EDEN AND THE 'CURSE OF THE PHARAOHS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100020022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: October 3, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2000/06/13 : 5:I6[ 539QIA01 R00010
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This sorics of articles is extracted from
a political biography of Ca,:ial Abdel
Nasser by h+oharr,rned Heikal, to bo
published in book form next' year by
Doubleday, New York, and other 'pub.,
Iishinf; houses throughout rho . world,
17
IE remarkable American warning to Nasser Mat
training his men was one of a number he received about Britain's an
Fr'ance's determination on . military intervention.
Egypt's friends inside the Baghdad Pact reported that Nuri Said was
convinced there was going to be an invasion.
The lolca movement iii Cyprus` and Egypt's supporters in the ' Maltese
,-tbotir movement both sent news of large troop, air and shipping move'
rr',ents based on the two islands. Eoka sent photographs of the French Nord
Atlas transports arriving at R,A.P.
bases on Cyprus. Merchant ship cap-
fm ins passing through the Suez Canal
also tolq of large concentrations of
%%'- lrsliips and landing craft.
In order to meet - these threats and
1,+ ;cause he still thought Anglo-French
collusion with the Israelis was the taboo
Fga,me, Presiclcnt Nasser had withdrawn
;'most of the Army from the Sinai leaving
oil 1?y two battalions at 1?1 Arish, two at
rltalfah and two at'A.bu Aghei]a.
When the Six Principles were accep-
ted at the United Nations on October
113, 1956, President Nasser estimated
(that the danger of invasion had dropped
to ].0 per cent. In fact hticjjllx ruled
it out. 7'he pt~l p iQllgi l4~t;t
Britain, France and Egypt at Geneva
'on October 29 had been put off, but
this postponement was regarded as part
of the diplomatic game. On that clay,
President Nasser went to a birthday
party for one of his sons. There were
children and cakes, games and movies.
The President was enjoying himself
when a messenger arrived with aslip
of paper.
It carried the news of the Israeli
till louncement that they had sent an
armoured column into the Sinai. So far
there had been no reports from the
V,*,ptian Army because the, bulk of that
Anny had been withdrawn to protect the
to wa c 1 t le empty spaces of the desert'
nn"1 so the first news the President had
cane from the monitoring service which
listened in `to. Israeli radio traffic.
'I'hc President ]eft the birthday party
called his colleagues to a nleetiolg, arrd.
asled fur an assessment of the situation.
1'h", first conclusion, given to the Presi-
dert'at sevelf-o'clock that evening, was
thatit was a limited operation.
But, at` 1-0 o'clock, the Israelis
anronnced' that their forces were
already close to the Suez Cana1. They
were referring to the battalion of para-
troops they had dropped just short of
the Mil:la Pass. And that gave the whole
operation a new dimension. ?
When the news was passed to the
special assessment committee it
revised its thinking and decided that
the Israelis had mounted a big opera-
tion because l gyllit had been successful
with the nationalisation of Suez. This
was their revenge for the United
Nations' vote on the Six Principles.
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