LETTER TO DR. DONALD H. STEININGER FROM N. F. WIKNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74J00828R000100010004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 18, 1970
• Content Type: LETTER

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
~~ ~~ ?~'~ Wt~SHINGTON, D. C. 20301
Log No. 70-2622
Copy No. ~_
Dr . Donald H . Ste`~ninger
Asst. Deputy Director for
Science and Technology
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 2.0505
This letter summarises a study activity we would like to have performed by
TRW ~ on the effectiveness of U.S. Ballistic Missiles.
L have designated Mr. Kenneth W. Whitt (QX 5-7181) as the DDR&E 'T`hreat
Assessment Office Project Monito~? for this contract. He will continue to
work closely with h.Ls CIA counterpart(s) as designated. by your office.
In consonance with our working agreement, DDR&E would like to task TRW
to conduct the following studies, in the order listed, on a best
effort basis during FY 171:
1. ABM Capabi~Lity of Soviet SAM and Upgraded SAM Systems.
Study Objectives: To determine the capability of the SA-5 system
(and SA-2 and SA-l, if warranted) to acquire, track and intercept current
and. propased U.S. land and sea-based ballistic missile RVs. To delineate
the technological strengths and weaknesses of the RV and SAM systems.
Study Background: During the past two years there have been
numerous studies which examined the ABM capability of the Soviet SA-5
system. These studies, individually, were generally deficient in one form
or another (e.g., lack of all-source intelligence, poor scenarios, inaccurate
Blue systems characteristics, ete.). TRW is requested to review these past
studies (supplied by DDR&E) dealing with potential ABM capabilities of the
SA-5 and assess the SA-5's capability to intercept (endoatmospherically)
MK 11 A, B, C, and. D; RVs; MK 12 RVs; and POLARIS A-2; A-3 and POSEIDON RVs.
TRW should examine the opportunity to acquire RVs using the booster as an
acquisition aid. (if applicable) or using chaff deployed as a PENAID. The
study should examine the U.S. currently deployed RVs first, and then examine
proposed RVs for missile systems currently in R&D.
The Soviets, historically, have been extremely concerned with the
aircraft threat to their homeland. This threat, at the time of the SA-5
design, was probably identified as being aircraft and air-to-surface missiles
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which would penetrate Soviet airspace at very high altitudes and supersonic
speeds. For example, the threat would include the B-70, B-58 and the Skybolt
missile. Given these parameters then, a design of the SA-5 system can be
postulated. Regarding the missile, the uncertainties of the design will
imply or permit a range of performance and size of the missile within the
physical constraints imposed by photography. Similarly, the Square Pair
Radar design are photographically limited since other information is almost
non-existent. However, the design against the postulated threat could be a
CW, track-while-scan or perhaps other type of radar, all of which. should
have adequate power and discrimination for high altitude, supersonic raids.
Additionally, one should consider whether the Soviets would have
placed additional criteria on the SA-5 designs. For example, might the
radar and intercepter have had to operate against the U.S. THOR, JUPITER
or sub-launched and land-based ICBMs. What design modifications would be
required for the SA-5 system to operate against all of these threats?
2. U.S. POLARIS~POSEIDON RV penetration capability against Moscow-type
ABM Systems.
Study Objective: Determine the capability of U.S. POLARIS A-2,
A-3 and. POSEIDON RVs to penetrate the Moscow-type ABM as currently defined.
and then i.ncl~ding impending improvements which might be made to the system.
Delineate technological strengths and weaknesses of the RVs and the ABM
system.
Study Backgrouxcd: This study is a continuation of the study that
was conducted during FY 70 whicY~ examined the MINUTEMAN penetration capa-
bility against the Moscow ABM system. All of the necessary Blue weapon
systems technological capabilities will be supplied TRW by ODDR&E. Results
of advanced RV discrimination sensors (e .g ., LWIR experiments) will be pro-
vided TRW by DDR&E.
3. Influence of SLBM haunch Area Surveillance Sensors on Terminal
Area ABM and Upgraded SAM Systems.
Study Objectives: Determine to what degree the effectiveness of
Soviet ABM and SAM systems might; be improved by Soviet SLBM launch area
surveillance sensors assuming the sensors could provide (in near real time):
a. Firing azimuth information.
b. Burnout velocity information.
c. Launch location and launch time.
Stud Bac round: Because the number of SLBM launch platforms are
-relatively few e.g., 1 - 20) it may be possible to significantly enhance
capabilities of ABM and upgraded SAM systems by (1) making an SLBM attack
~Qd by disrupting FBPd communications; and (2) providing target information
defense which might enable it to significant].,y blunt the effectiveness
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of the attack. We would like to determine how valuable that information
about launch location, time, a~:imuth and burnout velocity might be to the
Soviet ballistic missile defense systems, particularly SAM systems.
~+. USSR RVs versus SAFEGUARD ABM System
Study Objective: Determine the capability of the modified Soviet
SS-11 RV, SS-9 MRVs and. SS-13 RV to penetrate the SAFEGUARD ABM System.
Delineate technological strengths and. weaknesses.
Study Background: This problem is the "mirror image " of that
outlined in Task 2, SAFEGUARD system characteristics will be provided TRW
by ODDR&E.
Finally, we would appreciate it if TRW would submit a proposal, referencing
the above tasks, by 15 July 197c~ in order that we might begin the allocation
of FY 71 funds. If I can provide additional information regarding tasking
or funding, please contact me.
N, F. Wikner ~,>
Special Assistant
(Threat Assessment)
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