UTILIZATION OF NRP U-2R AIRCRAFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200027-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: November 7, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/08/2j,0~Affiff 0828RO001Q%' ~j2jrQ HANDLE VIA
TALE KEYHOLE-COMINT BYEMAN
UTILIZATION
OF
NRP U-2R AIRCRAFT
Dr. F. Robert Na.ka. DDNRO, Chairman
CIA
Lt. Col. Mitchell D. Erkelens, USAF
25X1
NSA, DIA, NRO, USAF reviews completed
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BYEMAN Igj`r
HANDLE VIA HANDLE C/UK CONTROL No BYE-13393-59
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UTILIZATION OF NRP U-2R AIRCRAFT
1. INTRODUCTION
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
III. DETERMINATIONS
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
V. DISCUSSION
A. Sources of Data
B. Requirements
C. History of Operations
Procurement of U-2 Aircraft
Other Costs
Present Posture
D. Capabilities
E. Survivability
F. Alternate Postures
G.. U-2 Program Costs
Cost Chart
VI. ATTACHMENTS
A. DIA Statements on Reconnaissance Value
B. NSA Report on Information Gathered
C. OSI Report on Information Gathered
D. CIA Operational Missions
E. Mission Coverage
F. OSA R&D
G. Avionics Development
H. Ancillary Mission Accomplishments
BYEMAN
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I. INTRODUCTION
The LDNRO through the auspices of the~~CIA, Office of
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Special Activities maintains a fleet of six U-2R aircraft
which are available for covert photographic and SIGINT
missions., At the present time. the rincipal deployed unit,
with two U-2R aircraft, isl From this base,
conduct missions along the coast
ance of the U. S. Navy carrier forces and the
I I an additional capability for
worldwide deployment has been demonstrated.
The Strategic Air Command also maintains-an additional
fleet of six U-2R aircraft 'of which two U-2Rs are deployed
against the national requirement in Southeast Asia, and the
island of Cuba.
There are ten "U-2C)aircraft in the NRP inventory, two
of which are used for test and training missions with the
remainder in flyable storage.
The Air Force Systems Command also operates three older
U-2s as platforms for carrying experimental equipment.
.mainland China on many penetration missions in the U-2 but
.In the past
25X1 since September 1968 the a.ircraft have been
restricted to flying 20 miles off the coast of China. To
obtain permission for these flights, it has been necessary
for the DNRO to make a monthly request to the 303 Committee.
25X1 extraordinary political considerations,
have reduced the frequency of over-
flights in calendar year 1968 to three missions while seven
peripheral missions were flown.- In calendar year 1969, no
overflights have been authorized, but eight peripheral mis- 25X1
sions have been flown as of this date.
The present FY 1970 and the forecast 1971 costs for the
U-2 Program are approximately Considering the infre-
quent overflights and the dol enditure, the question
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has arisen: "Is the a.yailable capability worth the price?"
Therefore, a committee) was established to determine:
1. The national requirement for the U-2R
capability.
2. The least expensive posture and mode
of operation to continue such a. capability.
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A formal statement of the value of the reconnaissance by
a. U-2R has been received from the DIA and is included in this
report as Attachment A.
Summarizing the memoranda.,, the primary mission of. the
U-2R is photographic intelligence. The secondary mission is
ELINT. Each mission is planned in accordance with the
COMIREX target deck for the photographic portion and CIA for
the ELINT portion. The photographic collection is evidently
of some value, having for example been the first to detect
aircraft at an airfield near Shanghai and data, on a, suspect
advanced weapons related facility. By comparison, satellite
photography is often hindered by cloud cover in the South China
area.
However, the ELINT collection is considered to be.of
marginal value, presumably because DIA receives a. routine
early readout of the slow-speed tape from the Pacific Elec-
tronics Center,
It is of interest to note that the Chinese Communists
consider the U-2R to be a. prime target for intercept and cause
the entire air defense to be activated. This permits the
collection of very valuable operational (a.s opposed to tech-
nical) ELINT. Both the NSA and CIA/OSI analyze the high-
speed tape and believe that unique data have been gathered
as reported in Attachments B and C.
The CIA/OSA ipurcha.sed the 12 U-2Rs and has performed all
the testing of t1e aircraft as well as installation and testing
Col. USAF
Dr. F. Robert Na.ka, DDNRO, Chairman
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of systems. The first U-2R was delivered in August 1967 and
the twelfth, in December 1968. CIA/OSA turned six U-2Rs over
to the Strategic Air Command and trained the initial pilots.
The CIA U-2R can be deployed worldwide on 24 hours'notice
either from the home base at Edwards Air Force. Base or its
tiona.l mission from a. deployment base, only one C-141 carrying
support personnel and the fly-away kit of spares and AGE
equipment need accompany the U-2R. Fuel must be brought in
separately, however. For sustained mission capability from
a. deployed base, more support is naturally required.
Operational base at For a. single opera.-
As a reliable, safe aircraft, the U-2R has exceeded its
expectations. Normal attrition was forecast to have been two
aircraft by now. The difficult period of aircraft test and
pilot transition and training has been completed and about
5,000 hours have been flown without a single loss.
The survivability of the U-2R flying against mainland
China is high. The MIG-21 lacks the altitude capability to
be planned to fly around these sites a.nd,if a. previously
unlocated SA-2 is encountered, sufficient wa.rnin.g equipment
is carried aboard a. IT-2R to permit employment of evasive
In areas of considerable cloud cover, reconnaissance is
more easily accomplished from aircraft than satellite. Air-
craft can be rescheduled for favorable photography whereas
unmanned satellites are committed to an orbit on launch. In
addition, an airborne mapping radar is presently feasible in
the aircraft state of the art but not in the satellite-borne
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 Combining the two fleets has been examined from time to
time and the conclusions have been, and still are, that it is
not economical or palatable because of construction costs,
security problems, personnel transfers, political considera-
tions, mission assignment, etc. As long as there are more
than eight U-2Rs in the inventory, combining the fleets does
not seem reasonable.
example, the installation of the
IIo should be completed, but the
s uld not be procured.
In August 1969 the CIA/OSA reduced its operating budget
in FY 1970 from FY 1969 by about Q Depending upon the
international situation and considering lead time and costs,
the CIA/OSA should continue cost reduction programs.
until procurement of advanced equipments is required. For
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The U-2R is the only covert manned aircraft in the NRO
inventory. It is easily deployed for crisis reconnaissance.
Daily photographic missions can be flown. Although the SR-71
can be flown for the NRO in time of stress, it is known to
be a Strategic Air-Command aircraft and its functions may be
mistaken. Further, it is more difficult and much more expen-
sive to deploy and employ.
Any changes in the basing a.t should be
coordinated with the Department of State. Since the agreement
is up for renewal next March, any change should be planned now.
The CIA U-2R fleet should be retained in a covert opera-
tional posture under the present political environment. Daily
photographic missions can be flown if the need arises.
The Strategic Air Command fleet should also be retained
in an operational posture to satisfy present overt national
requirements.
The NRP budget for the U-2R should be maintained as low
as is reasonably consistent wi ping the capability for
operational employment. Aboutper year is considered a
reasonable amount.
The present configuration of the U-2R should be frozen
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Worldwide deployment exercises, such a.s
I I and use of. the U. S. Navy aircraft carriers
should be continued. Contingency worldwide deployment plans
should be completed and consideration given to a. deployment
Research and development programs
survivability; increased performance; a
to insure aircraft
new mission capabilities, such as ELINT
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should be conducted provided the cost is modest.
Cost sharing in programs, such as
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equatorial zones being attempted by the Army
opogra.p is om-
mand, should be pursued. Collateral missions (such as
photographing the California oil slick, snow depth, etc.)
during training missions should be continued. A plan for
recoupment of mission costs from the requesting agencies
should be considered.
Combining of the CIA and Strategic Air Command fleets
should be considered when the mission accomplishment capabil-
ity of either unit is being degraded by aircraft attrition.
The combined fleet should be expected to be about eight air-
craft by the time the amalgamation has been completed. At
the present time, North Base appears to be the`best location.
Should there be a. substantial change in the intelligence
community's requirements or a. major political variant, then a.
re-examination of the U-2 retainability as an NRP asset would
be warranted.
To determine the requirement for continuation of
the U-2 reconnaissance capability, briefings were obtained
from the COMIREX, SORS, CIA, NPIC, NSA, and DIA. Although
the committee's principal emphasis was on the U-2R, whenever
possible, briefings on related systems were obtained. For
example, the committee was exposed to the manned SR-71; the
drones, TAGBOARD and 147T; and satellites. The value of
crisis reconnaissance was discussed with the CIA.
The committee visited various Air Force bases and
installations to determine comparative values; uses, costs,
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and operational capabilities of aircraft, drones, and satel-
lites. At Davis Monthan Air Force Base (SPC) the H-147 drone
and the Strategic Air Command U-2 Detachment were observed.
At Edwards Air Force Base the CIA U-2 Detachment and PFSC U-2
facility were visited. The Lockheed facility at Palmdale,
used for IRAN of the U-2 and storage of the A-12, was also
visited. Capabilities of the SR-71 and TAGBOARD drone at
Beale Air Force Base wore investigated.
Mr. William McAfee of the State Department on the present and
possible future political restrictions to U-2 overflight of
denied territory and on a. comparison of the U-2 and other
reconnaissance vehicles as related to the political impact of
each.
B. Requirements
Attachments A, B, and C are letters relating to the
value of the U-2R reconnaissance received from the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the
CIA/Office of Scientific Intelligence.
C. History of Operations
Procurement of U-2 Aircraft. The NRO purchased all
12 U-2R aircraft. The CIA OSA took delivery of all aircraft,
installed all systems aboard, tested the aircraft, trained
the initial pilots, and delivered six aircraft to SAC while
retaining six.
The CIA/OSA for the NRO performed and is performing
all the R&D tests for the entire 12 aircraft, including such
things as life support equipment.
Other Costs. The NRO purchased all new systems
(cameras, ECM) and spares for the 12 aircraft and delivered
them to the Air Force Depot at Warner Robins Air Force Base.
The Air Force maintains the inventory and delivers the equip-
ment to both fleets.
Both the CIA and SAC supply additional funds t
maintain their operational capability. For example, E
support oersonnel at Davis Monthan Air Force Base.
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Present Posture. The CIA aircraft force consists 'Rase (notachmont G.) a.
of four planes at Edwards Air Force
two at the Far East deployment base
(Detachment H). All aircraft are m i
tionally ready" posture. Both bases have a capability for
worldwide deployment on a 24=hour notice and, depending on
the deployment base distance, could be airborne on an opera.-
tiona.l mission in about 45 to 55 hours after notification.
MI and\SA-2 missiles. Sufficient camera. equipment
and are maintained at all U-2 bases
to satisfy - ose-'equirements levied by the intelligence
community.)
At present the CIA detachment Is 25X1
limited to peripheral missions 20 miles o1i 77 of China.
A list of the missions flown during calendar years 1968 and
1969 is attached (Attachment D). A ma.p showing the coverage
provided during these flights is shown in Attachment E.
(Note: Not shown is the coverage of Laos, Cambodia, and
Cuba. by the USAF/SAC.)
Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base is respon-
sible for maintaini
trainin all pilots 25X6
and performing the necessary H&D or main-
a.ft--both CIA and SAC--in an operationally
ready posture, i.e., systems, sensors, aircraft performance,
etc. A list of the U-2 oriented activities provided by the
CIA R&D division is attached (Attachment F).
A prodigious effort of the test phase is the qual-
ification of the developed ECM systems. This is disCu JB
in detail i.n Attachment G.
The CIA detachments have flown 3,153 hours in
calendar year 1968--2,073 hours in the U-2C and 1,080 hours
in the L-2R. During 1969 (cut-off date is 1 October) they
have flown 1,761 hours in the .U-2R and 355 hours in the U-2C.
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The Air Force Strategic Air Command maintains a
fleet of six U-2Rs--four at the home base of Davis Monthan
AFB, one at McCoy Air Force Base for Cuban coverage, and
one a for use over Laos and Cambodia..
Eighteen i are trained -and operationally ready
to satisfy mission requirements levied on this unit.
In addition to the above, the CIA and USAF detach-
ments provide aircraft, sensors, etc., as necessary to
satisfy a. myriad of requests from many departments of the
Government. 1,058 sorties were flown during the past calendar
year in support of these ancillary flights. However, these
were flown during training missions. A list is shown at
Attachment H.
D. Capabilities
The U-2R, a very high-a.lt' 25X1
aircraft with long range capability nau- 25X1
tical miles) is well suited to various unique missions. Some
of these missions are comparable to those being provided by
other aircraft but the high altitude and long endurance makes
it particularly suitable for specific penetration areas, i.e.,
Cuba, Laos, South China, etc. The ECM equipment oriented
against SAM sites and airborne intercept, plus the aircraft's
capability to fly above those levels necessary for co-altitude
aircraft intercept, enhance its probability of returning from
penetration missions. (Note: See paragraph E for survivability
discussion)
The various missions capable of being flown by the
U-2 are as follows:
1. Photographic. The U-2 carries various
proven photographic systems which include the
H Camera, B Camera., Optical Bar, and Delta. III
Camera. These configurations are capable of pro-
viding coverage varying from specific pinpointed
targets through a. horizon-to-horizon coverage by
the tracker.
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From time to time, the subject of combining the CIA
and SAC fleets on a. single base has been considered. The
notion is that such a. combining would result in more economi-
cal operations, particularly since two aircraft were expected
to be lost during the period of aircraft tests and pilot
transition and training. It is significant, howeve~, that
no aircraft have been lost to date. A recent study concerning
the combining of the fleets at Davis Monthan Air Force Base
ed that the costs of the new facilities re uired, about
would be prohibitive. In addition, about would be 25X1
expended in moving the detachment. Interrogation of the
commanders at Edwards North Base, Davis Monthan AFB,and
Beale AFB resulted in the same answer. As.Air Force bases
are phased down in economy moves, it might be possible to
employ one of these bases for consolidation. ove
would still require the costs of relocation. was COD_ 25X1
sidered as an alternate combined fleet base but was rejected
because of higher costs and compromise of a covert base.
G. U-2 Program Costs
The determination of program costs is predicated on
the following ground rules. The line items listed herein are
only those that reflect direct operating and maintenance costs
for both fleets, the negative film and community duplicate
film requirements, and the known investment costs (FY 1969 new
systems procurement). The Air Force and CIA contributions,
although substantial, were not included since this study covers
only the FY 1971 NRP dollars.
A description of each line item is as follows:
1. U-2R Investment. Included in this is pro-
curement : electronic and photographic systems, i.e.,
2"Relocation of IDEALIST Project to Davis Monthan AFB, Arizona.'25X1
14 March 1967,
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IRIS II, OS MK III, etc. No investment figures are
given other than those actually approved by the
DNRO. For in FY 1970 the U-2R investment
request was of which was approved.
tbu~f miss on wollia include items such as
and others; but this
approval would depend on enemy threat, aircraft
safety, etc. As such, these items are not included
in the FY 1971 operating and maintenance costs since
the U-2R Program could very well operate for several
years without additional investment.
2. U-2 Common. This includes the necessary
spares, overhaul anrepa.ir of spares, factory
engineering, materiel handling, and security neces-
sary for supporting all the fleets (including the
AFSC aircraft). It supports the airframe, cameras,
electronic systems, and life support equipment.
3. IDEALIST (CIA) Peculiar. This item pro-
vides for the necessary technical representatives,
spares, and modification kits for those-items which
are peculiar to the CIA effort only. It further
4. SENIOR YEAR (SAC) Peculiar. This includes
those items o spares, modifications to equipment,
technical representatives, and other minor peculiar
items that are required for sustaining the SAC fleet,
other than items that are common to all 12 aircraft.
5. General R&D (U-2R Aircraft Related Only).
The amount shown for FY 1971 is an arbitrary figure
which assumed a requirement for various projects and
studies which would enhance the survivability and
performance of the U-2 aircraft.
6. The amounts shown here 25X1
are for the completion o the operational capability
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for this equipment in FY 1970. FY 1971 forecast
costs were not included pending a, release by higher
authority for this type of mission.
7. U-2 Film. This provides for the negative
film used by both SAC and the IDEALIST Program plus
the duplicate film required by the intelligence
community for the IDEALIST take.
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U-2R Investment
U-2 Common
IDEALIST (CIA) Peculiar
SENIOR YEAR (SAC) Peculiar
General R&D
I
FY 1969 FY 1970 FY 1971
Obligations Approvals Forecast 25X1
**Countermeasures R&D related to U-2s
not included in these tabulations
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
2 4 NOV 1969
S-0941/XX
SUBJECT:} Evaluation 'of CHURCH DOOR Mission C259C Results (S)
TO: Dr. F. Robert Naka
Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force (Space Systems)
1. (S) The CHURCH DOOR mission flown on provided the best 25X1
quality coverage received from this source during t e past year. The
following results were obtained:
a. The presence of the G class ballistic missile submarine (SSB)
at thel There was no apparent change in
the sail area of the submarine, indicating that no modification of the
unit has taken place.
I This is the first CHURCH DOOR photography of submarines
underway since missioni
c. Two minor ground installations were covered which had not been
photographed sincel
d. The operational status of 12 airfields, eight occupied and four
unoccupied, along the 25X1
e. The operational status of one SAM site was confirmed as active
with six possible SA-2's on launchers.
f. A probable agricultural landing strip at
was noted for the first time. The lack of construction activity and
materials plus the local terrain indicates this is not construction of
a jet capable airfield at this location.
g. Other coverage from this mission was of a routine nature but
provided the oblique coverage valuable to coast and landing beaches, ports
and other coastal installations.
2. (S) As indicated in the previous DIA evaluation, the primary value of
these missions is as a supplement to other collection systems. Despite
the lack of highly significant information from this mission, it is still
believed that the CHURCH DOOR Program is a valuable asset in support of
special DOD intelligence needs.
+2+$wtlf/~
FBANCLS R. CAPPIIJ,h'FII
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Special ActvfBes Off&
A+ +At-hm CT,
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGEN
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
21 OCT 1969,
TO: Dr. F. Robert Naka
Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office
In response to your verbal request, the attached Tabs represent
the DIA view on the value of the CHURCH DOOR Program.
Specifically
addressed are the CHURCH DOOR imagery capability (TAB A), and the
I I
RANCIS R. CAPPELLE
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Special Activities Office
2 Enclosures a/s
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Attachment A
4... w, w?p- ~re.w1
capability (TAB B).
 Approved For Release 2
SUBJ: CHURCH DOOR IMAGERY CAPABILITY
1. The CHURCH DOOR Program, although seriously degraded by operational
limitations during the past few years, remains a valuable adjunct to the
KH-4 JI collection systems. Its chief merits are the coverage
prove e o onus targets particularly 25X1
in areas of difficult weather suc as MINE enc 25X1
and along other coastal areas; the location of new coastal targets;
and the lower classification of the coverage which permits a much larger
work force to be applied in all phases of intelligence production.
2. Initially the CHURCH DOOR photography was used by DIAAP analysts as
a primary source of information for the compilation of Lines of Communi-
cation Studies, Urban Area Analyses, Demography Studies and a variety
of targeting studies. The photographs also provided a ready source of
t e material for many widely disseminated collateral studies on
thout the expense and delays that accompany downgrading/
econtro o more sensitive photography for this purpose.
3. The overall value of the Program has diminished in the past few years
in direct proportion to the reduction in coverage and resolution. The
present standoff mode has resulted in long oblique photos of a relatively
narrow band along and has increased the problems of
grpund haze and terrain masking. These problems were further compounded
by changing from the 3-8 foot average resolution HR 73-B ("B" Configuration)
Camera System to the 6- to 8-foot estimated resolution 111-B ("H" Con-
figuration) Camera System. Stated in terms of interpretability, this
means from good to poor resolution or from specific identification of
essential elements of information to "probable vehicles and/or equipment."
4. Despite the foregoing problems, CHURCH DOOR photogra h continues to
a and a t'vities at 25X1
25X1
End
HUMINT-reported activities along the The most recen 25X1
examples of CHURCH DOOR-derived information are e discovery of 19 fighter
aircraft at hich was thought to be abandoned
and the discovery o an 25X1
The attached chart indicates that Immediate Photographic
Interpretation Reports of the last eight missions showed 622 targets were
covered with more than 40 percent fair to good quality photos and an addi-
tional 40 percent with poor quality photos but targets were still identifiable.
1 Enclosure a/s
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MAY 1062 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.0
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
NSA Briefing Dr. Naka, 10 October
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Cy 0
NOV 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance
Office .a
SIGINT Highlights Provided by
U-2 Flights During the Past wo Years
4. Individual SIGINT highlight examples from
program during the past two years are outlined below:
Attachment C to
I I
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OSA R&D - CALENDAR 1968 & 1969
U-2 ORIENTED ACTIVITIES
1. U-2R Development Program Management:
Development Flight Test through 15 Oct 1968
Systems Development and Problem Resolution
A. Aircraft Performance Evaluation
B. Propulsion, Interface & Performance
C. Ejector Assymetric Thrust
D. Assymetric Fuel Feed
E. Air Conditioning & Pressurization
F. Engine Oil Cooling
G. Constant Speed Drive & Hydraulic Oil Cooking
H. Stability & Control
I. Structural Demonstration
J. Oxygen System
K. DC Generator Cooling
L. Tail Limit Cycle Vibration
M. Q-Bay Temperature & Environment
N. Mission Equipment & Interface
Follow-On Flight Test - 1969
A. Installed Engine Performance Calibration
& Establish Engine Pressure Ratio Curve
2. Optical Bar Camera Development & Flight Test 1968 & 1969.
3, Engineering, Development, and Flight Test
IOC 19 May 1969
LI. Drag Reduction - General R&D 1968 & 1969
An investigation to prove the feasibility of a drag
reduction theory and apply this theory to the U-2R has been
underway during this time period. The feasibility of this
theory has been conclusively demonstrated with induced drag
reductions of up to 30% recorded in the wind tunnel. However,
translating this research type hardware will require more
investigation and wind tunnel testing.
.5. J-75 Performance Improvement - General R&D Studies 1969
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Funded studies have been completed by LAC on the
effects of proposed J75-P-13B engine performance improvements
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on performance of the U-2R aircraft and a final report has
been received. Results of the LAC study indicate that, the
engine growth step of primary interest to R&D could provide
several possible aircraft performance improvements such as
an increase of 1450 ft. in altitude with a slight reduction
in to 'ncrease.of.500 nautical miles in
range altitude or an increased payload cap-
ability of 2070-717s-. over the current mission profile with
a slight loss in total range.
6. Low Altitude Quiet U-2R - General R&D Studies 1969
The Lockheed preliminary investigation of the U-2 is
nearing completion. The study indicates that a significant
quieting can be obtained. The sound level is still somewhat
above background noise at 200 ft; however, the ability to
detect the presence of the aircraft will be markedly reduced.
A develdpment program would be required to solve some of the
air inlet technical problems associated with quieting the U-2
without reducing inlet and propulsion reliability. Further
testing is programmed to determine if substantial quieting is
in fact necessary for covert nighttime penetration.
As part of this study, a very preliminary investigation
was conducted of alternate approaches to accomplish a covert
low altitude mission. The study indicated that there may be
a number of existing commercial aircraft with the capability
to perform a completely low altitude mission. The silencing
problem for these aircraft would be considerably less complex
than to silence the U-2 and, additionally, they could probably
be silenced to a lower noise level. The trade-off, however,
may be in range. The study of these alternate aircraft is
continuing in greater depth.and the results will be available
during the next quarter.
7. Improved Navigation System - General R&D Studies 1969
The Honeywell Corporation has completed the preliminary
design effort of the Honeywell Update System interfaced with
the U-2R doppler system to improve the navigation accuracy.
The estimated error build-up for this system is a maximum
CEP = 0.5 n.m. every 90 minutes. A briefing has been prepared
summarizing the concept and capability.
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Infra-Red Suppression - General R&D Studies 1968
Analytical studies and scale model hardware tests were
conducted to evaluate various schemes for reducing the IR
signature of the J75-P-13B engine in the U-2R aircraft.
High Altitude Engine Relight Improvement - 1969
General R&D development and flight test resulted in
engine combustion section burner can modification yielding
an 8000 ft. altitude increase in engine relight capability.
Attachment F to
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OSA AVIONICS DIVISION - NOTES ON SYSTEMS QUALIFICATION
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development of systems - their installation in the vehicles; flight,
qualifications and acceptance testing and also the quantity pro-
curement of operational systems to equip the U-2 fleets. (Note
the actual ECM development is performed by OEL/CIA under NRO
auspices).
Flight test instrumentation, developed under the Avionics
sponsorship, is tailored to stimulate real life parameters; as
currently known by the Intelligence community. There parameters
are coordinated with system 'R and D components and with the avail-
able Intelligence data so that systems installed on the U-2 vehicles
will respond adequately and reliably.
Within the past two years, full scale range simulators have
been developed and upgraded so that systems are
The primary responpihilitj ..-, of the VT ics Division, OSA
are to equip and supportl Systems aboard 25X1
the U-2C and U-2R reconnaissance flights of the Agency and the
Air Force. In this role the Avionics Division res onds to nation
al requirements for exploiting ata radiated
by the opposition and by supplying technical advice for the 25X1
exe erting 25X1
and Active
stimulation of systems are provided by a series o Tests. I
The following systems were operationally qualified by these tests:
Additional passive and associated auxjllary ipment were
tested for operational reliability with the Tests; these
were:
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collection systems
collection system
c. Flow time code generator - providing time
correlation for data and operations
d. Data Recorders - acceptance testing performed
on the types GPAR-C and MC machines.
FCC!'}'C: 7A y c>rrnnrf d and conducted on a new
resulting in its qualification and ins a a ion in Ile -
inventory for protection of the vehicle against
aircraft. This system is currently deployed in the it Force
and Agency fleets.
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