PARAMILITARY CASE STUDY THE BAY OF PIGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100010009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

The pfalfil es for cohducting bnecTivein'teTrgence`gatiierin
operations have long been- essential tools in the conduct of nat
Unfortunately, however, certain misconceptions regarding the manne
stances in which they can be employed arose in this country after Wo
led directly to setbacks like the Bay of Pigs. Rather than shunning the
using covert operations in the future to gain policy objectives, expert
Bay of Pigs merely underline the fact that policymakers must be educat
is possible, and the responsibility for this lies with the career intelligent
PAP A Y CASE STUDY
CPYRGHT
I think that the usual caveat is
necessary before I get into the subject at
hand. What I am about to say today are
my personal views; they do not repr
sent the official CIA view nor the
official U.S.Government view. This.is
an after action report on an episode in
our history ,which engendered perhaps
the most intense emotions and public
reaction we have seen since World War
II.
President Kennedy in the aftermath
of the Bay of Pigs made the comment
that "Victory has a hundred fathers;
defeat is an orphan." I would simply say
that as Inspector General of the CIA at
the time, I was probably in charge of
the orphanage.
There is a very specific definition of
covert operations. In the broad litera
ture of intelligence, covert operations
are about as old as espionage, which has
been' called the world's second oldest
profession. To be properly considered
covert, an operation must be designed in
such a way that it can easily be dis-
The hand of the sponsor must not be
avowed by the originating government. and, must not be confused with irregu-
visible,
Covert operations, on the other
lar warfare. An example of irregular
warfare that has received recent world
vide attention is the operation in Laos.
on both sides knows who is
doing what to whom; the aid and ass
tance is obvious. That is irregular war-
fare. A covert operation, however, to be
totally covert must be so clandestine, so
well hidden, that its true sources may
never be specifically proven. Guesses, al
IME
AY OF PIGS
A. lecture delivered
by
Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
nal policy. implementation? Do the policymakers
and cirtum have a realistic understanding of the
d War II and operation?
>ossibility'of These are some of the basic questions
ices like the which must be asked prior to the
d as to what mounting of any clandestine or covert
community. operation.
Before turning to the case study
itself, a brief review of recent Cuban
history is appropriate. Fidel Castro
landed in eastern Cuba in 1956 with
what turned out to be 12 men. He'
gathered forces in the Sierra Maestra in
1956 and 1957. Even more important,
however, was the growth of anti-Batista
groups in the cities of Cuba among the
middle class, the professionals, and the
elite. It was the erosion of Batista's vital
political support in the cities which led
directly to his downfall. The guerrillas
in the countryside served merely as a
the public media, but no prc or verifi- catalyst in this process. And eventually,
cation is permissible if the ration is on 1 January 1959, Castro stepped into
to be properly
considered co t. the vacuum left by the fleeing Batista.
e-
At this point
believe it will prove helpfu o simply seem to recall was that despite our
list some of the questions t a must be misgivings about Fidel Castro, and the
asked before a covert ration is U.S. Government did have them, we
properly undertaken. recognized his government fairly
it be done cover .Can the promptly. The first cabinet of the Cas-
0 Can
of the sponsoring gov r invent be tro regime was probably one of the
role
sufficiently concealed at ea i step so as finest in Cuban history. It is worthy to
to avoid disclosure and us either note, however, that very few of the new
failure or a diplomatic set l: for the Cabinet members stayed very long.
sponsor? And if the cover he opera- In addition to recognizing Castro, the
tion is destroyed at any tage, are United States continued its subsidy of
alternative measures or wit) awal pos- Cuba's sugar crop which at that time
amounted to approximately $100 mil-
sible?
o Are the assets availabl to do the lion. The three major U.S. oil companies
job required? Are the indi eou.s per. doing business in Cuba advanced him
sonnel available who are s e and in $29 million because his treasury was
place to dot work re- bare when he took over. Batista and his
the proper
quired? If not, are there th available cohorts had seen to that. Castro was not
who can be put into place? invited to the United States on an
? Are all of the assets the spon- official trip, but he came here unoffi.
government being us d Can the cially to attend a meeting of the Ameri.
soring
operation
forces being used r spond to Washington, and he did have an inter-
or are they likely o go off on view with the then Vice President of the
direction
their own? Will they accept a cellation United States, Richard M. Nixon. Then,
the operation at any time, one by one, the men around Castro
of
? If it succeeds
silence? The maxi ' Silence is propriated U.S. dropping property worth $968
golden" has never been fully cepted in million. Even his closest barbados-the
country, but it is still w r h asking. bearded ones-that had been with him
this
, can it be handled sec ly within in the hills started to turn against him as
Also,
is-
the
? Finally, and this is aps the nists, and by the middle of 1960 it
most important question h United became obvious that the United States
ask, is the risk worth the was not going to be able to do business
States must ask
gain? Has there n a true with Fidel. This, I might say, was a very
potential
evaluation of the chance of iccess or ' great shock to Americans. Cuba was a n legations, spAN B taeP ~el se1lb I~~/13ectl-IK` 5d-'OQQ 1r Q ~d f itrfrom
Spain; we had assisted it through the
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