INSIGHT AND OUTLOOK ... THE TECHNIQUE OF 'AS IF'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100160047-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: August 6, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

C
WASH1NG1ON PUSi' AND
TIMES HEFULD AUG 6 1965
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 :CIA-RDP75-00001.EQ00100160047-9._..
?
Insight and Quthxk ,
By Joseph Kraft
The Technique oAAs If
THE RECENT WEEK of
secret White House talks on.
,Viet-Nam has been widely
written off as a charade de-
signed t o
provide an ern
a p pearance
of deep de-,
1ibez-stion
for decisions
already . tak-
en. In' fact,
the White
House talks
yielded a ba-
. WITH THAT UGLY pros-
pect exposed, the. Pres-
ident's advisers were ;at last
able to back away from the"i
position they had endorsed'i
so many times before. They
agreed with the President
that it was necessary to
change the scenario.
Though they accepted the,
immediate' military re-
J. I
President Johnson- has were -expressing their quests, they also moved, for
now explicitly broken away doubts on the matter. The the first time really, to open
from a policy that was lead press was just then full of .a number of doors for a set-
stories showing how Pres- tlement in Viet-Nam.
ing to an early ? and direct ident Kennedy had been
military clash with main- trapped by his advisers in The new moves may not
land China. And he did it in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. work. They may not--and
a way that enabled all of. his this would be tragic - be
advisers to go along with, BUT THE REAL art was pushed very long or very'.'
the new policy, _ though/ not to have doubts. The real hard. But for the time being.'
most of them had been lead= art was to communicate the United States is not on '.
;ominen atiogs. As usual, back for at least a. decade.
t h e s e recommendations . A big Asian war, in other
amounted to a deeper, words, was just around the
American military commit-
ment. As usual, the Pres- corner.
ident's chief foreign policy
advisers, McGeorge Bundy
and Dean Rusk, endorsed
he proposals.
For many reasons, how-
er, the President was in-
stinctively suspicious of, the
whole 'approach. His most
sic change colleagues-Richard B. Rus-
in the pace Kraft sell, Clinton P. Anderson, J.
and direction of. American William Fulbright, Everett
'policy in the Far East. M Dirksen Mike Mansfield
;; ing advocates of the old pol-
icy. ?
To understand the
-breadth of the decision, it is
necessary to have a grasp of
the' strategic vie of Asia
held in the highest41itafy
circles. In this "sophisticated
Wand cogent vlewjr,the only
threat to the American posi-
tion in the western. Pacific
comes from Communist Chi-
would carry weight with the ,? By the technique of "as if,"
'President's 'military and po- the President hat been able.
litical advisers. Mr. John to assert the political over
son, and Mr. Johnson alone, the' military .logic;.
~publfehe~s NeAaDwer 8yndlcate
achieved that trick. He did J'01965,
;it by the device 'of posing,
,what, may be called "as if",
He listened carefully to
all. the recommendations.
He then asked his advisers
to consider' the situation, as
na. American superiority in
if all the proposals had
,.been adopted. What would
the other side do'then? .And
whe~e would that leave the
United States?
At one point, in fact, the
think where we will be
where we will , be six
obliged to go in deeper in or-' When the answers to the
der to contain the Chinese. "as if" questions finally::
Virtually all possible propos- came in, the President had
als for negotiations h a v e on hand not only what he
been scotched as signs of , was being asked to do now;"
weakness that would only but also the whole scenario .
the air and in nuclear weap-
ons would make it c.relative-
ly easy to handle China at
present. But ten years from
now it may not' 'be 'so easy.
China, the theoty ? runs,
could then be a real; danger.,
WHILE RARELY, stated,
-this strategic concept has at
i all times been in the back-
ground of American deci-
sions in Viet-Nam. The war
there has been seen as an
.extension of Chinese power.
At every critical juncture;
this country has been
crisis in Viet-Nam. As usual,'- all-out bor-}bing attack on
feed the Chinese appetitie for the future. It was ap-
for conquest.' arent that what the mili-,
The most recent White ' 'ary wanted was: first, a ma
House review began just as.K jor effort to drive the Viet'4
all the previous ones. As Cong ? guerrillas ' out of
usual, there was a military South Viet-Nam; second, an i
is' aloes went out to ex- , in the nicely event or- inter- 7
mine 'the 'situation. As vention by Peking, air raids.,
sual, they came back to on modern military' installs- V