Vietnam, the introduction of forces into South Vietnam and into Laos, and I think it is only fair and historical to say that. But you are faced with this reality, and now it is becoming a tough one. With the exception of engaging in hostilities to protect our own troops during the process of withdrawal, I think our course should be total withdrawal. COMMENDATION OF MILITARY I would like to say one other thing. I promised not to be too long, but this is my chance to say it: That the military has been the sub- ject of denigration for several years now. They have done their duty because of orders by civilians, and they have done it well. We ought to be very proud of them. Secretary LAIRD. We thank you. I would like to just add to that, Senator Cooper, the military con- tinues to perform very well. The strikes on Haiphong and Hanoi, in Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 134 the Hanoi vicinity, were carried out in an outstanding manner as far as the performance of all of the aircraft and time over target, tankers, the fueling, the support aircraft, everything was done very well. I operated in the area with the destroyer Na 1do ;, back in the 1940's in the China Sea; and I was very proud of the destroyer that was operating up at the entrance of the' Haiphong Harbor. That destroyer was using its guns upon the batteries of the enemy, it was firing ; and when the A- was lost by antiaircraft fire, that destroyer was in there, in the entrance to Haiphong .Harbor and picked up the pilot after he had been in the water only for 7 minutes, and they didn't stop firing their guns at the time they made the rescue. On behalf of the President, I sent a special message to that ship, and I was very proud of the way it operated. But I have been proud of the manner in which all of our forces have performed, not only since the invasion across the DMZ, but also in their responsibilities of understanding what Vietnamizatiorn was all about, carrying out the training programs and the equipping programs, and understanding that it was their job to prepare the South Vietnamese to defend them- selves. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Davits. Senator DAvrrs. Mr. Secretary, before I start my questioning, I would like to associate myself with the views expressed by Senator Cooper about our Armed Forces. They have had their troubles, as in My Lai and elsewhere, but they carry out orders in the great Amer- ican tradition. They don't make policy-and I hope it may ever be so-and I would like to join Senator Cooper in a tribute to their fidelity, sense of duty, and efficiency. Our forces have fought with great skill in Vietnam and with gallantry in many instances. I NIPLUTATION OF WITNESS' REFERENCES TO COMMANDER TN C[3IEG Mr. Secretary, I noticed one thing in your testimony which is corol- lary to what I am going to ask you. I notice interlaced in your testi- mony were frequent references to our Commander in Chief. On the Commander in Chief level, and in connection with, for exam- ple, the passage of the war powers bill in the Senate, is there any new claim of authority to foresee almost at will in respect of these matters of undeclared war? Secretary LAIRD. No, but I have always stressed the importance of civiliu.n control over our Military Establishment and over all four of our servicos, and under our Constitution the Commander in Chief is the top civilian authority of our Government, the President of the I Tnited States. Senator DAVITS. So there is no deeper implication than that? Secretary LATTLD. There is no deeper implication than that. Senator DAVITS. I am glad of that. UNDERWRITING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE SECURITY IF VTETNAMIZATION UNSUCCESSFUL Mr. Secretary, you heard from Senator Cooper. We had it out with the Secetary of State on our views, including my own, that the time has come to get out, in our national. interest. Your statements respect- tile success of Vietnamization lead me to ask you this question : Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/11: CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Suppose Vietnamization is unsuccessful. It is possible. For how long do we underwrite South Vietnamese security with the Army, Navy,, and the Air Force of the United States? Secretary LAIRD. We have almost completed the program of turn- ing over full responsibility to the South Vietnamese. I am not going to give a projection as to the time when phase II will be completed and when phase III will be completed; that is, phas- ing out our military assistance group. But we will have further an- nouncements along that line as we make further progress. But I do not accept the premise of that question because we are giving this program the planning, the training, the equipment that is needed and necessary for success. I believe success is insured. We cannot insure the will or the desire of any person or any country, but I believe the South Vietnamese are showing the will and desire at this time, in the face of this invasion across the DMZ. Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, as a former Congressman and very sophisticated man, wouldn't you regard it as highly improvident of the United States not to have a plan if Vietnamization was unsuccessful? Secretary LAIRD. I would only say there was no plan that this Government had to end American involvement in Vietnam except the negotiating track in 1968. We felt that that was not a prudent policy for our Government, and so that is why we have established, adopted, and approved this second track to terminate American involvement in Vietnam. Senator JAVITS. And do we or do we not have Secretary LAIRD. The negotiating track is still open and a viable track, but we had to develop another means to terminate American involvement and we did that. I believe that was prudent. SETTING OUT WIIETIIER OR NOT VIETNA;VLIZATION SUCCESSFUL Senator JAVITS. All right. Do we or do we not have any plan which will determine that at a given point, whatever that point may be, we will get out, whether Vietnamization is successful or not, or are we committed eternally to stay in so long as it is necessary to their security ? Secretary LAIRD. I think the facts show quite the opposite. We are terminating, we are withdrawing, and we have moved forward now; in the last 33 months, 87 percent of our forces have been withdrawn. Senator JAVITS. I find both answers a little difficult to reconcile. I could understand if you told me, well, I am sorry, Senator, but I am not going to tell you that in public session. I would accept that. Secretary LAIRD. I wouldn't tell it to you in private session because I have not made any forecasts or projections. The announcements will be made periodically. We have a plan, we have a program, but the announcements will be made from time to time by the President of the United States, and whether I was in public or in private I would not give you those projections. Senator JAvITs. My point, Mr. Secretary, was not quite that. I said I found it difficult to reconcile both answers; that you do not accept Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000600080001-3 136 the possibility of failure in respect of Vietnamization, but that. you have a plan in the event of failure. secretary Lnnm. Well, I can assure the good Senator from New York that we do not plan on failure. We plan on success. Senator Jnvrrq. Mr. Secretary, life plans on failure. We don't? So what do we do, then, if there is failure? Secretary LAIRD. I have never gone about planning on failure. Maybe I am making a mistake, but I have never entered a political campaign, I have never entered anything I have done in my life, with that premise. Senator JAvrrs. Well, Mr. Secretary, I ask you this question: If Vietnamization is not successful, we will remain in South Vietnam in order to assist the South Vietnamese to defend themselves, however long it takes? Secretary LAIRD. Senator, I would like to go through the Vietnami- zation program so that it is understood by each of you. Phase I tarns over ground combat responsibility, and that is a plan that has gone forward and it has been completed. ]'tease II turns over artillery, air, logistics, and other support func- tions. 'ainst the strong. That has been demonstrated. It is difficult to understand a war where we were told that one of the chief reasons for fighting it was fear of the People's Republic of China. It is difficult to understand the acceleration of the war into Cam- bodi