CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100010030-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: July 27, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

July 27, 1972
.
search his conscience and do what he ing unless he has been cleared or unless ourselves have not been trained for, what
feels is right for the security and survival he is a member of the Joint Committee do we do? We go to the experts.
of the Nation. on Atomic Energy. It is a room that is When there is a case in court and we
I want to say at this juncture-and I constantly being debugged because of want to establish a medical point, what
say It with deepest sincerity, the gentle- what transpires there. do we do? We call in the expert, of we
men who are opposed to Trident, are We heard distinguished John McCond// have a situation in court that concerns
r r CSl ell , lave 7eC,n act lve on M , rresiQent, as we agonize over
problem before us today, in the form of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy these problems, what do we do?
an amendment by my distinguished and since 1953. We have sat in the classified When a man is sick he goes to see his
beloved colleague from Texas (Mr. BENT- sanctuary of that room that is guarded doctor. He flocs not try to cure himself
sEN) is a tremendously serious one. We by a member of the police department because, after all, he has not had th.a
see how controversial it is, one not easy 24 hours a day. No one can enter unless training.
of solution. But, be that as it may, a de- he signs his name and adequately iden- When we hold our hearings and want
cision must be made. Each of us must tifies himself. No one can sit in the hear- to getcrts we
t the best advice on sub
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
cb e l Fir F eleaset li 2000/05/23 : CFA-RDP75-00001 R000100010031
Nfr -, r rest ene M P 'd t I 1 1
sincere, dedicated, and patriotic. They when he was head of the CIA and, Allen
have firm convictions as to how we Dulles, who came before him -and now,
should proceed or delay--one way or the of course, we have Mr. Helms who is the
other. present D;rector of the CIA.
For myself, I, too, have searched my They come there and tell us about the
conscience. This is an agonizing decision nuclear progress and perils in the world.
that we have to make because of its tre- They tell us what progress our adver-
mendous cost. Here we are indeed speak- saries are making. Sonletinles the evi-
ing about billions of dollars. But that is dence is so severe and so solemn and so
the price of peace. When we talk about serious that, frankly, it gives one goose
national security, unfortunately, we al- 1hunlps, to use the vernacular or it makes
ways have to talk about it in terms of our hair stand up on, our heads. That is
billions of dollars. I am more than a little the kind of world we are living in today.
staggered by it. As a matter of fact, be- Would it not be glorious for mankind,
.fore I came to the Senate 22 years ago I would it not be wonderful for the world,
had hardly heard the word "billion." I if we could take every bomb and defuse
never thought there was that kind of it, destroy it, dump it at the bottom of
money around. the ocean-if we could get all the na-
But, unfortunately, as I see it, we are tions of the world; the five members of
living in the kind of world. today where the nuclear club, to do that. What a
it is hard to say from day to day what glorious day that would be for ,all man-
the situation Will he tomorrow. I mean, kind.
when we try to project ourselves into the But all we can do is hope. All we can
future and try to determine what the do is pray. Yet there is more that we can.
situation in the World might be, let us do: we can. keep strong enough to make
say,' a decade or a score of years from sure that no madman will have the
now, it is certainly difficult. Indeed it is audacity to take- a chance and start such
quite impossible. a war.
So many times in our Senate delibera.- Now, as we have looked at this situa-
tions we have found ourselves wonder- tion year in and year out, we have found
ing whether we have clone too much or, that deterrence is the only guarantee we
regrettably on some occasions, whether have against a nuclear holocaust. We
we have done too little. have heard this time and again, "Who is
But I must say this, if ever we find we going to win the next war?" My friends,
have done too much, but as, a, result, this no one is going to win the next War. If a
world has been without conflict or that global nuclear or thermonuclear war is
we have not involved the world in a nu- touched off, it will mean the end of the
clear or a thermonuclear holocaust, then world. It will mean. the extinction of
about the only thing we can regret is that mankind. No one will win, I do not care
we spent some money. how many Tridents. we have, I do not
On the other hand, if we do too little care how many Polaris missiles we have,
and a situation should arise analogous I do not care how many other kinds of
to the one in Cuba in October of 1362, missiles we have, I do not care how many
suppose America had not have' had the bombers we have. I do not care how
muscle to compel our adversary to turn many aircraft carriers we have. No one
back its ships and its warheads. That will win that war once it starts. The only
could have been disastrous for us. You chance we will have is to 'do now what
will remember we were on the edge, we has to be clone, to make sure that no one
were on the brink, we were almost at starts that holocaust. That is the name
the abyss of a nuclear wa.r. of the game: Deterrence.
I know how John Kennedy agonized Mr. President, how do we promote
over those moments. Courageously, he deterrence?
took a very, very firm position. He said I realize that because I say a thing,
at that time, "You turn those warheads that does not necessarily make it right.
back from a Cuba that is only 90 miles Other people have a perfect right to dis-
from our own mainland or I will stop agree with me. But I want the Senate to
those ships and blow them up. if understand, I want the people of my
necessary." ' State to understand, and I want the peo-
Because America had the power, pie of the country to understand that I
I#hrush.chev turned his ships back. do not want to spend 5 cents more than
I have said time and again that when is absolutely necessary for our defense
history is recorded a 100 years from posture--not a nickel beyond our needs.
today it will show that for Hhrushchev, But, by the same token, I Would not
at that moment, who was a man of spare $1-I would spare nbt $1-to make
understanding and great courage, it was sure that we guarantee security and
the beginning of his political end. freedom to posterity,
the structure of a house, what d.o we do?
We call in the architect and. put him on
'the stand as an expert.
So, in this moment, what does JOHN
Pnsaoaz: do?
He looks for the expert. To whom does
lie turn? He turns to the father of the
nuclear. Navy, Admiral. Rickover. I am
telling the people in the Senate at this
moment and the people of the country,
whether they agree with him or not, his
name will he 'iinmortal when American
history is written. I !.m talking about
Hyman Rickover, the father of our nu-
clear Navy. It was he who gave us the
Nautilus. It was he who, against the
resistance of the Navy Department, said,
"I can make a submarine that can be
propelled and stay under water for 30
days if necessary." And lie did it.
So, this morning, realizing that this
debate would come and realizing that
there would be a serious and sincere dif-
ference of opinion, I telephoned "Rick"
as I call him, and I said, "Adrniz'al, on
Trident 'give it to me, and give it to Inc
straight. I want a Dear John letter from
you." Here is my "Dear John" letter. I
want to read my "Dear John" letter to
the Members of the Senate.
The PRESIDING O.i?PICF.R. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. ,STF l~IIS.. Mr. President, what
time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BEniL).'I'sle Senator from Mississippi he s
86 minutes remaining. The Senator from
Texas has 129 minutes remaining.
Mr. STENNIS, Mr. President, I yield
the Senator an additional 15 r,Yin.utes.
The PRESIDING O sii ICIUt. The Sen-
ator from Rhode Island is recomiized for
another 15 minutes.
Mr. PA.STORE. Mr. President, the let-
ter reads:
Jin.y 27, 1972.
DFea JOHN: In our telephone conversation
this morning you requested that I furnish
you my views on the following: (1) the need
for the Trident submarines, (2) what re-
search has already been done on the'J`rid.ent
submarine and missile, (3) my personal opin-
ion on the feasibility and, practicality of.tho
Trident design.
Those are the questions I put to him,
and these are time answers he gave in the
"Dear John" letter:
The Trident sohmarJncs s.nd missiles are
needed to increase the survivability of our
seaborne deterrent in the 1980's and beyond,
and to provide for replacement of our aging
Polaris submarines, the oldest of which will
be nearly 20 years old before the Oust Trident
submarine becomes op err.tional In the late
1070's.
Our Polaris submarines are limited in their
patrol area by the range of their mi siles.
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100010030-3.