U.S. SABOTAGED GENEVA ACCORDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100020038-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: August 11, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

E`/ 1TXOJ1r 1 i (-CJ,t11MIAN
Approved For Release 2O'b l1442 1~ 6A-RDP7 30%I1 R041 00020038-4
By Richard F. ',Yard
Third of a series of articles
Official U.S, policy statements on Indochina issue(]. to
the public characteristically have charged the Viet-
namese with the crimes actually being committed by the
U.S. From 1954 to the present. clay, among the. U.S.
ideological keystones have been the spurious claims of
North Vietnamese aggression and violations of the 1954
Geneva settlement.
Although . U.S. responsibility for sabotaging the
'Geneva agreements has been recognized widely for well
bvcr a decade, the first time it was seriously suggested in
the New York Times was last month in its final
installment of documents and reports from the Penta-
goil's Iiistoryof U.S. intervention in Vietnaril.
Following the disastrous French defeat at Dien-
bienplhu in May 1954 as well as serious military reverses
elsewhere in Indochina, France finally faced the neces-
sity of negotiations to avoid complete destruction of its
forces. The ensuing settlement at Geneva contained
provisions for a durable peace in Indocldna. But as
quickly as French troops left Indochina the U.S. began
its direct intervention, preventing essential provisions of
the Geneva agreement from being carried out.
J?
... State John Foster Dulles opposed any international
recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
which had existed for nearly nine years and led the
resistance against the French.
Bldt@c) l.l.icit s
Prior to the Geneva conference itself, Washington
policy papers of 1954 underscored U.S. aims in Indo-
.ctuna as "a military victory" for the French, whose
armies were on their last legs-indicating the lack of
realism in Washington. Thus it is not surprising that the
U.S. worked to destroy the new peace. 'T'his was evident
at the time to anyone who wanted to see what was
happening in Vietnam.
Clearer than before, the newly available docurnents
show, that the U.S. never intended to respect the Geneva
settlement. On August 3, 1954, just two weeks after the
Geneva conference concluded, the National Security
Council discussed Vietnam. About the meeting, Fox
Butterfield in the Times wrote: "The objectives set by
the (National Security.) Council were `to maintain a
friendly non-Communist South Vietnam' and `to prevent
a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections.' "
Although the Pentagon analyst denied that the U.S.
"connived" with Diem to prevent national elections,
Butterfield noted that Washington had made its desires
known to Diem and when Die-in later blocked the
elections, the U.S. indicated its full "support." The
Pentagon papers could hardly conceal the fact that Diem
remained in power by virtue of U.S. backing, although
the dependence on the U.S. is sometimes obscured,
particularly in ascribing to Diem the repression. for
which U.S. was ultimately responsible.
Washington's cynical attitude toward the Geneva
settlement was stated by John Foster Dullesin a cable to,,
the U.S. embassy in Saigon on Dec. 11, 1955: "While we
silo uld"certailily take no step to speed ub the present
process of decay of the Geneva accords, neither should
we make the slightest effort to infuse life into them."
Perhaps the most *revealing, now document from the
,riii~-)>. Cc-SSSli41'7Cu lh:.: y'-)f1S
As is well known, the U.S. caused its puppet N-0-
Dinh Diem to be installed in Saigon, even before the
settlement had been reached in Geneva. Under programs
financed and largely conceived by his CIA tutors, Diem
instituted a neo-fascist regime. Thousands of patriots
who - had served in the anti-French resistance were
assassinated or jailed and tortured. Armed strugglg
became the only road to survival; this developed
spontaneously in some regions or under the direction of
local cadres in others. Full-scale, coordinated resistance
began with the formation of the National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam in December 1960, which was
ship of democratic and progressive organizations in the ' post-Geneva period is a lengthy report on the activities
South. of the so-called Saigon Military Mission, headed by Col.
In the U.S. version, which the American press rarely Lansdale of the CIA. Ostensibly written by anonymous
challenged (except to give a partially true picture as members of the group, there is no doubt that the report
Diern neared his end in 1963), the Saigon puppets were which eulogizes Lansdale was largely his doing. L ans-
treatedas the legitimates rulers, threatened by subversive. dale's-activities were described in. fiction by Graham
agents acting on behalf of Hanoi. In essence, according Greene, in "The Quiet American." Lansdale's chauvin-
to Washington, in the late 1950s the U.S. was not ism and Callousness might also be compared to the comic
intervening in .Vietnam while "foreign aggression" was strip character, Steve Canyon, like Lansdale an Air Force
carried otrt? by Vietnamese. - coloneb_
Unfortunately the press has only published a small
amount of material from the Pentagon study on the
period following the Geneva settlement. However, there
As sufficient information from the Pentagon report to
idemonstrate that Washington consciously and deliberate
ly was trying to crush the revolution in Vietnam and
that virtually every public statement was-nothing but a
tissue of lies designed-to conceal U.S. activities from the
American people.
At various stages the U.S. and its apologists have
blown hot and cold about the Geneva agreements. At
the conference itself the chief U.S. delegate,. W'Jalter
Bedell Smith, pledged that the U.S. would not upset
C.9ynt i;.nte d
them by force. Officials L itro edhfrggoReJeaseo2003/12/02: CIA-RDP75-00001R000100020038-4
ambiguous, hardly concealing their dissatisfaction. Dis-
satisfied . they well might be, for Bedell Smith's initial