SUPER SPY, STRANGE ALLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100010046-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: April 8, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

~1.r ,7.1 ~ J.. x,117 A
g APR 1972
:'CPYRGHT-'
CPYRGHT
Century. By j;,, II. Cookridge.
(rF.IILEV: Spy of the
(Random house, 402 pp., illustrated, $10.00)
TILE GENERAL WAS A SPY: The Trutla About
General Gelilen and His Spy Ring. By Hein Jfohne
cC Tlerinania Zolling. Inti'odactior. by Hugh. Trevor-
I$ r and Preface to the American Edition by Andrew
U UN'.
Reinhard Gehlen was a first Vlassov's propaganda
leaflets
general with an obses- ets promising good
treatment to deserters and
ve hatred of communism employment in the Vlassov
116 may have had more in- movement produced massive
uence on the course of the defections, but soon Hitler's
old War than any other ruthless treatment of the
ran. Soviet articles refer to Russians brought an end to
1 inn as a fascist warmonger that. Had Hitler not been a
who was the biggest single maniac, it is conceivable
ctor in the prevention of that Gehlen's plans would
in East-West detente. These have provided the basis for
wo'books tell his extraordi- a German victory in the
1 any story. . East, certainly a substantial
From late 1941 to the end prolongation of the war.
f the war Gehlen was Hit- . Gehlen remained loyal to
.r's chief of intelligence for I)itler, but seeing how the
tic U.S.S.R. and Eastern ISu-
I ope.' '1'lien, having arranged
lo, be captured by the Amer-
be soon emerged as
he principal source of CIA
i )tclIigenee f r o in the com-
,
nunist world until 1955,
hen he became Chancellor
denauer's chief of intelli-
ence for the West German
tiepublic. .
Gehlen was, one of the
Banners of "Operation Bar-
arossa," the 1941 Gelman
ttack on the Soviet Union,
which sent Nazi divisions six
lundred- miles into the
.S.S.R. in seven weeks.,
lacing 50 million Russians
under Hitler's rule. When
Alen became chief of in-
elligence for the Eastern
I ?rolit; lie immediately
egan organizing a Russian
r?nly of Liberation among
nti-Communist prisoners of
yar and partisans. By the
prang of 1943 the had organ-
zed this army under Soviet
Andrei Vlassov, who
lad been captured 'by the
',ermans and turned against
talirr. Vlassov and Gehlen
stinlatcd that there were
nundreds of thousands of
,,.d..1 1)
ern)afls In the overthrow
'? Stalin.
lint Gehlen's plans ran
head-on against Hitler's
View that the Slavs were
Hub-hurnan beings w o
spy 1.t\1 1.. Long, I .
-)01 106
Soviet expert for the Unite
States.
There can be little dou
that We Soviets, fearing the
&~injans more an e &ease'e2O te011s05t_ '
r?hould heApipI ep lorp
war would end lie made
plans for his future. lie ar-
rani-iod to have all his intel-
ligence files on the Soviet
Union packed win 50 steel
cases and hidden away until
he could he captured by th
U.S. Army. As Stalin's ag
gressive program in Eastern
Europe, the Hal ha us an
Iran began to unfold, it was
apparent to the American
that they were totally unpre
pared, without intelligence
about the Soviets. But Geh-
len was prepared and bat
soon negotiated a remarka
hie deal in Washington giv
ing him authority to estab-
lish an all-German intclli
genre apparatus with coo
plete control over its per
sonnel.
In the little village of Pu
lach outside of Munich i
a large housing dcvelopmen
Jtevictced by
Arthur Al. Cox
,
The net fewer, a former a cut. The l~ rife Affair,
Senior Fellow at the Brook- Ic billed with changes in
?nlitinat loadersluo
ings Institrtt.i.on and a spe-
cialist on internationol conz-
ln:ttnisin, is a consultant,
of f airs.
I.S. policy by the fact that
Gehlen was selected for this
?ole, But there can be little
oubt too that given Stalin's
ggressive moves the U.S.
would use the only available
ource of intelligence. Prob-
bly the revisionist histori-
ans of the Cold War will be
rebating for years the es-
ence of the conclusion P. H.
Cooliridge reaches in his
book: "'1Chether we like it or
ot, Western democracy
must be prepared in times
of danger to accept such
stranne allies as Reinhard
Golden in defense against
totalitarianism."
According to C'ookrid,Ce,
who is a British author of
many. fine books on espio-
na e, the Cl_\ pumped aver
8200' million into the Gehlen
organization. But Ih:a rehabs
more than paid off. Aanui g
its sensational exploits were
the accurate forecasts of tl;e
East German uprisings in
1953. the Hung u?ian revolt
in 1956, and the Soviet .iliva-
sian of Czechoslovakia in
1963.
Gehlen secured the text of
K.hrushchev's secret speech
denouncing Stalin, and gave
it to Allen Dulls. His inter
ligence operations expose
some of the most successfu
Soviet secret agents. Iii,
plans led to the 600-yar
tunnel the CIA dug ant
Last Berlin, where the mail
telephone trunk lines loading to Moscow and other
capitals in F [stern IEur?op
were tappcedl for mini
months until this incredibl,.
successful operation was dis
covered. In line, 1967, Cl.
Director Richard Helms Ewa
able to make high mark
fr?cnl President Johnson b~
prediction the exact date o
the six-clay Israeli attack h
the Middle last, His source
Gen. Gehlen.
It wasn't until he beeam
head of German intelli ;fens
formerly for SS officer
Gen. Golden built a walle
in headquarters for wha
was soon to become the sp
base of the Cold War, pr -
viding the CIA with 70 lie
cent of its intelligence o
the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Et
rope. Thus, in it matter a
1)cpared to join wrath the, months I-l:itler's chief -alit
I I~ tl
A'PI5IY d For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP75-00:0,01
rorlCa , 17, ge li '
t
o
cesses. The ? Cotlununists be
rating his organization
id planting fake informa-
t on. Taut the greatest blow
Gehlen was the discovery
i 1962 that his chief of
unter-intelligence, Heinz
.was a Soviet double
1 elfen
1nd the new technology of
ly planes and satellites all
ontributed to the fading
impact of Gehlen. He re
red in 1968 at 65.
Gehlen probably was the
spy of the century," but his,
ightist 'proclivities and
t igid anti-conmunistn proba-
ly contributed to prolon?f-
i n g the most dangerous pe-
a i.or.1 of tlle Cold War and
may have slowed the evolu-
;onarr political process in
he U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu-
ope. A proponent of revolu-
on not evolution, he be-
ieved that all communism
as bad and dreamed of war
etween (ha U.S. and
133.R. He 'had no sympa-
hy for national commlt-
iitim, Titoisr' , and r?ev)sron-
snn. Flo didn't seen[ tag he-
ieve that the political l:roc.
ss in Moscow and Eastern
?.urope would alloy for a'
truggle for power between
r to rightist Stalinists and
he anti-Stalinist revision-
sts. Even after the advent
f Iihrushchev his opera-
ions ' continued to give
weight to the arguments of
those Communist leader
who most feared the Gem
mans and who were most op
posed to relaxing the Stalin)
ist tactics of tyranny and
terror.
/Both of these books are
lively reading, well docu
mented and cover essen
t'ially the same events. The
Cookridge book is better or
ganized and better written
but spy buffs may enjoy th
operational detail of "'1'h
General Was A SPY" 1)
?iohne and 'Dolling, two Gc:
man newsmen who write fc
Der Spiegel.
FOIAb3b