CIA GOES CASUAL
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP75-00001R000100020101-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
November 17, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 6, 2000
Sequence Number:
101
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 9, 1970
Content Type:
NSPR
File:
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Body:
FOIAb3b
Approved For Release 2UMMSY- R P75-00001
9 Mar 1970
Fit' Marilyn Berger was secretory of stile and his brother The U.S. started arming and train-
By Sl11(1lJCV in the Mco tribesmen as early as
1C1\'~, 1\" (jl 011111 C ACC S 1
(lent
The popular image of the CIA oper- a relatively free hand, and in Laos, it 1060. Yet it was the recent disclo-;ure
ative usually comes straight from the ? tough tribesmen with a particular
movies: a slightly soiled trench coat, a' and recruit local agents.
turned-up collar sunglasses. But in It was in 1957 that the agency grudge against the North Vietnamese,
Laos. at least, the reality is apt to be started exerting noticeable influence on ..that helped trigger the current uproar
less James Bond and more a clean-cut the political affairs of that perennially against U.S. activities in Laos. Many..
fellow in a sport shirt. unsettled country. In an effort to dis- of the 1,040 Americans admitted to be
For years now, the Central Intelli- pel the apathy, dissension and lack of working in Laos scene reportedly are
ence Agency has played a covert role' 0 r g a n i z a t i o n among the non-, with the tribal army.
Communist Lato, the CIA apparently, The army is headed by Maj. Gen.
in the twilight war of Laos. (Some call ? helped organize the Committee for the Vang Pao, a Laotian military com% .
it a nonwar in a noncountry.) For Defense of National Interests. .''he ??mander . in northeastern Laos who,
years, the agency's undercover activity committee described itself as. a 'mass keeps his people in line by force of
has been known, but its role has patriotic organization, rather than a leadership and also b having one wife
political party, which. favored civil by
somewhat changed. service reforms and a "hard" liner for each of the four tribal areas. The
In the more free-wheeling days, :against the Communist Iathct Lao. Meos have been successful in their
there was the chance to set up strong- ~
men, polarize political forces and even The C o m m u n i s t sI considered battles beyond any expectation and,
fill have. become a significant .thorn in the..
nllow, , up money the e bags buy votes. Butt members "lackeys" to American inter side of Hanoi. It is believed that tl:e:
now, CIA, through its agents in. gists, and it appeared that the organiza-;North Vietnamese have made elimina
their sport shirts, apparently is train-~,I:1tion's dependence on the CIA 'ulti-'tion of Vang Pao and his tribesmen'.
tringibesm m and equipping an army of 'Meo, I...mately lent some truth to that. one of the goals in their current Lacer
en.
The fact that the "spies," or . The committee became the step- tian offensive.
"spooks" as they are semi-affection- ladder for a future Laotian leader who>'-/`flee CIA and how it grew in Laos is,..
ately called in government lingo, are . was so closely. tied to the CIA that he n an ironic way, almost-a success.,
was known to its agents as "our boy.", story which runs from the error of:
that that might in n be e expected training an an to army, fall a to job the . .':,`That leader was Phourni Nosavan. trying to set up a western-type army
th:
Pentagon, is not entirely sinister. Ever ? Phoumi was, by all reports, a patriot, with a military strong man in Phoumi
since the signing of the Geneva accords j; who genuinely sought to develop the Nosavan to the arming of a highly able
in 1962, the U.S. has sought to main.. .. country, but he was not above accept.,' guerrilla warrior,. yang Po. What is-.
fin the fiction that is abiding by the',. r.I ing huge sums from -a Phoumi was so valuable f that happening in Laos
what .should have been'
rules, and that means keeping out s .
American troops. The last four Presi- ! '?, rigged the 7960 election in his favor: done 1n Vie
dents felt that the accords, which the I, ? If Laotian politics were confused,,: ti .
U.S. accuses Hanoi bf being the first to ''there was something of a match withisi
violate, could best be restored it. ap the American diplomatic community;,
prances, at least, were observed.,; in Laos. The ambassador was never.,
sure that .lie was in charge of his Own
Those within the government
r
a
e mission, and in many cases, was, sure
are sympathetic to that view are
-
that he was not. The CIA was forever;;;
deeply concerned about
the
current
''
pushing for greater nctivism. Its agents.
congressional uproar over over
U.S. in-
,z
"
free-wheeled it," in the words of ono
,vulvcnrent in 1-4108. They say that con-I '
gressional lenders, as well a:; tl-e; informed source., And' cngineero'd a.;
b
mem
ers of the Senate and House coup. And then another . One six .
committees dealing with the CIA,'', months later.
h
d
. uouuu
a
begun to Count On the r a w
have known for years what was going CIA, which had chosen him over Sou-''
on in Laos. They say that the activity vanna 'Phouma. But just when Phoumi , ,., t?? r~ 1;
was funneled through the CIA not tat
l
rea
ly needed help, the CIA began feel.
keep it secret from the'' American; ing a clampdown ordered by President'
;;. people but rather ' to preserve the,Kennedy because of the Bay, of Pigs
necessary facade for ' international;' fiasco.. In Laos, where Winthrop Brown
diplomacy. ;a
A
b
s
m
assador, the CIA was forced
Of course, it was not `only for tlid 4o argue its cases . through- channels.'
sake of appearances that the CIA did! ',QEiicials say that.tho' ruins h
the job in the old days. In the Dulles-' , t.-,;ht over sioo~ ..: ,,? ,,.?,,,ry . ? .
' roetllae ern. when John FosWt Dullosj
Apprnv r?I Fnr Release 2nnn/nr%/1 A ? f .1A-PnP75:nnnn1 R000"n00901 01