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November 16, 2016
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April 24, 2000
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April 8, 1972
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00001R000100010046-6.pdf145.52 KB
~1.r ,7.1 ~ J.. x,117 A g APR 1972 :'CPYRGHT-' CPYRGHT Century. By j;,, II. Cookridge. (rF.IILEV: Spy of the (Random house, 402 pp., illustrated, $10.00) TILE GENERAL WAS A SPY: The Trutla About General Gelilen and His Spy Ring. By Hein Jfohne cC Tlerinania Zolling. Inti'odactior. by Hugh. Trevor- I$ r and Preface to the American Edition by Andrew U UN'. Reinhard Gehlen was a first Vlassov's propaganda leaflets general with an obses- ets promising good treatment to deserters and ve hatred of communism employment in the Vlassov 116 may have had more in- movement produced massive uence on the course of the defections, but soon Hitler's old War than any other ruthless treatment of the ran. Soviet articles refer to Russians brought an end to 1 inn as a fascist warmonger that. Had Hitler not been a who was the biggest single maniac, it is conceivable ctor in the prevention of that Gehlen's plans would in East-West detente. These have provided the basis for wo'books tell his extraordi- a German victory in the 1 any story. . East, certainly a substantial From late 1941 to the end prolongation of the war. f the war Gehlen was Hit- . Gehlen remained loyal to .r's chief of intelligence for I)itler, but seeing how the tic U.S.S.R. and Eastern ISu- I ope.' '1'lien, having arranged lo, be captured by the Amer- be soon emerged as he principal source of CIA i )tclIigenee f r o in the com- , nunist world until 1955, hen he became Chancellor denauer's chief of intelli- ence for the West German tiepublic. . Gehlen was, one of the Banners of "Operation Bar- arossa," the 1941 Gelman ttack on the Soviet Union, which sent Nazi divisions six lundred- miles into the .S.S.R. in seven weeks., lacing 50 million Russians under Hitler's rule. When Alen became chief of in- elligence for the Eastern I ?rolit; lie immediately egan organizing a Russian r?nly of Liberation among nti-Communist prisoners of yar and partisans. By the prang of 1943 the had organ- zed this army under Soviet Andrei Vlassov, who lad been captured 'by the ',ermans and turned against talirr. Vlassov and Gehlen stinlatcd that there were nundreds of thousands of ,,.d..1 1) ern)afls In the overthrow '? Stalin. lint Gehlen's plans ran head-on against Hitler's View that the Slavs were Hub-hurnan beings w o spy 1.t\1 1.. Long, I . -)01 106 Soviet expert for the Unite States. There can be little dou that We Soviets, fearing the &~injans more an e &ease'e2O te011s05t_ ' r?hould heApipI ep lorp war would end lie made plans for his future. lie ar- rani-iod to have all his intel- ligence files on the Soviet Union packed win 50 steel cases and hidden away until he could he captured by th U.S. Army. As Stalin's ag gressive program in Eastern Europe, the Hal ha us an Iran began to unfold, it was apparent to the American that they were totally unpre pared, without intelligence about the Soviets. But Geh- len was prepared and bat soon negotiated a remarka hie deal in Washington giv ing him authority to estab- lish an all-German intclli genre apparatus with coo plete control over its per sonnel. In the little village of Pu lach outside of Munich i a large housing dcvelopmen Jtevictced by Arthur Al. Cox , The net fewer, a former a cut. The l~ rife Affair, Senior Fellow at the Brook- Ic billed with changes in ?nlitinat loadersluo ings Institrtt.i.on and a spe- cialist on internationol conz- ln:ttnisin, is a consultant, of f airs. I.S. policy by the fact that Gehlen was selected for this ?ole, But there can be little oubt too that given Stalin's ggressive moves the U.S. would use the only available ource of intelligence. Prob- bly the revisionist histori- ans of the Cold War will be rebating for years the es- ence of the conclusion P. H. Cooliridge reaches in his book: "'1Chether we like it or ot, Western democracy must be prepared in times of danger to accept such stranne allies as Reinhard Golden in defense against totalitarianism." According to C'ookrid,Ce, who is a British author of many. fine books on espio- na e, the Cl_\ pumped aver 8200' million into the Gehlen organization. But Ih:a rehabs more than paid off. Aanui g its sensational exploits were the accurate forecasts of tl;e East German uprisings in 1953. the Hung u?ian revolt in 1956, and the Soviet .iliva- sian of Czechoslovakia in 1963. Gehlen secured the text of K.hrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin, and gave it to Allen Dulls. His inter ligence operations expose some of the most successfu Soviet secret agents. Iii, plans led to the 600-yar tunnel the CIA dug ant Last Berlin, where the mail telephone trunk lines loading to Moscow and other capitals in F [stern IEur?op were tappcedl for mini months until this incredibl,. successful operation was dis covered. In line, 1967, Cl. Director Richard Helms Ewa able to make high mark fr?cnl President Johnson b~ prediction the exact date o the six-clay Israeli attack h the Middle last, His source Gen. Gehlen. It wasn't until he beeam head of German intelli ;fens formerly for SS officer Gen. Golden built a walle in headquarters for wha was soon to become the sp base of the Cold War, pr - viding the CIA with 70 lie cent of its intelligence o the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Et rope. Thus, in it matter a 1)cpared to join wrath the, months I-l:itler's chief -alit I I~ tl A'PI5IY d For Release 2000/05/23 :CIA-RDP75-00:0,01 rorlCa , 17, ge li ' t o cesses. The ? Cotlununists be rating his organization id planting fake informa- t on. Taut the greatest blow Gehlen was the discovery i 1962 that his chief of unter-intelligence, Heinz .was a Soviet double 1 elfen 1nd the new technology of ly planes and satellites all ontributed to the fading impact of Gehlen. He re red in 1968 at 65. Gehlen probably was the spy of the century," but his, ightist 'proclivities and t igid anti-conmunistn proba- ly contributed to prolon?f- i n g the most dangerous pe- a i.or.1 of tlle Cold War and may have slowed the evolu- ;onarr political process in he U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- ope. A proponent of revolu- on not evolution, he be- ieved that all communism as bad and dreamed of war etween (ha U.S. and 133.R. He 'had no sympa- hy for national commlt- iitim, Titoisr' , and r?ev)sron- snn. Flo didn't seen[ tag he- ieve that the political l:roc. ss in Moscow and Eastern ?.urope would alloy for a' truggle for power between r to rightist Stalinists and he anti-Stalinist revision- sts. Even after the advent f Iihrushchev his opera- ions ' continued to give weight to the arguments of those Communist leader who most feared the Gem mans and who were most op posed to relaxing the Stalin) ist tactics of tyranny and terror. /Both of these books are lively reading, well docu mented and cover essen t'ially the same events. The Cookridge book is better or ganized and better written but spy buffs may enjoy th operational detail of "'1'h General Was A SPY" 1) ?iohne and 'Dolling, two Gc: man newsmen who write fc Der Spiegel. FOIAb3b