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Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 A WOQ96 >' FOIAb3b U.S. Mti1)1MCOVE3 ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY: A SURVEY [Article by Col. F. Sergeyev: "From the History of U. S. Covert Intelligence Activity Against the Soviet Union"; Moscow, Voyenno- Istoricheskiy Zhurnal (Military-Historical Journal), Russian, June 1969, pp 119-126 CPYRGHT The subversive activity of American intelligence against our country began literally with the first days of the Great October Socialist Revolution and has not ceased during any of the stages of the half-century history of the Soviet government. There were periods of maximum activity, time periods of a known decline caused by the various international and internal condi- tions, but for the U. S. imperialist circles, the Soviet-Union has always remained the main opponent, and for their intelli- gence agencies: "Object No. 1". Always, except perhaps the first post-revolutionary years, the U. S. has been confronted with the problem of staffing the anti-Soviet spy network. The first period, having been characterized by the maximum activity, and having had a blatant, adventuristic and aggressive nature, was associated with the nonrecognition ofbthe victory of the proletarian revolution and the attempt to suppress it quickly. Long before the beginning of the armed intervention, the Civil War and the economic blockade, the U. S., relying on the far- flung network of its legal representatives [See Note 1 - Appen- dix], still accredited in Tsarist Russia, utilizing the methods and means from the intelligence arsenal (the recruitment of agents, the secret dispatching of emissaries and contact men, the illegal supplying with arms, money, false documents and so forth) attempted to disrupt the new social structure from within. They organized rebellions, strikes, mutinies, and acts of terror- ism with the aid of the monarchic, bourgeois-landowner, kulak and other anti-Bolshevik forces. These sources, having proved the most favorable for the recruitment of agents in the first post- revolutionary years, willingly provided staffs for the diversionar Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT and espionage activity. It is natural that the American intel- ligence, having felt itself free in Tsarist Russia, did not ex- perience any particular difficulty in planting agents in the territory of the young Soviet republic and readily involved, in the network of its activity, a considerable number of persons who were hostile to the new society. Ambassador Francis and other American diplomats-intelli- gence agents immediately after the October Revolution, with the knowledge, approval and under instruction of the U. S. President, Mr. Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing, utilizing their old secret contacts, launched extensive recruitment work among the Russian officers and industrialists. Francis, his aides and the spy ring recruited by him created, armed and financed the Kaledin counterrevolutionary plot. On 10 December 1917, in a note con- cerning relations with the Soviet power, the U. S. Secretary of State Lansing suggested the establishment in Russia of a regime of military dictatorship and that the Kaledin rebellion be sup- ported for this purpose. The suggestion was accepted quickly and willingly. Within 2 days, the U. S. ambassador in London, Mr. Page, received a personal instruction from Wilson "to organ- ize all-out aid to General Kaledin in the setting up of a mili- tary dictatorship". At the end of 1917, Francis attempted to send secretly to Rostov (to the Kaledin supporters) 80 motor vehicles from those that had been shipped from the U. S. for the Provisional Government. From Yassy., the American officers Anderson and Parkins and the recruited Russian officers Kolpash- nikov and Verblyunskiy shipped a trainload of motor vehicles dis- guised as a Red Cross train [See Note 2 - Appendix]. In 1918, an agent of American intelligence, Barry, the former deputy chairman and treasurer of the Russian-American Trading Office in Tsarist Russia, clandestinely assembled in Moscow a detachment of 1500 men for movement to the Don River to serve under General Alekseyev [See Note 3 - Appendix]. In the conspiracy arranged by the British agent Lockhart, where "all the intelligence activities of the imperialist powers were intertwined" [See Note 4], those who participated included Ambassador Francis and Consul Pull, U. S. agent-resident D. Kolomatiano, the trade attache and the commissioners of the American firms in Russia. Recruiting a number of military spec- ialists, having worked in the central establishments of the re- cently formed Red Army, they regularly received copious classi- fied information from them [See Note 5]. The Kolomatiano spy ring, having operated in various cities of Russia, consisted of 32 persons. The recruitment of spies in Soviet Russia in 1918 was also the job of the American agent E. Sisson, a "representative Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT of the U. S. Committee of Social Information"; a pastor of the Protestant Missionary Church, J. Albert Syons, himself the res- ident agent of American intelligence, having set up in Petrograd an espionage group of 50 persons; the famous espionage organizer, U. Bullit, and others. The headquarters of the interventionist staff of General Graves was assigned 15 officer-agents headed by Col. R. L. Eichelberg. Along with the collection of infor- mation, they planted agents "for the future" in the regions of Siberia and the Far East. Such are the facts, now openly confirmed py the western historians. A professor at Toronto University, L. Strakhovsky, having served in the first world war in the tsarist army, and then in the ranks of the interventionists in the North of Russia, even generalizes: ..."President Wilson and Col. House (close advisor to Wilson, director of the U. S. intelligence service in Europe - F. S.) built their policy and formed public opinion in respect to Russia chiefly on the basis of the information re- ceived from the unofficial (read covert - F. S.) sources..." [See Note 6]. The crushing of the intervention and the victory of the revolutionary forces in the Civil War forced the U. S. to plan the subversive activity for a prolonged period under peacetime conditions. The strategic goal of American imperialism still remained the same--the overthrow of Soviet power. But the per- iod of direct armed plots had passed. The U. S. intelligence directed its efforts toward the employment of all possible con- cessions, missions, commercial firms for the penetration of agents into our country. Particularly convenient in this re- spect was the "American Aid Administration" (AAA), having had many years' experience in collaborating with intelligence acti- vity. From the time of the first World War, the AAA was headed by Herbert Hoover, a forceful opponent of Bolshevism, who later became U. S. president. Even during the years when the AAA was operating in the countries bordering with Soviet Russia, Col. House insisted in front of Wilson and Lansing on the necessity of planting a far-flung espionage network in these countries for gathering data on their economic and military potential. Considering that the AAA was an excellent cover for the open penetration of American spies into foreign countries, House sug- gested the recruiting from the army of a group of officers and, in the guise of civil servants, enlisting them in the AAA staff [See Note 7]. Among the candidates for conducting the politi- cal intelligence, even at that time, Allen Dulles, Lithhow Osborni and Norman Arthur [See Note 8] had been appointed. According to incomplete official data, 903 persons were engaged in the AAA missions in Europe. Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT In the European countries, the experience gained in or- ganizing an intelligence network through the AAA was widely utilized in 1921 in Soviet Russia, when the country was afflicted with an unprecedented drought, leading to the total loss of grain crops and to severe starvation in 16 guberniyas (particularly in the Volga region) with a population of over 30,000,000. At that time, the Soviet government allowed the AAA to extend aid in the form of provisions to the population in the starving guberniyas of the RSFSR. However, the AAA was engaged chiefly with espion- age-subversive activity. There arrived once again in Russia, but as an AAA representative, the same William Bullit, who later (as is known) became U. S. ambassador to the USSR. He was accom- panied by Allen Dulles, the future director of the CIA, and Col. William Haskell, later to become director of counter-intel- ligence operations in the American army. The nucleus of the ex- tensive AAA apparatus in our country was formed by 300 Americans, most of them professional intelligence agents. Those who sup- ported the network (and there were several thousand of them) were recruited chiefly from the Russian citizenry with a hostile attitude toward the revolution. In addition to the center lo- cated in Moscow, as early as October 1921, the AAA had its rep- resentatives in 37 cities of Soviet Russia, including Petrograd (Leningrad), Saratov, Astrakhan, and Samara. Utilizing the privilege of unrestricted travel about the country for distribu- ting supplies, the agents who had been incorporated into the AAA staff, launched on a wide scale the military, economic and polit- ical espionage work and recruitment activity. The period of the AAA's functioning, of varipus foreign concessions and domestic private trading firms should be consid- ered as the last, most favorable period for the U. S. intelligence network in our country. The source of strength for the American intelligence was composed of the NEP (New Economic Policy), kulak and White Bandit elements. A considerable reserve was also pro- vided by the extensive White emigration, all kinds of foreign emigrant unions and organizations having provided agents for illegal transfer to the USSR. The lack of diplomatic, commercial and other official channels of access to the Soviet Union (the U. S. recognized the USSR in 1933) made the operation of American intelligence difficult. It was compelled to set up legal, quasi-legal and illegal centers in the adjoining countries, chiefly in those where the White Russian emigrants had concentrated. Such focal points were Warsaw, Riga, Tallin, Helsinki, Kaunas, Harbin, Istanbul and also the border railway stations, where we broke up the centers, support and secret rendezvous points of various imperialist intelligence services that had collaborated with one another. Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT For example, from Manchuria, the Americans conducted intelligence operations against the Soviet Far East. The U. S. intelligence center in Riga was engaged in the selection and smuggling of agents through the northern and western Soviet frontiers. The American, S. Rees, who had worked at this cen- ter over a number of years, formed the espionage-saboteur groups for illegal entry into the USSR. Prior to the October Revolution, Rees had lived for some time in Russia. In the civil war years, under orders from American intelligence, he entered our country under the name of Maxim Galinskiy and was then re-assigned to Riga. The American agents L. Henderson and G. Kennan, having been considered the "foremost special- ists on Soviet Russia" [See Note 9] waged active anti-Soviet activity from the Baltic territory. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U. S. and the USSR in 1933, the directors of the Russian branch of American intelligence transferred the main center of their activity from the Baltic region'to the USSR, but the spy centers in Riga and other adjoining countries were retained. The intelligence system also strove to employ American special- ists, representatives of commercial trading firms, correspondents and so forth who had travelled to the Soviet Union. The most difficult time now set in for planting the spy network, as is admitted by A. Dulles, L. Farago and other authors of books on American intelligence [See Note 10]. This was the period of the socialist transformation of the USSR, the develop- ment of a permanent basis for the development of socialist re- lations, the strengthening of Soviet patriotism and the eleva- tion of the defensive might of the country, standing on the brink of a decisive struggle with fascism. In proportion to the suc- cessful building of socialism in the USSR, the American and all the other imperialist intelligence services were deprived of a social base in our country. The liquidation of the exploitative classes, the strengthening of the moral-political unity of the Soviet people restricted greatly the possibilities of the recruit-} ing activity and complicated the planting of a spy network. In the years of the Second World War, especially after the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, Japan and Germany naturally became the chief opponents and targets for the U. S. intelli- gence activities. As is known, however, even in these and later years, in the period of cooperative relations with the USSR, American intelligence not only retained but also expanded the orientation dating from the time of the October Revolution, i.e. the anti-Soviet activity. The U. S. military missions stationed in the USSR were staffed as a rule with trained intelligence agents, "specialists on Russia". They, just as the agents who Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R0001000400#"d Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT had been operating under the guise of employees of the U. S. diplomatic representatives, applied their efforts to recruit operators in our country. As is known, the war caused the uprooting of great masses of people. Many of the Soviet citizens, having been captured or forcibly transported by the Hitlerites to the work camps of occupied Western Europe, following the war found themselves in territory under U. S. authority. American intelligence counted on utilizing this new milieu, which knew (in distinction from the White Russian emigrants) the contemporary conditions of living, culture and customs of the Soviet land, for the recruit- ment of agents. The OSS (Office of Strategic Services) developed and im- plemented a complete system of holding the maximum number of former Soviet POWs and DPs (displaced persons) who were detained in areas occupied by the Americans. The lists of the prisoners who were located at the camps were shuffled around in every con- ceivable way, falsified, complicating the work of the represen- tatives of the Soviet command in repatriating our citizens. U.S. intelligence attempted to influence the inhabitants at the camps through informers, having served Fascist Germany and then having headed up the anti-Soviet nationalist organizations of refugees. In the postwar period, the recruitment of agents from among the displaced persons became the principal trend in the activity of American intelligence. The U. S. hired agents chiefly in West Germany but also in Japan, in the U. S. itself, and in Latin America--everywhere that the American occupation forces had scattered the Soviet citizens who were in bondage. The Americans organized a network of special schools and centers for training agents for their intelligence system in Munich, Frankfurt-am-Main and in the nearby cities: Kaufbeyren, Ffissen, Kempten, Strasburg, Starnburg, and Bad Hamburg. The most promising agents, chosen for the accomplishment of espec- ially important assignments, after verification and training in Western Europe, were sent overseas for taking a course involving a more complex program [See Note 11]. The principal goal which the U. S. attained, i.e. of infiltrating its recent ally as quickly as possible by planting an intelligence network, induced her to employ the methods of the investigatory services of Hitlerite Germany. Former Nazi agents willingly offered their services, knowledge and even their secret connections in the hope of gaining pardon from the war crimes which they had committed. Many of them became con- sultants and even advisors to the Americans. The most typical Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R0001000400 m- friuej Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT figure in this sense was the Hitlerite general, Gehlen, the future director of West German intelligence. Right after the war, he was assigned the role of the primary activist in the American- German intelligence organization. Basically, it was he who es- tablished the methods and the modus operandi with the new system in the plan for mass action [See Note 12]. In this manner, the experience and staffs of Fascist Germany's intelligence exerted a considerable influence on the formation of American viewpoints on the organization of their intelligence system. Essentially, the program for the training of agents was designed for absolutely "raw material" (intelligence data). In the training of the secret agents, use was made of the so-called "practical system of training", in which theory occupies a min- imal role and the principal attention is relegated to practice [See Note 13]. In a short period of time, the agent is given a general concept of the nature and value of all possible informa- tion. This is followed by an actual study of the collection techniques and the simplest procedure for processing the in- telligence data. The agents are trained in how to conduct ob- servations during ordinary trips by railway, on bike excursions, plane flights, etc. and are instilled with the idea of atten- tiveness [See Note 14]. Certain of the most reliable agents were trained for acts of sabotage [See Note 15]. The training course also included the method of infiltra- ting agents into the USSR. The system was prepared chiefly for entry by illegal means. The study of the theoretical course in the schools was accompanied by practical exercises at airports, training grounds, and in woods--i.e. under those conditions similar to those under which an agent would have to operate after gaining entry. Be- fore graduation, all the agents have to pass verifying tests. They are examined as to their knowledge of using a radio set, codes, cryptography, reading maps and plans, employing methods of self-defense, and handling weapons. The agent's training is completed by furnishing him with false documents--a passport, military and commercial identification cards, and with various references [See Note 16]. The teachers and instructors at the intelligence-saboteur schools were chiefly Americans--official intelligence staff mem- bers fluent in Russian. They usually served under aliases [See Note 17]. Several Russian emigrants associated for a long time with American intelligence, who had been heads of foreign anti- Soviet organizations, also taught at the schools. The bourgeois-nationalistic unions and organizations of various political shades collaborated closely with American Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R0001000400462-3n Tnue 9 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT intelligence. The most help to it was extended by the so-called "National Labor Union" (NLU), created in 1930 by the merger of the most reactionary elements of the White emigrants. In the 1930s, the NLU was financed by the German and Japanese intelli- gence systems, and after the war became dependent on U. S. in- telligence [See Note 19]. For the liaison with American intel- ligence, there was set up in the NLU the so-called "closed sec- tor", managed by special NLU schools [See Note 20]. In addition to the NLU, American intelligence utilized the new emigrant organizations which had sprung up in the 1950s: "Central Union of Political Emigrants" (CUPE) and the "Union of Struggling for Liberation of Russian People" (USLRP). With the U. S. intelligence, there also cooperated actively all possible nationalistic formations--ranging from the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) to the Baltic groups. Representatives of the reactionary Ukrainian emigrants to the U. S. openly admit that the members of their organizations are serving the purposes of the struggle against the socialist structure and are being used actively in espionage-sabotage ac- tivity [See Note 22]. The White Russian nationalists, having a number of organizations at their disposal (the "White Russian Nationalist Council" and others), have also used U. S. financial support [See Note 231. Replacements to the staffs for spy acti- vity in the USSR territory were also drawn from the emigrant organizations of Lithuanian, Estonian, Latvian, and Caucasian nationalists [See Note 214]. However, the joint efforts of American intelligence and of all possible emigrant nationalist organizations did not bear the anticipated fruit. They did not succeed in rallying the "new emigrants", or in creating a permanent anti-Soviet base for the recruitment of agents. This is explained chiefly in terms of the social difference of this milieu as compared with the'old post- revolutionary emigrants. As many facts will confirm, the very concept of employing displaced persons was not based on the irreconcilable contradictions of these people with the Soviet structure, but on fear or even on the fear of revenge for the crimes against the homeland perpetrated by them during the years of the Soviet occupation. Many of those who were recruited carefully concealed from the recruiters their intent to return to the homeland, come what may. The recruiters also overlooked such a powerful psychologi- cal factor as the victory of the Soviet Union in the war, and its ever-increasing influence on even the most weak-spirited among the DPs. Among those recruited, there were many who, once they reached USSR territory, quickly gave themselves up. Others Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 oont3nued Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT gnored their obligations to intelligence work and broke all con- ections with it. The most reliable were those agents who had ctually committed the most serious crimes against the homeland. series of government measures on the mass rehabilitation of eople having returned from captivity, and also the publication n the subsequent Order of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme oviet concerning the relief from responsibility of persons vol-- ntarily and promptly reporting to the official agencies their ink with foreign intelligence systems [See Note 25], finally de- rived the recruiters from the U. S. of their hope for the so- ailed "new emigration". Only the inveterate Hitlerite lackeys, of counting on forgiveness, continued to collaborate with any f the espionage networks, including the American one. Thus, the huge expenditures of efforts and resources, the xtensive organizational measures, supported by the U. S. govern- ent itself, the allocation for the development and prolonged tilization of the "new Russian emigration"--all these steps roved of no avail. American intelligence was confronted once again with the roblem of finding agents. The attention of the service was con- entrated on all channels linking the country of socialism ith the capitalist world, and on a study of each Soviet citizen rho happened to go abroad on official or personal business. U. S. intelligence has not overlooked and is not overlook- ing any of the possibilities, be it the repatriation of former OWs, re-emigration, or the return of White Russian emigrants' children to the homeland. All such occurrences, associated with the humane resolution of the historically developed tragedy of any given group of persons, became, from the viewpoint of the cynical American recruiter, only a pretext for underhanded in- filtration into our country. It goes without saying that the natural process of the broad development of scientific, social, cultural, commercial, tourist and other mutually advantageous contacts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with the capitalist world, evoked by the actual embodiment of a policy of peaceful coexis- tence of governments with a varying social structure, was eval- uated by American intelligence as a process opening new possi- bilities before it. The illusion developed of the broad possi- bility of acquiring "new human material" for recruitment. The "new human material" is sought by U. S. intelligence among the Soviet citizens travelling abroad, among the tourists, the members of various delegations and specialists on long-term assignments, and finally among the permanent staff of the Soviet Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 continued Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT diplomatic representatives, as well as among the Soviet troops displaced beyond the borders of the USSR. In this manner, in the past decades, American intelligence (in spite of the tempestuous development of the technical and other means for revealing the USSR military-economic potential), not only has not weakened but on the contrary, has even inten- sified its efforts in the direction which is most important and most difficult for it, i.e. the quest for staffs of reliable agents. The views of Americans regarding intelligence operations are expressed in numerous published works. The famed American agent, Prof. Sh. Kent, speaking of the special importance of the illegal intelligence activity for the acquisition of the most valuable, difficultly accessible information, considers the intelligence method the decisive means for surmounting the obstacles erected by governments around their secrets [See Note 26]. The emphasis on the predominant role of intelligence act- ivity pursues the purpose of avoiding the risk of underestimat- ing the secret intelligence service. Indeed, this purpose is assiduously concealed in the open publications by discussions about the tremendous growth of the legally collected, stored and processed information, and concerning the reduction in the relative share of information arriving from illegal sources. Those who resorted to such conscious disorientation in their writings included D. Petti, R. Hilsman, A. Dulles, E. Zaharias, U. MacGovern, L. Farago and other authors. They assert that 80 percent (and according to individual estimates, up to 90 per- cent) of the data is drawn by U. S. intelligence from open sources: "newspapers, books, scientific and technical publications, offi- cial government reports, radio- and TV-transmissions" [See Note 27]. However, a statistical comparison still does not provide a proper concept of the actual role of any. given techniques in intelligence. As was indicated above, the leaders of the U. S. intelli- gence agencies consider that, notwithstanding the difficulties with which the organization of a spy network is associated, it is specifically by the intelligence channels that there can be acquired the hard data of interest to the American government bout the knotty problems of nuclear armament and the strategic plans of the USSR and of other participating member nations of he Warsaw Pact. Evidence of this can be provided by the known ase of the agent of American and British intelligence, Penkovsky, eviewed in 1963 by the Military Tribunal and the USSR Supreme ourt. The Soviet people have the right to know positively that merican intelligence under modern conditions is attempting to Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 Continued Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT combine all its efforts into a unified system, to blend both the legal and the illegal practices directed toward the revelation of the Soviet military-economic capability. For the solution of this problem, the U. S. is not sparing any resources or forces, and is studying all aspects of USSR domestic and foreign policy attentively [See Note 28]. Also, as the practice indicates, in spite of the difficulty in recruiting agents in the USSR, it would be a major error to assume that the opponent will cease in its efforts at cultivating agents in our country. "Of course, even in the period of formation of the new communist relation- ships," said the Chairman of the Committee on State Security (KGB) under the USSR Soviet of Ministers, Yu. V. Andropov in his lecture devoted to the 50th anniversary of the Soviet state security agencies, "one could dig up isolated examples of persons, who owing to one reason or another of a personal nature, or to the influence of hostile propaganda from abroad, prove to be a favorable target for enemy intelligence activities" [See Note 29]. Therefore, only the extreme alertness of the Soviet people, the total support extended to the USSR state security agencies by the entire population, will be able to block reliably the path of enemy spies into our country. Footnotes [1] In addition to the embassy and consulate located in Petrograd, there were various general consulates, consulates and agen- cies of the U. S. in Moscow, Irkutsk, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Vladivostok, Omsk, Tomsk, Yekaterinburg, Chita, Samara, Novo- cherkassk, Tashkent, and Tiflis. In addition, there were special organizations (the Russian-American Trading Office, Society for Friendship Between Russia and America, the Rus- sian branch of the Committee on Social Information), and every possible kind of American mission: military, Red Cross, YMCA and others. [2] Documents have been printed in the Soviet press unmasking the American spies and their agents: a telegram from the head of the American Red Cross mission to Yassy written by Col. Anderson to Col. Kolpashnikov concerning the receipt by the U. S. ambassador Francis of 100,000 rubles for send- ing a train to Rostov, a false statement signed by Francis to the effect that the train allegedly was "travelling from Petrograd to Yassy", and others. '('Izvestiya, 9 December 1917) [3] This plot was revealed by the All-Russian Extraordinary Com- mission for Combatting Counterrevolution and Espionage. A Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 continued Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 .CPYRGHT Moscow revolutionary tribunal established that, with the help of Barry and his agents, the American Embassy provided the recruits with arms, money, forged documents, and then illegally assigned these persons to the Don region (Izvestiya, 28 April 1918, and 3 January 1919). [4] History of CPSU ((Communist Party of the Soviet Union), p. 291, Moscow, 1962. C5] Kolomatiano's agents served "in responsible positions in the Soviet establishments, delivering to their confederates the required information. For example, Yevgeniy Golitsyn worked in three establishments of the military department. General Zagorskiy and Fride also served the confederates. All these persons conscientiously elucidated the condition of the army". (Izvestiya, 6 November 1918). [6] Strakhovsky, L., American Opinion About Russia, 1917-1920. p. 121, Toronto University Press, 1961. 17] Refer to Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1919. The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 1, pp. 194-196. [8] Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1919. The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 1, pp. 199-200. [9] Byukar (Buccard), A., The Truth About the American Diplomats. Translated from the English, pp. 20-32, Moscow, 1949. [10] See e.g., Allen Dulles, Craft of Intelligence, p. 59, New York, 1963. [11] R. P. Moroz, who gave himself up, asserted that, after hav- ing been recruited by the Americans in West Germany, he was sent to Washington for training in an intelligence school. K. N. Kukk and Kh. Toomla, recruited in Sweden, before being brought to Estonia, studied for 8 months in the U. S. in two schools near Washington. [12] Gehlen's biographers assert that up to the time of the de- feat of Nazi Germany, he was able to retain in his hands a core of the intelligence service and its essential documen- tation. In 1945, he possessed the archives of a spy net- work in Eastern Europe and also had custody of intelli- gence data on the Soviet Union, collected over many years, and which he turned over to the Americans. "...the intel- ligence information provided by Gehlen," testifies J. Joesten, "made a deep impression on the Americans, especially the fact that a significant part of Gehlen's intelligence ap- paratus within USSR territory had been preserved and could Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R00010004004W63nueCl 13 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT be utilized." (A. Tully, CIA- . The Inside Story. New York, 1962, p. 157; J. Joesten, Im Dieftste des Misstrauens (In the Service of Misturst), p. 172, Munich, 1964. [13] Farago, L., War of Wits. p. 195, New York, 1954. [14] For example, the American intelligence agent Yu. A. Khramtsov indicated the result: "In working out the assignment, Kor- ney, the director of the intelligence school, recommended the following methods of its fulfillment: a) personal ob- servation. For this purpose, I was provided with eight- power binoculars and a topographic map of the region of interest to the Americans. It was necessary to conduct the observations from a railway car window, and to travel repeatedly over a nearby section of the railroad at various times; b) eavesdropping. In the area of interest to the Americans, I was to ride in the workers' railway cars in the hope that someone would chat about the nature of the work; c) the formation of acquaintances among the young people working on the hypothetical project; and d) the furtive photographing of everything that might prove of interest for intelligence." 15] Ye. G. Golubev, an American intelligence agent, told the court: "We were trained in the means and methods of accom- plishing acts of sabotage. We were trained to employ Bickford's (safety) fuse--a detonator, TNT blasting caps, an incendiary mixture in the form of a plastic mass, and .also an electrical demolition device. Near the West German city of Lansberg, an American instructor conducted several practical exercises with us: he demonstrated how to blow up masts and pillars, and how to use thermite. In the in- telligence school, we were shown a special film on the technique of burning military-industrial facilities and administrative buildings". 16] Forged documents were considered suitable only for the first period of sojourn in a country. Therefore, in the agents' instructions, it was recommended: "Do not delay in acquiring original Soviet documents". Thus, A. V. LakhnQ, A. N. Makov, S. I. Gorbunov, and D. N. Remiga, having illeg- ally infiltrated the USSR, had the task of obtaining origi- nal Soviet papers by any means, and, having replaced them with forged ones, were to set up bases in Kiev and Odessa. Cases are also known where the agents were immediately pro- vided with original passports containing a cleverly substi- tuted photograph. Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 "Oftinuea Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT [17] Thus, the leading instructors at the U. S. intelligence schools were Major Ronald Otto Bollenbach ("Steve"; "Pepper Jim") having worked from 1946-1947, as an aide to the U. S. military-naval attache in Moscow; Captain Holiday ("Igor'" Sergeyevich"); and Harold Irving Fidler ("Andrey"), having visited the USSR three times as a diplomatic courier. [18] For instance, in a sophisticated type of intelligence school in the town of Bad-Wiese [sp.?] (near Munich), in- struction was given by the White Russian emigrant, G. S. Okolovich, having served during the war years in Nazi counterintelligence in the temporarily occupied Soviet territory. After the war, Okolovich headed up an anti- Soviet emigrant organization. [19] In 1953, the U. S. government allocated $1,000,000 to sup= port the NLU. [20] N. I. Yakuta and M. P. Kudryavtsev, who gave themselves up to Soviet authorities, asserted that before being brought to the USSR, they went through special training in an NLU school situated at Bad-Homburg, wherein from the outset, the connection of the school with intelligence was concealed from them in every way. Within the USSR territory, they were to function only in the name of the NLU, because the "instructors assumed that the Soviet citizens would more readily seek contact with the NLU than with American in- telligence". [21] In May of 1951, a group of parachutist-agents was dropped in the Ukraine. This group was composed of four men headed by an emissary of the "restricted center" of the OUN (Or- ganization of. Ukrainian Nationalists), Okhrimovich. Their mission was to establish regular contact with the U. S. intelligence center and to create conditions-for the re- ception of new spy groups, having been prepared by the Americans in conjunction with the exiled Ukrainian nation- alists. [22] See the speech given by Dervinskiy in the House of Repre- sentatives ("Congressional Record", No. 11, p. 14796, 1966.) [23] The U. S. intelligence agent, I. A. 'ilistovich, illegally brought to the territory of Byelorussian SSR, posed as an emissary of the White Russian nationalist organizations, but all of his training and movement were accomplished under the supervision of American instructors. [24] For example, Ozolin'sh, who had clandestinely entered the USSR, went through training in a Latvian group, having Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R00010004GO4 . Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3 CPYRGHT functioned permanently within the framework of one of the U. S. intelligence schools. L. P. Brombergs was brought to the USSR in 1954 with-the assignment of setting up a spy center in Latvian SSR, utilizing his past associa- tions among the local bourgeois nationalists. During the war years, he had been a staff member of the Nazi police in Riga, and then became an instructor at an American in- telligence school. For the initiation of the work among the Latvian nationalists, U. S. intelligence paid Brombergs 1450,000 Soviet rubles. [25] By the Order of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 13 January 1960, the following amendment is provided to the Law concerning criminal responsibility for crimes against the state "A USSR citizen, having been recruited by foreign intelligence for conducting hostile activity against the USSR, is not subject to criminal liability, if in the fulfillment of the criminal assignment received by him, he has not performed any acts and has voluntarily reported to the official agencies his connection with foreign intelligence" (see Vedomosti Verkhovno o Soveta SSR [Reports of USSR Supreme Soviet j, No. 3, l9 0 (9b7, p. 24)). [26] Kent, Sh., Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, p. VIII. [27] Dulles, A., Op. Cit., p. 55. [28] L. Farago asserts that the orientation and actual content of intelligence work are established by the so-called "gen- eral plan of espionage", which is being developed according to a model of the operating plans of the active armies. The plan is formulated on world-wide scales and is so de- tailed that it considers each phase and aspects in the life of individual countries. L. Farago, Op. cit., p. 175. [29] Pravda, 21 December 1967. Signed to press: 23,May 1969 6268 CSO: 1855-D Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100040046-3