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December 19, 2016
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August 22, 2006
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November 7, 1969
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PDF icon CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0.pdf1.14 MB
Approved For Release 2006/08/2j,0~Affiff 0828RO001Q%' ~j2jrQ HANDLE VIA TALE KEYHOLE-COMINT BYEMAN UTILIZATION OF NRP U-2R AIRCRAFT Dr. F. Robert Na.ka. DDNRO, Chairman CIA Lt. Col. Mitchell D. Erkelens, USAF 25X1 NSA, DIA, NRO, USAF reviews completed TALENT-KEYHOLE-Co TOP SECRET BYEMAN Igj`r HANDLE VIA HANDLE C/UK CONTROL No BYE-13393-59 COPY OF COPIES CONTROL SYSTEM 'QNTRQL? YSTM M JQ1t i., , EE CLUD EEOFRROOMAUTOMATIC F EGRAaD ItN~^^^rt^rt ---^rt^YPAGE~l_ OF PAGES Approved For Release 2006/081 0%j&W00828RO00100200027-0 UTILIZATION OF NRP U-2R AIRCRAFT 1. INTRODUCTION II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM III. DETERMINATIONS IV. RECOMMENDATIONS V. DISCUSSION A. Sources of Data B. Requirements C. History of Operations Procurement of U-2 Aircraft Other Costs Present Posture D. Capabilities E. Survivability F. Alternate Postures G.. U-2 Program Costs Cost Chart VI. ATTACHMENTS A. DIA Statements on Reconnaissance Value B. NSA Report on Information Gathered C. OSI Report on Information Gathered D. CIA Operational Missions E. Mission Coverage F. OSA R&D G. Avionics Development H. Ancillary Mission Accomplishments BYEMAN Page 3 3 10 11 13 14 17 CONTROL NO BYE-13393?-69 EM AN TOP SECRET COPY OF COPIES _JNTROL SYSTEM EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE 2 OF PAGES Approved For Release 2006I8 :TICIAQ-IR 41JEY}828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRET I. INTRODUCTION The LDNRO through the auspices of the~~CIA, Office of 25X1 Special Activities maintains a fleet of six U-2R aircraft which are available for covert photographic and SIGINT missions., At the present time. the rincipal deployed unit, with two U-2R aircraft, isl From this base, conduct missions along the coast ance of the U. S. Navy carrier forces and the I I an additional capability for worldwide deployment has been demonstrated. The Strategic Air Command also maintains-an additional fleet of six U-2R aircraft 'of which two U-2Rs are deployed against the national requirement in Southeast Asia, and the island of Cuba. There are ten "U-2C)aircraft in the NRP inventory, two of which are used for test and training missions with the remainder in flyable storage. The Air Force Systems Command also operates three older U-2s as platforms for carrying experimental equipment. .mainland China on many penetration missions in the U-2 but .In the past 25X1 since September 1968 the a.ircraft have been restricted to flying 20 miles off the coast of China. To obtain permission for these flights, it has been necessary for the DNRO to make a monthly request to the 303 Committee. 25X1 extraordinary political considerations, have reduced the frequency of over- flights in calendar year 1968 to three missions while seven peripheral missions were flown.- In calendar year 1969, no overflights have been authorized, but eight peripheral mis- 25X1 sions have been flown as of this date. The present FY 1970 and the forecast 1971 costs for the U-2 Program are approximately Considering the infre- quent overflights and the dol enditure, the question COPY OF COPIES TOP SECRET I EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE 3 OF approved For Release 2006/@8/22cTICCptDl Dp7 J{O828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/081 bp'l P 4J00828ROO0100200027-0 has arisen: "Is the a.yailable capability worth the price?" Therefore, a committee) was established to determine: 1. The national requirement for the U-2R capability. 2. The least expensive posture and mode of operation to continue such a. capability. 25X1 25X1 A formal statement of the value of the reconnaissance by a. U-2R has been received from the DIA and is included in this report as Attachment A. Summarizing the memoranda.,, the primary mission of. the U-2R is photographic intelligence. The secondary mission is ELINT. Each mission is planned in accordance with the COMIREX target deck for the photographic portion and CIA for the ELINT portion. The photographic collection is evidently of some value, having for example been the first to detect aircraft at an airfield near Shanghai and data, on a, suspect advanced weapons related facility. By comparison, satellite photography is often hindered by cloud cover in the South China area. However, the ELINT collection is considered to be.of marginal value, presumably because DIA receives a. routine early readout of the slow-speed tape from the Pacific Elec- tronics Center, It is of interest to note that the Chinese Communists consider the U-2R to be a. prime target for intercept and cause the entire air defense to be activated. This permits the collection of very valuable operational (a.s opposed to tech- nical) ELINT. Both the NSA and CIA/OSI analyze the high- speed tape and believe that unique data have been gathered as reported in Attachments B and C. The CIA/OSA ipurcha.sed the 12 U-2Rs and has performed all the testing of t1e aircraft as well as installation and testing Col. USAF Dr. F. Robert Na.ka, DDNRO, Chairman 25X1 CONTROL NO TOP SECRET COPY OF COPIES EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE 4 OF PAGES Approved For Release 2006 MS8 22":EePALRDP'7 JO0828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 TOP SECRET of systems. The first U-2R was delivered in August 1967 and the twelfth, in December 1968. CIA/OSA turned six U-2Rs over to the Strategic Air Command and trained the initial pilots. The CIA U-2R can be deployed worldwide on 24 hours'notice either from the home base at Edwards Air Force. Base or its tiona.l mission from a. deployment base, only one C-141 carrying support personnel and the fly-away kit of spares and AGE equipment need accompany the U-2R. Fuel must be brought in separately, however. For sustained mission capability from a. deployed base, more support is naturally required. Operational base at For a. single opera.- As a reliable, safe aircraft, the U-2R has exceeded its expectations. Normal attrition was forecast to have been two aircraft by now. The difficult period of aircraft test and pilot transition and training has been completed and about 5,000 hours have been flown without a single loss. The survivability of the U-2R flying against mainland China is high. The MIG-21 lacks the altitude capability to be planned to fly around these sites a.nd,if a. previously unlocated SA-2 is encountered, sufficient wa.rnin.g equipment is carried aboard a. IT-2R to permit employment of evasive In areas of considerable cloud cover, reconnaissance is more easily accomplished from aircraft than satellite. Air- craft can be rescheduled for favorable photography whereas unmanned satellites are committed to an orbit on launch. In addition, an airborne mapping radar is presently feasible in the aircraft state of the art but not in the satellite-borne 25X1 TOP ` ECRET COPY OF COPIES EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE 5 OF PAGES DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74JO0828R000100200027-0 Combining the two fleets has been examined from time to time and the conclusions have been, and still are, that it is not economical or palatable because of construction costs, security problems, personnel transfers, political considera- tions, mission assignment, etc. As long as there are more than eight U-2Rs in the inventory, combining the fleets does not seem reasonable. example, the installation of the IIo should be completed, but the s uld not be procured. In August 1969 the CIA/OSA reduced its operating budget in FY 1970 from FY 1969 by about Q Depending upon the international situation and considering lead time and costs, the CIA/OSA should continue cost reduction programs. until procurement of advanced equipments is required. For Approved For Release 2006/08/22 CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 TOP SECRET The U-2R is the only covert manned aircraft in the NRO inventory. It is easily deployed for crisis reconnaissance. Daily photographic missions can be flown. Although the SR-71 can be flown for the NRO in time of stress, it is known to be a Strategic Air-Command aircraft and its functions may be mistaken. Further, it is more difficult and much more expen- sive to deploy and employ. Any changes in the basing a.t should be coordinated with the Department of State. Since the agreement is up for renewal next March, any change should be planned now. The CIA U-2R fleet should be retained in a covert opera- tional posture under the present political environment. Daily photographic missions can be flown if the need arises. The Strategic Air Command fleet should also be retained in an operational posture to satisfy present overt national requirements. The NRP budget for the U-2R should be maintained as low as is reasonably consistent wi ping the capability for operational employment. Aboutper year is considered a reasonable amount. The present configuration of the U-2R should be frozen CONTROL N TOP SECRET COPV EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE 6 OF PAGES Approved For Release 20066@?i2252o I I A74zJ00828R000100200627-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 TOP SECRET Worldwide deployment exercises, such a.s I I and use of. the U. S. Navy aircraft carriers should be continued. Contingency worldwide deployment plans should be completed and consideration given to a. deployment Research and development programs survivability; increased performance; a to insure aircraft new mission capabilities, such as ELINT I 25X1 should be conducted provided the cost is modest. Cost sharing in programs, such as f 25X1 equatorial zones being attempted by the Army opogra.p is om- mand, should be pursued. Collateral missions (such as photographing the California oil slick, snow depth, etc.) during training missions should be continued. A plan for recoupment of mission costs from the requesting agencies should be considered. Combining of the CIA and Strategic Air Command fleets should be considered when the mission accomplishment capabil- ity of either unit is being degraded by aircraft attrition. The combined fleet should be expected to be about eight air- craft by the time the amalgamation has been completed. At the present time, North Base appears to be the`best location. Should there be a. substantial change in the intelligence community's requirements or a. major political variant, then a. re-examination of the U-2 retainability as an NRP asset would be warranted. To determine the requirement for continuation of the U-2 reconnaissance capability, briefings were obtained from the COMIREX, SORS, CIA, NPIC, NSA, and DIA. Although the committee's principal emphasis was on the U-2R, whenever possible, briefings on related systems were obtained. For example, the committee was exposed to the manned SR-71; the drones, TAGBOARD and 147T; and satellites. The value of crisis reconnaissance was discussed with the CIA. The committee visited various Air Force bases and installations to determine comparative values; uses, costs, CONTROL NO TOP SECRET COPY OF COPIES EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE 7 OF PAGES Approved For Release 206 iI2s?DObA?RDP7 J00828R000100200027-0, Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 TOP SECRET and operational capabilities of aircraft, drones, and satel- lites. At Davis Monthan Air Force Base (SPC) the H-147 drone and the Strategic Air Command U-2 Detachment were observed. At Edwards Air Force Base the CIA U-2 Detachment and PFSC U-2 facility were visited. The Lockheed facility at Palmdale, used for IRAN of the U-2 and storage of the A-12, was also visited. Capabilities of the SR-71 and TAGBOARD drone at Beale Air Force Base wore investigated. Mr. William McAfee of the State Department on the present and possible future political restrictions to U-2 overflight of denied territory and on a. comparison of the U-2 and other reconnaissance vehicles as related to the political impact of each. B. Requirements Attachments A, B, and C are letters relating to the value of the U-2R reconnaissance received from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the CIA/Office of Scientific Intelligence. C. History of Operations Procurement of U-2 Aircraft. The NRO purchased all 12 U-2R aircraft. The CIA OSA took delivery of all aircraft, installed all systems aboard, tested the aircraft, trained the initial pilots, and delivered six aircraft to SAC while retaining six. The CIA/OSA for the NRO performed and is performing all the R&D tests for the entire 12 aircraft, including such things as life support equipment. Other Costs. The NRO purchased all new systems (cameras, ECM) and spares for the 12 aircraft and delivered them to the Air Force Depot at Warner Robins Air Force Base. The Air Force maintains the inventory and delivers the equip- ment to both fleets. Both the CIA and SAC supply additional funds t maintain their operational capability. For example, E support oersonnel at Davis Monthan Air Force Base. CONTROL N TOP SECRET COPV DF PI 5 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE 8 OF PAGES Approved For Release 20@&O22 54CCIS,e1 P74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RD 74J00828R000100200027-0 TOP SECRET Present Posture. The CIA aircraft force consists 'Rase (notachmont G.) a. of four planes at Edwards Air Force two at the Far East deployment base (Detachment H). All aircraft are m i tionally ready" posture. Both bases have a capability for worldwide deployment on a 24=hour notice and, depending on the deployment base distance, could be airborne on an opera.- tiona.l mission in about 45 to 55 hours after notification. MI and\SA-2 missiles. Sufficient camera. equipment and are maintained at all U-2 bases to satisfy - ose-'equirements levied by the intelligence community.) At present the CIA detachment Is 25X1 limited to peripheral missions 20 miles o1i 77 of China. A list of the missions flown during calendar years 1968 and 1969 is attached (Attachment D). A ma.p showing the coverage provided during these flights is shown in Attachment E. (Note: Not shown is the coverage of Laos, Cambodia, and Cuba. by the USAF/SAC.) Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base is respon- sible for maintaini trainin all pilots 25X6 and performing the necessary H&D or main- a.ft--both CIA and SAC--in an operationally ready posture, i.e., systems, sensors, aircraft performance, etc. A list of the U-2 oriented activities provided by the CIA R&D division is attached (Attachment F). A prodigious effort of the test phase is the qual- ification of the developed ECM systems. This is disCu JB in detail i.n Attachment G. The CIA detachments have flown 3,153 hours in calendar year 1968--2,073 hours in the U-2C and 1,080 hours in the L-2R. During 1969 (cut-off date is 1 October) they have flown 1,761 hours in the .U-2R and 355 hours in the U-2C. COPY OF COPIES TOP SECRET ' EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE 9 OF PAGES Approved For Release 206/O22 ,?qClA41 '74J00828R000100200027-0 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 TOP SECRET The Air Force Strategic Air Command maintains a fleet of six U-2Rs--four at the home base of Davis Monthan AFB, one at McCoy Air Force Base for Cuban coverage, and one a for use over Laos and Cambodia.. Eighteen i are trained -and operationally ready to satisfy mission requirements levied on this unit. In addition to the above, the CIA and USAF detach- ments provide aircraft, sensors, etc., as necessary to satisfy a. myriad of requests from many departments of the Government. 1,058 sorties were flown during the past calendar year in support of these ancillary flights. However, these were flown during training missions. A list is shown at Attachment H. D. Capabilities The U-2R, a very high-a.lt' 25X1 aircraft with long range capability nau- 25X1 tical miles) is well suited to various unique missions. Some of these missions are comparable to those being provided by other aircraft but the high altitude and long endurance makes it particularly suitable for specific penetration areas, i.e., Cuba, Laos, South China, etc. The ECM equipment oriented against SAM sites and airborne intercept, plus the aircraft's capability to fly above those levels necessary for co-altitude aircraft intercept, enhance its probability of returning from penetration missions. (Note: See paragraph E for survivability discussion) The various missions capable of being flown by the U-2 are as follows: 1. Photographic. The U-2 carries various proven photographic systems which include the H Camera, B Camera., Optical Bar, and Delta. III Camera. These configurations are capable of pro- viding coverage varying from specific pinpointed targets through a. horizon-to-horizon coverage by the tracker. CONTROL NO COPY OF COPIES EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE 10 OF PAGES TOP SECRET Approved For Release 20O6ffl8 2QS. , 4 l3P74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08122: CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 TOP SECRET From time to time, the subject of combining the CIA and SAC fleets on a. single base has been considered. The notion is that such a. combining would result in more economi- cal operations, particularly since two aircraft were expected to be lost during the period of aircraft tests and pilot transition and training. It is significant, howeve~, that no aircraft have been lost to date. A recent study concerning the combining of the fleets at Davis Monthan Air Force Base ed that the costs of the new facilities re uired, about would be prohibitive. In addition, about would be 25X1 expended in moving the detachment. Interrogation of the commanders at Edwards North Base, Davis Monthan AFB,and Beale AFB resulted in the same answer. As.Air Force bases are phased down in economy moves, it might be possible to employ one of these bases for consolidation. ove would still require the costs of relocation. was COD_ 25X1 sidered as an alternate combined fleet base but was rejected because of higher costs and compromise of a covert base. G. U-2 Program Costs The determination of program costs is predicated on the following ground rules. The line items listed herein are only those that reflect direct operating and maintenance costs for both fleets, the negative film and community duplicate film requirements, and the known investment costs (FY 1969 new systems procurement). The Air Force and CIA contributions, although substantial, were not included since this study covers only the FY 1971 NRP dollars. A description of each line item is as follows: 1. U-2R Investment. Included in this is pro- curement : electronic and photographic systems, i.e., 2"Relocation of IDEALIST Project to Davis Monthan AFB, Arizona.'25X1 14 March 1967, TOP SECRET CONTROL NO COPY PAGE 14 OF PAGES Approved For Release 20 6MEY2"2'??CP, 2Rr Pr"4"J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/ 74JO0828R000100200027-0 _Mww~ I LW fdwff _%W . IRIS II, OS MK III, etc. No investment figures are given other than those actually approved by the DNRO. For in FY 1970 the U-2R investment request was of which was approved. tbu~f miss on wollia include items such as and others; but this approval would depend on enemy threat, aircraft safety, etc. As such, these items are not included in the FY 1971 operating and maintenance costs since the U-2R Program could very well operate for several years without additional investment. 2. U-2 Common. This includes the necessary spares, overhaul anrepa.ir of spares, factory engineering, materiel handling, and security neces- sary for supporting all the fleets (including the AFSC aircraft). It supports the airframe, cameras, electronic systems, and life support equipment. 3. IDEALIST (CIA) Peculiar. This item pro- vides for the necessary technical representatives, spares, and modification kits for those-items which are peculiar to the CIA effort only. It further 4. SENIOR YEAR (SAC) Peculiar. This includes those items o spares, modifications to equipment, technical representatives, and other minor peculiar items that are required for sustaining the SAC fleet, other than items that are common to all 12 aircraft. 5. General R&D (U-2R Aircraft Related Only). The amount shown for FY 1971 is an arbitrary figure which assumed a requirement for various projects and studies which would enhance the survivability and performance of the U-2 aircraft. 6. The amounts shown here 25X1 are for the completion o the operational capability TOP SECRET CONTROL NO] EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE 15 Approved For Release 20t2 ''L1 it"JP74' IO0828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 TOP SECRET for this equipment in FY 1970. FY 1971 forecast costs were not included pending a, release by higher authority for this type of mission. 7. U-2 Film. This provides for the negative film used by both SAC and the IDEALIST Program plus the duplicate film required by the intelligence community for the IDEALIST take. TOP SECRET CONTROL NOO Approved For Release 200@, Approved For Release 2006/ 74J00828R000100200027-0 -qw~ TOF?ffkE I i"110' U-2R Investment U-2 Common IDEALIST (CIA) Peculiar SENIOR YEAR (SAC) Peculiar General R&D I FY 1969 FY 1970 FY 1971 Obligations Approvals Forecast 25X1 **Countermeasures R&D related to U-2s not included in these tabulations CONTROL NO TOP SECRET COPT EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE 17 OF PAGES Approved For Release 2068/W22 42WlA2R17P'f4LJ00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/c m. R DP74J00828R000100200027-0 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 2 4 NOV 1969 S-0941/XX SUBJECT:} Evaluation 'of CHURCH DOOR Mission C259C Results (S) TO: Dr. F. Robert Naka Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force (Space Systems) 1. (S) The CHURCH DOOR mission flown on provided the best 25X1 quality coverage received from this source during t e past year. The following results were obtained: a. The presence of the G class ballistic missile submarine (SSB) at thel There was no apparent change in the sail area of the submarine, indicating that no modification of the unit has taken place. I This is the first CHURCH DOOR photography of submarines underway since missioni c. Two minor ground installations were covered which had not been photographed sincel d. The operational status of 12 airfields, eight occupied and four unoccupied, along the 25X1 e. The operational status of one SAM site was confirmed as active with six possible SA-2's on launchers. f. A probable agricultural landing strip at was noted for the first time. The lack of construction activity and materials plus the local terrain indicates this is not construction of a jet capable airfield at this location. g. Other coverage from this mission was of a routine nature but provided the oblique coverage valuable to coast and landing beaches, ports and other coastal installations. 2. (S) As indicated in the previous DIA evaluation, the primary value of these missions is as a supplement to other collection systems. Despite the lack of highly significant information from this mission, it is still believed that the CHURCH DOOR Program is a valuable asset in support of special DOD intelligence needs. +2+$wtlf/~ FBANCLS R. CAPPIIJ,h'FII Colonel, USAF Chief, Special ActvfBes Off& A+ +At-hm CT, Approved For Release 2006/`f 9/. R RDP74J00828R000 00200027-0 D `Q Approved For Release 2006AQY2 : SE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGEN WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 21 OCT 1969, TO: Dr. F. Robert Naka Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office In response to your verbal request, the attached Tabs represent the DIA view on the value of the CHURCH DOOR Program. Specifically addressed are the CHURCH DOOR imagery capability (TAB A), and the I I RANCIS R. CAPPELLE Colonel, USAF Chief, Special Activities Office 2 Enclosures a/s Copy __L_of_ ___Copies TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2 eCd/22 ~,fA= Attachment A 4... w, w?p- ~re.w1 capability (TAB B). Approved For Release 2 SUBJ: CHURCH DOOR IMAGERY CAPABILITY 1. The CHURCH DOOR Program, although seriously degraded by operational limitations during the past few years, remains a valuable adjunct to the KH-4 JI collection systems. Its chief merits are the coverage prove e o onus targets particularly 25X1 in areas of difficult weather suc as MINE enc 25X1 and along other coastal areas; the location of new coastal targets; and the lower classification of the coverage which permits a much larger work force to be applied in all phases of intelligence production. 2. Initially the CHURCH DOOR photography was used by DIAAP analysts as a primary source of information for the compilation of Lines of Communi- cation Studies, Urban Area Analyses, Demography Studies and a variety of targeting studies. The photographs also provided a ready source of t e material for many widely disseminated collateral studies on thout the expense and delays that accompany downgrading/ econtro o more sensitive photography for this purpose. 3. The overall value of the Program has diminished in the past few years in direct proportion to the reduction in coverage and resolution. The present standoff mode has resulted in long oblique photos of a relatively narrow band along and has increased the problems of grpund haze and terrain masking. These problems were further compounded by changing from the 3-8 foot average resolution HR 73-B ("B" Configuration) Camera System to the 6- to 8-foot estimated resolution 111-B ("H" Con- figuration) Camera System. Stated in terms of interpretability, this means from good to poor resolution or from specific identification of essential elements of information to "probable vehicles and/or equipment." 4. Despite the foregoing problems, CHURCH DOOR photogra h continues to a and a t'vities at 25X1 25X1 End HUMINT-reported activities along the The most recen 25X1 examples of CHURCH DOOR-derived information are e discovery of 19 fighter aircraft at hich was thought to be abandoned and the discovery o an 25X1 The attached chart indicates that Immediate Photographic Interpretation Reports of the last eight missions showed 622 targets were covered with more than 40 percent fair to good quality photos and an addi- tional 40 percent with poor quality photos but targets were still identifiable. 1 Enclosure a/s .S P SECRET Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74JQ082 2SEeRE 74J00828 Approved For Release lnnr,/nR/'?-) - - 100200027-0 ?a_ 4 00 .J. 00 N r-1 M r-I o N M rH-H P4 .r4 %* 4 0 CU Le, co as M N N 'D Obi W 0 ON co co co ~ rH-i N r-4 r-4 CN*9 r-4 0 d 0 0 is 0 o v / sr-car-r T'R^Lt1" '?.D rr M At1Tq~ :{ TC 'J. 10 ;J ,Y %D O %0 0 c to Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For'FM)asi Amw CIA-RDP7 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 oPT1VA`~Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 T40. 10 MAY 1062 EDITION GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.0 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum ApproAWF9r' 9atsR 8 ulff' AID r J00828ROO0 100 Q. Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-R DP74J00828R000100200027-0 rr' NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY NSA Briefing Dr. Naka, 10 October Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74JO0828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 25X3 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-R DP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Rel 091 -61 n.~0"12-4 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 Cy 0 NOV 1969 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office .a SIGINT Highlights Provided by U-2 Flights During the Past wo Years 4. Individual SIGINT highlight examples from program during the past two years are outlined below: Attachment C to I I ..:~,is a= : 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 TOP SECRET OSA R&D - CALENDAR 1968 & 1969 U-2 ORIENTED ACTIVITIES 1. U-2R Development Program Management: Development Flight Test through 15 Oct 1968 Systems Development and Problem Resolution A. Aircraft Performance Evaluation B. Propulsion, Interface & Performance C. Ejector Assymetric Thrust D. Assymetric Fuel Feed E. Air Conditioning & Pressurization F. Engine Oil Cooling G. Constant Speed Drive & Hydraulic Oil Cooking H. Stability & Control I. Structural Demonstration J. Oxygen System K. DC Generator Cooling L. Tail Limit Cycle Vibration M. Q-Bay Temperature & Environment N. Mission Equipment & Interface Follow-On Flight Test - 1969 A. Installed Engine Performance Calibration & Establish Engine Pressure Ratio Curve 2. Optical Bar Camera Development & Flight Test 1968 & 1969. 3, Engineering, Development, and Flight Test IOC 19 May 1969 LI. Drag Reduction - General R&D 1968 & 1969 An investigation to prove the feasibility of a drag reduction theory and apply this theory to the U-2R has been underway during this time period. The feasibility of this theory has been conclusively demonstrated with induced drag reductions of up to 30% recorded in the wind tunnel. However, translating this research type hardware will require more investigation and wind tunnel testing. .5. J-75 Performance Improvement - General R&D Studies 1969 25X1 Funded studies have been completed by LAC on the effects of proposed J75-P-13B engine performance improvements TOP SECRET L ENCLUOED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE OF PAGES Approved For Release 200 &08~22-:SGlf -R@ P774P,IO0828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-R DP74J00.828R000100200027-0 TOP SECRET ?.0 on performance of the U-2R aircraft and a final report has been received. Results of the LAC study indicate that, the engine growth step of primary interest to R&D could provide several possible aircraft performance improvements such as an increase of 1450 ft. in altitude with a slight reduction in to 'ncrease.of.500 nautical miles in range altitude or an increased payload cap- ability of 2070-717s-. over the current mission profile with a slight loss in total range. 6. Low Altitude Quiet U-2R - General R&D Studies 1969 The Lockheed preliminary investigation of the U-2 is nearing completion. The study indicates that a significant quieting can be obtained. The sound level is still somewhat above background noise at 200 ft; however, the ability to detect the presence of the aircraft will be markedly reduced. A develdpment program would be required to solve some of the air inlet technical problems associated with quieting the U-2 without reducing inlet and propulsion reliability. Further testing is programmed to determine if substantial quieting is in fact necessary for covert nighttime penetration. As part of this study, a very preliminary investigation was conducted of alternate approaches to accomplish a covert low altitude mission. The study indicated that there may be a number of existing commercial aircraft with the capability to perform a completely low altitude mission. The silencing problem for these aircraft would be considerably less complex than to silence the U-2 and, additionally, they could probably be silenced to a lower noise level. The trade-off, however, may be in range. The study of these alternate aircraft is continuing in greater depth.and the results will be available during the next quarter. 7. Improved Navigation System - General R&D Studies 1969 The Honeywell Corporation has completed the preliminary design effort of the Honeywell Update System interfaced with the U-2R doppler system to improve the navigation accuracy. The estimated error build-up for this system is a maximum CEP = 0.5 n.m. every 90 minutes. A briefing has been prepared summarizing the concept and capability. TOP SECRET COPY OF COPIES CONTROL EXCLUDED FROM AUSOMATIC REGRADING PAGE OF PAGES Approved For Release 20W,?h2E52CG1A4J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA_- 74J00828R000100200027-0 TOP SE ET , 25X1 Infra-Red Suppression - General R&D Studies 1968 Analytical studies and scale model hardware tests were conducted to evaluate various schemes for reducing the IR signature of the J75-P-13B engine in the U-2R aircraft. High Altitude Engine Relight Improvement - 1969 General R&D development and flight test resulted in engine combustion section burner can modification yielding an 8000 ft. altitude increase in engine relight capability. Attachment F to CONTROL TOP SECRET CD PY E%GLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE OF PAGES Approved For Release 20MfCgPI2 rIA7-W OP'72fJ00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/ ,~p 74JO0828R000100200027-0 S ff 'WX1 OSA AVIONICS DIVISION - NOTES ON SYSTEMS QUALIFICATION 25X1 25X1 development of systems - their installation in the vehicles; flight, qualifications and acceptance testing and also the quantity pro- curement of operational systems to equip the U-2 fleets. (Note the actual ECM development is performed by OEL/CIA under NRO auspices). Flight test instrumentation, developed under the Avionics sponsorship, is tailored to stimulate real life parameters; as currently known by the Intelligence community. There parameters are coordinated with system 'R and D components and with the avail- able Intelligence data so that systems installed on the U-2 vehicles will respond adequately and reliably. Within the past two years, full scale range simulators have been developed and upgraded so that systems are The primary responpihilitj ..-, of the VT ics Division, OSA are to equip and supportl Systems aboard 25X1 the U-2C and U-2R reconnaissance flights of the Agency and the Air Force. In this role the Avionics Division res onds to nation al requirements for exploiting ata radiated by the opposition and by supplying technical advice for the 25X1 exe erting 25X1 and Active stimulation of systems are provided by a series o Tests. I The following systems were operationally qualified by these tests: Additional passive and associated auxjllary ipment were tested for operational reliability with the Tests; these were: TOP SECRET 25X1 CONTROL COPY COPIES PAGES Approved For Release 26,96t'96Y`22,OVA?-9R'L "i`4J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 CIA-R P74J00828R01100200027-0 ..~ TOP SECRET- collection systems collection system c. Flow time code generator - providing time correlation for data and operations d. Data Recorders - acceptance testing performed on the types GPAR-C and MC machines. FCC!'}'C: 7A y c>rrnnrf d and conducted on a new resulting in its qualification and ins a a ion in Ile - inventory for protection of the vehicle against aircraft. This system is currently deployed in the it Force and Agency fleets. 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRET CONTROL NO EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE OF PAGES Approved For Release 206@O/2? CP9Rl PTh'J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0 Approved For Release 2006/08/22 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0