3 BAY OF PIGS INSIDERS AGREE ON BASIC FLAWS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100250036-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: July 22, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

Soreuson,' Bissell -and Schic-"
sin
ll
ger a
agree that the opera-
'
rce o the men most inti i Lion had been weakened by both:
mately informed about the Ba 'foreign and domestic political'
I defeat of John F. Kennedy'
the disaster and their reaction
to it. ?
They agree to a remarkable
degree on what happened-and
even on why it all went wrong.
In what many undoubtedly
will regard as the most startling
revelation of all, Kennedy's
closest adviser, Theodore C.
Sorensen, writes in the current
issue of Look magazine that "I
am limited by the fact that I
knew nothing of the operation
until after it was over."
Nevortholess, Sorenson re?
Sorenson's words, "too large to.
be clandestine and too small to
be successful."
"Unfortunately," . Sorenson
writes, "among those privy to.
the plan in both the State''
Department and the White;
House, doubts were entertained
but never pressed. . . . The CIA
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on
the other hand, had doubts
about whether the plan had
been fatally weakened by those
very curbs, but did not press
them."
In the interview published in
The Star, Bissell put It this
way:
W
"
b
iti
i
f
e can
e cr
c
zed
or
he had with Kennedy in the
Y allowing this chipping away to
d
e
ays immediatelyft th
aere o on without insisting on the opt ation was under way the existent at the time of the Bay
disaster and his account proba- hole plan or on cancellation. Uni ed States would not let it of Pigs.
bly comes as close as historians Because we. were so involved in fail Schlesinger leans to they it was only after the disaster,{
will ever come to knowing what ecing it go ahead, we did not ass mption that this was sub- Sorenson says, that Kennedy;
..
went through the mind of the nsist on as great ?freedom'?ofcon; cious. But Sorenson says: told Sorenson to involve himself
late President in those dark action as we needed." " heir pplanning, it turned out, more in problems of foreign
days of mid-April, 1964. r o ceded almost as if open policy. j
pro
The week's first account of : Deadline Cited
the invasion by ~ 1,400 Cuban' nit vention by the United; At the time, Sorenson says,'.
Although now it would appear Sta s were assumed, but their Kennedy did not even have a~
'exiles, which began on April 17' hat as doubts grew on, both ans ers to the President's' staff intelligence officer at the
and ended when they ran out of ides,. it might have been better spc ific questions did not." House to help him evalu-,
ammunition two days later,' o postpone the ? action and B f! there should have been no ate the advice of the ecame Monday in a Life mega ?e
experts.
i
th
ti
l
v
ew
e en
re p
an everyon
., .zinc article by historian Arthur, nvolved was working under
M. Schlesinger. Jr., who was. hat they thought was a severe
also 'a clo
i
d
se a
v
ser to the eadline
. F e days before the invasion !graphs that candid!
y-and even
President. Within ? a short time th
e
, yl beg n and three days before the harshly-list Kennedy's own
On Tuesday, ?Richard M. elieved Soviet planes and; !failures, writes:
l 3isscll Jr., who planned the ther arms would be delivered' firs air strike, the President
operation for the Central Intelli- o Cuba that would doom any-~ ub cly..stated that "there will "He should never have be-,
'genee Agency, said in a Wash- hing short of a full-scale U S ; tot be, under any conditions lieved that it would be arrogant
ington Star interview that, if he vasion. n intervention in Cuba by' land presumptious of him, newly. i
had it to do over agahi; he' "The President," Sorenson{ r i d States armed forces." arrived on the scene, to call off! ra
might urge the United States to aYs, "thought he was approv-I Bi sell says the CIA got the the plans of the renowned
i
d tl b '1
s
recognize a Cuban government g a an rushed into execution' es age, tr led as clearly as -M r an re rave err es.
;in exile and supply it openly 11 the grounds that Castro oss ble to pass it on to the On Thursday of the week of
with money and ' "volunteer" ould later acquire the military' xil brigade and did not, in the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy and
fighting men. apability to defeat it. Castro,I act expect that U.S. troops:'Sorenson walked in the White
fact, already possessed that ou become involved except; House grounds and Kennedy
2 Writing Books pability." oss bly in the enforcement of.a! reportedly asked himself aloud:
All three men 'are now out of As it turned out, Castro did eg iatcd cease-fire. I' "How could I have been so
the government,.'.Bissell is an: feat the small invasion force. Br interviews by Haynes; far off base? All my life I've
ut Bissell still feels that the oh on a Star reporter and' known better than to depend on
executive of United Aircraft antes for success would have rath r of the book, "The Bay of
Corp, in Hartford, Conn. Soren- en improved substantiall if igs " indicated clearly that been experts. How could I have
son and Schlesinger are writing y been so stupid, to let them go
g t e second air strike, which was an of the invaders expected ahead?"
books from which the two' ncelled by the President, had hat their effort would not be
accounts published this week en carried out as scheduled inI r itted to fail I Sorenson says Schlesinger and
are excerpted.' effort. to complete, the de?4 ?.P haps the most serious Sen.? J. William Fulbright, D.-
,,flrk,,, among others, had voiced .
Cent. ad
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP7,5?A000i R000100250036-1 k
?.vaViV J1.1jZ?
JUL 2 2 1965
CPYRGAitized - Approved For Release :
CPYRGHT
?
g dee on as
str ction of Castro's tiny, breakdown -in communications?
obs lete air force. was due to then f Al
cwn
ess o e
1 ost dramatically revealed inI Kennedy administration.
the three accounts of the opera-
tio is the evidence of a critical
col pse of communications.
13 th Sorenson and Schlesing-
or eel that the CIA and the
Per agon believed - perhaps
sub onsciously - that once th
Schlesinger and Sorenson both'
indicate that the intricate;
decision-making machinery that;
functioned so - brilliantly in,
October, 10112, at the time of the
Cuban missile crisis., was non-
Candid Paragraphs
President's Stand 11
-
S