CUBAN INVASION: 3 IN KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION REVIEW '61 FAILURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100250034-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: July 22, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

CPYRGHT
Sanitized. - Appr 'F?1R' se : CIA-
CPYRGHT
-.C an. Invasion '
3in ennedyAdministY-atzon Review '61 F i7tz
, l
Iiy 1'UdI WICKER''. FOIAb b
- . ._..a ze that, t e opera
. special to The NOW York Times .The
the Joint Chief
rima
l
l
p
ry
s
imitatio w
earned thatation could nt b k
nas,oeept covert
WASHINGTON. July 21 .'that there was to be no overt Trinidad had been ruled out. iin an. "open, society," And, acs
United States military par- they selected the Bay of PigsIcpted the advice of "experts'!
flay of Pigs Invasion, pr?ovid d ticipation. as the best of the alternative ``over, his own politicAl doubts;
by former Kennedy Administr - This ' decision,' Mr. Sorensen sites offered without informing the skepticisnt,,'of some aides
tion offioials, agree that .Pre - rote, "led to other restrictions either Kennedy or [Secretary of like Mr, Schlesinger and the
! dent Kennedy's political' mi designed to make the operation Defense] McNamara that they1Open opposition of Senator J. -M
givings about the proje t' more covert 'and our involve tiil, thought Trinidad prefera_ Fulbright of Arkansas.
'niaterialiy reduced whatev r eat more concealed, restric? ble' Mr. Schlesinger wrote that
chances of success it had, I ions that In fact impaired the' Mr. Schlesinger, after writing Mr. Kennedy never saw the
Two of these accounts, lan'smilitaryprospects.",' that it was the President who written. ,-protest of Chester
:Theodore C. Sorensen and A -I Among other-; things, the de-ruled out Trinidad, said . the IBowles, then' Under Secretary,
thur M. Schlesinger' Jr.,. al.)' .ision sharply limited the Joint Chiefs agreed that thelnf Stxj.e and now Ambassador.
agree that the ill-fated inva
mount of ai
Ba
of Pi
i
"
y
s
o l
gs
r support avail
seemed the bet to Indi. Hi th
a-s?ae sadat he him-
of Cuba never :had much chanc ie to the invaders. They had?of the three alternatives, but lself 'was advised by Robert W.
of success o rel
on
added
td
ftl
y
ou
so
ated
y that they still
pre-
"How' could' everybody in I raft piloted by refugees and ferred Trinidad."
volved have thought such ased In Nicaragua. A source involved In the de
,Plan would- succeed?" Mr, Ken "Sinee [President I;en- cision said privately that his
.nedy exclaimed after' it was a edy] was unwilling to , con-rrecoileotion was clear that tine
:over, ac ording toTMr, Soren Grp tran overt operation through IJolnt Chiefs' continuing prefer-
so far off base? ? All hty orensen wrote, he should havekpressed in an official paper. He- Mr orenscri" 1ir"tWt--th
I've nnown better than _to_do bandhned It altogether. as be-; said he could not say whetherjC_I_A?, presented the plan to
____ _ ............ .... r. .."?u _. --- -.- - . - ?.aPau111Ly."
I have been so. stupid, to le Restriction on Landing site
thenigo ahead? ,
"' ] litleal decision against yUVLeU 1u Lnc ??.... ~? ~~e exues to tree
inget? also agree that President at-;interview as having said heathen awn isi, nd from dlctator-
ngciedy's decision to cairoela t meting the landing at Trini-;believed that the invasion plan-(ship, or whether, he was willing
scheduled air strike on the d d, at the foot of the Escam-hers"can be criticized for, Al- t0 liquidate well-laid prepara-
sc
niPirni hed rag of thr. invasion, April ay Mountains, That site has IOiving this chipping away to trans; leave
Cuba free to sub.
b .en selected by the Joint Chiefs ! go on without insisting on- the vent the hemisphere, disband an
]T, 1081, probably was mistaken o Staff, from alto natives whale , impatient
and unnecessary, but .drat it t pre- plan or on cancellation,' army in training for
hail little do with the failure rated by the 1 i?'Y as the Because we were so involvedilnearly a year under miserable'
of the Cuban force. rst likely for succe ti? 'in Seeing it go' ahead,", hG ,af,Gcond1ti6ns, and ? Alive them;
The third account, however, Mr' Sorensen wrote ' tint is quoted as having said; "we:- spread the word that Kennedy'
by Richard T? Bissell Jr., vet', rnldad was "ruled out as being, did not insist on as greet free-''had betrayed ..their attempt to.
the operation' would copspicuous." Mr. Schlesing- clom of action a5 needed." l' depose Castro," ;
B7tates'ets that had th"a damned cod r wrote that Mr. Kennedy con- But the Sorensen and Schies-! Mr. ? Bissell, whb now Ilves:
chance" had. there been stif-; r Bred -the proposed operation lager articles assert that the'.aApJks,.theHattford, Conrt?
:chanct air . support bfor . the! Trinidad too spectacular ? , . invasion play had never had any raised another point in the
Cuban Volunteers. ; I wanted a quiet landing, pref. rhalistic chance to succeed and Evening Star Interview. [The
r lily at night,', that President Kennedy came to exilesl, he said, "were the most
.. Parts of Forthcamiug hooka I he Joint Chiefs then named believe this after the event',
TIr, Soronseri Was Mr, Iiert.l 11 Bay of Pigs as the best) powerful milltary'torcc betwccn Mexico Panama
remaining t when the Cuban volunteer I it was separated by so Assurances that the operations might entirely ave tried l to seize a'hase
;brig rigade was defeated and cap. ri es of swampiron the Esca could succeed without United'
m- in Nicaragua, Honduras or Cua:
;turgid by Fidel Castr0'fi i for?ccsl r y Mountains, and thus it was! Stales military involvement, Mr.I temala; there Is not the slight?1
':After a three-day ? fight. Tir? i n ofor the invaders to' Sorensen wrote were -a wild gist doubt that they could have
Sorensen's version, a part of a.; ttcr into the : mountains as misjudgment.'' The project was: defeated any Guatemalan force.";
book to be published pnkt. art fall if u rrillas, as Mr.' Kennedy had '~cl!Ploinatically unwise and- II There was no "final plan," he
by Harper & Row,, appeared in`! 1 ected, tarily doomed from the outset' said, Of how to dispose of lilies
Look this week. It authors make it clear ,? ?.. that so great a gap betWeenl unit and "we did warn mono,
itirr Schlesinger rings a. speclallt tills difficulty was never concept and actuality should ex.: than once that there would-'be a'
assistant to the President in'e ? ained to the President. Mr. i-10, at-so- high a level on so; very difficult problem with this
1061. His account; also part of;;; r nsen wrote; "The vast ma. dangerous a matter reflectedi armed, -highly motivated unit inn
it forthcoming book, was ptrb. I) r ty of the [invaders] had not a sltrrrlting number of errors ail case the operation were c,ui~
lishcd in Life this week, Yester-'U a given any ? guerrilla the whole decision-maldng'proc ccled.
The Washing r- train.
clay A guerrilla
clog Evenln operation he ess, errors that Mr. Schlesinger's account of`
Star published a copyrEve in is d d. ;was ? "nevera realistic reaucratic moment m to tgovern
terview with Mr. Bissell, whoa t -native." the pressures an all Kithr
was in charge of planning the !Instead of policy'leadershi '~ coincided substantially ivitli 1iir.i
t 'wag never even planned: Pr 1 Sorensen's. ''All three, accounts
Invasion for the Central Intel- b he C.I.A. Officers in charged ' For that reason, Mr. Sorensen
picture an operation almost im?1
y, m stion. to reverse once lni
Mr. Sorensen dnd'TTr. Schles? A d they neither Ad the Press,'seemed to move inystettiouslu-,
lager nialcc it plain that Press- d that the thou ht this o and inexorably toward exec
dent Imake?dy, finding the in- tin was ou nor told the this op..1tion without the ? President's eerMr. ssell , toBbelievea app, there
.(l wpen tl this Was. the Presldent'srbeing able either to obtain
vasion plan well advane( a h vad bean a chance for success.
he took Office, had grave arils- pl firm grip on it or ieverse lt." ' rte said there , were two;
givings about It and gave con He said Mr. Kennedy, new in
ere Accounts Differ office ? posalbiIIties --- an established
siderablon to abandoning ? it', iff ,,.e, ,~ , hesitated to overrul re-beachhead arrn
eultimately, he. felt he had' no.. .Sorensen and e the Pigs
mcl the Bay of
Mr. 8chles- nowne
choic c~ experts" who had airstri
e but to proceed within theta e differ' sharply on' one project well under way ' He did permitted the rebel airs force to
~hole ~ions tho. ,tpo n about ,the. shift n-the ih??Zgt_,,i)cn0_W kthese ex er we bo
edt+GtJ Vt,,.r.'a ;va i ails.. J.'?, - .p.. ' .. [>. d. b -Cuba
'light military ; target,,
? _ gat, ttawat;;Ch4,
Sanitized v
3717-
nedy, ` then the Attorney
General: "You may be right orb
you . may be wrong, but the'
President has made his mind up:1
Don't psi ??tt~ny further'." .
Iroii',C.r,A, Viewed Operation