PROS AND CONS ABOUT CIA CHIEF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100100038-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: November 1, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

L..i., .may 1:.,1'x? I
NE17S Approved For Release 2000/08/03 : CIA-RDP75-00001R000.1
E. 496;900
1965
gOV?1 ~ ,
Joseph Krair'..
0
0
-fr"th if
_Alt~ e
CL Cni
Xros and. Cons . out
CPYRG,
ssibilities. This is Adm..Ra- cause it was looking fora good ';'I
WASHINGTON "Things' cussed only five, minutesea r -
have reached the p orn's top priority manager with the confidence
point where: her. Sometit't-es; it seems, his.
point of departur e is the exact Besides; the argument con of Congress.
I'm even beginning to wonder just'
whether the Polaris can posst opposite of, a decision fides, the. important thing for it is at that point precisely
taken. c welfare of the country is to that the shoe pinches. What-
'
bly he a good missile."
S a rca s t with cep the CIA-with its special ever the special requirements
A hic,1, t,f familiarity
sted interest in prolonging of the moment, the case of
i c remarks along
policy questions also. finds ex-
e cold war-from playing ,Adm. Raborn suggests that, in;
pression on the"working level
those lines arm heard almost,
y o large, a role in the policy- `'general, running CIA demands ?
within the CIA.
ever day in the national intel-
raking process. By ? having a some experience in'foreign of-':-
ligence community. The jibes Thoughtful' officials'' com-
irector more versed in hard- fairs, and a capacity of sense
have nothing to do with tire plain that in the final presenta-
are than in policy, the flow 'live analysis and sophisticated"
I
missile which is, of course, an ' lion their most careful work is
f information is 'maintained articulation. } p
badly mangled. Morale has
excellent one. Rather, they are ithout the agency becoming To hunt for managers likely.
apparently sunk in the research
inspired by the performance of dominant influence in, the to inspire the confidence- of
' and analysis sections 'of the
asic decisions. Congress is to have a formula
Adm. William Raborn, the for- :
agency, particularly among the
flier head of the Polaris pro- PE R?H A P S so, but that far more apt to turn up Bab-
group preparing, long-run esti-
gram, as director of the Cen- pologia bears the earmarks of bits than men of nice judg-:
males.
-..i Intelligence Agency. fionalization after the event. ment and a feel for; penetrating
i hey u be quitting, if they
hen the search fora new , analysis..
Like almost everything else
had any place ' to go," one of-\
irector to succeed John Mc-The fact is that the bluff
about the CIA, the remarks
ficial of another agency as-
one was on last winter and and hearty qualities, so much
about Adm. Raborn cannot be
serts.
ring,.. no one was looking for esteemed in both managerial
verified, and verge on gossip.
man with the ability to muf-, and congressional circles are '?
THE, DEFENSE against
'But the gossip is sufficiently
.
le the voice of the agency. On not especially appropriate to.
depends on dis-
high-level and widespread to these charges
e contrary, the administra- the guiding of a complex intel
counting their importance. Tho
merit reporting. The more 'so
or? lair, on Adm. Raborn be-ligence effort.'
starting point of'the agrument
as even the admiral's defenders
do not bother to ' deny t he
charges.
They merely argue that the
attacks are beside the point-
that, in fact, the complaints re-
flect a desirable condition that
works to keep the influence of
the CIA within safe bounds.
Ti-IE,BASIC complaint
about the admiral is that he has
neither training nor flair for
political analysis of develop-
ments abroad. The absence of ?
' grounding apparently shows it-
self most dramatically in the
highest policy councils of the
government.
is that with such sophisticated
veterans of policy - making
about as Sec. of Defense Rob-
ert McNamara, 'See. of State
Dean Rusk and White House
'aids McGeorge Bundy, the.
President is hardly dependent
upon the special insights and
perception of the director of
Furthermore, the case for
Adm. Raborn continues, th e
great mass of activities under-
taken by the CIA are rooted
in technology. They involve, in
particular, new developments
in using them to best advantage
in photography and in conics.
In these meetings Adm. Ra- Like all other large govern-
born is supposed to mispro-; ment agencies, this agency' is
nounee, the names of foreign said to have experienced diffi-
countries, and personalities, culty in digesting the new
consistently. His recommends- technological developments and
lationship to the fact he pre-, .to meet the changing demands
cents. On occasion, apparently,' for. information: '
he has broached, as if the Accord~ingl the need of th'e
were fresAp taQM d dip el f~@n ~Mlltd/Vt he tt
that had been exhaustively fits-.abreast of .:',its .technological
rintetri the November WASUINGTON POST
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the followin sentence is aiaea after
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vAretwo n co umn three above :
'!Ar,d,~ir,~that matter he