HOTTEST ROLE IN THE COLD WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100060055-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: September 1, 1957
• Content Type: NSPR

PM U tit ?
COLD
Ever since lie served U.S. Army Intelligence in
World War 11 , Euno Ilobhing has been a fascinated
student of intelligence organizations and their metlo-
ods. This interest was particularly :purred when,
after the war, he had the opportunity to interrogate
the leading members of Hitler's spy system. His
career since the war has taken him into numerous
areas ridden with international intrigue; be was the
editor of Die Neue Zeitung, the U.S. military gov.
ernment German-language newspaper, when it was
published in postwar Perlin, and lie has beat a
news correspondent both abroad and in Washington
I'm so good that I could suraggcr.
I knoxw things that tvozrld make you stagger.
Tun 90 per cent cloak ... and 10 per cent dagger.
Boo-boo, baby, I'm a spy.
INCEthe days in World War 11 when a puckish Istanbul orchestra
played this song every time an unmistakably American intelligence
Nicer entered its cafe, the U.S. intelligence business has shucked any
nd all quixotic romanticism. It is cold and serious big business now,
with upwards of 8,000 people employed by the pre-eminent U.S. intclli-
ence organization, the Central Intelligence Agency. And CIA work,
or all its partaking of many of the monotonous characteristics of corpo-
'ate enterprise, is today the pursuit where an American in peacetime
upremely looks into the soul of others and his own. The CIA man is
lore constantly, closely and tellingly at grips with his Communist oppo-
ite number than any other American. The CIA man may penetrate
hose state secrets the Reds want to hide and he conceals the American
secrets the Reds seek. The CIA man may discreetly disinfect a foreign
political climate poisoned by Red insinuations. Or the CIA man moves
swiftly through foreign political back rooms, to rescue and revive a
friendly government and a friendly people who were on the verge of being
choked by Coriumutist pressure. Where he succeeds, the CIA man gets
no public acclaim, but has the unmatched reward of knowing that he,
in the night, massaged the heart of freedom back to life.
Within the last year, the CIA men have had loaded on them the biggest
ange of responsibility that they have borne in their decade of existence.
The CIA was established in September, 1947, when the lessons of
World War 11 made it apparent that the many disparate intelligence
ctivitics of U.S. government departments needed a center and a head.)
s long as Joseph Stalin ran the U.S.S.R., the East-WVest struggle was
fluff and blatant, noisily black and white. With the advent of Nikita
hrusltchev, it has become a much more subtle proposition. Clandestine
activities in the Stalin era, it seems fair to say, had a vital tactical signifi-
cance. But Khrushchev has inaugurated what may properly be called
An expert's inlimale picture of the U. S.'s growing spy system
and how it scored a decisire vielory over Khrushchev
`the clandestine c ' 'nyUzsdclr Asp j{ /fit t i It a 1 ~' FA
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RDP75-00001 R0001 00060055-1
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